Revisiting Urban Planning in the Middle East North Africa Region

Dr. Mostafa Madbouly

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Dr. Madbouly is a professor of urban planning and management at the Housing and Building National Research Center, Cairo, Egypt. For seven years, he has been involved in running training programs on urban planning and management for local and international officials and professionals. Dr. Madbouly has worked with several international organizations as a local and international consultant in the field of urban planning, housing and slum upgrading. He has published a series of urban planning papers in those fields in several international and national conferences and Journals.
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1. Urban Challenges and the need to revisit urban planning

1.1. Introduction

People of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have long played an integral role in the history of human civilization. MENA is one of the core centers of civilization and urban culture. Three of the world's major religions originated in the region — Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. In modern times, MENA's politics, religion, and economics have been tied in ways that affect the globe. The region's vast petroleum supply — two-thirds of the world's known oil reserves — is a major reason for the world's interest. But the influence of MENA extends beyond its rich oil fields for occupying a strategically important geographic position between Asia, Africa, and Europe.

The MENA region includes 20 countries, 12 of which are active or potential borrowers of the WB (Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, West Bank and Gaza, Tunisia and Yemen). In addition, 8 relatively high-income countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Libya, Malta, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates), and while they are not active borrowers, but they rely on non-lending services.

1.2. MENA Region's Major Challenges

1.2.1 Population and Urban Growth

Over the past 50 years, MENA region has experienced the highest rate of population growth of any region in the world. Its total population has increased from around 100 million in 1950 to around 380 million in 2000 — an addition of 280 million people in 50 years. During this period the population of the MENA region increased 3.7 times, more than any other major world region¹, (Figure 1).

The introduction of modern medical services and public health interventions caused death rates to drop rapidly in the developing world after 1950, while the decline in birth rates lagged behind, resulting in high rates of natural increase (the surplus of births over deaths). The declines in mortality that occurred in the past 50 years in the developing world mostly benefited infants and young children. In MENA, infant mortality dropped from close to 200 deaths per 1,000 live births in the early 1950s to fewer than 50 deaths per 1,000 live births at the turn of the 21st century.

Despite this sharp decline and the fact that infant mortality rates in some oil-rich Persian Gulf states are quite low (Kuwait's infant mortality is as low as the average for Europe), the regional infant mortality rate in MENA remains higher than that of Latin America and East Asia (Figure 2). While the "demographic transition," the shift from high to low mortality and from high to low fertility, is well under way throughout the region, individual countries are at different stages (Figure 3). Some indicators in MENA region can be seen in (Table 1), about total population in MENA region's countries, level of urbanization, population projections,

¹ United Nations Population Division, 2001
with a special mention to the people living in urban areas as a percentage from the total population.

Figure 1-1


Table 1-1: Selected Demographic and Reproductive Health Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Pop. Mid-2001 (millions)</th>
<th>Rate of Natural Increase (%)</th>
<th>Level of Urbanization (%)</th>
<th>Projected Pop. 2025 (millions)</th>
<th>Projected Pop. Change 2001-2050 (%)</th>
<th>Percent Urban</th>
<th>Percent of Pop. 65+</th>
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* Approximate statistics

As MENA's total population increases, so does its elderly population and with it a health burden that has important implications for the cost and configuration of health systems. For example, the elderly population of Egypt (60 years and older) is expected to grow from 4.3 million in 2000 to 23.7 million in 2050. Saudi Arabia's elderly population is expected to grow from 1 million in 2000 to 7.7 million in 2050.

Regardless of the level of economic development or national income, MENA governments are increasingly challenged to provide the basic needs for a growing numbers of citizens — adequate housing, sanitation, health care, education, and jobs — and to reduce poverty, narrow the gap between rich and poor, and generally improve the standard of living. In addition, the region's scarce water resources need to be managed in the face of growing demand.

Unfortunately, MENA countries are currently more likely to experience "brain drain," as large flows of educated people leave the region for Europe, North America, and other parts of the world.

1.2.2 MENA's Highest Unemployment & Illiteracy Rates in the World

Unemployment is considered the major challenge facing MENA countries at present, and, in view of the coming surge in growth of the working force, it is expected to be an even bigger problem in the future.

As a consequence of demographic increases, several of the MENA countries have experienced fast growth in their labor force — i.e., population between age 15+ and 59 — over the years between 1990 and 2010. The rate of growth was 30% in Algeria, 35% in Iran, 48% in Lebanon, 68% in Jordan, and 80% in Yemen over the last decade, and the same trend is expected to continue in the next decade in several of the MENA countries. While growth in working age population is high, unemployment is one of the most severe problems of the region, reaching 30% in Algeria, 15% and 14% in Iran and Lebanon respectively. Underemployment is estimated to be around 25% in Yemen.

According to the International Labour Organization (ILO), the only countries with a dependency ratio of two or higher (an average of two or more persons not economically active per one economically active person) are found in the MENA region.

MENA's unemployment rate is the highest between 1996 and 2010; MENA economies will need to create half again as many additional jobs as those that existed in 1996 in order to prevent the region's unemployment rate from increasing above its mid-1990s' rate of about 14% — assuming the proportion of working-age population who enter the labor market remains unchanged. The Egyptian economy, for example, needs to create an additional 500,000 new jobs each year to absorb new entrants into its job market. Even some of the oil-rich countries in the Gulf, such as Saudi Arabia, which have traditionally had no unemployment, are faced with youth unemployment.

According to the World Labour Report 2002, in Jordan in 1997, three-quarters of the unemployed were 15 to 29 years of age, and the female unemployment rate was twice as high.

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2 United Nations Population Division, 2001
3 ILO, World Labour Report 2002
as that of men. Women in MENA face the highest rate of unemployment in the world. According to the ILO, the largest gender gaps in unemployment are found in MENA. Unemployment rates in Egypt were reported to be 24 percent for women in 1995, compared to 7 percent for men.

To prepare its growing working-age population for the era of economic globalization, MENA requires a much greater investment in human resources. Despite governments' efforts in the area of education, the number of illiterate adults continues to increase in some countries. In Egypt, between 1980 and 1995, the literacy rate among the population age 15 years and older increased from 40 percent to 50 percent, but the total number of illiterate Egyptians still grew from 16 million to 19 million. Morocco's illiterate population grew from 8 million in 1980 to 9.5 million in 1995, despite the increase in its literacy rate from 29 percent to 44 percent. Two-thirds of MENA's illiterate adults are women.

1.2.3 MENA's Rapid Urbanization

The population of the region has grown rapidly over the past few decades, faster than all regions of the world, except sub-Saharan Africa.

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Source: GHSR – Statistical Annex- 2005
Increase in population has been accompanied with high rates of urbanization. Except Egypt, Syria and Yemen, all the countries in the region are highly urbanized and have experienced significant growth in urban populations comparing 1990s, 2000 and estimations for 2010.

Managing rapidly growing urban populations in the face of housing shortages and inadequate infrastructure is also becoming more of a challenge. The populations of cities are growing faster than the populations of the countries as a whole, as population growth in the rural areas feeds a pool of potential rural-to-urban migrants. Currently, Cairo (10.6 million), Istanbul (9.6 million), and Tehran (7.2 million) are ranked 19th, 22nd, and 28th in the world, respectively. By 2015, Cairo (13.8 million) and Istanbul (12.5 million) are projected to rank 16th and 17th, according to the UN's latest estimates.

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<th>Household connection to improved drinking water Total (%) - 2004</th>
<th>Improved sanitation coverage Total (%) - 2004</th>
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<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
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<td>Lebanon</td>
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<td>98</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>52</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>73</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
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<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
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<td>Qatar</td>
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<td>100</td>
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<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
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<td>Turkey</td>
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<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GHSR – Statistical Annex- 2005

1.2.4 MENA's Severe Water Shortage Problem

Rapid population growth threatens MENA's sustainable development, as the region is faced with the most severe water shortage of any region in the world. While it is home to 6.3 percent of the world's population, MENA holds only 1.4 percent of the world's accessible

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4 United Nations, 2006

Dr. Mostafa Madbouly

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fresh water. Between 1975 and 2001, population growth caused the available renewable fresh water resources per person in MENA to drop by more than half: from 3,300 to 1,500 m³/person/year. The per capita fresh water resources available are projected to decline to around 1,000 m³ by 2025, the internationally recognized threshold for water scarcity. Today, much of the region is already below the international standard, since nearly 80 percent of available fresh water in the region is found in Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. In countries such as Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, the national average is below 200 m³/person/year.

Although there were many improvements in drinking water and sanitation coverage, the household connection to improved drinking water is still not improved by the same degree, as shown in the previous table.

1.2.5 MENA's Peace and Political Stability Problems

Peace and political stability in the region are necessary for governments to address some of their population challenges, particularly those of refugees. According to the U.S. Committee for Refugees, MENA, home to more than 6 million refugees, has the largest refugee population in the world. Iran has the largest number of refugees living in its territory. Palestinian refugees are the largest and oldest refugee population in the world.

In addition to a commitment to peace and political stability, sound environmental, social, and economic policies are needed to address these and a variety of other population-related challenges, such as labour migration and environmental degradation. Different policies ranging from labor and trade laws and regulations to those related to raising the status of women and protecting the environment all need to take into account the population factor.

1.2.6 MENA's Informal Settlements and Slums

Informal (unauthorized) housing: defined as the housing stock which is not in compliance with current regulations, where "Slums" refer to deteriorated living conditions and low levels of access to basic services

None of the countries in the region except for Egypt is above the informal settlements trend line, comparing with other developing countries. But, numbers show clearly that demand is not translated into formal supply. There are also signals that informal housing stocks increase, primarily in Morocco, Algeria, Jordan and Iran.

Slum upgrading policies and programs to improve the living conditions of existing poor neighborhoods, appear to be a major priority in all the countries of the region, but especially in Iran, Yemen, Morocco, and Egypt. Experiences of Jordan and Tunisia in slum upgrading would be useful for the other countries in the region. Tunisia and Jordan have implemented successful long-term policies for slum upgrading and these countries seem to be now on the right track to solve their slum problems, without further WB assistance.
1.2.7 MENA’s Poverty

Although largely a middle-income region, poverty and vulnerability are affecting a large and growing proportion of MENA’s population\(^5\). In 2001, 23.2% of MENA’s population lived on less than $2 per day. The 1990s witnessed 20 million more persons living on less than $2 per day despite higher growth than the previous decade, which saw a reduction in poverty. Such increasing vulnerability of the population is alarming in a region that is witnessing frequent conflicts and natural disasters, and which suffers from major natural resource constraints, especially water supply, also adding enormous pressures on cities to deliver infrastructure, services, housing and jobs to meet the growing demands and needs of the urban poor.

Over the period 1990-2005, the poverty rate in MENA has been declining, although at a slower rate than in LAC or ECA. The number of people in poverty, however, has not declined since 1990 due to rapid population growth, and by 2005 remained around 50 mln. (under $2 a day). Comparing number of poor under different poverty lines, $1.25, $2.00 and $2.50 per day at PPP, reveals very high concentration of population. Hence, as many as 17 percent of Egyptians, 15 percent of Yemenis and 10 percent of Moroccans have consumption levels which are no more than 50 cents per day above the international line of $2 a day, suggesting high vulnerability to economic shocks.

Poverty reduction is one of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) set by the United Nations in the context of its Millennium Summit held in New York 2000. Prior to the Millennium Summit poverty reduction goals were articulated by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in the form of the International Development Goals (IDGs)\(^6\). In this respect, and in a foreword to the report titled “A Better World for All”, the representatives of the international community declared that poverty “in all its forms is the greatest challenge to the international community.

Table 1-4: Population, GDP and Private Consumption Expenditure in MENA Countries 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>23.23</td>
<td>91.1</td>
<td>12.80</td>
<td>1408</td>
<td>70.8</td>
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<td>Jordan</td>
<td>5.2</td>
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<td>8.8</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>1692</td>
<td>6.5</td>
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<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>2.35</td>
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<td>Morocco</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>10.49</td>
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<td>4.71</td>
<td>1147</td>
<td>20.5</td>
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<td>16.8</td>
<td>6.03</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td>1143</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>780</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>3.48</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>2072</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>1247</td>
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<td>Diversified Economies</td>
<td>129.4</td>
<td>46.46</td>
<td>189.4</td>
<td>26.62</td>
<td>1464</td>
<td>136.1</td>
<td>1052</td>
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<td>11.81</td>
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<td>7.69</td>
<td>1663</td>
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<td>723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>8.80</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>11.38</td>
<td>3306</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>1959</td>
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<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>4.51</td>
<td>5535</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>2724</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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\(^5\) The World Bank uses an average of the national poverty lines of the world’s 15 poorest countries to determine the international poverty line at $1.25 per day; $2 a day in PPP terms is an average of national poverty lines in all developing countries, low and middle income.

\(^6\) Poverty in the Arab Region: A Selective Review, 2005

Dr. Mostafa Madbouly

GRHS 2009: Regional Report MENA Region
1.2.8 MENA’s Economic Policy and Governance Reforms' Slow implementation

MENA countries are overall lagging behind in implementing needed economic policy and governance reforms, which are critical to improve the investment climate and address the inefficiencies caused by a large and inefficient public sector, and an embryonic and relatively non dynamic private sector.

Progress in decentralization has overall been limited. In Tunisia and Jordan, local government expenditures as a share of total government expenditures are 3.1% and 5.5%, respectively. The limited fiscal transfers and human resources at hand, and the limited financial and political autonomy severely impede local government capacity to finance, deliver and manage urban services7.

1.2.9 MENA’s Lack of Secure Property Rights

The overall lack of secure property rights, particularly concerning land and real estate, and difficulties in accessing land have been identified by firms in most MENA countries as a constraint to investment (Egypt, Morocco, Yemen, and Syria). The lack of secure property rights severely hinders the ability to use land and real estate as collateral to access finance, which in large part explains why housing mortgage finance markets in the region remain undeveloped (Jordan and Tunisia are exceptions).

Recently, in 2006 Egypt has embarked on an ambitious plan to stimulate financial markets and create its first-ever mortgage industry by freeing up the billions of dollars in capital that are trapped in unregistered real estate properties. The centerpiece of this progressive economic program is the development of a parcel-based deeds registration system in Cairo.

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7 The World Bank, 2005
that will make it easier for the lower and middle classes to have their landownership rights recorded by the government.\footnote{Egypt in Mortgage Market, 2007}

GOE has observed that low-income people in Egypt, like any other place in the world, often have only one asset—the property they occupy. This property represents an untapped resource in many urban areas because these landholders usually have no officially recognized right to own or occupy the property. In addition, many formal systems do not recognize informal or customary forms of land tenure. Without a registered deed, title, or lease, the owner cannot use the land as collateral and improve the property or start a business. For an emerging market, this untitled land is a major impediment to economic development.

While the benefits of land registration are many, the disincentives are often considerable. In many parts of the world, poor people don't trust land registries or formal government out of fear that those systems will only result in taxation. Another common drawback is the formal registration process itself, which is often complex and expensive for anyone but a wealthy landowner to attempt to navigate.

In Cairo, only 5 percent of the roughly three million real estate properties are registered in the existing paper-based deeds system. The land registration process, which lacks computerized automation, takes an average of 193 days to complete, involves many complex steps, and has high fees. The typical landowner doesn't view the process as worth the time and money involved.

The Egyptian government recognizes the long-term economic benefit of bringing the other 95 percent of Cairo's private properties into the formal system. With encouragement from a rising middle class that increasingly wants to take advantage of mortgages, Egypt is streamlining the process and replacing the manual registry index in Cairo with a parcel-based deeds registration system that is linked to a digital cadastre using GIS technology.

\subsection*{1.2.10 MENA's slums and informal settlements}

The high cost of land and poor public land management, coupled with the high price of housing available in the formal sector, has contributed to create slums and informal/squatter settlements in cities throughout the region. Over 30\% of Egypt's urban population lives in such conditions of limited, if any, tenure security and poor access to basic infrastructure services.

\subsection*{1.3. Urban Planning Development Strategies in MENA Region}

In order to face the above-mentioned challenges, MENA's regional urban strategy focuses on creating livable cities that are able to fully tap their productive potential and deliver on their promise of development for all residents. This requires that cities be efficiently managed, economically competitive and financially viable. And while cities are in an increasingly important position to maintain social cohesion and drive productivity within countries, most still need to catch up with infrastructure and housing deficiencies and take needed steps toward sustainable urban management. To bring better quality of life, social equity, and in particular services to the poor, it is crucial to improve the overall regulatory environment for urban and housing development (infrastructure and housing delivery, preservation of key
heritage sites), management of cities (capacity building of municipal governments and strengthening their fiscal base), and access to capital markets (housing and municipal finance). MENA’s urban development can be achieved, focusing on four strategies:

1.3.1 Improving decentralization and service delivery:

Providing policy guidance and building local government management capacity to further decentralization, strengthening municipal financing of basic urban service delivery, improving asset management and maintenance, expanding the involvement of the private sector in public-private partnership (PPP) arrangements, and responding to population pressures by financing needed infrastructure and urban services, are all central to this area of focus.

1.3.2 Strengthening local economic development:

Assisting cities to respond to competitiveness pressures by enabling the participatory formulation of city development strategies (CDS), helping to improve strategic, physical and investment planning capacity, streamlining administrative procedures and creating an attractive local business environment are all critical measures needed to attract investment, create jobs and contribute to growth and poverty reduction. Such upfront strategy and local economic development work is being carried out in Yemen (through the Port Cities Development Program), and in Lebanon, with likely expansion to Tunisia and Morocco.

The following are some examples of how urban interventions in MENA address the challenges identified earlier and support the World Bank’s goals of economic development, growth and poverty reduction:

1. **Yemen Port Cities Development Program (PCDP).** In a move to strengthen Yemen’s investment climate, encourage growth and create jobs in the strategic port cities of Aden, Hodeidah and Mukalla, the World Bank has approved in 2003 a $23 million credit to the country—the first in a three-phase APL to develop Yemen’s coastal cities over 12 years at a total cost of $96 million. First phase financing is used to support local government capacity building, strategic and physical planning, small scale infrastructure improvements, and other efforts needed to lay the foundation for future economic growth and establish a participatory development process. The program builds on Cities Alliance-funded work, in which participating cities analyzed their competitive endowments and started formulating CDS and investment programs to improve their business environments. Each city prioritizes and implements specific policy reforms with the aim of creating the enabling environment to encourage private sector development and growth, particularly in the key economic clusters contributing to its competitiveness.

2. **Lebanon Municipal Infrastructure Project.** In response to the ravages of the civil war, this project aims to address urgent municipal works while setting the stage for gradual assumption of responsibility for municipal services at the local level. The project is

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9 The World Bank, 2005
10 It has been argued that decentralization can improve service delivery, primarily by increasing user participation, facilitating local responsiveness and encouraging accountability. However, other research questions these assumptions, arguing that challenges at the local level, such as mixed political incentives, weak capacity and limited financial resources, can mean that decentralization does not automatically lead to service delivery improvements.
11 The World Bank, Urban Development in MENA: Challenges and Opportunities, 2005
progressing with a focus on restoring selected basic municipal infrastructure to improve living conditions, while supporting the municipal sector by enabling municipalities to begin addressing local infrastructure maintenance and rehabilitation needs for the first time in over twenty years. The project was catalytic in triggering the resumption of central government transfers to local governments to repair and rehabilitate the deteriorating capital stock in a country that is 90% urban.

3. Tunisia Third Municipal Development Project. The project development objective is to strengthen the institutional environment for the delivery of municipal basic services and infrastructure through: (a) increasing institutional capacity of both local governments and related central agencies, and (b) enhancing the financial and institutional capacity of the Municipal Development Fund (Caisse des Prêts et de Soutien des Collectivités Locales, CPSCL) that provides financing for municipal investments. The project includes two main components: (i) Capacity-building for local governments and related central agencies to deliver and manage services; and (ii) Capacity-building for the Municipal Development Fund to provide funding for municipal investments. The project therefore entails a credit line to the CPSCL to finance the investment projects of municipalities (physical component) and funds to finance consultancy work and training (institutional component). The further evolution of both municipalities and sector institutions are intertwined and are addressed in tandem. A Special feature of this operation is the policy dimension consisting of establishing and implementing a restructuring program for financially stressed municipalities with the aim of restoring their credit worthiness prior to further borrowing form the municipal fund.

4. Morocco Housing Sector Policy Development Loan. In response to a request from the Government of Morocco, this operation aims at assisting the country in reforming the current policy framework of the housing sector with the objective of addressing the long standing housing crisis, which is affecting primarily the increasing number of low middle class and urban poor. The main objective of the project is to support the relevant sector institutions in developing and implementing a comprehensive reform plan to remove current market constraints and build a well functioning housing market where access to housing products is affordable to all segments of the population. The main policy reforms supported by the project include: a) simplification of urban planning regulations and maximizing land use by lowering land development standards; b) streamlining land titling and registration procedures; c) improving access to housing finance to low income groups; d) restructuring and better targeting of public subsidies to the housing sector; e) development of private sector and restructuring of loss making public entities; and f) implementation of a national slum upgrading program to improve the living conditions of the urban poor and prevent further development of urban slums.

1.3.3 Development of efficient housing and land markets:

This strategic area provides assistance to national and local governments in formulating sound housing policies and programs intended to provide adequate shelter for all, based on stronger property rights, improving access to mortgage finance, rationalizing housing subsidies, and providing infrastructure for residential land development.

In addition, policy guidance is provided for the development of efficient urban land markets through enhancing registration of land and property rights, reducing transaction costs and regulatory obstacles to access and develop land, putting in place transparent and efficient
public land management and disposition procedures, as well as efficient property taxation systems.

1.3.4 Providing effective emergency assistance

Developing rapid and responsive interventions in post-conflict (West Bank and Gaza, Iraq) and natural disaster situations (earthquakes in Iran, floods in Algeria and Djibouti) is critical to enable cities and countries to rebuild destroyed economic and social infrastructure assets, and resume the path of growth and poverty reduction. More recently, MENA’s urban unit has launched a disaster mitigation program that is gaining increasing interest from client countries interested in preparing and reducing vulnerability to natural disasters.
2. Understanding the Diversity of the Urban Context

2.1. Diversity of Urban Context

It is difficult to describe urbanization trends in the MENA region because the region comprises a great diversity of socio-economic, human, and natural resources and characteristics. To only mention a few, MENA countries differ in the income/resources that they possess, the levels of political and economic liberties and the traditions of governance related to these liberties, human development indices, political stability, recent histories of conflict, social cohesion, and modes of production in general. Moreover, They also differ in their openness to globalization where notably UAE and Kuwait, Lebanon, Jordan are more receptive to globalization more than the other countries in the eastern and western parts of the MENA region. Some of these countries have been committed to market economies (GCC, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt) while others have adopted state directed ones (Syria). It is also important to separate between post-conflict contexts (Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq) and others. These differences have two main implications;

- First, they make it difficult to describe urbanization changes at a regional level.
- Second, linkage between this background and the localized histories and needs of these countries: for instance, stability and reconstruction in Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine, poverty alleviation and urban governance in Yemen, Syria, Egypt and Jordan, environmental and Eco-system protection in GCC etc.

Emerging Urbanization trends should be understood in relation to a broader pattern of regional changes that stems from the need of MENA countries to face the new economic challenges posed by globalization. , Table 2.1 below shows the population trends in selected MENA region countries.

Table 2.1 The population trends in selected MENA region countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Percentage of Urban Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The general economic trend in the region has thus been towards i) economic liberalization, ii) the privatization of service sectors, and ii ) a general realization that the role of the state as provider has to shift towards enabling, even among richer states.
These shifts are visible in almost all the countries of the region (especially the GCC) where privatization is underway and foreign capital is finding higher opportunities for investment. This is, for example, the case of Kuwait and Qatar where new opportunities for foreign capital investments have been opened in several sectors (in local partnerships), of Oman where privatization policies have become an integral element of economic policies, and of Saudi Arabia where recent development plans have begun to include privatization initiatives within the panoply of their adopted policies.

Several countries (such as Yemen, Jordan, and Egypt) have also engaged in economic liberalization through the structural adjustment policies they have been implementing since the mid-1990s. The importance of these shifts should be seen in relation to the traditional forms of governance and decentralization in the region.

a) The image portrayed on the environment in the MENA region may not be as rosy as conveyed by the announced public figures. MENA states have allocated important financial resources towards infrastructure such as electricity, water supply and roads. Yet in many cases, there is a new and serious imbalance that has been created with highly negative repercussions on environmental sustainability. The most glaring of these imbalances is the provision of near universal access to portable water without a parallel development of the sanitation networks which was historically the case in rural areas and small cities in Egypt especially in the southern parts of Egypt. Another example is the imbalance in the provision of roads and transportation infrastructure without adequate concern for the repercussions in terms of excessive growth rates in energy consumption and energy waste. Moreover, institutional environment agencies and ministries have limited power over guiding the massive urbanization patterns in these countries.

However, the intensified process of ‘Globalization’ generated three main trends in urbanization in the MENA region: Monumental real-estate, Middle-income residential developments and Informal settlements.

b) The first trend is also dominant in GCC countries with professional economic opportunities where middle-income residential developments service white-collar labor migration.

c) The second trend is the largest so far, and it is available in both Mashrek’s countries (Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, and Syria), and GCC with economic migration dynamics where large numbers of blue-collar labor migrate into the informal settlements and slums of oversaturated, primary inland and coastal urban metropoles.

d) The third trend is dominant in GCC countries with oil economies where ‘monumental real-estate and gated communities (Sheshtawi 2004) urbanization invades coastal areas and deserts and reaches sky heights. The phenomena of monumental real estate, has become a defining character of globalizing urbanity. A number of MENA countries have adapted similar urban policies, the traditional cities are re-configured to cater to these new projects; rapidly urbanizing cities are using them as a major defining urban character; and in some instances entire cities are built, thus becoming one, big megaproject.

- In 2008 Saudi Arabia, will begin construction on what is intended as a showcase for a new Saudi Arabia: a $300 billion multicultural metropolis designed to lure 700,000 inhabitants from around the globe. The construction of this and five other
megacities are scheduled for completion by 2020. Every economic city is planned as a multipurpose economic hub featuring housing complexes, educational facilities, entertainment areas, agriculture, logistics, food processing, mining and a variety of industries. This will create an astounding number of new jobs estimated at 1.3 million. The six cities are intended to turn Saudi Arabia into one of the world's 10 most competitive nations by 2020.

