

PART II

**URBAN CRIME
AND VIOLENCE**

Part II of the Global Report on Human Settlements analyses the global conditions and trends of urban crime and violence, and examines policy responses designed to reduce the incidence and impacts of crime and violence. In particular, Chapter 3 assesses global trends in the incidence of urban crime and violence by type, the factors that determine levels of vulnerability to crime and violence, and the impacts of urban crime and violence. Chapter 4 identifies the range of policy responses at the local, national and international levels designed to tackle urban crime and violence.

Crime and violence are fundamental threats to human security and safety from crime, and violence – including the resulting fear and insecurity – is increasingly being acknowledged internationally as a public good, as well as a basic human right. Although found in virtually all cities across the world, most places are safe and most citizens are neither perpetrators nor victims of crime and violence. Rather, crime tends to be concentrated in certain parts of the city and in neighbourhoods that are known to the police and citizens. Fear of crime, whether linked to these specific ‘hotspots’ or more general in nature is often exacerbated by the media and may spread quickly as information is communicated by cell phones, email and through the internet.

As shown in this part of the report, global crime incidence has steadily increased over the 1980–2000 period, rising about 30 per cent, from 2300 to over 3000 crimes per 100,000 inhabitants. However, crime incident rates have fallen significantly in some regions, such as North America. This is in contrast to Latin America and the Caribbean, where crime incidence rose during this period, reflecting, in part, political transitions from autocracy to democracy and localized civil conflicts. Globally, there is little indication that crime rates will decrease in the near future.

Homicide, a significant type of violent crime, is discussed in detail in this part of the report. Homicide rates for cities are extremely variable, with Asian cities demonstrating generally low rates compared to cities in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, Eastern Europe and North America. Interpersonal violence is widespread, with women and children being the main victims. While the private setting of the home is often the venue for child abuse and interpersonal violence, many victims experience these crimes at public institutions such as schools, hospitals or in other public facilities.

Another type of crime examined is organized crime, which is often linked to corruption. It is estimated to account for US\$1 billion in illicit capital that is circulated

daily by criminal groups among the world’s financial institutions. Findings show comparatively high levels of perceived organized crime in Africa, Central Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean, while low levels are reported for Canada, Australia and Northern Europe. Drug, arms and human trafficking are among the principal activities of organized crime. Women and girls are especially vulnerable to human trafficking. It is estimated that between 700,000 and 1 million persons are trafficked around the world each year. Human traffickers often exploit children and young, uneducated and unemployed women from rural areas. The prevalence of as many as 100 million street children in cities around the world is also associated with drug and human trafficking, along with interpersonal violence, child abuse and poverty, among other factors. Youth gang membership is also estimated to be in the millions worldwide, with institutionalized youth gangs concentrated in cities that have high violence rates.

With respect to the factors underlying crime and violence, which are examined at length in this part of the report, informal social, cultural and religious values are generally more powerful motivators or constraints than formal legal rules or regulations. Poverty has long been recognized as an important factor associated with increased crime and violence. While crime may be seen as a survival alternative in the face of grinding poverty, there are poor communities where crime levels are low because behaviour is constrained by informal social and cultural values. Inequality may be a more important underlying factor in the perpetration of crime and violence than poverty *per se*.

An important issue explored in this part of the report is the relationship between city size, density and crime incidence. The rapid pace of urbanization in many developing countries, and the resulting increase in city size and density, is associated with increased crime and violence. Poor urban planning, design and management have increasingly been cited as playing a role in the shaping of urban environments that put citizens and property at risk. Thus, the physical fabric and layout of cities have a bearing on the routine movements of offenders and victims and on opportunities for crime. In response, a number of crime prevention strategies through environmental design have emerged, especially in developed countries.

The proportion and growth of youthful populations have long been connected with increased crime and violence rates. Unemployment is a fundamental risk factor related to

Box II. I Nairobi: A city under siege by murderous gangs

They shot my 19-year-old nephew Jaimeen last week. I don't know who 'they' were; but I do know they were young men barely out of their teens who felt no qualms about killing someone for a few shillings, a mobile phone or a car. 'They' are the face of Kenya today: ruthless, lacking in compassion or ethics, totally devoid of feeling, worshippers of only one god – money. The bullet entered my nephew's intestine, where it left 16 gaping holes, finally lodging itself in his thigh. Luckily he survived. But though the wounds have been stitched and he is healing, the trauma of the event has left him permanently scarred.

The same day that my nephew was shot, 'they' invaded parts of Nairobi's Kangemi slums, not far from where my nephew lives, and tore down *mabati* shacks so they could steal the few possessions of Nairobi's dispossessed. This was a less ambitious group of criminals; but sources tell me that the fear they instilled in the slum was so widespread that no one slept that night. Neither the near-fatal shooting of my nephew nor the slum robbery was reported in the press. Nor were the cases of the many women and girls who have been violated and tortured by robbers in front of their husbands, fathers and sons in the last few years. Their tragedies are being played out every single day in this city gone mad. And no one, except maybe the Nairobi Women's Hospital and some good cops, cares.

Every day, and today is no exception, someone somewhere in this city of dread will be killed, raped, robbed or carjacked. It wasn't always so. When I was growing up, most people in the city

didn't have *askaris* guarding the gates to their homes. The windows in houses lacked grills and the remote alarm was something we only saw in James Bond movies. Dogs in those days were pets, not man-eating beasts trained to maim intruders. Most children walked to school without ever wondering if they would be raped or molested on the way.

In my family home in Parklands, we often left the house door open, even at night. People drove with their car windows open and their car doors unlocked. If your car broke down in the middle of the road, someone would stop and give you a lift, and even take you home.

The security business was virtually non-existent. There was crime, but the benign kind: an odd jewellery snatching here, a pick-pocketing there. The men with guns had not yet arrived. Then it all changed, suddenly and without warning. A financial scandal of monstrous proportions was revealed. It emerged that the people we feted as heroes were, in fact, thieves, smugglers and con men. Kenyans lost faith in the system. Overnight, the money they carried in their pockets wasn't worth the paper it was printed on. Inflation soared, banks collapsed. Middle-class Kenyans moved to slums. Slum dwellers struggled to survive. Kenya joined the ranks of the most unequal societies in the world.

As neighbouring Somalia descended into anarchy, a culture of impunity set in. AK-47s were being sold openly in Nairobi's Eastlands for less than 500 Kenyan shillings (US\$7.58) each. Police officers looked the other way. Well-off Kenyans sent their

children abroad in the hope that they would never return. Skilled professionals left the country in droves, to the US and Europe. The brain drain became an epidemic.

Meanwhile, back home, security firms flourished. Night guards became mandatory in all housing estates. Construction companies began building homes with window grills, barricades and electrical fences. Gated communities became the norm rather than the exception. Nairobi's began to believe that it was normal to have 'safe havens' in their homes, three locks on their front doors and alarms next to their beds.

Fear, the biggest inhibitor to freedom of movement, ruled the streets and invaded our houses. We became hostages ... of the thugs who roamed freely on the streets with their guns. One foreign correspondent even compared Nairobi to Mogadishu, where lawlessness and violence were the order of the day.

Nairobians have now learned to live in fear. They envy people in other cities who can walk alone at night or who sleep without worrying about the safety of their children. They dream of escape – to Europe, America, Australia, even Asia, where living in a city does not mean always wondering if or when you will be killed or maimed. The ones who get away never come back. Those of us who stay out of misguided patriotism, lack of resources or just plain bad luck do the only thing we can in these circumstances – we come home from work before dark, lock ourselves in our homes and pray.

Source: Warah, 2007

crime and violence rates among both young males and females. Furthermore, the globalization of markets threatens employment opportunities for many young people, especially in transitional and developing nations. The deportation of criminals to their countries of origin, particularly from the US to Latin America and the Caribbean, accounts for increasing levels of youth crime and gang-related activities in the region.

The transition towards democratization often brings social and economic disruption that may be associated with increased crime and violence, at least in the short term. Findings suggest that some nations undergoing transition from autocratic governance to democracy have had significant increases in homicide rates. These include countries in Eastern Europe and in the Latin American and Caribbean region.

This part of the report also addresses the impacts of urban crime and violence, from the local to the global levels. Findings suggest that in 2000, more than 500,000 people across the globe were victims of homicide. Crime negatively affects economic and health systems at the national and

regional levels. It has been identified as an impediment to foreign investment and a cause of capital flight and brain drain. High homicide and violent crime rates are also associated with increased healthcare and policing costs. The collapse of the Brazilian public hospital system during the 1980s and 1990s has been attributed to large numbers of homicides and criminal injuries.

Local impacts of crime and violence include the flight of population and businesses from central city locations. There is also evidence that rising levels of crime tend to depress property values – an important economic variable bearing on investment decisions and the creation of wealth. The impact of robberies and burglaries in cities of developing countries manifests in the growing demand for private security and the proliferation of gated communities. In South Africa, for instance, the number of private security guards has increased by 150 per cent since 1997.¹ The increased privatization of security and public space is an indication of the loss of confidence in the ability of the relevant authorities to cope with the growing levels of crime and violence. When confidence in public authorities and

processes is low and cultures of fear are high, citizens may resort to vigilante or rough justice.

No current discussion of urban safety and security would be complete without mention of terrorism. Recent attacks in Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, Bali, New York, Madrid, London, Colombo and Mumbai, as well as the daily attacks in Baghdad, have all had specific and more general impacts on urban centres, including a significant shift in public perceptions of the safety and security of cities. However, this part of the report does not address the origins, motives or instruments of terrorism – rather, it focuses on the impacts of terrorism-related violence on cities, as well as on city-level responses designed to mitigate these impacts. Indeed, it is apparent that responses to terrorism in cities such as New York and London have influenced the debates about and responses to urban insecurity in other cities. A few cases of urban terrorist attacks and responses of the targeted cities are described in this report in order to illustrate the impacts of this extreme type of urban violence on cities, as well as the vulnerability, resilience and preparedness of these cities.

Some of the issues relating to the trends, factors and impacts of crime and violence discussed in this part of the report are illustrated by the case of Nairobi (Kenya), described in Box II.1.

Finally, several policy initiatives have emerged in response to the trends, factors and impacts of crime and violence sketched in the preceding paragraphs, as shown in this part of the report. Since a high proportion of crime takes place in specific locations, the most significant of the levels of response is the local level. But much crime can also be organized across much broader spatial scales, and so responses at levels that are broader than the local are important if crimes of this nature are to be addressed effectively. Evidence suggests that the most successful policy responses to prevent and reduce the incidence and impacts of crime and violence are those that take cognisance of the local context, rather than those based on the experience of other places.

The policy initiatives at the local level to address issues of urban crime and violence have been grouped into six broad categories:

- enhancing urban safety and security through effective urban planning, design and governance;
- community-based approaches to enhancing urban safety and security;
- strengthening formal criminal justice systems and policing;
- reducing risk factors;
- non-violent resolution of conflicts; and
- strengthening social capital.

Many of these policy responses have been attempted in combination with others, and it is becoming increasingly common to find that several of these are constituent elements of formal programmes. In addition, there are many examples of targeted single initiatives that seek to address particular types of crimes.

Enhancing urban safety and security through effective urban planning, design and governance starts from the proposition that there is a relationship between the characteristics of the built environment and the opportunity to commit crime. It therefore seeks to manipulate the built environment in ways that are intended to reduce or even to eliminate the opportunity to commit crimes. Key to this notion is the role of the planning system since it is through the planning system that most development is mediated. Available evidence from countries that have attempted this is that it can undoubtedly add value to the range of methods available to tackle crime.

Community-based initiatives cover a broad spectrum of approaches, including information-gathering, processes for determining policies and projects, implementation, and creating opportunities for communities to take initiatives themselves. The essence of these approaches is that initiatives to tackle crime and violence should be ‘done with’ local communities rather than ‘done to’ them. Central to this approach is the need to recognize that the people who are the intended beneficiaries of projects must contribute fully to shaping them, implementing them and, often, taking ownership of them.

In this context, a widespread response examined in this part of the report is the strengthening of social capital. This entails not only improving the ability of groups and communities to respond positively to problems of crime and violence, but is also about the creation of assets that assist in enhancing the resilience of communities. Available evidence suggests that stronger communities are better able to fight crime and violence than are weaker communities, and so initiatives which build the capacity of communities to respond and which provide community assets that reinforce this process are of huge value.

Strengthening formal criminal justice systems and policing have traditionally been the main tools for responding to crime and violence. However, problems have been experienced in this context in some parts of the world. These include corruption in such systems, inflexibility of response to changing criminal circumstances, limited resources and skills in relation to the needs of the job, and ineffective practices. The problem of corruption in criminal justice systems and in the police is a particularly corrosive one in terms of public confidence since the public at large relies on these agencies to do their traditional jobs of apprehending and sentencing criminals.

To date, policy responses focusing on reducing risk factors seem to have concentrated on tackling violence against women and trying to prevent young people from drifting into a life of crime. An important part of work to tackle problems of violence against women is the need to fully engage families, households and local communities since in some instances violence against women seems to be deeply entrenched in local cultures. Strategies to prevent young people from drifting into a life of crime typically employ a wide range of initiatives, including employment creation. The non-violent resolution of conflicts, which is more of a philosophical idea than a specific policy to address crime and violence, is yet another response. As a philosophy,

it has much more to offer in tackling problems of crime and violence than has yet been appreciated – not only in helping to address immediate problems, but also in teaching valuable life skills.

Finally, the role of institutions is highlighted. Institutional responses from all levels of the hierarchy of government, as well as partnerships that serve as a viable mechanism to encourage interested parties and stakeholders, are crucial for the success of the various approaches to reducing urban crime and violence.

