PART V
TOWARDS SAFER AND MORE SECURE CITIES
This part of the Global Report explores promising policy responses to the three major threats to urban safety and security reviewed in Parts II, III and IV. It specifically builds on the international, national and local policy and practice trends identified and discussed in Chapters 4, 6 and 8 – that is, on crime and violence, security of tenure and forced evictions, and natural and human-made disasters, respectively.

There can be little doubt that there is considerable scope for further development in policies and practices for reducing urban crime and violence. Chapter 10, the first in this part of the report, discusses policy responses and practices designed to address the threat of urban crime and violence that, on the basis of experience to date, could be further pursued in the future.

The ‘traditional’ approach to problems of crime and violence, which is to see them as the primary responsibility of the police and the criminal justice system, is increasingly being replaced by an approach that recognizes that the complexity of the phenomena being addressed requires a broad-based response. There is considerable scope for further development of this approach. Nonetheless, it is important that the police and the criminal justice system are ‘fit for purpose’ in the modern world, and are seen as key contributors to the fight against crime and violence. Improvements and reforms in these ‘traditional’ areas are essential and should primarily be driven by central governments in most developing countries. Such improvements should be seen as complementary to the newer approaches being developed in ‘non-traditional’ fields, and appropriate linkages should be developed between all of these activities.

The main ‘non-traditional’ or newer approaches explored in Chapter 10 include enhancement of urban safety and security through effective urban planning, design and governance; the development of community-based approaches to enhancing urban safety and security; reduction of key risk factors by focusing on groups most vulnerable to crime; and strengthening of social capital through initiatives that seek to develop the ability of individuals and communities themselves to respond to problems of crime and violence, provide economic, social, cultural and sporting opportunities, and improve the environment in ways that assist these processes. The combination of several of these approaches – all of which are specially suitable for implementation at the local level – into a systematic programme, driven by a broad strategy and based upon a careful understanding of the local context, seems more likely to be successful than the ad hoc application of individual initiatives.

The preferred mechanism for supporting this broad-based approach is usually the partnership mechanism; but to be fully effective, partnerships need to address a series of questions about their operation, and partners need to buy fully into the spirit of partnership. Central and local governments can play a key role in providing an enabling environment and framework for partnerships to flourish. The best institutional structures for implementing such programmes or initiatives are likely to be those that succeed in getting the key players involved in delivery together in ways that get them not only to commit to the programme, but also to explore how the mainstream work of their own agencies can contribute to the overall effectiveness of these initiatives. Local authorities will often be the most appropriate leaders of such structures. Local communities need to be as fully involved as possible in these processes, not only in terms of consultation, but also as generators and implementers of projects. Capacity-building is a fundamental part of work to address crime and violence at the local level. The approach adopted towards capacity-building activities needs to be as broadly based as possible, and to respond to the capacity-building needs of professional groups, partnership members and local community members.

The transfer of ideas from elsewhere can be very valuable, but it needs to be thought about carefully in the particular circumstances in which it is intended to apply them. It cannot be assumed that ideas that have worked in one part of the world will necessarily work elsewhere. There are no one-size-fits-all solutions, and there is no substitute for a careful study of the particular situation in order to determine the most appropriate course of action.

There needs to be a greater level of commitment to evaluating crime prevention programmes, as well as more open reporting of evaluation results, including areas where problems have been experienced. This is an area where civil society and independent non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can play a key role. This is because much that is done in the area of crime and violence prevention is either not evaluated, is assessed in the most perfunctory manner, or is declared to be successful without much, if any, evidence to support such claim. An important point that is by no means always recognized is that valuable lessons can be learned from what has not gone well, as well as what has succeeded.

International support of various kinds can help cities,
particularly in developing and transitional countries, to improve their ability to effectively implement measures that address problems of crime and violence. Such direct assistance should be part of a package that also includes continuing and strengthening international cooperation in tackling various types of organized crime, such as trafficking of drugs, arms and people — all of which have international dimensions. There are several examples that have been of immense importance to particular cities. For instance, assistance from the US has been a key factor in recent efforts to mount projects tackling aspects of crime and violence in Kingston (Jamaica). Likewise, Canada, The Netherlands and Sweden have contributed to Safer Cities projects supported by UN-Habitat in several African cities. One particular type of international support that can be very helpful is in the field of training and staff development. There are already several good examples of this practice. For example, as part of its support for the reform of the Jamaica Constabulary Force since 2000, the UK government has been providing financial resources on a significant scale, mainly to support international police officers working alongside Jamaica’s force in addressing issues of serious crime. This latter element has included Metropolitan Police officers working directly with their Jamaican counterparts, as well as training being offered by the Metropolitan Police to the Jamaica Constabulary Force. The relationship between the Jamaica Constabulary Force and the UK’s Metropolitan Police suggests that there can be particular advantages in this relationship — on a continuous rather than an ad hoc basis — since this offers the opportunity of progressive improvement rather than short-term gains. The UN-Habitat Safer Cities Programme has much potential for expansion, especially by engaging more cities than it has done to date and, where possible, by helping to speed up the process in cities that have proved to be slow in getting to grips with the problems of crime and violence. There are several things that might help in this context; but one important issue is the availability of resources, both for the programme as a whole and for projects in individual cities. Further international support could be of considerable value in this context as well. Forced evictions are the most visible manifestation of tenure insecurity. The number of people falling victim to forced evictions each year runs into several millions, and the human costs associated with such evictions are staggering. Evicted people not only lose their homes and neighbourhoods, but they are also often forced to leave behind personal possessions since little warning is given before bulldozers or demolition squads destroy their settlements. And, in many such cases, the entire eviction process is carried out without having been subject to judicial scrutiny. Forced evictions are inevitably traumatic: they cause injury; they affect the most vulnerable; and they place victims at risk of further violence. Evictees often lose their sources of livelihood since they are forced to move away from areas where they had jobs or sources of income. In particular, women evictees face unique challenges, suffering disproportionately from violence before, during and after a forced eviction. Women also often have to manage multiple responsibilities as the primary caretakers of children, the sick and the elderly in situations of forced eviction and homelessness. All of these consequences of forced evictions are directly linked to the theme of this Global Report: from a range of aspects of physical security of the person, to job security and social security, to the very notion of security of the home itself. Evictions that result in homelessness are a serious threat to most, if not all, aspects of human security. An end to forced evictions is thus a major part of a strategy to enhance urban safety and security. Chapter 11 examines how an approach to security of tenure combining international advocacy with human rights and human security concerns could prove invaluable in preventing the practice of forced evictions. A large and increasing body of international law now condemns the practice of forced eviction as a gross and systematic violation of human rights. Despite this, evictions are a tragically common feature in all regions of the world. Chapter 11 argues that the right to security of tenure goes beyond a narrow focus on property rights alone, and proposes that it is more appropriate to use the term housing, land and property rights, or HLP rights. Such an approach would contribute to avoiding the exclusion and inequitable treatment of, or outright discrimination against, certain segments of the population, such as tenants, co-operative dwellers, people living and/or working in informal settlements without security of tenure, women, nomads, indigenous peoples and other vulnerable groups. At the international level, four areas stand out for particular attention. First, there is a need to raise the awareness of governments and other stakeholders with respect to what the already existing body of international law implies at the national and local levels. Chapter 11 suggests the proclamation of a global moratorium on forced evictions as one way of addressing this. Such a moratorium would send a strong signal about the importance of such rights and could enhance the international public debate with respect to the right to security of tenure. Second, Chapter 11 calls for the application of international criminal law to cases of forced evictions. Third, international cooperation activities should increasingly focus on supporting local institutions, including, in particular, NGOs and community-based organizations (CBOs) that are actively involved in awareness-raising about HLP rights at the national and local levels. Fourth, as noted in Chapter 5, there is an immediate need to ensure that governments are fulfilling their obligations with respect to monitoring the progressive realization of the right to adequate housing. Efforts under way to develop indicators for global monitoring mechanisms on security of tenure, evictions and other aspects of HLP rights should thus be actively encouraged and supported. At the national level, states are obliged to respect, protect and fulfil all human rights, including HLP rights. The obligation to respect requires states to refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of rights, such as when a state engages in arbitrary forced evictions. The obligation to protect requires states to prevent violations of such rights by third parties, such as landlords or private developers. Finally, the obligation to fulfil requires states to take appropriate
legislative, administrative, budgetary, judicial and other measures to ensure that all people have access to adequate housing. So, while states are not necessarily required to build homes for the entire population, they are obliged to take a whole range of steps, both positive and negative in nature, grounded in human rights law, which are designed to ensure the full realization of all human rights, including the right to adequate housing.

Chapter 11 provides a whole range of specific recommendations on elements to consider when developing housing and urban policies, taking into account the principles of HLP rights. These include, among other issues, steps to prevent discrimination with respect to housing; to cease the practice of forced evictions; to introduce faster and more affordable measures to confering security of tenure to people living in informal settlements and slum areas; and to ensure that the obligations of states under international law are incorporated within national legislation. As noted above, in order for national (as well as local) governments to fulfill their obligations with respect to international law, and in order to plan for improving tenure security for all, there is a pressing need for better monitoring and better data on security of tenure and forced evictions.

It is important to note that security is less about which type of tenure an individual community, household or individual enjoys, but rather about the security enjoyed. Even freehold land can be expropriated by the state under the pretext of being ‘for the common good’. As noted in Chapters 5 and 6, there is a whole range of tenure options that may (or may not) provide security of tenure. Thus, living in an informal settlement or in a residential area governed by customary or communal law does not inherently mean that a person, household or community will be forcibly evicted from their homes and lands. It has to be recognized that there are no universal solutions to the provision of security of tenure and that challenges in this regard tend to be solved in different ways in different locations. Depending upon circumstances, there are a number of acceptable forms of secure tenure, and the merits of innovative policies are clear. The importance of the urban or local level lies in the fact that evictions are most frequently carried out by local authorities or other local actors. It is thus essential that local authorities, in their development strategies and planning, acknowledge the right to enjoy security of tenure. Likewise, the most important actors in any effort to prevent evictions are those operating at the local level. As noted above, the report thus highlights the importance of supporting the activities of NGOs, CBOs and others engaged in enhancing security of tenure and combating forced evictions.

The extensive impacts of natural and human-made disasters on cities and their inhabitants have been elaborated upon in Part IV of this Global Report. Various actions are currently being pursued at the international, national and local levels to reduce disaster risk in urban areas. Chapter 12 examines key policy areas where future prospects for building resilience against natural and human-made disasters in cities lie.

In view of the increasing numbers of people being affected by disasters globally, risk reduction is now identified as a significant concern in several international frameworks and agreements. Most fundamental are the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Although there is no disaster risk reduction MDG, it is recognized that failure to integrate disaster risk reduction within urban, national and regional development policy will undo development gains and thus impede the achievement of other MDGs. Disaster risk reduction is also highlighted in both international frameworks for urban development (the Habitat Agenda) and disaster risk reduction (the Hyogo Framework). Such international frameworks are important in focusing the attention of multilateral and bilateral donors, as well as international civil society actors, towards disaster risk reduction. They can also facilitate advocacy and guide the development of disaster risk reduction strategies at national and city levels. Furthermore, governments require assistance from the international community in the form of funding, data and information and technical expertise to establish or improve their disaster risk reduction systems. International assistance for disaster risk reduction should not focus primarily on recovery and reconstruction efforts, as has been the case in the past, but also on longer-term development objectives.

Chapter 12 identifies a number of policies that, if adopted at the national level, can support city-level risk reduction planning and implementation. It is especially important that disaster risk reduction is mainstreamed within national development and poverty reduction policies and planning. Knowledge of disaster trends and impacts is fundamental in guiding the development of risk reduction policies. Governments thus need to improve risk, hazard and vulnerability assessment and monitoring capacity through increased investments, with support from the international community, where necessary. Technological innovation has greatly improved such assessments, although not equally in all countries. Participatory techniques offer a unique opportunity of generating basic data on hazard, vulnerability and loss where this is not available from centralized databases, as is the case in many low-income countries. In addition to informing policy formulation, assessment data should feed into national initiatives that aim to build a culture of awareness and safety through public education and information programmes. The use of education systems to raise awareness and skills for disaster risk reduction is especially effective in minimizing loss from disasters.

Governments should also seek to build and strengthen national and local early warning systems. Cultural and linguistic diversity or socio-economic inequalities may lead to some people being excluded from early warning information and advice on how to respond to disaster. Involving local communities in vulnerability and hazard assessments can facilitate the dissemination of early warning messages and, thus, enhance local-level preparedness. Indeed, participatory and inclusive strategies that enable the full participation of relevant local actors should guide risk reduction activities at both national and city levels. People-centred early warning systems, which bring together technical expertise for identifying approaching hazard with local expertise, are invaluable in diffusing early warning information and catalysing preventative action. The use of
socially acceptable communication media to disseminate early warning information has been found to be particularly effective. Furthermore, knowledge derived from early warning systems should be linked to local-level action plans as these enable timely response and resource mobilization in the face of disasters.

As highlighted in Chapter 12, city authorities can also implement a number of strategies to reduce disaster risk under the auspices of overarching national policies. Disaster risk reduction should become an integral part of urban planning and management, although this is not easy. A key constraint at the city level is a lack of capacity for enforcing regulations and implementation of plans. Differences in professional training and work practices, and budget lines that make a distinction between development and emergency also hamper progress. Interdisciplinary and intersectoral training, research and partnerships can be used to enhance implementation capacity at the city level. Involving the private sector in disaster risk reduction efforts can further enhance the capacity of city authorities to reduce loss from disasters.

Land-use planning is a particularly effective instrument that can be employed by city authorities to reduce disaster risk by regulating the expansion of human settlements and infrastructure. Evidence-based land-use planning at the city level requires accurate and up-to-date data, which is lacking in many contexts, especially those with rapidly expanding populations and informal settlements. Technological innovation can help to fill part of this gap. Participatory planning offers opportunities for extending land-use planning into informal settlements and slums. For instance, participatory GIS can be used to identify more subtle local characteristics of places that lead to vulnerability or risk.

Designing disaster-resistant buildings and infrastructure in cities can save many lives and assets from natural and human-made disasters. The technical expertise to achieve this is available; but implementation is a major challenge. The safety standards of buildings and infrastructure can be improved through integrating risk reduction within construction design and project management. Partnerships between engineers, artisans and the public can help to promote disaster-proof construction locally. Increasing the prominence of disaster risk management in relevant academic and training courses has the potential to improve safer design and construction. Even where initial designs or construction methods have not been sound, retrofitting provides an option for ensuring safety standards. Indigenous designs should not be cast aside in the rush to modernize urban settlements, as valuable techniques for safe construction can be lost in the process.

Finally, reconstruction efforts need to balance a range of competing pressures. Hardest to reconcile are demands for rapid provision of basic needs against the more time-consuming aim of ‘building back better’. This tension is particularly evident in shelter reconstruction. Greater partnership between humanitarian and development actors is the most likely way beyond this impasse. If humanitarian actors are to integrate development planning within their work, appropriate budgetary and institutional changes are necessary. Clear legislative frameworks should also be in place to avoid uncoordinated and fragmented action by city governments, local actors, donors and humanitarian agencies. Innovative financial programmes, such as microfinance or micro-insurance, are necessary for facilitating the revival of household and community economies, while avoiding the disempowering experience that can come with international humanitarian aid. Mobilizing spare capacity at the city level, such as medical stock and temporary accommodation, can enhance response and recovery efforts.

All of the three chapters in this part of the report do, in fact, propose specific pathways to resilience, as discussed in Chapter 2. While working towards the goal of safer and more secure cities, it is obvious that the efforts undertaken at all of the various levels discussed in this Global Report have to address, often simultaneously, a number of issues in various arenas. Crime and violence cannot be addressed solely through a focus on more police or more jails. Similarly, security of tenure cannot be addressed through the provision of title deeds alone, and people cannot be protected against natural and human-made disasters if all efforts are concentrated at disaster response. Safer and more secure cities can only be realized through comprehensive initiatives that, at the same time, incorporate aspects of institutional and policy development, and international and national law, as well as the potential contributions of all relevant stakeholders, including civil society actors.
The primary purpose of this chapter is to explore some of the most helpful ways forward for urban areas in seeking to tackle issues of crime and violence, based on the discussion in Chapter 4 of the policies being applied to this end. In this regard, the chapter is divided into five sections. The first explores the potential of the six groupings of policy responses to crime and violence identified in Chapter 4. The second section examines the emerging policy trends that were also identified in Chapter 4 in terms of their future utility. The third section looks at some of the key issues for implementing policy that have been identified since it is clear that one of the key challenges in this field is the need to find effective ways of putting them into practice. The fourth section pulls together some of the key issues that arise from these discussions for the future of the UN-Habitat Safer Cities Programme. The final section identifies 13 broad propositions that reflect the conclusions of this chapter.

**SCOPE FOR THE CONTINUING DEVELOPMENT OF KEY POLICY RESPONSES**

Chapter 4 identified six groups of policy responses to crime and violence in urban areas:

1. enhancing urban safety and security through effective urban planning, design and governance;
2. community-based approaches to enhancing urban safety and security;
3. strengthening formal criminal justice and policing;
4. reducing risk factors;
5. non-violent resolution of conflicts; and
6. strengthening social capital.

Each of these is discussed in more detail below in terms of its potential to contribute effectively to addressing crime and violence in urban areas.

**Enhancing urban safety and security through effective urban planning, design and governance**

Chapters 3 and 4 have shown that poor planning, design and management of cities are among the factors associated with crime and violence. The idea that where crimes takes place is something that should be of interest to the processes of planning and urban design is a relatively new idea in terms of its mainstream acceptance. But the reason why this matters is that the work of these disciplines through their manipulation of the physical environment has the potential either to reduce the opportunity for crime to be committed or to create such opportunities. The accumulated experience from several parts of the world suggests that attempts to manipulate the physical environment in order to reduce the opportunity for crime as part of design processes are potentially very useful elements in the fight against crime and violence.

**Building crime prevention into new and existing environments**

There are usually two primary elements to processes of this nature: building crime prevention considerations into the design processes that shape new development, and revisiting problematic existing built environments where there is the possibility that reshaping these might reduce the crime problems that they are experiencing. This latter element is often given less attention than the former; but in most societies the amount of new development under consideration is on a much smaller scale than the extent of development that already exists. As a result, it is important that attention should not be focused exclusively on new development. Nonetheless, it is essential to get new development right from a crime prevention perspective for three reasons. First, the problems of crime are experienced by the occupants of developments over protracted periods of time, and this can be a major factor in public satisfaction (or otherwise) with these developments. Second, developments that encourage high levels of criminal activity are also likely to put pressure on policing services, which, of course, is a public cost. Third, retrofitting is inevitably a somewhat constrained process; therefore, revisiting developments to
Design should not just be about the aesthetics and the functionality of what is being created, but also about how criminals might abuse it for their own ends.

Designing with crime prevention in mind

Perhaps the most basic requirement of an approach of this nature is that the design process needs to think from the outset about the possible criminal use of the buildings and spaces being created. In other words, design should not just be about the aesthetics and the functionality of what is being created, but should also be about how people can occupy and use it safely and about how criminals might abuse it for their own ends. This is probably the right place to start, rather than with planning processes, because planning processes essentially get to deal with designs for development that are often not only well formed, but also have substantial levels of commitment attached to them. Thus, planning systems would be faced with a difficult challenge if their role was essentially to try to add further design considerations at a relatively late stage into a process that has already in the minds of its promoters reached a satisfactory conclusion. So the starting point must be that it would be highly desirable if design processes took account of safety considerations and of the possibility of criminal misuse from first principles. As illustrated below, this is also one of the reasons why effective planning policies not only indicate what they will do when faced with an unsatisfactory design from a crime prevention perspective, but also seek to put in place basic principles of crime prevention that they want developers and their designers to consider in order to reduce the likelihood of an unsatisfactory submission.

It should not be assumed that an approach of this nature would necessarily be welcomed unreservedly by all designers, especially if they see it as constraining their design freedom and creativity or as challenging particular views about urban design to which they hold strong allegiance. Some of this is undoubtedly controversial, and there is still much work to be done to resolve much of this controversy on the basis of evidence. But one helpful approach to this issue, which does not necessarily require a designer to adopt a particular design perspective, but asks individuals to think strategically about what are key problems in terms of residential burglary as part of their design approach, has been developed (see Box 10.1).

Planning systems can also play an important role in this process through policies and practices that promote thinking about crime prevention and through their role in controlling development. Chapter 4 has demonstrated that the process of getting planning systems to think in this way is relatively recent and far from being straightforward. For example, Box 4.3 shows how the English planning system developed thinking about this in several steps over a period of 11 years. Even then, there were both controversies around the guidance.
available to planners and doubts about how readily and how fully the planning community picked this guidance up. In many parts of the world, planning systems are relatively recent arms of urban governance, struggling with limited resources and problems of access to sufficient skilled personnel to cope with large-scale development pressures. Many planners, faced with this situation, will undoubtedly be tempted to feel that being expected to start thinking about issues of crime prevention is yet another pressure on them that they do not need.

Nevertheless, planning must surely be concerned with the quality of urban living, as well as coping with the pressures caused by its scale. From this perspective, thinking about how planning can contribute to crime prevention is important because there is ample evidence from citizen feedback studies that crime and safety are top priorities in residential neighbourhoods, especially for the urban poor. This issue is undoubtedly a challenge for planners, their professional bodies and for the process of planning education since crime prevention has not achieved prominence in planning dialogues. But it is also a challenge for urban governance because if planning is to make its full contribution to crime prevention planning systems, and structures are to be properly established and resourced, planning staff need to be properly trained and the political process needs to support planning systems in undertaking these tasks.

**Integrating crime prevention within planning policy and practice: The British example**

In most planning systems, an important step in the chain of effective action is the need to create planning policy tools that planners can apply consistently and with the expectation that their actions will be supported. The most common form with which this drive to create appropriate tools starts is the need to get basic policies about planning for crime prevention written into development plans and associated documents since both shape how planners deal with submitting documents since both shape how planners deal with submitting

British practice may offer useful lessons for developments of this kind in two ways. First, it demonstrates a fairly highly structured set of relationships between planners and police architectural liaison officers (these are the staff members in the police service who provide advice about crime prevention in relation to physical developments), which means that there is a process of securing police inputs in development decisions made by the planning service. Second, there is a range of advisory documents available from both national and local government levels setting out what the planning system is trying to achieve in seeing urban safety as an integral element in achieving sustainable development, which is the primary purpose of the UK planning system. All of this does not imply that the British system has solved the problem of integrating crime prevention within planning, or that even if it had, the British system would be capable of being transplanted to other locations. Rather, this is an example of a planning system that has taken work in this field further than many others and thus contains useful examples of tools and approaches that may provide lessons elsewhere.

**Integrating urban safety within planning and service delivery: The UN-Habitat Safer Cities Programme example**

Approaches of this nature are also typically part of the UN-Habitat Safer Cities Programme. The starting point for this has to be a recognition that, in many instances, the existing structures of urban governance had not done much of this kind of work before. Thus, introducing what are new processes and practices is likely to be a long-term process, raising important issues of skills, resources, training and staff development, as well as causing debates about priorities for planning systems. UN-Habitat has identified a range of planning, design and municipal service delivery initiatives based on the experience of the Safer Cities Programmes in African Cities (see Box 10.2).

The wide range of activities summarized in Box 10.2 provides a good indication of the kinds of initiatives that are possible under the broad heading of environmental stewardship, which is the theme that links these activities. It is crucial that the results of evaluations of how effective initiatives of this kind have been, and under what circumstances, are made widely available. Other cities can then design their programmes with the benefit of this information. There is

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**Box 10.2 Urban planning and design and municipal service delivery initiatives in Safer Cities programmes in African cities**

UN-Habitat's range of planning, design and municipal service delivery initiatives have been grouped together under seven broad headings; the key actions in each instance are summarized as follows:

- Integration of safety principles within the planning or upgrading of neighbourhoods, public places and street furniture, including planning for mixed uses (including, in some cases, a multiplicity of uses) and animation, signage and physical access, vision and lighting, frequency of use and access to help, as well as safety audits.
- Surveillance of streets, equipment and public spaces through formal and informal mechanisms, including CCTV and patrols of various kinds (usually by community-based organizations rather than the police), incentives for increased human presence throughout the day and partnerships with private security service providers.
- Design and intervention in neighbourhoods, including lighting, access roads, cleaning and waste removal, removal of abandoned vehicles, elimination of graffiti, and the maintenance and repair of street equipment.
- Management of markets and public ways, including updating, integration and enforcement of municipal by-laws, urban renewal of particular areas, and interaction and dialogue with retailers' and hawkers’ associations.
- Management of traffic and parking, including updating, integration and enforcement of municipal by-laws, specialized squads and car guards, and sensitization campaigns.
- Control of bars, including the regulation of opening and closing hours, the periodic control both of juveniles and of activities, and promoting the responsibility of owners.
- Securing homes and neighbourhoods, including sensitization campaigns on safety measures, technical assistance to homeowners and tenants, surveillance and mutual assistance between neighbours, neighbourhood watch activities, and access to help.

Source: UN-Habitat, 2006a, p.33
Urban planning systems contribute in important ways to the broader process of environmental stewardship by the opportunity that they provide to think strategically about improving places for people. Thus, comparisons between societies are not easy to make up a full story of what the ‘community view’ is since there may only represent part of it. All of this implies that it does not always show unanimity of view, and so it is important to bear this in mind rather than to treat it as being fixed once communities are defined, in the first instance, and given the fluid population structure of many cities, it is important to consider crime prevention from the outset. The drivers of crime are often about facilities that can only be in a limited number of locations but draw users from wide areas. An example here would be work on youth unemployment is high, and where there is a significant risk that young people will drift into localities where youth unemployment is high, and where this may well need to take account of those areas which is likely to transcend particular geographical boundaries. However, this may well need to take account of those localities where youth unemployment is high, and where there is a significant risk that young people will drift into criminal lifestyles.

Community-based approaches to enhancing urban safety and security

With respect to community-based approaches, Chapter 4 argued that there are two main types: those where the community is not in the lead but is involved in a project in various ways, and those where the community is, essentially, the driving force behind a project and where the public sector plays an enabling role. Although there is no reliable data on this, the probability is that where formal responsibility and supported planning systems are essential if this potential is to be realized.

There is clear evidence that there are moves taking place in this direction in some parts of the world. The pace of change needs to be accelerated if this is to be fully integrated within the challenge that planning systems face in coping with the tide of urbanization expected in many parts of the world over the next few decades. This is not just a problem for the developing world since it is clear that the transitional countries of Eastern Europe still have some distance to go before catching up with the work that has been done in other parts of the European Union (EU) to move towards establishing European standards in this field.

Community types, interests and diversity

The other critical factor is the nature of communities themselves. There is huge scope for discussion about how communities are defined, in the first instance, and given the fluid population structure of many cities, it is important to bear this in mind rather than to treat it as being fixed once geographical definitions have been arrived at. Another way of looking at this is to think not just in terms of geographical communities, but in terms of communities of interest, which may well not correspond to communities defined by residential location. An example here would be work on employment development opportunities for young people, which is likely to transcend particular geographical boundaries. However, this may well need to take account of those localities where youth unemployment is high, and where there is a significant risk that young people will drift into criminal lifestyles.

Many cultural or sporting initiatives are also of this kind since they are often about facilities that can only be in a limited number of locations but draw users from wide areas. Even where this is thought about in terms of residential location, it is not always the case that the communities in these areas are homogeneous. Homogeneous communities do not always show unanimity of view, and so it is important to have processes in place that go beyond relying on a handful of people to say what the ‘community view’ is since they may only represent part of it. All of this implies that it is important not to take an overly simplistic view of community-based approaches to tackling crime and promoting public safety across a large urban area.

Changing community-based approaches

There are two other elements that are important in this discussion. One of these is a recognition that the role of community-based approaches is likely to change according to the project in hand. For example, a long-term strategy for tackling crime and promoting public safety across a large urban area is a very different thing from an individual project in a specific locality scheduled to be implemented at a particular point in time. In the former case, a common situation is that the lead on this will be taken by a public-sector agency, probably working with a partnership structure, with the role of the community being essentially around information provision and consultation on drafts. Even here, community representatives can play a more proactive role than this by utilizing their membership of the partnership to raise issues and to promote ideas that emanate from within communities. In the case of a specific project, it is possible that the idea originated within the community and is implemented with community members playing leading roles, with the role of public-sector agencies being that of providing support. Both of these approaches may be perfectly appropriate to the particular situation, although in both instances there is considerable scope to develop the roles of key players and to see each particular initiative as a learning opportunity that can contribute to future developments of this nature.
nity’, but rather to understand its diversity and to ensure that the range of views and interests often to be found is not obscured by this process of simplification. All of these factors need to be carefully thought about when considering forms of community involvement, including the role of the public sector as initiator, rather than just playing an enabling role.

It is clear that right across the spectrum of community-based approaches in enhancing urban safety and security, there is considerable scope for beneficial development. This needs to be seen in terms of opportunities, rather than in terms of problems, and must be approached realistically, which means properly understanding the local circumstances. There is no point in drawing idealistic conclusions about what local communities are capable of achieving and then criticizing them for failing to live up to these ideals. However, there is every point in taking the view that community capabilities are not static, but can be developed through appropriate training, information, support and opportunity. Consequently, programmes to develop community capability need to sit alongside appropriate contemporary programmes of community engagement. In particular, if the part of the spectrum which is about direct community action, rather than about information and consultation, is to be developed, it is important that public and private-sector agencies and partnerships learn to trust communities and to be willing to work with them as equal partners.