- Madinat al-Hareer, is a proposed 250 square kilometer planned urban area in Subiya, Kuwait, an area just opposite Kuwait city, upon construction, would include the Burj Mubarak al-Kabir, the world's tallest structure, a natural desert reservation of 2 square kilometers, a duty free area which will be beside a new airport, in addition to a large business center, conference areas, environmental areas, athletic areas, and areas that concentrate on media, health, education, and industry. The City of Silk will also include numerous tourist attractions, hotels, spas, and public gardens. However, the city will be built in individual phases with total completion within twenty-five years. The development will cost an estimated 25 billion Kuwaiti Dinars (86.1 billion USD).

- However, this time these trends are fueled by global capital – and some would argue neo-liberal economic policies. Among the main players in this transformation are the GCC states – and one particular city stands way above the rest – Dubai. At the level of spatial transformation the analysis has shown that the Dubai and the GCC influence is very visible in urbanization trends and major urban centers in MENA region: Jordan/ the Abdali development in Amman; Egypt/ Uptown Cairo; Lebanon/ Solidere in Beirut.

- In Amman the real estate industry is expanding significantly due to an influx of Arab migrant’s as well as developments across a range of industries. The sector grew by 40% to reach a value of US$6.9bn. One of the key projects is Abdali done in partnership with a Arab private sector which will eventually become a fully functioning city centre for Amman. The project is viewed as an anchor that will attract global business to Jordan. The Abdali development project is part of larger phenomena which includes a proliferation of malls and gated communities; in addition to luxurious towers which represent a form of "living above the city."

- The Emirate of Dubai in the United Arab Emirates extends over 3,900 square kilometres and currently comprises a population of approximately 1 million, of which 80 per cent are expatriates of other Arab nationals, Asians and Europeans. The Emirate includes Jebel Ali, some 20 kilometres from Dubai, which is the largest free-trade zone in the Gulf region. Moreover, its geographical location halfway between Europe and the Far East has turned Dubai into a major transit stop. Within that context, Dubai International Airport plays a leading role in the region, and transportation contributes to some 13.3 per cent of the city’s GDP. Dubai is the third largest re-exporter in the world after Hong Kong and Singapore. Additionally, Dubai enjoys a number of other comparative features that have placed it on the global map, including the following: the world’s biggest shopping mall, the world’s tallest building, the world’s largest man-made island, the world’s fastest growing city (equal pole position with Las Vegas in the United States), the gold centre of the world, the busiest airport and port in the Middle East, and the highest Internet access in the Middle East.

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12 UNHABITAT, 2008
As a result of the recent project approach to economic development, much of the urban development has sprawled incoherently on the outer fringes of the city and primarily along the road to Abu Dhabi, thereby resulting in a relatively linear city. With the exception of the Sheikh Zayed Road, Jumeira and Dubai Creek, urban development has largely been piecemeal and isolated. There is consequently a need for a coherent connection that could link all these development projects to the rest of the city’s fabric. However, the Emirate has been able to provide ample infrastructure support for the sustenance of new development. The approach of projects preceding plans generates many challenges at the level of urban planning and management, planning and building regulation at city level is mostly missing, the full captured view about the need of infrastructure (especially water and sanitation) is always missing and in many cases these mega projects are built without the full social and environmental picture of the city level where these projects are causing a negative impacts.

2.2. Peri-Urban Context

Peri Urban Development has been one of the urban forms in some of the MENA countries. However, it is important that although some studies have been mandated to show the case of PU areas within the urban context of the cities in Egypt and Jordan, only one program for alleviating poverty in PU areas was designed and implemented in Morocco. The Pilot Programme for Poverty Alleviation in Urban and Peri-Urban Areas (1998–2001) is being implemented in three cities – Casablanca, Marrakech and Tangier. The program is jointly led by the Ministry of Employment, Education, Social Development and Solidarity and the UNDP, with the technical assistance of UNCHS (Habitat). One of the programme's objectives is to strengthen local capacities to formulate and implement integrated plans of action for poverty alleviation. These plans of action focus on three main areas of intervention: income generation; access to housing and basic services; and protection of vulnerable groups and social integration. The programme consists of several new approaches for social Development, the main one of which is partnerships between local social organisations, local governmental institutions, civil society and the private sector. The partnerships are premised on participatory decision-making and the mobilization of the urban poor and marginalized groups.

The spatial form in the North African countries in no different from the case of Egypt and Jordan. The main cities of Tunis and Morocco are moving into two directions; the first gives importance to the city centers with the conservation of the inner parts of the main cities linking both city development to tourism and national economic development, while the second support moving to the outskirts with the efforts to prevent urban sprawl and managing the peri-urban interface of these cities. UMP and UNHABITAT have led the CDS in Tunisia since 2002 with the following objectives in mind;

- Reinforce the economic and cultural importance of the city centre
- Create a "window" of the city on the lake and the sea by creating a new alliance port-lake-city centre emphasizing functional, cultural, architectural and urbanistic cohesion
- Improving circulation in the city centre and the periphery at a lower economic and environmental cost and making the public transportation system more attractive.

13 UNHABITAT, DFID and DPU, 2002, Implementing the Habitat Agenda – in search for urban sustainability, 2002
• Improving natural and green spaces, environmental and aesthetic quality and strengthening the capacity of the city in urban environmental management\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{14} UNHABITAT, 2002, City development strategies: lessons learnt from UMP/UNHABITAT experiences
3: The Emergence and Spread of Contemporary Urban Planning

3.1. Introduction

In every part of the world, the urban planning system is strongly shaped and influenced by the context within which it operates. Even though many countries, particularly those of the global South, have formal planning systems modelled on those from other parts of the world, these systems are inserted into particular institutional contexts and their ability to influence land management in cities and towns is circumscribed by a wide range of local, national and international forces.

3.2. Planning in the Past

From the early 1970s there has been a “…further strengthening and internationalization of capital using substantial advances in communications and transport technology”. This definition recognizes the clear shift, which has occurred in recent decades, as well as the continuities, which exist with previous forms of international economic organization.

3.3. Planning Shifts in the Last 50 Years

Because of the industrial revolution, accompanied with rapidly growing, informal and polluted cities in the industrializing world, modern town planning has emerged in the latter part of the 19th century as a reasonable response.

Urban ‘visions’ put forward by particular individuals (the ‘founding fathers’ of planning) in the UK, in Europe and in the USA in the late 19th century to shape the objectives and forms of planning which in turn has successfully reflected in cities' urban context in the 20th century.

Understanding planning process has been changed through time, at the beginning; planning was seen as a technical activity to be carried out by trained experts without the involvement of politicians or communities, then necessarily involved the production of master plans, blueprint plans or layout plans, showing a detailed view of the built form of a city. Then, viewed as a normative task, that is, it should be driven by a particular set of values which described the ideal living environment and which, it was held (by planners), reflected the ‘public good’. But such values were not always explicit and were highly varied and often individualized. Broadly, however, values tended to be quite specific to the time and place in which they were formulated.

While in some countries the idea of planning emerged to counter the ‘horrors’ of the industrial city, other visions prevailed. In France “Le Corbusier” had established in the 1920s and 1930s the ideal of the ‘modernist’ city, as the ideal city was neat, ordered and highly controlled. Slums, narrow streets and mixed use areas should be demolished and replaced with efficient transportation corridors, residences in the form of tower blocks with open space ‘flowing’ between them, and land uses separated into mono-functional zones. But while the spatial forms promoted in the planning visions tended to vary, the nature of the plans which produced them had more in common.
3.4. Emergence of urban planning: Master and Development Plans

These urban visions were carried out by master plans which were based on a number of key assumptions:

- it would be possible to shape the nature of societies which occupied it through the design of physical space
- the ‘neighborhood unit’ planning model could create social communities
- it was possible to predict both the scale and nature of population and economic growth over the long term and plan for this
- it was possible to imagine a future ideal state for each city and to achieve this through the plan, and that thereafter no further change would occur

Another partner to the master plan was the development control system or zoning scheme. While the master plan was the ‘creative’ and forward-looking vision of the city, the zoning scheme was the primary legal tool through which it would be implemented.

That approach has taken various forms. In UK development rights were nationalized, and local plans gave an indication of future land use but without automatic rights, giving wider discretionary powers to planners when faced with a development application, In USA the forward plan (or comprehensive plan) played a less important role in most cities. In Germany, the concept of land use zoning originated and was adopted with great enthusiasm across the USA and Europe in the early part of the 20th century.

Land use zoning carried with it a particular view of urban form, and was adopted by middle and commercial classes who were able to use it as a way of maintaining property prices and preventing the invasion of ‘less desirable’, lower income residents, ethnic minorities and traders.

3.5. Criticism of the Master Plan Approach

In some (but not many) parts of the world where master planning originated, it was subsequently found to be problematic and new forms of planning were devised. The concept of land use zoning on the other hand has persisted, if in evolving ways, as have various forms of the relationship between the forward plan and the zoning scheme.

Critics of master planning in the global North have pointed out that its assumptions about that cities are not static, predictable or easily controllable by government, became clear with the onset of the long economic boom of the 1960s, when urban population growth, car use and real estate development exceeded all predictions of the master plans.

The realization that planning was in fact acting as a straightjacket on economic development and progress emerged in the 1960s. Master plans quickly became dated and useless and planning as a profession lost the popularity it had had in the post-war welfare era.
By the 1980s many cities had backed off from any form of forward plans, and urban development became largely project and market driven, although this was to change again in the 1990s as the importance of city-wide plans was realized.

Thus, the key assumptions on which master planning have been based, were questioned in the advanced capitalist countries. It was accused of being outdated, inappropriate and above all, ineffective, in cities experiencing economic growth and change, and the pressures of globalization. It was also argued that master planning was no longer compatible with the changing role of local governments as the latter shifted to include a wider range of stakeholders in decision-making and to see their role as facilitative and promotive rather than simply as conduits for state-led intervention.

The ‘urban management’ new approach to city development (which in the global South was driven largely by multi-lateral institutions such as the World Bank and UN agencies) was sharply contrasted with urban planning which was regarded as being control-oriented and state-dominated, and hence a relic of old-style ‘government’.

The new forms of forward spatial planning which were put forward from the 1960s onwards in the North were variously termed structure plans, strategic plans and growth management plans (particularly in the USA).

Strategic planning has been adopted in a number of Latin American countries, in South Africa and Australia. In the UK a government review of the post-war planning system criticized the master planning approach as inflexible and unresponsive to change; insufficiently concerned with socio-economic aspects of cities; and concerned only with use zoning and not the qualities of places or the environment. In the subsequent UK Town and Country Planning Act of 1968, two different kinds of plans were provided for: broader level ‘structure plans’ (less detailed, indicative and flexible) and within these, more detailed district or local plans. The term ‘strategic spatial planning’ has gained currency more recently and particularly in Europe.

Along with a shift in the form of spatial plans in this part of the world, has gone a shift in the physical/spatial urban forms, which have been promoted. Many of these forms are linked to the new imperative of the global positioning of cities: waterfrocks, conference centers, office and commercial districts, hyper-malls and entertainment centers. Other forms represent more of a reaction to earlier urban developments, which are viewed as environmentally unsustainable, inconvenient and monotonous.

3.6. Contemporary Forms of Urban Planning

According to the problems associated with the wide-spread persistence of master plans, in a context where the issues confronting planning were very different to what they were in the past, some new and more innovative ideas on planning have been merged in various parts of the world in response to changing economic and environmental imperatives.

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16 Master Planning/Programming Approach, 2005
3.6.1 Strategic spatial planning\textsuperscript{17}

Strategic spatial planning emerged in Western Europe in the 1980s and 1990 partly as a response to an earlier disillusionment with master planning, but also due to a realization that the subsequent project-based approach urban development, in the absence of a broader and longer-term spatial framework, was equally problematic.

The strategic spatial planning system contains a ‘forward’, long range, spatial plan which consists of frameworks and principles, and broad and conceptual spatial ideas, rather than detailed spatial design (although it may set the framework for detailed, local plans and projects). The plan does not address every part of a city – being strategic means focusing on only those aspects or areas that are important to overall plan objectives.

Strategic spatial planning is a process: it does not carry with it a pre-determined urban form or set of values. It could just as easily deliver gated communities, suburbia or new urbanism, depending on the local groups involved in the implementation process. In the context of W Europe, which is culturally and climatically highly diverse and contains a large range of different urban forms which have emerged over a long history, it is appropriate that new developments fit in with the old.

The actual process of formulating the plan is as important as the plan itself. It is an active force which needs to bring about changed mindsets of those participating, as well as the development of new institutional structures and arrangements, within and between levels of governance, to carry the plan. Co-ordination and integration of policy ideas of line-function departments is essential here (because planning is not just about the functional use of land) and the plan itself cannot achieve this co-ordination: new institutional relationships must evolve to do this. The plan must therefore be institutionally embedded and must act to build social capital in governance structures. In theory this could include the participatory budgeting processes which have become popular in Brazil. This is very far removed from the idea of a foreign consultant delivering a plan document and then departing.

As a process, strategic spatial planning addresses many of the problems of old-style master planning, although much will depend on the actual ethics and values which the plan promotes (whether or not it promotes and enforces sustainable, inclusive cities), the extent to which the long term vision is shared by all (and not simply dominant groups or individuals), and the extent to which a stable and enduring consensus on the plan can be achieved. Guiding urban development is a long term process and there is little chance of success if the plan is changed with each new election. In practice, strategic spatial planning in Europe may be seen as an ideal but is not easy to put into practice, and there have been criticisms that economic positioning is taking precedence over addressing issues of socio-spatial exclusion.

3.6.2 Multi-National Programs and Approaches

The UN Urban Management Program\textsuperscript{18}

Regarded as one of the largest global urban program, it was started in 1986 by the Urban Development Unit of the World Bank in partnership with UNCHS and funded by UNDP. It

\textsuperscript{17} Strategic Spatial Planning, 2003
\textsuperscript{18} UN Habitat, Urban Management Program, 2006
functioned as a tri-partite collaboration between UN-Habitat, UNDP and the World Bank. The program has been involved in 120 cities in 57 countries, with the overall mission of promoting socially and environmentally sustainable human settlements and adequate shelter for all, and the objective of reducing urban poverty and social exclusion. The Cities Alliance organization also emerged from this grouping. In 2006 UN-Habitat disengaged from the program and transferred the work to local anchor institutions (UN Habitat 2005).

In common with other recent and innovative ideas in planning, and particularly with the ‘urban management’ approach, it attempted to shift the concept of planning and development to the whole of local government rather than belonging to one department, attempted to promote participatory processes in local government decision-making (the city consultation), to promote strategic thinking in planning, and to tie local government plans to implementation through action plans and budgets. The more recent City Development Strategy (CDS), promoted particularly by Cities Alliance, encourages local governments to produce inter-sectoral and long range visions and plans for cities. One of the longest and deepest involvements of the UMP has been with Dar es Salaam in Tanzania.

The peri-urban interface

The bulk of rapid urban growth in Southern cities is taking place in the peri-urban areas, as poor urban dwellers look for a foothold in the cities and towns where land is more easily available, where they can escape the costs and threats of urban land regulations, and where there is a possibility of combining urban and rural livelihoods. The peri-urban interface is therefore highly mixed in terms of uses and also highly dynamic and unstable.

3.7. Conclusion

As a conclusion, it could be said that:

- urban planning (involving master planning and detailed functional zoning schemes) was developed to deal with urban problems but was later abandoned or significantly changed in many parts of the global North, due to its inability to deal with urban problems in a rapidly changing world.
- There have been shifts to different forms of forward planning – structure plans, strategic plans and growth management plans.
- Master planning, zoning and the urban forms in the 20th century have found their way to almost every other part of the world and have been applied in contexts very different from the ones in which they originated.
- The impacts of master planning have been persisted in many parts of the world, against a set of criteria defining good planning in the 21st century.
- The urban forms, which have been promoted (urban modernism), are entirely in conflict with urban populations which are largely poor and survive in the informal sector, as is the case in much of the global South.
- The static, end-state form of most plans is completely at odds with cities in all parts of the world, which are growing (in the South) and changing, in largely unpredictable ways, probably faster now than at any other time in history.
- Master plans reflect a rural-urban division that cannot deal with the major social and environmental problems in the newly critical peri-urban areas and urbanizing rural areas.
• Master plans usually have the ability to control but not to promote, and to emphasize the product not the process. As the forward plans present visions, the land use regulations that accompany them are not suitable mechanisms for implementing them.
• The land use regulations, which accompanied master plans usually, demand standards of construction and forms of land use which are unachievable and inappropriate for the poor in cities, which make up the bulk of urban populations in the South.
• Master plans and zoning have been applied in many parts of the world as an excuse for forced evictions, usually of the poor and minority groups.
4: The Institutional and Regulatory Framework for Planning

4.1. Introduction

The link between governance and development has been well-understood for some time. In countries with poor governance, development paths have concentrated resources in the hands of the few, and economic and political institutions have been slow to adapt to the challenge of global flows of information, products and capital.

Although it is difficult to make generalizations and there are wide variations across countries, MENA countries tend to perform above average in terms of political stability and rule of law - which reflects the characteristics of autocratic or monarchical regimes. Compared to the rest of the world, the region also performs relatively well in terms of quality of administration, covering indicators of government effectiveness protection of property rights, regulatory frameworks, budget and financial management or general public administration. Despite a general perception of low quality of service delivery, the evidence does not systematically point towards lower service delivery in terms of health infrastructure or education outcomes.

But MENA countries consistently perform below average on indicators of transparency, voice and accountability, as well as control of corruption. In terms of control of corruption, only Jordan, Tunisia and Morocco display scores above 50. All countries exhibit systematic weaknesses in terms of accountability and access to civil and political rights. The level of public accountability as measured in terms of access to information or holding leaders accountable for their actions and policies is particularly low and not a single country in the region figures in the top half of the world in terms of public accountability. Furthermore, although quality of governance tends to increase with incomes as consistent with international trends, MENA countries consistently display lower quality of governance than would be expected for their level of income. This gap is even wider for public accountability related indicators.

In the MENA region, weak governance institutions and processes could arguably be associated with disappointing economic performance. The MENA region had, during the 1980s and the 1990s, disappointing rates of GDP growth. More seriously, per capita incomes in the two decades were essentially unchanged.

Various efforts have done to identify critical dimensions of what governance is, ranging from the rule of law, to controlling corruption, to public sector efficiency, to citizen voice, to “democracy.” Many of these measures are based on observer perceptions and opinions, making the measures subjective. And the lack of data on the quality of governance in MENA region compounds the difficulty of measuring governance empirically.

Even so, the analysis in this chapter supplements the qualitative assessment and allows comparisons among countries worldwide by drawing on past work and by aggregating the available empirical data into broad indices of governance.

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19 Overview of Corruption in MENA Countries
20 The World Bank, 2003
The quantitative picture reveals a gradation in the quality of governance in MENA, thus reflecting the region’s diversity, which makes generalizations difficult. But on close examination, some strong regional patterns emerge.

For the most part of MENA region, the quality of governance increases with incomes—a worldwide pattern that has been found in every study on governance. In terms of the overall index of governance quality, upper-middle-income countries around the world, as well as in MENA, have average governance quality about twice that of lower-income countries.

When compared with countries that have similar incomes and characteristics—the main competitors in the global marketplace—the MENA region ranks at the bottom on the index of overall governance.

That overall governance gap has two components: an index of the quality of administration in the public sector and an index of public accountability. The first measures the efficiency of the bureaucracy, the rule of law, the protection of property rights, the level of corruption, the quality of regulations, and the mechanisms of internal accountability. On this index, MENA countries largely track their counterparts worldwide, typically running only slightly lower. With few exceptions, they have individually and on average lower levels of the quality of administration in the public sector than would be expected for their incomes, with the gap tending to be worse for countries that have higher incomes that rely on oil resources.

The second measures the openness of political institutions and participation, respect of civil liberties, transparency of government, and freedom of the press. Here, the MENA region falls far short. In the rest of the world, the quality of public accountability increases as incomes increase, but not in MENA. (For some of the richer MENA countries, the gap is particularly wide when compared with similar countries worldwide. Moreover, not a single country in MENA appears above the world average for the quality of public accountability, whether adjusted for income or not. Individually and collectively, the region lags on measures of public accountability, and the richer the country, the worse the gap.

Within MENA, there is a stark difference in the quality of public accountability between the countries that have very little or no oil or gas (the Arab Republic of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia) and those that do. This is because the high incomes of the latter depend less on good environment for business activity (as, say, is not the case for some of the richer East Asian countries such as the Republic of Korea and Singapore) than on the exploitation of oil and gas resources.

4.2 Regional and national perspectives of decentralization in Lebanon

4.2.1 Local governance and good governance in the Lebanon.

A comprehensive review of the municipal sector in Lebanon during the past three years, shows that the administrative division "municipality" focuses on how to deliver services successfully, what kind of relationships connecting it with the local population, the civil society, and the central government.

\[\text{Empowering Local Government Institutions in the MENA Region, 2002}\]

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Actually, in-depth, there are 350 municipalities that can be selected on the basis of geographic equity and population size the role of local governments in the reconstruction and development process. It questions whether central government alone should assume the full responsibility of post-war reconstruction and development and whether local governments are geared to take on that challenge.

Actually, municipalities lack a qualified human resource base but recognize also the emergence of qualified municipal council members with strong private sector and voluntary work background. Some have successfully promoted participatory approaches to municipal management and made extensive use of their business connections for resource mobilization.

At the financial level, most municipalities do not have the resources and tax base to sustain the local development needs of their resident population. In many cases the size of municipalities is inadequate making it difficult to develop the critical mass of financial resources required for the provision of acceptable levels of service.

**4.2.2 Municipal Management in Lebanon: Opportunities and Constrains**

A comprehensive review of the municipal sector in Lebanon during the past three years is considered an excellent case study that address regional and national perspectives of decentralization, local governance and good governance in the MENA region. The review focuses on the municipality as a service institution, its relationships with the local population, the civil society, and the central government.

The case study came because of a survey of 350 municipalities selected on the basis of geographic equity and population size.

This case study addresses the debate in the country as to the role of local governments in the reconstruction and development process. It questions whether central government alone should assume the full responsibility of post-war reconstruction and development and whether local governments are geared to take on that challenge.

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**4.2.3 Lebanon Municipalities as institutions**

*The Municipal Council:* Lebanon as a case study addresses the responsibilities and relationship between the mayor and the municipal council. It mentions that this relationship lacks clarity and is at times the source of confusion and internal conflicts. While the executive authority is limited to the mayor alone, decision-making is the responsibility of the municipal council. Mayors find their executive authority quite restrictive while council members consider it as non-participative. A large number of mayors acknowledge their weak

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22  Empowering Local Government Institutions in the MENA Region, 2002

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municipal management experience and the need to devote more time for municipal management responsibilities.

The Municipal Administration: Lebanon as a case study highlights a number of structural weaknesses facing the municipal administration. At the human resource level, the lack of qualified and trained staff is seriously hindering the provision of efficient municipal services and the use modern municipal planning and management tools.

At the planning level, and despite a number of success stories, the lack of reliable demographic, social, economic and land use data is hampering proper planning at the local level. Another feature of municipal management has been the lack of long-term investment planning by the municipalities. This is attributed to the lack of expertise in strategic planning on one hand and to the push for political visibility through short-term investments on the other.

The Municipal Revenues: Municipalities in Lebanon are highly dependent on statutory transfers from the central government. However, central government transfers have become limited as the government focuses on debt servicing and on financing major infrastructure projects that are important for the national economy. This situation has made it difficult for municipalities to carry-out investment planning as the sustainability of municipal investments depends largely on the reliability of the intergovernmental transfers. At the municipal level, local revenues represent a lower share of total revenues and local fees and taxes are not cost-effective to administer.

The Municipal Expenditure: Most municipalities do not have the resources and tax base to sustain the local development needs of their resident population. In many cases the size of municipalities is inadequate making it difficult to develop the critical mass of financial resources required for the provision of acceptable levels of service. Municipal expenditures are spent mainly on salaries and administrative costs.

The role of municipalities in local economic development mainly in light of the marked reduction in central government interventions in this sector. There is also growing recognition of the importance of local business environment in cities and towns mainly as both people and capital have greater mobility and the need to retain businesses and create new ones is becoming paramount.

Municipalities and the Local Population: Municipal management in Lebanon is about making the appropriate collective choices for the efficient use of limited city resources. It adds, however, that in Lebanon, people believe in representative democracy but very few believe in direct democracy and public participation. Hence, the latter disrupts the traditional view of politics, in which the citizen's participation finishes during his act of voting.

Public participation is needed as the absence of elected municipal councils for 35 years added to years of centralized planning have caused citizens to disengage from the local public debate. Furthermore, as people vote where they are registered and not where they reside, a large number of residents are deprived of their basic democratic rights to express the views where they pay their municipal tax. Increased public participation becomes important tool to close this gap and helps to match the citizens’ expectations leading to an improved willingness to pay. However, public participation faces a number of challenges. It is yet to be institutionalized by law and the little knowledge of municipal management restricts the
capacity of the public to intervene effectively. Public participation could also affect the Municipal Council’s credibility and may result in more empowerment of the already established groups in the community, and less voice to the least established.

This case study\(^{23}\) has many examples where municipalities have already initiated public participation at the local level. Some success stories were recorded but the lack of well structured and institutionalized mechanisms for interaction between the municipality and the residents remains an obstacle.

**Municipalities and the Civil Society:** As local government institutions are constrained by weak administration and limited resources, the paper proposes that a number of parallel support structures such as NGOs, universities and private sector institutions be tapped to assist municipalities and support local development efforts. Among these:

*The NGO sector:* A wider collaboration between the municipalities and the NGO sector could lead to large benefits to municipalities in areas such as needs assessment, environmental management, health, education, training and cultural and recreational activities. A number of NGOs in Lebanon are already engaged in joint developmental activities with select municipalities. The experience to date has been promising with ample scope for additional involvement in the future.

*Universities:* Closer co-operation between the municipal sector and universities could be promoted in Lebanon. This could cover areas such as management training, field surveys, needs assessment as well as the formulation of action plans. Universities could be encouraged to design multidisciplinary training programs for urban managers on topics such as economics, finance, geography and urban and environmental planning and management.