NOTES

- I See www.humansecurity-cities.org, 2007, p27.

URBAN CRIME AND VIOLENCE: CONDITIONS AND TRENDS

This chapter documents global conditions and trends with respect to urban crime and violence. It forms the basis for the policy responses that are presented in Chapter 4 and recommendations as to ways forward that are advanced in Chapter 10. In examining crime and violence, the analytical framework presented in Chapter 2 is used by focusing on vulnerability, risk factors and impacts at the global, national, local urban, community, household and individual levels. It must be emphasized from the outset that the topic areas covered in this and the other chapters on crime and violence involve vast and rapidly evolving literatures. This is one measure of the importance of the subjects to individuals, states and the global community. This also means that comprehensive review of the field is not feasible in a few chapters, nor is this the intent. Rather, the aim is to provide an assessment of conditions and trends, as well as policies and strategies, which are fundamental to the creation of safer and more secure cities relative to the prevention, reduction and mitigation of crime and violence. The chapter is divided into five sections.

The first section describes the analytical framework and orientation of the chapter. It also identifies key concepts and terms, and makes observations about the quality and availability of crime data. The section on ‘The incidence and variability of crime and violence’ discusses the incidence of crime at the global, regional, national and local levels. The factors that trigger crime and violence are discussed in ‘Factors underlying crime and violence’. The impacts of crime and violence are then addressed in a fourth section. This is followed by the final section, which provides brief concluding remarks.

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS FOR THE CHAPTER

Crime and violence as predictable phenomena

Like natural disasters, crime and violence are predictable phenomena variably affecting cities of all sizes across the globe. Often seen as discrete events, crime and violence are the result of processes and choices that have long-term

underlying roots, including those related to global economic changes, national conditions and to the level and pace of urban development. Crime and violence are also associated with more immediate risk factors, such as the ready availability of drugs and guns.

‘Common’ or conventional crimes and violence are socio-pathologies that are traditionally and often automatically associated with cities. But it should be clear that *most* places in *most* cities are safe and that most types of common street crime tend to reoccur at certain locations – hotspots – that are venues known to citizens and to public officials. They are therefore reasonably predictable events; indeed, some research suggests that, relative to crime prevention, the question that could best be asked first is not *who* committed the crime but *where* it happened.¹

Cultures of fear and the media

While the issues are complex, it is clear that fear of crime, violence and terrorism are global concerns, made increasingly salient by all forms of media, including that provided by the internet and sensationalized press reports. For instance, the media in Latin America plays a key role in constructing images of fear, insecurity and violence due to the phenomenal and, at times, sensational coverage given to youth violence and youth gangs.² Similarly, the British Crime Survey found that readers of national ‘tabloids’ were twice as likely to be worried about violent crime, burglary and car crime as people who read ‘broadsheets’, although it is not clear whether such readers were more predisposed to worry about crime in the first place.³

The flood of information (and misinformation) reaches residents of megacities at an astonishing rate, especially as the internet, email and cell phones knit together more of the world. The rapid diffusion of information is now the lifeblood of industrialized and democratized market economies where both conflict and enterprise are generally constrained by law. But the media also affects that half of the world’s population that is described by some as falling within the unregulated ‘shadow economy’, in which violence rather than the state’s rule of law is the ultimate ‘arbiter’ of disputes. As discussed below, burgeoning criminal networks – called by some the ‘sinister underbelly of

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Formal and informal institutions play important roles in mediating or exacerbating the impacts of crime and violence

Crime is fundamentally defined as an antisocial act that violates a law and for which a punishment can be imposed by the state or in the state's name

globalization⁴ – have helped to nurture shadow economies in many nations and cities. It is ironic, but not unpredictable, that media portrayals of this sector have never stoked the same level of fear that it has about terrorism, which is far less pervasive and arguably less serious than either common or organized crime.

Since the media is the key vehicle of globalized fears, it also has an important role in the construction of the perceptions of local insecurities, in terms of issues that are highlighted and the way actors are depicted. Cultures of violence do permeate many media reports, and impact on the way violence against women or police brutality or youth gangs are understood in society. The importance of understanding and considering fear in analysing impacts and responses to crime and violence has to be acknowledged, as it points to the need to address not only crime and violence as phenomena, but also the sentiments of fear and insecurity in a broader sense.

International legal frameworks and trends

The discussion in this chapter is also guided by the view that safety from crime and violence, including the fear and insecurity that flow from these disturbing events, are public goods and basic human rights, not unlike the right to clean water, air and shelter. These principles have been embraced at the international level and are increasingly being acknowledged by national and local governments, as well as by local community organizations. In concert with this, crime *prevention* approaches have gained credibility and momentum, as demonstrated by the development and reaffirmation of the United Nations Economic and Social Council Resolution 1995/9 of 24 July 1995, the United Nations Guidelines for Crime Prevention,⁵ by the entry into force of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its three protocols,⁶ and by the promulgation of the United Nations Anti-Corruption Toolkit as part of the Global Programme Against Corruption,⁷ to name but a few of the relatively recent initiatives.

Formal and informal institutions

It is clear that formal and informal institutions play important roles in mediating or exacerbating the impacts of crime and violence inasmuch as victims and perpetrators are affected by rules, decisions and programmes that flow from public policy, as well as by 'socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels'.⁸ In many instances, informal institutions trump the policies made by formal institutions, as suggested in the examples from Brazil and Russia below.

Formal institutional rules are epitomized in a variety of interventions at all levels across the developed and developing world and will be discussed in more detail. They include some recurring themes based upon conditions and trends in crime and violence, and can encompass social and economic, situational and law enforcement interventions, or combinations of these. For instance, based on what is known

about the linkages of employment, youthful populations and the risks of crime, a major strategy of public and private crime prevention programmes – from Kenya and Papua New Guinea to the US – is targeting unemployed urban youths, especially males, by providing training and job opportunities.⁹ Such programmes are variably effective, given local implementation strategies; but their desirability is almost universally embraced.

Informal institutions are cultural norms that are not sanctioned by official programmes or public policy (although they may be influenced by them). For example, while extra-judicial killings are prohibited by Brazilian law, the police are sometimes encouraged by informal norms, pressures and incentives within the security system to execute suspected criminals who might otherwise escape prosecution. In the former Soviet Union, although not approved by the state, the '*blat*' system was widely used to obtain commodities not provided by the Soviet command economy. It was a 'prohibited but possible' means of receiving goods and favours that would otherwise not be available.¹⁰

There are instances where informal institutions play vital and positive roles, for example in providing mediation mechanisms that resolve conflicts within a community before resorting to the formal justice system, therefore providing diversion channels for minor offenders. There are examples of informal institutions that are supported and sanctioned by public policy, and do contribute to safety and security in neighbourhoods. For example, the *Sungusungu* of Tanzania are organized groups of people (neighbourhood watch) operating with the authority and protection of the government for law enforcement and protection of people and property. *Sungusungu* are legally recognized through the Peoples' Militia Laws (Miscellaneous Amendment) Act, 1989 (No. 9 of 1989). The powers granted to *Sungusungu* are similar to those vested in police officers of the rank of Police Constable¹¹. The *Sungusungu* groups are established by the communities and recruit unemployed youth who receive militia training and various forms of support from the communities and municipalities. The communities sometimes provide financial support, while the municipalities usually provide material support, such as uniforms.

There are also instances where distinctions between formal and informal institutions blur. This is evident in the violence in Darfur and Iraq. In these circumstances, it is not easy to distinguish between formal and informal institutions that are perpetrating violent acts against citizens. In other instances, where legitimate state force – in the way of the *realized* protection of law and regulation – is lacking or ineffective, criminal enterprises often fill the vacuum, as exemplified by the expansion of the Russian mafia following the fall of the Soviet Union and by burgeoning gangs in lawless areas of Latin America's megacities.

Key concepts and terms

A crime is fundamentally defined as an antisocial act that violates a law and for which a punishment can be imposed by the state or in the state's name; the resulting range of punishable acts is extraordinary and varies across jurisdic-

Table 3.1

Roadmap of categories, types and manifestations of violence in urban areas

Source: Moser, 2004, p5

| Category of violence | Types of violence by perpetrators and/or victims | Manifestations |
|----------------------|---|---|
| Political | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> State and non-state violence | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Guerrilla conflict Paramilitary conflict Political assassinations Armed conflict between political parties |
| Institutional | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Violence of state and other 'informal' institutions, including the private sector | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Extra judicial killings by the police Physical or psychological abuse by health and education workers State or community vigilante-directed social cleansing of gangs and street children Lynching of suspected criminals by community members |
| Economic | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Organized crime Business interests Delinquents Robbers | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Intimidation and violence as a means of resolving economic disputes Street theft robbery and crime Kidnapping Armed robbery Drug trafficking Car theft and other contraband activities Small arms dealing Assaults including killing and rape in the course of economic crimes Trafficking in prostitutes Conflict over scarce resources |
| Economic/social | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Gangs Street children Ethnic violence | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Territory- or identity-based turf violence Petty theft Communal riots |
| Social | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Intimate partner violence inside the home Sexual violence (including rape) in a public area Child abuse: boys and girls Intergenerational conflict between parent and child Gratuitous/routine daily violence | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Physical or psychological male-female abuse Physical and sexual abuse particularly evident in the case of stepfathers, but also uncles Physical and psychological abuse Incivility in areas such as traffic, road rage, bar fights and street confrontations Arguments that get out of control |

tions and cultures. Within this context, crime prevention approaches and classification schemes have focused on offenders, on punishment, on policing, on corrections, on victims, and on sociological, cultural and economic contexts of the criminal event. These emphases have produced an extensive literature¹² of prevention strategies relative to addressing offenders' moral, psychological, economic and social conditions, devising police tactics, assessing the efficacy of prisons and correctional systems, remedying urban slums and addressing physical and management issues relative to urban planning and design.

Violence has multiple definitions and is subject to numerous classification schemes. The World Health Organization (WHO) defines violence as 'The intentional use of physical force, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community that either results in or has a high likelihood of ... injury, death, psychological harm, mal-development or deprivation.' The WHO further categorizes violence relative to whether it is self-directed, interpersonal or collective.¹³ It is also possible to identify broad categories of violence, types of violence by perpetrators or victims, and manifestations.¹⁴ This typology is illustrated in Table 3.1.

The typology is quite inclusive and focuses attention beyond types of violence receiving media attention to more specific forms, including those specifically directed at women and children, as well as those originating from the state. In addition to the above, the notion of *structural violence* has been identified.¹⁵ This relates to non-physical acts or indirect forms of violence that have emerged from historical experiences and are woven into social, economic and political systems. In this context, violence is 'built into the structure of society ... and shows up as unequal power

and consequentially as unequal life chances'.¹⁶ Such implicit forms of violence include exploitation, exclusion, injustice inequality and discrimination.

The linkage of crime and violence

Crime and violence are related issues, although many crimes may not entail violence (such as theft and drug-related offences) and some acts of violence may not be crimes (such as those committed pursuant to law or those embedded in cultural norms). However, there are significant overlaps between crime and violence, such as in the cases of murders, armed robberies and assaults, including sexual assault. Violence is one feature that distinguishes types of crime within the broad categories of crimes described below. Certain types of violence may not be considered as crime in some jurisdictions or may be illegal but tolerated within the context of overriding religious or cultural frameworks. In these cases, violence is so embedded in norms that it is part of the accepted structure of life.

Although the International Crime Victimization Survey (ICVS) uses 11 types of conventional crime on which overall victimization rates are based,¹⁷ crimes may also be grouped into three broad descriptive categories that affect people throughout the world: personal or contact (violent) crimes; property offences; and crimes against public order and welfare.

Contact crimes

The first category of crimes includes violent acts against persons, which are considered to be the most serious offences. Sometimes called personal crimes,¹⁸ this group of

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Contact crimes jeopardize the physical and psychological well-being of victims, with potentially devastating results

offences generally includes homicides, assaults (including those suffered as a result of domestic violence), robbery (including armed robbery), rape and, in some jurisdictions, kidnapping. It may also include some relatively minor offences, such as pick-pocketing. Though usually less frequent than property crimes, personal crimes such as homicides and robberies imperil individuals and communities, with significant social and economic impacts to families, cities and states. They often have significant long-term impacts on the way in which urban areas are perceived and used by residents and outsiders, and how they are regenerated (or ignored) by public agencies. Contact crimes jeopardize the physical and psychological well-being of victims, with potentially devastating results. This chapter focuses on homicides and robberies as some of the most well documented of these crimes in more detail below.

Property crimes

Property offences constitute the second category of crime and are considered less serious than personal crimes. Nonetheless, they significantly affect individual victims and negatively influence the overall quality of urban life. Across all crime categories, larceny and thefts are generally the most frequent individual offences, with rates that usually far exceed either violent crimes or those of other types of property crime. The vast majority of all crimes are, indeed, minor in most places. There are, of course, exceptions to this, such as in Accra, Ghana, where assaults were the highest individual category of offences reported between 1980 and 1996.¹⁹ There are a considerable number of ‘lesser’ property crimes, including vandalism and ‘quality of life’ crimes, such as graffiti and damage to property.

The most serious property crimes generally include burglary, larceny and theft (the latter two are often, but not always, synonymous with each other depending upon jurisdiction), arson and other property-related offences that are specific to localities. Of all property crimes, burglary is probably the most invasive offence, often carrying with it long-term psychological impacts on victims, stigma for neighbourhoods and districts, and implications for planning and design. Burglary is considered in more detail below.