The following points need to be made regarding community-based interventions:

- Given the nature of crime and violence, they are by some, not considered very appropriate issues to be dealt with at the community level. The police, for instance, may be reluctant to share data on crime or on their operations with communities and the public at large, for fear that this information may be abused.
- Communities themselves may have their own views of crime and delinquent activities that may not be fully compliant with the definitions and classifications provided by the law. Indeed, in many communities, the lines between legal, formal, informal and illegal activities are blurred. A measure of common ground has to be found before any meaningful engagement can take place.
- Security may be a major issue for mobilizing a community into action, but may not be such a sustaining force; as the problems get solved, the community may shift attention to other issues. It is therefore important to build security and prevention issues into broader communities agendas, and link them with service delivery, management of services, and community development in general. In this way, efforts can be sustained and modulated over time.
- Finally, city strategies need to acknowledge the social mechanisms and knowledge that communities already deploy, possibly in isolation from, or even in contradiction to, official practice to address risk factors and vulnerabilities related to crime and violence. As they have enormous potential to contribute to overall safety, these mechanisms need to be described, discussed and assessed.

Indeed, communities not only have the direct experience of crime and violence, of which they often bear the brunt, but they also often have the understanding of local dynamics and risk factors, as well as of the ideas and mechanisms vital for tackling them. That said, communities have a key role to play in the prevention of crime, both by reducing vulnerabilities and addressing risk factors.

### Community safety approaches: Toronto and Kingston

A good example of an approach described in the preceding section is in the Crime Prevention through Social Development strand of Toronto’s Community Safety Strategy, summarized in Box 4.7. Here, there are several instances of individual programmes where, in effect, a policy, financial and administrative framework is provided for community-based initiatives, but where the initiatives themselves come from communities. Examples include:

- youth opportunity initiatives: Jobs for Youth, which provides government funding for community-based organizations to run summer employment projects targeted at youth from priority neighbourhoods;
- the Youth Challenge Fund, which supports community safety ideas that come from people living in Toronto’s 13 ‘at-risk’ neighbourhoods, and encourages community organizations to apply for funding in order to implement projects of this nature;
- grassroots/community-based youth services, which provide support for not-for-profit community-based agencies to implement programmes and services for youth in ‘at-risk’ neighbourhoods.

There are also examples of programmes with some of these characteristics in Kingston (Jamaica), where ‘top-down’ programmes of the type described in Chapter 4 were accompanied by programmes designed to encourage local communities to play a more active role in some parts of the city in addressing the problems that were contributing to high levels of crime and violence. For instance, in the Fletchers Land community, major efforts were made to encourage better parenting in order to tackle what was seen as a breakdown in family values. The success of this initiative led to its replication in other parts of the city. Similarly, the Grants Pen community in Kingston, which once had a reputation for its volatility, has witnessed significant progress in reducing crime through a range of programmes, which have included a major emphasis on the creation and use of sports opportunities targeted at young people. In both of these cases, important roles were played by formal programmes in terms of the provision of facilities or opportunities; but the local communities also played a major role in determining how these were utilized.14

It is, of course, possible to go beyond this and to have a completely open-ended approach to community-based...
initiatives. However, there are few examples of this since the resources available for community safety initiatives are usually small in relation to the scale of the problem. What is important even when organizations that control funding are not prepared to take an open-ended view of community-based initiatives is that they should be willing to listen to ideas that come from the community sources.

**Strengthening formal criminal justice and policing**

Although one of the most apparent trends in the response to crime and violence has been the move from sole reliance on the police and the judiciary to the development of more broadly based approaches, this does not detract from the importance of measures to strengthen the formal criminal justice and policing systems in societies where these can be seen as part of the problem. The move towards more broadly based approaches should not be seen as diminishing the importance of the police and the judiciary, but rather as an acknowledgement of the fact that the struggle against crime and violence needs to encompass an ever broader range of approaches. What is important is that these more ‘traditional’ elements are seen as integral to contemporary comprehensive approaches, rather than as elements standing outside them.

**An example of a changing police culture: Hong Kong**

An interesting illustration of the interdependent nature of these phenomena is provided by the move of the Hong Kong police towards a more community focus for its work, and the development of a community service culture (see Box 4.8 in Chapter 4). Here, the debates about the nature and role of community policing approaches, which had been going on vigorously in police forces across the world over this period, were overlain by major political changes away from a colonialist governmental legacy and towards reintegration with China, which, in turn, recognized that Hong Kong was in some important ways different from the rest of the country.

What was also clear during this process of change was that it did not always take place in a linear or orderly manner. It included significant stages where public responses to what had been done previously shaped events, and where the ebb and flow of ideas were influenced by the views of key personalities at various points in time. It was also a process that took place over a long period. Clearly, there are elements of this story that are particular to the circumstances of Hong Kong; but there are also aspects that offer useful lessons elsewhere about the dynamics of a process of this nature. In particular, this case study illustrates the importance of a process of winning hearts and minds, both within the police service and among the communities for whom it works. This can be among the most difficult and protracted elements of a change process of this nature. But it is vital if the case for change is to be properly developed and then put into effective practice.

**Resistance and the inability to change in police and justice systems**

One of the most important reasons why changes to police and criminal justice systems need to be an integral part of comprehensive attempts to address crime and violence is because diagnoses of the problems to be faced have often concluded that the operation, in practice, has added to the difficulties. Three paragraphs from the UN-Habitat review of its experiences of Safer Cities projects in Africa summarize this well:

*Police have traditionally placed more emphasis on major crime at the expense of unrelenting community problems and conflicts. Police are often opposed to the introduction of reforms due to cultural resistance to change, inadequate training offered to its agents and a lack of transparency.*

*The justice system is also being questioned in view of its inability to deal effectively with urban delinquency. The helplessness in dealing with files efficiently, the lack of resources, in some cases a lack of transparency, the myriad of laws that are impossible to implement, and the lack of alternative solutions all account for the inefficiency within the justice system. In Africa, the number of prisoners awaiting trial is twice as high as the number of accused. This number is equal in Latin America and much lower in other regions. This illustrates the slow pace and the lack of efficiency in the justice system.*

*Prisons, with the exception of a few modern and experimental ones, can be considered schools for technical training and network development for delinquents.* The worldwide rate of recidivism exceeds 60 per cent. But despite evidence that the restorative function of prison fails, they maintain a symbolic value in the minds of many which renders it an easy solution and clear response, as demonstrated in Africa where the rate of incarceration is similar to Latin America but higher than in other regions in the world. Not surprisingly, given this diagnosis, an important component of Safer Cities projects in African cities has been attempts to address such problems. Box 10.3 summarizes the various actions that have been undertaken in this regard.

**The importance of public confidence in police and justice systems**

As well as the direct benefits that flow from the specific actions summarized in Box 10.3, the public at large also feels confident that the police and the criminal justice systems will do their jobs properly so that their contribution to public safety will be effective. There is clear evidence from the case studies for this Global Report that this is not always the case.
For example, the Port Moresby case study suggests that the police and criminal justice systems’ public credibility is poor. This is so for several of reasons, including what is frequently seen as violent behaviour by the police; the failure of the prison system to offer anything much more than an advanced education in crime; and the general failure to effectively address the city’s escalating crime problems.

As a consequence, there is a need to ‘modernize’ these systems if they are to play a key role in tackling the problems of crime and violence in Port Moresby. An important part of initiatives of this nature is the need to address corruption wherever it exists. This is because the widespread belief that corrupt behaviour will enable criminals to avoid capture and sentencing, or to be treated more leniently than would have been the case, is corrosive of public trust and confidence in these services. Where it is clear that confidence and trust are low, an important element in any action would be steps to retrieve this position since it is very difficult for the police and the criminal justice systems to operate effectively without public support and goodwill.

It is important to note that programmes aimed at strengthening the police, particularly in developing countries, should also address their welfare and poor conditions of service. For instance, in Kabul, Afghanistan, the average police officer earns $15 per month. Similarly, in African countries such as Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana, the police earn a pitance, and often lack the appropriate equipment to carry out their duties. In countries such as Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, South Africa and Kenya, members of the police force have not been spared from the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Furthermore, the living conditions in most police accommodation are appalling. It was therefore not surprising to observers when, in 2002, junior officers of the Nigeria Police Force threatened to embark on strike action to press for improved working and service conditions.

Learning from initiatives, finding resources and setting priorities for community safety change

In terms of future action, two points stand out from the material summarized in Box 10.3. First, it represents a lot of initiatives in different cities, and it is critical that when evaluations of these initiatives have been undertaken, the lessons that can be learned from them be publicized so that other cities can see what has worked well and under what circumstances, and can shape their own practices accordingly. Second, many of the actions listed in Box 10.3 require extra resources in order to be undertaken. But some of this is about priorities for the use of existing resources. There is still an opportunity cost issue as time spent doing one thing is time not spent doing something else. It is therefore critical that leaders and senior managers in the police and criminal justice systems participate fully in the debates on community safety strategies, are active members of the partnership arrangements that shape them, and buy into what is being attempted in a manner that recognizes the need to review how they utilize their existing resources in order to find ways in which they can contribute effectively.

Box 10.3 Actions to strengthen formal criminal justice and policing in Safer Cities projects in African cities

There are broadly nine types of actions that have been undertaken to date, which are summarized as follows, together with the key specific types of projects that have been carried out under each of these headings:

Decentralized police services: includes strengthening of local police precincts, and creating satellite and mobile police stations.

Collaboration with municipalities: includes improvements to police facilities and equipment, joint analysis of crime problems and identification of priorities, and neighbourhood watch.

Municipal police involvement in by-laws enforcement: enforcement of the traffic code and regulations, and more patrols and greater visibility in problematic neighbourhoods and areas.

Coordination and training: includes liaison with private security agencies, coordination of operations between national and municipal police, and better training of police personnel.

Working closer with the local population: including community, neighbourhood and problem-solving policing approaches, prevention programmes that target youth, victims and retailers, and sensitization campaigns.

Alternative sanctions: including community work and reparations to victims of various kinds.

Neighbourhood justice: including legal education (focusing on rights and responsibilities), ward tribunals, and mediation by neighbourhood and religious chiefs.

Detention oriented towards the social and economic reintegration of young offenders: includes completing school, job training and sensitization to the prevention of health problems.

Partnership with civil society: including the reintegration of young people within their families and training sessions in the workplace.

Source: UN-Habitation, 2006e

All of this pertains to priorities, and experience suggests that it is easier to influence the priorities of the police and the criminal justice services if their leaders and senior managers are active participants in the process of pulling together and implementing community safety strategies than if they stand outside them. This may also be about the willingness to experiment and to try new things, especially when faced with evidence or perceptions that traditional ways of doing things may actually be contributing to the problem. It may well be that leaders and senior managers in the police and criminal justice services will be more willing to look at this positively if it is seen as part of a comprehensive programme of change where others are willing to experiment and try new things.

The challenges of imprisonment and recidivism

The philosophies and resources that govern prison policy and practices, and the laws that determine the crimes for which offenders are sent to prison are usually controlled at national rather than municipal levels. This is one of the most important policy areas through which central governments – by addressing these issues – can contribute to measures to tackle urban crime. Although this problem is being addressed in some countries by improving prison conditions and by placing more emphasis on rehabilitation, a particular
element of these debates is the frequency with which prisons can still easily become finishing schools for criminals. For instance, a similar point is made in the Port Moresby case study, where the Bomana prison is often referred to as ‘the university’, and where inmates enter without any skills and come out armed with skills and contacts with crime.20

There can be little doubt that it is possible for recidivism rates to be significantly reduced as a consequence of a much greater concentration on rehabilitation during periods in prison. This will have a beneficial impact on urban crime because a high proportion of crime is committed by previous offenders. This will be a huge challenge to governments, not least because there might well be public and media opposition to an approach of this nature as being ‘soft on crime’, and because of the resource implications in terms of the need for new and improved prison facilities and more investment in staff training and development. But the potential benefits of a changed approach to the experience and circumstances of prisons towards a fight against crime and violence are considerable; at the very least, there is a strong case for more carefully monitored experimentation of this kind.

Reduction of risk factors

Chapter 4 has argued that this approach is essentially about two related strands of activity: initiatives to address issues in relation to those groups in society who are more likely to become offenders (particularly young men), and actions to help those groups who are likely to become victims of crime (particularly women). There has also been a growing emphasis on victim-support initiatives of several kinds. This approach recognizes that in a world of limited resources, it is important to target major problem areas such as these. It is therefore not surprising to find that activities of this nature are common in strategic processes designed to address crime and violence.

Targeting youthful offenders: Recruitment and educational policy issues

With respect to the first strand of activities, many of the initiatives seek to target youth either in ways that deflect their energy and interests into other activities or offer various kinds of work experience and training. This combination of approaches is evident in Toronto’s programme of crime prevention through social development and the strategies adopted in Kingston (Jamaica), both of which were discussed in Chapter 4. It is important, however, that thinking about problems of this nature does not only begin at the time when young people leave school because, as Chapter 3 has demonstrated, children as young as six years are recruited into gangs. Even if young people have not already committed themselves to criminal activities by the time they leave school, there is still a considerable possibility that the role models they seek to emulate are from the criminal fraternity.

One of the most important developments in this field is the need for closer and more effective liaison between the work of educational services and work that targets young people in order to try to prevent them from offending so that, as much as possible, the transition between the two is seamless. Evidence suggests that this is often not the case. However, there is considerable scope for closer and more effective coordination. A typical example is where school sports and cultural facilities are, in effect, locked up in the evenings, at weekends and during school holidays – and, yet, projects to divert the energy of young people towards sporting and cultural activities at these very same times struggle for access to facilities. Very often, the explanation for locking up these facilities relates, understandably, to concerns about the security of school premises.

But these problems are capable of being resolved locally and in ways that take up a small fraction of the cost involved in duplicating these facilities, or of the cost to society of crime and violence perpetrated by young people that might have been capable of being deflected through the community use of these facilities. Another issue that is commonly faced is how young people manage the transition from school to work, where again there is considerable scope to improve cooperation between schools, local employers and youth-related services. The aims of these sorts of activities would be to improve work experience and training opportunities of many types, and to emphasize both the importance and the value of an economically active lifestyle in preference to one dominated by crime and violence.

Preventing violence against women

In relation to the prevention of violence against women, the key element of importance is the fact that such violence needs to be perceived as a serious issue by policy-makers and leaders at all levels. A systemic approach to tackling violence against women needs to be developed and deployed. This should strengthen the understanding of the impacts and causes of gender-based violence, as well as identify vulnerabilities, and systematically address them. Awareness and sensitization tools are therefore of key importance. Women’s rights and measures against violence have also to be reflected in the law, as in many contexts legislation is still very wanting in terms of protecting women from violence. In terms of interventions, in many contexts, the priority would have to be sensitization of policy-makers and access of women to decision-making processes. The development of specific tools and interventions to address vulnerability in different contexts is also important. Other interventions of relevance should target underlying factors, such as conceptions of masculinity, cultural definitions of women’s roles and rights in society, capacity of law enforcement and other actors to carry out early interventions and to deal with offenders.

Women’s safety audits

One of the frequently used tools to support the prevention of violence against women in the African Safer Cities programmes is the women’s safety audit. The example from Durban (Box 4.9) demonstrated both the value of the specific suggestions that emerged from the process and the process itself.21 As valuable as these process-related benefits are, they need to be followed through so that commitments
to action are made by the key players and are then put into practice. This is often not just about doing specific things, but is also about getting the process of governance in partnership with local communities to take this seriously in its everyday actions and practices. The Durban experience suggests that this process of embedding action can be the most difficult element in implementing the results of a women’s safety audit, but that it is also one of the most important elements.

### Reducing crime and violence to make a difference in people’s lives

It is important to remember that actions of the kind discussed in this section are not just about tackling some of the most difficult problems in many cities in terms of crime and violence, but are also about making a difference to the lives of individuals. Some of the most encouraging stories in the struggle against crime and violence in Diadema (São Paulo), for example, are of young people whose lives have been changed for the better through opportunities provided and taken to develop cultural or sporting interests that would otherwise have been very difficult to pursue. It is very easy to forget this kind of individual dimension to change, especially, perhaps, when looking at problems that exist on a large scale. Nevertheless, changes of this kind are about making a positive difference to the lives of identifiable individuals and are not just the broader abstractions inevitably expressed in formal evaluations, important, of course, though these are.

As with all of the other policy responses reviewed here, it is important that initiatives regarding the reduction of risk factors are carefully evaluated so that more is known about what works, and under what circumstances, so that other cities can learn from these experiences. It seems likely, however, that initiatives of this kind will continue to be important elements of many programmes because they are about tackling fundamental problems, some of which are deeply embedded in the economic, social, cultural and political circumstances of societies. Some of these, such as endemic violence against women, can be seen not just as crime and violence issues, but also as basic issues of human rights.

### Non-violent resolution of conflicts

As Chapter 4 has argued, the non-violent resolution of conflicts can be seen as a philosophical approach that has been put into practice in many related fields, but has not seen very much specific application in tackling crime and violence. Consequently, there is, as yet, only limited evidence that can be drawn upon in discussing what its future role might be in programmes of this nature. This situation might be improving. For example, Chapter 4 noted, in passing, some American evidence of its successful application to problems in schools. Furthermore, there is evidence from the Kingston case study of programmes of this nature being instituted as part of a wide range of initiatives, in which the Jamaican government has been a major player. Three components of this work – the Dispute Resolution Foundation, the Peace and Love in Society programmes and the Police Mediation Unit – in their various ways offer mediation training to community members, police, teachers, lay magistrates and youth. They also develop programmes to teach non-violent conflict resolution in schools and communities, and they have incorporated peace education as part of their regular activities. The key question here is this: can approaches that emphasize the non-violent resolution of conflicts play an effective part in addressing the problems of crime and violence? The answer to this question, in the absence of reliable evidence, must be that it would be worth exploring the scope for this, perhaps in the first instance on an experimental basis that is carefully evaluated and reported upon.

Two examples that relate to problem areas already discussed might be particularly appropriate in this context. The first is as part of managing the transition of young people from a school environment to the world of work and other social, community or sporting activities. This would be particularly appropriate where young people have already come across approaches of this nature in their school lives: it would represent a continuation of something that is familiar, rather than introducing something completely new.

The second example relates to efforts to tackle the problem of prisons becoming ‘universities for crime’. This needs to be seen alongside programmes to improve prison conditions and to enhance rehabilitation efforts, rather than as a substitute for initiatives of this kind. The argument here is that this issue needs to be tackled not just for the benefits to the lives of individual prisoners that would arise, but also because of the general benefits to communities from reducing rates of recidivism.

This problem needs to be addressed by rethinking attitudes regarding what the purpose of a prison sentence is, and by reconsidering the nature of the prison experience to place greater emphasis on rehabilitation and ensuring that resources are available to support these activities. This, in itself, might be seen as a controversial approach in some quarters, and the suggestion that non-violent approaches to conflict resolution might have a part to play in such an approach would probably add to this among those who see imprisonment as being primarily about punishment. But evidence seems to suggest that existing prison regimes in many parts of the world are not working and that alternative approaches need to be considered.

### Strengthening social capital

Chapter 4 adopted a relatively broad-based definition of social capital, which encompasses efforts to improve the ability of people, groups and communities, as a whole, to challenge problems of crime and violence, as well as the provision of community facilities that facilitate or provide more opportunities for processes of this nature. This approach therefore includes the idea that public realm improvements, and the provision of better facilities in areas such as culture and sport, can also contribute to reducing crime and violence, as well as being of value in their own right to local communities by adding to quality of life.
The fundamental maintenance issue

A critical issue in many initiatives of this nature, however, is that of maintenance. Typically, this can be problematic because while the provision of new facilities usually involves finding capital resources for investment at a particular time, their ongoing maintenance usually involves locating revenue resources to, for example, pay people to carry out essential tasks continuously. This often seems to be trickier than the initial task of raising capital resources precisely because it is a continuing commitment that has not always been clearly thought through at the time of initiating the project. Where maintenance fails, facilities then become neglected, vandalized or underutilized. There is the risk that this can actually undermine the good work done up until then and send out very negative messages about the communities in which such facilities are located and the level of care for that community by the people who live there. This argument is akin to that of the ‘broken windows theory’, which states that the negative signals sent out by environmental problems of the type often caused by lack of maintenance convey messages that an environment is not cared for and, consequently, invites crime.

Creating social capital and reducing crime through educational opportunities and programmes

One of the most basic ways of creating social capital is by encouraging young people to attend school regularly in order to develop skills that are relevant to the world of work. Programmes of this nature are important to the social development of the individual since the likelihood is that someone who missed many years of schooling will be permanently disadvantaged and may turn to crime in the absence of perceived alternatives. Typically, strengthening educational opportunities and providing means to smooth the path from school to work through initiatives such as work experience, training and apprenticeships are vital components of many programmes that address the problems of youth in rapidly growing cities.

The need for programmes of this nature that provide alternatives for young people to a life of crime in a city like Kingston (Jamaica) is, in part, illustrated by the fact that 33 per cent of the murders recorded between 1997 and 2005 were committed by males aged 25 and under.24 Many of the young people involved in crime come from Kingston’s inner city communities, which are characterized by low levels of employment, established gang activities and an associated culture of violence.25 Consequently, part of the response has been to tackle the problems of poverty and social marginalization that are the breeding grounds for these problems. A specific illustration of this approach is in the Fletchers Land community in downtown Kingston, where the Citizens Security and Justice Programme has initiated long-term creation of social capital and short-term training of individuals. These have included remedial education, mentoring programmes, identifying jobs and skills training, dispute resolution, homework programmes, continuing education services, and parenting workshops.

Creating social capital and reducing insecurity through innovative infrastructure development: Nairobi’s Adopt a Light initiative

Defining social capital more broadly to include not just the capacity of communities to address issues of crime and violence themselves, but also the provision of community infrastructure that helps communities in this regard, carries with it the likelihood that some elements that fall within this definition are likely to be expensive. There are ways in which issues of this nature can be addressed without being totally dependent upon the public budget. One of these is the use of sponsorship. An example of this is the Nairobi Adopt a Light initiative, which is part of the Safer Nairobi Initiative that sought to address the widespread feelings of insecurity brought about by poor or non-existent street lighting. Here, in order to fill an important gap in public service provision by improving street lighting in major streets and by adding high-mast lighting into Nairobi’s slum districts, sponsors are invited to pay an agreed annual sum to adopt a light pole in return for their advertisement being hoisted on that pole. This project has been well received by firms and advertisers since its commencement in August 2002.

The use of sponsorship, in this instance, enabled more to be done than would have been the case if reliance had been solely on public budgets. A project of this nature also illustrates the point that many activities fall into several categories since in one sense this could be seen as a classic CPTED project, as well as something that is about improving community safety infrastructure as a basis for getting the community more actively involved in the fight against crime. It is clear that strengthening social capital has an important part to play in strategies to tackle crime and violence, and that its resource challenges can be tackled by thinking creatively and by working across traditional boundaries between sectors. The effect of strengthening what is available to a community in terms of physical infrastructure may also have a positive effect on the dynamics of community responses to crime. Although this is hard to calculate in individual cases if it does result in strengthening the will of communities to fight against unacceptable behaviour, then that is undoubtedly a very significant added benefit of this approach.

EMERGING POLICY TRENDS

Chapter 4 identified six emerging policy trends that are discussed in more detail below:

1. The move away from the idea that crime prevention and tackling violence are essentially matters for the police and the criminal justice system, and towards the idea that these are complex phenomena with a range of causes that require broad-based responses. The emergence of crime prevention as a specific concern of urban policy and urban actors is an indication of such a shift;
2 as an important part of this process, four of the six groupings of policy responses to crime and violence (see the previous section on ‘Scope for the continuing development of key policy responses’) have attracted particular interest: enhancing urban safety and security through effective urban planning, design and governance; community-based approaches; reducing risk factors; and strengthening social capital;

3 the move away from ad hoc initiatives and towards more programmatic approaches encompassing some or all of the approaches described above, backed by broad strategies and detailed understanding of the issues on the ground;

4 the use of the partnership mechanism as a key vehicle for delivering programmes of this nature;

5 the growing recognition of the need to adapt solutions to local circumstances, rather than to borrow uncritically from elsewhere;

6 the growing acceptance of the need for honest evaluation of initiatives and for publicising such material.

Before undertaking this task, however, it is important to make the point that it does not follow automatically that just because something has been identified as a policy trend, it is inherently desirable. There are several reasons why something might become a ‘policy trend’, one of which is the process of emulating something else in the desperate search to find some action to undertake. Another is the observable point that some policy ideas do become fashionable for a period of time. Thus, in order to assess the merits or otherwise of these trends in relation to particular circumstances, the following discussion includes a brief analysis of the strengths and limitations of each trend in question.

**Broadening the range of responses to problems of crime and violence**

The first trend identified is the move away from the traditional reliance on the police and the criminal justice system towards the idea that crime and violence are complex phenomena that require broad-based responses. For ease of reference, these added approaches will be referred to as non-traditional. The reasons for this policy trend are complex; but two related lines of argument are outlined here.

The first is that in many countries the traditional approaches were seen as increasingly struggling to tackle crime and violence effectively in societies that were becoming more complex and less reliant on historic family and community structures. Thus, there has been a growing need over the last 30 or 40 years to explore other approaches that could complement the work of the police and the criminal justice system. This does not imply that traditional work has remained largely unchanged during the time in which other approaches have been explored, although there have been criticisms about inflexibility and slowness to change in this context. The growing police interest in CPTED in some parts of the world and the increasing adoption of community policing models can both be seen as illustrations of adaptations of this kind that have been taking place. Nevertheless, it became clear that this search for alternative ways of tackling what was widely seen as an increasingly sophisticated problem was not confined to changes within the police and the criminal justice system, but also needed to encompass other areas outside of them.

The second reason why this policy trend has taken root is that it has been recognized that the nature of the response must be congruent with the nature of the problem. Thus, the growing recognition that criminal behaviour and opportunity are often a function of economic and social circumstances, as well as the recognition that technological developments have assisted criminals, as well as the process of fighting crime, have together seen the development of more broadly based approaches to tackling crime and violence.

The main strength of this approach of broadening the range of responses is that it appears to be appropriate to the task in hand. To use a simple example: if it is, indeed, the case that the likelihood that young people will embark upon a life of crime is related at least in part to both educational opportunity and to effective processes of transition between school and work, then measures that seek to address these issues head on are more likely to be successful than the traditional work of the police and the criminal justice services. A related strength is that, by definition, broadening the range of responses to problems of crime and violence also extends the numbers of people and groups who are involved in processes of this kind, and thus adds to both the range of possible responses they might identify and to the numbers of people who are prepared to participate in implementing chosen actions.

These are real strengths, although they also represent challenges in the sense that the process of ensuring that these theoretical advantages are always captured, in practice, is a complex one in terms of issues such as forms of partnership operation, seeking agreements for all affected parties, including local communities, and effective coordination. The main weakness of this approach is that it can deflect attention from measures to ensure that the police and the criminal justice system are fully ‘fit for purpose’; indeed, it can be seen as downgrading the importance of these traditional services in the ever widening search for alternatives. It is very important that the approach adopted does not see this as being about alternatives to efficient and effective police and criminal justice systems, but rather sees it as being about the identification of complementary activities that are simply more appropriate for the particular challenge being addressed than expecting the police and the criminal justice system to do what they are not primarily designed to do.

Available evidence from the experience of African cities in establishing Safer Cities projects indicates that tackling problems in these ‘traditional’ areas of the police and the criminal justice systems is vitally important, and that it is necessary to look for, and to encourage, change in areas where existing practices may be contributing to the problem rather than its solution.27 Two very difficult illustrations of this point are the fight against corruption and the need to
tackle the extent to which prisons in some countries have become finishing schools for crime, rather than places where criminals can be rehabilitated. Both of these involve issues that cannot be resolved at the city level, although in both instances it is at the level of the individual city where many of their adverse consequences are felt.

Thus, the approach here needs to be one of continuing to find policies and practices that are appropriate to tackle both the symptoms and the causes of crime and violence in cities. Because many of these are socio-economic in nature, and are about much more than simply the criminal intentions of some human beings, it is likely that the range of solutions that continue to be seen to be appropriate will be broadly based and probably will in future be more comprehensive than has been seen to date. But within these approaches, the traditional functions of the police and the criminal justice system are of vital importance, and it is essential that they are fully involved in the agreed actions, fully aware of their own roles within them and of how these relate to other roles, and constantly reviewed to ensure that they remain ‘fit for purpose’.

**Developing policies and practices in ‘non-traditional’ areas**

Of the six broad groups of policy responses to crime and violence discussed in the section on ‘Scope for the continuing development of key policy responses’, one (strengthening formal criminal justice and policing) represents the ‘traditional’ approach and the other five are the main non-traditional policy responses. Since this section has already discussed what was involved in the development of these policy responses, the focus of this discussion is on the process of broadening out policy development in non-traditional areas, rather than on the content of these policy packages. Four of these are commonly found in contemporary strategies to tackle crime and violence; but a fifth (the non-violent resolution of conflicts) seems to be much less commonly utilized.