*Municipal Service Clustering and Private sector participation:* In view of the technical and financial complexities related to service provision in areas such as waste and wastewater management, the involvement of the private sector in municipal service provision through a regional approach to service delivery will need to be encouraged. Considerable economies of scale could be achieved in areas such as solid waste and wastewater collection and treatment, maintenance of municipal sewerage systems and street lighting. As for private sector participation, the institutional setting and legal arrangements defining the role and responsibilities among levels of governments and between municipalities could limit the involvement of the private sector in the financing of local municipal infrastructure and services.

Furthermore, the limited fiscal autonomy of municipalities in setting rates and tax bases further reduces the set of options available to design and honor agreements with the private sector.

**4.3 Municipalities and the Central Government**

Urban Planning: The rapid urban expansion in Lebanon presents a serious challenge to the sustainable management of the natural resources and the built environment. There is a disturbing tendency in Lebanon to view urban planning as a separate sector function, equivalent to, and on a par with, ‘environmental planning’, ‘transport planning’ and the like.

\(^{23}\) Empowering Local Government Institutions in the MENA Region, 2002

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A shift by the municipalities towards a more holistic and forward-looking approach to urban planning is urgently required.

4.4 Conclusion

Urban planning decisions cannot be made anymore without reference to the full range of social, cultural, economic, political and environmental issues which impact upon those decisions. Also, better coordination between land use controls and infrastructure investment strategies is needed in order to respond effectively to the growing infrastructure demands. Another common feature among municipalities in Lebanon is that there is no evidence of a shared vision of what urban planning should be trying to achieve and what would be the future role of cities and towns.
5. Planning Participation and Politics

Generally, participatory planning is that approach to planning that is about people and the development of their communities. It is where the beneficiary communities participate in a particular way on the implicit assumption that their participation is a means to some further action on their part to bring about specific change. It is a process and not a product, in which the planner gets to know the people and their situation well enough to offer him/herself as a resource, so as to help people find out what they need to know in order to do what they need in their settlement.

The key elements in this circular process of planning include participation at the level of: Verification of objectives; Resource assessment; Formulation of programmes and Monitoring and evaluation. The assessed objectives are translated into programmes and plans, whose forms could be different due to “environments” but their common features are realism, clarity and accountability. In relation to MENA countries, the application of participatory planning differs from the north African region where participatory approaches were implemented since more than 30 years, while other countries such as Lebanon and Jordan where participatory approaches were not as old as the North African countries, has been centrally located in the planning practice in these countries while the GCC countries has different approach where partnership with the private sector and strong leadership of the public sector has been dominant.

Areas where participatory planning flourishes Experience from the implementation of site and service schemes, shelter up-grading and other self help projects that were implemented in Egypt during the 80s and the 90s reveals that incorporation of the communities in projects enhances projects results. There is need for the urban managers and planners to recognize streamline and institutionalize the operations of such and have the idea replicated in other municipalities as a measure to urban sprawl.

(i) When land is converted from agricultural into urban use

This is where formal or informal subdivision of rural land into urban-sized plots take place, at this moment land readjustment and other land taxation instruments, regulatory controls on both tenure and other land uses, could be applied in a participatory manner. Egypt is currently leading a national program where detailed planning, request the participation of elected leaders of the areas where land is converted as a legal means to ensure the implementation of the plan and through applying land re-adjustment and land pooling instruments

(ii) During the provision of Major - Urban Services especially transportation net work.

There are obviously great costs involved at the time when major services including transportation are made available. Since the provision of each service is normally the result of the public agency, the possibilities of effective - public intervention are correspondingly high, and therefore need to be tapped. Many infrastructure improvement tasks could be contracted out to target communities, thus reducing costs, promoting employment and skill development, amongst others.
Given the huge financial constraints facing most local authorities, this would be a suitable way to service private land to pave way for housing neighborhoods in future. Participatory planning could provide the enabling environment by acting as advisers and link persons for such communities. This area flourished in most of the GCC countries where PPP was undertaken as a vehicle of participation and where effective media campaign about these PPP arrangement used as a means to allow information dissemination about future urban development projects as a minimum level of participation in urban planning context.\(^{24}\)

(iii) When there is urban Renewal/Redevelopment

Innovative participatory approaches are quite suitable to urban renewal/rehabilitation programmes. It has been established over the years that rehabilitation programmes are financially and administratively feasible when undertaken on a neighbourhood basis. When redevelopment is due, the respective municipalities or private developers could capture such moments and utilize the salient participatory principles of land readjustment as the “conversion method”. Though individual or piecemeal redevelopment contributes both to aesthetics and higher spatial returns, yet the final development is adding to image of the urban renewal area through the enhancement and widening of neighbourhood streets, availability of parking lots and the utilization of building designs that would accommodate more people and office or residential users. The cases of Beirut, Amman and Tunis are good example of this approach.

In this participatory/strategic planning context, land use planning ceases to be a simple regulatory activity but a development and resource mobilization tool. For instance, the privately held land, particularly, in the extended area of municipalities after boundary expansion could be seen as a major resource for the financially feeble municipalities. Participatory Planning in this connection will be concerned with ways of encouraging socially, economically and environmentally sound development through public-private schemes that are able to reconcile the need for fair returns on private investment with the provision of say, housing and infrastructure for different income groups.\(^{25}\) In the light of the above facts that represents a current discussion regarding the importance of participatory planning in urban planning practice and which describe the major approaches and areas where participation could be exercised in the areas of city development.

The following cases shed the light on the actual cases where participatory planning in the different geographic parts of the MENA region was exercised.

5.1 The Participatory Planning in Egypt

This is the oldest and the richest in terms of applying the participatory planning approaches in different scales in urban and rural areas in Egypt. The historical implementation of the concepts began in the site and service schemes, shelter up-grading and other self help projects in the 70s and the 80s beginning from the various experiences that was led the UNHABITAT in Ismailia sites and services project and then various donor funded projects were involved using participation in different locations in Egypt including the Nassriya project in Aswan, SCP project in Ismailia and other different practices.

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\(^{24}\) Ali A. Alraouf, 2005  
\(^{25}\) UN-HABITAT, 1995  

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At the national level, several ministries were involved among them three main ministries;

- Ministry of Housing, Utilities and Urban Development
- Ministry of Economic Planning
- Ministry of State for Local Development

The participatory planning in Egypt dates back to the 90s that was began in a close cooperation with a number of multilateral and bilateral agencies including USAID, UNDP, UN-HABITAT & GTZ.

The scale of the experience ranged from a pilot project implemented at a neighbourhood level till upscaled national program of participatory planning led by the General Organization for Physical Planning (GOPP) and implemented at all Egyptian cities and villages. The Egyptian government launched a 40 million USS unprecedented program where participatory planning was exercised in making strategic plans for 4600 villages this program is expected to be finished the plans are ready for implementation. Another program was launched in 2007 which is focused on applying strategic participatory planning in the Egyptian cities. Moreover, the master planning practise that characterise this type of planning that was implemented according to the law no 12/1982 was replaced by the strategic participatory planning as according to law no 118/2008. This law had put enormous importance to participatory planning at all administrative levels (village, city, governorate, regional and national levels).

*The North African experience could be represented in the following case study where participatory budgeting was allowed to sustain urban planning decisions.* El–Kasserine is a low-income town that is located in the south west of the country, some 300 km away from Tunis. The city participated in a two year USAID project of municipal behavioral change towards more participatory decision making during 1995–6, namely GESCOM. The city of Kasserine adopted participatory budgeting whereby the local population became directly involved in decisions and deliberations about allocations of GESCOME project resources at the beginning of each fiscal year. This, along with other measures of involving citizens in decision making and implementation of slum upgrading projects, resulted in a new rapport with the local population, and eventually led to a greater willingness to pay taxes and so strengthen the financial viability of the local authority. The NGO–Municipality Partnership of Tunis, Tunisia The municipality of Tunis has a partnership programme with NGOs. Through the programme, the municipality issued agreements with NGOs that are active in community development and poverty alleviation work. Such NGOs receive different kinds of support from the municipality to facilitate their activities. The scope of their work is diverse, including care for the elderly, youth skill development, charity disbursement, shelter provision, etc. The support provided by the municipality helps in expanding and strengthening activities of NGOs and ensures co-ordination among them²⁶.

The up-scaling of the previous stated initiative was very important including its linkage to training and capacity building. The decentralization process of central government skills in terms of planning and urban management for the benefit of municipalities has progressed since the promulgation of the local authorities law in 1975. There are 259 municipalities today, and they have wider responsibilities in the field of town planning of public utilities.

²⁶ Urban Management Programme UNCHS/UNDP/World Bank, 2000, Participatory Urban Governance. Practical Approaches, Regional Trends and UMP Experiences, UNHABITAT
Their scope in urban planning was strengthened in 1994 thanks to the new urban planning and land use code. They now have a performing structure for communal financing and investments (Municipal Fund), created with the support of the Municipal Development Program (PDM), co-financed by the Tunisian Government and the World Bank, which contributes more than 60% of the financing of municipal investments.

In parallel, the training of municipal agents and elected representatives has improved, as a result of the new Training and Recycling Centre for municipal agents. Many training sessions are held within the Municipal Development Program (PDM) and other training and cooperation programs.


In the early 1980s, the B’doul tribe was relocated from the Petra Archaeological Park, where it had been living for generations, to Um Sayhun, a site near the entrance of the park. In 1995, the Petra Regional Council adopted a regional master plan aimed at limiting urban expansion to preserve the archaeological site in Petra. This was done without consulting the local people. Under the new plan, the vertical and horizontal expansion of the settlement of Um Sayhun was strictly limited to prevent encroachment on the park. The B’doul tribe claimed that this plan and the site did not allow room for the necessary expansion of their settlement. The conflict was made worse by the social and political marginalization of the tribe and its exclusion from decision-making processes. The main objective of the city consultation in Petra was to deal with the following issues:

- ensuring access to residential land;
- developing existing urban patterns to cope with the development of tourism in the region; and
- enhancing the participation of the local population in land use decisions.

Due to the high levels of tension and resentment, it was critical to design a careful and highly consultative process. The team from Housing and Urban Development Cooperation had to proceed cautiously by first documenting the important issues through participatory research, and then drafting an action plan that looked into areas of possible understanding and compromise. Finally, a formal consultation was held to discuss the issues of governance and access to land. The key ingredient of success lay in the consultative approach, which did not attempt to undermine the demands of the B’doul people, but rather invited them to participate in finding a solution. The traditional tribal system of decision-making provided a recognized and legitimate channel for participatory approaches and made it easier to identify local leaders. A main challenge was in including women in the process. In the case of Petra, the city consultation needed to open up the traditional system and broaden the scale of participation to include new stakeholders from amongst the B’doul tribe. This meant, for example, the inclusion of women and youth in the process, which was done by holding separate meetings with these constituencies prior to the main city consultation workshop. Some women were also present at the main workshop to take part in the discussions. This was a significant achievement because traditional authorities do not usually seek the views and interests of women and youth.

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27 UNHABITAT, 2002
28 United Nations, 2005
In many parts of the Developing World, modern government institutions co-exist with traditional and, on occasion, in formalized governing institutions. Smaller cities and towns in particular are often embedded in regional political systems that overlap with traditional authority structures. In the interest of sustainable and inclusive development it is crucial to involve these constituencies through creative mechanisms that will not threaten their power base, while giving them access to new opportunities for influence within the overarching governance framework. In other words, these leaders need to recognize that their interests can partially be achieved within a more democratic and representative political model. Larger cities have to contend with normalized power brokers, especially in low-income neighborhoods, who act beyond the purview of formal political accountability. The approach was up-scaled in the national land management strategy which was implemented in various areas including Amman, Zarka and Aqba during the previous 20 years. This approach was utilized in the new Housing strategy, informal settlement upgrading and land regularization program including guiding development from precarious agricultural lands towards redevelopment of old areas. Finally the case of Jordan put great emphasis on reforming the regulatory framework that guide urban development including the inclusiveness approach embedded in it.

5.3. The Participatory Planning in the GCC Countries

The intensified process of ‘Globalization’, generated monumental real-estate, which is dominant in GCC countries, the globalization forces shaped the participation in the GCC countries, where participation is mainly encapsulated in the central and local government, the role of the private sector including and mainly international real estate investors became crucial. The inclusive approach that is in the centre of the participation approaches is not widely implemented in the GCC countries leaving the community organizations and the civic society organizations outside the active stakeholders in terms of their participation.

The experience in Turkish municipalities showed they generally organize participation by partner analysis, search conferences, evaluation governments, nongovernmental organizations, different public institutions, some private institutions and universities participate in the process. No efforts aimed at direct participation of the population into strategic planning were included in the answers. Only the Metropolitan Municipality of Kayseri indicated that they have conducted a survey for the urban population about the subject. Istanbul, Izmir and Samsun indicated that the district municipalities would always be present in the process of strategic planning and that coordination would continue.

5.4. Lessons learnt from Applying Participatory Planning in Different MENA Countries:

- Participatory planning should be inclusive as possible in order to ensure that powerful and potentially threatened parties are involved in the process.

29 Urban Management Programme UNCHS/UNDP/World Bank, 2000, Participatory Urban Governance. Practical Approaches, Regional Trends and UMP Experiences, UNHABITAT
30 UNHABITAT, 2008
31 Ali A. Alraouf, 2005
32 P. Ozden, 2007
• Central and local government's commitment towards participatory planning should be enhanced including their willingness to accept and implement the outcome of the process.
• Inclusiveness of traditional/informalized systems of dealing with land besides the formal governing institutions.
• Training and capacity building is crucial for up-scaling of experiences at the local level.
• Local financing and investments of local plans is extremely important.
• Importance of having a clear regulatory framework which could pave the way for smooth replication of experience from one local area to another.

5.5. The Ethical Responsibility of Planners and Participatory Planning.

It is understandable that one of the obstacles to effective urban planning in the MENA countries is the lack of trained professional planners. Although it has been mentioned earlier that several types of disciplines are involved in planning, it should be important to train professional planners who would have a broader view of planning rather than being limited to a ‘social’ or ‘economic’ discipline alone. With regards to this fact, it would be advisable for each country to develop its own institutions in order to produce trained good regional planners.33 A professional planner is important because of two valid arguments.34

• The role of a professional planner is to stimulate and facilitate the communication or interaction process between individuals, groups, and organizations with different experiences and interests.
• The planner as a trained professional should be skilled in the arts of coordination in making decisions as well as seeing planning as part of an integrated process in making and implementing decisions in order to achieve certain objectives and goals.

It is also equally important to know the fact that there are counter-arguments that say: planners hamper the planning process and also delay and complicate the process of decision making. Under the umbrella of participatory planning, the planner’s roles should be doing the following:

• Facilitator: - Encourage planning by making relevant individuals and organizations more aware of the purpose and nature of planning and by providing services such as collecting and analyzing data, organizing meetings, preparing reports etc.
• Coordinator: - Ensure that all those that have interest or experience get involved in the planning process.
• Negotiator: - Resolve conflicts between various individuals and groups so that relevant decisions are reached.

The planner’s roles also go further as to include that of an ‘innovator’ or ‘politician’ when he acts as an advisor to ‘political actors’; an ‘advocate’ while he takes into account the needs and demands of the general public; and a ‘bureaucrat’ in his capacity to carry out instructions given by politicians and working closely with administrators.

33 This issue will be discussed in details in later section of the report
34 Conyers, D. & Hills, 1984, pp. 58-59, 229-238
6. Planning and Sustainable Development

There has been a tendency for planners to align themselves to either the Habitat Agenda or Agenda 21 through identifying with the planning perspectives that have helped to promote each of these. Specifically, there is a tendency to link the Habitat Agenda with urban planning and a 'brown agenda' focus and Agenda 21 with ecological concern and a 'green agenda' focus.

Agenda 21 has generated widespread support for its concern over a sustainable future, yet it is perceived in many developing countries, due to its association with green issues, as an agenda for developed countries. The Habitat Agenda, on the other hand, is perceived by many developed countries as an agenda for developing countries, through its emphasis on (brown agenda) issues of improving the conditions endured by the poor. As highlighted by the 1998 Experts Group Meeting on Local Implementation of the Habitat Agenda in Turku, Finland, 'both these false perceptions need to be reconciled to enable the agendas to be fully implemented'. Whilst this is not problematic in itself, it becomes so when such perspectives prevent the Habitat Agenda and Agenda 21 from being realised in practice.

Typically proponents of the green agenda have been seen as environmentalists, whereas those of the brown agenda are seen as urbanists and development workers. The principle concerns of the green agenda are presented as ecosystem protection and the immediate and deferred effects of human activity at the regional and global scale, while the brown agenda is seen as focusing on human well-being and social justice and the immediate problems at the local level, especially those suffered by low-income groups.

“Sustainable Urbanization” is a multi-dimensional dynamic process. It includes not only environmental but also social, economic and political-institutional sustainability. It encompasses urban-rural linkages and the full range of human settlements from village to town to city to metropolis. Sustainable urbanization bridges the crucial linkages between cities and their environment, at local, metropolitan, regional, national and global levels. It provides a framework for dealing with the environmental impact of cities on their hinterlands, including adaptation to, and mitigation of, climate change. It also provides a platform for managing the economic relationships between town and countryside. Sustainable urbanization is a concept that goes beyond the traditional arguments around the urban-rural dichotomy and recognizes the need to come to terms with rapid urbanization and urban growth by focusing on the effective management of these processes to achieve functional, resilient and responsive human settlements.

Economic and social dimensions, such as poverty and deprivation, governance, gender inequality and social exclusion are central challenges to sustainable urbanization at all levels. Water and sanitation in human settlements, for instance, are vital for health and for economic prosperity, especially for the poor. But, if the current inadequate provisions are to be corrected, communities, civil society and local government will have to work together. Local authorities endowed with adequate powers, resources and operational capacity, combined with empowered communities and other local partners are the key actors in the sustainable urbanization equation.

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35 DFID, DPU, UN-HABITAT; 2002
36 Michael Kenny and James Meadowcroft, 1999
This partnership approach was well articulated in the Habitat Agenda that has two main goals, adequate shelter for all and sustainable human settlements development in an urbanizing world. These were restated in MDG 7 (environmental sustainability) under target 10 on halving the proportion of people without access to safe drinking water and sanitation by 2015, and target 11 on making significant improvements in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers by 2020 and promoting cities without slums through slum prevention strategies at national and local levels. The Johannesburg Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development of 2002 further emphasized the importance of shelter as a key focus alongside water and sanitation, health, agriculture and biodiversity (WEHAB). The 2005 World Summit Outcome in Paragraph 56(m) re-iterated the importance of slum upgrading and called for further and urgent action to prevent the future formation of slums and encouraged support to the United Nations Habitat and Human Settlements Foundation and its Slum Upgrading Facility.

The issue of land use stands at the core of urban sustainability. As noted earlier, the form and density that urban expansion takes plays a decisive role on the demands made on the environment - recent research has confirmed that higher density 'compact cities' have smaller 'ecological footprints' per capita than 'sprawl cities'. Control of land uses has been the primary objective of urban planning practice. While closely linked with societal visions of what planners and social scientists thought cities should be, the end result of planning and zoning is the distribution of use of land, its price, and how and where people live and work in the city. With its vision of a 'modern', physically organized world, the application of zoning has significantly contributed to the spatial segregation of the rich from the poor in much of urban Latin America and other regions of the developing world.

Most of the Mena countries are experiencing historically unprecedented urban growth especially as a result of migration from rural areas and smaller cities and, to a lesser extent, high fertility rates of the resident urban population. While efforts have been made to accommodate this rapid growth, most attempts at providing low-cost housing have failed and large segments of the urban population build their own homes on unoccupied and non-serviced land. Attempts to guide the growth and development of many cities in the region included conventional master planning techniques imported from richer nations where population growth was markedly slower remain largely ineffective in terms of redirecting rural migration and containing the inexorable growth of existing cities.

UNHABITAT in 2002 identified the following principles which should guide the cities in achieving sustainable development and hence achieving the brown and the green agenda;

- Ecosystem protection and Global problems such as climate change
- Urban cultures, lifestyles and physical structures
- Sustainable urban mobility
- Shelter for all
- Infrastructure, services and sustainability
- Sustainable building construction and design.
- Community and the built environment

37 UNHABITAT, 2008
38 UNHABITAT, 2002
The following cases below will summarize the different case studies in the MENA region to show the position of the MENA governments towards achieving suitable urbanization;

6.1 The case of Amman, Jordan

Jordan’s urbanization is closely associated with the geo-political situation in the region. It has a population of 5.5 million. As a middle-income country, it is making economic progress. Despite the fact that it is notably resource-poor, with no oil resources and limited water resources, its population enjoys one of the highest per capita disposable incomes compared to other countries in the region. The country depends, to a large extent, on migrant labour remittances from its work force abroad. Jordan’s GNI per capita was $2,500 in 2007. Jordan’s success is based on its political stability and its ability to attract investments from Gulf countries.

Jordan’s cities are modernizing at a very fast pace compared to other countries in the region. This is mainly a result of its leadership that puts governance reform and planning for development and investment at the forefront of Jordan’s urban agenda. Cities in Jordan, which have sprawled without any plans in the past, are now being organized. Cities are increasingly adopting strategic planning approaches that address environmental issues and plan strategically for effective conservation of their very limited water resources and consumption of energy.

Amman, Zarka and Aqaba have been leading in recognizing the importance of strategic planning and preparing a master plan that adopts a new governance agenda in which these initiatives placed the people in the forefront and are demand driven in their problem-solving approach. Amman’s master planning process can be regarded as a best practice with regard to good urban governance, through the creation of a collective city vision of sustainable urbanization. The plan won the world leadership award for town planning in 2007. The city of Amman was also awarded with the title of the city of the year for the Middle East and Asia for many reasons. The system of governance is modernizing and all efforts are geared to work effectively in attracting investment while ensuring sustainable development. Furthermore, the city embarked on an efficient transportation plan while building its capacity for effective local governance, land management, taxation and by providing employment opportunity for its young population.

Jordan’s challenge with regard to sustainable urbanization remains one of ensuring adequate shelter for lower-income households and improving living conditions in the few remaining slums and in the refugee camps. Following a successful housing reform programme, this type of problem is being addressed in the master plans of cities, together with the Housing and Urban Development Corporation, which is actively involved in a programme for low-income housing. The housing reform programme aims to liberalize the housing market and widen housing finance opportunities, as well as diversifying the available housing options in the market.

While the physical evolution of Amman since the 1990s is connected to the various demographic, political and economic factors that have affected the city during that period, it has not been determined by such factors. The physical evolution of Amman, albeit highly accelerated in the 1990s, has its roots in previous decades.

39 IBID
Before 1990, the most prominent large-scale public spaces and monuments included the following: the Monument of the Unknown Soldier, erected in 1977; the Hashemite Plaza, developed in 1986 in the downtown area adjacent to the Roman Theatre; and the King Abdullah Mosque, established in 1989. Since the 1990s, the Municipality of Greater Amman, which benefited from an amalgamation and subsequent pooling of resources of several municipalities, has moved to commission a number of large-scale projects. This new financial power has brought with it an appetite for building and developing various public monuments, including the following: (a) the municipal complex in Ras Al ‘Ain; (b) Al Hussein Public Parks; and (c) the Culture Avenue.

The Ras Al ‘Ain complex is currently the largest urban development project in Amman’s history. With a surface area of 14 hectares and occupying a dilapidated district of historical Amman between the western and eastern halves of the city, this ambitious project is aimed at rejuvenating the neighborhood by constructing a number of important public and cultural buildings, including the Amman City Hall, which is set to incorporate exhibition and lecture halls, and offices of the mayor and high-level municipal staff; the administrative municipality building connected to the City Hall by way of a bridge; Al Hussein Cultural Centre with lecture halls, a library and artist studios; a mosque; the Jordan National Museum; and an open, landscaped area to function as an urban public park.

Al Hussein Public Parks occupies a site of 70 hectares located at the western edge of Amman. It includes various landscaped areas, theme gardens, recreational facilities, museums and cultural buildings. The project, which has not yet been completed, is by far the largest urban park in Jordan. Compared to Ras Al ‘Ain and Al Hussein Public Parks, the Culture Avenue is a much smaller project. The project consisted of converting the median of a wide, 360-metre-long street in the busy Shmeisani banking district into a pedestrian walkway. The median includes landscaped areas, shops and exhibition areas.

Despite these shortcomings, these projects represent a new positive trend in Amman, which is aimed at creating spaces and buildings that serve the general public.

Amman is a city where the public realm has more or less been restricted to the street, which in turn is dominated by the automobile, thereby marginalizing and alienating pedestrians.

Otherwise, most of the activities of the city take place in private or semi-private realms. This emphasis on the creation of spaces that are open to all (though not necessarily easily accessible by all) is a welcome development that gives the public realm a stronger physical presence in the city.

Figure 6.1.: View of the Ras Al Ain municipal complex in Amman


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40 United Nations – Economic and social commissions for west Asia, 2005,
Although water shortage are amongst the major challenges facing achieving urbanization in Jordan, however, the government succeeded on providing the water service to more than 93% of the total population of Jordan\textsuperscript{41}.

Figure 6.2: Culture Avenue in Amman

\textit{Source: United Nations – Economic and social commissions for west Asia, 2005, Urbanization and the changing character of the Arab city.}

\section*{6.2 The Case of Lebanon}

Beirut is said to have been destroyed seven times during its long history; and it recovered seven times. The legend of the phoenix rising from the ashes is still alive. Beirut has been continuously inhabited since the third millennium B.C.; and the city’s heritage testifies to a variety of influences to which Beirut was subjected, including, among others, Phoenician, Persian, Hellenistic, Roman, Byzantine, Crusader, Mamluk, Ottoman and French under the mandate and leading to independence in 1943.

The reconstruction period that followed the 1975-1990 Lebanese war is perceived as a necessary condition for and sign of the renaissance of Lebanon. Consequently, the renaissance of Beirut has acquired something of a symbolic significance.