Crimes against public order

A third broad category includes moral infractions and crimes against public order and welfare and may include anti-social behaviour, as well as some types of sexual offences and infractions, such as corruption, trafficking of human beings, firearms and drugs. As an example of the wide range of offences in this category, Ghana includes currency offences, treason, sedition, mutiny, rioting, publication of false rumour, evasion of military service, prostitution and food safety violations, among others.²⁰ Other much less serious offences and disorder in this category of crime can include public intoxication and criminal damage. Fraud, cyber-crime (including identity theft), other so-called ‘white collar’ crimes and environmental offences may be variably included in the crimes against public order category or even fall

within the civil law domain as distinct from criminal offences, depending upon jurisdiction, seriousness or other factors related to the specific circumstance. Trafficking offences are often the province of organized and relatively sophisticated groups at global, national and urban levels. The growth of international criminal enterprises, such as trafficking, is associated with broader global trends, facilitated by weak or failing formal institutions and abetted by complicit or fragile civil societies.

Data issues

There are several important caveats to interpreting the data that follows. These include:

- Methods of recording and counting crime vary from country to country, and there are no accepted universal standards on producing and presenting crime statistics.
- Crime reporting is related to the prevalence of law enforcement and to peoples’ willingness to come forward, both of which vary by country – in virtually all jurisdictions many crimes are not reported to authorities.
- Crime victimization data obtained through surveys tends to be higher quality than police reports, even though they, too, rely on people’s memories and willingness to cooperate.
- Definitions of what constitutes a crime differ widely and may not be comparable by virtue of cultural, social and legal system differences.
- Crime data quality diverges widely and is related to resource availability – hence, poor nations are less likely than wealthy ones to have complete and accurate crime data.

Comparisons of crime data between and among regions, countries and cities should therefore be seen in light of these limitations. Moreover, it is important to note that trends can be best understood in terms of a long-term perspective as a means to understanding regional and national differences.

Although there are differences among countries, four general approaches are commonly used to count crime. These include: crimes that are reported or known to the police; information gathered on the arrest of persons; data based on convictions for crimes; and crime rates obtained from victim surveys audits. Offender interviews and hospital admission records are also employed to collect crime data, although their use is not as widespread as police reports, arrest and conviction rates and victim survey data. While each of these measures offers insights into crime conditions and trends, all crime data must be carefully balanced against the numerous data collection problems noted above.

Recognizing these issues, attention is paid to certain conventional crimes that research and victim surveys suggest as having significant impact on urban dwellers, with compounding effects on the larger communities of which they are a part. These include contact crimes such as homicides (an indicator of violent crime, generally) and

Of all property crimes, burglary is probably the most invasive offence, often carrying with it long-term psychological impacts on victims, stigma for neighbourhoods and... implications for planning

robbery, as well as property crime, indicated by burglary – a non-violent but nonetheless serious crime. Furthermore, this chapter considers a variety of public order offences, such as corruption, organized crime and trafficking offences, including drugs, arms and human trafficking.

THE INCIDENCE AND VARIABILITY OF CRIME AND VIOLENCE

Crimes and violence are unevenly distributed across the globe and within nations and cities. Nevertheless, they are pernicious, continuing threats to human security, generally, and especially for the poor, who are disproportionately victimized as individuals and whose communities are strongly affected. While crime and violence must be considered through the lens of unique local contexts and circumstances, trends in crime and violence can also be seen at much broader levels. This section reviews some of the global, regional, national and city data for serious contact, property and public order crimes.

Global and regional crime conditions and trends

Figure 3.1, based on United Nations surveys, shows that crime rates at both the global and regional levels have increased steadily over the period of 1980 to 2000, rising about 30 per cent from 2300 crimes per 100,000 to over 3000 per 100,000 individuals.²¹ But this is not the case for all regions. Some crime rates, such as those in North America, fell significantly over these two decades even though the general level of crime was higher there than for other regions, except for the European Union (EU) beginning in approximately 1999. Crime in Latin America and the Caribbean regions rose during this period, reflecting, in part, political transitions from autocracy to democracy and civil conflict. Data for the EU disguises the fact that states have experienced variable crime rates, with increases in some Eastern European nations and decreases in some Western European nations. African data has been excluded since only a relatively few African states provided crime survey data for the indicated period.

Comparatively high general crime levels in higher-income regions of North America and Europe are explained by the greater propensity of people to report crimes of all types to the police, whereas in middle- and lower-income nations, serious offences, such as violent contact offences, are more often reported than property crimes. Crime rates in middle-income nations are likely to increase as the spread of technology offers more opportunities for things to steal and as people have increased abilities to report crimes to the police.²²

Although the levels of crime are higher in North America, this is also where the most significant declines are evident. Despite many competing explanations for the decrease, one suggestion attributes this to countermeasures that have been enacted, especially in the US.²³ Nonetheless,




Figure 3.1

Total recorded crime trends per 100,000 individuals in selected regions of the world

Source: Shaw et al, 2003, p42

much of the decline in crimes in North America is due to the decrease in property crimes, which constitute the vast bulk of crimes and are more likely to be reported in industrialized countries vis-à-vis developing ones.

National crime conditions and trends

When various types of crimes for all income groups are aggregated cross-nationally, the sums are staggering. For example, there were almost 50 million property and violent crimes recorded by police in 34 industrialized and industrializing countries in 2001 alone.²⁴ These nations account for less than one fifth of the world's population according to 2006 estimates,²⁵ which makes the numbers even more compelling when it is considered that many crimes are not reported. Moreover, crime statistics routinely undercount poor victims and those from marginalized communities, where crime is likely to be more pervasive. Large nations such as the US, Russia and the UK consistently account for a major share of crime incidents, although their rates have varied considerably within each country over the past decade. Moreover, crime rates differ significantly between countries and are not always explained by sheer population size. For example, based on 2001 data, the US had about six times the crime rate of Cyprus (3658 crimes per 100,000 versus 595 crimes per 100,000 individuals), but 383 times

Crime statistics routinely undercount poor victims and those from marginalized communities, where crime is likely to be more pervasive




Figure 3.2

Police-recorded crimes and attempts for 52 countries: Changes in counts and rates (2001-2002)²⁶

Source: Adapted from UNODC, 2005a, Table 2.1




Figure 3.3

Rates of homicides: Selected regional trends (1986–2000)

Source: Shaw et al, 2003, p48

the population (300 million versus 784,000). Although it is important, there are many other factors at work besides population size that explain crime counts and rates. Not the least of these is how data is reported and recorded at local and national levels.

Using another sample, Figure 3.2 shows that 73 per cent of the mostly industrialized nations (38 out of 52) providing information on crimes reported to the police showed an increase in both crime counts and rates between 2001 and 2002, while 19 per cent experienced decreased counts and rates, and 8 per cent higher counts but reduced rates.²⁷ The overall increase in counts and rates is generally consistent with victim survey data for this time period. However, this data includes ‘crime attempts’ that make it difficult to compare with other official crime data sets. Given the very short interval, no trends can be clearly discerned.

Homicides at global and regional levels

Homicides are considered in terms of global, regional and national levels since in many cases the data overlaps. Homicides are violent contact crimes. The definition of homicide generally includes intentional and non-intentional homicide. Intentional homicide refers to death deliberately inflicted on a person by another person, including infanticide. Non-intentional homicide refers to death that is not

deliberately inflicted on a person by another person. This includes manslaughter, but excludes traffic accidents that result in the death of a person.²⁸ Homicide is widely considered the single most important indicator of violent crime, and there are often many other lesser crimes (such as robbery) that are associated with it. Moreover, it is the offence that is most likely to be reported. Consequently, homicides are likely to be recorded by the police.²⁹ Despite this, it should be clear that homicide is a rare crime, especially when compared with property crimes such as larceny and theft.

Homicide rates are associated with combinations of social, economic, cultural and political factors that are unique to localities, even though similar underlying risk factors tend to be found globally, such as poverty, unemployment, and cultural and social norms that may encourage violence as a way of settling disputes. These risk factors are discussed in more detail in the section ‘Factors underlying crime and violence’. Figure 3.3 provides a picture of homicide rates for selected global regions. It clearly shows that Latin America and the Caribbean region and sub-Saharan Africa have the highest rates of homicides, while the EU and the Arab States have the lowest rates. For the period of 1990 to 2000, WHO data shows that violent crime, including homicide, grew globally from about 6 incidents per 100,000 to 8.8 per 100,000 individuals.³⁰

Figure 3.4 includes homicide and war casualty rates for various regions. It shows double-digit homicide rates for Africa and the Americas, and significantly lower rates in Southeast Asia, Europe, the Eastern Mediterranean and especially the Western Pacific. Although there are many factors at work, some of the divergence between regions reporting high and low homicide rates is associated with broad socio-cultural constraints on violence and the development and perceived efficacy of criminal justice systems. High war casualty rates for Africa reflect large numbers of localized conflicts that have taken place there over the last decade. Research suggests that the deadly after effects of civil wars linger for about five years after combat itself stops, increasing the per capita rate of homicide by about 25 per cent irrespective of changes to income levels, equality or the nature of state institutions.³¹

Figure 3.5 reports the same homicide data regionally, but also shows suicide rates. Suicide is considered an intentional crime in many countries. With the exception of the Eastern Mediterranean region, suicide rates are almost the inverse of homicide rates in other regions. Among other things, this data suggests that poverty is less of a risk factor associated with suicide than cultural and social values and norms that discourage (or support) self-harm as a viable solution to problems. Interpreted this way, it reinforces the fundamental importance that informal institutions play in shaping behaviour.


Homicides trends in cities

Homicide rates for 37 selected cities drawn mainly from developed countries and based on police reports are presented in Figure 3.6. Also shown is the EU average for

Figure 3.4

Homicide rates and war casualties

Source: UNODC, 2005b, p54



the same period. EU city averages are significantly higher (2.28 per 100,000) compared to the matching *country* homicide rate average (1.59 per 100,000). High murder rates (near or above 5 per 100,000 individuals) are apparent for cities in countries undergoing civil strife, such as Belfast (Northern Ireland) and in cities that are in the midst of transitions between political and economic systems, such as Tallinn (Estonia), Vilnius (Lithuania) and Moscow (Russia). The highest reported murder rate is in Washington, DC, which equals or exceeds rates in developing nations. This city has a number of converging risk factors, including significant social and economic inequality, a high proportion of impoverished citizens and widespread availability of guns.

While crime rates vary significantly within regions and countries, over a recent five-year period, it has been estimated that 60 per cent of all urban dwellers in developing countries have been crime victims, with rates of 70 per cent in parts of Latin America and Africa.³² Crime and violence are typically more severe in urban areas and are compounded by their rapid growth, especially in developing and transitional nations. In Latin America, where 80 per cent of the population is urban, the rapidly expanding metropolitan areas of Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Mexico City, Lima and Caracas are responsible for over half of the homicides reported in their respective countries.³³ The homicide rate in Rio de Janeiro has tripled since the 1970s, while the rate in São Paulo has quadrupled. In the Caribbean, Kingston, Jamaica's capital, consistently accounts for the vast majority of the nation's murders.³⁴

At the global level, discerning violent crime trends is complicated by the significant variability across regions (as seen above), within nations and between areas within cities. For example, as is evident in Figure 3.6, violent crime rates for some American cities, such as Washington, DC, and San Francisco, are widely divergent and Washington's homicide rate is more comparable to that of Rio de Janeiro's, which was about 45 per 100,000 in 2001. Tokyo's and Rome's rates are about the same, although they are cultures and continents apart.³⁵

Within cities, homicide rates vary significantly. In São Paulo, crude homicide rates in 2001 ranged from 1.2 per 100,000 in the Jardim Paulista district to 115.8 per 100,000 individuals in the Guaianazes district.³⁶ The reasons for such variations are subject to much debate, with rationales variously attributed to differences in local drug markets, policing strategies and contextual community cultural and social values.

More recently, violent crimes, such as homicides and assaults, have been increasing in the US, particularly in medium-sized cities of between 500,000 and 1 million people.³⁷ Despite this recent upsurge in violent crime, overall crime rates in North American cities had been generally declining. Large and rapidly growing cities in Asia and the Middle East, which are constrained by a variety of formal and informal forces, consistently report significantly lower crime rates than urban places elsewhere. These variable trends, admittedly based on imperfect statistics, suggest that while crime and violence may be predictable phenomena in cities and regions, they are not necessarily their unalterable fates.





Figure 3.5
Homicide and suicide rates by World Health Organization region (2000)
Source: Krug et al, 2002, p 11

Fear of crime and violence

Cultures of fear of crime and violence are widespread, both in the developed and developing world. Public opinion surveys in the US and the UK repeatedly show that people rank crime among the top concerns that they have in everyday life. It should be noted that fear of crime is different from the perception of crime, which is the recognition and knowledge that crime occurs.

These concerns are also found in developing countries, as evidenced in Nairobi (Kenya), where survey

Figure 3.6
Recorded homicides in selected cities
Source: adapted from Barclay et al, 2003



Burglary is the most common property crime connected to local built environmental and design features

data reveals that more than half of the citizens worry about crime all the time or very often.³⁸ A national survey conducted in South Africa found that about 25 per cent of respondents indicated that concerns about crime prevented them from starting their own businesses and interfered with everyday transportation decisions.³⁹ Likewise, a World Bank study in Zambia uncovered significant fear of crime that manifested itself in the work decisions of teachers.⁴⁰ In Lagos (Nigeria), 70 per cent of respondents in a city-wide survey were fearful of being victims of crime, while 90 per cent were fearful of the prospect of being killed in a criminal attack.⁴¹

Figure 3.7, based on ICVS and United Nations data, depicts the responses of people from 35 developing and industrialized nations when asked how safe they felt walking home at night. It is obvious that although the fear of crime is pervasive, it is also extremely variable, with the highest levels of fear reported being in Brazil, where 70 per cent of respondents felt unsafe walking home at night, and the lowest in India, with 13 per cent. Latin American and African nations rank among the top ten. Regionally, the fear of crime and violence tends to correlate with police-recorded crime and victimization surveys of crime and violence.