The nine case studies prepared in support of the part of this Global Report that focuses on crime and violence reflect this balance, with the strategies evident in Bradford, Durban, Kingston, Nairobi and Toronto, and, to a lesser extent, New York and Rio de Janeiro, exemplifying this broadly based approach, and the work on developing the Safer Cities Programme for Port Moresby also going in this direction. The only one of these that appears to contain an explicit programme designed around the theme of non-violent approaches to conflict resolution is the strategy adopted for Kingston (Jamaica). Available evidence suggests that this strategy, as a whole, has contributed to the recent reductions of crime and violence in Jamaica, although it is often difficult to be clear about what elements of success can be attributed to individual initiatives when several different initiatives are being implemented more or less simultaneously.

The Kingston case is interesting because apart from its innovative elements, such as the work on non-violent approaches, it also includes significant measures to improve police performance. In addition, it contains an example of measures to target gang operations via Operation Kingfish, which has been successful in recovering firearms, ammunition and other equipment from gangs operating in the illicit drugs trade, and which can also be seen as a development of the ‘traditional’ role of the police and criminal justice systems. The lesson that this experience reinforces is the point that the process of exploring ‘non-traditional’ approaches to crime and violence is not an alternative to seeking improvements in traditional areas, but rather should be seen as a complement to it.

The extent to which non-traditional approaches to crime and violence have now become well established is illustrated by the main areas of activity promoted via UN-Habitat’s Safer Cities approach, which are summarized in Box 10.4.

What Box 10.4 shows is a mix of traditional and non-traditional approaches, with a strong emphasis on process issues, an emphasis on the leadership role of local authorities working in collaboration with a wide range of partners, and recognition of the need to build capacities in order to make people and processes more effective. This does not neglect traditional approaches, including the need to support new and alternative forms of justice and policing; but it recognizes that reliance on these alone would offer a very limited approach to what are seen as major and deep-seated problems both for many urban communities and the citizens who inhabit them and for the process of urban governance.

### Box 10.4 The place of non-traditional approaches to crime and violence in UN-Habitat Safer Cities programmes

UN-Habitat Safer Cities Programme activities target three main types of prevention:

- **situation prevention** — crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED);
- **institutional prevention** — support to new and alternative forms of justice and policing;
- **social prevention** — actions aimed particularly at groups at risk.

In addition, the following are the other significant areas of activity:

- promoting local authority leadership and responsibility for urban safety as part of good urban governance;
- supporting crime prevention partnerships and initiatives implemented in collaboration with local authorities, the criminal justice system, the private sector and civil society in order to address urban insecurity issues successfully and in sustainable ways;
- building city networks to share knowledge, expertise and good practices that can be replicated in other cities and regions;
- conducting training and capacity-building for local authorities and other stakeholders;
- disseminating lessons learned in collaboration with partners in the North and South.

Source: UN-Habitat, undated, p.3

### The move away from ad hoc initiatives and towards more programmatic approaches

As has been previously discussed, urban crime is rarely a one-dimensional phenomenon. It is therefore unlikely that it will be challenged effectively by single ad hoc initiatives. This does not imply that carefully chosen and well-targeted initiatives have nothing to contribute. But the recognition of
the deep-seated and multidimensional nature of the problem has led to a growing emphasis on more programmatic approaches, which seek to address not merely the symptoms and effects of crime and violence, but also its causes. The UN-Habitat Safer Cities Programme is one example of such an approach. A second example is the approach to be found in England as a result of the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act, which required local Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships to prepare three-year rolling strategies to address the issues revealed by a careful audit of crime and violence in the locality.40

There are several characteristics that appear to be important in making approaches of this nature successful:

- a careful audit of the main crime and violence issues that are experienced in the locality that needs to be repeated periodically;
- an approach to tackling these issues that has both clear strategic intentions and specific action plans/programmes;
- effective public consultation practices and a good level of community support for the proposed actions that includes opportunities for direct action by communities, where appropriate;
- a partnership framework that draws key stakeholders together, generates real commitment from them, and encourages them to address how their own mainstream activities can support this work;
- a long-term perspective in recognition of the fact that it is unlikely that all problems will be resolved quickly, together with a commitment to achieve some early successes in order to generate some momentum for the process;
- an innovative approach to providing resources for programme work that does not just rely on what will inevitably be limited public budgets, but creatively explores a range of possible sources;
- a firm commitment to evaluation and the publication of results on a regular basis so that the programme can be adjusted, where necessary, in the light of experience.

Not all programmes display these characteristics; indeed, it is important to recognize that they are not all easily attained. In particular, the recognition that this must be seen as a long-term commitment to tackling problems that will not easily be eradicated does not sit easily with much shorter-term political and electoral cycles. It is also clear that many programmes have been limited by the resources available to them not just in terms of finance, but in terms of expertise. It should also be remembered that criminal communities often do not just stand by while their hegemony is being challenged; thus, programmes need to constantly adapt as the nature of the problem changes. All of this underlies the point that this should not be seen as an easy road. Nevertheless, there is ample evidence from around the world that programmatic approaches have much to offer, not just in tackling problems of crime and violence, but in terms of engaging people from many walks of life and across all sectors to address these problems.

### The use of the partnership mechanism

If properly used, partnerships can be helpful and effective. But as the discussion in Chapter 4 has shown, the process of partnership by itself is not a universal panacea since partnership needs to be seen both as a specific tool and as a more general philosophy about the importance of working together. There are examples of successful partnerships and there are also examples of partnerships that achieve very little. This sub-section explores what partnerships set out to do, who is involved and with whom they seek to engage, and how effectively they are able to go beyond mere discussion and undertake meaningful action. Key questions in this context include:

- Who is involved in the partnership and who is not? How is membership determined, and what sort of commitment to the partnership process does membership entail?
- How is the partnership process led and how broadly accepted is that process of leadership? If leadership sits with the political or executive leadership of the local authority, does this carry with it a commitment to ensure that the aims of the partnership are supported in the everyday work of the authority?
- What sorts of resources are available to the partnership to enable it to undertake its work? Can the partnership seek to add to these in a variety of ways?
- How does the partnership see its relationships with the various sectors that are active in the local community – public, private, voluntary and community? Does it have a communications strategy which ensures that it is not only committed to keeping people up to date with what it is doing, but also listens to what they are saying? If members of the community wish to engage with or access the work of the partnership, is this easy for them to do?
- Is this a partnership with clear terms of reference that allow it to go beyond discussion and into action? Is it clear just what it and other organizations are responsible for, and what the lines of communication are between these bodies?
- Has it achieved a strong level of buy-in for what it is doing from all sectors, and does it keep checking this from time to time? Is it willing to review what it has been doing in the light of feedback from these processes?
- Is the partnership committed to evaluation processes as a standard arm of its activity, and does it carefully discuss the results of such evaluations and make adjustments in the light of them?
- What is the distribution of power within the partnership? Can all partnership members, irrespective of their backgrounds, influence what the partnership does, or is it, in practice, dominated by a small number of members who are seen as holding the most powerful positions?
- Is the partnership willing to challenge existing orthodoxies if there is evidence that they may be part of the problem, or is it unwilling to step on what it regards as...
Towards safer and more secure cities

There have been many examples of projects that have been implemented in a locality because they have been seen elsewhere and have been copied...without any understanding of the extent to which the apparent success of the project was dependent upon a particular set of local circumstances.

The importance of evaluation has come to be more widely recognized, and more programmes funded with public money have undertaken and published evaluations as a condition of receiving support.

Adaptation to local circumstances, rather than uncritical borrowing

There have been many examples of projects that have been implemented in a locality because they have been seen elsewhere and have been copied, sometimes without any proper evaluation of the original project and almost always without any understanding of the extent to which the apparent success of the project was dependent upon a particular set of local circumstances. It is easy, in one sense, to see the superficial attractions of an approach of this nature – it may appear to offer a quick fix, it certainly gives the impression of action being taken, and it appears to short-circuit the learning process. Many projects of this nature, however, have proved not to be as successful as was hoped, and from this experience has come a greater willingness to recognize that borrowing what appears to be good ideas must be dependent upon an understanding of the particular context in which they were originally applied and a recognition of the necessity to think carefully about how they might need to be adapted to local circumstances. These circumstances might be physical, political, cultural, resource or skills based, or of many other types. Indeed, a simple list such as this underlines the need for care when undertaking such activities since any one or a combination of these activities could be sufficient to make something that is apparently very effective in one locality more doubtful in another.

A good example of this is the difficulty often experienced in applying ideas from the developed West to the developing world. For example, the British approach to integrating planning for crime prevention within planning processes may be seen as a useful model. But this has happened over a long period of time in a planning system that is now well established and in a police force that has adopted CPTED as one of the areas where it will offer crime prevention advice and in so doing will liaise with planners. Even so, there are limitations in terms of what it has yet achieved and there are areas of controversy between police, planners and the development community that remain unresolved.

There are also important issues about training, about buy-in to this philosophy, and about how well connected this thinking is with other policy drives. None of these things would necessarily stop other localities from going down this road or from trying to learn from the British experience. But they all should cause people to stop and think carefully about how to do this in their local context where the likelihood is that many or even all of these characteristics may be different. In particular, how to fit such an approach into local planning systems given their stages of development, how to develop capacity among planners and the police in order to make something like this effective, and how to generate acceptance of an approach of this nature given the other priorities of planning systems are important questions that need careful thought.

The importance of evaluation

A major review of crime prevention programmes in the US that was published in 1997 concluded that ‘Many crime prevention initiatives work. Others don’t. Most programmes have not yet been evaluated with enough scientific evidence to draw conclusions.’

41 The situation has probably improved: the importance of evaluation has come to be more widely recognized, and more programmes funded with public money have undertaken and published evaluations as a condition of receiving support. Nevertheless, the case for evaluation still needs to be made because there is much that is done in this field that is either not evaluated, is assessed in the most perfunctory manner or is declared to be successful without much (if any) evidence to support such a claim. The review by UN-Habitat of the experience of delivering Safer Cities strategies in African cities44 not only reinforces this point, but also focuses on the different kinds of evaluative activity needed at various stages of the Safer Cities process. These are as follows:

- at the stage of the initial assessment of the issues;
- when thinking about whether the strategy actually seeks to address the issues identified as fully and as effectively as possible;
The importance of identifying this multiplicity of evaluation activities is that it sees evaluation not just as a set of activities at the end of the process, but as something integral to the process itself at several stages, and which probably operates as a series of iterations, rather than as a linear process.

This is an important corrective to the all-too-common view that evaluation is something that only happens at the end of the process. The fact that there are many different types of evaluation, and that these can contribute in various ways to an effective process on an ongoing basis, challenges this view. The experience of evaluation activities also suggests that these are best done if they are built into the process from the beginning, with the intention to evaluate systematically helping to structure how the process and its various stages are conceived. An important point that is by no means always recognized is that valuable lessons can be learned from what has not gone well, as well as what has succeeded. Indeed, it can be argued that the need to identify what is not working as quickly as possible in order that consideration can be given to changing it is one of the most important tasks of evaluation, especially when it is seen not just as a task to be carried out at the end of a process, but as something integral to that process at several stages.

This often raises issues about what gets published by way of evaluative material, especially on websites, where there seems to be a tendency not to include material about what has not worked well for what appear to be public relations reasons. It is understandable that organizations will look at their websites in this manner in the contemporary world; but they do need to reflect on how credible this stance is among those stakeholders who are aware that there have been issues and expect them to be covered in published evaluative material. It is also more helpful for outsiders looking at material of this nature in an attempt to learn from it to see a ‘warts and all’ presentation. The fact that these are still relatively rare, and that a presentation which only highlights the positive aspects is much more common, may have contributed to the phenomenon discussed above of the uncritical borrowing of ideas from elsewhere. The need, therefore, is to move towards honest, open and transparent reporting – and if organizations find this difficult from a public relations perspective, one action that they can consider is publishing alongside such material a statement of how they intend to address the issues raised.

**The Challenges of Implementation**

One of the most important considerations for any partnership is the need to think carefully about how what it wants to do can be effectively implemented in the particular circumstances of its remit. As a consequence, one of the early issues to be faced in such situations is an identification of what the barriers to implementation might be and how they might be overcome. This must be about the local situation since implementation is about making something work in a specific context. The key question here is how can things be made to work? This relates to the previous discussion about adapting to local circumstances, rather than uncritical borrowing, since without careful consideration of the particular circumstances in which something is going to be applied, there can be no guarantee that what has worked well elsewhere can be transplanted effectively.

Having underlined the importance of locality, this section looks at five implementation challenges that are commonly faced and which are more thematic in nature. These are defining appropriate institutional structures for action; involving and mobilizing local communities; capacity-building at the local level; integrating crime prevention into urban development; and effective international support for initiatives against crime and violence. Each of these is discussed in turn.

**Defining appropriate institutional structures for action**

In most instances, the appropriate local player to take the lead on actions against crime and violence at the urban scale will be the local authority. Not only will it have a large number of service functions that it can bring to bear on these problems and a resource base that can be used to address them, but it will also see itself as having a central responsibility for the quality of life in its area and for the welfare of its citizens. If these reasons were not enough by themselves to explain why local authorities can normally be found in leading roles in relation to urban initiatives against crime and violence, it is also likely that the local authority will attach considerable importance to the representational role that it plays on behalf of its city.

To enable it to do all of these things well, it will need to be in regular touch with its citizens and its businesses, to be an effective communicator and provider of information, and to be responsive to the feedback that it receives through these channels. In order to do these things, it will almost certainly have to work with a wide range of other local stakeholders, and as has already been argued, in practice this often leads to the creation of formal partnership mechanisms to provide vehicles for activities of this nature. All of these things help to explain why local authorities increasingly accept that taking a lead in fighting against urban crime and violence is an integral part of their approach to providing good governance for their locality. And they also help to explain why leadership in these terms comes not merely from the executive arms of local authorities, but also often
from their political arms. It is no coincidence in this context that it was African city mayors who were instrumental in taking the action that led to the establishment by UN-Habitat of the Safer Cities Programme.

■ Role of local authorities

It is, however, important to recognize that local authorities cannot do it all. Their powers and their resources are finite, and other players in the local environment are simply better at doing some things than local authorities. This is one of the reasons why, increasingly, partnership approaches have emerged as the most appropriate vehicle for addressing problems of crime and violence. It is not necessary for local authorities to be in the forefront of providing leadership for partnerships, and there are many examples of respected local players who are not from the local authority who do this, and do it very well. But what is critical is that the local authorities, whether playing leadership roles or not, are fully supportive of the work of their partnerships. This means not just making formal statements of support for specific actions, but also being willing to align their own policies, practices and budgets with the work of the partnership so that this becomes part of their mainstream work, rather than a marginal extra. If this means changes for the local authority, they should be willing to embrace change if it enables crime and violence to be tackled more effectively. The relationship between the partnership that is tackling crime and violence and the local authority is probably the single most important relationship of all; and both the partnership and the local authority need to recognize this for what it is and to put the time and effort into this relationship to ensure that it is an effective one.

■ The spirit of partnerships

It is worth emphasizing that partnerships are most likely to flourish if their members take on board what might be described as ‘the spirit of partnership’. This means that partners commit to the enterprise, rather than to the defence of their own territories, that everyone is treated as an equal; that partners seek to promote the aims and objectives of the partnership not just when they are sitting around the table, but also in their everyday working and community lives; and that contributions are valued according to their quality and not their source. Many of the difficulties that partnerships have experienced have probably arisen at least, in part, because key partners have not fully adopted the spirit of partnership, which inevitably lessens the likelihood that the model will achieve its full potential. Thus, it is important to acknowledge that partnerships are much more than simple coordination mechanisms, and that they represent an attempt to do much better through joint working than individuals and organizations are capable of doing in isolation. To maximize the likelihood of this happening, however, it is necessary for all partners to recognize and to commit to the spirit of partnership wholeheartedly.

■ Structural problems affecting partnerships

There are two common structural problems affecting the work of partnerships and the local authority’s contributions to them. The first is the problem of the boundaries of jurisdictions, and the second is the difficulties that national governments can experience in committing to partnerships that effectively require them to give priority to particular localities. The problem of the boundaries of jurisdictions is a common one that takes many forms. Typically, the local government structure of large urban areas is a fragmented one, which often involves several local authorities covering different parts of the city that may well involve two tiers of government each having responsibility for particular services. Similarly, the basis on which the police operate does not follow the same set of boundaries and is often commanded at a broader spatial scale than that of the individual city. It is also known that problems of crime and violence do not respect local government or police administrative boundaries. All of this can combine to present real issues for the structuring of partnerships to tackle urban crime and violence; realistically, it is unlikely that structural changes to produce a much better set of boundaries will solve these problems in the short term.

This situation requires a considerable amount of pragmatism in many quarters and it can also test sorely what has been discussed about the spirit of partnership. Often, a practical way forward starts from an acknowledgement that there may be more than one spatial scale that is appropriate here, so that broad strategic issues covering the scale of a whole conurbation may need different partnership structures than interventions in individual communities experiencing particular kinds of problems. This can make the structure of partnerships in the area very complex, and it almost certainly will raise issues about how the various partnerships relate to each other; but it may well be a partnership structure that is both achievable and congruent with the real world situation. The need here is to reach agreements about ways forward relatively quickly, and not to let the difficulties of this process get in the way of what the real task is, which is addressing the problems of crime and violence. It is probably helpful to acknowledge that there is no such thing as a perfect structure, and that what matters most is getting something that works and that partners are prepared to commit to as quickly as possible, rather than to wrangle endlessly about alternative approaches.

The difficulty that governments often have with committing to individual spatial partnerships is not usually a political one, but is more often the problem that government departments or ministries are simply not set up in ways that enable spatial differentiation of this kind. So a typical problem for them would be when they are asked to do something that they regard as being inconsistent with their general policies and practices, or when they are asked to adjust their budgets in order to make more resources available to a particular area than would normally occur. They can also have real difficulties with how they are represented in particular spatial partnerships since it can be genuinely difficult for someone from one ministry to represent the full range of governmental interests. It can be equally unhelpful for people from several ministries to be in attendance, not least because it tends to give the impression that government coordination is poor and that these are people
defending ministerial fiefdoms, rather than committing to the spirit of partnership.

At the same time, it is easy to understand why the idea of having central government representation on such partnerships is likely to be an attractive one. In practice, central government services frequently have a part to play in the fight against crime and violence in a particular locality, and partnerships will often want to raise issues with central governments about how policies and practices might be changed in order to aid their work. There is no single correct answer to this, not least because the structure of central government departments or ministries itself might make a difference to how an issue of this nature could be tackled. For example, a governmental structure with regional arms might find this easier than a structure that consists solely of nationally focused organizations. Sometimes this creates the view that the national government level will not be incorporated within partnerships looking at specific localities. But, occasionally, ways of enabling this to happen have been found. The important issue for central governments, whatever view they take about this particular matter, is that they should be supportive of the work of partnerships and should be prepared to look in an unbiased way at how they can help, whether this comes at them as a result of partnership membership or as a result of a direct approach to them by a partnership.

This represents the kinds of challenges that many partnerships have had to overcome. The primary test is whether a partnership mechanism can be put together that will work effectively in the local circumstances and will be seen, in particular, to be adding real value to what otherwise would have been achieved. Partnerships can achieve this; of that, there is no doubt. But the creation of a partnership structure is not of itself a guarantee that this will happen. More than anything else, what is probably needed is people who are committed to the idea that they need to work with each other and with the affected local communities in order to be effective – people who, in other words, embrace the spirit of partnership.

**Involving and mobilizing local communities**

In just the same way that people need to embrace the idea of what has been called ‘the spirit of partnership’ in order for partnerships to deliver to their full potential, so it is in terms of involving and mobilizing local communities. The central concern here is that the value of this kind of action needs to be fully understood and fully committed to, and not undertaken as an act of tokenism or in the most minimal ways. In a phrase, action to tackle problems of crime and violence should be ‘done with’ local communities rather than ‘done to’ them. This means many different things in different circumstances, which have to take into account both a differential willingness and a differential ability to take part in activities of this nature. It will also vary according to the types of actions to be taken, although the broad philosophy about the importance of community involvement as a principle is a common element. This is well put in relation to efforts to tackle domestic violence in Africa:

> Effective projects aimed at changing harmful beliefs and practices in a community must engage and be led by members of that community. Organizations can play an important facilitative and supportive role; yet the change must occur in the hearts and minds of community members themselves.48

This gets to the heart of why community involvement is so central to work in the field of crime and violence. Essentially, what action to address crime and violence is seeking to achieve is changing human behaviour for the better, and while there are potentially a large number and a wide variety of contributions to this endeavour, much of this comes down to the various ways that exist of making an impact on individuals. This is often achieved at least as much through the influence of families and household members, neighbours and regular social contacts as it is through the formal mechanisms of public policy. Not only can engaging with local communities in developing and implementing programmes be seen in terms of people’s rights as citizens, but it also makes sense in terms of working towards successful outcomes to help mobilize people who are best placed to make a difference because they are closest to these target individuals. This is unlikely, in practice, to prove as straightforward as this may sound; but the principle really is as simple as this.

What does accepting the philosophy of ‘doing with’ rather than ‘doing to’ mean for partnerships and other implementing bodies in seeking to involve and mobilize local communities in taking action against crime and violence? The suggestion here is that this requires them to make at least the following three commitments from the beginning:

- A commitment to go down the road of community involvement with all that this will entail. This includes a willingness to trust local people even when that trust is not always immediately repaid.
- A commitment to support communities and individuals in a range of ways during the implementation process. For example, programmes seeking to address domestic violence need to accept the possibility that confronting this issue might, in some cases, cause violence to increase in the first instance. Consequently, it is important not only to pursue programmes of this nature, but also to offer appropriate victim support and, possibly, tough police intervention as well.
- A commitment to improve community capacity to take a leading role not as a one-off activity, but as part of an ongoing programme. Training and development activities need to be available not just to partnership members and public officials engaged in the process of implementation, but also to a wide range of community groups and individuals. There is inevitably an element of upfront cost in this; but the pay-back is in terms of community members who are both willing and able to play active roles in the process.
**Capacity-building at the local level**

One of the most important tasks that partnerships and other implementing agencies need to undertake as an early part of the process of tackling crime and violence is an assessment of the extent to which what they want to do might be limited by the capacities of the relevant organizations and individuals. This should be followed up by a programme designed to address capacity limitations over a reasonable period of time.

Put differently, implementing organizations need to audit the skills available to them in relation to what they want to do and to put in place actions to tackle the deficiencies identified. This may need to be seen as a process that will take a reasonable amount of time; in the short term, there may be limits on what can be achieved. The critical issue is the need to recognize the relationship between what the implementing body wishes to do and the human capacity that is available to get this done effectively. The failure to take cognisance of this partly accounts for why programmes in this field sometimes struggle.

Discovering from an audit process of this kind that there is a shortage of the appropriate skills typically raises two types of issues. The first relates to resource – are the resources available to bring in more people with the necessary skills and experience? The second is a staff development issue – can existing staff be helped in sufficient numbers to develop the required skills? These are not mutually exclusive alternatives, but they may well operate over different timeframes, with the former approach probably being quicker. Very often, the resources are simply not available for wholesale programmes of recruitment in order to bring in the required skills; as a result, for many organizations, staff development is a necessary component of seeking to develop new functions or to undertake new initiatives. A judicious combination of bringing skills in from the outside and improving existing staff capabilities is often the response to this situation. But most organizations with limited budgets would probably take the view that investing in staff development is a better long-term option than relying on imported skills, even though the latter, in the short term, might enable action to be undertaken more quickly.

For example, the decision to pay more attention to the principles of CPTED in managing new development and in tackling the crime problems experienced by existing development will require people in the architecture, planning and police communities who are knowledgeable about these issues and have practical experience of working in these fields. Internationally, but not always locally, expertise of this kind is available and can be brought into organizations by various means in order to kick-start programmes of this nature. One example of initiatives of this kind might be relatively short-term international secondments of skilled and experienced professionals. But in-service training programmes can also help to develop a cadre of people who build up these skills over a period of time. Programmes that seek to link these two elements in appropriate ways so that external expertise is used not just to begin work in the field, but also to institute training programmes that can then be expanded upon by their early participants, may have much to offer in these terms.

Over time, activities of this kind can develop relationships with the formal structure of skills and qualifications development in a country so that they become part of its more formal awards programmes, often through further or higher education institutions or professional bodies. But it is likely that the focus will be on the more immediate benefits of capacity development. One of the most valuable learning tools in this context is the initial work being undertaken to implement programmes so that there are benefits from these activities not just in terms of the specific achievements, but also in the opportunities they offer in developing the skills of those who either participate in these processes or observe them at close hand. The kinds of skills that are important here include not just direct hands-on skills, but also reflective skills, so that people are able to think about what is going well or badly, and to consider appropriate action as a consequence.

It also needs to be acknowledged that capacity development issues permeate the work both of local authorities and of partnerships at all levels; thus, the potential scale of this challenge may be daunting. To take just four groups of stakeholders by way of illustration, the development needs of different groups of professionals; partnership members; the local development community and its various agents; and members of community groups may all be different, not just from each other, but also within each of these groups. It is very unlikely that a partnership would be able to put in place a single programme that could tackle all of these differing needs at the same time. But what a partnership could do in this situation is to acknowledge the nature and the extent of this task, commit itself to addressing it over a reasonable period of time, and make a start on what it is able to do immediately. In making decisions on matters of this nature, the partnership will want to take into account the benefits that will ensue not just to its own immediate operations, but also to the capacities of various stakeholders (including community members and groups) to contribute more effectively in implementing the overall strategy.

Improving capacity should be seen by partnerships and other implementing bodies as seeking to establish a continuous trajectory of improvement. In the UN-Habitat Safer Cities Programme, this responsibility is often carried out through the Safer Cities coordinator (who will also need training for this role), who is able to draw on some training modules that have already been developed by UN-Habitat for particular issues. The ability to do things such as this is one of the real benefits of a programmatic approach because it means that cities that have decided to undertake Safer Cities projects can learn directly in this way from the accumulated experience of Safer Cities work elsewhere.

**Integrating crime prevention into urban development**

Many determinants of crime and violence are local in context and are better tackled through local interventions. The impacts of crime and violence are also to a large extent local. It is therefore quite understandable that crime and violence are increasingly becoming subjects of concern for
In terms of direct action to help specific cities, several examples have already been given of projects that are of considerable benefit. For example, funding from the US has been a very significant factor in recent efforts to mount projects tackling aspects of crime and violence in Kingston (Jamaica). The Netherlands has contributed to Safer Cities projects in Johannesburg, Durban and Dar es Salaam (where the government of Sweden has also been a contributor). Canada has helped with the process of updating the pre-existing review of the experience of Safer Cities projects in Africa. These are a few examples of how international assistance can help the effort to tackle crime and violence in rapidly developing cities. Targeted assistance of this nature is not only immediately beneficial to the recipient city, but it also gives the donating organization confidence that the funding will be used in the specified manner and will not be filtered off for other uses, including corrupt activities, which has been a big issue in relation to international funding.

One particular type of international support that can be very helpful is in the field of training and staff development. There are already several good examples of this practice. For example, as part of its support for the reform of the Jamaica Constabulary Force since 2000, the UK government has been providing financial resources on a significant scale – UK£2.5 million in the first three-year period, a further UK£2.4 million for the three years from August 2005, and a further UK£750,000 announced in October 2005, mainly to support international police officers working alongside Jamaica’s force in addressing issues of serious crime. This latter element has included Metropolitan Police officers working directly with their Jamaican counterparts, as well as training being offered by the Metropolitan Police to the Jamaica Constabulary Force. The relationship between the Jamaica Constabulary Force and the UK’s Metropolitan Police suggests there can be particular advantages in this relationship existing on a continuous rather than an ad hoc basis since this offers the opportunity of progressive improvement rather than short-term gains. This arrangement was also of direct value to the UK in the sense that it helped to stem the flow of criminal activity from Jamaica to the UK. Bearing in mind the international nature of some criminal activity, this is a dimension that should not be ignored when considering such arrangements.

Mentoring projects can also help in this situation and may well be an appropriate form of follow-up to initial training periods. If initiatives of this kind concentrate not just on skills development, but also on helping to develop a cadre of people capable of training others in their locality, this can be a very cost-effective form of assistance with considerable long-term benefits. It should also be said that the benefits of approaches of this nature can be two way since this can also be a useful development opportunity for the individual seconded and from which the employing organization would also subsequently benefit. There is clearly scope for more initiatives of this kind because capacity-building is one of the significant problem areas that many crime and violence initiatives face in parts of the world where few, if any, of these kinds of activities have taken place previously.

Effective international support for initiatives against crime and violence

International support of various kinds can help cities in the developing world to improve their ability to effectively implement measures that address problems of crime and violence. This kind of direct assistance should be seen as part of a package, which also includes continuing and strengthening international cooperation in tackling certain kinds of crime, where very often their worst consequences are most felt in cities. For example, as Chapters 3 and 4 have discussed, the trafficking of drugs, arms and people into prostitution are all matters where international cooperation is vitally important, and where, in practice, the consequences of a failure to stop illegal activities of this nature will be experienced on the streets of cities of both the Western world and the rapidly urbanizing developing world. It is important that support activities continue and develop across this full spectrum. But the following discussion develops, in particular, arguments about the scope for direct international support targeted at particular cities.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UN-HABITAT SAFER CITIES PROGRAMME

The experience of the Safer Cities Programme to date is that more cities in various parts of the world are signing up to it after its initial concentration in African cities. The available evidence suggests that those cities that have chosen to participate in the programme have benefited from that choice, although this is not to say that their problems of crime and violence have all been successfully addressed. This gives rise to three kinds of challenges:

- Can more cities that could benefit from involvement in the programme be encouraged to choose to do so?
- Is it possible to speed up the process in individual cities so that more can be achieved quickly?
- Are there any significant modifications to the programme that should be considered in the light of accumulated experience?