Given its location, economic and symbolic implications, and the extensive damage it suffered, the Beirut Central District (BCD) was considered as a separate item in the reconstruction programme. Subsequently, a single real estate company, namely, SOLIDERE, was established to develop the city centre. This company, capitalized partly by cash subscriptions from investors and partly by issuing shares, expropriated the central district perimeter. In retrospect, it is clear that the reconstruction plan should have preserved the rights of the original property owners. Rebuilt as a collective effort, the city centre would then have attracted residents and involved individuals, not merely visitors.

Saifi Village is one of the few neighborhoods that survived the war, offering a sound balance between commercial needs and activities, outdoor spaces and low-rise dwellings. During reconstruction, an extensive study recommended to maintain its scale and provide the district with urban and building regulations, thereby protecting its character while allowing for new construction. However, despite those recommendations, the project unfortunately surrendered to an easy pastiche of traditional architecture. Dissociated from the accompanying traditional dwelling layouts, the superficial treatment of arches, corbelled balconies and red-tiled roofs is nothing but quickly concocted historical reference. Furthermore, the streets and squares in Saifi Village that are presented as open to the public are guarded so heavily by security personnel that visitors feel unwelcome.

\textsuperscript{41} Ghaleb Azza, 2006
Despite the effort to provide outdoor spaces, which are significantly lacking in the city, the objective is not fully attained because the spaces in Saifi Village are gentrified. Recently, the neighborhood witnessed the opening of art galleries supported by temporary art exhibitions in an effort to attract more people.

The city’s promenade, namely, the Beirut Corniche is still a major attraction and is often described as the only real public space in the capital. Moreover, it is the urban space that is surreptitiously preferred by the authorities. While another promenade was implemented in the 1990s on the northern exit of Beirut in Antelias/Dbayeh, it does not perform its basic task, given that a high parapet has been erected that obstructs the view of the sea.

Temporary social arenas are created in BCD, particularly to house cultural events. These play the role of public space, albeit provisional as well as staged and controlled. Additionally, a heritage trail is being implemented, which is aimed at providing the opportunity to discover historical and cultural landmarks on foot, and is set to complement the pedestrian zones in the city centre. The reputation of “Green Lebanon” has greatly suffered both in the mountainous hinterland and in the capital where there is a dearth of public parks. Figures reveal that Beirut has 1 tree for every 33 inhabitants, compared to Berlin, with 4 trees per inhabitant, and Abu Dhabi, with 34 trees for every inhabitant.

Additionally, a project aimed at reforesting the Pine Forest in the area of the Hippodrome was initiated in 1992. The park with its 32 hectares is now ready to be opened to the public. Similarly, a number of landscaping projects have been completed in the city centre, including the Gebran Khalil Gebran Garden, facing the United Nations House, the reflecting pool adjacent to the Municipality of Beirut, and the Roman Baths Garden.

In the 1950s and 1960s, Lebanon observed a period of integrated modernism in the area of architecture, which was focused not only on normalizing the cityscape, but also dealing with local climatic conditions and orientation. Offered opportunities for a variety of creative designs. From the sun-protecting cloisters of the Pan Am Building to the west-oriented concrete veil of the Dar Assayad printing press and the north-oriented curtain wall of the Horseshoe Building, rational choices dressed the buildings with distinctive skins. Caring less about statements on the identity of the place did not hinder the production of a locally assimilated version of modernism with a Levantine soul.

Currently, the models that are the most visible and prevalent are either a pastiche of tradition or a pastiche of exacerbated modernism. Fortunately, other approaches have emerged to counter these superficial architectural statements. Displaying a decisive character that could be called situated modernism, these include such buildings as the Banque Audi headquarters in BCD, and the extension of the Abdel Kader School.

In March 2002, CDR launched the study of the Lebanese National Master Plan is being undertaken by the Institute for Urban Planning and Development of the Paris Ile-de-France Region (IAURIF) with the collaboration of Dar Al Handasah and other local consultants and partners.

The first phase of the report, completed in December 2002, is justifiably alarming. It warns that comprehensive planning has become vital and may be the last chance for economic
recovery. The recommendations highlight the need to preserve the role of Beirut in terms of its aspirations and ability to compete with other major cities in the region.

Figure: 6.3: Beirut central district


6.3 The Case of Egypt

Economically, Egypt has achieved growth rates of around 7 per cent in recent years, due to an aggressive structural economic adjustment programme and national advocacy campaigns to attract foreign investments. On the other side, Egypt is giving serious attention to addressing the socio-economic and environmental negative impacts of uncontrolled urbanization. Egyptian Cities, which cover only 5.5 per cent of its total area of one million kilometers, are facing great challenges. The country’s population has reached 80 million, due to an annual increase of approximately 1.35 million per annum. Almost 25 per cent of the total population is poor; unemployment is approaching 20 per cent; and around 50 per cent of the urban population lives in slums and unplanned informal settlements. Lack of security of tenure and access to quality infrastructure are challenges for sustainable urbanization. The lack of affordable housing combined with poorly administered public land, weak land management and administration and the lack of effective property taxation are the main causes of the increasing informal land subdivisions and encroachments on agriculture land. This is the most serious threat to sustainable urbanization in Egypt.

42 United Nations – Economic and social commissions for west Asia, 2005
43 UNHABITAT, 2008
Sustainable urbanization strategy is being developed. The government, with the support of UN HABITAT, embarked on a country-wide programme to revise its urban planning process, review and enact a new urban planning law to ensure citizen participation, and commit cities to develop strategic plans. Nearly 50 cities are taking part in this process. Effective local governance remains a challenge in Egypt. However, the Government has taken active steps to decentralize services to the local level (water, privatized solid waste collection and electricity supply). However, some of these services are still not efficient (e.g. solid waste collection, public transit), leading to increased air, earth and water pollution.

The Government is also slowly implementing a programme to redevelop Cairo: improve slums in different cities; provide infrastructure services; regularize informal settlements; and grant tenure security. The programme that started in 1993 has yielded good results, contributing to reduce the number of people living in slums by 30 per cent. The new town initiative was partially successful in addressing the growing need for shelter, economic opportunities and quality education. Good examples are Six October City and New Cairo. An important factor for their success is connectivity to old urban centers. Their success has encouraged the Government, after careful studies for more than two years, to create new governorates that oversee those new towns (Six October and Helwan Governorates). This will also reduce the pressure on the current Cairo governorate urban management system.

The great challenges to sustainable urbanization are effective transport and proper transit-based urban planning and the creation of urban nodes. Good networking of cities and the creation of a culture of reliance on public transportation systems remain one of Egypt’s key challenges. The Cairo underground has been successful in transporting middle- and low-income Egyptians in Cairo and reducing air pollution. The challenge remains on how to effectively redevelop urban centers around it and ensure a smart growth approach and could contribute to sustainable initiatives led by the government.
Planning, Informality and New Urban Forms

7.1 Introduction

The second half of the 20th Century, has witnessed an unprecedented urbanization process that has taken place within all developing countries. This repaid urban growth has taken place due to several reasons, on the top of them, the high natural population increase rate coupled with rural-urban migration seeking for better job opportunities by the poor. Due to governmental failure to provide formal alternative for shelter, infrastructure urban services and employment, the majority of cities in the MENA region have been characterized by substantial informal growth in the form of informal settlements, slums and shanty towns. Although these areas have contributed to some extent to mitigating the magnitude of the housing problem, however, such areas have been developed without following any planning or construction regulation outside the confine of formal planning mechanisms, and as the government has never officially recognized such areas, they continued to suffer from the lack of infrastructure and social services, which resulted in environmental degradation44.

Furthermore, those areas, which have provided the shelter for new migrants from rural areas or small towns seeking better jobs but lacking skills, has always been characterized by high rate of unemployment. This has contributed to social unrest, violence and has provided a suitable environment for crime and illegal gangs45. The main governmental response within the MENA countries (Egypt, Iraq, Turkey and others), following the worldwide policies, has developed from aggressive response in the form of demolition and eviction in 1960s and 1970s to recognition of the right of those deprived households living in these areas to have access to land tenure, infrastructure and social services. Other Countries have started some programs towards the prevention of further establishment of informal settlements through adopting enabling programs for the poor to get access to urban land, low-cost sites and services, land tenure regularization and other innovative affordable housing programs. (e.g., Egypt, Tunisia and Jordan)46.

7.2. Informal Development in MENA Region Countries

7.2.1 Informal Settlements Growth in Egypt

In a context of rapid population growth and urbanization in Egypt over the past four decades, much of urban development and housing construction was informal. Today, informal settlements along with squatter areas (together lumped under one label in Arabic known as Ashwaiyat) are thought to accommodate about 12 to 16 millions inhabitants, or about 40-50% of Egypt’s urban population and over 20% of total population. The informality label characterizes housing built in violation of existing urban planning legislation and the building code, often by converting (legally owned) agricultural land to urban uses without land subdivision or building permits, and in almost all cases without registered property titles (whether legally-owned land and property or squatter)47.

44 Madbouly, M., 2003
45 Sims, D., 2000
46 Madbouly, M., 2008
47 Sims, D., 2003
There is little consistent or credible data on informal settlements in Egypt. Such settlements were usually neglected by public officials, until the incidents of social unrest took place in such places as Imbaba and Ain Shams in the early 1990s. Subsequently, the first comprehensive and updated government inventory of informal settlements was completed by Shoura Council in 1993. Later, Hernando de Soto’s with the Institute for Liberty and Democracy and ECES conducted a comprehensive multi-year study of informality in Egypt in the end of the 1990s.

The following part will draw on existing data to shed light on informal housing in Egypt, its typologies, quantity, settlement characteristics, informal housing supply mechanisms, costs, land prices, and housing construction process.

A. Informal Settlements Population in Egypt

Official data on informal settlements is inconsistent. It is hardly to find accurate data about informal settlements in MENA region, this is simply due to main reasons; the first one is the lack of a unified perception about the meaning or definition of "informal", while the second reason returns to the fact that the governments within several countries have been ignoring the presence of those settlements for decades, assuming that the informality is a temporary problem that will be handled by the government when it has the required resources. Accordingly those areas have been outside cadastre, census or statistics. Egypt is a good example of this fact. There are several reports and information about informality in Egypt with hardly any consistence. The 1993 Shoura Council report provided the first official information on the number of informal settlements in Egypt and their population, listing 406 settlements in 10 governorates with over 7 million inhabitants, while another report prepared by Cabinet’s Information and Decision Support Center (IDSC) in 1997 (released in 1999) provided contradictory information, counting 1,034 informal settlements with a total area of 344 km² in 22 Governorates, inhabited by 12 million persons. The third and most recent set of figures comes from the Ministry of Local Development (MOLD) in 1999-2000, which listed 1,174 settlements in 22 governorates including Luxor city. This figure was subsequently revised downwards in 2002 to be 1,221 informal settlements.

According to the national committee for upgrading formed by a Minister of Local Development decree in 2000, such contradictory data among other things stems from the lack of a common definition among such entities as IDSC, CAPMAS and local governments. The GOE’s launch of the national informal settlement upgrading program in 1993 made it imperative to identify and quantify the number of such settlements and their population so as to allocate required funds for their upgrading. Each governorate rushed to identify informal settlements in its jurisdiction based on its own criteria since the definition provided by the IDSC was perceived to be ambiguous and unclear, which resulted in discrepancies. To give one example, Table 7.1 shows how informal settlements statistics for the Greater Cairo Region differ by entity.

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48 ILD, ECES, 2001
49 Madbouly, M., 2005
50 Ministry of Local Development, 2003
51 IBID
Table 7.1 Contradictory informal settlement statistics for the Greater Cairo Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cairo</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>2,437,988</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giza</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1,398,000</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qalubia</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>686,350</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Madbouly, M., 2003

The total informal settlement population in Cairo governorate according to the 1993 Shura report amounted to 2,437,988 inhabitants, which then represented 35.9% of its total population. In Giza Governorate, informal settlements accommodated 1,398,000 inhabitants, 62% of total population, which meant Giza housed the largest concentration of population living in informal settlements in Egypt.

Table 7.2 Population of informal settlements in urban areas, in 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Informal Population (1000)</th>
<th>Total Urban Population (1000)</th>
<th>% of informal Population to total urban population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Cairo</td>
<td>2,438</td>
<td>6,(2,098,469)</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Giza</td>
<td>1,398</td>
<td>2,332</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Qalubya</td>
<td>1,398</td>
<td>1,494</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Alexandria</td>
<td>686</td>
<td>3,285</td>
<td>35.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Fayoum</td>
<td>1,163</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Bani surf</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>31.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Menia</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>558</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Assuit</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>1,590</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Sohag</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>676</td>
<td>56.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Qena</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>723</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Aswan</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Ismailia</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Suez</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>46.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Port Said</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>43.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Gharbia</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Dakahlia</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Monufya</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Kafr El-Sheikh</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Damietta</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Behira</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total | 8,028 | 20,819 | 38.6 |

Source: CAPMAS 1996
Table 7.2 shows figures for other governorates as well. The 1997 IDSC report estimated the number of informal settlement population in Cairo at 2,098,469 inhabitants living in 76 areas. In Giza Governorate, the informal settlement population equaled 706,953 inhabitants residing in 36 areas. The 1999-2000 MOLD report indicates that there are 81 informal areas in Cairo, 36 in Giza and 67 in Qalubiya it increased to 67 as indicated by MOLD 1999/2000. It is believed that the most reliable official data on informal settlements is the MOLD report, which was submitted to Cabinet in 1999-2000, which is the last official count to date. A comprehensive research argued that in 1996, of the 20.8 million inhabitants living in urban areas in 20 governorates, over 8 million lived in informal settlements, or 38.6% of the total urban population (See Table 7.2).

B. Typologies and number of informal settlements in Egypt

In several studies and official reports, housing types and the nature of land tenure were used to determine the different typologies of informal settlements, as follows:

According to type of housing:

i. Shacks and construction in non-permanent materials, usually of tin and wood, represent the dominant typology of informal housing particularly for recent rural migrants settling in the cities’ peri-urban fringe.
ii. One-room dwellings with shared utilities.
iii. Cemetery dwelling.
iv. Housing in non-residential buildings or spaces (spaces earmarked for staircases, garages and rooftop dwellers, occupancy of workshops, shops, monuments, etc).
v. Housing built without a permit is also considered informal, as with houses that did not abide by the applicable planning or building standards (setbacks, land coverage, etc).

According to land tenure:

i. Housing built on illegally owned/occupied land, including squatting on State/public or privately-owned land
ii. Housing built on legally owned land that was illegally converted from agricultural to urban use
iii. Housing built on legally owned land that was illegally subdivided (i.e. without land subdivision permit)
v. Housing built outside of the urban boundaries or cordon, i.e. without planning permission

Although this definition encompasses a wide range of informality in Egypt that would include old historical cores, slums, etc, the GOE’s efforts have tended to focus on areas which have formed since the 1960s on the outskirts of cities on both agricultural and desert land. This left a large number of under serviced and slum areas in the inner city, which did not match the definition for eligibility in urban upgrading efforts, without improvement. Such areas or housing types today (slums, decaying housing in historical areas, cemetery and rooftop

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52 A.Soliman-2004
53 This builds on the analysis in a Conference on Informal Housing in 1994 (building on the Shura Council work), Arandel (1997), and the MOLD in 1999
54 ILD, ECES, 2001
dwellings, etc) have large concentrations of precarious housing, on the whole lack clear legal tenure and access to services, and have become the locus of significant urban poverty in cities\(^55\).

Finally, a comprehensive study by Hernando de Soto’s ILD and the Egyptian Center for Economic Studies (ECES) classified informal housing and real estate in Egypt in two categories as follows, which were quantified and estimated to equal some USD 73 billion in “dead capital”\(^56\).  

1. Informal housing with informal origin, totaling 8.5 million housing units distributed into:
   - 4.7 million units built on agricultural land within or outside cities boundaries;
   - 0.6 million units built on State-owned desert land within cities; and
   - 3.2 million units built outside village administrative boundaries (haiez).

2. Informal housing with formal origin, totaling 3.4 million housing units distributed into:
   - 0.8 million units of old public housing built by government since the 1950s with no clear tenure status, and which as a result of rent control led to informal sale of many units;
   - 0.9 million units new public housing built by cooperatives, many of which have been sold and resold informally and are currently without clear tenure status;
   - 0.7 million units in the city core in the form of dwellings built without permits and which were sold under simple condominium arrangements (tamleek) but are almost impossible to transfer/convert;
   - 0.5 million units in historic areas, which suffer from ownership disputes resulting from inheritance claims and/or religious trust status (waqf, which is a very poorly document tenure system) that may extend back to centuries. Such units include some that are under rent control and many precarious units; and
   - 0.5 million units in old subdivisions, built without permit, subject to rent control and including many precarious units.

As the government's response to informality started taking shape in 1993 with the adoption of the National Upgrading Program for Informal Settlements, interventions have focused on the two main types of informality:

- **Informal settlements on agricultural land**, which constitute about 80% of all informal settlements in Egypt, typically take place through the informal subdivision of privately-owned land into small plots, which are sold to individuals who gradually build their own houses\(^57\). Even though Egyptian laws prohibit the conversion of agricultural land to urban uses (only 2% of the land is permitted to be built upon), owners of agricultural land near cities face a land price multiplier of up to 10-20 if they converted their landholdings to urban uses. As a result, many agricultural landowners informally subdivide their lands for urban development. If a landowner who built an informal house on agricultural land sought to legalize his/her asset, the

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\(^{55}\) Sims, D., 2002  
\(^{56}\) Hernando De Soto, ECES, 1997.  
\(^{57}\) World Bank, 2007
process promises to be very long, bureaucratic, costly, and may easily fail to yield any results. A study estimates that in four out of six junctures in the process, the applicant may well end up with a prison term and/or heavy fines. And in the unlikely event of success, it will take 6-11 years. As such informal settlements gradually consolidate, the problems of lack of government recognition and absence of services (utilities, paved roads, schools, healthcare centers, etc) accentuate. Subsequent government interventions aiming to upgrade these areas typically face the problem of lack of vacant land on which to provide needed services and amenities, and the difficulty of retrofitting utility networks or widening the narrow roads and lanes (mostly 2-5m) to allow minimum vehicular access.

- **Squatter settlements on State-owned desert land** evolve differently from informal settlements, often relying on individual efforts, the (re)settlement of a group of squatters in the aftermath of an event, or to some extent organized land invasions as found in other cities (e.g. Lima, Peru). The Civil Code does not recognize or allow for adverse possession on State-owned land, unlike squatting on privately-owned land which could be legally recognized after “15 years of peaceful, unconcealed and uninterrupted occupancy (Hiyaza in Arabic)”. Squatters thus constantly face the threat of being evicted by government, which means that they largely build temporary low-cost shelter in the early squatting stages. And as their perceived threat of potential eviction decreases (often as a function of perceived implicit government recognition/tolerance of the settlement through, say, provision of services, payment of property taxes, etc), they gradually replace their temporary shelters with permanent structures. These areas also suffer from lack of infrastructure and services, and often from such problems as high rate of unemployment and illiteracy. Interventions in these areas thus typically require an integrated approach combining infrastructural and socio-economic development.

Both types of settlements share similar problems, including unorganized and very narrow street networks (2-4m wide), lack of sufficient vacant land or public space to provide needed services, and small land parcels averaging 80-120 sqm with nearly 100% land coverage ratio (no setbacks and minimal light wells). Due to the lack of construction licensing, there are no restrictions on building heights, which, over time, produces extremely high residential densities (sometimes in excess of 1,000 persons per Feddan). Surprisingly, the quality of much of the informal housing stock in urban areas in Egypt, especially in the Greater Cairo Region, is of good quality. The most common type is 4-7 story apartment buildings with reinforced concrete frame and slab construction and brick infill walls.

The proliferation of informal housing in Egypt is directly related to several government policies that have distorted the housing market. These include: (i) rent control (which distorted the rental market and diverted new formal private sector supply to higher-end segments of the market and for sale only); (ii) heavily subsidized public housing programs which have prevented scaling up in a way that could address increasing demand/needs for affordable housing; (iii) the inefficiency of direct public sector supply of housing; (iv) complex unwieldy building regulations and a very bureaucratic, costly process for building permit issuance; (v) unrealistically high planning regulations and standards; and (vi) a

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58 Madbouly, M., 2005
59 Sims, D., 2007
60 Madbouly, M., 2003
61 Sims, D., 2003
dysfunctional urban land market due to the lack of secure property rights and the many difficulties associated with acquiring public land\textsuperscript{62}.

These combined interventions made compliance with formal rules and regulations difficult and greatly increased the cost of housing supply, which meant that the informal sector became the only channel to cater to the needs of a large number of low, moderate and even middle-income families who could not afford formal housing options in the absence of a functioning rental market. By contrast, the informal market allowed freedom from the high costs and unwieldy regulations associated with formal construction, especially since families could build their houses progressively according to their needs and affordability level. Key to the process is the role played by the owner-builder which included land development, site management, and contracting, with every step of the process sanctioned not by formal contracts, but through informal networks and trust\textsuperscript{63}.

The formal land development/subdivision process has proven totally incapable of capitalizing on the dynamism of small scale informal owner-builders and enabling them to formalize and expand their activities. Unrealistically high land subdivision and building standards (maximum land coverage of up to 50-60\%, large setback requirements, large right-of-ways even for local streets and collector roads, etc), in addition to the significant costs and bureaucratic hassles associated with formality, shut out small scale land developers.

The GOE’s 1993 intervention to upgrade these informal settlements through the National Upgrading Program of informal settlements only came in reaction to the increasing social unrest that emanated in such settlements and especially after the incidents in Imbaba and Ain Shams in 1991-1992. The program aimed to upgrade 1,201 (98.4\%) of the 1,221 informal settlements that were identified under the program through the provision of needed roads, utilities, and services (although without land tenure legalization/formalization). The remaining 20 (1.4\%) settlements had either undergone or were slated for clearance. After investing more than LE 2.8 billion in 13 years to implement selected upgrading activities in 895 settlements, the program was considered to have had mixed results. The main positive outcomes were government recognition of informal settlements and residents’ right to have access to basic services and adequate facilities, and the delivery in many areas of basic infrastructure such as water supply and sewerage networks together with schools and healthcare centers, which resulted in improving living conditions\textsuperscript{64}.

However, the policy/program was criticized for the following reasons\textsuperscript{65}:

- Little if any attention was given to legalizing/formalizing land tenure. This is not to say that this admittedly critical issue is reported in surveys at the top of residents’ priorities or needs. Many families living informal settlements appear to suffice with the perceived land tenure security as a result of implicit government recognition of their settlement, in the form of public service delivery. Yet, this problem constrains the functioning of the land and real estate market (often forcing transactions to take place only among limited networks of trust, which reduces asset prices), and as explained in detailed by de Soto, results in a form of “dead capital” that cannot be

\textsuperscript{62} El-Kholei, A., 2005 a,b,c
\textsuperscript{63} World Bank. 2006
\textsuperscript{64} Madbouly, M., 2005
\textsuperscript{65} World Bank, 2007
collateralized and converted into credit which to finance housing improvement or business start-ups and expansions.

- The program concentrated on bricks-and-mortar with little if any attention to socio-economic development. Surveyed residents of informal settlements place at the top of their top priorities tackling the problems of unemployment and poverty.
- Very little attention was devoted to community participation through NGOs and CBOs and the private sector plays no role in the process.
- Even as utility networks were installed in informal settlements, many residents could not connect their houses to these networks in order to benefit from these huge infrastructure investments. Egypt’s Planning Law No. 3 of 1983 explicitly prohibits local authorities from granting permission to connect to infrastructure networks to housing units lacking formal legal status, which all these settlements were. Only those who could bypass such restrictions through connections or gifts were connected to the networks.

In a new initiative towards improving the access to housing and land for the youth and urban poor in order to prevent the emergence of new informal settlements, the Egyptian Government in 2005 launched a new housing program which aims to construct 500,000 subsidized housing units over six years spread throughout the country, with a significant component of subsidization from the government budget. The National Housing Program (NHP), adopted a new planning approach to housing schemes that simply try to follow the local standards set by the people in the informal areas, but in a formal way. The program stipulates that Egyptians qualifying for subsidization of housing needs, are individuals with monthly income of a maximum of LE 1,000, or a total household income of LE 1,500 per month. For these individuals and for a unit of estimated cost of around LE 55,000, the program stipulates that the individual puts LE 5,000 as down payment, the government subsidizes the unit with LE 15,000 and the individual takes a loan of LE 35,000 to be paid over a period of 20 years. The monthly payment of the loan starts with LE 160 per month and increases at an annual rate of 7%.66

Core housing or ‘Ibni Beitak’ (Build Your House) program, another modality of the program, was introduced to cater for individuals belonging to either of these groups. The idea of ‘Ibni Beitak’ originates from financing mechanisms implemented in unplanned areas where an individual would buy a plot of land, then would approach a contractor from the neighborhood to partner with. The land owner contributes the value of land while the contract contributes the cost of construction. The split of units between the two partners is negotiated in terms of a number of units for each depending on the relative cost of land vs. cost of construction.

In addition to ‘Ibni Beitak’, and in the pursuit of the GOE of Egypt to address differing needs of lower and middle income individuals, housing rental models are introduced to meet non-ownership needs of individuals. The most critical rental needs arises from ultra poor households whose needs are not standard and cannot be unified across regions and socio economic causes of poverty. This model is based on cooperation between the Ministry of Housing and various governorates to make available smaller units of housing (36 sq meter apartments with a bathroom and kitchen area)67.

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66 MHUUD, 2008
67 Ibid

Dr. Mostafa Madbouly

GRHS 2009: Regional Report MENA Region

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While all the programs described above represent engagement of various government and public bodies in the provision of housing units that cater for different types of housing needs for lower income individuals, one of the main changing features of the NHP over previous subsidized housing programs in Egypt is the introduction of private participation in the provision of subsidized housing.

Under the NHP, private investors are invited to acquire plots of land in NUCA cities to build at least 50% of units of 63 sq. meters and the rest of the units to be no bigger than 120 sq. meters. The fraction of land used for 63 sq. meter units is sold at LE 70 per square meter, while the remaining land is sold to investors at prices covering the cost of infrastructure. The individual qualifying for the subsidy under the income ceiling specified by Law, receives LE 10,000 grant, while the unit benefits from the additional subsidy representing the difference between the cost of infrastructure and the LE 70 per meter price.