Figure 3.7

Percentage of respondents stating that they 'feel unsafe walking home at night'

Source: Nuttall et al. 2002, p40

Robbery

Robbery may be defined as the taking of property through the use of violence or threat of violence.⁴² Primarily a contact crime, robbery is often classified as both a violent



crime and a property crime in many jurisdictions. Consequently, it is more likely to be reported to police than lesser crimes. Robbery is a major security threat and a special concern in developing countries. This is because it not only results in injury and property loss to victims, but also increases the general fear of crime.⁴³

Figure 3.8 suggests that global robbery trends have increased between 1980 and 2000 from about 40 incidents per 100,000 individuals to over 60. Data for Eastern Europe, Latin America and Africa (primarily from South Africa) is grouped into 'Selected countries with high robbery rates'.⁴⁴ North America witnessed a remarkable decline from 200 per 100,000 recorded cases in 1992 to about 120 in 2000. Victimization rates for robbery based on United Nations survey results are presented in Figure 3.9. It shows much higher rates for robbery in Latin America and Africa than in other regions of the world. Although of a shorter period, it corroborates the information presented in the police-reported data.

Figure 3.10, based on Crime Trends Survey data, shows that South America has the highest robbery rates, with 442 incidents per 100,000 individuals. This is followed by Southern Africa, with 349 cases. The regions with the lowest rates of robbery are South Asia and the Middle East, with 3 and 2 incidents per 100,000 inhabitants, respectively.

Although the findings are generally comparable, some differences between this data can be attributed to collection procedures and differences in the specificity of the various sub-regions. As noted earlier, victimization surveys tend to yield more reliable data, especially when compared to police reports that depend upon the willingness of victims to come forward.

Burglary

Although often targeted against vehicles, burglary is the most common property crime connected to local built environmental and design features. It may be generally defined as the unlawful entry into someone else's property with the intention to commit a crime. Like other crimes, the elements that constitute a burglary are different across the world. For example, in some localities, theft from a car would not be considered a burglary. In other places, the required elements of a burglary include forced entry or the taking of property, whereas other jurisdictions do not have these requirements. High burglary rates have implications for neighbourhoods, cities and nations. Commercial and residential properties are frequent targets for burglaries and data shows that, on average, one out of five urban residents worldwide report being victimized within a five-year period.⁴⁵

Regional trends in burglary, robbery and assaults between the period of 1996 to 2000, based on victim reports, are shown in Figure 3.11. The data includes 31 countries that participated in the ICVS sweeps in 1996 and 2000. Owing to differences in the number and distribution of countries analysed based on the 2000 ICVS survey, caution should be exercised in discerning the patterns, especially relative to developing nations.⁴⁶

The survey data generally shows declining rates of burglary for all regions, with the exception of Western Europe, with relatively dramatic drops in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Police-reported data for EU countries shows an average decrease of 10 per cent in domestic burglaries for the period of 1997 to 2001, and no change in burglaries for the period of 2001 to 2002.⁴⁷ Despite the reported decreases, African nations, and especially African urban areas, still have the highest reported overall levels of burglary, with victimization rates of over 8 per cent of the population in sub-Saharan Africa (see Figure 3.12).

Although a non-violent crime, burglary is a very serious offence in developing regions such as Africa, given the fact that people generally have fewer goods in the first place. More Africans believe that they will be victimized by burglary than people in any other region. Nonetheless, the reporting rate for burglary in Africa is 55 per cent, with only Asia reporting a lower rate of 40 per cent. Other reporting rates are 84 per cent for Oceania, 72 per cent in Europe and 59 per cent in the Americas.⁴⁸ Reporting rates for burglary, like many other crimes, tend to be related, in part, to the perceived competence and integrity of the police and public authorities by citizens.

Intimate partner violence and child abuse

Intimate partner violence (IPV) has global, national and local significance as a type of contact crime that may culminate in homicide, assaults and property damage or public order offences. It is aggressive, violent, coercive and threatening behaviour from a spouse, dating partner or ex-partner that often entails psychological abuse. Also known as *domestic abuse*, IPV negatively affects many intimate relationships and families worldwide. Due to the sensitive and personal nature of exposure to domestic violence, many victims do not report the crime to authorities.⁴⁹ Surveys in the UK show there were almost 500,000 official reports of domestic violence in 2000. Furthermore, 4 per cent of women and 2 per cent of men were victims of non-sexual domestic violence during 2001.⁵⁰ A national study within the US estimates that 29 per cent of women and 22 per cent of men are victimized by IPV (including physical, sexual and psychological abuse) during their lifetime.⁵¹

Globally, women are significantly more likely than men to be victims of IPV. A recent international study by the WHO interviewed over 24,000 women from ten different countries about their experiences with intimate partner violence. The majority of women (between 51 and 71 per cent) from Peru, Ethiopia, Tanzania and Bangladesh reported experiencing physical or sexual violence from an intimate partner. Women in other countries reported less physical or sexual violence from a partner, such as Brazil (29 per cent), Namibia (36 per cent) and Japan (15 per cent). Sexual victimization was less common than physical abuse by an intimate partner for most women. However, between 30 and 56 per cent of victimized women experienced *both* physical and sexual assaults from a partner.⁵² Box 3.1 illustrates the plight of women in South Africa, including some of the underlying risk factors associated with IPV.




Figure 3.8

Trends in reported robbery per 100,000 individuals (selected regions)

Source: Shaw et al, 2003, p.50




Figure 3.9

Victimization rates for robbery (one-year period)

Source: adapted from del Frate, 2003, p.132


Note: Data indicates percentage of population robbed during a one-year period. Data recorded in years between 1989 and 2000.

Factors predictive of women's increased likelihood of being victimized by an intimate partner include age (younger women are at a higher risk); lower socio-economic status; less education; childlessness; less social support; and exposure to abuse in the family of origin. Factors predictive

Figure 3.10

Police-recorded robbery

Source: UNODC, 2005b, p.60






Figure 3.11

Trends in victimization, selected crimes (1996–2000)

Source: del Frate, 2003, p135


of a woman's male partner to become abusive include use of drugs/alcohol; unemployment status; economic pressures; and witnessing parental violence during childhood.⁵³ In some settings, local cultures, community attitudes and social norms significantly influence the likelihood of violence taking place between intimate partners. For instance, in Zambia, the 2002 Demographic and Health Survey shows that 79 per cent of married women believe that domestic violence is justified when a woman goes out without the permission of her husband.⁵⁴ Similarly, in India, married women with low dowries expect to be victims of domestic violence, not only at the hands of their husbands, but also at the hands of their in-laws.⁵⁵

Violent households are often venues for child abuse. Child abuse includes physical abuse, sexual abuse, psychological/verbal abuse, commercial or other exploitation of children, as well as neglect and negligent treatment of children. As with many crimes, there is no 'universal' definition of child abuse. For example, some definitions include witnessing parental violence as child maltreatment, whereas others do not. Vast numbers of children are exposed to violence each year. The United Nations estimates that

Figure 3.12

Survey respondents who have suffered burglary during the previous year

Source: UNODC, 2005b, p63



between 133 million and 275 million children experience violence at home annually, with the largest proportion in South, Western and Eastern Asia, as well as in sub-Saharan Africa.⁵⁶ Boys and girls are often equally subjected to child abuse by family members and are equally victimized by child labour exploitation. However, globally, girls make up 98 per cent of children who are sexually exploited.⁵⁷

Most children experience abuse at the hands of their primary caregivers – parents and step-parents – with abuse largely taking place within the home. Consequently, some children either run away from home or are removed by authorities and placed in foster care or orphanages. In 2003, 12 per cent of children in sub-Saharan Africa, 7 per cent in Asia and 6 per cent in Latin America and the Caribbean were living in orphanages.⁵⁸ A major factor contributing to the high rates of children in orphanages is the death of parents largely attributable to the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Many orphaned children are at great risk of abuse and exploitation.⁵⁹ Early marriage is also used by victimized children as a means of escaping abuse. It is important to note that there are other reasons why youths may marry early, including cultural tradition, religious reasons or to obtain financial security.

Children are increasingly being victimized outside their homes – in schools and hospitals and by individuals other than primary caregivers, such as teachers, police or clergy in the workplace and in community settings at large.⁶⁰ The *World Report on Violence and Health* reports that 57,000 children were murdered internationally in 2000. Aside from the fundamental violations of human rights that these cases present, child abuse often has been cited as a major risk factor linked to future criminal behaviour, and recent research firmly supports that contention.⁶¹

Street children

Interpersonal violence, child abuse, family disintegration and poverty contribute to the growing numbers of street children and families across the world. Recent global estimates indicate there are likely to be tens of millions of street children, and some estimates place the number as high as 100 million.⁶² Other more localized studies point to 250,000 street children in Kenya, 150,000 in Ethiopia, 12,000 in Zimbabwe, 445,226 in Bangladesh, 30,000 in Nepal and 11 million in India.⁶³ The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) estimates there are more than 6000 street children in the Central African Republic.⁶⁴ It is estimated that there are hundreds of thousands of street children in Latin America, with a significant proportion in Brazil.⁶⁵ Future approximations project increasing numbers of street children, growing especially with the pace of urbanization.⁶⁶ The growth in the numbers of street children is illustrated by the situation in Kenya, where the numbers of street families and children have developed almost exponentially, as discussed in Box 3.2. In the absence of any form of formal assistance, many street children turn to crime as a survival strategy and eventually become easy targets for membership of youth gangs.

Corruption

Although it comes in many forms, corruption is generally classified as a crime against public order. There is no universally accepted definition of corruption; but it has been summarized as the abuse of public power for personal gain.⁶⁷ It constitutes a growing threat to human security and plays a significant role in urban development, planning, management, and programme design and policy. Corruption may be found at the 'grand scale', penetrating the highest policy-making organs of government, or it may be seen at 'petty' or street-scale levels, which involve day-to-day public and social transactions. It often involves soliciting, giving or taking bribes and is sometimes categorized by levels of 'infiltration' within the public sector. While grand corruption has the broadest impacts on societies, corruption in any form helps to destroy public confidence in the fairness of government, the rule of law and economic stability.⁶⁸ There are several measures of corruption. Among the most widely used are the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and the Global Corruption Barometer (GCB), both developed by Transparency International. Each is discussed briefly below.

■ The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)

The Corruption Perceptions Index calculates a score on the perceived levels of corruption in a given country, based on the responses of business people and analysts around the world, including local experts resident in the country being evaluated. The CPI has a range of between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). A higher score means less perceived corruption. The map in Figure 3.13 shows the ranking for 158 countries. It indicates that the top ten ranked countries (least corrupt countries) are wealthy European and Oceanic nations, headed by Iceland. The bottom ten ranked countries consist largely of poor and developing nations of Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa and the Caribbean, with Bangladesh and Chad being the lowest ranked.⁷¹

■ The Global Corruption Barometer (GCB)

The Global Corruption Barometer provides an indication of the extent and nature of corruption from the perspective of ordinary people or the general public around the world. Findings from the 2005 GCB based on a survey of 54,260 people in 69 countries noted that political parties, parliaments, the police and the judicial system were the most corrupt.⁷⁰ Figure 3.14 illustrates the distribution of responses among sectors in this regard. Religious bodies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and registry and permit services are considered the least corrupt sectors.

Although the responses vary by region, 62 per cent of the countries surveyed reported that political parties were the most corrupt sector. This trend has increased since 2004, when 58 per cent of nations saw political parties as the most corrupt. As Table 3.2 indicates, when considered on a regional basis, Asian, Western European and Latin American citizens saw their political parties as the most corrupt, while African respondents judged their police to be the sector most corrupt. In Central and Eastern Europe, political parties and the police tied for first place as the most corrupt sectors.

Box 3.1 Violence against women in South Africa

South Africa has one of the highest incidences of violence against women (and children) in the world. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) data on crimes reported by the police indicate that 123.84 rapes per 100,000 individuals were committed in 2000. This is one of the saddest and most alarming manifestations of violence in a society generally regarded as traumatized and wracked by violent crime and (very often) violent interpersonal and public behaviour. Although the causes of the high levels of violence in South African society are manifold and complex, they broadly relate to the country's violent history of colonialism and apartheid. One can also safely assume that the high levels of poverty and unemployment in the country and the resultant economic hardships and frustrations add to the already volatile social and political atmosphere. In addition, patriarchal attitudes, which we share with other societies, make it particularly difficult for women to attain economic independence. As a result, many women are unable to permanently leave their abusive partners, thus failing to protect themselves and their children from physical, sexual, emotional, economic and other forms of abuse.

Source: Zambuko and Edwards, 2007

Petty corruption in the way of bribery is widespread, but affects poorer countries more significantly than richer ones, with some families in Cameroon, Ghana and Nigeria reporting that they spend at least the equivalent of 20 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita on bribery 'taxes'. Of special significance to urban dwellers are the bribes paid for services that they would normally be entitled to receive since they tend to be larger recipients of services than rural residents. Figure 3.15 shows the variation in service bribery among surveyed nations. Former socialist nations such as Lithuania, Romania, Russia and Ukraine tend to top the lists.