These challenges are in some ways interrelated; but for ease of presentation, they will be discussed separately below.

Continuing development of the programme

There can be little doubt that the answer to the first challenge – will more cities benefit from this approach? – must, in the broadest sense, be ‘yes’. Reading the account of the cities that have already chosen to go along this path suggests that they are typical of many other cities that have not done so; and as such, in principle, the same kinds of benefits that participating cities have obtained ought to be achievable in other cities as well. Of course, if cities do not believe that this is an appropriate model for addressing their problems of crime and violence, then that is a matter of their choice. Perhaps UN-Habitat could contribute to debates of this nature by promoting the benefits of the Safer Cities Programme more forcefully, particularly by using stories from participating cities that demonstrate these benefits. Of themselves, such actions raise resource questions for the programme as a whole, and also for UN-Habitat in terms of its role both in overall programme management and in contributing to individual city projects, especially in their early phases. This may be one area where the scale of international financial and practical support available could really make a difference.

Can progress with individual Safer Cities programmes be accelerated?

The rate of progress with individual Safer Cities projects depends mainly upon the local situation. In some cases, this means that it is relatively slow, given that the pace at which individual city projects are able to proceed varies. This is undoubtedly related, in part, to capacity-building issues since the capacity to deliver is one of the key factors in the rate of local progress. This needs to be seen in the context of the problems being addressed, particularly where rates of crime and violence are high and/or growing. It also needs to be related to the expectations of stakeholders, particularly to what is needed to maintain their commitment, support and enthusiasm since these are vital ingredients of a successful process. Thus, whether or not individual programmes are moving fast enough really ought to be a local judgement. Nevertheless, there is scope for the individual cities that have been moving slowly to learn from the cities that have been moving more quickly, and in order for this to happen there is scope for developing existing experience-sharing arrangements.

But it should also be remembered that the Safer Cities approach is not in the territory of the quick fix. Rather, it is about gaining a thorough understanding of the problem, working towards recognition of the importance of getting the right machinery in place, generating full and necessary engagement with the process from all sectors, and building capacity. It is also important that these things are properly embedded within the working relationships between partners in order to ensure that beneficial change is long term. All of this is likely to take time, and since the challenge each one poses will be different from one city to another, it is likely that these time periods will also vary. While there is a prima facie case for speeding up the process, especially in cities where it has been slow, this should be seen in the context of the situation on the ground in individual cities, rather than by developing a standardized view of what the pace of projects ought to be.

Should the Safer Cities approach be adapted in the light of experience?

A useful starting point for considering this issue is by examining the major problems that have been experienced, to date, in implementing strategies in Safer Cities projects. These are summarized in Box 10.5, which draws on the experience of African cities since these are, as yet, the most advanced in utilizing the Safer Cities model.

The first thing to note in Box 10.5 is that some of the points reflect the difficulties in making partnership models work, which are by no means unique to this programme. These issues about the experience of partnership have been discussed earlier; in particular, they have contributed to the ‘checklist’ of ten groups of questions that should be asked about partnerships, generated in the section on ‘Emerging policy trends’. It is also quite common to find that ‘process’ issues in this area can be challenging. It is therefore not wholly surprising that some partnerships have struggled with translating broad goals into action plans. Similarly, it is not an uncommon experience that organizations sometimes marginalize experimental or pilot projects, which they see as challenging their traditional ways of doing things.

Perhaps one way of addressing these ‘process’ issues is to think about how Safer Cities partnerships might themselves be paired with partnerships in other parts of the world that have relevant experience to offer, and which can help them to overcome some of these challenges by drawing on their own experiences and playing a mentoring role. Just
as cities across the world benefit in these terms, by being ‘twinned’ with other cities, so too could partnerships benefit from similar arrangements. The points about the importance of capacity-building and of the open and accessible reporting of evaluative work have already been noted. Encouraging developments in these areas ought to be helpful not just in its own right, but also in helping the Safer Cities partnership process in individual cities. The difficulty of relating individual initiatives in Safer Cities programmes to national and even international initiatives in these fields is important, and a willingness to address issues of this nature is one of the ways in which national governments can improve their contributions to particular place-based partnerships. As far as the resources available for Safer Cities projects are concerned, there is no getting away from the fact that resource availability affects what both UN-Habitat can do in relation to the programme as a whole, and what can be done in individual cities. It is, of course, a matter for individual jurisdictions to decide whether they wish to do anything about this situation; but the challenges of urbanization are among the greatest faced by humanity, and within this the drive for safer cities is of considerable significance to the quality of life. There is also a scope, as some of the examples have demonstrated, for help both in terms of financial resources and expertise to be made available to individual partnerships. This is a very effective way in which the Safer Cities process can be moved forward.

On the basis of this quick review, however, none of these points suggests that there is anything basically wrong with the Safer Cities model. They merely indicate that there is more that could be done to help overcome some of the operational difficulties being experienced in trying to put into practice something that is inherently quite complex and difficult.

### Options for scaling up and enhancing the impact of the Safer Cities Programme

There are two broad areas where the impact of the programme could possibly be enhanced. These are: at city level, in terms of direct impact on local insecurity; and at the international level, where the programme could increase its impact on partners and actors that can deliver at the local level or provide enabling frameworks for local-level action.

The scope of institutional change and reform should indeed be considered as paramount for sustainability of actions and impacts as well as the development of local capacities among key actors. Both are ways to enhance impact of individual initiatives. A third important strategy to increase impact is to look at leveraging large-scale investment in support of the implementation of local crime prevention strategies. This report has identified in some detail areas of planning and service delivery that are considered as providing an important contribution to the prevention of crime in cities. Accessing resources for such types of investment is crucial for the larger-scale impact of Safer Cities processes at local levels.

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### The 2006 review of progress with Safer Cities programmes in African cities itemized eight difficulties encountered in implementing strategies:

- the necessity to translate general goals into a concrete and targeted action plan geared towards short-, medium- and long-term benefits;
- the complexity of creating and implementing projects involving several partners;
- the experimental or pilot nature of several initiatives, which is quite often marginal to the traditional ways of doing things by the involved institutions and organizations;
- limited financial resources available for the municipality or the partners to ensure the implementation of such initiatives;
- limited resources and technical capacities of the municipal services in several countries working on implementing decentralization policies;
- the difficulty of anchoring these initiatives to larger national and international programmes addressing poverty and exclusion, good governance, decentralization, social development, women, children, youth and family support, and criminal justice system modernization;
- insufficient partnerships blocking the development of a joint approach to safety and prevention, and making coordination very difficult; and
- limited access to information on good or promising practices.

**Source:** UN-Habitat, 2006a, p.26
police and the criminal justice system, has increasingly been replaced by an approach that recognizes the necessity for a broad-based response. There is considerable scope for further developing this approach.

- Nonetheless, it is important that the police and the criminal justice system are ‘fit for purpose’ in the modern world, and are seen as key contributors to the fight against crime and violence. Improvements in these ‘traditional’ areas should be seen as being complementary to the new approaches being developed in ‘non-traditional’ fields, and appropriate linkages should be developed between all of these activities.
- The main ‘non-traditional’ fields where the development of fresh policy responses has taken place comprise the following:
  - the idea that urban safety and security can be enhanced through effective urban planning, design and governance;
  - the development of community-based approaches to enhancing urban safety and security;
  - developing ways of reducing the key risk factors by focusing on groups most vulnerable to crime, especially young people and women; and
  - strengthening social capital through initiatives that look to develop the ability of individuals and communities themselves to respond to problems of crime and violence, provide economic, social, cultural and sporting opportunities, and improve the environment in ways that assist these processes.
- Less attention has, as yet, been paid to applying the idea of the non-violent resolution of conflicts. However, there is scope for the further exploration of this idea.
- The combination of several of these approaches into a systematic programme, driven by a broad strategy and based upon a careful understanding of the local context, seems more likely to be successful than the ad hoc application of individual initiatives.
- The preferred mechanism to support this approach is usually the partnership mechanism; but to be fully effective, partnerships need to address a series of questions about their operation, and partners need to buy fully into ‘the spirit of partnership’.
- The transfer of ideas from elsewhere can be very valuable; but it needs to be thought about carefully in the particular circumstances in which the ideas will be applied. It cannot be assumed that ideas that have worked in one part of the world will necessarily work successfully elsewhere. There are no one-size-fits-all solutions, and there is no substitute for a careful study of the particular situation in order to determine the most appropriate course of action.
- A greater level of commitment to evaluation as a process that can contribute to partnerships working at several points in time and on several levels is still required, and there needs to be more open reporting of evaluation results, including in areas where problems have been experienced. The work of partnerships should be seen as a learning process, to which both the results of evaluative work and the operational experiences of people directly involved in the process of implementation can make a considerable contribution.
- The best institutional structures for implementing programmes are likely to be those that succeed in getting the key players involved in delivery in ways that commit them to the programme, as well as ways that explore how the mainstream work of their own agencies can contribute to the overall effectiveness of the programme’s initiatives. Local authorities will often be the most appropriate leaders of such structures.
- Local communities need to be as fully involved as possible in these processes, not only in terms of consultation, but also as generators and implementers of projects.
- Capacity-building is a fundamental part of work at the local level to tackle crime and violence. The approach adopted to capacity-building activities needs to be as broadly based as possible and should include the idea of capacity-building for professional groups, partnership members and local community members.
- International support has a key role to play in action against crime and violence in the cities of the developing world, as well as in continuing to develop cooperative measures in tackling the international dimensions of crime. This can also include targeted financial support for particular initiatives, help with capacity-building, availability of appropriate expertise through secondment, and assistance with various types of mentoring. In addition, norms, guidelines, and reporting requirements could be developed to assist and facilitate the promotion of such interventions.
- The UN-Habitat Safer Cities Programme needs to engage more cities than it has done to date and, where possible, to help speed up the process in cities that have proved to be slow in getting to grips with the problems. There are several things that might help in this context; but one important issue is resource availability both for the programme as a whole and for projects in individual cities. Further international support could be of considerable value in this context as well.

There can be no doubt that this represents a very challenging agenda. There are many parts of the world where crime and violence are at completely unacceptable levels, and where citizens find their daily lives blighted all too frequently by experiences of this kind.
which city authorities struggle to cope. The propositions that have been summarized above do not represent an easy solution to these problems: in truth, there is no such thing. But they offer hope that this problem is capable of being addressed effectively so that urban crime and violence, if not eradicated, can at least be contained in the 21st century.

NOTES

2 This issue of the relationship between design decisions and future pressures on police resources seems to have been little studied in the literature; but if it is the case that one kind of design approach will lead to a different experience of crime in the future than will another, then it is a factor to be taken into account.
3 Kitchen, 2005.
5 One of the best-known examples of this is in the work of Coleman (1990), who coined the phrase ‘design disadvantage’ for the features she saw in the developments she studied, which in her view created opportunities for crime and violent behaviour.
6 There is some evidence from the field of premises liability litigation in the US to suggest that this issue is beginning to have an impact on court decisions. It remains to be seen whether, and to what extent, this will spread to other parts of the world; but if it does, it could well have a powerful impact on designers and developers. See Schneider and Kitchen, 2007.
8 There are several examples of African cities that illustrate this point that are summarized in UN-Habitat, 2006e.
9 The elements summarized in this paragraph are discussed in more detail in the Bradford case study undertaken for this volume (Kitchen, 2007).
10 See UN-Habitat, 2006g.
12 This work is summarized in Box 4.2.
13 This would certainly be the conclusion to be drawn from the literature on these processes in developing countries, although there are also extensive debates about both the strengths and the limitations of this approach. See Innes and Boorher, 2004.
15 Elements of this same process of transition can also be seen in the case study material presented in Chapter 4 on the role of the police in helping to reduce crime and violence in Diadema, São Paulo, and also in the development of a stronger community orientation for the police as part of a series of measures to address crime and violence and Kingston (Jamaica).
16 This is also a strong feature of the reactions to the prison system in Port Moresby (Papua New Guinea).
17 UN-Habitat, 2006g, p.8.
20 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 UN-Habitat, 2006g, p.16.
27 Ibid, p.32.
28 The example of Papua New Guinea has already been cited by Boamah and Stanley, 2007.
29 The Hong Kong case study undertaken for this Global Report illustrates the processes of change in policing that have taken place in those particular circumstances (Broadhurst et al, 2007).
34 Thompson and Gartner, 2007.
39 Ibid.
40 The example of the work of one of these partnerships is discussed in Kitchen (2007).
43 UN-Habitat, 2006g, p.27.
46 The resources available to local authorities in various parts of the world to enable them to discharge their mainstream functions are variable, with some local authorities having in an absolute sense a much stronger resource base than others.
47 UN-Habitat, 2006g, pp.15–16.
49 UN-Habitat, undated, pp.8–9.
52 UN-Habitat, 2006g.
54 Ibid.
55 The progress with individual projects can be reviewed at http://www.unhabitat.org/programmes/safercities/projects.asp.
56 UN-Habitat, 2006g.
57 As yet, the Port Moresby Safer Cities Programme is still in its early stages.
Ensuring that everyone enjoys the legal and physical protections provided by security of tenure will continue to be one of the major challenges facing policy- and law-makers in the coming years. Chapter 5 reviewed some of the current trends on secure tenure, while Chapter 6 explored a cross-section of some of the key policy responses that have been employed to address the problem of tenure insecurity throughout the world today. This chapter expands on the findings in Chapter 6 and offers a series of proposals designed to strengthen the prospects of security of tenure by focusing on the human rights dimensions of a status that is increasingly seen as an enforceable human right.

A range of efforts are under way dedicated to tackling the global security of tenure crisis. From the Global Campaign on Secure Tenure to the work of Cities Alliance and others, and the countless efforts of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and community-based organizations (CBOs), numerous organizations are now actively seeking to expand tenure protection around the globe. And yet, given the massive scale of the problem, to date these efforts have effectively only begun to scratch the surface. Much work thus remains to be done if the goal of security of tenure for all is to be achieved. Moreover, there is a need to work towards the integration of the many diverse and often competing approaches to providing tenure security (see Chapters 5 and 6). The objective is to address the issue of security of tenure in the most effective, just and rights-consistent manner in order to guarantee that all persons, everywhere, can enjoy appropriate degrees of secure tenure throughout their lives.

In many respects, the eventual outcome of these discussions will be highly determinative of the shape of cities in the future. Whichever approach ends up influencing policy-makers from the international to the national and local levels will have considerable ramifications not only for the current generation of hundreds of millions of people living under the constant threat of forced eviction and other threats because of their insecurity of tenure, but also for future generations, as well.1 As shown above, there is considerable evidence, for instance, that freehold title-based approaches to the conferral of security of tenure, while possessing many positive features, may, in fact, result in greater numbers of people being forced into situations of tenure insecurity, both now and certainly in the future. Conversely, continuing to embrace the status quo will also surely lead to increased levels of insecure tenure. While various approaches presented in the past have been criticized as overly simplistic and potentially harmful to the rights of the poor, it seems timely to consider whether more flexible and innovative approaches to secure tenure or some other path might stand the best chance of achieving the most desired outcome.

This chapter provides an overview of the main elements of a human-rights based approach, focusing on a comprehensive understanding of the interrelationships between housing, land and property rights. It calls for enhanced efforts to support and develop innovative approaches to tenure, taking into account the wide range of experiences from all over the world, and it calls for enhanced efforts to combat homelessness. This is followed by a discussion of the roles and potential contributions of local authorities and an overview of how the obligations of non-state actors can be strengthened and clarified. The last part of the chapter provides a set of recommendations for future action to end forced evictions and enhance security of tenure.

A new ... approach to security of tenure ... must combine the laws and principles of human rights and jurisprudence with the best of the tried and tested approaches to secure tenure
seriously consideration by governments and international agencies. Such an approach may stand the best chance yet of gaining and maintaining tenure security for the world’s poorest and most vulnerable groups.

But if such an approach is to be embraced, why would an integrated approach, based on human rights, be any better than what has been attempted in the past? First, it is important because states are already legally bound by a whole series of human rights obligations. Second, when access to secure tenure is viewed through the lens of human rights – or the bundle of rights and entitlements that protect people from being arbitrarily or unlawfully removed from their homes and lands, and the protections that this legal regime is designed to provide to every human being – it becomes clear that the right to security of tenure is perhaps denied to more people than any other basic human right, with the possible exception of the right to water. Thus, the pressing need to address these questions as rights violations adds increased urgency to the global quest for security of tenure.

While approaching security of tenure from such a rights-based approach is still relatively uncommon, many developments point in this direction. The Global Campaign for Secure Tenure, for instance, has recognized the importance of taking human rights approaches in achieving secure tenure, and has stressed the absolute primacy of human rights in this regard. All states have voluntarily ratified international human rights instruments that legally bind them to certain actions, many of which include specific obligations to recognize and protect rights, such as the right to secure tenure. The principles of a human rights-based approach are, in fact, found – albeit providing varied levels of protection – within the existing law of most countries. These principles may not always be subject to full compliance or enforcement; but as legal principles, there is no disputing the fact that they are in place. Indeed, all legal systems – common law, civil law, Roman-Dutch law, Islamic law (see Box 11.1), customary law and others – address the question of tenure and the degrees of security accorded to each type of recognized and informal tenure arrangements. Much research on security of tenure, however, only touches lightly on the question of law and its role in the conferral of security tenure, and even less so on the human rights dimensions (which are also legal in nature) of this question. It is important to ask why states have not more frequently embraced human rights tools to support wider access to tenure. International human rights law, for instance, stipulates that governments need to respect, protect and fulfill housing, land and property rights by ‘taking steps’ to the ‘maximum of available resources’ to ensure the ‘progressive realization’ of all rights, including the right to security of tenure.

Moreover, addressing security of tenure as a human rights issue is somewhat trickier than many other rights. The main reason is that local conditions must always be taken into account in determining both the diagnosis and the remedy to prevailing conditions of tenure insecurity. This is not often the case with rights such as freedom from torture, a fair trial and other rights for which more universally applicable remedies may be easier to identify and implement.

The legal and normative basis for security of tenure as a human right

If security of tenure is to be treated as a right, it is clear that a range of existing human rights, viewed as an integral whole, form the legal and normative basis for the existence of this right. While numerous rights form the foundation upon which the right to security of tenure rests, it is perhaps the right to adequate housing, the right to be protected against forced evictions, the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of one’s property, the right to privacy and respect for the home, and the right to housing and property restitution that are most fundamental. These rights are briefly outlined in the following sections.

The right to adequate housing

The right to adequate housing was first recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948

The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions.4
The right to housing is recognized in a range of international legal instruments, including inter alia:

- 1948: Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 25(1));
- 1961: International Labour Organization (ILO) Recommendation No 115 on Workers’ Housing;
- 1965: International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Article 5(e)(iii));
- 1976: International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Article 11(1));
- 1979: Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (Article 14(2));
- 1989: Convention on the Rights of the Child (Article 27(3));
- 1990: International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (Article 43(1)(d));

The practice of forced eviction ... constitutes a gross violation of a broad range of human rights

As noted above, many states have incorporated references to the right to housing in their national constitutions. Moreover, all states have domestic legislation in place recognizing at least some of the requirements associated with the right to adequate housing. Laws governing property relations, landlord and tenant arrangements, nondiscrimination rights in the housing sector, access to services, land administration and a range of other legal areas can be found in all states. Among other things, those entitled to this right are legally assured to housing that is adequate. Adequacy has specifically been defined to include security of tenure; availability of services, materials, facilities and infrastructure; affordability; habitability; accessibility; location; and cultural adequacy.5

Governmental obligations derived from this right include duties to take measures to confer security of tenure (and consequent protection against arbitrary or forced eviction and/or arbitrary confiscation or expropriation of housing); to prevent discrimination in the housing sphere; to ensure equality of treatment and access vis-à-vis housing; to protect against racial discrimination; to guarantee housing affordability; and many others.6 Moreover, there is a duty incumbent upon those exercising powers of governance to promote access to, and provision of, housing resources suited to the needs of the disabled, the chronically ill, migrant workers, the elderly, and refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).

States parties must give due priority to those social groups living in unfavourable conditions by giving them particular consideration. Policies and legislation should correspondingly not be designed to benefit already advantaged social groups at the expense of others.7

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, international law requires governments to take steps to progressively realize housing (and other) rights:

Each State Party to the present Covenant under...
The more recently adopted Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons (the Pinheiro Principles) is even clearer in establishing rights against displacement (see Box 11.3).14

■ The right not to be arbitrarily deprived of one’s property

The right not to be arbitrarily deprived of one’s property is closely related to the issue of forced eviction. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was adopted in 1948, guarantees everyone the right to own property alone, as well as in association with others, and prohibits the arbitrary deprivation of property.15 Such rights are widely addressed throughout human rights law, although ‘property rights’ as such, are – perhaps surprisingly for many readers – not found within the two (legally binding) international covenants on human rights, which became law in those states that have ratified them as from 1976.

While some have argued that this omission was essentially a technical mistake, the vote of the drafting body of seven ‘against’ to six ‘for’, with five abstentions, of whether or not to include a specific article on property within the ICESCR, clearly shows that unanimity on this question was not apparent at the time of the drafting of these cornerstone international human rights treaties.16 In identifying the reasons for the exclusion of property rights from these texts, it appears that questions of definition, scope and issues surrounding interference with property, the circumstances under which the right of the state to expropriate property could be legitimately exercised and the question of compensation each contributed to preventing widespread agreement.

■ The right to privacy and respect for the home

The widely recognized rights to privacy and respect for the home are fundamental human rights protections that can also be linked directly to security of tenure. Privacy is, in fact, one of the elements of adequacy identified by the CESCR,17 as well as by governments in both the Global Strategy for Shelter to the Year 2000 and the Habitat Agenda.

The safeguards against arbitrary and unlawful interference with the home found in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, for instance, have been frequently relied upon by claimants before the European Court on Human Rights in cases seeking protection of housing rights, as well as related housing and property restitution rights. Closely related to the practice of forced eviction, according to jurisprudence, any interference with these rights can only be justified if they are carried out in accordance with law, in pursuit of a legitimate social aim in the public interest and subject to the payment of just and satisfactory compensation.

Both owner-occupied and rental housing falls under the protections offered by the right to privacy provisions under the European Court on Human Rights. Under the case law of the European Court on Human Rights, one’s ‘home’ can even be a place that a person neither owns nor rents, but nonetheless resides in. Moreover, the court has repeatedly determined Article 8 cases more on the basis of the factual situation of a resident of a particular home than exclusively on the legal status of the rights holder concerned. Both of these trends are important for dwellers in the informal sector, and for their relevance for treating security of tenure as a human right.18

■ The right to housing and property restitution

Over the past several decades, intergovernmental agencies, government officials, the United Nations and NGO field staff, and others working in protection or support capacities with refugees and IDPs have become increasingly involved in efforts to secure durable rights-based solutions to all forms of displacement based on the principle of voluntary repatriation. During more recent years, the idea of voluntary repatriation and return have expanded into concepts involving not simply the return to one’s country for refugees or one’s city or region for IDPs, but the return to, and reassertion of, control over one’s original home, land or property (i.e. the process of housing and property restitution).

As a result of these developments, since the early 1990s several million refugees and IDPs have recovered and re-inhabited their original homes, lands and properties through restitution processes, while smaller numbers have accepted compensation in lieu of return.19 These efforts have been played out from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Afghanistan to South Africa, and from Tajikistan to Guatemala, Mozambique and beyond. This historic change in emphasis from what were essentially humanitarian-driven responses, to voluntary repatriation, to more rights-based approaches, to return is increasingly grounded in the principle of restorative justice and of restitution as a legal remedy that can support refugees and IDPs in their choice of a durable solution (whether return, resettlement or local integration). As noted above, the recently approved Pinheiro Principles expand and clarify the rights of all refugees and displaced persons (including evictees) ‘to have restored to them any housing, land and/or property of which they were arbitrarily or unlawfully deprived’.

Box 11.3 The Pinheiro Principles: Provision against evictions

- Principle 5.1: Everyone has the right to be protected against being arbitrarily displaced from his or her home, land or place of habitual residence.
- Principle 5.2: States should incorporate protections against displacement into domestic legislation, consistent with international human rights and humanitarian law and related standards, and should extend these protections to everyone within their legal jurisdiction or effective control.
- Principle 5.3: States shall prohibit forced eviction, demolition of houses and destruction of agricultural areas, and the arbitrary confiscation or expropriation of land as a punitive measure or as a means or method of war.
- Principle 5.4: States shall take steps to ensure that no one is subjected to displacement by either state or non-state actors. States shall also ensure that individuals, corporations and other entities within their legal jurisdiction or effective control refrain from carrying out or otherwise participating in displacement.

The term ‘housing, land and property (HLP) rights’ ensures that all residential sectors are included in legal analyses and in the development of plans, policies and institutions.

Towards safer and more secure cities

Box 11.4 Defining human security

The former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan has said:

Human security in its broadest sense embraces far more than the absence of violent conflict. It encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and health care and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfill his or her own potential. Every step in this direction is also a step towards reducing poverty, achieving economic growth and preventing conflict. Freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy natural environment - these are the interrelated building blocks of human and, therefore, national security.

Source: Commission on Human Security, 2003

Security of tenure goes beyond property rights

Examining security of tenure within the context of the above-mentioned recognized human rights also meshes well with treating security of tenure as a core element within the concept of human security. This implies taking a more all-encompassing vision of human rights as they relate to the tenure issue (see Box 11.4). Nobel Peace Prize winner Jody Williams makes the link between human rights, human security and property rights in a 2006 article, where she questions the efficacy of a property rights (title-based) approach to solving the security of tenure crisis:

But it remains to be seen how extracting one right – the right to property – can possibly be… a long-term solution to meeting the complex needs of the poor. Meeting those needs for the long term would require addressing the political, social, cultural and economic factors (on both the national and international levels) that created the gross inequalities in the first place and exacerbates them in a globalized world, thus depriving the poor of human dignity and the full realization of their human rights.21

This is an important point, for in the realm of housing and land policy (as also discussed in Chapters 5 and 6), property rights approaches have often proven inadequate in fully achieving the objective of universal access to a place to live in peace and dignity. Indeed, on their own, property rights are often seen to undermine the pursuit of this goal. In some situations, a focus on property rights alone may serve … to justify a grossly unfair and unequal status quo.

The question thus becomes whether the concept of ‘property rights’ is adequate

A focus on property rights alone may serve ... to justify a grossly unfair and unequal status quo

The term ‘housing, land and property rights’ ensures that all residential sectors are included in legal analyses and in the development of plans, policies and institutions.

Housing, land and property (HLP) rights

As one means of addressing these questions and, in effect, of overcoming the limitations of the concept of ‘property rights’, the more inclusive terminology of housing, land and property (HLP) rights has been suggested as a far better (and, again, integral) term with which to describe the residential dimensions of the property question, set within a human rights framework.22 Treating what are traditionally referred to as ‘property rights’ as the more all-encompassing ‘HLP rights’ promotes a unified and evolutionary approach to human rights and all of their associated residential dimensions. Moreover, such an approach – grounded deeply in the indivisibility and interdependence of all rights – allows all of the rights just noted to be viewed as a consolidated whole in broad support of security of tenure initiatives. The term ‘housing, land and property rights’ ensures that all residential sectors are included in legal analyses and in the development of plans, policies and institutions addressing the legal and physical conditions in which people in all societies live. Working with HLP rights also ensures that the terminology used in one country to describe the rights possessed by everyone (e.g. ‘housing rights’) is treated as the human rights equivalent of terms such as ‘property rights’ or ‘land rights’, and vice-versa. Using only the term ‘property rights’ can very easily result in the exclusion of certain sectors (tenants, co-operative dwellers, informal-sector dwellers without secure tenure, women, vulnerable groups, nomads, indigenous peoples and others), inequitable treatment and, far too often, outright discrimination. In contrast, the term ‘HLP rights’ is universally relevant within all legal and political systems, and resonates in both developed and developing countries.

While HLP rights are each unique and complex legal and human rights concepts, they are, at the same time,
closely related to one another and, to a certain degree, overlap. In general terms:

- Housing rights are the rights of ‘everyone’ to have access to a safe, secure, affordable and habitable home.
- Land rights cover those rights related directly to the land itself as distinct from purely the structure built on the land in question.
- Property rights concern the exclusive user and ownership rights over a particular dwelling or land parcel.

Each of these terms is important; but none of them captures in their entirety the full spectrum of rights associated with the right to a place to live in peace and dignity, including the right to security of tenure. For the purposes of the security of tenure process, therefore — and because historical, political, cultural and other distinctions between countries with respect to what have also more broadly been called ‘residential’ rights are so extensive — HLP rights seems a more comprehensive term for describing the numerous residential dimensions of these questions from the perspective of human rights law. What people in one country label as ‘land rights’ may be precisely the same thing as what citizens of another country call ‘housing rights’. ‘Property rights’ in one area may greatly assist in protecting the rights of tenants, while in another place property rights are used to justify mass forced evictions. Many more examples could be given; but the important point here is simply that the composite term HLP rights probably captures the notion of ‘home’ or ‘place of habitual residence’ better than other possible terms.