Despite the continued need to rely on subsidies in the form of grants from the government budget, subsidized infrastructure, and limited subsidized financing, the current NHP represents a significant improvement over previous subsidized housing programs in terms of more involvement of financial institutions, the participation of the private sector in the provision of this category of housing, and the introduction of a menu of products that are more responsive to the needs of different categories of social housing 68.

### 7.2.2 Informal Housing and Development in Iraqi Cities

Given the absence of efficient housing policies and the failure of the land market to offer sufficient affordable and accessible housing options, urban poor have developed their own houses either by invading public land or by buying land illegally and constructing their own housing. Over the last 20 years, informal low-cost housing has been growing fast in many cities in Iraq especially Baghdad. Those responsible for illegal subdivision rarely comply with planning standards. As in most countries, occupying land is often done very quickly overnight or on weekends. The construction of the roof always leads to occupant right. Large percentage of employment and production originates from the informal sector in Iraqi cities. Besides providing employment and incomes to the poor, this sector has been a major source of human resource development since it serves as a training ground for many job seekers and enable them to acquire productive skills at low cost and without any public expenditure. The building industry has mainly been in the hands of small scale enterprises often single artisans in walling, roofing and servicing trades being brought together by an owner. This informal activity has provided a large share of all-new housing. Due to the current circumstances large scale housing developers play a relatively small part in housing. On the other hand, for those who can afford it, there still exists a potential to build houses for sale 69.

The lack of homogeneity in slum areas requires a variety of responses from central and local government. While some areas may only need land ownership regularization to integrate them into the city, e.g. Al-Futhaliya (250 hectares and 4040 houses) and Cheftlic (300 hectares and 2000-2500 houses), other areas are so poorly built and/or badly sited to the extent of requiring clearance and re-settlement.70 The informal extension of formal housing is evident in many old government housing projects (Al- Sadar city in Baghdad). This occurred when small

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68 Ibid
69 UNHABITAT, 2006
70 Ibid
government-built dwellings were extended by their occupants against building regulations in order to provide more rooms for the household, rooms for renting, or space for economic activity. While the effect may be chaotic, in many cases the additions are soundly built surpassing the condition of the original building.\textsuperscript{71}

In informal areas, the availability of water is the most important factor, while electricity and sewerage are less important as power can be locally generated and sewerage can be provided by the installation of house-based septic or holding tanks. In these areas there is no system of garbage collection and garbage is generally dumped in open areas or left on pavements. In Iraq, as migration originated from rural areas, many informal areas have a rural character and residents are keeping their traditions in raising animals and poultry. Inadequate housing can be manifested in many forms, which may appear individually, or in combination. Crowding or inadequacy of space either in terms of area or in the number of separate rooms is a common sign of inadequate housing but more dangerous is the lack of basic services available to large numbers of people in urban housing. For example, there are no accurate statistics on the proportion of the urban population in most Iraqi cities who have adequate provision of sanitation during the last 15 years. Most urban centres in Iraq have no adequate sewers; this is not only for smaller urban centres, many major cities such as Basra with more than million inhabitants has no sewer system. Defecation in open spaces is not uncommon. For other cities, sewer systems rarely serve more than a small proportion of the population, typically richer residential areas, government buildings and selected commercial areas.\textsuperscript{72}

Central authorities are dealing with evolving legislation. While, during the previous regime Law 51/1951 and RCC resolution 548/1979 described encroachment as “criminal” behaviour punishable in addition to uncompensated clearance of building, RCC resolution 156/2001 and amendment 16/2003 authorizes the ownership of encroached land for residences built before 1/1/2001 without fee or compensation for duration and return of any expenses spent. Although, the Cabinet order 12/2005 has cancelled previous legislation and orders that discriminate between citizens in residential land ownership, practically policies enabling land and housing preferring interest groups over others are in effect to date.\textsuperscript{73}

The provision of infrastructure and services have not been extended fast enough to keep up with population growth, consequently, settlements without services have been increasing at an alarming rate. In addition to the problems of providing new services, the problem of maintaining old network and failure to improve the efficiency of services is mounting. For Baghdad, water is treated at two large water plants. The April 7 project at Rusafa is responsible for western Baghdad, and Al-Karkh project in Tarmia supplies water for the larger eastern side. Al-Karakh project was designed to operate until the year 2000 and awaits overhaul. The lack of operational and capital funds for maintenance and purchase of or upgrading special equipment, e.g., motors, pumps, electrical equipment, etc. is a major problem.

Government data shows that 67% of the water needed is produced and distributed through networks. Leakage estimated between 10-20% reduces production to 55% of the needed capacity. Furthermore, interrupted power supply, fuel and lack of maintenance products, e.g. lubrication oils, etc. cause interruption in the provision of water. Most Iraqi cities lack access

\textsuperscript{71} UNHABITAT, 2007  
\textsuperscript{72} UNHABITAT, 2006  
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid
to municipal services especially sewerage services, only very few cities maintain limited sewerage services mainly. According to the ARE Report, damage from coalition bombing disrupted water distribution and treatment plants sewerage related facilities. None of Baghdad’s three sewerage treatment plants, designed to handle just 30% of the city’s sewage, is currently working. The office of the Iraqi General Corporation of Water and Sewerage (GCWS) was completely looted after the war ⁷₄.

Due to collapse of the sewerage treatment system, huge quantities of raw sewerage, mixed with industrial waste (as there is no separate system for industrial discharges) are being discharged into water bodies every day, with a large part of this being released into the Tigris in Baghdad. Most municipalities complain from absence of solid waste dump sites, especially in the rural areas where collection systems do not exist. Solid waste is burnt, deposited in a village dump or left in the open air. Recycling sites where waste is recycled, veterinary waste procedures, butcheries design to health standards, and public awareness environmental programmes are needed. Total solid waste disposed is 16,900 tons/day (other estimates include 17,800 tons/day) while the removing capacity at the directorates of Municipalities is 25%, i.e. 4, 225 tons/day to 250 dumpsites. A National Committee for Solid Waste Management (NCSWM) in Iraq was established. The NCSWM is chaired by the MMPW and with membership of Ministry of Health, Ministry of Environment, and the Mayoralty of Baghdad ⁷₅.

The price of services does not reflect the cost associated with the provision of these services. The central budget subsidizes 77.5% of expenditure in municipalities. The largest cost is for the sewerage and it has been noted that it is essential to connect the cost of provision of these services to user charges and to raise it in direct proportion to amount consumed (applied in setting the cost of electrical power consumption). Given the current deteriorated state of most services, it seems irrational to increase service prices when most of the time services are unavailable. It is not uncommon to find unpaved roads in Iraq. Only 43% of roads are paved. Housing mortgage institutions base finance on property as collateral. In most cases land is the collateral for housing mortgage. In this approach, the poor are systematically excluded for formal mortgage as informal settlements lack tenure. In addition, Government programmes distributing land have targeted specific sectors of society and by extension have enabled these sectors, in exclusion of others, of housing finance.

What is happening in cities and how are people acting? New floors are being added to existing buildings for extra dwelling units, counter to building regulations; units originally designed for housing are now used as offices to generate income to the extent that the intermix of business and residential areas has recently become a common feature; new office buildings, predominantly with glass curtain walls, are emerging and destroying the traditional character of Iraq cities; the inability of the central business district to meet the increasing demand of businesses resulted in the emergence of new business centres; industrial complexes, workshops, stores and crafts have extended to residential areas; independent luxurious residential units with imported designs are emerging; most neighbourhoods are today a mixture of different housing types ⁷₆.

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⁷₄ Ibid
⁷₅ Ibid
⁷₆ Ibid
7.2.3 Informal Development in Yemen, the Case of Sana’a

There is a little information on informal settlements in Sana’a. Previous studies have tried to define and analyze few types of informal settlements. Existing definitions of informal settlements – in Arabic translated as “’ashwa’i” or “random” areas vary widely. Narrow definitions consider only slum areas or marginalized areas as “’ashwa’i” whereas the GALSUP planning department uses a much broader definition that includes all areas that develop without an official subdivision and land use plan and in which construction is done without a permit. A recent study about informality in Sana’a, carried out by both Cities Alliance and World Bank, has also adopted a rather broad definition that allows for capturing the wide range of informal development dynamics that need special attention in planning and development efforts. Informal areas are defined as “areas in which land is squatted on or subdivided without following an official subdivision plan and which are informally developed without adhering to any official planning and building regulations”77.

A. Assessment of Informal Residential Development in Sana’a

Altogether 35 informal settlements are identified in Sana’a. They are located in six districts throughout the city as well as on the urban fringe. Four areas were established alongside sailas, seven areas on hills and mountains, 23 areas on private agricultural land and adjacent mountains (marahiq) and one area consists of tents and shacks erected besides a main street. With the exception of the latter which is a very recent settlement, all informal areas were established between 1990 and 1995. Altogether 23 areas were at least partially planned ex-post but plans were never really enforced and development continues largely informally. Therefore, these areas were not excluded from the list78. The 35 areas were classified into four different types, including sub-types: (1) Slum pockets (2 areas), (2) Informal areas within or close to the core urban built-up area (8 areas), (3) informal areas on the far urban fringe whether alongside or close to major roads (6 areas) or as village extensions (9 areas) and (4) Informal areas on land that was reserved for the preservation of public goods (3 areas) or other non-residential purposes (7 areas). More detailed information on the characteristics of the different types is included in Table 7.3

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78 Ibid
Figure 7.1: Location of Informal Settlements in Sana’a
Table 7.3: Types and Key Features of Informal Settlements in Sana’a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Land Tenure</th>
<th>Building Stock</th>
<th>Density</th>
<th># and name of areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Slum pockets</td>
<td>Squatters on state land</td>
<td>Predominantly precarious structures</td>
<td>Dense</td>
<td>(17) Haret Al Lakama (qa’at al-mu’tamarat)* (23) Souq Shamlan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mainly squatters on state land, some plots in some areas on private (ex-) agricultural land or on state land that was appropriated with unclear mechanisms and is meanwhile traded informally</td>
<td>Mostly low cost buildings on small plots, built mainly by owner-builders who construct and expand their house gradually In some areas more larger multi-storey buildings and/or villas (most notably area (25), many larger buildings also in areas (3) and (35)</td>
<td>Medium dense to dense, rapidly filling up</td>
<td>(3) Beit Ma’yard (18) Gabal Sneina* (19) Gabal Madbakh* (20) Haret Al Diqiq* (21) Madinet Al Leil* (24) Sa’ilat Shahira* (25) around Al Madina Al Libiya (35) Sa’ilat Sheraton*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Informal areas within or close to the core urban built-up area</td>
<td>Mainly squatters on state land, some plots in some areas on private (ex-) agricultural land or on state land that was appropriated with unclear mechanisms and is meanwhile traded informally</td>
<td>Mostly low cost buildings on small plots, built mainly by owner-builders who construct and expand their house gradually In some areas more larger multi-storey buildings and/or villas (most notably area (25), many larger buildings also in areas (3) and (35)</td>
<td>Medium dense to dense, rapidly filling up</td>
<td>(3) Beit Ma’yard (18) Gabal Sneina* (19) Gabal Madbakh* (20) Haret Al Diqiq* (21) Madinet Al Leil* (24) Sa’ilat Shahira* (25) around Al Madina Al Libiya (35) Sa’ilat Sheraton*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3a</td>
<td>Informal areas on the far urban fringe</td>
<td>Mainly private (ex-) agricultural land with encroachment on state land on hills adjacent to agricultural land (mahariq)</td>
<td>Areas (7), (22): Mostly very small, single family houses that are built incrementally with some medium-sized multi-storey buildings in between Areas (5), (8), (9), (15), (16), (28), (34): Mixture of smaller, single-family houses and consolidated medium-sized multi-storey buildings Areas (10), (11), (12), (13), (14): Mainly medium-sized multi-storey extended family houses mixed with larger, costly buildings and villas and small, single-family houses</td>
<td>Low to medium density</td>
<td>(7) Qa’ Al Qaidi* (5) Dar Silm* (8) Madinet al mughtaribeen* (15) Subaha (22) Shamlan* (28) Mantiqet Gidr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3b</td>
<td>Informal areas on the far urban fringe (a) alongside or close to major roads</td>
<td>Mainly private (ex-) agricultural land with encroachment on state land on hills adjacent to agricultural land (mahariq)</td>
<td>Areas (7), (22): Mostly very small, single family houses that are built incrementally with some medium-sized multi-storey buildings in between Areas (5), (8), (9), (15), (16), (28), (34): Mixture of smaller, single-family houses and consolidated medium-sized multi-storey buildings Areas (10), (11), (12), (13), (14): Mainly medium-sized multi-storey extended family houses mixed with larger, costly buildings and villas and small, single-family houses</td>
<td>Low to medium density</td>
<td>(7) Qa’ Al Qaidi* (5) Dar Silm* (8) Madinet al mughtaribeen* (15) Subaha (22) Shamlan* (28) Mantiqet Gidr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4a</td>
<td>Informal areas on land that was reserved for</td>
<td>Areas under (4a): Mainly squatters on state land with few plots on private land</td>
<td>Areas (4), (2), (26), (27), (29): mainly small, low-cost houses with some precarious structures and</td>
<td>High density only area (4)</td>
<td>(1) ‘Atan* (2) Faj ‘Atan* (4) Al Khafji*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4b</td>
<td>(a) the preservation of public goods (water resources and security of airport)</td>
<td>Areas under (4b): informal construction on private (ex-) agricultural land on which construction is explicitly forbidden in between Areas (1), (30), (31), (32), (33): Mixture of small, single-family and medium-size extended family houses with few larger, more costly buildings (particularly area (33))</td>
<td>Other areas low to medium density</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b) other non-residential purposes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: El-Shorbagi, M., 2008
## Table 7.4: Estimates of Area and Population in Informal Settlements in Sana’a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th># of area</th>
<th>Name of Area</th>
<th>Size of area (m²)</th>
<th>Normative density hh/ Hectare (low)</th>
<th>Normative density hh/ hectare (high)</th>
<th># of households (low)</th>
<th># of households (high)</th>
<th>Estimate of population (low)</th>
<th>Estimate of population (high)</th>
<th>Speed of population growth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>‘Atan</td>
<td>70,916</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>979</td>
<td>1,223</td>
<td>medium above natural pop. increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Faj ‘Atan</td>
<td>136,348</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>2,822</td>
<td>3,293</td>
<td>quickly filling up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Beit Ma’yard</td>
<td>208,856</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>1,462</td>
<td>1,671</td>
<td>10,888</td>
<td>11,529</td>
<td>slightly higher than natural pop. increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Al Khafji</td>
<td>809,714</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>5,665</td>
<td>6,474</td>
<td>39,085</td>
<td>44,669</td>
<td>quickly filling up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Dar Slim</td>
<td>910,958</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>3,188</td>
<td>4,099</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>28,285</td>
<td>medium above natural pop. increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Heziaz</td>
<td>1,566,043</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2,819</td>
<td>3,915</td>
<td>19,450</td>
<td>27,014</td>
<td>medium above nat. pop. increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Qa’ Al Qaidi</td>
<td>4,000,000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>5,520</td>
<td>6,624</td>
<td>low but higher than natural pop. increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Madinet Al Mughtaribeen</td>
<td>2,820,915</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4,231</td>
<td>6,206</td>
<td>29,197</td>
<td>42,822</td>
<td>medium above nat. pop. increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Al Sawad village ext.</td>
<td>796,297</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1,752</td>
<td>1,991</td>
<td>12,088</td>
<td>13,736</td>
<td>low but higher than natural pop. increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Beit Baus village ext.</td>
<td>63,709</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>1,539</td>
<td>1,758</td>
<td>medium above natural pop. increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Beit Zabatan village ext.</td>
<td>356,324</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>641</td>
<td>3,196</td>
<td>4,426</td>
<td>low but higher than nat. pop. increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Sana’ village extension</td>
<td>671,072</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>1,852</td>
<td>2,778</td>
<td>low but higher than nat. pop. increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Hadda village extension</td>
<td>1,394,203</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1,673</td>
<td>1,952</td>
<td>11,544</td>
<td>13,468</td>
<td>medium above natural pop. increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Al’ Ashash village ext.</td>
<td>106,534</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>1,470</td>
<td>1,838</td>
<td>medium above natural pop. increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Al Subaha</td>
<td>311,563</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>2,150</td>
<td>2,580</td>
<td>low but higher than natural pop. increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Asar</td>
<td>166,268</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>1,606</td>
<td>2,065</td>
<td>low but higher than natural pop. increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Haret Al Lakama</td>
<td>32,770</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>2,261</td>
<td>2,487</td>
<td>stable, only natural pop. Increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Gabal Sneina</td>
<td>868,283</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1,042</td>
<td>1,302</td>
<td>7,189</td>
<td>8,987</td>
<td>medium above natural pop. increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Gabal Madbach</td>
<td>306,720</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>644</td>
<td>3,810</td>
<td>4,444</td>
<td>medium above natural pop. increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Haret Diqq</td>
<td>317,809</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>1,112</td>
<td>1,430</td>
<td>7,675</td>
<td>9,868</td>
<td>quickly filling up, high above nat. Pop. Increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Madinet Al Leil</td>
<td>161,267</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>1,210</td>
<td>1,371</td>
<td>8,346</td>
<td>9,458</td>
<td>quickly filling up, high above nat. Pop. Increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Shamlan</td>
<td>32,214</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>778</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>medium above natural pop. increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Souq Shamlan</td>
<td>1,118</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Sailat Shahira</td>
<td>105,350</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>2,544</td>
<td>2,908</td>
<td>quickly filling up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Guwar Al Madina Al Libiya</td>
<td>123,619</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>2,559</td>
<td>2,985</td>
<td>medium above natural pop. increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Houd Sanaa south</td>
<td>1,326,293</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>915</td>
<td>1,098</td>
<td>low but slightly higher than natural pop. increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Dhabban Houd Sanaa north</td>
<td>6,706,667</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1,006</td>
<td>1,140</td>
<td>6,941</td>
<td>7,867</td>
<td>low but higher than natural pop. increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Mantiqet Gidr</td>
<td>1,790,275</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2,685</td>
<td>3,223</td>
<td>18,529</td>
<td>22,235</td>
<td>medium above natural pop. increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Wadi Ahmed</td>
<td>1,401,970</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3,505</td>
<td>4,206</td>
<td>24,184</td>
<td>29,021</td>
<td>medium above natural pop. increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Hema Al Matar</td>
<td>1,725,577</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3,969</td>
<td>4,487</td>
<td>27,385</td>
<td>30,957</td>
<td>medium above natural pop. increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of area</td>
<td>Name of Area</td>
<td>Size of area (m²)</td>
<td>Normative density hh/ Hectare (low)</td>
<td>Normative density hh/ hectare (high)</td>
<td># of households (low)</td>
<td># of households (high)</td>
<td>Estimate of population (low)</td>
<td>Estimate of population (high)</td>
<td>Speed of population growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
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<td>--------------------------------------</td>
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<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Beni Harith</td>
<td>5,002,631</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2,001</td>
<td>3,002</td>
<td>13,807</td>
<td>20,711</td>
<td>low but higher than natural pop. increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Al Hatarish</td>
<td>629,085</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>755</td>
<td>3,907</td>
<td>5,209</td>
<td>low but higher than natural pop. increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Khoshm Al Bakara</td>
<td>773,275</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>619</td>
<td>3,201</td>
<td>4,269</td>
<td>low but higher than natural pop. increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Sa'wan</td>
<td>1,161,759</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1,627</td>
<td>2,091</td>
<td>11,223</td>
<td>14,429</td>
<td>medium above natural pop. increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Sailat Sheraton</td>
<td>109,415</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>602</td>
<td>3,397</td>
<td>4,152</td>
<td>quickly filling up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>36,965,317</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>59,110</strong></td>
<td><strong>72,418</strong></td>
<td><strong>313,306</strong></td>
<td><strong>390,285</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: El-Shorbagi, M., 2008*
B. Scope of Residential Informality

Population figures and densities could only be estimated, which was done by roughly defining the boundaries of each area on GIS imagery of Sana’a. Densities were estimated based on calculations carried out previously for similar types of areas in Taiz. Population figures were then calculated by multiplying space with density. These calculations suggest that the total number of residents is somewhere between 313,000 (low estimate) and 390,000 (high estimate) by 16.5% and 20.5% respectively of the total population of Sana’a. The above Table 7.4 includes the detailed estimates of the size of each area as well as low and high estimates of densities and population for each of the 35 areas79.

C. Causes and Dynamics of Informal Residential Development

The Driving Forces of Informal Residential Development

Informal residential development is a relatively young phenomenon in Yemen. The early phase was mainly driven by rural-urban migration and resulted in a number of informal settlement in the eastern part of Sana’a that were later upgraded and regularized as well as in the establishment of a number of slum pockets most of which were later demolished and the population resettled. The boom of informal urbanization started in the early 1990s and was largely driven by forced returnees from the Gulf States after 1990 as well as a wave of in-migration after Sana’a became the capital of the reunified Yemen in 1994. Most of the informal settlements were established during this period. They continue to grow and densify driven by ongoing rural-urban migration from all over Yemen and natural population increase that directs young low-income starter-families who cannot afford housing in the formal sector to informal areas80.

The Informal Land Market

Public land is very scarce in Sana’a. State land is mainly located on the mountains in and around Sana’a as well as alongside sailes (stormwater beds), most agricultural land is owned by private individuals. The State has no exact inventory of its own land which facilitates encroachment by private persons, particularly on the slopes adjacent to agricultural land 20% of which can be legally claimed by the private land owners to protect their water resources. However, private land owners often occupy much larger land parcels and tend to claim non-agricultural as agricultural land to support their claims of ownership. In practice, it is the State that has to prove ownership in case of first registrations without knowing the exact boundaries of public land which opens the door for all sorts of manipulations. Land transactions are complicated and costly and the capacity of the State to protect private property rights is considered weak. Therefore, land is in most cases traded informally with the use of written documents (basa’ir) that are certified by the amin al-mantiqa, a government appointed area chief. There are numerous land disputes that can turn quite violent. Disputes may arise among individuals, between private individuals and the State, between a private landowner and a tribe with customary rights to the area and in inheritance cases. Land claims are difficult to

79  El-Shorbagi, M. 2008
80  Wahba, S. 2006
verify due to the absence of a cadastre and exact land surveys, as well as the fact that the basira system makes it easy to generate documents that attest ownership claims.\textsuperscript{81}

It is relatively easy to find cheap land in informal areas at the periphery of the city. Land prices are cheapest in squatter areas and informal areas where construction is strictly prohibited due to environmental hazards or security reasons. Land prices tend to escalate as soon as post-planning starts in an area. Land owners in fringe areas often encourage informal development to increase pressure for services. In some cases, land owners are reported to build simple structures themselves and rent them to low income families to speed up urbanization. In squatter areas, individuals apply a wide range of practices to either claim large land parcels for subdivision and sale or to build low cost housing that they rent to create fait accompli that would eventually establish their claim to the land. The main actors in the construction process are private owner-builders who are often supported by small informal contractors who provide a wide range of tailored services such as designs and advice on material to use for different types of housing, taking into account the economic means and changing needs of the gradually expanding family of the owner-builder. Many houses are built, reinforced and expanded gradually according to financial resources and social needs.\textsuperscript{82}

\textit{Government Responses to Informal Urbanization}

So far, the government has no strategy to control, contain or guide informal residential development. In some areas, it tries to control informal development by prohibitions. In some areas, the Municipality tries to control informal development by prohibitions which it is, however, unable to enforce. The main instrument of government response is an ex-post planning mechanism, i.e. the preparation and approval of detailed neighborhood plans that consist of the street layout and location of basic services such as a school, a mosque and a garden. These detailed plans are not embedded in any broader structural planning or strategic vision and are usually not enforced. In practice, most post-planned areas look virtually the same as unplanned areas and planners themselves use the term of “takhtit ‘ashwa’i” (random planning) which reflects the fact that development in post-planned areas continues largely informally. Slum pockets are considered illegal and unacceptable and the favored solution is demolition and resettlement. Most slum dwellers were resettled in the Sa’wan area where the State has built small, low-cost housing units for them. In the 1980s and 1990s, the older informal areas in the eastern part of the city were upgraded and regularized with the support of the Worldbank. This more comprehensive and integrated upgrading approach was not repeated since but in most informal areas, the State introduced at least some of the most needed infrastructure and services. Electricity is usually the first utility to arrive to an area, followed by some basic social services in case no schools or health facilities are available in nearby areas.\textsuperscript{83}

\textbf{D. Specific Problems in Informal Areas}

The main problems in informal areas are the following:

- Lack of or deficient infrastructure and utilities

\textsuperscript{81} El-Shorbagi, M. 2008
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid
\textsuperscript{83} Madbouly, M. 2008

Dr. Mostafa Madbouly

GRHS 2009: Regional Report MENA Region

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• Environmental problems and health hazards (e.g. pollution of Sanaa’s water basin and spread of insects and vermin that transport disease due to garbage piles on public space, leading sewage, etc.)
• Lack of social services, particularly schools and health care facilities
• Insecure tenure, particularly in squatter areas
• Problems of public security due to inappropriate location (mainly areas adjacent to the existing and planned new airports)
• Dangers of land slides or other problems related to the difficult topography of some areas

7.2.4 Informal Settlements in Lebanon: The Case of Beirut

A particular challenge to undertaking the mapping slums in Beirut is the absence of a unified understanding of the city. Indeed, during the years of the civil war (1975-1990), the city was divided into two sections, each run by one or several antagonistic groups. The developments of the city during this phase followed somewhat different trajectories, and studies conducted at the time generally concentrated on specific sections or neighbourhoods. Furthermore, and prior to 1975, most slums were located near the industrial suburbs of Beirut, essentially its north-eastern suburbs and almost all studies of slums and poverty looked at living conditions in this area. At the time, the southern suburbs did not attract the same scale of industrial development, notably because the development of large-scale public works (eg the Gulf Club, the Sports Stadiums, Beirut International Airport) and high-income beaches led to land speculation and made access more costly.

However, shortly after 1975, most of the residents of the north-eastern suburban slums of Beirut were evicted from their houses and many started squatting in various areas of the southern suburbs, in expensive sea-front beach resorts, empty green lots, or institutional buildings. Their numbers, compounded by an extensive rural to urban migration fuelled by the two Israeli invasions (1978 and 1982) and the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon (1978-2000), led to the transformation of most of the open spaces of the southern suburbs of Beirut into large slums. Today, it is the southern suburbs of Beirut that carry the label of “illegal settlements” in most people’s minds, while the eastern suburb slums, now relatively limited in scale, are more or less invisible for the research community and others.