Corruption is closely linked with organized crime. Indeed, the two have been characterized as 'two sides of the same coin'.⁷¹ Research on the connections between corruption and organized crime suggests that socio-economic factors such as poverty, unemployment, societal wealth, income inequality, the pattern of public investment that benefits citizens' quality of life, levels of judicial independence, independence of civil servants, and the strength of

Petty corruption in the way of bribery is widespread, but affects poorer countries more significantly than richer ones

Box 3.2 Street families and street children in Nairobi

One of the major challenges facing urban development in Kenya is the growing number of street families. It is estimated there were approximately 115 street children in 1975. By 1990 this number had grown to 17,000 and by 1997 over 150,000.⁷² In 2001, the number was estimated to be 250,000 street children countrywide.⁷³ With older street dwellers included, the total population of street persons was estimated at approximately 300,000. The bulk of such street dwellers are found in Nairobi, which at present has approximately 60,000 street persons. Street families live permanently or part time in the central business district area streets, bonded by a common identity and involved in organized street survival activities within given operational 'territories'. These families operate in environments that lack protection and supervision mechanisms available in normal social settings.

The survival activities include begging, albeit forcefully, pick pocketing and stealing, child prostitution, and the use and trafficking of drugs. Consequently, the public generally perceives street persons as criminals, thieves, drug addicts and eyesores that should be removed from the streets. Citizens feel that most ills are the responsibility of criminals who were previously street children. The public has no mechanisms to respond to the manifestations and causes of crime by street children – hence, their fear and over-generalizations.

Source: Masese, 2007




Figure 3.13

Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (2005)

Source: Transparency International, 2005b

democratic institutions explain the occurrence of corruption among countries.⁷⁴ The likelihood of corruption taking place is also high where significant natural resources are extracted in environments that are relatively free of state oversight, including effective judiciaries. For instance, in 2004, Transparency International noted that many oil-producing states in the developing and transitional world have low CPI scores since these industries provide significant opportunities for bribery, embezzlement and cash skimming.⁷⁵ Such circumstances also provide the recipe for civil unrest and urban warfare inasmuch as they 'provide fuel for both greed and grievance'.⁷⁶ The following sub-section considers the various conditions and trends associated with organized crime.

Figure 3.14

Sectors and institutions most influenced by corruption

Note: 1 = not at all corrupt; 5 = extremely corrupt.

Source: Transparency International, 2005a


Organized crime

The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime defines organized crime to mean 'a structured group of three or more persons existing for a period of

time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established pursuant to this Convention in order to obtain, directly, or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit'.⁷⁷ As one of the major threats to human security, transnational organized crime has been characterized by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) as 'impeding the social, economic, political and cultural development of societies worldwide'. An enormously diverse series of enterprises, organized crime profits from drug trafficking, trafficking in human beings, trafficking in firearms, smuggling of migrants and money laundering, among others. As one measure of its profitability, the United Nations Drug Control Programme has estimated that US\$1 billion in illicit capital is circulated daily by criminal groups among the world's financial institutions. These groups thrive in political and social contexts where traditional values have given way to 'a mentality of individual advancement at any price'.⁷⁸ Fed by market forces, and especially by globalization, organized crime groups have adapted to changing economic and social conditions faster than the abilities of most states to constrain them.

Assessing the conditions and trends of international criminal organizations is challenging for many reasons. Chief among them are the different scales at which the various groups operate (from the local to the international level); the fundamental data collection hurdles relative to crime, generally, and to the secretive nature of the groups, in particular; and the highly adaptive structures and dynamic nature of the groups. To overcome some of these problems, a recent analysis of the prevalence and global distribution of organized crime has been conducted using 'statistical markers' based on data from World Economic Forum surveys (1997 to 2003) and an international crime assessment group representing 156 countries.⁷⁹

One of these markers is the Organized Crime Perception Index (OCPI), which is a composite score that



refers to the 'levels of different types of organized crime activities, such as extortion and drugs, arms and people trafficking, as perceived by potential victim groups and experts'.⁸⁰ That marker and four others – the extent of the shadow economy; the percentage of unsolved homicides; the high level of corruption among public officials; and the extent of money laundering – are used in Table 3.3 to rank regions of the world on the basis of their levels of organized crime activities. Table 3.3 shows that Oceania/Australia has the lowest composite rank (least), while the Caribbean has the highest (most) in terms of organized crime activity.

Although there is general consistency between regional scores and the rank order, a cautionary note is necessary with regard to these numbers, given that data is missing for some countries. Nevertheless, the data is suggestive of regional differences that tend to be consistent with country data. Figure 3.16 illustrates the manifestations of organized crime in various nations of the world using the OCPI.

The index shows low levels of organized crime in Canada and Australia. The same is true for Northern Europe, with levels increasing as one moves south and east into Italy, Spain and especially into Eastern European nations such as Russia and Ukraine. South Asia, particularly Pakistan and Bangladesh, stand out with comparatively high levels of organized crime, while India and China are seen as having higher activity than some southern European countries, such as Italy. The African nations of Nigeria, Angola and Mozambique have the highest composite scores. In Latin America and the Caribbean, the countries of Haiti, Guatemala, Paraguay, Venezuela, Colombia and Jamaica stand out with the highest composite index scores.⁸¹

Conditions supporting the growth of organized crime, such as globalization of markets and increasingly sophisticated communications technology, are not likely to diminish in the near future. Facilitated by developments in these areas, organized crime has flourished in urban drug trafficking and trafficking in arms and in people. The following sub-sections describe global, regional and national conditions and trends related to these facets of organized crime.

■ Illicit drug trafficking and use

Drug trafficking, simply defined as buying and selling illegal drugs, is a huge worldwide industry that is often the province of organized crime. Moreover, drug trafficking and drug use are fundamental risk factors underlying crime and violence at global, national and local levels. Drug addiction, particularly in urban areas, fuels crime and violence, increases policing and healthcare costs, disintegrates families and generally diminishes the quality of life. While long-term overall trends point to some successes in combating the availability of drugs, such as the reduction of coca cultivation in the Andean region and the decline of opium production in Asia's Golden Triangle, these gains may be offset by setbacks elsewhere, such as the increasing demand for cocaine in parts of Europe, amphetamines in Asia and the US and new transit routes for illicit drugs that have opened in West Africa. The extent of global illicit drug use is depicted in Figure 3.17. This is estimated to be 5 per cent of

| | | | | |
|--|--------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Asia (12 countries) | Political parties 4.2 | Parliament/legislature 3.9 | Police 3.9 | Tax revenue 3.5 |
| Africa (8 countries) | Police 4.4 | Political parties 4.2 | Customs 4.0 | Parliament/legislature 3.8 |
| Western Europe (16 countries) | Political parties 3.7 | Parliament/legislature 3.3 | Business/private sector 3.3 | Media 3.3 |
| Central and Eastern Europe (14 countries) | Political parties 4.0 | Police 4.0 | Parliament/legislature 3.9 | Legal system/judiciary 3.9 |
| Latin America and the Caribbean (15 countries) | Political parties 4.5 | Parliament/legislature 4.4 | Police 4.3 | Legal system/judiciary 4.3 |

the world's population aged 15 to 64, or 200 million people.

Trafficking is one of the major components of the illicit drug problem. The other components are cultivation, production, retailing and consumption. Of these components, the least is known about trafficking, although information can be obtained indirectly through studies of criminal group activities and through estimates of drug supplies, areas under cultivation and drug seizures. Seizure and trafficking routes for drugs vary by region, by nation and by the type of drug in question.⁸²

There are three major destinations for cannabis resin: West and Central Europe (transiting Spain and The Netherlands); the Near and Middle East/Southwest Asia region (with supplies originating in Afghanistan and Pakistan); and North Africa. Much of the cannabis resin supplied to West and Central Europe and to North Africa is produced in Morocco. In 2004, more cannabis resin was seized in Spain in 2004 than in any other nation.

The world's main cocaine trafficking routes continue to run from the Andean region, notably Colombia, to the US, with Europe as the second most important destination for cocaine produced in the Andean region. The trafficking and use of cocaine in Asia and Oceania is low compared to the rest of the world, while the use in West and Central Africa increased in 2004 on account of the region being a transshipment point to European markets.

Trafficking illicit drugs is a major profit generator for organized crime groups, who often plough their profits into the purchase and subsequent marketing of illegal weapons and engage in trafficking people. The connections between drugs, arms and human trafficking are complex and not

Table 3.2

The most corrupt sectors by region

Note: 1 = not at all corrupt; 5 = extremely corrupt.

Source: Transparency International, 2005a, p5

Drug addiction, particularly in urban areas, fuels crime and violence ... disintegrates families and generally diminishes the quality of life

Figure 3.15

Bribes for public services

Note: Percentage of respondents who paid a bribe for public services they were entitled to.

Source: Transparency International, 2005a, p15




Table 3.3

Regional mean scores and ranks on the Organized Crime Perception Index (OCPI) (rank numbers of regions)

Source: van Dijk and van Vollenhoven, 2006, p5

| | Average of the OCPI and rank | OCPI (rank) | Informal sector (rank) | Unsolved homicides (rank) | High-level corruption (rank) | Money laundering (rank) |
|---------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------|------------------------|---------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------|
| Oceania/Australia | 33 (1) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| West and Central Europe | 35 (2) | 2 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 3 |
| North America | 44 (3) | 4 | 4 | 4 | 6 | 4 |
| East and Southeast Asia | 45 (4) | 5 | 3 | 7 | 3 | 6 |
| Central America | 50 (5) | 4 | 13 | 3 | 8 | 13 |
| Near and Middle East | 50 (6) | 7 | 6 | 11 | 1 | 2 |
| World | 54 | | | | | |
| South Asia | 54 (7) | 14 | 8 | 8 | 7 | 11 |
| North Africa | 55 (8) | 6 | 5 | 6 | | 5 |
| East Africa | 55 (9) | 12 | 9 | | 11 | 9 |
| Southern Africa | 56 (10) | 10 | 12 | 5 | 12 | 10 |
| South America | 58 (11) | 11 | 14 | 10 | 13 | 12 |
| Southeast Europe | 58 (12) | 15 | 10 | 12 | 9 | 14 |
| West and Central Africa | 60 (13) | 13 | 11 | 15 | 5 | 8 |
| East Europe | 70 (14) | 17 | 16 | 14 | 14 | 16 |
| Central Asia and Transcaucasian | 70 (15) | 16 | | 13 | 15 | |
| Caribbean | 70 (16) | 9 | 15 | | 16 | 15 |

completely understood because of the dynamic and inherently secretive nature of these groups and transactions. Other aspects of organized crime – arms and human trafficking – are discussed below.

■ Arms trafficking

Easy access to illegal weapons is a major risk factor driving crime and violence rates. Like drug trafficking, arms trafficking is often the focus of organized crime. Access is facilitated by the trafficking of small arms and light weapons, characterized as the weapons of choice of youth gangs, organized criminal groups, paramilitary groups, rebel forces and terrorists. Defined as weapons that 'one or two people can carry, can be mounted on a vehicle, or loaded onto a pack animal', they are easy to obtain as pilfered or legally sold remnants of stockpiles left behind after wars and civil unrest.⁸³ They are also relatively cheap, lethal, portable, concealable and


durable, and their use can be disguised under many legal pretences. Probably most important from a control standpoint is that they are in high demand as the means and motivations for personal security, especially in the absence of effective policing or public protection. For these reasons, small arms are widely trafficked and they are prime facilitators of common crime and violence around the globe.

Research suggests that, overall, weapons tend to move from unregulated jurisdictions to regulated ones.⁸⁴ This has become more of an issue as trade of all goods increasingly globalizes. The illegal trade in small arms is much harder to document than the legal trade, but it is thought to be worth about US\$1 billion a year.⁸⁵ According to the Small Arms Survey, the latter sales account for an estimated 60 to 90 per cent of the 100,000 combat deaths that occur each year and thousands more that take place outside of war zones. It is estimated that there are more than 640 million small arms

Figure 3.16

Organized Crime Perception Index

Source: van Dijk and van Vollenhoven, 2006, p6



available worldwide, or enough to arm one in every ten persons, and that 1000 individuals each day are murdered by guns worldwide.⁸⁶

Many legal and illicit arms arriving in West Africa from Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, China and other African nations become converted by brokers and private sellers who reap the profits. In Brazil, the 'leakage' of arms from military arsenals has been one of the prime ways in which weapons get into the hands of *favela*-based gangs.⁸⁷ The upsurge in violent crimes in Kenya, particularly in Nairobi over the last few years, has, in part, been attributed to the influx of illegal arms from war-torn neighbouring countries, particularly Somalia.⁸⁸ Recent estimates for Kenya show that there is one illegal firearm for every 300 citizens.⁸⁹ This is likely to be much higher in Nairobi, where gangs 'provide a deep and widening market for illegal weapons' and where an illegal firearm can be hired for as little as US\$15.⁹⁰ Within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the problems of arms trafficking and availability of small arms are vastly compounded by the proliferation of non-state armed groups. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the US State Department, there are at least 8 million illicit small arms in West Africa, with about half in the hands of criminals or insurgents. These represent most of all illegal weapons on the continent.⁹¹ The problems have been particularly severe in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea, which were wrecked by protracted civil wars.