A term such as HLP rights may confuse some and frustrate others; but it is difficult to imagine how an integral approach to security of tenure can emerge within human rights law unless the impasse between housing rights, property rights and land rights is broken and allowed to properly evolve. This new terminology embraces all the different approaches to this question, not necessarily favouring one or the other, but incorporating the best, most pro-human rights elements of each into a new vision of human rights as they relate to the places and conditions in which people live. The new terminology may assist greatly in finding new ways to integrate rights with security of tenure.

In addition and, more specifically, linked to the question of eviction, it may also be time to consider looking for new ways to define people’s rights not to be evicted in a more positive and affirmative manner. Since all human rights are to be treated equally, in an interdependent and indivisible manner (see Box 11.5), it may be useful to expand discussions on what could be called a right to security of place. This right exemplifies the convergence of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights and places three forms of security into an indispensable human rights framework:

- It encapsulates the notion of physical security, protection of physical integrity and safety from harm, and guarantees that basic rights will be respected.
- It incorporates all dimensions of human security – or the economic and social side of the security equation.
- It recognizes the importance of tenure rights (for tenants, owners and those too poor to afford to rent or buy a home) and the crucial right to be protected against any arbitrary or forced eviction from one’s home.

This manifestation of security intrinsically links to housing rights concerns during times of peace and to housing rights issues arising in the midst of armed conflict and humanitarian disasters. It recognizes that everyone has an enforceable and defendable right to physical security and rights to housing, property and land, including rights to security of tenure. As with ‘HLP rights’, a right to security of place makes no presumption that one form of tenure is to be necessarily preferred over another, but the ‘right to security of place’ would go beyond security of tenure alone. The stability of the home would form the starting point from which supplementary rights emerge. Such a right to security of place would strengthen the rights of all dwellers within the informal sector by providing a conceptual means to plug the gap in the attention and institutional protection given to those forced from their homes due to forced evictions and development-induced displacement.

An integral, comprehensive approach based on the notion of HLP rights holds the best promise for marshalling resources and assets towards improving the lives of lower-income groups. Treating HLP rights simultaneously as human rights concerns and development concerns is both practical and has universal applicability. In fact, this approach can provide one of the clearest examples of how a rights-based approach to development actually looks in practice and how security of tenure can be treated increasingly as a core human rights issue. A human rights–human security approach to secure tenure has the potential to significantly improve the prospects of security of tenure being an attribute of everyone’s life. The essential issue, however, is that the approach has to be applied seriously and wisely by governments – both local and national – and must be supported solidly by the international community and civil society. To achieve this will be no small feat, as few rights, if any, are as widely denied as the right to security of tenure.

This view, though perhaps seemingly distant from a human rights perspective on the issue, in fact reflects the key point. At the end of the day, what matters most is not necessarily the formality associated with the tenure levels enjoyed by dwellers, but the perception of security, both de facto and de jure, that comes with that tenure. By treating security of tenure as part of the broader human rights equation, we automatically incorporate dimensions of security, rights, remedies and justice to the analysis.

**Box 11.5 The indivisibility of human rights**

All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated ... it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Source: Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, para 5
Moreover, and in turn, we open up—rather than close—the avenues through which security of tenure (in a manner fully consistent with human rights) can be provided. The explicit human rights dimensions of security of tenure have not been long on the international agenda; but they are there now and need to be used as the basis for improving the prospects for secure tenure so that this right can be enjoyed universally and sustainably by everyone, everywhere.

THE NEED FOR INNOVATIVE APPROACHES TO TENURE

The major lesson learned from a variety of tenure initiatives taken in preceding decades is simply that flexible and innovative approaches to providing security of tenure are more advisable than approaches grounded in ideology and the generation of capital. Such a view is increasingly shared by researchers and practitioners, as well as by international organizations. The World Bank, for example, who earlier advocated title-based approaches, states that:

Tenure security, one of the key goals of public land policies, can be achieved under different modalities of land ownership. Instead of an often ideological stance in favor of full private ownership rights, long-term secure tenure and transferable leases will convey many of the same benefits to owners and may be preferable where full ownership rights and titles would be too politically controversial or too costly.\(^{23}\)

Any successful initiative to provide tenure will need to be based on a recognition that innovation is required for many reasons, not the least of which is the fact that there are many diverse types of tenure and varying degrees of legality and de facto and de jure protection associated with both. Although a variety of tenure types was listed in Chapter 5, the ‘reality is that tenure systems exist within a continuum in which even pavement dwellers may enjoy a degree of legal protection’.\(^{24}\) Furthermore, in practice, there are numerous sub-markets between those with the highest and the lowest levels of tenure security. The majority of urban dwellers in developing countries have some form of de facto security to the housing and land that they occupy. The actual legal status of their housing and land occupancy may not even be clear to the occupants themselves. What matters in the everyday life of the majority of urban dwellers is their perception of security. Everything else being equal, if the residents themselves in one location consider the risks of eviction to be marginal, their level of security of tenure is, indeed, higher than that of others who perceive higher eviction risks.

Experience shows that settlements upgrading approaches, which include the granting of full freehold title, may, in fact, result in an increase in informal settlements rather than a decrease. This may occur because granting such titles implies that households acquire an asset that can be sold at a high price in the formal land market. Many households may thus be encouraged to sell, realize the capital value, and move on to another informal settlement, perhaps even hoping to repeat the process. Furthermore, as noted above, traditional slum upgrading approaches also tend to ignore the situation of tenants. Granting of full title to ‘owners’ in settlement upgrading schemes tends to lead to market evictions of tenants. Again, the result is often the same: the poorest are forced to relocate to other informal settlements.

The main question faced is thus how to increase security of tenure without forcing the poor to relocate to more peripheral locations where lack of employment opportunity may further enhance their poverty. Although no universally applicable answers to these questions exist, experience indicates that the main focus should be on providing forms of tenure that are sufficiently secure to ensure protection from eviction.\(^{25}\) At the same time, HLP rights and regulatory frameworks should cater for multipurpose use of their dwellings (i.e. support the development of home-based and other small-scale enterprises)\(^{26}\) and ensure access to basic services.

So, which types of tenure provide such levels of security? Again, there are no universally applicable answers. In addition to the most obvious solution (i.e. a moratorium on forced evictions; see below), several options have been successfully employed. Among these are temporary occupation licences, communal or individual leases, community land trusts, communal ownership, customary tenure, and others that are detailed below.

A recent UK Department for International Development (DFID)-funded survey explored innovative ways of providing secure tenure to the urban poor by examining unique methods of tenure provision. The survey revealed that certificates of use or occupancy, community land trusts and other forms of what could be called intermediate forms of tenure provide a valuable means of increasing legitimacy. Furthermore, the existence of these approaches also provides valuable breathing space for local governments, while the administrative capability to record and clarify rights is improved. The survey also exposed that tenure issues cannot be isolated from other related policies of urban land management and that it is important not to put all of one’s eggs in one or two baskets. It is essential to offer a wide range of tenure options so that the diverse and changing needs of households can be met on a long-term basis through competition.\(^{27}\) Linking innovative approaches such as these with HLP rights and the right to security of place could truly create the basis for an entirely new approach to ensuring security of tenure for all.

A range of innovative approaches to providing tenure is used in Brazil. One of these – ‘use concessions’ – is a measure through which the government transfers the right to use property for residential purposes to families settled in public areas without the transfer of property title. Use concession can be an appropriate measure in establishing the collective occupation of areas such as favelas. These measures can provide the population with security of tenure and impede forced eviction, and can also be a mechanism guaranteeing the social purpose of a public area, thus avoiding real estate speculation since such public areas are not ‘privatized’.
Similarly, ‘special social interest zones’ can now be declared in urban areas in Brazil. These zones are efficient tools for municipalities to avoid forced evictions. The main candidates to be defined as such zones are urban areas occupied by favelas, cortiços,28 collective residences, popular subdivisions, and vacant and underutilized urban areas. Such zones are typically declared in areas where there are a high number of landownership conflicts or housing that will result in forced evictions of low-income groups. Once such areas have been identified, municipal law can define them to be special social interest zones. This provides legal guarantees to social groups living within the zone and recognizes these as residential areas for low-income groups. Based on this tool, judges can deliver judgements in favour of these social groups when they consider requests for eviction and removal of families occupying public or private areas. They can then establish a process of negotiation between the owner of the area, the residents and the government to regulate the legal situation of the population and promote improvement of these areas. Some Brazilian municipalities – such as Recife, Diadema, Porto Alegre, Santos and Santo Andre – have utilized this land regulation tool to combat forced evictions.

Thailand is another country where innovative tenure options have been introduced to address the concerns of low-income groups. Low-income residents of Bangkok experience one of the main effects of globalization and urbanization, increasing pressures for more ‘efficient’ use of land in inner-city areas. Box 11.6 provides an example of such attempted ‘development’ in Bangkok. Despite local government efforts to evict and relocate the community of Pom Mahakan, the residents were able to resist eviction and obtain security of tenure in a negotiated settlement that included elements of land sharing. The experience of this community exemplifies how development can be achieved in a process incorporating both human rights and community design/development concerns.

On the basis of the wisdom associated with innovative approaches to the security of tenure question, it is appropriate to consider a ‘twin-track’ approach to improving tenure security. First, implementation of such innovative approaches can improve living conditions for current slum dwellers. And, second, the revision of regulatory frameworks can reduce the need for future slums by significantly improving access to legal land and housing.29 The latter is perhaps even more important than the former as urban growth

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Box 11.6 Eviction prevention in Pom Mahakan, Bangkok

In Pom Mahakan in Bangkok (Thailand), a community of about 300 residents in the Rattanakosin area of the city has been successfully resisting eviction for several years. This area of the city is the original settlement of Bangkok, and today there are some 200,000 people who live and work in Rattanakosin.

Historically, there have been a number of plans to develop the area, and the most recent set of plans, ratified by the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration in 2001, began to have a progressively destructive impact on the security of tenure for many of the communities who make the Rattanakosin area their home. The plan – The Master Plan for Land Development: Ratchadamnoen Road and Surrounding Area – was partly motivated by the 1997 economic crash and the consequent desire to capture more tourism income for the city of Bangkok.

Rattanakosin – with the Grand Palace and Wat Po as international attractions – was the main focus of this tourism initiative. The master plan was meant to ‘beautify’ this local environment essentially as a tourist attraction and, in so doing, to improve property values (most of Rattanakosin is Crown Land administered by the Crown Property Bureau). The idea was that if the city was made more attractive, tourists would stay longer and thus leave more money behind, speeding the economic recovery of Bangkok.

Thus, in January 2003, the city planning department posted eviction notices on all the houses in Pom Mahakan. The residents were told to vacate their homes and were offered relocation to a place 45 kilometres away, on the outskirts of Bangkok. The evictions were spearheaded by the governor of Bangkok, supported by the Board of the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, the Crown Property Bureau, the National Economic and Social Development Board and other organizations, such as the Tourism Authority of Thailand.

Despite this pressure, residents began holding protests, building barricades and organizing a night-watch system. They also acted pre-emptively. Assisted by a coalition of academics based at the local university, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and human rights activists, they put forward a highly innovative land-sharing plan as an alternative to eviction and relocation. The plan included the renovation of the older buildings and the integration of the residences within a historical park. The residents even started implementing part of this plan, and many outsiders rallied to the call to support them in this process.

Despite the above efforts, in August 2003 an administrative court ruled that the eviction was legal and could go ahead. In January 2004, the authorities started work on the unoccupied areas of Pom Mahakan. The authorities repeatedly announced their intention to evict the entire community. Some lost hope and left, but the majority continued their attempts to negotiate with the authorities and to put forward alternatives.

Eventually, although after yet another attempt to implement the evictions, the governor finally agreed to resolve the issue through negotiations. On 19 December 2005, the governor confirmed that negotiations between the community, the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration and other stakeholders had resulted in an agreement to preserve and develop the area as an ‘antique wooden house community’.

This agreement led to the development of a community plan that included preservation and rehabilitation of existing buildings and landscape in the community. Furthermore, it was agreed that the people will stay where they are and that the funds that had been allocated to the park development would go to the community improvements that the community itself had planned. Pom Mahakan now has security of tenure.

Source: Bristol 2007b

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The creative use of regulation and regulatory audits has also been suggested as an innovative way of promoting improvements in the urban landscape and increasing tenure security. Developed as a means for promoting the upgrading of existing informal settlements, this approach seeks to strengthen regulatory frameworks to better benefit the poor. Among the positive aspects of regulation are that it allows orderly land development and efficient land management; attracts and guides inward local investment; maximizes public revenues; protects the environment and public health; mitigates the impact of disasters; helps the poor access improved housing, services and credit; protects occupants from unscrupulous developers; minimizes harmful externalities; and allows for common land uses. Conversely, the negative aspects of regulation include the dangers of over-regulating and, therefore, discouraging investment; imposing regulations, standards or administrative procedures that increase costs to levels that many people cannot afford; failing to reflect the cultural priorities of different groups, especially in the ways in which people perceive and use dwellings and open space; institutionalizing corruption through fees for non-enforcement; and creating overlapping or contradictory conditions that expose developers or individuals to the risk of conforming to one regulation or standard and therefore of contravening another.31

**COMBATING HOMELESSNESS AND PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF HOMELESS PEOPLE**

As discussed above, the international legal foundations of the human right to adequate housing are designed to ensure access to a secure, adequate and affordable home for all people in all countries. The long recognition of this right under international human rights law, however, has yet to sufficiently influence national policy, law and practice on housing rights; as a result, few rights are denied as frequently, on such a scale and with the degree of impunity as housing rights. Whether in terms of outright homelessness, forced evictions and other forms of displacement; life-threatening, unhealthy and dangerous living conditions; the destruction of homes during armed conflict; systematic housing discrimination against certain vulnerable groups (particularly women); campaigns of ‘ethnic cleansing’; or any number of other circumstances where housing rights are denied, few would argue against the view that the universal enjoyment of housing rights remains a very long-term proposition.

In essence, states are obliged to respect, protect and fulfill all human rights, including the housing rights of homeless persons. The obligation to respect human rights requires states to refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of rights. As noted, housing rights are violated if a state engages in arbitrary forced evictions. The obligation to protect requires states to prevent violations of such rights by third parties, such as landlords or private developers. If the exercise of these two obligations does not result in the access by everyone to an adequate home, then the obligation to fulfill becomes relevant, requiring states to take appropriate legislative, administrative, budgetary, judicial and other measures towards the full realization of such rights. Thus, the failure of states to take such steps, to the maximum of its available resources, to achieve the universal enjoyment of housing rights, would not comply with human rights principles.32 So, while states are not necessarily required to build homes for the entire population, they are required to undertake a whole range of steps, both positive and negative in nature, grounded in human rights law, which are designed to ensure the full realization of all human rights, including the right to adequate housing by the homeless.

At the same time, there are a number of states that have accepted the fundamental legal responsibility of providing an adequate home to certain specifically identified homeless groups. There are laws and jurisprudence in several states, indicating that under certain circumstances, the state is legally required to provide particular individuals or groups with adequate housing in an expedient manner:

- In Finland, the law requires local government authorities to provide housing resources for the severely handicapped under certain circumstances. Furthermore, local governments are required to rectify inadequate housing conditions or, as the case may be, to provide for housing when inadequate or non-existent housing causes the need for special child welfare or constitutes a substantial hindrance to rehabilitating the child or the family.33
- In the UK, local city councils are required to provide adequate accommodation to homeless families and persons ‘in priority need’ (see Box 11.7).
- In Germany, two additional legal duties are added to the legal framework relating to the rights of the homeless. First, the law provides that social welfare payments may be used to pay rent arrears in order to maintain the dwelling and to prevent homelessness. Second, it proclaims that individuals (including the homeless) who have special social difficulties that they cannot themselves overcome may claim assistance to avert, eliminate or ease particular difficulties – including measures to help procure and maintain a dwelling.34

In addition to these national-level rights of the homeless, many states approach housing requirements, at least in a de facto manner, in terms of providing housing to the homeless following natural disasters, and to refugees and displaced persons, and while perhaps not invariably accepting such duties in law, in practice temporary (and sometimes permanent) homes are provided. Interestingly, the ICESCR is now
also seen to provide similar protections to all persons who have faced forced eviction, notwithstanding the rationale behind the eviction in question. The CESCR clearly asserts that evictions ‘should not result in rendering individuals homeless’, thus making it incumbent on governments to guarantee that people who are evicted – whether illegally or in accordance with the law – are to be ensured some form of alternative housing.

Many have questioned whether or not states that have housing rights obligations are legally required to provide, in a substantive sense, adequate housing directly to homeless persons and families or even to the entire population. Indeed, this comparatively minor issue in the overall housing rights domain has unfortunately often dominated debates on the legal status of housing rights. Critics of housing rights have often equated ‘the human right to adequate housing’ with the immediate duty of governments to substantively provide a house to anyone who requests it to do so. This overly literal translation of the term, however, reflects neither general state practice or the interpretation given to this right under international law, although there are, as will be shown, specific instances where the direct provision of housing is envisaged. CESCR attests that while states are required to ‘take whatever steps are necessary’ to achieve the full realization of the right to adequate housing, it also stipulates that ‘Measures designed to satisfy a state party’s obligations in respect of the right to adequate housing may reflect whatever mix of public- and private-sector measures [are] considered appropriate.’

No state has ever, or could ever, hope to construct adequate housing for the entire population, and the advocacy of such approaches verges on the absurd. No government, no United Nations institution and no NGOs back this approach to implementing housing rights. Rather, a perspective is required whereby a collective effort by all relevant actors leads as rapidly as possible to the enjoyment by all persons of an adequate home as a right. Ultimately, there is a growing recognition that a continuum of rights approaches is the most likely method to result in protecting the rights of the homeless and the inadequately housed. Coupled with this approach is the growing view that the provision of appropriate forms of security of tenure can act as an important means of preventing homelessness and, conversely, that insufficient tenure security can far too easily become the cause of homelessness. Human rights law and the rights that this system of law provides in support of housing rights and against forced eviction is developing rapidly in this regard, and the manner by which it can be used to protect against eviction is particularly noteworthy.

**Box 11.7 The UK Homeless Persons Act**

Section 65: Duties to persons found to be homeless:
1. This section has effect as regards the duties owed by the local housing authority to an applicant where they are satisfied that he is homeless.
2. Where they are satisfied that he has a priority need and are not satisfied that he became homeless intentionally, they shall ... secure that accommodation becomes available for his occupation.
3. Where they are satisfied that he has a priority need but are also satisfied that he became homeless intentionally, they shall:
   - secure that accommodation is made available for his occupation for such period as they consider will give him a reasonable opportunity of securing accommodation for his occupation; and
   - furnish him with advice and such assistance as they consider appropriate in the circumstances in any attempts he may make to secure that accommodation becomes available for his occupation.

Section 66: Duties to persons found to be threatened with homelessness:
1. This section has effect as regards the duties owed by the local housing authority to an applicant where they are satisfied that he is threatened with homelessness.
2. Where they are satisfied that he has a priority need and are not satisfied that he became threatened with homelessness intentionally, they shall take reasonable steps to secure that accommodation does not cease to be available for his occupation.

Section 69:
1. A local housing authority may perform any duty under section 65 or 68 (duties to persons found to be homeless) to secure that accommodation becomes available for the occupation of a person by:
   - making available suitable accommodation held by them under Part II (provision of housing) or any enactment; or
   - securing that he obtains suitable accommodation from some other person; or
   - giving him such advice and assistance as will secure that he obtains suitable accommodation from some other person.
The City Statute, or the Brazilian Federal Law on Urban Development, was adopted in 2001. It defines the framework, principles and instruments to regulate the use of land for social purposes, the recognition of informal settlements as part of the city and the subject of rights, the democratic participation in urban management, and the empowerment of the municipalities as the main local agents entitled to regulate land usage and occupation.

One of the main components of the City Statute is that it includes provisions to simplify the regularization of informal land occupations. Before the adoption of this law, the regularization process in São Paulo included 80 steps, making approval of informal settlements virtually impossible, thus ensuring that the expansion of settlements could only occur in irregular ways. The City Statute thus allows for the decentralization of urban planning, thereby facilitating the work of municipal governments in developing local plans.

The City Statute is particularly innovative by introducing clear regulations governing democratic participation of civil society in urban planning and management. The municipalities must arrange their decision-making procedures in such a way that all the concerned parties can participate directly in the process of designing public policy, as well as in the subsequent management of programmes on housing, land and urban planning, which result from such processes. In essence, the statute empowers local government, through laws, urban planning and management tools, to determine how best to balance individual and collective interests in urban land.

The statute seeks to deter speculation and non-use of urban land (through taxation) so that land can be freed to provide housing space for the urban poor. Among many unique elements of the statute is the envisaged use of adverse possession rights (see Articles 8 and 9 below) to establish secure tenure and to enforce the social function of urban property. Yet, it should be noted that despite the City Statute, the poor remain excluded from official entitlements such as identity cards and social services.

Several articles of the City Statute provide the basis for perhaps the first legislative recognition in any country of the essential ‘right to the city’ as a basic element of citizenship and human rights:

- Article 2 states that the purpose of the urban policy is to support development of the social functions of the city and of urban property through a number of guidelines, including guaranteeing the right to sustainable cities. This is understood as the right to urban land, housing, environmental sanitation, urban infrastructure, transportation and public services, and to work and leisure for current and future generations.
- Article 8 entitles local governments to expropriate unused urban land after a period of five years if the obligation of the owner of the land to subdivide, build or use the property is not met.
- Article 9 entitles anyone who has possession of an urban area or building of less than 250 square metres for five years or more the right to title of dominion. The main provisions are that the land or building has been in the possession uninterrupted and without contestation; that they use it for their own or their family’s residence; and that the claimant is not the owner of any other real estate. The article also states that title will be conferred to men or women alike irrespective of their marital status; that the same possessor can only make use of this adverse possession entitlement once in their lives; and that the title can be transferred through inheritance.

**SUPPORTING THE VITAL ROLE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT**

The role of local government in diagnosing security of tenure conditions and then acting to provide security of tenure to all, within the shortest possible timeframe, is a vitally important component of any successful security of tenure policy. However, security of tenure is not the only concern of public bodies at the municipal level; local government responsibilities the world over are expanding, with many local governments effectively inundated with new powers and responsibilities, including the provision of services related to health, education, housing, water supply, policing, taxation and other matters. Its relevance to political empowerment, citizen involvement and delivery of public services has meant that local government has become a major arena of policy formulation. It is estimated that such processes are under way in some 80 per cent of all developing and transition countries.37

However, while the localization of governance has many positive features, weak and under-resourced local governments are far more common than those with the political will and financial basis for remediating tenure insecurity. One of the major problems, from the perspective of urban security and safety, is that very few local governments have adopted policies that explicitly draw on human rights and none, at present, use international human rights to inform their planning and programming.

Despite the fact that decentralization policies still tend to depend upon central or federal governments...
however, is that they ‘generally lack the financial and administrative resources to ensure effective implementation of their policies throughout the country. At the same time, intermediate-level management agencies with genuine decision-making power are generally weak or absent.’

The City Statute in Brazil is one example of how local governments can more effectively play a supportive role in expanding tenure security (see Box 11.8).

**STRENGTHENING AND CLARIFYING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS**

The legal obligations emerging under human rights law have advanced considerably during recent years. Whereas human rights law has traditionally been seen largely as a set of rules governing the acts and omissions of states (see Boxes 6.17 and 6.18), in fact, this legal domain creates a very considerable degree of obligations requiring non-state actors to act in accordance with internationally recognized human rights principles. In terms of security of tenure, this would be particularly relevant both to companies and individuals capable of infringing upon the security of tenure rights and related rights of individuals and groups. Principle 1 of the United Nations Global Compact, a standard initiated by the former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan and agreed to by various world business leaders, commits companies to ‘support and respect the protection of international human rights within their sphere of influence’. The scope of the obligations accepted by companies under the Global Compact includes commitments ensuring rights to basic health, education and housing (if operations are located in areas where these are not provided). The website explaining the nature of the compact explicitly declares that the intent of those who support the compact is to ‘prevent the forcible displacement of individuals, groups or communities’ and to ‘protect the economic livelihood of local communities’.

Some companies have begun making tentative steps in the direction of preventing evictions. For instance, for several years BP has been refining its approach to involuntary resettlement and developing project management techniques that actively seek to prevent the economic and, especially, the physical displacement of communities in areas of operation. The aspiration of the company is not to physically displace communities against their will. It seeks to create active dialogue with communities who may be displaced, and to work in partnership with them to develop mutually acceptable solutions. It commits to ensure that their human rights are not threatened by project activities.

The principle of corporate complicity in human rights abuses has also gained added credence in recent years, and may assist in clarifying the responsibilities of companies with respect to evictions and security of tenure. Complicity can take three forms:

- **Direct complicity.** This occurs when a company knowingly assists a state in violating human rights. An example of this occurs when a company assists in the forced relocation of peoples in circumstances related to business activity.
- **Beneficial complicity.** This suggests that a company benefits directly from human rights abuses committed by someone else. For example, violations committed by security forces, such as the suppression of a peaceful protest against business activities or the use of repressive measures while guarding company facilities, are often cited in this context.
- **Silent complicity.** This describes the way in which human rights advocates see the failure by a company to raise the question of systematic or continuous human rights violations in its interactions with the appropriate authorities. For example, inaction or acceptance by companies of systematic discrimination in employment law against particular groups on the grounds of ethnicity or gender could bring accusations of silent complicity.

Amnesty International urges all companies to establish procedures to ensure that all operations are examined for their potential impact on human rights and for their safeguards to ensure that company staff are never complicit in human rights abuses. Some companies which have been viewed as directly complicit in forced evictions have been singled out by respected human rights NGOs (see Box 11.9).
CONCLUDING REMARKS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE ACTION

There is no doubt that considerable progress has been made in recent years on the question of security of tenure. Policy at all levels has changed in important ways; as a result, taking all legal domains into account, there is today more legal (and de facto) protection against arbitrary and unlawful forced evictions than ever before. Furthermore, there is greater recognition than ever that forced evictions are prima facie human rights violations. Governments, international organizations, NGOs and other civil society actors are increasingly showing resolve and commitment to enable ever larger numbers of people to have access to appropriate forms of tenure security. It is widely agreed that security of tenure can be addressed in a pro-poor manner, and there is also widespread agreement that this does not happen automatically and that special care thus needs to be taken to address the concerns of the poor and other vulnerable groups in this regard.

At the same time, there is a compelling need to move the security of tenure agenda forward. We still cannot underestimate the scale of forced evictions or of market-based evictions. Furthermore, it is crucial to recognize the forced evictions paradox that exists today, where a firm normative framework for addressing forced evictions exists and is constantly being improved, and yet the scale of eviction continues to grow. We need to recognize that there are no universal solutions to providing security of tenure and that challenges in this regard tend to be solved in different manners in different locations. Rather, the goal must be to identify appropriate forms of secure tenure. Depending upon circumstances, there are a number of such acceptable forms of secure tenure in addition to the often presented ideal of individual title, and the merits of innovative policies are clear.

There is also a pressing need for better monitoring and better data on security of tenure and forced evictions, and a necessity to simplify the process of providing security of tenure, but in ways that are acceptable to the communities involved and fully consistent with human rights principles.

As noted above, a whole range of international agreements are highlighting the importance of security of tenure. Many of these are presenting specific recommendations for action. Perhaps the most prominent of these international agreements is the Habitat Agenda (see Box 11.10). Indicative of the increasing focus on security of tenure, a myriad of other declarations and statements have been adopted by a range of organizations and conferences during the last decade. The main perspective of most of these statements is that the ‘illegal’ city, far from being an eyesore in need of eradication or eviction, is the core of better cities, which are more responsive to the rights and needs of people.

Convincingly, there seems to be a general agreement on the importance of security of tenure and that the informal housing sector is realistically the only housing sector currently capable of providing land and dwellings to lower-income groups. There is also widespread agreement that the conditions in which the urban poor are forced to live are wholly unacceptable – whether in moral, ethical or human rights terms – and that much more needs to be done to provide lower-income groups with greater protection from abuse and insecurity. All would agree that a huge infusion of financial resources dedicated to expanding security of tenure protections are required, and new ways need to be developed to mobilize these from as many sources as possible.

The Bathurst and Fukuoka declarations are fairly typical of such statements (see Boxes 11.11 and 11.12). Both declarations provide quite a comprehensive coverage of the types of actions that governments and other stakeholders should take to make security of tenure a reality for everyone.

In view of the fact that a myriad of recommendations has already been presented on how to achieve the goals of enhancing security of tenure and ending forced evictions, the focus of this Global Report is to attempt to reconcile the various recommendations made in the past. The main focus of this report is that an integral approach grounded in HLP
enhancing tenure security and ending forced evictions

Box 11.12 The Fukuoka Declaration

The Fukuoka Declaration was adopted in 2001 at a seminar on securing land for the urban poor. The declaration asserted that:

1. Secure tenure is a major contribution to the alleviation of poverty, to advancing sustainable livelihoods, to improving choices and opportunities for men and women; for accessing services; and for the recognition of the citizenship of the urban poor and the rights that go with such citizenship.

2. The fundamental principle of secure tenure endorsed by all Governments at the City Summit is a culture of governance and a legal and administrative system that prevents forced and arbitrary evictions from land and homes; provides effective redress for those who are so evicted whether by public agencies or private interests; and a fair hearing before, and alternative accommodation in the event of, any eviction or relocation that is adjudged to be necessary in the public interest.