Another difficulty in mapping slums is the mobility of many of their dwellers, whether Lebanese or not, without any tangible means for quantification, before, during, and after the war. Rather than a period of stability, the postwar scene has been a phase of important population changes in all the slums in Beirut. Indeed, policies to reverse the population exchanges that occurred during the war as well many reconstruction projects, whether the rehabilitation of downtown, the southern suburbs, or infrastructure projects, are all generating important patterns of displacement. The impacts of these projects are either in displacements to make way for developments, or in attracting labour to work for the projects.

Quantifications are available for important moments of the war, such as the estimated 200,000 individuals who navigated from the eastern to the southern suburbs of Beirut between 1975
and 1976, or the 700,000 to 900,000 displaced at least once over the 15 years of the war.\textsuperscript{87} Prior to the war, reports on slums also often mention Arab workers (especially Syrian), and the transformation of some of the slums over time with changes in their dwellers, especially Qarantina.\textsuperscript{88}

Given its complex history, the limited illegalities in property rights, and the widespread violation of building and construction codes, it is difficult to adopt legality as a criterion for slum identification in Beirut. Accordingly, a definition has been adopted that identifies slums as areas of the city where the majority of residents live in precarious economic and/or political conditions, with high levels of vulnerability, and where services and living conditions appear to be lower than other sections of the city. Also, given the absence of public data on these areas, and/or on poverty in the city, our definition and assessments rely essentially on qualitative measures, developed through our own research experiences in the city, various reports (academic and professional) in Lebanon and Beirut, as well as interviews with slum dwellers, researchers, and policy makers. Hence, we do not claim to present in this typology, a comprehensive listing of slums and their living conditions in the Metropolitan Area of Beirut but rather an initial investigation, designed to bring visibility and attention to those areas in the city, and to propose theories that can explain their location and the logic of their evolution.

Slums of Beirut can be categorized according to their mode of production and the particular regional and national political situations that led to their establishment. Furthermore, depending on the time when they developed, and the region where they were located. In general, slums can be classified as: \textsuperscript{89}

**Slums that began as international refugee camps or low-income housing areas for international refugees** (instituted from 1920-1955) within and outside the city municipal boundaries

**Slums that began as housing areas for rural-urban migrants (1950s-1960s),** these slums housed the various waves of rural to urban migrants arriving in Beirut and its suburbs in relation to the country’s industrialization and urbanization processes, coming especially from South Lebanon and the Beka’a Valley where poverty and insecurity (in the case of the South) gradually encouraged an important migratory movement.

**Slums that began as squatter settlements during the period of the civil war (1975-1990)** These areas grew in several parts of the city, where refugees displaced by the early events of the Lebanese civil war (1975) occupied either buildings or entire neighbourhoods, abandoned by their owners (for reasons of security) or occupied large plots of land and transformed them into large squatter settlements. Other similarities across slums can be perceived in the methods of construction and the permanence of the built structures. All slums combine a varying percentage of precarious, tin sheet and wooden houses with more solid and permanent structures. All slums also contain houses serviced in varying degrees, going from legal electricity and water hook-ups, to illegal hook-ups or the absence of these services altogether.

\textsuperscript{87} Virely 2000
\textsuperscript{88} Fawaz, M. and Peillen, I. 2003
\textsuperscript{89} Ibid
Furthermore, various types of illegality can be listed simultaneously for all slums, albeit to different degrees and hence it is common to see overlapping violations to property rights, building, land use and zoning codes.

**Slums that Began as Housing Areas for Rural-Urban Migrants (Peri-urban Areas)**

From the 1950s on many families left their villages of origin to come to Beirut, attracted by employment opportunities in factories (eg in the Bourj Hammoud area, Sad el Baouchrieh and Choueifat), large institutions (eg Beirut International Airport, Regie du Tabac, etc), construction sites, or in construction quarries (eg the Jdeideh area).

**Slums in the Far Suburbs of the Capital City**

Located in the far suburbs of the city, on lands of relatively low monetary value, and close to factories and other employment opportunities, a number of areas, formally identified as green agricultural lands, and zoned with rather large minimum lot sizes (Hayy el Sellom for example was planned with 2,000m² minimum lots) were taken over from the 1950s by an informal process of urbanisation. Four areas can be identified under this category: Hayy el Sellom (Amrousseih) in the southern suburbs and Zaaytriyyeh (Fanar), Roueissat (Jdeideh) and a smaller development known as Hayy el Ayn (Biaqout) in the eastern suburbs. The three areas of Zaaytriyyeh, Roueissat, and Hayy el Ayn are said to be “off-shoots” of each other. Zaaytriyyeh is said to be the oldest (dating to the 1950s), and the first anchor from which people left to Roueissat when the slum became too congested.

**Official Definitions of Slums**

Few if any public references exist to slums, as defined above, in current public discourse. Firstly, slums are generally considered in official discourse as the “outcome of the civil war” and their population is still perceived as “temporarily displaced.” Hence, the official jurisdiction of these areas goes back to the Ministry of Displaced People, created in 1992, whose main task is to eradicate slums resulting from the war. In this scenario, slum dwellers and war-displaced populations are confused. Slums are also clearly not under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Housing or the Housing Institute. Poor recognition of slums has meant that to date, there is no official definition of these areas. Instead, slums are mentioned and defined in various ways in reports commissioned or conducted by public institutions.

Most definitions currently used fall under an approach relying on physical criteria in the identification of slums. For example, the 1996 report on built structures of the Central Statistical Agency included in its classification of physical structures the category “improvised buildings” (mourtajal in Arabic), defined as including “kiosks, barracks, and containers used for housing or commercial activities”. However, the current reference to mourtajal cannot be seen as a real translation of slum since with few exceptions, the majority of slums are no longer temporary structures (as was the case in the first report, notably with Qarantina and Tell ez-Zaatar), and hence the category of murtajal now refers to individual structures in slums and elsewhere, rather then actual slum areas. Other definitions based on physical criteria rely instead on the population density of an area. This is the case for example of the Evaluation Environnementale de le Côte du Liban and the subsequent land use maps of Lebanon (1984, 1999) in which slums are marked as “tissu urbain informel” (informal urban fabric) and defined according to the density of urban fabric, detected by aerial photographs.

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90 Yahya 1994
Another set of definitions, used especially in the 1980s, relies on legal criteria and refers to slums as “illegal housing,” in reference to violations of property rights, zoning codes, building codes, and others. This is the definition adopted by the first academic literature on the southern suburbs of Beirut, and taken up by practitioners as well, such as the French offices Iaurif in 1984 in their study of the *Schema Directeur de la Region Metropolitaine de Beyrouth*. This same approach is recurrent in the various studies that will look at the conditions of the southern suburbs of Beirut after the war, with the aim of addressing their problems. These studies also adopt a similar terminology in Arabic, “massaken ‘aswakiyyah” (chaotic housing), in which the legal connotations are often highlighted.

**Unofficial Definitions of Slums**

Unofficially, definitions of slums and their dwellers are related to the perceptions of residents, areas, and history, before and after the civil war. Nonetheless, definitions on hygienic, physical, and legal terms are among the most commonly used among people and in the press, as well as a few others that distinguish residents according to some of their perceived characteristics. Also worth noticing is the tendency among official and unofficial sources to exaggerate the numbers. Mayors, for example, describe the population sizes of slums as 10 times higher than they actually are, and so do newspaper articles. Finally, theses and academic works (especially those prepared by students abroad) tend to adopt terminologies that are in line with academic trends and advisors and bring in new labels not in line with current policy documents.

Another set of definitions, developed before the war, is physical. Among these, “tanake” in reference to tin (Arabic translation), the basic construction material of slum dwellings before the war, is a witness of physical definitions. People also refer to slums as residential areas in poor physical conditions, and use poor infrastructure, dirty roads, and unavailable services, to demarcate these areas from others in the city.

During and after the war, policymakers have tended to associate “slums” either with the war, in which case refugees and displaced populations tended to be compounded under the terminology of “mouhajjareen,” or with the fanatic, anti-state political attitudes with which they labelled slum dwellers.

In general, especially after the displacement and payment (unusually high) of compensation to a number of squatters in Beirut’s downtown, a common vision among the Lebanese is that the residents of these settlements are “crooks” who are seeking to benefit from the indemnities of the Ministry of Displaced People. Furthermore, because property rights tend to carry major sanctity for most middle-income and rich Lebanese people, fierce condemnation of all squatters tends to be the rule among various groups, in newspaper articles, and elsewhere. Another notable definition, which highlights negative stereotypes against residents, this time prior to the war, is the “kurdification of neighbourhoods,” an indication of the arrival of low-income residents and changes in the demography, in reference to Kurdish refugees about

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92 CDR-DGU 1986, Charafeddine 1985
93 BTUTP 1992, Dar el Handassah 1993
94 BTUTP 1992
95 Keuroghlian 1970, Bourgey and Phares 1973
96 Yahya 1994
97 Charafeddine 1985
whom a multiplicity of negative stereotypes prevailed\textsuperscript{98}. Not all definitions are however negative, and it is not uncommon to see in studies of the 1970s descriptions like “neo-citizens”\textsuperscript{99} and other descriptions more related to the recent arrival of residents to the city.

This is the most commonly adopted definition, especially among people who look negatively at these areas. At the advent of a conflict that opposed the residents of one squatter settlement (Ouzai) to the state’s projects to build a bridge above their area, the pages of almost all the local papers emphasized the “illegality” of the neighbourhood and the absence of “rights” for residents to stay. Among slum residents, legality also takes on an important role. Hence, people tend to associate long term residents with legality, irrespective of their legal status and new ones with “illegality”\textsuperscript{99}.

7.2.5 Informal Development in Khartoum, Sudan

Rapid, unorganized, sometimes unauthorized urban growth (urban sprawl) has become a prominent feature of developing countries, and the Sudan is no exception. This urban growth is generally measured by increases in area and density more than by functional development. Rural mass exodus to Sudanese urban centres is attributed mainly to geographically and socially uneven development and the concomitant depression of rural ecosystems and communities, the long civil war and armed conflicts, natural disasters like drought and famine, and the failure of government economic policies.

The number of displaced people has been estimated by the Commission for Relief and Rehabilitation at 4,104,970 of whom 1.8 million are in Greater Khartoum\textsuperscript{100} and about 2 million others are in other urban centres. National governments adopted, to varying degrees, a policy of self-reliance. Weak infrastructure development encouraged the concentration of industries, services and administration in already existing towns. The urban process gained momentum thereafter. Urban population in 1993 was more than 7 times its size in 1955 and will be more than 12 times that size by the end of 2002, while the total population in 1993 was less than 3 times its 1955 size\textsuperscript{101}.

The horizontal expansion of Greater Khartoum has been quite remarkable. Its area in 1998 was 48 times as large as in 1955. The greatest expansion occurred during the last 30 years. The average annual rate of increase skyrocketed to 66.1 per cent between 1970 and 1980 while it was only 5.2 per cent between 1955 and 1970, but then dropped to 14.6 per cent during the period 1980-1998. The three towns have grown differentially, with Khartoum constituting 43 per cent of the total area of Greater Khartoum.

The typology of slums is rather diffuse, but in broad terms they can be categorized as follows\textsuperscript{102}:

1. **Inner-city slum areas**: These are either engulfed or annexed by urban expansion, the residents of some, such as Fallata village (of Nigerian origin), have been moved further out and the area redeveloped and planned. Others have been re-planned and residents were allowed to stay, for example Diyoun.
2. **Outer slums:** These are areas planned by the authorities and distributed to the landless. Living conditions are worse than in the first group.

3. **Squatter settlements:** These are settlements built on land illegally occupied by newcomers. Conditions here are the worst in all the slums. Temporary shelters are built of cardboard, tin and sacks. The second category is the most dominant, and the last occupies a considerable area.

The locational trend is one of outward expansion of each type of slum, because the high land prices in the core area encourage inner city slum residents to sell their land and move outwards. Similarly the inner part of the outer slums become part of the inner city slums while expanding outwards and the squatter settlements gradually become part of the outer slums, while new squatter settlements spring up. Naturally this locational pattern is not geometrical.

During the first twenty years of the condominium rule Tuti Island was the only inner city slum, lying between the first and second class buildings along the Blue Nile in Khartoum and those west of the River Nile in Omdurman. To the south of these buildings in Khartoum and to the west in Omdurman were the outer slums. Between then and independence, each of the three towns developed its commercial core, which expanded over the outer slums which, in turn expanded outwards.

The first squatter settlement appeared in 1921 in Khartoum North (now third class) and spread then around the industrial areas (now removed). National governments continued to distribute plots of land and many first and second class quarters sprang beyond the former outer slums, such as Amarat, Riyad, Safia and Muhandiseen.

Squatter settlements grew gradually due to rural-urban disparities, but the exceptionally high rate of expansion occurred during 1984 - 86 because of the outbreak of the civil war and the severe drought and famine. Surveys of squatter settlement continued from 1973 to 1977 and then in 1985/86 and during the 1990s. As a result resettlement programmes were reactivated. Since 1989 12 major squatter settlements were removed to 12 planned settlements on the fringes and beyond the boundaries of Greater Khartoum. Now five squatter settlements await action, their residents numbering about 265,000.

There are no reliable data on the population of the slum areas. However, Ahmed (1997: 80) estimates that the displaced in 1977 constituted 35 per cent of the population of Khartoum, 27 per cent of Omdurman and 16 per cent of Khartoum North. In a recent social survey conducted by the Government of Khartoum State, the number of southerners was estimated at 2 million. With a modest assumption that 90% of these southerners live in slum areas together with 1.7 million form other parts of the country, particularly the famine stricken western areas, the population of slum areas totals now 3.5 million people in Greater Khartoum. One could estimate that 1.3 million people (22.5 per cent of the total) live in squatter settlements, 1.6 million (27.6 per cent) live in outer slums, and 0.6 million (10.3 per cent) in inner city slums.

The tribal structure in squatter settlements and other slums shows a predominance of southern tribes (mainly Dinka, Nuer and Shuluk) and western Sudanese tribes (mainly Fur, Zaghawa,}

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103 Ibid
104 Ibid

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Miseiriya, Baggara, Riseigat, Barno, and Nuba). Those in the inner city slums are mainly from central and northern Sudan. Some population characteristics will be given in the two sample cases later in the report. The official term used as an umbrella term for all types of illegal residence is “squatting”. Within this broad category, there are a number of particular categories. These are:

- **Carton** (cardboard) and **safeeh** (tin) camps; these are the poorest slums on public or private land.
- Large fenced areas with or without housing, reserved by land speculators (for sale or rent) who claim that it is theirs through inheritance.
- Old villages incorporated into urban centre, occupied by people who have customary rights. These are now being replanned and residents given ownership rights.
- Planned squatter settlements. These emerge when authorities resettle squatter or displaced populations, and give them ownership rights.
- Luxurious squatter settlements erected by dignitaries on public land.

Policy concerns hinge upon the legality of land acquisition and not the type of residence. Slums are tackled within the wider context of poverty.

The city derives a number of advantages from the slums, which can be summarized as follows: The informal sector developed by slum residents absorbs about two thirds of the city’s labour force and has reduced the unemployment rate and associated problems. The slum dwellers engage in menial jobs which may not be accepted by others. Labour wages have also been depressed. Slum areas have developed large markets, e.g. Suq Libya, which provide a wide range of goods at lower prices. Positive effects have extended to other sectors, for example transport. Crowding has been reduced in the city centre. Cultural effects, e.g. tribal festivals and dances. Social cohesion and integration since all major tribes are represented. The ruling party draws political support when needed since these people are easily manipulated by local authorities.  

7.2.6 Informal Settlements in Morocco, Rabat

In Rabat- Salé, a slum is defined as any settlement of precarious housing either on private plots of land, or with the settlers being provisionally tolerated on publicly owned plots of land. The main categories in Rabat- Salé are:

- **Médinas**: these are the old neighbourhoods of the pre-colonial city. Their deterioration resulted from the out-migration of middle and well-off classes and of economic activities. Lack of maintenance of houses that were rented room by room led to a rapid deterioration. The médinas continued to constitute a source of informal and irregular employment that allowed underprivileged populations to live and work there, attracting poor external populations. Médinas are comparatively well preserved and, although damaged in part, other sections have been rehabilitated. For some the only problem is general urban development.

- **Intra-muros**: these shanties are slums with precarious buildings in sheet metal or adobe that date from the 1960s on rented or squatted plots of land. They emerged as

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105  Ibid  
106  Navez-Bouchanine, F. 2003

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spontaneous settlements on easily occupied lands near industrial or agricultural activities. These slums have been gradually and partially rebuilt with more permanent material along the time. They have better urban integration, with some services and self improvements of tertiary road, rail and waterways and organized garbage collection. However illegal, those slums that have existed for a long time are often tolerated by the authorities.

Peripheral slums: these emerged in a similar way to the intra-muros, on easily accessible community land or near economic activity. However, their history is less marked by formal and structured interventions. They are still able to accommodate new populations because of lower densities. Their sheer numbers force the authorities to tolerate them.

Illegal districts: these are groups of concrete buildings that, more or less, resemble traditional low-cost buildings built on purchased plots of land but without any permit. They are deprived of basic services and infrastructure. However, depending upon age and stage of legalization, their situations do vary. This is why it is difficult to consider them as similar to the previous categories and to the ‘slums’ category, in general. They are primarily designed in anticipation of legality. Populations in illegal districts are more heterogeneous than in the former categories, both in terms of origins and in socio-economic terms. Today, the oldest formations of illegal neighbourhoods are completely integrated within the urban environment. The first settlements were on rented or leased lands. The most recent settlements (since the 1970s) started as subdivided agricultural properties. The majority of the population is of lower-middle class, for whom these neighbourhoods were the only access to home-ownership.

Urban policies never had the objective of improving slums or their social conditions; rather they have focused on resettling their inhabitants in public housing schemes. Interventions tried either to get rid of slums as obstacles to urban development or to minimize their impacts on the urban landscape and on the city image. Political or security imperatives; the need to undertake big infrastructure works; urban modernization or improvement requirements; land or property pressures; and accidents or natural catastrophes have all been used in the past as reasons to ‘clean up’ slums and force their inhabitants to reception sites. These sites are generally less central than the primary settlements (often outside of the urban area) and quite often lack adequate services. Alternatively, urban cosmetic operations that were meant to hide the unsightly or disturbing effects of slums, and to encapsulate them, limiting their expansion, were carried out.

During the 1970s and 1980s, some more positive interventions took place, prompted by the conviction that improvement in situ can resolve the problems of the poor in a more efficient way because it is adapted to their real conditions. These interventions came in two categories:

Limited improvements: neither part of programmes nor formal policy, they are mainly in the form of daily political management, and ad hoc negotiations involving elected representatives, local authorities, private agencies and populations regarding NGO and community-based action.
Restructuring: this encompasses upgrading projects implemented on a large scale and decided at the national level as policy popularized during the 1970s and 1980s. The interventions brought basic infrastructure and services to existing shantytowns, regularized occupational status and allowed the occupants to build on their plots. From then on, the site is considered as integrated within the formal city. The best known operation is the Urban Development Project that integrated spatial and physical upgrading with social, economic or institutional improvements. This restructuring soon raised disputes, was called into question and was abandoned at the end of the 1980s. The central issue concerned the quality of the final product – housing – as well as neighbourhoods.

The rapid evolution of legal urbanization around slums has generated strong pressures for their eradication. This pressure is sharply felt by the inhabitants and deepens the feelings of extreme marginalization. Cleaning up interventions, except for the recovered urban space ready for new urban development, does not achieve any improvement in housing conditions for the previous inhabitants. Confidence in resettlement as the perceived unique and best answer to the slum issue has entirely ceased during the last 15 years\textsuperscript{108}.

The only hope for Rabat- Salé lies in the steady promotion of regularization interventions, combined with massive basic infrastructure and services provision to underserved areas. This can only happen if Morocco is prepared to seriously step up its national- and local-level interventions in a holistic approach to urban poverty alleviation and to support social programmes that help slum inhabitants to emerge from their marginalization and societal exclusion. To achieve this, the general perception of slum dwellers has to be considerably improved nation-wide, and far greater emphasis must be given to participation and partnerships that involve all stakeholders and beneficiaries. Coherent urban policy must be promulgated as a start to creating a national system of urban governance that includes all sections of society\textsuperscript{109}.

7.3. Peri-urban Dynamics in the MENA region, The Case of Egypt- Greater Cairo

Peri-urban areas are defined as those localities where the transition from rural to urban context is taking place – those vast areas that surround cities which are neither strictly rural nor urban.\textsuperscript{110} For this reason we concentrate on the agricultural plain found both to the north and south of Greater Cairo proper, where there is a long-existing and well-articulated rural life and settlement pattern and where a vibrant transition is taking place.

Accordingly, peri-urban areas can be classified as the nine rural administrative zones (marakaz) on the Greater Cairo Region periphery where population growth has been significantly above prevailing natural increase rates (which currently is 1.66\% per year for Cairo Governorate and 1.9 \% per year for Delta governorates based on vital statistics).

In peri-urban Greater Cairo urban expansion is almost entirely polycentric in nature. That is, existing towns and villages (most of which are at least 80 years old) simply expand progressively outwards into the surrounding agricultural plain. This form of urbanization is

\textsuperscript{108} Ibid
\textsuperscript{109} Ibid
\textsuperscript{110} This definition comes from "Peri-urban Areas: No Man’s Land or Keystone for the Rural-Urban Transformation?" Concept Note for Learning and Analytical Program, Spatial and Local Development Team, FEU-SDN, August 2007.
inherent in informal development, which is always progressive and incremental, both horizontally and vertically (more floors added) over time.\textsuperscript{111}

Figure 7.2 Peri Urban Areas in Greater Cairo

Only in the northeast quadrant has this polycentric growth merged into what could be called a more or less a continuous agglomeration which has become grafted onto the main conurbation. This quadrant is growing extremely rapidly (annual population increases of well over 5%), due to its excellent public transport and road connections to northeast Cairo, which is itself probably the main axis of metropolitan expansion (the Ismailia Road corridor).

In peri-urban Greater Cairo the size of settlements varies greatly, from small villages and hamlets with populations of less than 5000 persons to huge agglomerations of more than 100,000 persons. Due to the nature of village and informal development, ultimate net residential densities in these settlements are very high – at least by international standards – easily exceeding 900 persons per hectare.

In terms of the quadrants or axes of development, most peri-urban expansion is going to the north. This is logical, simply because the agricultural plain to the north of Cairo fans out into the Delta, offering a vast and almost limitless nexus of villages and towns upon which progressive informal development can be grafted. By contrast, opportunities for expansion to the south are limited by the very narrow agricultural plain.

Although officially the peri-urban areas of Greater Cairo are classified as rural, over the last few decades the role of agriculture has diminished significantly. By 1996 the economies of GCR peri-urban areas were quite diverse. Agriculture only accounted for 21% of the active

\textsuperscript{111} El-Kholei, A. 2005
population (compared to 47% for rural Egypt), and the largest single sector was manufacturing with 22% (higher even than the national urban average). Also, the construction, transport, and commerce sectors were all well represented. Thus by 1996 it could be said that peri-urban Greater Cairo was already acquiring purely urban attributes, albeit with a small but still significant agricultural labor force. Although similar data for 2006 are not yet available, it can be said with confidence that the "urbanization" of the peri-urban economy has continued.

In the 1940s through 1960s a number of medium-sized and large factories were established in peri-urban Greater Cairo, especially along the Alex Agricultural Road and in Abu Zaabal, but with others sprinkled throughout the landscape. Since the 1970s practically no new factories have been established (due to the policy of obliging new industries to locate in the desert new towns). And except for a power station in Waraq and the massive wastewater treatment plant in Gabal el Asfar, no major utilities or institutional land uses have been established in peri-urban areas in the last twenty-five years.

Agriculture continues to be important, all of which is made up of intensive small-hold farms which concentrate on fruits and vegetables as well as animal husbandry, mainly aimed at Greater Cairo markets. There are no precise figures on the loss of agricultural land due to urban (mostly informal) expansion in peri-urban areas, but it is probably not as great as some commentators assume.

It should be added that the towns and villages in peri-urban Cairo contain a myriad of small and micro commercial and service enterprises which mainly serve the local populations. There are also a large number of transport, storage, and distribution enterprises, including the repair and reconditioning of transport vehicles (mainly trucks and small buses).

In Greater Cairo only 14% of households own a vehicle (and this includes taxis and small trucks), thus public transport is an absolutely essential factor in any urban development. Peri-urban areas enjoy quite good and affordable means of public transport, which offers a mix of different modes:^\textsuperscript{112}

- Privately operated micro-buses (11 to 18 seats)
- Public (CTA and cooperative) mini buses and large buses
- The Cairo metro (two lines to the north and one to the south with termini at the edge of the peri-urban zones)
- Suburban rail run by the Egyptian Railways Authority (four lines to the north and one line to the south)
- The three-wheeled taxi (touk-touk) which has recently made its appearance and provides local transport within settlements

These modes are all used, sometimes in combination, by inhabitants of peri-urban areas to access destinations throughout Greater Cairo. Probably the single most important mode is the private mini-bus, which only appeared in Greater Cairo in 1977 with 800 vehicles on 11 fixed routes.

Virtually all agricultural land in peri-urban Greater Cairo (as well as previously agricultural land which is now built upon) is privately held in freehold tenure. Most land may not be

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^\textsuperscript{112} World Bank, 2006
registered, but the tenure of this land is very secure and ownership is recognized by all. Land is easily bought and sold and subdivided, with most transactions carried out through simple civil (ourfi) contracts.113

The informal process of conversion of agricultural land to urban use is also straightforward. A farmer will commonly divide agricultural strips into several building plots (average size 110 m2) or might sell the whole strip to a middleman subdivider. In both instances, he will be paid the market price. Raw land prices vary considerably, with higher prices for those parcels which are closest to existing buildings where construction will not be very visible to authorities. As a rule of thumb, building land will fetch between 8 and 12 times the price for agricultural land. Thus the farmer selling parcels for building purposes will enjoy a huge windfall profit.