■ Human trafficking

Like the trade in drugs and arms, human trafficking is a global problem that involves organized criminal groups and that disproportionately affects women and children. Human trafficking is defined as:

The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation includes, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.⁹²

Although accurate data is unavailable, it is estimated that between 700,000 and 1 million persons are trafficked around the world each year.⁹³ Trafficking people is big business that generates enormous revenues for traffickers. Human trafficking adds to urban service provision problems, already overburdened in many nations by waves of legal and illegal immigrants, by creating new crime and violence targets largely unprotected by formal institutions that are underserved by informal institutions. Trafficking people




Figure 3.17

Illegal drug use at the global level (2004)

Source: UNODC, 2006a, p8

violates a wide array of national laws and contravenes United Nations protocols that have been adopted as part of the Convention against Organized Crime.⁹⁴ Like other crimes, it is best characterized as a complex process, rather than in terms of discrete incidents.

The trafficking process involves at least four phases – recruitment, transportation, exploitation and profit laundering – that take place in many countries and regions. Women and children, especially girls, living in poverty and without economic prospects are particularly vulnerable to traffickers, with bogus promises of jobs and financial security being prime lures. Although sexual exploitation is by far the most frequently reported type of exploitation, forced labour is also a major component of the problem. Trafficking is often confused with smuggling of human beings, which may entail elements of consent, whereas trafficking involves compulsion and criminal victimization.⁹⁵ Nevertheless, there can be a fine line between the two depending upon circumstances, and the results can be equally disastrous for individuals, especially when transportation arrangements go awry, as in the case of 58 Chinese migrants who died in an airtight truck on their way to the UK in 2001, or 19 Mexican migrants who suffocated in similar circumstances trying to enter the US in 2003.⁹⁶

■ Origin, transit and destination points

UNODC data reveals 127 countries in which trafficking reportedly originates and 137 destination countries.⁹⁷ Some of the 98 countries that are identified as transit points overlap those identified as points of origin. The main countries of origin include those in Central and Southeastern Europe, the Commonwealth of Independent States and Asia. These regions are then followed by nations in Western Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean. The regions of origin tend to be economically poorer, rank higher on corruption indices, have had more recent political transitions, civil wars and civil disruptions, and (with the exception of Latin America) are generally more rural than destination regions.

Some of the main transportation paths for human trafficking include countries within Central, Southern and

Human trafficking is a global problem that involves organized criminal groups and that disproportionately affects women and children

Youth gangs are found throughout the world, partly spurred by rapid urbanization, exclusion, poverty and the enactment of repressive public policies towards marginalized groups

Many young men from marginalized communities join gangs who help to replace the extended family and who provide economic and social values not found in mainstream society

Western Europe, and nations within Southeast Asia, Central America and Western Africa. Corruption and weak state institutions have been identified as some of the principal risk factors associated with the prevalence of transit routes in some of these regions and nations. In one of the highest transit zone states – Bulgaria – corruption linked to organized crime and human trafficking were cited as principal reasons initially hindering its accession to the EU.⁹⁸

Trafficking people is a relatively low-risk, low-cost venture for organized crime. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) notes that ‘compared with other illicit forms of trafficking such as drugs or weapons, the investments made by the traffickers in a victim are limited to transportation and, sometimes, documentation, bribes, protection and marketing’.⁹⁹ Moreover, unlike other illegal commodities such as drugs, which can generally be sold only once to a consumer, human contraband can be sold several times over.

The regions that are the most common destinations include countries within Western Europe, East and Southeast Asia, and some countries in the Western Asia sub-region, such as Turkey. The US and Canada, respectively, are identified as very high and high destinations for human trafficking. Germany is the highest destination nation for women and children trafficked for sexual purposes.¹⁰⁰

There are two prime reasons underlying trafficking to destination countries: the first is the demand for cheap labour in destination nations; the second is the perception of greater economic and living opportunity in destination nations by victims from origin nations. These beliefs are easily exploited by traffickers who typically prey on poorly educated individuals from distressed social and economic backgrounds. For example, a United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) study that documents women trafficked from Romania to Germany notes that:

*Recruiters targeted young women (17 to 28 years old) from rural areas with a low level of education and no employment. While being recruited, 95 per cent of victims were lied to regarding the nature of the work they were going to perform in Germany, the working conditions and the living conditions in Germany.*¹⁰¹

Trafficking often involves the movement of persons, especially females, from rural to urban areas across borders, as well as within their own nations. Victims are lured to cities with promises of work or marriage, such as in Lao PDR, Viet Nam and Indonesia, where many are later exploited in factories, for sexual purposes or domestic servitude. In Ecuador, some poor farm families have been forced to sell their children to work in the cities, and in Cambodia, traffickers move large number of rural women to cities to take advantage of the demand for cheap labour and sex.¹⁰² Indeed, serving the urban sex industry is a primary reason for trafficking women and girls.

Youth and territory-based gangs

Like organized crime, youth gangs are found throughout the world, partly spurred by rapid urbanization, exclusion, poverty and the enactment of repressive public policies towards marginalized groups. Some gangs, such as the Crips found in the US and Europe, have international reach and have become ‘institutionalized’ by virtue of persistence over time, complex organizational composition, adaptive survival strategies and the ability to meet some local community needs. In the US, increase in gang violence has been popularly linked to the growth in cocaine markets beginning during the 1980s, although empirical studies do not clearly support causal connections.¹⁰³ In Latin America, youth gangs constitute key features on the urban violence landscape, and are variously known as *pandillas*, *maras*, *bandas*, *galeras*, *quadrilhas*, *barras* and *chapulines*.¹⁰⁴ Examples include the youth gangs of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, Brazil, whose violence is legendary throughout Latin America, even spawning an internationally acclaimed movie entitled *Cidade de Deus* (*City of God*). In Brazil, two-thirds of all homicides involve youths,¹⁰⁵ where children as young as six years are drawn into gangs to serve as lookouts and carriers of hard drugs.¹⁰⁶ Apart from drug trafficking, youth gangs in Guatemala regularly engage in pick pocketing, mugging, theft and bus robberies, kidnapping and arms trafficking, as well as various forms of social violence such as territorial conflict, rape and vandalism.¹⁰⁷ In sub-Saharan Africa, where the impacts of rapid urbanization and poverty have been particularly severe, many young men from marginalized communities join gangs who help to replace the extended family and who provide economic and social values not found in mainstream society.

Although seen as a reaction to economic conditions, one research stream suggests that institutionalized urban youth gangs have evolved as avenues through which resistance identities have been forged as a means for marginalized young people to stand against prevailing cultures and the instability of modernizing societies.¹⁰⁸ In this context, youth gangs may be distinguished from organized crime groups, which have been described as primarily profit driven. While no reliable numbers exist, it has been estimated that, worldwide, membership of youth gangs runs into millions – spreading throughout both high and low crime cities. While the direction of causality is arguable, recent research suggests that cities that have high violence rates tend to have institutionalized youth gangs, and this includes Chicago, Los Angeles, Rio de Janeiro, Medellín, Caracas, Kingston, Lagos, Mogadishu and Belfast.¹⁰⁹

Although youth gangs often become involved in common crime and violence, their enterprises also intertwine with mainstream community life, thus making suppression especially challenging. While this involvement may include politics, one trend has been away from politicization, especially as left-wing movements declined during the 1990s. A recent study quotes a Central American journalist in this regard, who notes: ‘Until recently, a rebellious youth from Central America would go into the mountains and join the guerrillas. Today, he leaves the




Figure 3.18

Estimated homicide rates among youths aged 10 to 29 (2000)

Source: Krug et al, 2002, p26

Note: Rates were calculated by WHO region and country income level and then groups according to magnitude.

countryside for the city and joins one of the street gangs engaged in common crime without political objectives.¹¹⁰

Youth homicides

Closely related to youth gangs is the issue of youth homicides. According to WHO data, about 199,000 youth homicides took place globally in 2000, implying an average of 565 young people aged between 10 and 29 dying daily due to various types of violence.¹¹¹ Regional variations show that youth homicide rates were lowest in Western Europe and in the high-income countries of the Pacific. The highest rates are found in Latin America, the Caribbean and Africa, as shown in Figure 3.18. This coincides with regions where there are large bulges in the youthful population. Countries with very low rates include Japan (with 0.4 per 100,000 individuals); France (0.6 per 100,000); Germany (0.8 per 100,000); and the UK (with 0.09 per 100,000). The countries having high rates of youth homicide include Colombia (with 84.4 per 100,000 individuals); El Salvador (50.2 per 100,000); Puerto Rico (41.8 per 100,000); and Brazil (with 32.5 per 100,000). Other countries with high rates are the US (11 per 100,000); Russia (18 per 100,000); and Albania (with 28.2 per 100,000). The high rate in the US reflects, in part, gun policies and inequality, while that of Russia can be linked to its economic transition.

Urban terrorism

Urban terrorism is one type of violence that has serious consequences for cities in both developed and developing countries. Acts of terrorism fall within the ambit of 'spectacular violence', which derives from the deliberate attempt to unsettle and disrupt urban populations, in contrast to 'everyday violence'.¹¹² In this report, terrorism is seen as violent acts that are deliberately targeted at civilians and urban infra-

structure. The report does not examine the perpetrators of acts of terror, their origins or their motives – all of which lie outside the scope of this report. This approach is adopted due to the contentious and complex nature of what constitutes terrorism, since terrorism itself could have different meanings depending on the perspective from which it is viewed. While this approach might have certain shortcomings, it clearly avoids the problematic issue of 'when one person's "terrorist" becomes another's "freedom fighter"', and escapes the essentialist categories associated with the discourse on the current 'war on terror'.¹¹³

The terrorist attacks on New York of 11 September 2001 have brought to the fore in vivid terms the vulnerability of cities to terrorism. Cities make attractive targets for terrorist attacks due to several reasons. Cities are built-up agglomerations with high densities, and, as such, the impact of an explosion increases with density — thereby maximizing the impact of an attack or destroying a large amount within a short time. This is often referred to as the 'target effect'¹¹⁴ — implying that the large size and dense agglomeration of cities make them ideal targets for terrorist attacks. Furthermore, given the role of cities in terms of their administrative, economic, social, cultural and political functions, as well as the fact that the influence of cities transcends their national boundaries,¹¹⁵ attacks on cities provide a high degree of visibility. Within cities themselves, infrastructure and services such as mass transit and communication systems, as well as commercial areas and shopping malls, restaurants, sports stadia, hotels, theatres and other places where large numbers of people gather, form the key targets of terrorist attacks because of the likelihood of greater devastation. For instance, the suburban train system in Mumbai, India which carries more than 6 million commuters daily, and one of the busiest in the world¹¹⁶ has been the target of a series of terrorist attacks over the last decade because of the enormous consequences of such attacks.

Urban terrorism is one type of violence that has serious consequences for cities in both developed and developing countries

Within cities ... infrastructure ... such as mass transit and communication systems... and other places where large numbers of people gather, form the key targets of terrorist attacks because of the likelihood of greater devastation

Recent trends in the incidence of urban terrorism

Table 3.4 shows major terrorist incidents that have taken place since 1997, which include: the attack on the World Trade Center in New York, US, on 11 September 2001; the bombing of holidaymakers in Bali, Indonesia; the coordinated bombings in Madrid in March 2004; the London bombings of July 2005; and the bombing of commuter trains in Mumbai in July 2006. Although these acts of terrorism are local events, they have had international repercussions that have ricocheted across the world. Therefore they tend to receive greater media and international coverage than, for example, riots or disturbances in an urban slum that might claim more lives. Although not indicated in the table, most terrorist-related attacks and subsequent loss of human lives that have occurred in 2007 are linked to the situation in Iraq, where deaths from car bombing have remarkably increased. It is pertinent to note that a greater proportion of recent terrorist attacks have taken place in developing countries (see Table 3.4). If the situation in Israel is left out, the lowest level of terrorist attacks occurs in developed countries.¹¹⁷ Colombia, more than any other country, experienced a total of 191 terrorist attacks in 2001 alone.¹¹⁸

Although mass transit systems, particularly commuter trains, are frequently targeted, recent international research that compares several modes of travel has shown that mass transit systems are extremely safe and that other travel modes, such as the automobile, represent a far greater risk

Table 3.4

Examples of major terrorist incidents since 1997

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_terrorist_incidents

| Date | Incident | Number of people killed | Number of people injured |
|--------------------|---|-------------------------|--------------------------|
| 17 November 1997 | Gunmen attack tourists in Luxor, Egypt | 62 | 24 |
| 7 August 1998 | US embassy bombings in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya | 225 | > 4000 |
| 18 October 1998 | Blowing up of the Orensa pipeline near Machuca in Antioquia, Colombia | 84 | 100 |
| 11 September 2001 | A series of hijacked airliner crashes into the World Trade Center in New York City and The Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, USA | 3500 | |
| 9 May 2002 | Bomb explosion in Kaspisk in Dagestan, Russia during Victory Day festivities | 42 | 130 |
| 12 October 2002 | Bombing of holidaymakers Bali, Indonesia | 202 | |
| 23–27 October 2002 | Moscow theatre hostage crisis, Russia | 160 | |
| 27 December 2002 | Truck bombing of the Chechen parliament in Grozny | 83 | |
| 7 February 2003 | El Nogal Club bombing in Bogotá, Colombia | 36 | 150 |
| 12 May 2003 | A truck bomb attack carried out on a government building in the Chechen town of Znamenskoye | 59 | |
| 25 August 2003 | South Mumbai bombings: Gateway of India and Zaveri Bazaar | 48 | 150 |
| 6 February 2004 | Bombing of Moscow Metro, Russia | 41 | |
| 27 February 2004 | Bombing of Superferry 14 in the Philippines | 116 | |
| 11 March 2004 | Coordinated bombing of commuter trains in Madrid, Spain | 191 | 1500 |
| 24 August 2004 | Terrorist attack on two domestic Russian aircraft in Moscow, Russia | 90 | |
| 7 July 2005 | London bombings: Bombs explode on three underground trains and on one double-decker bus | 56 | 700 |
| 23 July 2005 | Bombing of tourist sites in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt | 88 | > 100 |
| 29 October 2005 | Multiple bomb blasts in markets in Delhi, India | 61 | 200 |
| 9 November 2005 | Three explosions at hotels in Amman, Jordan | 60 | 120 |
| 11 July 2006 | A series of explosions rock commuter trains in Mumbai, India | 209 | 714 |

to society than does transit terrorism.¹¹⁹ For example, while not intending to minimize the horror of the events, this study notes that the 56 deaths resulting from the 7 July 2005 London bombings were equivalent to about six days of normal British traffic fatalities and that the 9/11 attacks killed about as many as die in a typical month of US traffic accidents.