3. Governments must adopt policies and where necessary reform legal and administrative systems to enable women to have access to land and credit through market processes; to inherit land; and to achieve secure tenure of land in ways which are no less favourable than those which apply to men. Policies must address historical imbalances which have disadvantaged women in relation to their access to land.

4. Secure tenure embraces a range of relationships between humankind and land. Governments must adopt policies and adopt administrative and legal systems to give recognition and endorsement to relationships based on customary tenure; practices and tenurial relationships developed by the urban poor themselves; communal forms of tenure; intermediate, flexible and innovative forms of tenure which are less than freehold tenure.

5. The participation of the urban poor is central to any proposed solutions to the challenges of developing policies and programmes to ensure secure tenure; governance systems must be adapted to facilitate and actively assist the urban poor to contribute to the development and the implementation of policies and programmes to that end.

Source: UN-Habitat and ESCAP, 2002

Support the awareness-raising work of local institutions and organizations

Experience from all over the world highlights the importance of local institutions and actors when it comes to protecting the housing rights of the poor. NGOs and CBOs in particular play essential roles in awareness-raising about HLP rights at national and local levels. Without their efforts, the number of people evicted during the last decades would have been considerably higher. In many instances such organizations are the only support mechanism available to slum dwellers when they are threatened by forced eviction. Even if there are laws protecting the housing rights of slum dwellers, this is not much help to people who are unaware of their rights, or unable to make use of appeals mechanisms where such do exist. International cooperation activities should thus increasingly encourage the formation of, enhance the capacities of and/or support the activities of such local organizations or institutions.

Promoting residential justice

Every year, millions of people end up as refugees, IDPs and evictees, whether due to development projects, city beautification schemes, armed conflict, natural and human-made disasters, or other factors. Virtually all of these individuals are entirely innocent victims of circumstances beyond their control, and for many their wish to return to their original homes is never achieved. And, yet, every legal system on Earth – especially international law – clearly gives all human rights victims the right to an effective remedy – a means of
Recent developments … will enable the international community to hold those ordering forced evictions and other housing rights violations accountable. If HLP rights are to be taken seriously, there are strong grounds on which to discourage the impunity almost invariably enjoyed by violators of these rights. Obtaining justice by undoing the circumstances that resulted in their current housing predicament. This principle, however, is still too rarely applied to the displaced. Renewed energy to achieve the restoration and the restitution of the housing rights of the world’s 50 million or more displaced persons would considerably strengthen the seriousness accorded to security of tenure rights. Whenever refugees and IDPs themselves express a wish to return to their original homes, international standards now clearly provide for rights entitling them to reclaim, repossess and re-inhabit these homes.

Applying international criminal law to forced evictions

Although violations of housing, land and property rights are not always considered as seriously as violations of other human rights, recent developments involving the prosecution of war criminals and those who have committed crimes against humanity will enable the international community to hold those ordering forced evictions and other housing rights violations accountable. Armed conflicts result in thousands and sometimes millions of individuals being forcibly evicted from their homes or forced to flee their homes for their own safety, despite protections under international humanitarian law expressly prohibiting such evictions unless the security of the inhabitants can only be assured through temporary displacement.44 Since the violent conflicts in the Balkans, Rwanda, East Timor and elsewhere, considerable attention has been devoted to creating international courts and commissions entrusted with bringing those individuals responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity to justice. The statutes of the International Criminal Court, and the international tribunals on the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda each provide the legal basis necessary to prosecute persons responsible for crimes of ‘destruction or appropriation of property’, ‘destruction of cities’, ‘inhumane acts’ or ‘ordering the displacement of the civilian population’. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court declares forcible transfer as a crime against humanity. As such, HLP rights violations carried out during armed conflicts or those generally subject to the jurisdiction of the various mechanisms developed to prosecute war criminals can now act as one of the grounds on which to base complaints for HLP (or residential) justice. If HLP rights are to be taken seriously, there are strong grounds on which to discourage the impunity almost invariably enjoyed by violators of these rights. Whether it is those who advocate ethnic cleansing, those who sanction violent and illegal forced evictions, those who call for laws and policies that clearly result in homelessness, or those who fail to end systematic discrimination against women in the land and housing sphere – all those promoting such violations should be held accountable. The recommendations in 2005 by the United Nations Special Envoy on Operation Murambatsvina in...
A global moratorium on forced evictions

Examples of the world over have shown that forced evictions are not an inevitable consequence of economic development, nor are they the necessary price of progress or an adjunct to civic infrastructure improvements. Forced evictions are a largely preventable source of inconceivable human anguish. While some evictions may be impossible to avoid (under exceptional circumstances), the overwhelming majority of the forced evictions already carried out and those that are planned can be prevented and ultimately made unnecessary. An initial global moratorium on forced evictions, therefore, over a period of five years could be one concrete means for ending a practice that patently violates a range of recognized human rights.

United Nations member states could proclaim such a moratorium at a future United Nations General Assembly session. During the five-year moratorium period, each state would cease carrying out forced evictions, review domestic legislation on these practices, carry out any legislative reform to adequately protect people against forced eviction, all while taking a series of well-financed and concerted series of steps to confer security of tenure on all of the world’s communities currently without such protections. This initial five-year period would see national security of tenure action plans developed in all member states. Such plans could be coordinated by initiatives such as the Global Campaign for Secure Tenure and would involve more positive and suitable approaches to security of tenure emerging, combined with renewed commitments and resources dedicated to the improvement of existing homes and communities.

A global mechanism to monitor the realization of housing rights

As noted in Chapter 6, there is a glaring lack of accurate and comprehensive data on security of tenure and forced evictions. Similarly, there is also a scarcity of data on other components of the right to adequate housing. This is so despite the fact that all state parties to the ICESCR are required, by international law, to submit such data to the CESCR every five years (see Box 5.4). Several different efforts are already under way to collect such data, including as part of the effort to report on the implementation of the MDG on improving the lives of 100 million slum dwellers by 2020. Yet, it is time for the establishment of a mechanism to collect a comprehensive set of data on the progressive realization of HLP rights. The effort to design and implement a set of housing rights indicators by the United Nations Housing Rights Programme (see Box 5.5) is an important step in this direction since it gives advocates and governments alike information needed to establish benchmarks, evaluate success (and failure) and implement effective policies.

Perhaps the time for addressing this in a more comprehensive manner has arrived, with the ongoing reform of the human rights framework and mechanisms within the United Nations system, including that of treaty bodies, in general, and the reporting procedure, in particular. It has been argued that use of appropriate indicators for assessing human rights implementation could contribute to streamlining the reporting process, make it more transparent and effective, reduce the reporting burden, and, above all, improve follow-up on the recommendations and concluding observations of the CESCR at the national level. The ongoing work of the United Nations Housing Rights Programme regarding the development of housing rights indicators is a good start and should be supported, particularly in the context of developing a comprehensive mechanism for continuous monitoring of the progressive realization of all human rights.

NOTES

1 See, for instance, COHRE, 2006.
2 See CESCR, General Comment No 15.
3 UN-Habitat, 2004b.
4 ICESCR, Article 11(1).
5 CESCR, General Comment No 4, para 8. For an in-depth analysis of the right to adequate housing, see UN-Habitat and OHCHR, 2003.
6 CESCR, General Comment No 4.
7 Ibid, para 11.
8 ICESCR, Article 2(1).
9 Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 1993/77.
10 Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 1999/11.
12 CESCR, General Comment No 7, para 18. See also UN-Habitat and OHCHR, 2002.
14 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 17.
16 See Leckie (2003b), which provides an overview of the progressive realization of human rights.
17 CESCR, General Comment No 4, para 7.
18 Buyse, 2006.
19 See Leckie (2003b), which provides an overview of the more than 12 restitution initiatives.
20 UN Documents E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/17, Principle 2.1. Additional relevant provisions can be found throughout Principles 2 and 10.
21 Williams, 2006, p173.
22 Leckie, 2005a.
28 A favela is an informal settlement, normally found on the periphery of the city. In contrast, condominums are overpopulated high rises.
29 Payne, 2005.
33 Karapuu and Rosas, 1990 (Act No 380/1987, Article 8(2) and Child Welfare Act No 683/1983, respectively).
34 1994 German Federal Welfare Assistance Act, sections 15(a) and 72, respectively.
35 CESCR, General Comment No 7, para 16.
36 Ibid, para 14.
38 Ibid.
40 See www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/principle1.html.
41 See www.bp.com/section-page.do?categoryId=9013904&contentId=7026915.
42 Clapham, 2006.
44 See, for example, Article 49 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, and Article 17 of Protocol II to the Geneva Convention.
This Global Report has shown that there is no shortage of evidence for the negative impacts of natural and human-made disasters on human life, property and the environment in urban areas. Rapid urbanization is, in turn, fast becoming a force shaping who, where and when disaster strikes. Economic development planning and urban management systems that lead to inequality, poverty and poor governance also accumulate disaster risk in urban areas. Changing hazard landscapes, partly caused by urban growth, but also linked to environmental change, further contribute to the need for a dynamic set of tools and approaches with which to reduce risk and enhance resilience in urban areas.

This chapter examines future policy directions in disaster risk reduction. It concentrates on policies that can contribute towards effective disaster preparedness and prevention and improved processes of relief, recovery and reconstruction post-disaster. At heart, these are agendas for increasing the disaster resilience of local communities, civil society and government organizations. Policies and practices at the city, national, regional and international levels are identified, and the factors underlying their success examined. The need to reduce human vulnerability, incorporate disaster risk reduction within national planning, and the requirement for this to be built on interdisciplinary and inter-sectoral collaboration drive the central concerns of this chapter.

INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORKS FOR ACTION

Urban development and disaster risk reduction are two critical agendas for international development policy and action. Increasing numbers of people and resources based in urban locations, and growing numbers of people affected by disasters, have led to the integration of the disaster risk reduction agenda in major international frameworks of action. This section examines the ways in which urban disaster risk affects progress towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the overarching framework influencing international and national development policy. An assessment is then presented of the Habitat Agenda and the Hyogo Framework for Action, 2005–2015, two international agreements adopted by the majority of governments. Both set out programmes of action to reduce urban disaster risk. Some of the barriers that hinder the integration of disaster risk reduction policies on the ground are also examined.

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)

The MDGs provide an international framework for development work that extends to disaster management. The MDGs are empowered by the Millennium Declaration, which calls for the international community to:

- intensify cooperation to reduce the number and effects of natural and man-made disasters (IV, 23, v)

and to:

- spare no effort to ensure that children and all civilian populations that suffer disproportionately the consequences of natural disasters, genocide, armed conflicts and other humanitarian emergencies are given every assistance and protection so that they can resume normal life as soon as possible. (VI, 26)

During 2001, a road map for the implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration was released that prioritized the following agenda for risk reduction:

- developing early warning systems, vulnerability mapping, technological transfer and training;
- supporting interdisciplinary and inter-sectoral partnerships, improved scientific research on the causes of natural disasters and better international cooperation to...
With international support, national planning for urban development has begun to integrate disaster risk reduction and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The following cases are indicative of such integrated work.

**MDG 1: Eradicating extreme poverty and hunger.**

In India, the Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA), a trade union representing low-income informal-sector women workers, offers its members a variety of micro-insurance packages. Over ten years, 2000 women have received US$327,400 in claims. Following the 2001 Gujarat earthquake, SEWA provided insurance benefits and microfinance to regenerate destroyed livelihoods, homes, working capital and assets. Within two weeks, SEWA’s insurance team surveyed over 2500 insured members’ claims of damage and asset loss, mainly destruction of houses.

**MDG 2: Universal primary education.**

Colombia has linked achieving MDG 2 directly with seismic vulnerability analysis of a school building programme in the capital city, Bogota. This programme was developed by Proyectos y Diseños Ltda in April 2000. The programme developed a risk evaluation methodology that staff in the Education Ministry were trained to implement. Primary evaluations were then conducted in all schools to determine seismic vulnerability. Priorities among individual schools were subsequently assigned according to available budgets. In some cases, more detailed vulnerability analyses and structural retrofitting studies were conducted.

**MDG 3: Promoting gender equality and empowering women.**

In Armenia, the non-governmental organization (NGO) Women for Development has partnered with other agencies in a national survey for seismic protection and has worked towards including seismic protection courses in school curricula. This has enabled the inclusion of education games and contributed to a greater acceptance of women’s participation as specialists in a wide range of disaster reduction and response activities where men traditionally dominate, including vulnerability and impact surveying, academic work, emergency services and civil protection.

**MDG 6: Combating infectious diseases.**

Tajikistan has integrated this goal with risk reduction through the Dushanbe Water Contamination Response Programme sponsored by the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Department (ECHO). This programme aims to improve the access of targeted health facilities to safe and potable water supply in the capital city, as well as their disease outbreak response capacity. The programme directly addresses MDG 6, which deals with the containment of infectious diseases, by increasing preparedness and response levels in case of a possible disaster. It seeks to build community capacity for self-management of health needs by improving public awareness in the prevention of water-borne diseases.

**MDG 7: Ensuring environmental sustainability.**

As part of its efforts towards meeting target 11, which is on slums, UN-Habitat is active in applying inclusive strategies to support slum upgrading and, where appropriate, as a mechanism for risk reduction. In Mozambique, rapid unplanned urbanization has brought flood-prone land into residential use in Maputo, a city where more than 70 per cent of the population live in slums. Here, slum upgrading has fostered risk reduction. The wider programme supported training and capacity-building, participatory land-use planning and physical interventions at the local level. Local government and community groups, as well as state ministries, participated. This inclusive approach was instrumental in leading to the revision of planning regulations, and a movement away from dealing with floods through reactive emergency management, towards a more proactive and developmental approach.

**MDG 8: Developing global partnerships for development.**

In Turkey, in partnership with the World Bank, ProVention Consortium has been promoting best practice examples of disaster mitigation and future cost reductions through measures such as a US$505 million reconstruction loan to Turkey that included measures to update and enforce building codes. Poor quality construction was responsible for many of the lives lost during the 1999 Marmara earthquake. The reconstruction programme will introduce better planning for land use (possible links to MDGs) and requires compulsory insurance for housing. Emergency response management will also be upgraded.

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**Box 12.1 National initiatives to integrate urban disaster risk reduction and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)**

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Disaster risk reduction cuts across each of the eight MDGs, but is not identified as a separate target for action. This has reduced the visibility of risk reduction to some degree. However, the importance of integrating risk reduction with safeguard gains from disaster loss has become increasingly apparent. A number of international organizations – such as the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR), the UK Department for International Development (DFID), and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) – have reviewed the ways in which risk reduction can contribute towards meeting the MDGs.

The ISDR has surveyed disaster risk reduction strategies that have been designed purposely to contribute to meeting individual MDG targets. Box 12.1 presents some of these findings that draw from urban projects and programmes. In addition to direct contributions towards achieving individual MDGs, reducing disaster impacts frees up resources, including overseas development aid.

In 2005, progress towards meeting the MDGs was reviewed by the independent United Nations Millennium Project. The resulting report recognizes that disasters are a serious impediment to meeting the MDGs. It calls for the mainstreaming of risk reduction strategies within MDG-based poverty reduction strategies. The report recommends four pathways for achieving better integration, all of which have relevance for urban disaster risk reduction:
The Habitat Agenda

... Includes disaster risk reduction amongst its commitments for action

- Investment in disaster-proof infrastructure, including the application of disaster standards in new building and retrofitting existing buildings and infrastructure. This is a particularly important task for rapidly growing cities since uncontrolled urban growth increases vulnerability to disasters. Risk assessments, land-use planning and construction standards are identified as key components of any urban risk reduction strategy.

- The protection of livelihoods. Social safety nets to safeguard livelihoods and lives during slow-onset disaster or during protected periods of recovery are supported, with employment guarantees and micro-finance schemes suggested as appropriate for urban contexts.

- Governments investment in building and strengthening national and local early warning systems to monitor conditions and provide advance warning of potential disasters. Surveillance systems can include field monitoring, remote sensing and meteorological forecasting. Public information campaigns are important for raising awareness of the risks of natural disasters and adequate responses.

- Emergency preparedness and contingency plans are needed to minimize loss and maximize efficiency and equity in post-disaster relief and reconstruction. Plans should include strategies for evacuation, emergency safety zones, insurance schemes, and the pre-location and financing of humanitarian resources for rapid distribution. As part of their contingency plans, governments must establish mechanisms for delivering emergency services after a disaster has occurred, especially immediate healthcare, to prevent the outbreak of diseases among displaced populations. Developed countries should establish a far more systematic financial mechanism for disaster response, including contingent credit investments for individual countries.

The Habitat Agenda

The 1996 Istanbul Declaration on Human Settlements endorses ‘the universal goals of ensuring adequate shelter for all and making human settlements safer, healthier and more liveable, equitable, sustainable and productive’. In particular, paragraph 4 reaffirms commitment to integrated urban development:

To improve the quality of life within human settlements, we must combat the deterioration of conditions that, in most cases, particularly in developing countries, have reached crisis proportions. To this end, we must address comprehensively … planning; growing insecurity and violence; environmental degradation; and increased vulnerability to disasters.

This integrated approach to urbanization presented in the Habitat Agenda is entirely compatible with disaster risk reduction, which takes disaster risk to be a product of the unsustainable trends identified in paragraph 4 of the Istanbul Declaration. The United Nations General Assembly Resolution S25.2 of 9 June 2001 reaffirmed that the Istanbul Declaration and the Habitat Agenda provide the basic framework for future sustainable human settlements development.

The Habitat Agenda is the sister document to the Istanbul Declaration and the main political document directing international work on urban development. The document recognizes the World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction (which took place in Yokohama, in 1994) and includes disaster risk reduction among its commitments for action (see Box 12.2). In addition to commitments, some 31 recommendations are made that cover all aspects of disaster risk reduction, including building partnerships between local organizations, government and the international community; risk mapping (including hazardous waste); investing in human capital for risk management; emergency planning; early warning; land-use planning, including the location of dangerous industrial plants; recognizing the needs of women and children; and planning for reconstruction.

As the leading United Nations agency for human settlements issues, UN-Habitat has a commitment to reduce disaster risk and build this into the reconstruction of human settlements. It seeks to influence partners and, in particular, to provide guidance at the national level, as well as through urban professional practice. Building on the commitments of the Habitat Agenda and on dialogue with its partners during the second and third World Urban Forums (2004 and 2006, respectively), UN-Habitat has developed a conceptual Framework for Sustainable Relief and Reconstruction. This framework identifies priority areas for action in making urban areas more resilient in the face of disaster risk (see Box 12.3).
Box 12.3 The UN-Habitat Framework for Sustainable Relief and Reconstruction

The Framework for Sustainable Relief and Reconstruction is the key guide used by UN-Habitat to support humanitarian agencies and local and national governments, and to refine the practice of building back better. The framework builds on UN-Habitat’s experience and strength in assisting local capacity development in pre-disaster preparedness and mitigation and in post-disaster response and reconstruction.

The aim of the framework is to promote reconstruction and risk reduction strategies that promote longer-term sustainable development gains, as well as reduce disaster risk in human settlements. Consultation with partners has led to the elaboration of seven key thematic areas of the framework:

Disaster mitigation and vulnerability reduction

Often, the root causes of vulnerability are known, but they are seldom addressed. When building a culture of prevention, one needs to overcome preferences for short- over long-term development options and to demonstrate the cost-effectiveness of risk reduction over post-disaster reconstruction.

The framework recommends integrating disaster risk reduction within national and local development and poverty reduction plans, emphasizing risk reduction in human settlements rather than reconstruction as the mode of managing disaster risk, as well as the need for cross-sectoral working.

Land and property administration

Housing, land and property rights are major challenges in reconstruction. This is often exacerbated by the disintegration of institutions governing and protecting land and property rights after disaster and can increase social tension and add to conflict. Restitution problems requiring resolution have challenged reconstruction following the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and the 2005 South Asian earthquake.

Longer-term shelter strategies

It is vital to consider the long-term consequences of post-disaster shelter and infrastructure. The importation of prefabricated dwellings proves a cheap and easily transportable short-term solution; but construction standards are often culturally inappropriate, environmentally unsustainable or not built to hazard-resistant standards. The transition from temporary to permanent housing continues to take too long and, in some cases, is never achieved. Part of the resolution of this challenge lies in planning for long-term recovery at the initial relief stage. This will also enable the more efficient use of emergency resources.

Local economic recovery

Even after disaster, affected communities have many resources and skills that can be used as a base to rebuild the local economy. Recovery and reconstruction interventions, especially those in the shelter and infrastructure sectors, provide a real opportunity for local economic recovery, and even for increasing the local skill and experience base. Re-establishing small-scale production, support for local market development and skill training can all be part of shelter reconstruction programmes.

Public participation and good governance

Disaster risk reduction and reconstruction are opportunities for engaging civil society actors in development. Effective risk reduction can utilize participatory vulnerability and risk assessments to shape local preparedness and response planning. Inclusive decision-making in recovery that includes women will be more likely to identify opportunities and challenges for ‘building back better’. The local government is best positioned to coordinate public participation, and a first step is to strengthen the capacity of local government in community development, disaster preparedness and recovery planning.

Partnerships

Making best use of the limited resources available for risk reduction and reconstruction is facilitated through the building of partnerships between all stakeholders (local, national and international), the public sector, civil society and the private sector, including the media. Partnerships allow individual organizations to contribute from positions of strength and can control overlapping functions. Partnerships can also be a pathway for transferring skills and for developing relationships that contribute to development in addition to reconstruction and risk reduction work.

Capacity-building

The integration of development and disaster management at the points of preparedness and recovery provide opportunities for skills enhancement, knowledge transfer and the building of confidence that can empower local actors, especially women. Capacity-building is often supported by legislation and national or local vulnerability reduction plans that help to move the focus of risk management away from a narrow interest in building standards and engineering techniques to embrace the social, economic and institutional aspects of life that shape disaster risk.

The opportunities for moving towards more sustainable relief and reconstruction methods outlined in this framework are designed to be compatible with the objectives of the Hyogo Framework for Action.


International action for disaster risk reduction is given direction by the Hyogo Framework for Action, 2005–2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disaster. The framework identifies five general priorities for action:

• Ensure that disaster risk reduction is a national and local priority with a strong institutional basis for implementation.
• Enhance early warning through improvements in the identification, assessment and monitoring of disaster risks.
• Use knowledge, innovation and education to build a culture of safety and resilience at all levels.
• Reduce the underlying risk factors that are currently built into development paths.
• Strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels.
The Hyogo Framework recognizes unplanned urbanization as a key factor driving increasing global vulnerability and losses to natural and human-made disasters. Detailed urban-specific recommendations encourage two priority actions for urban development and land-use planning:

- Incorporate disaster risk assessments into the urban planning and management of disaster-prone human settlements, (particularly) highly populated areas and quickly urbanizing settlements. The issues of informal or non-permanent housing and the location of housing in high-risk areas should be addressed as priorities, including in the framework of urban poverty reduction and slum-upgrading programmes. (Section 4, iii (n))

In addition, international organizations are encouraged to support states in building and maintaining urban search and rescue capacity, mainly through the development of mechanisms to mainstream disaster risk reduction into development financing and assistance for urban development.

Recommendations for action also include many cross-cutting themes that apply to urban, but also to peri-urban and rural, contexts. These include human resource development, early warning, emergency planning, and partnerships between local, national and international actors.

Plans for implementing the Hyogo Framework have been agreed and explicitly acknowledge the need to break the negative spiral of poverty, accelerated urbanization, environmental degradation and disaster. Work is required at national and international levels to build the institutional structures that can take the Hyogo Framework forward. A survey of progress made at the national level in 2006 indicates that some good progress has already been made. A total of 60 governments have designated focal points with national-level responsibility for implementing the framework and 40 countries have reported concrete disaster risk reduction activities. Examples of reported national-level progress are as follows:

- The strengthening of national institutions for risk reduction has been the area where most progress has been achieved, to date. In many countries, this is a first step in building the organizational infrastructure from which more targeted initiatives can be developed. Examples of progress include work in Argentina, where the Ministry of Federal Planning, Public Investments and Services has embarked on a two-year national programme to mainstream disaster risk reduction at the national, provincial and local levels as part of an overall Federal Land-Use Planning Strategy. In El Salvador, authorities have developed a National Action Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction. In Uganda, disaster reduction has been mainstreamed into a national Poverty Eradication Plan. Nepal has designed a national strategy and comprehensive national plan on disaster reduction. Indonesia has prepared a comprehensive disaster management law on response, risk mitigation and recovery for all hazards. Bolivia included disaster risk reduction in its national development plan. Cuba is implementing a policy of risk assessment in all of its development initiatives.
- National risk assessment and early warning programmes have also been developed. There is increasing investment in seismic hazard monitoring capacity in several Central Asian countries. Thailand, the Maldives and ten countries in East Africa with coastal settlements have strengthened their capacities in flood and tsunami early-warning and response systems.
- Efforts by governments aimed at building a culture of awareness through public education and information programmes include disaster reduction in national curricula (e.g. in Indonesia and Kazakhstan). In China, promoting awareness through schools is complemented by public awareness campaigns focusing on communities and villages. There are also many examples of graduate and postgraduate studies that have integrated disaster risk reduction. One example is the University of the West Indies in Jamaica.
- A national policy to reduce underlying risk factors is essential, but requires strong political will. Some laudable progress has already been made by India through creating a training programme for safer construction. Cuba and Grenada have also developed programmes for safer construction. In Simeulue Island (Indonesia), community knowledge has been used in the design of local regulations and the promotion of forest and mangrove conservation.
- The challenge of integrating risk reduction within emergency recovery plans has already been met by Bolivia and Guatemala. Elsewhere, while integration has not yet been achieved, progress has been made on strengthening disaster preparedness and response planning in Comoros, China, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Tajikistan. Pakistan has developed a national scheme for volunteers and Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti and Jamaica have initiatives to increase their preparedness and response capacity.

Integrating disaster risk reduction and urban development

Progress is being made in bringing together urban development, disaster risk reduction and humanitarian action. The UN-Habitat Framework on Sustainable Relief and Reconstruction is a key document in this process. Here, UN-Habitat identifies future opportunities for working with the international community, local authorities and communities in integrating disaster risk reduction and urban development. The vision of sustainable relief and reconstruction encompasses all phases of disaster management, from prevention through relief to recovery, and aims to provide a
conceptual framework for broadening the portfolios of humanitarian and development actors.

Yet, key challenges to a more integrated and sustainable approach persist, perpetuated by institutional structures at all levels. International progress on joint funding for sustainable reconstruction is tangible but slow. At the municipal level, challenges vary, but include differences in institutional capacity and political will. Box 12.4 presents the findings of a review of innovations in El Salvador that have overcome some of these barriers and enabled a more integrated approach to risk reduction.

It has been argued that the failure to integrate risk reduction and urban development starts with overly specialized training, which serves to compartmentalize disaster management and urban planning, rather than foster a culture of interdisciplinarity.14 This is exacerbated when urban planners have limited post-disaster experience, until their city is hit by a disaster, although city exchanges and training in post-conflict reconstruction can help to overcome this challenge. This disciplinary and experiential gap is all too often translated into the absence of urban development professionals from disaster response and reconstruction efforts, particularly in the planning and management of temporary housing. This misses an opportunity for disaster response to integrate the knowledge of local urban planning professionals.

Professional separation results in the use of different working priorities, concepts and terminologies that maintain barriers between the different professionals.15 Institutional differences and competition for funding breeds scepticism about the tools and capacities of other disciplines. Urban planning is criticized for predominantly employing a physical/engineering approach, often related to expensive large-scale engineering measures, which has only limited relevance to the language and working priorities of risk reduction. Potential for developing more integrated, interdisciplinary risk reduction projects is further limited by donors’ separate budget lines for development and emergency relief.16

Ways beyond the impasse in communication between disaster management and urban development professionals are opening up; but more work is needed. International organizations, as well as national and local governments, can develop internal mechanisms to foster interaction between these practitioner communities. Funding cycles for reconstruction and relief projects are often rapid and target specific aspects of reconstruction, rather than taking an integrated approach. This undermines capacity for building integrated teams. At the national level, legal structures for risk reduction and urban planning are frequently separate, absent or lack national–municipal collaboration.

**RISK REDUCTION THROUGH LAND-USE PLANNING**

Effective land-use planning requires evidence-based and transparent decision-making. Without up-to-date and accurate information, as well as clear decision-making criteria, effective urban development planning becomes difficult.
Towards safer and more secure cities

Land-use planning for risk reduction needs appropriate tools and must be set within a supportive and responsive urban governance regime.

Because of the scale of resources and the number of people whose lives can be affected by land-use planning, strong governance systems are required to protect the legitimacy of decisions and to maximize compliance. Legal instruments and capacity for oversight and enforcement are also required to support implementation. Implementation and the quality of planning decision-making are often strongest when strategies are inclusive. Governance systems that include local voices and foster individual and local responsibility for safe land use, and that can support local, decentralized leadership, can be more effective than overly centralized regimes. This is particularly the case where rapid urbanization has stretched capacity for oversight and enforcement, and where centralized approaches are not practical. A balance must be kept between decentralized responsibility and the maintenance of minimum standards for safe land-use planning. This is a difficult balance to get right and a large part of the recipe for success surrounds the generation and distribution of information and knowledge on land use, vulnerability and hazard, and the development and use of more inclusive decision-support tools.