For all intents and purposes, there is no urban planning or land management carried out by government in peri-urban areas. Since building on agricultural land is officially prohibited, by definition government cannot impose planning or management procedures to guide development. Nor can it impose fees or taxes to capture some of the increased value of urbanizing land.

**Government Planning and Investment in Peri-urban Areas**

In the various master plans and structure plans produced for Greater Cairo (years 1983, 1991, and 1997) all of peri-urban areas of Greater Cairo were assumed to remain primarily agricultural with a stable population. Even major transport arterials were rarely planned to cross peri-urban areas. It is interesting to note that the recently completed strategic planning exercise carried out by GOPP and JICA labels peri-urban Greater Cairo as "villages and small towns" which are targeted only for "development control" in the 2027 proposed general land use plan. In terms of government investment strategies aimed at peri-urban Greater Cairo, these can only be said to exist in sectoral budget allocations for infrastructure and public facilities, much as is programmed for any rural area of Egypt. That these investments are totally insufficient for peri-urban Greater Cairo should be clear from the discussion in Section 15 below.

In peri-urban areas of Greater Cairo, as is the case throughout Egypt, there are few mechanisms for even partial cost recovery for infrastructure or public services, either through user charges or taxes and fees. This issue is discussed in Section 16 below.

**Why Are These Areas So Attractive to Inhabitants of Greater Cairo?**

The main reason for the measurable and growing attraction of peri-urban areas to a vast block of Greater Cairo's population can be said to relate to the array of affordable housing solutions that the mainly informal housing markets generate in these areas. Land accessibility and price is conducive for informal settlement creep and infill. Also, there is less control prohibiting building on agricultural land in these settlements than along the fringes of the core agglomeration of Greater Cairo (development is largely out of sight). These two factors result in housing/shelter packages on the market which are affordable, at least compared to other

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113 El-Kholei, A. 2005a,b,c
parts of GCR, especially for lower income families. Anything from a single room to a large flat or traditional rural house can be found on the market either for rent or purchase.\footnote{At present there is only anecdotal information on land and housing markets in peri-urban areas of Greater Cairo. However, in the expanded housing demand survey to be carried out in 2008 (Ministry of Housing, Utilities and Urban Development, Ministry of Investment, and USAID) peri-urban areas of Greater Cairo are to be targeted as a separate geographic area for household sampling, and this should generate a wealth of information about housing markets and housing dynamics in these areas, and allow comparisons with other geographic areas of Egypt.}

Combined with the housing factor is the fact that peri-urban Greater Cairo is well served by affordable public transport systems and networks, which provide the needed mobility/access at cheap cost even from far distant settlements to the Greater Cairo core. (See the discussion in Section 8 above.) Thus potential residents can and do calculate the trade off between cheaper housing and higher expenditures on commuting.

Furthermore, the local economies of existing peri-urban settlements easily accommodate incremental growth and add needed services. And considerable employment and petty entrepreneur opportunities are generated within villages and informal settlements themselves. Although public services and infrastructure may be overburdened (and getting more so) in these areas, the situation does not seem to have gotten out of hand, so far at least.

Finally, social cohesion seems to be good in peri-urban settlements, even with substantial numbers of new arrivals. This is partly due to dynamic of informal settlement processes (which relies upon and works through social groupings), but also simply because there are existing tight communities upon which to build.\footnote{Sims, D. 2007}

\textit{Towards a Policy Framework for Peri-urban Areas of Greater Cairo}

There is currently a complete policy vacuum as concerns Greater Cairo's peri-urban areas. As mentioned above, the very phenomenon of huge population growth in these areas is hardly recognized.

A first step in formulating policies is very simple and obvious: the GOE must recognize and track the rapid population growth and the increasing concentration of poor and modest income families in peri-urban areas.\footnote{Sims, D. 2007} The fact that there are currently nearly four million inhabitants in peri-urban Greater Cairo (and that at least another 1.4 million inhabitants can be expected in the next ten years) must be recognized and incorporated at three levels:

\begin{itemize}
  \item At the governorate and local authority level, especially in terms of improved service delivery
  \item At the Greater Cairo planning level, especially in incorporating peri-urban areas into metropolitan transport and environmental strategies
  \item At the national level, especially in terms of greater allocations of investment budgets to support improved service delivery and infrastructure needs in peri-urban areas
\end{itemize}

In September 2007, the General Organization for Physical Planning "GOPP" started an important planning initiative for Alexandria and Greater Cairo, as well as for a number of
smaller cities.\textsuperscript{117} The concept of allowing a certain amount of urban expansion on agricultural land on the peri-urban areas has been introduced. This represents a fundamental departure from the long standing policy of prohibiting any building on agricultural land, and it is very welcome. The aim is to permit planned urban fringe growth both to meet the needs of the growing fringe urban population and also to limit and control the widespread phenomenon of informal and unplanned \textit{(aashwa'i)} development.

In both Alexandria and Greater Cairo, GOPP has prepared master plans which identify agricultural and vacant desert lands suitable for urban fringe growth. In all cases these lands are near to existing informal or aashwai'i areas, and plans call for layouts which will allow planned, orderly urbanization but which will also involve the "belting" (tahzim) of the informal areas to prevent the further creep of illegal construction.

GOPP's initiatives to create tahzim zones represent a radical departure from prevailing urban planning policies. Since at least the late 1970s no urban plans or projects have been initiated on private agricultural land in Egypt. Thus in a sense Egypt is entering a new era in terms of urban development, one which will require the re-invention of appropriate tools of planning and intervention, as well as a process of trial and error, refinement and feedback. This paper hopes to contribute to this process.

GOPP documentation states that the tahzim exercise has two main objectives:

\begin{itemize}
  \item The limiting of existing unplanned aashwa'i growth and the blocking of avenues of future aashwa'i expansion
  \item The limiting of the creation of new aashwa'i areas by giving alternative urban opportunities for planned expansion to meet the needs of inhabitants in existing aashwa'i areas for housing and services on lands which can absorb future growth.
\end{itemize}

These objectives are very noteworthy. In particular, the second objective directly addresses a crucial issue in Egyptian towns – the need to create housing, employment and economic opportunities, and services for the large and rapidly growing populations found in informal urban areas. Until now these inhabitants have had no affordable shelter alternatives other than what extra-legal informal areas themselves can provide\textsuperscript{118}.

The guidelines and standards for developing tahzim areas proposed in this note take this second objective as the main point of departure. They show how it is possible to capture the positive dynamics of informal areas and direct them towards planned and legal subdivisions, and in particular to replicate the housing processes which have in the past produced housing units which are suitable and affordable for the majority of urban Egyptians\textsuperscript{119}.

\textit{Lessons to be Extracted for The Global Level}

The case of peri-urban Greater Cairo may not contribute much to the global discourse of the peri-urban phenomenon. The reason is simply that the context of Greater Cairo is unique, given the fact that the region hinterlands have the stark geographic dichotomy of publicly owned desert on two sides and intensive agriculture and dense rural settlements on two others.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item\textsuperscript{117} GOPP, 2007
  \item\textsuperscript{118} Attempts over the last two decades to attract those of limited income to live in the new towns have been largely unsuccessful. Heavily-subsidized government housing has attracted some of the target population, but nowhere near the scale required, and at great cost.
  \item\textsuperscript{119} GOPP, 2007
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Egypt is certainly fortunate in having a desert hinterland. This had allowed Greater Cairo's expansion to bifurcate: Practically all industries over the last 30 years have located in planned desert estates, avoiding the common land-use and environmental conflict associated with metropolises whose expansion on all directions must confront a rural hinterland. Also, land-hungry global capitalist development, speculative subdivisions, public housing programs, and institutional and defense needs, all can find a home in the desert, a perfect match between lots of land and land-wasteful development, sanctioned and encouraged by the State.

By shunting off large scale formal urban development to the nearby deserts, the rural fringes have been left to "silently" absorb people and the dense and small-impact informal residential neighborhoods they create. It wasn’t planned that way. The rural hinterland was supposed to freeze as it was, and practically all population growth was to occur in the deserts. But the economics of housing and livelihoods for the mass of inhabitants has prevailed, and as a result, the rural fringes of Greater Cairo now have a population of in excess of 4 million inhabitants, and at least another 1.6 million can be expected to be added in 10 years. The incremental/informal mode of settlement expansion in these peri-urban areas is dense and efficient, minimizing the loss of the agricultural land which surrounds them. And since these areas are made up of well-established communities, there are not the jurisdictional and governance confusions so often associated with peripheral urban sprawl. There are certainly many problems in these areas, but they relate mostly to the lack of sufficient State investments in infrastructure and public services to keep up with population growth. A re-prioritization of government budgetary allocations could make these areas much better, and at little cost.

However, there are some lessons to be extracted out of the Cairo peri-urban case which could enlighten the global discourse on peri-urban policies:

**Shunting industry and other non-compatible land uses away from valuable rural hinterlands**

Although few expanding metropolises have the geographical dichotomy which Greater Cairo enjoys, many will have some fringe rural areas which are less heavily populated and are less valuable (e.g. swamps and low-lying land, barren soils, etc., especially those in State ownership) than others. A policy could be adopted to direct industry and other non-compatible land uses to these areas. As is the situation in Cairo, policies could be a combination of positive incentives (tax breaks, subsidized infrastructure, etc.) combined with enforced prohibitions against development in valuable and populated rural areas. This would at least limit the urban-rural land use conflicts on the metropolitan fringe. And it just might remove from populated fringe rural areas the frequently predatory behavior of formal, large scale and well-connected developers.

**Recognizing informal housing processes as part of the solution instead as a problem**

In almost all developing countries informal housing processes are very vibrant, they are people-centered, and they generate housing which is affordable. It is part of

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120 World Bank studies of peri-urban areas in Tirana, Albania, and Bishkek, Tajikistan underline the importance of the informal housing phenomenon, including how informal processes produce affordable housing solutions on the periphery which are accessible to migrants as well as city dwellers seeking better housing.
poorer and disadvantaged peoples struggle for better housing and livelihoods. As the case of Greater Cairo shows, informal housing processes easily fit with and graft themselves on to existing fringe rural settlements, with informal land markets which are equitable and work well. If such informal development were allowed or actually encouraged in metropolitan fringe rural areas, (perhaps formalized with very simple "rural" planning and building standards), then fringe metropolitan development might become more equitable. A spin-off benefit would be that some of the existing fringe rural inhabitants, most of whom will be poor, will benefit from the rise in land values such informal development generates.

Applying simple "rural" development programs to peri-urban areas with rapid uncontrolled population growth

As the case of peri-urban Greater Cairo shows, the most cost-effective and straightforward interventions which could dramatically improve living conditions in growing fringe areas are those which are largely rural in nature. All developing countries have rural development programs which focus on a wide range of issues, from rural health and education to rural roads, water supplies, and community empowerment. These could, with little bureaucratic effort, be concentrated in rapidly growing rural fringe areas of major cities, especially where much of the growing population is poor. This suggests that it is not always essential that fringe urban areas be rapidly designated "urban" in legal, bureaucratic, and jurisdictional terms. This is especially true if such designations will impose the kinds of rigid and modern planning and building standards which raise housing costs and preclude informal housing processes.
Planning, Spatial Structure of Cities and Provision of Infrastructure

The transport sector plays an important role in the economies of the MENA region. On average, transport represents seven to ten percent of the countries’ GDP, and employs around ten percent of the labor force. For most countries, the sector is central to their main objectives of accelerating economic development through export led growth, creating jobs, and reducing vulnerability and exclusion. It is also key to regional integration and vital to improving the quality of life and reducing poverty.

In general, with the exception of Yemen and Djibouti, transport systems in the MENA region are relatively well developed. Most countries have extensive road networks, with high capacity in some areas; they also have important facilities for air and sea transport, and, in several instances, a sizable rail network. The quality of transport infrastructure is, however, often deficient and cannot support growing, modern economies. There are also serious capacity gaps in urban and rural transport infrastructure and congestion is a growing and serious problem in most large urban areas. Institutions in charge of the sector are generally in place, but policy formulation and management capacity are often weak.121

Regulatory and financial systems also need development, especially to encourage more private sector participation in transport infrastructure and service provision which has traditionally been dominated by the public sector. Although GHG emissions are less than 6% of world total for the transport sector, some countries (especially the oil producers) are among the highest emitters on a GDP per capita basis. So far, also, very little has also been done for adapting the transport sector to climate change.

8.1 Key Issues in the Transportation Sector

The Population in the Middle East North Africa Region (MENA) region (approximately 300 million) is rapidly urbanizing and growing at an average annual rate of two percent. Already, eight of the region’s cities have more than three million citizens; Cairo and Tehran have more than ten million. Enhancing infrastructure capacity and service efficiency to accommodate the increased mobility of the expanding population, and the need of a growing economy, are challenges for the transport sector in MENA.

In general, transport systems in the MENA region are well developed (except in Yemen122 and Djibouti). Most countries have extensive road networks, with high capacity in some areas, and important facilities for air, sea, and rail transport. The quality of transport infrastructure is, however, often insufficient to support growing, modern economies. There are also serious capacity gaps in urban and rural transport infrastructure. Institutions in charge of the sector are generally in place, but are in need of improvements in terms of policy formulation and management capacity. Regulatory and financial systems also need development, especially to encourage more private sector participation in infrastructure and service provision123.

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121 World Bank, 2006
122 TEAM international and Sana'a Municipality, 2006
123 World Bank, 2006
The transport sector plays an important role in the economies of the MENA region. On average, transport represents seven to ten percent of the countries GDP, and employs around ten percent of the labor force. For most countries, the sector is central to their main objectives of accelerating economic growth, creating jobs, and reducing vulnerability and exclusion. It is also key to regional integration and vital to improving the quality of life and reducing poverty.

**Facilitating Trade and Promoting Growth through Greater Transport Efficiency:**

Economic growth and employment creation are priority objectives for most countries in the region. To achieve them, it is essential to develop trade. Over the past couple of years, however, the region has lost global market share in many export sectors, and non-oil exports represent just one percent of world trade, which is the lowest share of any developing region. While a number of factors have contributed to this reduction, deficient transport infrastructure and services in many countries of the region have adversely affected trade flows through higher costs. Trading blocs, such as the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area, could potentially increase trade and promote economic growth throughout the MENA region; however, for these arrangements to have an impact, cost-effective transport services, efficient facilitation, and transport infrastructure with ample coverage, good inter-modal connectivity, and sufficient capacity to accommodate traffic flows are required.

**Upgrading Urban Transport Services:** With almost 60 percent of its population living in cities, the MENA region is far more urbanized than East Asia or South Asia. Yet the development of urban transport systems, and particularly public transport, has lagged. As a result, many of the region’s large urban areas, where the bulk of GDP is produced, face increasingly difficult transport problems with a high degree of traffic congestion, reduced mobility, and deteriorating air quality. Most of the larger cities have experienced rapid growth in transport demand, but because public transport services have not kept pace with demand, there is excessive reliance on private automobiles. This exacerbates congestion and air pollution, increases overall transport costs, and reduces opportunities and quality of life, while affecting cities’ competitiveness and economic growth. In Cairo and Tehran ambient concentrations of sulphur dioxide, particulates and nitrous oxides regularly exceed the World Health Organization’s guidelines.

In May 2007, Dubai is officially the most congested city in the Middle East, according to the latest survey by GulfTalent.com. The survey, which was conducted last month and released just before the launch of Dubai’s new road toll system (Salik), found that professionals working in Dubai spend on average 1 hour and 45 minutes each day in total commuting time to and from their place of work, the highest figure in the region. The journey times are particularly long for those commuting to Dubai from neighboring Sharjah, home to many expatriates working in Dubai. Although just 15 km away and connected to Dubai via two express highways, Sharjah residents working in Dubai reported spending on average 2 hours and 44 minutes for the daily return journey to and from work, much of it in slow-moving bumper-to-bumper traffic. According to GulfTalent.com, many employers in the emirate are becoming increasingly concerned at the impact of traffic-related stress and exhaustion on the productivity of their staff. Cairo came second in the traffic rankings, with total daily commute

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124 Ibid
125 Ibid

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time at 1 hour and 33 minutes on average. Jeddah, by contrast, saw the lowest reported commute time, with employees spending on average just 46 minutes each day commuting.\footnote{GulfTalent.com, 2007}

Figure 8.1: Average Commute Time per Day in Selected MENA cities

In addition, based on GulfTalent.com’s survey findings, Dubai also tops the list as the city with the most acute shortage of parking space, with nearly half the respondents reporting difficulties in finding parking space near their place of work. Many reported having to leave home much earlier than necessary, to avoid the morning rush and to secure a parking space close to their place of work. Dammam in Saudi Arabia was the easiest city for finding parking space, with only 21\% reporting shortages.\footnote{Ibid}

While Dubai’s traffic and parking problems have been the most acute, all major cities in the region have been experiencing growing congestion. The recent oil-driven economic boom, combined with greater availability of auto financing and the lack of a modern public transport network, have led to greater demand for private transport and a sharp rise in car ownership across the region. At the same time, spiraling rents have forced many residents to seek cheaper accommodation in more distant locations, further adding to the traffic problem.

The GCC governments have been investing heavily in their road infrastructure, although this has not kept pace with the increase in the number of vehicles, leading to growing problems of congestion. Ironically, some of the investment in transport infrastructure has, in the short term, exacerbated the congestion problem due to ongoing construction work and the associated diversions and road blockages.

\footnotesize 126 GulfTalent.com, 2007
127 Ibid

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According to some traffic experts, Dubai is suffering from an originally flawed road system, with in-built bottlenecks on certain key routes such as the Dubai-Sharjah road. Over time, however, the new infrastructure including transit trains, the new bridges and complex of flyovers is expected to ease congestion to some extent.

A core underlying problem remains that, across much of the region, the development of support infrastructure is lagging behind more prestigious mega-projects such as airports, business parks, and high-rise towers – leading to continuous bottlenecks and disruptions in traffic.  

Expanding Rural Access: Transport is a critical input for accessing markets, health centers, schools and other social and administrative services, and populations without dependable access are generally poorer than those with reliable access. This is particularly true for those rural areas that are distant from roads with regular motorized transport services. For many rural communities in the MENA region, however, year-round access is limited by the poor condition of rural road networks and the lack of basic transport services. With just 22 percent of the rural population living within two kilometers of an all-purpose road, access in Yemen is very low by international comparison. With some 45 percent living within one kilometer of an all-weather road, access in Morocco is improving though still lagging. In general, throughout the MENA region, improving mobility of the rural inhabitants, which make up about 40 percent of the population, facilitates access to markets and services, and will be essential for reducing rural poverty.

Promoting Private Sector Participation to meet growing transport needs:

Throughout the 1990s, most countries encouraged private participation in the development of infrastructure facilities and services. In 1997, private investment flows to infrastructure

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128 World Bank, 2006
projects throughout the MENA region peaked at approximately US$5.7 billion, but have been on a steady decline ever since. Yet, the need to build additional capacity at airports and ports, and to extend and maintain road and motorway networks has continued to grow. To meet this additional demand in a fiscally constrained environment, the private sector can still have an important role to play. The challenge remains one of removing major constraints, supporting policymakers to build institutional, regulatory, and financial frameworks that are favorable for private participation, and developing well-structured transactions to better fit the economic and political context of MENA countries.129

**Improving Road Safety:** Inadequate urban and interurban road networks, weak institutional and legal frameworks, unsatisfactory enforcement of traffic and transport regulations, and shortcomings in safety information and education contribute to poor road safety records in many countries throughout the region. In 2003, the fatality rate on Jordanian roads averaged 18 deaths per 10,000 vehicles, while in Iran that figure was about 45 deaths per 10,000 vehicles, or twenty times the average for industrialized countries. Similar records are witnessed by other countries of the region. There is a need to formulate and consistently implement appropriate national road safety plans that integrate institutional, regulatory and physical improvements.130

8.2. Water Supply and Sewage Services in MENA Region

8.2.1 Urban Planning and Infrastructure in Egypt

Although the delivery of Water supply and sewage services in Egypt may be seen as one of main decentralized services since there is a special entity within each local governmental responsible for managing and implementing infrastructure projects within its jurisdiction, a careful look would reveal that central control in the delivery of this service has taken the dominant role. The last two decades have witnessed substantial governmental intervention within this sector to provide these two basic services to all human settlements in Egypt. Concerning the water supply, the government has managed to cover 100% of all cities and almost 96% of villages. However, the sewage services still need huge investments to cover all human settlements. The total investment within water supply and sanitation has exceeded LE 60 billion within the last 20 years.131

The urban planning has shaped the provision of infrastructure in Egypt since it is prohibited to connect any building with the basic infrastructure unless it is located within the urban boundaries of a village or a city, which should have a detailed plan. Based on that, only official areas have had the possibility of accessing the main infrastructure depending on the governmental resources and priorities. This legal situation has resulted in absolute exclusion of informal settlements from any governmental programs for infrastructure provision till 1993 when the government started its national program for upgrading informal settlements with the main focus of providing those deprived areas with infrastructure.132

Today with the rapid urbanization process, especially in peri-urban areas, the main problems found in the peri-urban areas of Greater Cairo can mostly be blamed on a lack of sufficient

129 Ibid
130 Ibid
131 MHUUD,2008
132 World Bank, 2006
public investment. It is infrastructure and public facilities which are in a poor state and cannot serve the large and growing populations of this urban hinterland. Although it is difficult to generalize across the whole peri-urban geographic space, the following can be said to be the main problems:133

Wastewater systems do not cover most of the expanding villages, although all of the established towns have such systems in the central areas. Even where systems networks exist, they tend to be overburdened and blockages and overflows are common. Also, not all buildings are connected to the networks (due to the high cost of such connections). Villagers complain of rising water tables, which reduces the efficiency of their individual septic tank and soak away systems, requiring frequent (and costly) emptying by suction truck.

Water systems cover virtually all peri-urban villages and towns, but water cuts are common and inhabitants complain of chronic low pressure (especially on the fringes of service areas), forcing those in multi-story buildings to install small electric pumps. Also, water losses are said to be high and the water quality is variable, probably due to back-contamination from groundwater sewerage effluent when system pressure drops.

Electricity networks cover virtually the whole peri-urban landscape, and power is considered by inhabitants the least problematic of all utilities. Yet due to ever increasing system demand, complaints are heard of low voltage and brownouts.

Major roads, especially those which are regional or national in nature (such as the Cairo-Alex Agricultural Road, the Upper Egyptian Road, and the Ismailia Canal Road) are in good condition although road geometry and traffic control could be greatly improved. However, the condition of minor roads and streets and access lanes is, on the other hand, deplorable. Usually those minor roads are badly maintained which increase the economic costs, in terms of lost time and depreciation of vehicles.

Public facilities, especially schools at all levels, are said to be acutely deficient, overcrowded, and poorly run.

Solid waste collection and disposal is limited to the center of the main peri-urban towns (e.g. Qaliub, Qanatir el Kheiriyia, Khanka, etc.), with virtually no regular collection of wastes in any of the expanding village settlements nor on the fringes of agglomerations.

Irrigation Canals and Drains, which run throughout the peri-urban landscape, are mostly open channels which become clogged with rubbish and garbage. This is due to the rural practice, in the absence of solid waste collection systems, of dumping into canals, and it is a serious environmental problem throughout rural Egypt. However, it is particularly acute in peri-urban Greater Cairo, where the volume of wastes generated by the rapidly increasing populations is very high. In the centers of some villages and towns canals have been covered (usually under joint SFD/Ministry of Water Resources initiatives), but this solution is expensive and can never extend to all the hundreds of kilometers of canals found crisscrossing the peri-urban landscape.

Most of these problems either relate to insufficient investment budget allocations to peri-urban areas or structural problems in the sectors themselves. Public investment budgeting in Egypt is an annual event which is very centralized, and growing peri-urban areas simply do not capture their share, mainly due to central budgeting mechanisms, where investment allocations tend to follow -- in each geographic area and sector -- the levels of previous years, and do not take into account rapid population growth and associated needs.

8.2.2. Urban Planning and Infrastructure in Yemen

The supply of infrastructure services is negatively affected by several factors. The most important factor is that the existing land pricing system does not include a provision for the delivery of infrastructure services a priori, which means that parcels in the new land subdivisions are delivered without services. The absence of services (especially access roads, water supply, and electricity) significantly delays the settlements’ densification, as many prefer for services to arrive before they move in. This in turn delays the formation of the critical population mass needed to lobby local authorities for service delivery. Such land subdivisions thus remain unserviced and largely uninhabited for a long time.\(^{134}\)

Another constraint to service delivery is the authorities’ inability to preserve from encroachment land earmarked for future services and public amenities (e.g. schools, health centers, etc), which complicates the service delivery process. There are also serious capacity constraints for water and electric power supply threatening Yemeni’s Cities future growth. Steep topography, especially in the case of the illegal settlements that develop on mountain slopes (e.g. Al Koda and the squatter pockets in Ba Aboud and Al Salam areas) adds technical difficulty and consequently more cost to service delivery. Finally, the lack of funds for the maintenance of existing services and capital investment is a chronic problem, although not only in Mukalla but also in all other Yemeni cities.\(^{135}\)

There are several demand-side constraints to service delivery. Most importantly, the combination of low-density sprawl in the suburbs promoted by the recent pattern of land distribution (which increases the unit cost of service delivery) and the cost sharing formula applied by the authorities for the supply of water, sewerage and electric power (which will be discussed in the next section) makes for a prohibitive cost of service delivery. In addition, widespread poverty in Yemeni cities and for some illegal land tenure act as constraints to demand for services.

As already elaborated before, there are at least some services available in most of the informal areas. The main problems and challenges related to infrastructure in informal areas can be summarized as follows:

- Drinking water and sanitation, electricity, street pavement, transportation, emergency and security services are often insufficient, inadequate or even missing altogether. As illustrated in Table 8-1 below, all but six areas are connected to the public electricity network. Usually, only part of the area is covered by the public system and households in the other parts extend electricity cables informally. Connections to private households are often quite hazardous, executed with substandard material and with

\(^{134}\) Touber J.,2004
\(^{135}\) Dar El-Handasah,2004
cables hanging around everywhere. Local distribution networks tend to be overburdened and many residents have to cope with frequent electricity cuts.