In relation to 'everyday violence' or common crime, the incidence of terrorist attacks is significantly small. Consequently, the risks of terrorism cannot be as easily calculated, since such small numbers of attacks defy probability analysis when compared to huge numbers of common crimes. For example, the US National Counterterrorism Center reported 13 terrorist incidents in the United States between February 2004 and May 2005 and, for approximately the same period, the Federal Bureau of Investigation identified 10.32 million property crimes and over 1.36 million violent crimes.¹²⁰ Nonetheless, the impacts of terrorism on cities have been enormous in recent years.

FACTORS UNDERLYING CRIME AND VIOLENCE

This section discusses some of the factors associated with criminal and violent activities. Crime and violence are life-changing events that are often facilitated by the convergence of several risk factors. These include the immediate availability of guns, drugs and alcohol. The last two serve as triggers, rather than the causes of violence. These facilitators play off individual and relationship characteristics, such as personality traits, histories of abuse and neglect, dysfunctional family settings, age and gender, and risky lifestyles. At broad national and societal (macro) levels, crime and violence are linked to a range of long-term underlying economic, social, cultural and political circumstances that produce opportunities and incentives for criminal behaviour and violent acts, as well as the situations that frame victimization. Some of these factors are described in the following sub-sections.

Social and cultural factors

Globally, informal forces embedded in social and cultural values are arguably the most powerful factors acting to encourage or discourage crime and violence. In some societies, crime and violence are common components of daily life and are accepted social and cultural norms, or (in the case of 'structural violence') are built into, or encouraged by, law. For example, in Kabul, Karachi and Managua, violence is so interwoven into the fabric of daily life that it has become 'routinized', or normalized, as 'terror as usual' for many slum dwellers.¹²¹ Structural violence helps to legitimize other forms of ethnic- and gender-based domestic physical and sexual assault that have immediate impacts on individuals, and which may result in re-victimization. For instance, between 70 and 90 per cent of Pakistani women suffer from domestic violence incidents, many of which have resulted in other victimizations such as rape and murder.¹²²

Almost half of Pakistani women who report rape to authorities are jailed as a result of the Hudood Ordinances, which criminalize sexual relationships (including rape) outside of marriage. Pakistani women are also victims of honour killings, which are private acts condoned by social and cultural norms. Hundreds of women are victimized and killed each year by burnings or acid attacks from their intimate partners.¹²³ A sizeable majority of women in Ethiopia, Thailand, Samoa, Peru and Bangladesh view IPV as acceptable behaviour from their partner in response to unfaithfulness. Between 60 and 80 per cent of women in Ethiopia believe that enduring violence at the hands of their intimate partner is an acceptable consequence for failing to complete housework or for disobeying one's husband.¹²⁴

Cultural and social expectations of violence, coupled with young male 'hyper masculinity' values, pervade many Brazilian *favelas*, Colombian *barrios*, Jamaican slums and North American ghettos – where marginalized young men are expected to revenge insults with injury or death, often using guns. On the other side of the spectrum, culture can mediate crime. For example, in Hong Kong, Confucianism-based family-oriented values, extended kinship structures and a generally compliant 'pro-social' population, who favours a government hostile to crime and corruption, are seen as major factors in keeping crime and violence rates low.¹²⁵ Similarly, in the Middle East and Arab states, the comparatively low homicide and crime rates are, in part, attributed to the religious and social values prevalent in such cultures. Crime and violence is thus significantly influenced by prevailing social and cultural norms, including religious values, which often overpower official and legal pronouncements. But, they may also be encouraged by legislation, as in the case of the Hudood Ordinances noted above.

Poverty

It is clear that crime is a survival strategy for many urban dwellers whose attitudes and perceptions are shaped by poverty. For example, a survey of residents of the South African town of Greater East London suggests that unemployment and marginalization have dramatic impacts on attitudes towards violent crime.¹²⁶ A significantly larger proportion of unemployed respondents were more tolerant of crime than those who were employed. Murder, theft from vehicles and domestic violence were considered by more than half of the unemployed respondents not to be taken seriously. While some of the tolerance for violence is attributed to the residual climate of the anti-apartheid era, a possible rationale for the tolerance of domestic violence is attributed to tensions between jobless men and women.¹²⁷ Women are often employed in domestic work, a sector that is not equally available to men. In Jamaica's poorest neighbourhoods, young people are accustomed to seeing violence at home and on the street. The high homicide rates in Jamaica are partly due to urban poverty and gang warfare, as well as political parties arming young men with guns in their struggle for political control.¹²⁸

At the global level, rates of violent death generally vary with income. The WHO estimates presented in Table 3.5 show that in 2000, the rates of violent death for high income countries (14.4 per 100,000 individuals) were less than half that of low- to middle-income countries (32.1 per 100,000).¹²⁹ Survey data from Brazil, as indicated in Figure 3.19, show that as family income increases, residents are less likely to have relatives that have been murdered.

While economic prosperity is associated with lower death and homicide rates, income inequality, as discussed below, is likely to be a more salient operative factor affecting crime rates. Indeed, a body of international evidence connects poverty levels as well as income inequality to crime and violence rates, although the connections are still subject to debate in the literature.¹³⁰ The direction of the causal link between poverty and violence has been questioned, with some researchers noting that violence promotes poverty since it degrades the physical and social capital in affected areas. This is borne out by studies on the concentration of firearms and violence-related property crimes in the *favelas* of Brazil. At the national level, economic data suggests that violence drives out capital and depresses economic growth so that it further impoverishes poor nations and communities. Moreover, there are desperately poor communities throughout all regions of the world where crime rates are constrained by prevailing cultural and social values. This is the case in parts of Ghana and Indonesia, where powerful informal social control mechanisms serve to keep crime rates low.¹³¹ The same is true for Hong Kong and Japan, where the influence of informal and cultural systems tends to moderate many risk factors that are normally associated with crime.¹³² Evidence from poor Latin American communities in the US suggests that community characteristics that stress protective norms and building social capital can help to protect adolescents from the negative effects of poverty, including crime.¹³³

Inequality

The relative distance between the richest and poorest members of society is as important as, or even more important than, levels of poverty in affecting crime and violence. Closely associated with inequality are key exclusionary factors relating to unequal access to employment, education, health and basic infrastructure.¹³⁴ Research has consistently found that income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient (a measure of the inequality of a distribution) is strongly correlated with high homicide rates.¹³⁵ For example, two major comparative studies – one of 18 industrialized nations using data for 1950 to 1980 and the other of 45 industrialized and developing countries with data between 1965 and 1995 – concluded that income inequality had a significant and positive effect on homicide rates.¹³⁶

Growth in GDP has been found to be negatively correlated with homicide rates, although this was offset by income inequality. This has been the general finding for violent crimes, although the reverse holds true for property crimes: the higher the growth in GDP, the higher the level of property crime rates. This indicates that increasing levels of

A body of international evidence connects poverty levels as well as income inequality to crime and violence rates

There are desperately poor communities throughout all regions of the world where crime rates are constrained by prevailing cultural and social values

| Type of violence | Number ^a | Rate per 100,000 individuals ^b | Proportion of total (percentage) |
|---------------------------------|---------------------|---|----------------------------------|
| Homicide | 520,000 | 8.8 | 31.3 |
| Suicide | 815,000 | 14.5 | 49.1 |
| War related | 310,000 | 5.2 | 18.6 |
| Total ^c | 1,659,000 | 28.8 | 100.0 |
| Low- to middle-income countries | 1,510,000 | 32.1 | 91.1 |
| High-income countries | 149,000 | 14.4 | 8.9 |

Table 3.5

Table 3.5 Estimated global violence-related deaths (2000)

Notes: a Rounded to nearest 1000.

b Age standardized.

c Includes 14,000 intentional injury deaths resulting from legal intervention.

Source: Krug et al, 2002, p10

prosperity are associated with increasing levels of property crimes. Similarly, within cities, more prosperous areas or neighbourhoods often account for a larger proportion of property crimes. Relative to individual prosperity, recent research suggests that the wealth of an individual is closely connected to the risk of becoming a crime victim. In countries with high levels of income inequality, the risk of individual crime victimization is higher than in countries with less inequality.¹³⁷

Gender, racial, ethnic and religious inequalities are also major factors in violence perpetrated against women and minorities. While the venue of violence against women and children is often the home, racial, ethnic and religious inequality generally plays out in community settings. In this context, an egregious example is the atrocities committed in Rwanda by ethnic Hutu groups against Tutsis, where it is estimated that as many as 800,000 people were massacred.

Pace of urbanization

While early research failed to substantiate a relationship between crime and the pace of urbanization,¹³⁸ more recent studies have found that the speed of urbanization is significantly associated with increased crime rates in some of the world's regions. For instance, results from a survey of 17 Latin American countries indicate that households located in areas experiencing high levels of growth are more likely to be victimized than those in communities with stable populations.¹³⁹ In Latin America, city growth is seen as a very stronger indicator of crime rates.¹⁴⁰ These findings suggest that there may be a wider association between urbanization and crime in certain high-growth regions.

The impacts of rapid urbanization also extend beyond direct victimization. People in rapidly growing cities of Latin America have diminished confidence in police officials and

the judiciary to resolve problems.¹⁴¹ Thus, rapid development places increased pressures on the ability of authorities to meet public security and safety demands. When expectations are not met, citizens become cynical and distrustful of public institutions. This is especially important since almost all of the world's urban growth in the next two decades will be absorbed by cities of the developing world, whose public institutions are least equipped to deal with the challenges of rapid urbanization.

Moreover, the rate of urbanization is related to the pace at which people change households – population instability – which is strongly associated with crime. Rapidly growing urban centres are typically places where there is a high turnover of people and where social coherence is less stable and 'protective' as an informal social control for criminal behaviour. Thus, being 'transient' is a significant risk and an enabling factor associated with organized and common crime in urban areas and especially where 'illegal immigrants, drug dealers and sex workers tend to congregate'.¹⁴² For instance, almost half of Port Moresby's (Papua New Guinea) urban population of 330,000 live in squatter settlements most are relatively recent in-migrants to the city. These settlements are considered to be the main sources of criminal activity in the city. The problems are compounded by poverty, the lack of formal-sector employment, low confidence in public authorities to provide protection and justice, and the destabilization of traditional social and cultural systems found in village councils and courts.¹⁴³ The burgeoning growth of São Paulo, Brazil, offers another example of the disruptive effects of rapid population growth and change, as shown in Box 3.3.

Projections indicate that the pace of urbanization is most rapid in the less developed regions of Africa and Asia. Smaller urban settlements of less than 500,000 and medium-sized cities between 1 million and 5 million are growing faster than megacities. Existing urban areas of Africa, Asia and Latin America are projected to have the largest increases in urban populations by 2030. Yet, these are regions whose institutions – including planning, criminal justice, social service and infrastructure systems – are least equipped to deal with rapid urbanization. All of this invariably suggests impacts in terms of increases in slum and squatter settlements, street children and crime within urban centres struggling to provide adequate public services (including security and justice systems) to existing residents.


The speed of urbanization is significantly associated with increased crime rates in some of the world's regions

Figure 3.19

Family income and relatives murdered (Brazil)

Note: MW = minimum wage; approximately US\$175 per month at time of publication.

Source: Zaluar, 2007



City size and density

If the relationship between the pace of urbanization and crime is not completely understood, the same can be said about the highly complex connections between city size, density and crime. Nevertheless, there is little question that more people are increasingly vulnerable to crime and violence in many large urban areas than ever before. A fundamental theory is that city size and density are in themselves directly associated with social pathologies, including crime.¹⁴⁴ There is evidence that city size and crime rates are related.¹⁴⁵ However, this relationship is likely to be more pronounced in developing countries vis-à-vis developed

countries. For instance, while in Latin America, a household living in a city of 1 million or more people is 78 per cent more likely to be victimized by crime than a household living in a city of between 50,000 and 100,000 people, the corresponding figure for the US is 28 per cent.¹⁴⁶ The link between crime and city size in developing countries can be explained by three factors.¹⁴⁷ First, returns on crime are likely to be higher in larger cities due to the greater concentration of wealthier victims, more opportunities to commit various types of crime, and a more developed second-hand market for the disposal of stolen items. Second, the chances of arresting a criminal might be lower in larger cities because large cities spend less on law enforcement per capita, or have lower levels of community cooperation with the police, or require more police officers per inhabitant to effect an arrest. Finally, larger cities have a greater proportion of crime-prone individuals/potential criminals.