The advantages of inclusive strategies for urban risk reduction are discussed later in this chapter. This section concentrates on actions driven by municipalities and local government, although a common theme for success is partnership with other local actors, international organizations, the state and the private sector. Land-use planning needs to face a number of challenges, some of which were discussed in Chapter 8. Key future challenges include the following:

- The global proliferation of slums calls for innovative land-use planning procedures. Providing frameworks for more participatory planning and extending planning into informal settlements can help to build resilience in the face of risk from natural and human-made hazards. Integrated projects and programmes for slum upgrading emerged during the 1990s, and these provide a background of experience for innovation built on inclusive planning.17
- Re-planning the city to design out risks inherited from past planning decisions is important. Examples of this include planning for buffer zones (using mangroves, salt marshes and river floodplains to absorb hazard); and preventing the establishment of major industrial and port facilities on reclaimed land in cities at risk from earthquake that may be prone to liquefaction, such as Kingston (Jamaica) and Kobe (Japan).
- Planning for risk reduction in the city region in a way that recognizes that the city is not an isolated system and will be at risk from disaster in its hinterland is also very important. It is the hinterland that provides inputs and a sink for wastes produced by the city. Examples of where this approach has been recognized include Mexico City and New Delhi. This approach also concedes that the economy of the city drives environmental change in its hinterland, so that urban areas are partly responsible for peri-urban and rural risk. Examples of this include environmental degradation caused by fuelwood extraction for charcoal and the degradation of floodplains caused by the extraction of gravel from riverbeds for the construction industry.
- Yet another challenge is planning for global risk reduction – for example, by reducing dependency upon private or collective car use in order to mitigate climate change, as well as atmospheric pollution and accident rates in cities. Land-use patterns that bring residential, educational, recreational, commercial and employment activities closer together can make a major contribution to reducing the pollution footprint of cities.18

In the following sub-sections, opportunities for improving planning performance and examples of practice that point towards future directions in land-use planning which can integrate disaster risk reduction are reviewed. These are areas of innovation that will improve the effectiveness and accountability of land-use planning across the range of challenges that lie ahead. Pathways for building resilience within urban planning through innovations in data collection, management and analysis, as well as through decision-support tools and institutional reform, are examined.

Data collection, management and analysis

Technological innovation provides new opportunities for collecting and manipulating data on hazard, human vulnerability and disaster impacts. Geographic information systems (GIS) and organized data collection systems both offer scope to improve the evidence base for urban planning. Box 12.5 offers experience in the use of GIS for risk mapping gained by Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ).19 During recent years, technological advances in GIS have led to the development and improvement of numerous instruments and methods for physical hazard mapping and analysis. In contrast, the integration of social, economic and environmental variables within GIS models, risk maps and risk analysis, generally, still remains a challenge. It is in this area where improvements might be looked for in the future. Better integration of social, economic and environmental variables within GIS and risk models might be achieved through more systematic formal data collection systems managed by municipalities. Participatory GIS (PGIS), in particular, can generate relevant socio-economic and environmental data that may serve as an input for risk models and plans. PGIS combines participatory methodologies with GIS technologies in order to involve communities in the production of spatial data on hazards. PGIS can thus engage local stakeholders in land-use planning and risk management and contribute to efforts to decentralize planning. The involvement of local actors opens scope for better communication and strengthens local monitoring of the impacts of risk reduction policies.20 In this way, PGIS can enable the extension of risk management and urban land-use planning into informal and slum settlements.
The process of quantifying local knowledge through P-GIS can further enhance the position of communities when they negotiate with outside agencies. For example, when assessments are conducted before and after external interventions, the success or failure of plans can be made equally transparent to local and external stakeholders. P-GIS can thus contribute to reaching consensus on the state of local urban environments and on arriving at targets for land-use planning that integrates risk reduction.

P-GIS has become established as a tool in risk management for urban planning within richer cities; but scarcity of human resources and technical capacity have meant that it has received more limited application as a strategic tool in cities at risk from disaster in middle- and low-income countries. P-GIS is an important opportunity not to be missed as it provides a mechanism for generating basic data on hazard, vulnerability and loss when centralized data is not available, which is predominantly the case in low-income urban communities at risk. This said, the comprehensive use of P-GIS is likely to prove costly to implement and maintain, and may not be achievable in many poorer cities over the short and medium term.

The methodology used in GIS is to construct individual maps for specific social or environmental variables, such as income class, housing quality or altitude. Individual maps can then be layered on top of one another to identify risk as a result of different combinations of vulnerability and hazard variables. In this way, GIS is useful for identifying sites of special concern (which may vary over time in response to economic and environmental cycles) or areas of potential land-use or social conflict.

For long-term analysis of trends in vulnerability and impacts, regular and consistent data collection systems are required. There are few examples of such systematic data collection systems operating among marginalized and at-risk populations in urban settlements. Box 12.6 presents the experience of the Monitoring, Mapping and Analysis of Disaster Incidents in South Africa (MANDISA) database operating in squatter settlements in Cape Town (South Africa), with a focus on fire hazard loss data collection.

Cost–benefit analysis

Cost–benefit analysis allows a comparison to be made between the costs and benefits of an investment decision. Benefits are defined as anything that improves human well-
being. There is a wide variety of cost–benefit tools and these are frequently applied in decision-making in urban infrastructure development. Most methodologies include a three-stage process. First, the costs and benefits of an investment are identified. If a quantitative methodology is used, a common metric and numerical value must be assigned to each cost and benefit. Second, future costs and benefits are discounted to allow for the comparison of future and current values. Third, a decision criterion is applied to determine which is greater, the costs or benefits of a proposed investment. Recent efforts have applied the cost–benefit analysis approach to measure the pros and cons of land-use decisions and the relative merits of investing in hazard mitigation.

Despite some growing evidence of the utility of cost–benefit analysis as an aid to land-use decision-making for risk reduction, it is still not routinely used to determine the comparative advantage of investing in disaster prevention, preparedness and mitigation infrastructure investments. Cost-benefit analysis offers a methodology to help determine the optimum allocation of resources to reduce disaster risk. Where cost–benefit analysis has been undertaken, there is now a growing body of evidence to show empirically the cost effectiveness of investing in risk reduction. For example, a comparison of different disaster prevention measures undertaken against floods and volcanic hazard in the Philippines calculated benefits of between 3.5 and 30 times the project costs. The Philippines case is based only on direct losses. Box 12.7 presents additional measures of the benefit of proactive investment in risk reduction, which have been calculated using a range of cost–benefit methodologies.

Disaster risk is similarly not included in the majority of evaluations for urban planning decisions. This increases the chance of projects being damaged or destroyed by natural and human-made hazards. Where investment funds have to be borrowed internationally, this increases debt while running the risk of losing the investment. The scale of this problem is seen in the increasing number of disaster reconstruction projects that international development banks, and mainly the World Bank, have supported during the last two decades. It is hoped that increasing the awareness of disaster risk through tools such as cost–benefit analysis will prevent reconstruction investments from also becoming subject to disaster. The need to adapt to climate change places additional pressure on the necessity of integrating disaster risk within development planning decision-making.

The variable frequency and severity of natural and technological hazard events and any associated human disasters present a challenge to cost–benefit analysis, although a number of statistical methods can be employed to measure the uncertainty that this brings to calculations. Cost-benefit analysis is further constrained by the need to reduce inputs to a common metric that usually requires putting a monetary value on all costs and benefits, including human life and injuries. This is a challenge for any comparative assessments between places with different land uses – for example, in attempting to measure relative returns from an investment that increases security in a business district or a low-income housing area. The former land use will have far higher economic value; but the latter provides life-support services, some of which (shelter and access to basic services) can be quantified in economic terms, as well as social and ecological services (a sense of identity and community) that cannot be easily represented. More generally, methods for deriving values for human life, and also for other intangibles such as environmental quality or women’s empowerment, are hotly contested. One approach is to ask people how much they are willing to pay to protect a certain asset, or how much they would be willing to receive in compensation if an asset was lost. The latter methodology routinely provides values an order of magnitude higher. This serves to indicate the vulnerability of cost–benefit analysis to manipulation or misinterpretation. Part of the solution to this is not to use cost–benefit analysis as a stand-alone tool to determine decisions, but rather to provide supporting evidence for decision-making alongside other non-economic inputs.

**Box 12.7 Revealing the advantages of disaster risk reduction through cost–benefit analysis**

The World Bank and US Geological Survey calculated that economic losses worldwide from disasters during the 1990s could have been reduced by US$20 billion if US$40 million had been invested in mitigation and preparedness.

In China, investments of US$3.15 billion in flood control measures over 40 years are believed to have averted potential losses of US$12 billion.

In Viet Nam, 12,000 hectares of mangroves planted by the Red Cross to protect 110 kilometres of sea dikes costs US$1.1 million, but has reduced the costs of dike maintenance by US$7.3 million per year, in addition to protecting 7750 families living behind the dikes.

A study on Jamaica and Dominica calculated that the potential avoided losses compared with the costs of mitigation when building infrastructure, such as ports and schools, would have been between two and four times. For example, a year after constructing a deepwater port in Dominica, Hurricane David, in 1979, necessitated reconstruction costs equivalent to 41 per cent of the original investment; while building the port to a standard that could resist such a hurricane would have increased basic costs by only about 12 per cent.

In Darbhanga district in North Bihar (India), a cost–benefit analysis of disaster mitigation and preparedness interventions suggests that for every Indian rupee spent, 3.76 rupees of benefits were realized.

Source: DFID, 2005

**Institutional reform**

Appropriate institutional arrangements define the relationships, responsibilities and power of stakeholders in disaster and its management. The movement from managing risk through emergency relief and response towards a more proactive pre-disaster orientation requires institutional change. Development actors are better placed and have more appropriate skills than emergency response experts in achieving disaster risk reduction. Humanitarian actors and those involved in disaster reconstruction also need to integrate development planning within their work. These two shifts require a change in the distribution of responsibilities for risk management. This is likely to be accompanied by adjustments in budgets and in policy. Institutional arrangements can help in co-coordinating such changes.
Mitigating the impacts of disasters

Box 12.8 Elements of successful reform for disaster risk reduction legislation

A recent study by Tearfund has reviewed the processes leading to the successful reform of national disaster risk reduction legislation. The following recommendations draw from this report, and together emphasize the need for strong leadership, a commitment to participation in the process of drafting legislation, and clarity in the required roles and outcomes of local-level actors, who include local authorities:

- Reform requires sustained high-level political support.
- Reform is greatly facilitated by high-level political support and a well-placed policy champion with technical knowledge, skill, commitment and creative initiative.
- The leadership of the reform process must be explicitly committed to broad stakeholder consultation.
- Review of the pre-reform policy and legislative context is necessary to understand the pre-existing mandates of agencies. As far as possible, legislation should fit into existing government planning cycles and procedures for implementation and monitoring.
- External facilitators can enable the reform process. Since disaster risk reduction is a fairly new policy area, it can easily be perceived as a threat or as duplicating existing policy and budget lines. In addition, the need to build high-level and cross-sectoral support is challenging for sectoral actors. International expertise or neutral, but informed, national actors, such as academics, may be well placed to act as technical advisers for dialogue.
- Create a clear identity for disaster risk reduction. Disaster risk reduction is developmental and should clearly be seen as a separate policy area from relief-oriented disaster management.
- Align new legislation with international best practice and use terminology consistent with contemporary global thinking.
- Develop an implementation plan during the development of legislation. This should clearly demarcate responsibilities, timelines for action, agreed benchmarks and protocols for review.
- Legislation must explicitly state required outcomes at the community level, such as local early warning systems or community-based disaster-contingency plans.
- Monitor performance and implementation. As risk changes in character, the nature and tasks of frontline policy actors will also change and legislation needs to be able to reflect this change to empower disaster risk reduction.

Source: Pelling and Holloway, 2006

Disaster risk continues to grow despite existing legislative frameworks for urban risk reduction.

Urban- and national-level legislative reform has usefully engaged with international forums for risk reduction. The Habitat Agenda, which promotes the need to improve the quality of human settlements through solidarity, cooperation and partnerships, and the ISDR, which can act to provide information on good practice or facilitate South–South learning, are examples of this.

Regional cooperation can be similarly useful in promoting successful reform and implementation of risk reduction in urban planning. The Asian Urban Disaster Mitigation Program (AUDMP) and the African Urban Risk Analysis Network have been instrumental in sharing information on risk reduction and building communities of practice for urban professionals working on risk reduction in their respective regions.

DESIGNING DISASTER-RESISTANT BUILDINGS AND INFRASTRUCTURE

US$1 invested in construction saves US$40 if the building has to be rebuilt after an earthquake; US$1 invested in retrofitting saves US$8.

This estimate of the economic benefits of safe construction and retrofitting in Turkey is compelling. Technological and engineering expertise is available in most cities to design buildings and infrastructure for disaster-proofing. When development projects fail, this is more a reflection of failures...
Where inappropriate development has led to the accumulation of disaster risk, retrofitting can offer a way of improving the resilience of a city’s buildings. In slums … incentives to improve the safety of buildings are particularly limited.

Aid agencies and construction oversight
Multilateral and bilateral development aid agencies can influence the location, timing and content of investments in infrastructure through their stated policy priorities. However, these agencies often do not have their own guidelines or engineering standards and procedures with which to ensure that investments are disaster resistant. Rather, this service is decentralized and local standards and practices are used. Aid donors rarely become involved in design. This is especially so in indirect investments such as social investment funds, where detailed budget decisions and design criteria are generally set at the national level.

Retrofitting
Where inappropriate development has led to the accumulation of disaster risk, retrofitting can offer a way of improving the resilience of a city’s buildings. Opportunities for retrofitting are often constrained. Despite the small marginal costs of retrofitting in most instances, where works are perceived by owners to be unduly disruptive, they are unlikely to be entered into voluntarily. Similarly, if costs of retrofitting are considered to be high in relation to perceived risk, voluntary action will be limited. Where building owners are not prepared to retrofit buildings, tenants have little power and are often denied rights to invest in the upgrading of the property they rent. This includes tenants of private and public landlords. In slums lacking landownership, incentives to improve the safety of buildings are particularly limited.

Retrofitting has been encouraged by insurance companies by offering incentives such as reduced premiums, or the stick of only insuring those properties meeting basic standards of construction. Municipal governments may also offer advice, technical support and sometimes grants to encourage private owners to upgrade building safety, and can integrate retrofitting within urban plans for disaster management. This is most likely to be undertaken where local authorities are contemplating urban redevelopment schemes in which disaster risk reduction has been integrated. Retrofitting is being tackled on three fronts by the Tokyo Metropolitan government (see Box 12.9).

Indigenous buildings
Non-engineered or indigenous structures are dominant in many cities around the world. For instance, almost 90 per cent of Kathmandu’s buildings are non-engineered. Although indigenous construction techniques are not always inferior to modern ones, in many disasters, especially those associated with earthquakes, it is the non-engineered or indigenous buildings that are most damaged and that kill the most people. Indigenous styles are not of themselves inherently dangerous. Where traditional building skills persist and are valued by contractors, and where good quality materials are used, indigenous building techniques can be hazard-proof, as well as retain local built heritage. Unfortunately, under rapid urbanization, the majority of non-engineered structures have not been built to such high standards.

Indigenous buildings are considered by some to fall outside the scope of engineering science. However, this view is changing and offers an opportunity for partnerships between engineers, artisan builders and low-income households to improve building safety. New knowledge is a necessary component of a comprehensive strategy for improving the quality of indigenous buildings, most of which are constructed outside the formal housing and planning systems. In addition to a lack of knowledge, indigenous housing is made unsafe by a lack of financial resources and the number of competing demands on household budgets, many of which require more immediate attention than disaster-proofing.

Given the constraints of poverty and the reality of competing demands, complete seismic resistance in indigenous housing may not be attainable. However, improvements to enhance security can be made to ensure that key buildings will not suffer complete collapse and that damage incurred will be of a type that can be quickly repaired. These are the aims of the National Information Centre of Earthquake Engineering in India, which has undertaken research on improved security for indigenous buildings in fried-brick, stone, wood, earth and non-engineered reinforced concrete. Engineering advice is available in the report Guidelines for Earthquake Resistant Non-Engineered Construction produced by the National Information Centre. Growing interest among engineers in research and the training of builders, architects and planners in safe building design for non-engineered structures offer major opportunities for safer cities.

Training

Universities and technical institutes have long been at the forefront of disaster risk reduction through research and teaching on design aspects for disaster-resilient cities. But more can be done. There are opportunities for integrating disaster awareness within curricula, even for non-specialist degrees. This is a mechanism for fostering awareness of disaster risk reduction as a cross-cutting concern for all seeking careers in urban development, engineering design, project management, housing and urban planning. Box 12.10 describes some of the initiatives of the Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre (ADPC), which has a long track record in professional training for urban disaster risk reduction.

The potential for e-learning opens much additional scope for professional training in design for risk reduction. The United Nations Disaster Management Training Programme was launched in 1990. The programme is delivered at distance, but promotes national and regional workshops. Since 1990, more than 70 workshops have been organized, benefiting approximately 6000 participants in developing and transitional countries. The workshops have supported national efforts to revise national disaster management plans and legislation and to create and strengthen national and United Nations disaster management teams. They have generated follow-up training events that disseminate learning to community levels, and have led to the initiation of technical projects supported by the UNDP, other partner agencies and donor governments. It is notable in this programme that urban disaster risk is not flagged as a priority for action, although many generic issues are covered that would benefit those engaged in urban risk management. Individual universities also coordinate disaster management training courses, often with distance learning components.

Climate change, building and infrastructure design

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) expects climate change to affect urban populations through rising sea levels, increased hazard from tropical cyclones, flooding, landslides, heat and cold waves, as well as challenges of urban water quality and storage. Changing physical parameters require adaptation in building and infrastructure design. Cities in low- and middle-income countries are doubly at risk. Many cities are located in tropical and subtropical climatic zones where climatic hazards are already a constraint on development, and face extreme financial and technical constraints and limited adaptive capacity. The location of large urban centres in coastal areas exposed to hydro-meteorological hazards is a significant risk factor.

### Box 12.10 Professional training in urban risk management: The Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre (ADPC) story

Through educational work and professional training, the Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre (ADPC) has helped to incorporate disaster risk reduction aims and techniques within related disciplines such as engineering, environmental management, hydrology and planning. In Asia, the ADPC engages with a number of universities and lists 15 specialist centres for disaster research in the region among its network. The centre also works in partnership with the European Union (EU).

The ADPC offers e-learning programmes on disaster risk reduction. South–South learning has also been facilitated by the centre and delivered by national partners. For example, the Prince of Songkhla University and the University of Chiang Mai in Thailand undertook training in risk assessment with planners from the people’s Democratic Republic of Lao’s Urban Research Institute.

In addition, the ADPC offers a range of short courses for professionals on a regular basis. Courses include earthquake vulnerability for cities, flood risk management, technological risk management, urban fire risk management, urban disaster mitigation, land-use planning and risk management, as well as hospital preparedness for emergencies.

*Source: ADPC, 2005*
Adapting now to future climate change is difficult because of the uncertainty in forecasting and a tendency for conservative estimates of future change. This makes it difficult to identify design targets for adaptation. Some basic principles for successful adaptation have been proposed. For example, to be successful, adaptations must be consistent with economic development, be environmentally and socially sustainable over time, and be equitable. In cities where the institutional architecture for natural disaster risk reduction is in place, this is a strong base for adapting to climate change.

Mitigating greenhouse gas emissions in cities requires immediate and aggressive action alongside adaptation work. There is great scope for future work in enabling mitigation through improved urban design. One direction to begin research and development might be in those areas where mitigation also offers a financial opportunity. Examples include improved building materials and energy efficiency to reduce costs; transport demand management to reduce congestion and the health impacts of transport; and the promotion of renewable or alternative energy generation, such as methane recuperation from landfills for use in local energy generation schemes. Many local authorities already play leadership roles by reviewing purchasing and energy conservation policy. The Cities for Climate Protection Campaign, coordinated by ICLEI-Local Governments for Sustainability, has enlisted over 650 cities worldwide, each of which has demonstrated willingness to integrate climate mitigation within its decision-making processes.

The greatest challenge is to … ensure that early warnings are communicated and acted on in a timely manner.

Integrating ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ approaches

Connecting technical expertise to people at risk requires that early warning systems are built from the bottom up (sensitive to the contexts in which they will be useful), as well as from the top down (being accurate and effective with their use of information). The fusion of top-down scientific and bottom-up people-centred approaches can maximize the trust that those at risk place in the system. Not only the message but also the messenger needs to be trusted for people to take action.

An important challenge in improving the outputs of early warning systems is to bring the right team of stakeholders together – politicians, hazard experts, disaster managers, the media and community members all have a role to play. To help build trust in Jamaica, mayors chair local Disaster Committees, thereby adding legitimacy to any warnings that might be issued from hazard technicians. There is also a policy of avoiding the ‘blame game’. It is accepted that early warning is not an exact science and that wrong decisions may be made. A professional approach to analysing why wrong decisions have been made, rather than a recriminatory approach, helps to reduce pressure on decision-makers.

The challenge of cities

Environmental change associated with urban expansion into new hazard zones, or with the local consequences of global environmental change, coupled with social and demographic change in cities, generates uncertainty for early warning. New hazards and vulnerabilities may emerge, generating risk that is unrecognized until disaster strikes. This was partly the case in the European heat wave of 2003.

Urban settlements offer opportunities as well as challenges for early warning.

Indeed, 21 of the 33 cities that are projected to have a population of 8 million or more by 2015 are located in coastal zones.

Perhaps most challenging of all is sea-level rise. The scale of risk is enormous:

- In Japan, a 1 metre sea-level rise would expand areas at risk 2.7 times to 2339 square kilometres, and increase population and assets at risk to 4.1 million and 109 trillion Japanese yen, respectively.
- In Egypt, a 50 centimetre sea-level rise would affect 2 million people and 214,000 jobs, and would result in the loss of US$35 billion in land value, property and tourism income.
- In Poland, a 1 metre sea-level rise would cause US$30 billion of land to be lost to the sea, and put US$18 billion of assets and land at risk of flooding. It is estimated that coastal protection would cost US$6 billion.

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underlines the importance for advance preparation to enable the best actions to follow from scientific information and early warnings. The integration of multiple hazard monitoring systems is a current challenge for urban disaster risk managers.

**Knowledge for action**

Experience shows that, following a warning, in order for action to be effective, knowledge on what preparedness actions to take is needed by people at risk and emergency services. This section discusses the potential for developing two strategies for building capacity: public education and participatory mapping.

Knowledge of hazards and resources is essential for successful evacuation. Box 12.12 recounts experiences from the evacuation system put into operation for Hurricane Rita during 2005, which made landfall on the Texas–Louisiana border on the Gulf Coast of the US. This was the fourth most intensive Atlantic hurricane recorded and caused US$10 billion in damages and 120 deaths. This case study underscores the importance for advance preparation to enable the best actions to follow from scientific information and early warnings.

Public information campaigns can seek to target the general population and have dedicated strategies for reaching less accessible social groups – for example, by presenting material in multiple languages. Successful public information campaigns also often include working with key community groups to disseminate messages, and to build, in advance, the cooperative relationships that are the bedrock of an effective disaster response. Key groups include schools, businesses, community groups, fire and police departments, local governments and the media.

The media can be very helpful in educating the public on disaster preparedness and recovery programmes after disaster strikes. However, disaster managers frequently complain that the media distorts information, often sensationalizing warnings or turning disasters into a spectacle. Forging links with local and national media and individual journalists and reporters is time consuming, but is valuable in fostering more responsible media coverage of disasters.

Innovative media strategies include the use of radio soap opera (**Radionovelas**) to promote hurricane preparedness, the creation and broadcasting, by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and the European Union (EU), of calypso-style songs on the subject of disaster preparedness in Central America, and a weekly 15-minute radio programme on humanitarian concerns from Nepal Red Cross. Some of the most successful innovations, such as **Radionovelas**, combine media messages with hands-on workshops or self-led exercises. The **Radionovelas** initiative has, to date, been delivered in Central America with 20-minute programmes being delivered each day over a month during the hurricane season.

Many aspects of participatory risk mapping have been discussed already both in Chapter 8 and earlier in this chapter; but an additional benefit of this tool is that local actors are able to share information with one another and external actors to help identify where vulnerable people, such as the frail or isolated elderly, live. If evacuation becomes necessary, this data is useful for planning and
Whereas Hurricane Katrina’s evacuation plan functioned relatively well for motorists, but failed to serve people who depend upon public transport, Hurricane Rita’s evacuation plan failed because of excessive reliance on automobiles, resulting in traffic congestion and local fuel shortages.

Three days before Hurricane Rita made landfall, an evacuation plan that would see over 1 million people leave their homes was begun. On 21 September 2005, a staggered evacuation order was announced for Galveston County and city. The system of staggered evacuation and the designation of particular evacuation routes and destination cities for different zones of the county and city were aimed at preventing traffic congestion. Evaluations of the evacuation have identified a number of communication failures and weaknesses.

Training and planning needs to include those local authorities involved in evacuation. This can help, for example, in streamlining traffic control to reduce congestion, and in the provision of sanitary facilities and primary healthcare along evacuation routes. Public education is needed to inform people of evacuation routes and destinations, and to provide advice on the need to prepare adequately for long journey times by taking adequate water; food, medications, etc.

Conflicting information from state and media weather bulletins and approaches to providing information led to confusion. At times, the media sensationalized the nature of the hazard, adding unnecessarily to tension. This had an exaggerated impact, given the recent nature of Hurricane Katrina. Elected officials need to take control and act as figure heads to reassure people and project a sense of responsibility.

A number of recommendations have come from reviews of communication and information flow during the Rita evacuation. While communication between state and local government was good, there was a disconnection between public agencies and the people. This needs to be improved. Simple actions, such as providing more roadside signs about fuel and water, have been proposed, as has a state-wide public education programme.

### IMPROVING EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND RECONSTRUCTION

Urban areas offer specific challenges for emergency response and recovery (see also Chapter 7). Key challenges for emergency responders include:

- The existence of the majority of settlements in cities of developing countries outside the formal and legal system: at best, there are restricted land rights and documentation.
- The mobility of responders can be inhibited by large quantities of debris. Consequently, in some cases, communities may not receive adequate medical supplies, food, water and security for weeks.
- Public services may be inadequate, such as, for instance, the lack of available water through the public distribution system for fire fighting.
- Secondary disasters (such as fires, toxic spills and other industrial accidents) complicate and hinder rescue efforts (e.g. fire, smoke, gases).
- Information management for decision-making becomes more complicated and difficult in larger settlements.

From the perspective of emergency services, resilience can be built into risk management through making use of redundant capacity. In cities exposed to frequent events, spare capacity should be extended to mobilize materials, such as medical stock, temporary accommodation, equipment, and mobile water and sanitation units. Capacity can also be extended by involving community actors and the wider civil society in first-response planning and training. The Iranian Red Crescent has promoted disaster-response training, with over 1.2 million people trained.51

Coordination of emergency response efforts between different urban sectors remains a key challenge. It is particularly important to synchronize response efforts that involve critical services such as medical assistance, electricity and water services. The case of Nanning City’s Urban Emergency Response Centre in China illustrates the mechanisms for establishing an integrated disaster response system (see Box 12.13).

Post-disaster recovery is also challenged, particularly if this period is to make the most of its opportunity for ‘building back better’ to reduce risk and integrate development within reconstruction. The gap in funding and planning between response, recovery and development continues. On the ground, reconstruction governance is made complicated by ad hoc legislative and institutional frameworks generating uncoordinated and fragmented action. There is no agency devoted to housing reconstruction, and very few of the major non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working in relief would claim to specialize here. UN-Habitat’s increasing involvement in reconstruction is a progressive indication of the positive contribution to be made by developmental actors.

Future improvements in recovery and reconstruction might come from approaches that build on local and national capaci-
ties, and which experiment with more decentralized planning and programming that builds on pre-disaster risk reduction.

Speed and sustainability in shelter provision

A longstanding tension in reconstruction is between the demands of delivering basic needs, including shelter, quickly, and the desire for sustainability, which requires greater participation and a longer time commitment. Fair and efficient distribution of housing that provides a basis for participation and a longer time commitment. Fair and the desire for sustainability, which requires greater development and resilience building is repeatedly undermined by a rapid and fragmented approach to shelter reconstruction, which does not consider the economic, social and environmental consequences of reconstruction decisions.

Part of this challenge is conceptual and lies in the very nature of housing, which, unlike other relief items such as food aid or medicine, is a significant, long-term and non-consumable asset. While the logic for humanitarian actors to lead in the post-disaster provision of life-saving medical care is clear, this is less so for settlement reconstruction, which is, at heart, a developmental activity requiring the skills and knowledge of housing and urban development specialists. Reconstruction in Bam during 2003 – one of the first times that UN-Habitat had been formally consulted on post-natural disaster reconstruction planning – shows that the integration of development within shelter reconstruction is rare.52

The disconnection between shelter reconstruction and development is perhaps also partly a reason for the many instances where temporary shelter is not replaced and becomes, de facto, permanent. In Santo Domingo (the Dominican Republic), public confidence in the ability of the state to adequately deliver reconstruction following Hurricane Georges in 1998 was severely undermined by the knowledge that many still remained in ‘temporary’ housing built after Hurricane David struck in 1979. In extensive disasters, a scarcity of large construction firms can lead to the creation of virtual monopolies, forcing up prices to exorbitant levels and creating a long waiting time for completion. The long waiting period for temporary housing following Hurricane Katrina has contributed to anxiety and financial hardship among those affected.