- Water is mainly provided by water tankers and sometimes from private wells which are available in altogether 13 out of the 35 areas included in this study. Areas on steep slopes and unpaved streets are difficult to access for water tankers. In locations with difficult access, residents have to pay increased prices or must even carry the water to their homes on foot. Three areas are at least partially connected to the public sewer network. Provision of basic commodities is burdensome since residents have sometimes to walk long distances before they reach the next transportation line. Emergency situations can be quite desperate if ambulances, fire fighters or other emergency services cannot reach the location.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Name of Area</th>
<th>Source of Water</th>
<th>Sewerage</th>
<th>Electricity</th>
<th>Street Paving</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>‘Atan</td>
<td>×</td>
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<td>Faj ‘Atan</td>
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<td>Dar Silm</td>
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<td>public network</td>
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x = majority  * = minority

*Source: El-Shorbagi, M. 2008*
8.2.3. Urban Planning and Infrastructure in Iraq

Housing provided by government during the last three decades was less than 5% of the total built dwelling units. According to Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction 2000 estimate, deficit in housing stock was 882,000 dwelling units (the three northern governorates not included) the same estimate stated that the deficit would reach 1.4 million dwelling units during the period (2003-2012) assuming that the average family size is 7 persons/family. Public Construction companies, with availability of resources, are only able to build 100,000 dwellings in the next 10 years. In 2003, a joint team from the Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction and CPA had estimated the required financial resources to build 140 housing complexes (70,000 dwelling units) in 15 governorates during 2004 at two billions US Dollar and reconstruction period of 20 months for each housing complex. The plan is to continue till 2014 for building 1,130 housing complexes (570,000 dwelling units). According to the Ministry, they are able to build 10,000 dwelling units/year and this would require the cooperation of the private sector.136

The issue of informal settlements upgrading has been on the government agenda since long. In the 1980s, the Japanese Consortium of Consulting Firm (JCCF) led action to investigate slum areas in Baghdad. 40 areas were identified and 12 of these, in Al-Kadhymia and Al-Adhamia, Al-Rusafa, Nissan, Al-Futjalia and Cheftlic, were targeted for improvements in three years. However, only two of these areas exist today, namely Al-Futhaliya (250 hectares and 4040 houses) and Cheftlic (300 hectares and 2000-2500 houses) since the others were cleared and residences provided with governmental land.

Infrastructure programmes include mainly water supply projects. For water supply, a continuous programme for supplying water networks in Iraqi Governorates is implemented annually with 2004 total budget of USD 101.3 Million and projected budget of USD76.7 Million for 2005. Projects include building, rehabilitation and completion of water systems, new water provision projects, construction of networks and fences and maintenance projects. Many projects have been implemented with cooperation from ‘Humanitarian Organizations’137. Although land was available in cities by virtue of land allocation programmes, the lack of services and infrastructure prohibited the construction of residential buildings on these lands. Unserviced lands seem to be the norm in Iraqi cities. This has given the image of the “vacant city” to be the predominant character of main cities in Iraq. According to the Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction, there are 1,035,896 plots delivered for horizontal housing, have no services (this figure does not include the three northern governorates)

Detailed plans for different services, e.g. roads, paving, basic services, etc. were not completed and many plots were delivered to the public without services despite the fact that citizens had paid the fees for these services at registration. Constraints on supply of serviced land have an impact on housing supply and resulted in degradation of these areas. Bureaucratic obstacles facing the revision of Physical Plans and thus the expansion of serviced areas of cities has impeded the development of new sites for housing, and thus slowed down the housing market, and led this important economic sector to stagnation. The stagnation of the housing and infrastructure industry has directly affected the job market, particularly the poor in their pursuit of job opportunities requiring basic skills. The housing

136 UNHABITAT, 2006
137 Ibid
industry provides socio-economic stability and is an important form of asset creation and savings, it also provides access to urban economy especially as the housing industry is considered to be a key source of employment\textsuperscript{138}.

\textsuperscript{138} Ibid

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The Monitoring and Evaluation of Urban Plans

Monitoring urban growth and developing the required indicators for future urban development policies have recently been recognized by several governments in developing countries as tools for better urban management of not only their growing urban agglomerations but small urban centers as well. While the urban planning process in most of MENA region countries has substantially improved within the last decade, very little progress has been realized in monitoring and evaluation as integral parts of the process. Traditional techniques for monitoring and evaluation such as objective assessment of stated goals or the suitability of plans to local needs and how they managed to realize their stated objectives have not been commonly adopted in the region.

The major shift in the urban planning process in Egypt from physical to strategic planning is a positive step towards filling this gap, however, the relatively short period of applying this new approach has not enable yet efficient evaluation of the process. On the other hand, some countries in the region started to apply simple technique to monitor urban growth and realization of urban plans through embracing land cadastre systems, housing and real estate registry systems to realize the scale of new development and its direction, and periodical national and local census and development of statistical frameworks to achieve the same objective.

All these tools support the decision making process for urban development. A recent innovative monitoring methodology and urban data analysis developed by UN-HABITAT is the "Urban Observatory". This initiative, although not mainly meant to be a monitoring and evaluation tool, it could be utilized to give very good indications on directions, trends and characters of urban growth and its related socio-economic aspects, which could substantially affect and support the urban planning process, when being collected and analyzed periodically.

In addition, land information and monitoring has been argued as the corner stone for the success or failure of any land development system and urban planning whether on central or local levels. Several initiatives to improve the land development process and allow different classes in society access to land and services in addition to improving financial capacity of local government have failed due to lack of land information system through which land ownership, valuation, taxes and service charges could be recorded. Several innovative practices have taken place to establish a land cadastre system and database for infrastructure management in developing countries. This contributed to substantial improvement in the land development process on the longer term.

The Arab league attaches great importance to the issue of establishing an urban observatory in the Arab countries; this requires building a network of national and local urban observatories in all the Arab countries. Moreover, the Arab league urges the Arab countries with all its cities and intended authorities to focus on urban development and the production of indicators which help as an important tool in making policies and plans to achieve this goal.

The analytical research of the available data illustrate how the Arab experiments in the field of urban observatories is until now a modest one due to the lack of a mechanism for collecting data and analyzing it. Following is a brief example of some of these experiments in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Yemen and Egypt.
9.1 Monitoring and Evaluation in Saudi Arabia

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia represented by the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs took the initiative in building a national urban observatory and encouraging different regions and cities in the Kingdom to build a national network for urban observation. One of these projects is the establishment of an observatory in Jeddah. However, the city of Al Madinah Al-Monawara was one of the first cities that responded to the Kingdom's initiative and established an urban observatory that works with memorable capability.

The ever-increasing urge for mobilizing a steadily growing metropolitan city has generated many problems such as unemployment, poverty, ghetto and the decline of urban services. In order to combat these problems in Jeddah, Riyadh and Al-Madinah it became necessary for the development of an urban observatory.

Henceforth, the vital role of the urban observatory stems from its measuring capability and effectiveness of the local authorities in achieving on going urban development and setting up efficient urban plans for future growth.

As a more efficient and accurate way of collecting and analyzing information, Jeddah's urban observatory established a more tactical approach by implementing the use of the Geographical Information System (GIS). This results in increased capability in dealing with problems caused by Jeddah's current expansive urbanization growth.

Further, the Jeddah Urban Observatory works within the International Urban Observatory System to benefit from its vast experience and knowledge in obtaining development objectives keeping in mind our own general strategies in keeping with the vision of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

The observatory through human and technical resources will study the international urban development indicators and contrive what is best suited for Jeddah.

The observatory role includes surveying, documenting, retaining, and analyzing information, henceforth-generating overall urban development indicators, applied surveillances and locality analysis utilizing geographical information system.

The observatory output will enable decision-makers to monitor urban development status in the economical, constructional and environmental areas and will no doubt help urban development efforts to achieve its desired targets.

9.2 Monitoring and Information Management in Iraq

The Central Organization for Statistics and information Technology (COSIT) within the Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation produces the Annual Abstract of Statistics every year which reflects continuous scientific and applied efforts aimed at providing a comprehensive package of data and information covering the various aspects of economic and social life in Iraq.
The local development community being separated from international development for years of war and as a society governed by a centralized government system, lacks systematic knowledge about international best practice and the application of decentralized systems and market based instruments. Currently, development projects, often assisted by external third parties from governments and/or international non-governmental organizations deliver knowledge needed. While such interventions are helpful, they need coordination to avoid confusion and duplication.

Development still is at an infant stage, where governmental organizations still having major data gaps or information with questionable accuracy, particularly, about most localities. These government organizations are to date using manual systems in monitoring, recording, documenting, mapping, and disseminating information. In practice much knowledge already exists but needs to be identified, organized and updated. However, results-based management techniques, including setting development objectives and agreeing on indicators, have not been used to-date.

Municipalities often lack adequate management information systems to enable them to adequately monitor and understand the impact of various municipal programmes. Often no adequate internal (horizontal and vertical) co-ordination mechanisms, which will enable municipal policy makers to ensure coordination and cooperation in the implementation of the various sectoral programmes, exist. Problems are often aggravated by limited number of trained staff available at local level to perform many municipal functions.

Some ministries and governmental organizations have GIS departments within their organizational structures (Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works, Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation, and the Mayoralty of Baghdad). Most of these departments are newly created and are in the process of building their capacities. In summary, problems associated with technology introductions are; hardware and software costs, availability of training and institutions, data collection, data quality, data updating, and data sharing mechanisms.

Law 14/1991 has in the past regulated employees’ conduct. Institutions responsible for monitoring urban administration exist on various levels. On the state level there is the Independent Integrity Commission (founded by CPA resolution No. 55/2003) responsible for monitoring all financial issues and any corruption related to financial transactions; and the Financial Audit Commission (Divan) responsible for checking all financial issues in all Ministries and governmental organizations. On the ministry level, there are two main monitoring devices. First, the Inspector General Office linked directly to the Minister’s, and second, the Department of Audit. On project level, special independent committees monitor project tendering, implementation and evaluation.

Information systems in most governmental organizations are weak and under developed. The archives in many ministries were lost during the chaos of looting and burning. Lack of trained staff, equipment and new documenting technology had compounded the problem further, which resulted in lack of detailed and reliable data and information, which even when available, are not easily accessed. Database and information on Land are usually inadequate and often out of date or inaccurate and lacking financial resources to improve them. Old regulations are repeated and dubious assumptions are not challenged. Existing sources of local knowledge are often overlooked in favour of central policy and political intervention,
which means that any data needs to be investigated before use in any report or research in land management in Iraq.

Information management needs to be strengthened to enforce normal land market. Information transparency and delivery need legislative changes more than capacity building efforts. A Public Information Act should institute good information management and should strengthen the right of citizens to information as instituted in the PAC. Improved information technology should enable the delivery of timely land information to the public. The need to introduce new archives technology and establish inventory mechanism in each ministry is essential to improve documentation system. Moreover, technical assistance for training and workshops focused on developing staff skill is important.

Lack of securing tenure, and associated pro-poor information systems, by most informal area residents as well as the short termed leasing policy, provides insecure conditions, and, coupled with conflicting legislation, the livelihood of citizens are at risk. Although previous limited decrees have been issued for the provision of land to vulnerable groups such as pensioners and martyrs, other non-military or government sectors such as widows or women-led households were not included.

9.3 Monitoring and Evaluation of Urban Planning in Egypt

The issue of mentoring and evaluating the urban development in Egypt is relatively new practice. Despite the previous efforts of preparing master plans for almost 85 cities (out of total of 222 cities), the urban development that took place within those cities did not largely followed the plans. In addition, the Ministry of Housing, Utilities and Urban Development, the main responsible arm for providing the basic urban services and shelter has faced difficulties in acquiring credible information about land and shelter in order to draw its national policies and related programs.

Accordingly, in 2003, the General Organization for Physical Planning (GOPP) has established an urban Observatory unit within its organizational structure to carry out those important tasks. Several Bilateral agreements have been signed and enacted with CIDA and KOICA to build the capacity of GOPP technical team in collecting and analyzing urban indicators and several pilot schemes have been carried out. Lately, in a step to improve the urban planning process, the GOPP has shifted towards the strategic planning approach and currently preparing the strategic urban plans for the largest 53 cities as the first phase of a national program for preparing strategic plans for all Egyptian cities in 5 years time with the technical support of UNHABITAT.

The strategic planning process is totally built on the participatory planning approach where the different development stakeholders are involved in setting development objectives, defining priority areas for intervention, defining the new urban boundary for the city and agreeing on the main projects to be implemented within the first five years. The process also includes collecting basic urban indicators within those cities which could be later used as a data base for tracing the urban growth and impact of plans on the socio-economic and physical aspects. The indicators are been collected by the consulting firms preparing the strategic plan. Training and capacity building support has been provided by GOPP in that respect. An ambitious plan is on the way to train the local governmental staff to start updating those indicators and to follow up the implementation of the strategic plans for their cities.
Finally, the new building law imposed in 2008, has stipulated that all strategic plans are to be reviewed and updated within a maximum five year period. This process will also enable good monitoring and evaluation for the success of these plans to realize their stated objectives.

9.4 Conclusion

While significant progress has been made in increasing the level of citizen involvement in many countries of the region, these efforts have been concentrated primarily in the area of organizing broader public discussions of proposals and alternatives prepared by expert teams. To a lesser extent, some progress has been achieved in engaging the public more actively in the processes of goal-setting and plan development. However, very little has been accomplished in integrating broader public participation in the process of monitoring and control. Significant advances in this area can be achieved by non-profit organizations, citizen groups, expert committees, or professional firms.

Access to information in plan monitoring and evaluation accumulated from good practices around the world and within the region is another underutilized method of increasing the effectiveness of urban planning. It is hoped that global urban observatory initiative can play a pivotal role in that respect.

Finally, review and regular updating of prepared strategic or master plans represent a good mechanism for monitoring and evaluation of urban plans. However, the willingness of governments to apply that through allocating the necessary funds would represent the cornerstone for embarking this tool.
10. Planning Education

10.1 Introduction

Planning education is something to said to be theoretical, with too much attention to producing plans as documents, or as a space in the urban design traditions, and too little to the actual outcomes in practice.

In most of the MENA region's countries, current planning teaching and practice emphasizes heavily the physical aspects of planning. As we've entered the 3rd millennium, future urban planning teaching and practice in all countries – especially MENA countries – should expand to cover the following related issues, which present some obstacles in the way as well.

10.2 Planning Education: Interrelated key Issues

With the globalization of the world economy, national prosperity is no longer depending on how good each country feels about itself, or what has it achieved, but prosperity depends on the abilities of MENA countries to compete in the world economy, and to operate efficiently as an urban system, with all parts in this system working together, and here it is the connection between preparing abilities for the globalization challenges, and planning education to face these challenges.

Generally, most MENA countries are providing pre-employment technical and vocational training (TVT), often looking towards this as a solution to unemployment. However, these programs often focus on enrolling unemployed youth, rather than ensuring their employability. The Education Group has helped to define needed reforms in the area of technical and vocational training in a number of countries (e.g., Egypt, Jordan, Iran and Yemen) with a greater focus on matching the skill needs of the economy and providing opportunities for lifelong learning. Furthermore, the World Bank supports the implementation of reforms in Egypt that attempt to ensure that vocational training programs are better matched to the needs of the private sector. Similar approaches are under preparation in Yemen and Jordan.

Urban planner need to be prepared through formal education and practice to deal with more diversified issues of how to provide to make the urban environment more attractive to the growing diversifying activities.

Towards this, Strategic planning becomes of a great importance in shaping cities future. The following key issues can reflect this:

10.2.1 Universities and Planning Schools are isolated from the internal societies

As a result of this, the interaction between academic staff and the society and government making bodies is not at the best. Professional staff interaction between local academic planning institutions and similar international institutions is not frequent, and depend mostly on personal efforts.

139 The World Bank, 2006e
10.2.2 Planning is not turned to realities

For most of the planning techniques are theoretical and a wide gap is forming between planning and society's needs. By other words, there is a gap between what is taught in planning schools and skills needed by the practitioners in the real world. There is a growing concern about the effectiveness of current teaching and learning methods in planning schools because of the complex nature as well as the ongoing change in the evolution of different trends in development and planning practices.¹⁴⁰ This can be seen in almost all MENA countries, except Jordan, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and UAE.

10.2.3 Planning teaching and practice reflects only the physical aspects

As planning is a multi disciplinary activity, physical planners find it difficult to tune in to other participating professionals, also that social, demographic and economic aspects are not addressed properly.

Other issues can also be addressed, as follows:

- Land markets and land values are marginally introduced in urban planning teaching and practice
- Urban Management is reduced to dealing with the crisis of the moment
- Inadequate contribution of urban planning towards shaping future societies' development.
- Missing Legal Planning Framework.
- Community views are hardly accounted for in Planning.
- Using recent Information technologies in Planning in a very slow rate

10.3 The changing pattern of education and planning

Need for a specific education and training in the physical planning field has appeared after the Second World War, in 1945. From the sixties to the eighties the pressing urban and territorial changes driven by technological advances was no longer sustainable at the environmental level, as well as the sharp contrast between the famous two political systems divided the world in to two political trends, plus that the citizens were not called to participate in any trials for developing their cities.

At the beginning of the nineties, with the globalization trends to be started to invade the while world, new planning trends in theoretical and practical aspects have emerged.

10.3.1 Planners Role

Planners perform different roles in almost all life activities. All industrial, agricultural, tourist, institutional, health, services… etc should have planning departments, with planners acting in different aspects.

The gap between what is taught in the planning schools and the skills needed in the real world is widening. For example, while all skills must be oriented to cope with the strategic planning

¹⁴⁰ The World Bank, 2005
concepts and practices, in order to define a real output for these plans explaining projects priorities and their budgets, classical approaches in planning; as structure and master plans are still taught. There is a growing concern about the effectiveness of current teaching and learning methods in planning institutes because of the complex nature and the ongoing changes in the different trends and planning practice evolution, complexity, rapid urbanization and continuous change in the role of professionals.

10.3.2 Education and Practice: The Egyptian Context

In Egypt, planning is taught in architectural departments, in engineering schools and universities. Most of the Urban and regional planning institutes and faculties are extended to include other relevant disciplines such as sociology, economics, environmental sciences. Despite of this, planning education in Egypt – in almost all universities – had always been based on classical master planning (survey – analysis – plan). But recently, since 2001, many of the architecture departments has established special departments to teach planning, by all its levels, local, regional and national spatial ones, in order to cope with the new trends are taken outside the education field, specially in outside consultation entities which has is the same time been oriented towards the new approaches in urban and physical planning practically.

Education methods, techniques, and tools are directed towards producing comprehensive blueprint master plans and designs reflecting scientific, expertise based technologies, as well as a top down, non participatory approaches. This has produced planners who can fit the limited system in to which they recruited on graduation.

Planning practice in Egypt is still dominated by "master planning" approach in dealing with both new and existing communities. Although there have been several attempts to introduce new bottom up, participatory approaches through several experimental and demonstration development projects in the last 2 decades, planning practice in both central and local public institutions and private professional firms is still limited to the classical traditional planning model. This has recently changed, as an obligatory approach, witnessing issuing the new planning law 119 for year 2008, which focuses on doing all plans – in any spatial level – dealing with the strategic approach.

10.3.3 Skills and Competencies – Case of Egypt

In order to address the new and emerging problems of urban areas, many new and innovative planning curricula, which deal with the issues facing urban planning, are applied in some of the MENA region's countries, specially in Jordan, Yemen, Syria, Turkey and Tunisia.

Planning is taught mainly in architectural departments of engineering schools, with an exception of faculty of Urban and Regional Planning (FURP) - Cairo university and specialized departments in EinShams and AlAzhar universities, where exclusive planning education is extended over a period of five years at the undergraduate level. Also, planning is associated with both; architectural engineering and environmental trends, as complementary activities.

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141 The World Bank, 2006e
The emphasis of planning education is on the application of methodologies of physical planning in new and existing regions and cities. In (FURP) this emphasis is extended to include other relevant disciplines; such as sociology, economics and environmental sciences. Despite these differences, curricula, planning education in all Egyptian universities is currently – and has always been – based on classical master planning.

Education curriculum at (FURP) includes\textsuperscript{142}:

- Theoretical courses on planning history, theories and systems.
- Scientific thinking, research methods, system analysis.
- Applied courses in regional and city planning, urban design, landscape planning.
- Introductory courses in related disciplines; such as urban – rural sociology, urban economics, road and transportation systems, infrastructure systems, urban management, and legislations.

10.3.4 Emerging Trends in Planning Practice

Although planning practice in Egypt is still dominated by "master planning" approach in dealing with both new and existing communities there have been several attempts to introduce new bottom up, participatory approaches through several experimental and demonstration development projects in the last 2 decades, planning practice in both central and local public institutions and private professional firms is still limited to the classical traditional planning model.

Five different areas of high "uncertainty" require deep understanding by planners, and the way they are taught to the planning students must be reviewed. These areas are determined by the changing nature of urbanization; as a complex growing context. Without an understanding to each of this, planners will have a limited ability to engage with the rapid urbanization issues and their reflections. These areas are:

1. Development Finance and land investment market
2. Role of informal sector in urban development, and its contribution to the process of urbanization.
3. Community participation, and all new forms of relationships with the community, NGO's and civil society agencies
4. The changing forms of governance.
5. New role of the city, from a traditional settlement to an economic, social, environmental catalyst in a sustainable system.

10.3.5 Planners Skills and Competencies

Enabling planning in the 21st. century needs many systems to be integrated and put in place in order to help planning schools and their associations in various parts of the world to respond to new and changing planning issues.

With this framework; planning education needs to be concerned with developing enabling skills based on a wider circle of knowledge of aspect that are directly involved in the new

\textsuperscript{142} Planning for the Real World, 1999

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planning mechanism. The educational curriculums have to address a wide variety of issues away from physical planning. These could be summarized under three broad categories: 143

**A. Development of Knowledge:**

*Environmental and Ecological systems:* cause it's a key factor in any development policy in the 21st century, and it's hard to ignore its effect on local and global economic, social and cultural aspects of human life. The awareness of such environmental influence is crucial to enabling planning as it poses the challenge of reducing the conflict between sustainable environmental sensitive development and the capitalist mode of economic.

*High Tech Networking and the information Technology:* rapid and cheaper forms of telecommunications have increasingly made cities dependent upon economies, which transcend the nation-state, thus enabling local to global communication, which had been unimagined.

*Transportation (local and global):* transportation is becoming an increasing factor in the success of planning policies. The effect of transportation technologies and advancements do not only influence the physical forms and the definition of place, but affects economic and political structures as well as social and cultural capacities. Managing transportation and its impact on the ecology, the economic mobility, and ways of life is becoming an important to in planning for the 21st century.

*Markets and the New Division of Labor (local to global economy):* several questions arise associating with an understanding of regional, national and local economic development policies:

i. How to improve the economic base of a city, or region, and provide productive employment?
ii. How to recapture more land values generated by urban growth to finance other investments?
iii. How to initiate financial resources to meet massive needs of general service, housing and infrastructure?
iv. How to take advantage of low-income progressive housing investments patterns to develop affordable but efficient communities?
v. How to incorporate environment resources as an element for constructive development rather than restrict development?

**B. Development of Enabling planning Techniques**

Regarding that Jordan, Egypt UAE & Bahrain had recently applied Strategic Planning in many projects, as pilots for further ones, in both academic and practical fields, the following issues are very important, as guidelines to be followed by other MENA countries:

*Evaluation and prioritization techniques:* the development of evaluation and the prioritization techniques and methods are important in enabling planning curriculum, through 3 main aspects: a) specific forms of discipline on the collection and interpretation of information.. b) the variables examined, c) standards developed for evaluation.

143 Kamel, 1999
Presentations conducting Workshops: a crucial component of enabling planning is to give presentation of similar experience and conduct workshops for planning design and implementation.

Surveying and Documentation: planners should be educated about means and methods to conduct environmental, social, economic and political surveys and documentation besides the traditional education of conducting physical surveys that may include some analysis and understanding of minor social and economic potential of local communities.

Technical Assistance and Training Programs: departing point in enabling planning is an awareness of its techniques, processes, and methods of implementation. All cannot be effective without substantial knowledge of training and informative techniques that should be the base in implantation courses for enabling planning.

C. Building Community and political Awareness:

Political structure: implementing any planning process, dealing with issues of local community, environmental potentials and constraints, and economic development without awareness of the political structures and how the hierarchy of power is distributed between the different players in the development process. So the planning process should address theses political and administrative structures based on an analysis of existing mechanisms that govern and direct the decision-making process.

Community Organization and structuring: Besides the study of tools and methods to analysis the social, demographic, economic structure of localities, the planner has to be sensitive of the needs and wants of any community under study. This can be achieved through courses aiming at incorporate the experience of community analysis in to realistic planning projects.

10.3.6 Conclusion

In order to increase the role of organizations, working theoretically and practically in the planning field, and increasing the availability of planning skills, as well as other learning methods, some recommendations should be taken into consideration;

- Evaluate the curriculum studies at faculties of regional and city planning, and relevant departments and institutes should reflect and emphasis the new urban trends.
- Teaching students the up-to-date programs, subjects and relevant issues, according to the local, regional, and national context.
- Building capacities of the students in undergraduate level, cooping with practical needs, according to advanced assessment.
- Liking theoretical and applicable studies with the actual context, with the agencies and organizations dealing with different spatial levels.
- Developing Education Curriculum to include:
  - Planners' role Development.
  - Humanities and social sciences (including human development indicators, local, national and international/global).
  - Urban Land Administration.
  - Urban Ecology.
  - Formal and informal urban trends.
  - Spatial planning with GIS analysis.
o Formation civil society (including different actors).
 o Participation (concept and approach)
 o Negotiations and urban development.
 o Strategic planning (concept, tools, mechanisms)
 o Local economic development (LED).
 o Time management and HR skills
 o Applied courses in regional and city planning, urban design, landscape planning.
 o Introductory courses in related disciplines; such as urban – rural sociology, urban economics, roads and transportation systems, infrastructure systems, urban management, legislations.
 o Developing learning methods (using high technology techniques and tools), through multi system education (which enable distance learning, with credited hours and certifies the skills' level).
 o Expanding and enlarging the scientific context, and increasing awareness to join the up-to-date new theories and applications, through specialized post-graduate courses.
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