An awareness of the opportunity for shelter provision to contribute to longer-term development has stimulated some reappraisal by humanitarian and development agencies of the processes through which shelter is provided. It is important that, as far as possible, those people whose homes have been lost or damaged in disaster are involved in repair and reconstruction. This saves costs, provides a mechanism for transferring new or improved construction skills and can bolster the local economy. Time and again, survivors of disaster express a preference for working on reconstruction, rather than being made to receive aid in temporary camps. Where possible, survivors should be allowed to return to the sites of their former occupation and begin reconstruction as soon as possible. Where the costs of reconstruction are affordable, this can further enable survivors to take over the process of providing their own shelter.

Where settlements have suffered great damage or been shown, through disaster, to be at unacceptable levels of hazard exposure, settlement planning and, in extreme cases, relocation will still be required. This opens a rare opportunity for progressive land-use and ownership planning, including the extension of basic services for those people who may previously have lived on the margins of urban life. It is commonplace for landownership to be disputed in the aftermath of a disaster, which is made worse by a lack of documentation or the destruction of local public offices that held records. Networked electronic databases of citizen

Box 12.13 Integrated Urban Emergency Response Centre, Nanning, China

Nanning City is located in southwest China, with a population of 1.7 million and a built area of 170 square kilometres. The city has experienced rapid urbanization over the last decade, with its population growing by 172 per cent. This has been accompanied by increased threats to safety and security, including natural and human-made disasters. The old emergency response system, characterized by fragmented agencies, was poorly adapted to the changing environment of the city. Thus, the city established an Emergency Response Center, a successful example of an integrated emergency response system.

The Center, the first of its kind in China, started to provide emergency services in November 2001 by integrating telephone calls for the Police Service (110), Fire Service (119), Ambulance Service (120), Traffic Accident (122), Mayor’s Hot Line (12345), and other emergency response systems for flood, earthquake, water, electricity and gas supplies. To prevent emergencies and disasters, and to minimize their impact, the Center has prepared numerous prevention and emergency response programmes for natural disasters, public health, management of dangerous chemicals, housing safety, school safety and public space safety. This Center, consisting of 15 sub-units, has the following technical capabilities:

- to identify immediately, with the support of GIS and GPS systems, the location of incoming calls from among nearly 1 million landline telephones, and display the distribution of all police units;
- to identify the location of available rescue resources and make the best choice of response;
- to transmit voice, image and document information between the Center and the site of the emergency;
- to monitor, record and intervene traffic conditions;
- to set up temporary command stations at emergency sites and provide commanding and communication services by deploying emergency mobile communication vehicles; and
- to record all relevant voice and digital information for each case for further search.

The Center has improved the overall efficiency and coverage of emergency responses in the city, particularly rescue services. The experience of the Center shows that a municipal government can successfully mobilize stakeholders and use modern technologies to create a safer living environment for its residents.
identity and property ownership can help. In areas with high land values (such as inner-city and coastal locations), there is pressure for redevelopment and a risk that customary landownership and use will not be recognized in redevelopment. Oversight of reconstruction planning and the legal empowerment of those affected by disaster can help to maintain a more level playing field in discussions of post-disaster planning. It is especially important that the rights of the poor, women and orphans are recognized in this process.

Closing the gap between emergency shelter, shelter in recovery and longer-term development is important. Human shelter should be recognized as a foundational aspect of building resilient communities. Working with people at risk to achieve sustainable shelter in both pre- and post-disaster contexts requires action to strengthen institutions, including those that govern entitlements to landownership. It is also important that sustainable shelter is maintained within the context of local economic development and poverty reduction over the long term.

A recent review of shelter reconstruction identifies much scope for positive reform and innovation. The review argues for flexibility and the participation of all stakeholders, particularly beneficiary communities, if housing reconstruction is to fulfill its potential as a mechanism for enhancing social and economic development. To do this, agencies should try to avoid standard one-size-fits-all approaches to housing. Flexibility in design should allow structures to be adapted to meet a variety of cultural needs and expectations.

Participation of beneficiaries in shelter reconstruction enhances the appropriateness of housing. For example, involving women in house design can correct misconceptions about family life and thus prevent inappropriate interventions, such as the design of nuclear houses for extended families. Active participation can also help to improve local skills and industry, re-establish social networks and relationships, and promote psychological recovery. Disaster survivors almost always would prefer to be engaged in reconstruction than be made passive recipients of aid in refugee camps.

The most provocative question raised by a number of authors commenting on the Indian Ocean Tsunami is why relief agencies should contemplate doing housing reconstruction at all. Why not meet the need for shelter through temporary provision and leave more permanent solutions to the developmental sector, private businesses or the government, once the immediate, acute disaster phase has passed? UN-Habitat’s Sustainable Relief and Reconstruction proposal recognizes that the transition from relief to reconstruction is not always clear on the ground. This is especially so following large events with widespread losses, such as the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, the 2005 South Asian earthquake, and Hurricanes Katrina or Mitch in 2005 and 1998, respectively. Different places and communities will be at different stages of recovery; so some degree of overlap is unavoidable. The roots of reconstruction lie in relief, so that long-term reconstruction and economic recovery should begin while post-emergency actions are being undertaken. This enables strategic investments to be made during emergency and relief stages.

**Disaster response training**

Human-made and natural hazards and the resultant disasters often cross administrative boundaries. Planning for effective and timely response not only benefits from collaboration between adjacent political and administrative units, but offers an opportunity to build trust and cooperation. This is particularly the case in adjacent countries recovering from political or military tensions, or in countries rebuilding national identity following civil conflict. Box 12.14 describes a collaborative natural disaster training exercise that included emergency response and military units from the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Republika Srpska.

**Insurance and urban reconstruction**

Chapter 8 discussed the challenges of international financing for disaster management and noted the increased willingness of donors to take the challenges of reconstruction seriously. Putting financial mechanisms in place before a disaster strikes can enable a more speedy and independent recovery. Innovations in financial aspects of risk management have been most active around the potential for insurance and risk off-setting through hedge funds at the national and international levels, and through the potential offered by micro-insurance at the household and individual levels. Both are reviewed here.

The uptake of risk transfer understandably remains low in developing countries as insurance demand generally rises with per capita income (up to a certain level). In developed countries, insurance cover for loss from disasters may be restricted, as illustrated in the aftermath of the Kobe earthquake in Japan.
earthquake in 1995 (see Box 12.15). Recently, however, a number of novel schemes have been implemented or are under implementation. These include, at the macro level, private–public insurance partnerships administered together with national governments, international financial institutions and the private sector, and risk transfer for public liabilities.55 For example, the World Bank’s Commodity Risk Management Group is establishing a Global Index Insurance Facility to assist in providing reinsurance.56 The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the Organization of American States (OAS) have also been providing support for insurance and hedging products.

The Mexico City earthquake of 1985 revealed a financing gap, with few residential properties having insurance cover. Today, the World Bank and Mexico take a three-step approach to financial risk management: identification of risks, mitigation investment, and the transfer of residual risk to insurance companies and capital markets.57 This has led to a strengthening of the insurance sector and its regulatory regime; the establishing of a broad-based pooled catastrophe fund with efficient risk transfer tools; the promotion of public insurance policies linked to programmes for loss reduction in the uninsured sectors; and the strengthening of procedures for risk assessment and enforcement of structural measures, such as zoning and building code compliance.58

Micro-insurance can assist poorer urban residents to meet their immediate needs during and after a disaster through emergency loans or the release of savings. It can also support clients in reconstruction through helping businesses where productive assets or stock have been lost, or for repairs to be done on homes. Research by the World Bank shows clearly the range of options available for relief and reconstruction.59 For both of these stages, planning ahead is critical. Policies, procedures, practices and systems need to be in place and understood by clients and managers before a disaster. It is quite difficult to design and roll out new products immediately after a natural disaster event.

Post-disaster loans are riskier than those provided in stable times. Refinanced loans will need to be structured so that the business being financed can generate enough cash to service both loans, while still allowing the borrower to care for her or his family. This will require greater focus by the loan officer on clients’ cash flow, collateral and personal character. In some circumstances, it may be necessary to decline a loan application where a second loan may overindebt the borrower. Applications from those who have not previously held a loan should be viewed with caution as capacity and experience to repay immediately following a crisis may be limited. When successful, post-disaster microfinance can kick-start development. The Asociación de Consultores para el Desarrollo de la Pequeña, Mediana y Micro Empresa (ACODEP), a microfinance organization based in Nicaragua, focused on micro-enterprise loans pre-disaster, but following Hurricane Mitch, established a new housing loan product in response called Mi Vivenda (‘My House’). In total, 2700 households took advantage of this product. The housing loan is now offered as a regular loan product and has reached a high level of demand.60

Box 12.15 Insurance policies and disaster loss in Kobe, Japan

In 1995, the Kobe earthquake in Japan caused over US$100 billion in damages and resulted in the destruction of 150,000 buildings. Insured losses, however, were limited to around US$6 billion. The absence of a comprehensive insurance cover in this wealthy country is a consequence of the restrictive provisions of the national insurance sector and several key features of Japanese insurance policies:

- Basic homeowners’ fire insurance policies do not cover fires resulting from earthquakes.
- Owners may purchase a limited earthquake rider, with the indemnity covering 30 to 50 per cent of the structure’s replacement value, up to a maximum of US$100,000.
- Claims were categorized into three groups: total loss, half loss and less than half. If damage was categorized as half loss, payout would be 15 to 20 per cent of the replacement value.
- Contents were not covered unless they were totally destroyed.

In addition to the specificities of these insurance policies, only 7 per cent of homeowners nationally have such earthquake riders, and at the time of the earthquake in Kobe, coverage was less than 3 per cent of homeowners.

During reconstruction, lack of insurance may well have contributed to the economic pressures that led some homeowners, especially the poor and elderly, to join many renters in moving from high-value city centre property. The elderly and lower-income families comprised a large portion of residents in city centre neighbourhoods that were heavily affected by the earthquake. For many, it was easier to sell their properties to speculators and move elsewhere than to borrow towards rebuilding. Renters, likewise, found it easier to move elsewhere than wait for housing to be reconstructed in their former neighbourhoods. The result was a movement of property from vulnerable groups into the speculation sector, with potential impacts on land use and values that could, in turn, reduce land and housing access and equity in the city.

Source: Orr, 2007

Revisiting governance for relief and reconstruction

During the last 25 years, coordination has become a prominent feature of multilateral assistance during and after emergencies. Today, coordination takes up considerable time and effort for all humanitarian actors. Contemporary relief and reconstruction operations are large in scope and include numerous agencies responding to a broad range of needs. Perhaps the first such large-scale event was the humanitarian response to Hurricane Mitch in 1998, which directly affected more than 3 million people as it swept across Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala and Belize.61

While the United Nations system and large international NGOs have developed coordination architecture (as exemplified by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, or OCHA) and codes of practice (such as the Sphere Standards62), the multitude of small and sometimes temporary civil society actors who have come to prominence during recent disasters, such as the Indian Ocean Tsunami, largely lie outside of these arrangements and lines of accountability. The contemporary presence of such a large number of partners, each one with its own identity, culture, mandate, capacity, funding sources and operating style, is possibly the one main factor making coordination an absolutely essential feature of today’s humanitarian operations. But for coordination to be successful, an underlying tension between two directions of

Micro-insurance can assist poorer urban residents to meet their immediate needs during and after a disaster.
accountability for intermediary humanitarian actors needs to be resolved. First, and most important, is downward accountability to the survivors of disaster. Second is accountability to donors or the government agencies, private companies or individuals who provide funds for specific work to be undertaken. Tensions set up by these necessary lines of accountability contribute towards gaps, overlaps and competition between agencies on the ground. This leads to losses in the efficiency and equity of programmes and can undermine local governance structures.

Perhaps most fundamental is that humanitarian actors should review the extent to which their interventions contribute to local development agendas and build resilience by adding to local skill, knowledge and resource bases. In a review of the tsunami reconstruction, it was found that generous levels of funding created obstacles for field-level learning as a consequence of requirements for upward accountability. Upward accountability is resource intensive and expensive. It relies upon skilled professionals to report back on local actions.63

If reconstruction and development are to be genuinely linked, then those involved in reconstruction need to think hard about who sets the agenda, and about how best their actions can contribute to local and national visions and plans for development. But concerted effort will be required. The Stockholm Conference in 1999 set out a framework for the US$9 billion in international reconstruction aid for Central America following Hurricane Mitch, but this has arguably led to little improvement in socio-economic status or environmental security in the region.64 More recently, in Sri Lanka, a Road Map for Disaster Management, co-sponsored by the Government of Sri Lanka Ministry for Disaster Management and the UNDP, was issued in 2005. This provides a framework for integrating disaster risk reduction within development planning.65 The central involvement of national government in the planning stage of the road map is a good example of growing partnerships between national and international actors in reconstruction governance.

### THE ROLE OF PARTICIPATORY AND INCLUSIVE STRATEGIES AND POLICIES

Building resilience into urban development is a challenge that requires the application of participatory and inclusive strategies. The task of participatory and inclusive strategies is to identify what every actor and asset in the city can contribute to shape and implement sound disaster risk management. The fact that everyone, even children, has a role to play is demonstrated well in Armenia, where disaster risk education is promoted in schools and through the mass media. This initiative is led by a women’s development group that emphasizes disaster mitigation and focuses on mothers.
Inclusive planning

Inclusive planning opens space for wide participation and engagement with the planning process. The aspect of inclusive planning that is, perhaps, most developed, and where most experience lies is the incorporation of local actors within disaster preparedness, relief and reconstruction projects. Many techniques exist for bringing multiple stakeholders together to generate more open and transparent planning processes.68 The Earthquake Safe Shimla Initiative coordinated by the Indian NGO Sustainable Environment and Ecological Development Society is typical in concluding that bringing communities and local government together in partnership delivers better results than a recipient–provider model.69 The huge potential for inclusive reconstruction planning is exemplified in Box 12.16 through an account of the Maharashtra Emergency Earthquake Rehabilitation Programme in India.

As mentioned earlier in Box 12.1, UN-Habitat is using inclusive strategies for slum upgrading in Maputo (Mozambique) and is integrating flood risk reduction in the process.70 Through the inclusion of multiple actors, including community groups, as well as through participatory land-use planning and reform of planning regulations, flood risk is now seen and responded to as a problem of development and not one for humanitarian relief.71

Local conflict over land rights following a disaster can also be mediated through the use of inclusive approaches. As part of disaster preparedness programmes, customary landownership and use rights can usefully be catalogued. These will require regular updating, but are invaluable post-disaster. Where no records are available, rapid participatory reviews of land use and landownership are less open to disruption and corruption than exercises conducted without open participation or, at a later date, during reconstruction. In addition to physical outputs that reduce risk, institutional benefits of participatory approaches have included the establishment of a transparent decision-making process that helps to resolve local conflict over land rights.

Inclusive planning also presents opportunities to identify resources used in everyday urban life that can contribute to disaster preparedness, response or reconstruction. Existing, local civil society, business or government networks can be piggybacked for raising awareness of disaster risk and planning for disaster or for disseminating disaster warnings. Box 12.17 describes actions taken in the state of Texas (US), which is exposed to hurricanes. Here, school buildings and buses are used for evacuation and shelter during hurricanes. This is common practice in many US states and other countries and points the way for other imaginative uses of everyday resources to build resilience through their overlapping uses.

Inclusive planning is often criticized for requiring more time and resources than more directed planning. However, the experience of UN-Habitat in Mozambique illustrates that inclusive planning can increase time and cost effectiveness. This is achieved through transparent decision-making that reduces conflict and the facilitation of access to local knowledge, avoiding reliance on contracted technical field surveys.72

Among other challenges facing inclusive planning is the charge that most initiatives are inherently local and can only contribute in a limited way to larger structural concerns that shape poverty, vulnerability and risk. Initiatives focus on resolving the symptoms of a problem (e.g. poor housing, lack of local institutions and inadequate services) without addressing the root causes of risk (e.g. macro-economic restructuring and lack of political will). However, deliberative techniques can enable participation to feed into policy decision-making.

Box 12.17 Education centres as evacuation resources for the US Gulf Coast

School buses have long been used to support evacuation during hurricanes. Following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, where evacuation planning has been criticized, strategies for the Gulf Coast have been re-evaluated, with greater emphasis put on pre-disaster planning to improve the effectiveness with which school resources can be used in evacuations.

It is estimated that in a hurricane evacuation of the Texas Gulf Coast area, aside from those requiring support because of medical or special needs assistance, there might be as many as 190,000 citizens requiring public evacuation because they have no access to private transportation or have insufficient funds for fuel, lodging, etc.

In March 2006, the Governor’s Division of Emergency Management in Texas issued an executive order including a directive that requires public education institutes to assist in transportation and shelter operations. School districts have been asked to draw up a plan to provide school buses, drivers and shelter facilities in the event of a hurricane threatening the Texas Gulf Coast. This directive applies to inland, as well as coastal, schools. School district plans are coordinated with the regional unified command structure of the local council of government. Plans need to identify the right people to be on call in an emergency and must provide this information to local emergency responders. Depending upon the severity of the hurricane threat and the population of the area, the need for school buses and drivers from outside the area affected by a hurricane could range from several hundred to more than a thousand.

Hurricane season is mostly during the summer when students do not attend school. This makes it easier to use schools as shelters, but more difficult to contact and raise drivers and other support staff. Staff directories and an agreement by staff that they are willing to work during emergencies can help to overcome this challenge. Plans also need to consider how a school closure will be managed should the school become a shelter during teaching time.

Source: Governor’s Division of Emergency Management, Texas, www.txdps.state.tx.us/dem/pages/index.htm

Inclusive planning opens space for … the incorporation of local actors within disaster preparedness, relief and reconstruction projects

Local conflict over land rights following a disaster can … be mediated through the use of inclusive approaches
Informal education … offers a key opportunity for empowering those at risk…

Deliberative processes can be used either for instrumental ends or for genuine citizen empowerment. They can open political space for debate about wider questions of ethics, values and their links with issues of justice, morality and rights in development or risk management decision-making. Techniques used include citizens’ juries, citizens’ panels, committees, consensus conferences, scenario workshops, deliberative polling, focus groups, multi-criteria mapping, public meetings, rapid and participatory urban appraisal, and visioning exercises.

Recent examples of deliberative planning feeding into decision-making for risk governance have included the setting of air quality standards and regulation in Santiago (Chile); citizen involvement in the location of a hazardous waste facility in Alberta (Canada); urban environmental assessment in Greenpoint, New York (US); and, a citizens’ panel to feed into a decision on where to locate a waste disposal site in Canton Aargau (Switzerland). All of these activities provide scope for local communities to be involved in planning decisions that shape their exposure to human-made hazard and potential disaster.

Deliberative techniques can take time and this is a potential source of exclusion for those who are poor or have little time to spare. Care needs to be taken to ensure that women burdened with domestic, child caring and other tasks can still engage in the process. Guidelines for deliberative and inclusive processes have been proposed by the UK-based Institute of Public Policy Research. Despite the wide application of deliberative methods, there has been little systematic analysis of the interaction of these methods with the wider policy process that they claim to influence.

Box 12.18 World Disaster Reduction Campaign: Disaster Risk Reduction Begins at School

Faced with the huge challenge of responding to urban disaster risk, it is difficult to know where to start. One leading priority should be to make public infrastructure safe for those who use it today and as a legacy for the future. Protecting schools adds security and can build human resources when undertaken as part of an integrated programme of education and skill development in addition to structural safety.

The need for risk reduction initiatives for schools is clear. In 2006, 160 schools were destroyed during an earthquake in Iran, and a mudslide on Leyte Island in the Philippines covered a single school but killed more than 200 children. In 2005, the South Asian earthquake led to over 16,000 children being killed when schools collapsed.

The 2006–2007 World Disaster Reduction Campaign: Disaster Risk Reduction Begins at School is led by the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) in partnership with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), ActionAid International and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). It seeks to promote disaster reduction education in school curricula, and to improve school safety by encouraging the application of construction standards that can withstand any kind of natural hazard.

The campaign was launched in June 2006 and during this year brought attention to school safety through press briefings and workshops with journalists, academics and policymakers. Activities have taken place in Kathmandu (Nepal), Nairobi (Kenya), Panama City (Panama), Bali (Indonesia), Geneva (Switzerland), Paris (France) and Wuppertal (Germany).

Education for awareness-raising and self-reliance

Education provides a key resource to make risk reduction strategies more inclusive. A little over half of the countries reporting to the United Nations World Conference on Disaster Reduction in 2005 stated that their education systems included some form of disaster-related teaching. In Mexico, Romania and New Zealand mandate, by law, the teaching of disaster-related subjects in their schools.

A very recent review of the potential of education systems to raise awareness and skills for disaster risk reduction reports that many school curricula already focus on hazards through earth science, and also practise preparedness and drills; but few schools integrate the two and few develop their own local curriculum to reflect local risk contexts. Greater still is the unmet potential for schools to connect learning with practice in the local community.

School curricula vary greatly. Some provide excellent training in earth and climate science, but do not focus on locally experienced hazards. In other cases, they focus exclusively on one recent disaster. On the tsunami-affected coast of Thailand, new curricula focus exclusively on tsunami, despite more common hazards being coastal storms, floods and forest fire.

In Cuba, disaster preparedness, prevention and response are a part of all school curricula. This is supported by the Cuban Red Cross, which provides teaching material, and is reinforced by training courses and disaster drills for parents in the workplace, as well as by radio and television broadcasts. The impacts of such holistic education can be seen, in part, in Cuba’s exceptional record in protecting human life in recent hurricanes. In Ecuador, Civil Defence is involved in training on appropriate actions to be taken by teachers and students in case of emergency for both earthquakes and volcanic eruption. These programmes were put to the test during recent active periods of Pichincha and Reventador volcanoes.

In New Delhi (India), 500 schools have developed disaster plans as a result of the work of school committees composed of the zone education officer, the principal, teachers, parents, the head boy and the head girl. Mock drills are held in the selected schools. The children also learn life-saving skills.

Informal education also offers a key opportunity for empowering those at risk, not only children, but adults too. Informal education can be promoted alongside formal services, where these exist, to target vulnerable groups who may be excluded from formal education through poverty or social inequality. Two successful pathways are to develop community and popular media programmes. Community delivery works well where programmes are built onto existing community organizations and networks. The advantage of this approach is that people can learn from experience and the example of others. Using the popular media can reach more people and be cost effective in these terms, but has less lasting impressions compared to community-delivered programmes of education. Opportunities for combining popular media with local activities offer perhaps the greatest scope for informal education to reduce risk.

In conclusion, education can:

- Provide a sense of continuity and normalcy after disaster. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and a number of NGOs, such as Save the Children, are already active in this field.
- Challenge preconceptions about who is most at risk and who can reduce risk in the community. In particular, education can challenge gender and age stereotypes.
- Reach out to the 325 million children worldwide who live on the street or work full time and have no contact with formal education.

Some progress in meeting these challenges and a potential mechanism for sharing lessons learned will come from the ISDR 2006–2007 World Disaster Reduction Campaign: Disaster Risk Reduction Begins at School (see Box 12.18). Driven by an understanding that every school that collapses killing children or destroying resources was once a development project, this campaign aims to inform and mobilize governments, communities and individuals to ensure that disaster risk reduction is fully integrated within school curricula in high-risk countries and that school buildings are built or retrofitted to withstand natural hazards.

Including the private sector

The private sector is a major actor in shaping the opportunities and risks of urban life. Public–private partnerships and foreign direct investment have increased the stake and responsibility of international capital in urban infrastructure provision and economic development. Despite this growing influence, there is little evidence of a proactive engagement with disaster risk reduction among the private sector that goes beyond charity donations for recovery. Even this is by no means to be taken for granted. The generosity of many businesses following the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004 has been followed by doubt among business donors over the transparency of relief and reconstruction mechanisms managed by non-governmental and governmental actors alike, with potential for a backlash against donations for disaster response and recovery.

The business case for involvement in disaster risk reduction is largely built upon corporate social responsibility. The most active industrial sector is insurance, with a growing number of companies going beyond offering advice to providing financial incentives and training for safe construction and disaster response. There are also a small number of global engineering and urban planning companies that have provided services as part of a corporate social responsibility package during reconstruction. Arup, an engineering firm, for example, provided urban planning expertise to the Government of Turkey following the Marmara earthquake in 1999. Twenty experts worked for six months to develop a city master plan. The experience also enabled planners from Turkey and overseas to exchange ideas on reconstruction in an earthquake-prone region. The majority of recorded cases of corporate support come from the US, with some examples from the Philippines and the Caribbean.

There is clearly great scope for private-sector involvement in cities outside these areas.

From a business perspective, successful prevention activity can reduce risks to operations, suppliers, trading and customers, and reinforce good will towards a company. One of the most important ways in which business could contribute is by working to reduce vulnerability among at-risk populations within their sphere of influence. Responsible business practice can include putting in place measures to protect employees, their homes and families from the effects of disasters. Business relationships also provide a level for change. Giving preference to suppliers who themselves follow a corporate social responsibility code, and endeavouring not to leave suppliers in the event of temporary disruption following a disaster event, are examples of the kind of positive engagement with risk reduction that corporations could be encouraged to consider.

The corporate social responsibility case for disaster prevention is held back by a lack of empirical evidence. Analysis is needed of the impacts of disasters on business, of the contribution that business involvement can make to disaster prevention, and of the costs and benefits of that involvement to establish the most effective actions that businesses can take.

Strategies for encouraging corporate social responsibility for risk reduction might include partnerships between business and humanitarian actors. Where this relationship already exists, there is some evidence that business has recognized the strategic value of supporting risk reduction. Examples of partnerships include:

- TNT and Citigroup working in partnership with the World Food Programme;
- Nike and Microsoft in partnership with the UNHCR and the IFRC;
- UPS in partnership with CARE;
- FedEx in partnership with the American Red Cross;
- Ericsson in partnership with the United Nations and the IFRC; and
- DHL in partnership with the OCHA and the UNDP.

Small- and medium-sized businesses are also becoming involved, often through their local chamber of commerce or other local business associations.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Increasing numbers of urban dwellers have to live with the threat and experience of natural and human-made disasters. Often, but not always, disaster risk is greatest among the poorest. This chapter has examined core pathways through which resilience to disaster risk is, and can be, strengthened in cities. There is a good degree of overlap between these routes to security and also with pro-poor urban development and urban policies that aim to reduce the environmental damage of urbanization.

For all aspects of disaster risk reduction, inclusive and participatory strategies and policies can offer scope for build-
ing empowerment, self-reliance and accountability among those who make decisions, strengthening the resilience of communities and cities. Participation is not a panacea and it is as vulnerable to capture from vested interests as other approaches to development. There are many examples of partnerships, including local or national government and civil society; but the private sector also has much to offer. This potential has not yet been realized in urban risk reduction, with corporate social responsibility being limited to emergency relief.

NOTES

1 General Assembly Resolution A/RES/55/2 (adopted 18 September 2000).
2 United Nations, 2001b.
6 Projects and Designs Ltd.
7 See www.unmillenniumproject.org/reports/fullreport.htm.
8 See www.unhabitat.org/downloads/docs/2072_61331_ist-dec.pdf.
11 English.pdf.
13 Salvadoran Foundation of Integral Support.
14 Warner, 2006b.
15 Bull-Kamanga et al., 2003.
16 DFID, 2005.
17 UN-Habitat, 2003d.
18 Re-planning the city to reduce the amount of distances that people and goods travel also needs to consider the potential risks of placing industrial facilities close to other land uses (e.g. residential, educational and recreational risks).
19 The German government’s international development agency.
20 Forrester et al., undated.
21 Quan et al., 1998.
22 Debeerst, 1998.
24 Sensitivity analysis randomly varies input variables to study the sensitivity of outputs to these changes. Where frequency data on return periods and severity exist, more sophisticated probabilistic analysis can be undertaken. See, for example, the US Federal Emergency Management Agency Mitigation Benefits–Cost Analysis Toolkit, available from www.fema.gov/government/ grants/bca.htm.
26 Gavardia and Civrellari, 2006.
27 The AUDMP aims to reduce the disaster vulnerability of urban populations, infrastructure, critical facilities and shelter in targeted cities throughout Asia. It has demonstration projects in nine countries, coordinated from its headquarters in Bangkok. See www.adpc.net/AUDMP/audmp.html.
28 The African Urban Risk Analysis Network is a network of African-based universities and NGOs conducting research and undertaking local activities that attempt to reduce urban risk in African cities. The network was initiated in 2003, with founding institutes from Algeria, Ghana, Kenya, Senegal, South Africa and Tanzania. See www.auranfrica.org.
33 ISDR, 2005a.
34 Duxt, 2006.
35 ISDR, 2005b.
36 See www.nicce.org/iaee_English.php.
37 IAEE, 1986.
38 See www.unisdr.org/about.htm.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Approximately US$34 billion, US$459 billion and US$917 billion, respectively.
44 Schipper and Pelling, 2006.
46 See www.iecii.org/index.php?id=800.
47 Bohannon, 2005.
48 McQuaid and Marshall, 2005.
49 IFRC, 2005a, 2005b.
50 To listen to the Radionovela episodes over the internet, access www.eird.org/esp/radionovela/radionovelas-temas-lista.htm.
51 Bijan Dastani, head of Relief and Rescue Organization, Red Crescent Society of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Tehran, in GIGnos Institute, undated.
52 DFID, 2005.
54 Christoplos, 2006.
56 ProVention Consortium Brief, undated.
57 Kreimer et al., 1999.