The blanket association between size, density and crime has been the basis of attempts to stop or limit the size of new residential developments in many cities and to halt the expansion of existing residential areas, especially slums. As suggested by cities such as Cairo, New York, Hong Kong and Singapore, there are many exceptions when urban areas are compared on the basis of population size alone. Differential crime rates suggest that city size alone does not 'cause' crime and violence since some of the largest cities such as New York have comparatively low rates, thus disproving conventional wisdom.¹⁴⁸ Although vastly different in scale, a study of Madagascar communes suggested that crime was positively associated with low population densities and feelings of insecurity and isolation, contrary to expectations about the link between urban size, density and crime.¹⁴⁹

There are many dimensions to connections between population density and crime. Confounding factors such as culture, socio-economic development, governance and the strength of civil society controls are arguably as important determinants of crime and violence rates as population density. Within cities of all sizes, crime is concentrated within certain, generally known, geographic areas and population density is just one of many variables that play a role in its occurrence. There is evidence that population density is variably related to the occurrence of different types of crimes. For example, some US-based research suggests that high-density cities have fewer burglaries than lower-density cities. According to this research, motor vehicle thefts are also higher in denser cities.¹⁵⁰ Reasons for the differential effects are ascribed to opportunity, risk, effort and reward factors that are related to residential structural type and the opportunity for surveillance of property that may be planned or fortuitous. For example, because high-density residences are typically located in apartment complexes, they are more risky and difficult for burglars to enter than detached suburban houses with rear doors and windows, which burglars favour because of reduced surveillance possibilities.

In sum, city size and density measures are important relative to predicting crime rates, but are incomplete determinants of criminal or violent behaviour, and may be overshadowed by other, more local, social and environmental

Box 3.3 Rapid urban growth and crime: The example of São Paulo, Brazil

São Paulo's population exploded at an annual rate of 5 per cent from 1870 to 2000, with the city and its peripheral areas now hosting over 18 million people. The population of central São Paulo expanded by 171 per cent between 1940 and 1960, and its suburban areas grew by 364 per cent in the same period, largely due to rural in-migration. Existing civil institutions were overwhelmed by the pace and size of population growth and were incapable of dealing with demands for services in the hundreds of illegal subdivisions that sprang up, where standards of due process of law are low or non-existent and levels of retributive justice and vigilantism are high. Crime increased along with the rapid pace of urbanization, such that in 1999, the city recorded 11,455 murders, more than 17 times that of New York City's 667 murders. One of São Paulo's rapidly growing suburban municipalities, Diadema, reached a murder rate of 141 per 100,000 individuals in 2003, one of the world's highest rates.¹⁵¹

factors and by qualitative and economic forces relating to social inclusion and cohesion.

Poor urban planning, design and management

Only relatively recently has research pointed to the urban environment as posing risk factors associated with crime and violence. There is increasing evidence that poor planning, design and management of the urban environment puts citizens at risk of death, injury and loss of property. Place-based crime prevention and reduction theories of defensible space,¹⁵² crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED),¹⁵³ situational crime prevention¹⁵⁴ and environmental criminology¹⁵⁵ have increasingly been supported by empirical research suggesting that physical design and management of the built environment play a role in facilitating or diminishing opportunities for crime and violence. While there is no way of accurately counting the number of incidents related to physical design or management, it has been estimated that 10 to 15 per cent of crimes have environmental design and management components.¹⁵⁶

Globally, this amounts to millions of incidents each year. Thus, land-use juxtapositions, street layouts, building and site design, transportation system planning, infrastructure improvements – especially lighting and facility and landscape maintenance, as well as activity and space scheduling – have been shown to have variable impacts on crime opportunity and on the subsequent incidence and fear of crime.¹⁵⁷ The lack of integration of crime prevention strategies within comprehensive city planning practices has been cited as a factor in facilitating opportunities for urban crime.¹⁵⁸ Physical planning can make a difference in terms of crime prevention/reduction, to more effective policing, to informal surveillance and to the protection of persons and property. For example, street widening programmes can open up previously impenetrable urban areas to police and emergency service vehicles, and the creation of new housing or commercial developments can change traffic generation patterns and may provide increased economic and residential opportunities. Site design that provides increased prospects for people to observe their surroundings can reduce criminal opportunity.

There is increasing evidence that poor planning, design and management of the urban environment puts citizens at risk of death, injury and loss of property

It has been estimated that 10 to 15 per cent of crimes have environmental design and management components

From a planning and public policy standpoint, then, where crimes occur and how places are designed and managed are at least as important as who the perpetrators are

Evidence also suggests that permeable street layouts that encourage vehicular traffic flows across the urban fabric tend to enhance certain crime opportunities since more potential offenders will see more potential targets. This is said by some to increase the cost of policing.¹⁵⁹ On the one hand, access and escape routes for offenders are facilitated by gridiron-based patterns, reducing the risk of being caught, as well as facilitating the efforts to commit robberies and burglaries.¹⁶⁰ On the other hand, permeable street patterns knit cities together in the face of increasingly privatized gated communities and tend to reduce dependence upon the automobile, especially when urban mass transit is utilized.¹⁶¹ While the evidence is not conclusive and the mechanisms are imperfectly understood, studies have linked these elements with the routine movement, behaviour and interactions of offenders and targets in cities.¹⁶²

From a planning and public policy standpoint, then, *where* crimes occur and *how* places are designed and managed are at least as important as *who* the perpetrators are. This is so because crime and violence tends to reoccur in relatively limited numbers of places in cities that provide niches for offending. Moreover, these places are generally known to citizens and police, and occurrences are therefore reasonably predictable. Most other places are reasonably safe. Chapter 4 identifies some of the approaches that cities across the world have taken in integrating place-based crime reduction strategies within existing or new planning and public policy processes in attempting to grapple with these challenges.

Demographics: Youthful population growth

A wealth of international data suggests that crime and violence are strongly associated with the growth and proportion of youthful populations and, especially, young males. Cross-national research using data on 44 countries from 1950 to 2000 reveals that 'the percentage of young people in the populations and prosperity are jointly more important in explaining the variability of homicide'.¹⁶³ The number of children under 16 years per area (child density) has been noted as the single most important variable in explaining vandalism in certain housing estates in the UK.¹⁶⁴ In Nairobi (Kenya), where bank robbery, violent car robbery, house breaking, and street muggings and snatching are the main criminal activities, a distinctive attribute of the perpetrators is their youthfulness – criminals in their teens and 20s.¹⁶⁵

For people between the ages of 14 and 44 years old, violence has been identified as a major cause of death,¹⁶⁶ and in some distressed communities it is the primary cause of mortality of young people. This is a particularly salient issue for young males. Chapter 1 noted, for example, that violence was among the highest causes of death among African-American males in the US; the homicide death rate for African-American males aged 15 to 24 is 12 times the rate for white males in the same age category and twice the rate for Hispanic males.¹⁶⁷ The firearm-related death rate for African-American males aged 15 to 19 is four times the rate for white males in the same category.¹⁶⁸ Age and gender are

fundamental factors in determining vulnerability to small arms violence, generally. These risk factors are particularly significant when comparing firearms-related homicides among nations as shown in Figure 3.20.

Across countries, Small Arms Survey and WHO data report that males aged 15 to 29 account for about half of all firearm-related homicides and, as Figure 3.20 indicates, rates tends to be much higher for them than for the general population in the top five selected nations. This trend is consistent over time. The Small Arms Survey estimates the total number of annual global deaths from gun-related homicides for men aged 15 to 29 as falling between 70,000 and 100,000.¹⁶⁹

Other factors associated with youth crime

Youth crime and violence rates are associated with other factors, such as level of policing, conviction and imprisonment rates, drug cultures and a host of situational elements that condition people, especially young men, to their surrounding world. For example, the Small Arms Survey concludes that youth demographics alone are insufficient in explaining the variability of rates of violence among nations.¹⁷⁰ It cited a US study suggesting that more and better trained police, increased prison populations, the ebbing crack epidemic and the effects of legalized abortions have had more impact on crime rates than youthful populations.¹⁷¹ For young males, local situational factors related to masculine identity, achievement of status, prestige and social and economic empowerment are important elements in explaining the variability of violent crime rates around the world.¹⁷²

■ Youth unemployment

In addition to the risk factors described above, unemployment is a fundamental issue related to crime and violence rates among young people. The World Bank estimates that 74 million people between the ages of 15 and 24 are unemployed, which accounts for 41 per cent of all unemployed persons.¹⁷³ In connecting these dots, most research suggests that unemployed youths are disproportionately more likely to be perpetrators, as well as victims, of crime and violence. Unemployment, and especially long-term unemployment, undermines human capital so that work abilities and motivations 'atrophy'. Unemployment is also correlated with other aspects of social disadvantage, such as low socio-economic status, family dysfunction and prior criminal history. In this sense, the link between employment, youth and criminal behaviour is part of a process and a constellation of issues rather than the mark on a line as an incident or event.¹⁷⁴

Few factors have affected the prospects of young people more than the globalization of employment markets. A recent address to the Goethe-Institut in Johannesburg claimed that 'supply shock' has affected world labour markets, and especially youthful job-seekers, as millions of new workers have been added to world job markets due to the influx of new labour from nations of the former Soviet Union, the restructuring of China's economy, India's

Crime and violence are strongly associated with the growth and proportion of youthful populations and, especially, young males

opening of new economic frontiers, and pressures brought to bear on developing nations to cut back bureaucracies while increasing private-sector involvement in state enterprises.¹⁷⁵ The resulting destabilization has led to widespread job insecurity and increasing social fragmentation among young people, especially those living in distressed communities in developed and developing nations. Gang membership thereby provides alternative avenues relating to illicit economic gains from robbery, extortion and other types of crime, with violence being used as a resource to obtain social identity.¹⁷⁶ Although there is variability among regions and nations, this overall trend is not likely to be reversed in the foreseeable future.

■ Deportation of offending criminals

Closely related to globalization is the deportation of criminals to their countries of origin. This phenomenon, which is quite common in Latin America and the Caribbean, where offenders are deported from the US, in part accounts for increasing levels of youth crime and gang-related activities in the region. In Central America, the phenomenal growth in youth gangs has been attributed to the deportation of young Salvadorans from the US. This has resulted in the 'transfer' of gang wars from the ghettos of Los Angeles to the streets of El Salvador.¹⁷⁷ Similarly, in Jamaica, where gangs have a stranglehold on society and are at the centre of most murders, the feeling is rife that deportees are a major part of the crime problem. Indeed, the deportation of criminals has been linked to escalating gang violence, extortion and drug-related murders experienced over the past five years.¹⁷⁸ In 2001, 'an analysis by the Jamaican police concluded that deportees, many of them gang members from the north-eastern US, were involved in 600 murders, 1700 armed robberies and 150 shoot-outs with police'.¹⁷⁹ The effect of deportees on the Jamaican crime scene is further highlighted in a survey of deported criminals, which revealed that 53 per cent had been involved in criminal activities since deportation.¹⁸⁰ Such crimes include those not reported to the police. Among those reporting involvement in crime, 78 per cent had committed more than one crime, and another 35 per cent indicated that they had been involved in drug-related offences.

Transition towards democratization

As violent crime rates have variably increased over the past half century, cross-national, longitudinal research paints a picture of this as an outcome, at least in part, of broad international trends in governance. In this context, homicide rates are used as an indicator of violent crime. Reporting on observed trends in 44 mostly industrialized countries over a 50-year period, research indicates that global homicide rates have grown at about the same time as there have been significant increases in political democratization.¹⁸¹ Evidence to support this contention comes from researchers tracking significantly increased homicides in Latin America following widespread democratization of the region during the 1990s. Democratization is broadly characterized as the spread of governments that are put




Figure 3.20

Firearm homicide rates: Victims per 100,000 individuals among men aged 15 to 19 compared with the overall population (selected countries, latest year available)

Source: Small Arms Survey, 2006a, p297

into power by majority vote and supported by civil societies that 'encourage citizen participation, public deliberation and civic education'.¹⁸² Three principal theories have been elaborated upon in this context. They are the 'civilization perspective', the 'conflict perspective' and the 'modernization perspective'. Figure 3.21 summarizes the expected relationships between democracy and crime based on these theories.

Results of statistical analysis suggest that nations undergoing transition from autocratic governance to democracy exhibit the most significant increases in homicide rates (modernization perspective). These include countries in Eastern Europe and the Latin America and Caribbean region. As such nations move towards full democracy, their rates may begin to decline, even though they will not disappear and may, indeed, creep upward as evidenced by the data from full democracies. Evidence to support the decline in rates commensurate with democratization may be found in South Africa's murder rates, which have been declining as it has been consolidating democratic governance. In 1995, its murder rate was 68 per 100,000 individuals, which dipped to 50 per 100,000 and then 48 per 100,000 in 2002. During 2003 to 2004, the rate dropped to 44 per 100,000 – still extremely high, but an impressive 35 per cent improvement in less than a decade. Other evidence comes from the reduction of the murder rate in Diadema (Brazil), which has slowly consolidated a democratic response to crime as it has evolved from a community based on frontier justice standards. Although still high, its murder rate has fallen twice as fast as that of neighbouring São Paulo's between 1999 and 2003.¹⁸³ It should be noted that the latter trends are short term and may not be indicative of causal relationships. Indeed, there are democratic states where violence rates are extremely high, such as Colombia and Jamaica.

In Central America, the phenomenal growth in youth gangs has been attributed to the deportation of young Salvadorans from the US

What this implies is that connections between democratization and violence are extremely complex and not easily explained.

Nevertheless, some groups have used high violence rates as political arguments against democratization and as a rationale for segregating distressed populations and carving up urban territories into gated privatized enclaves. Such approaches have been particularly evident in São Paulo (Brazil) and Johannesburg (South Africa)¹⁸⁴ and are implicit in strategies used elsewhere to privatize security and territory.

IMPACTS OF CRIME AND VIOLENCE

This section addresses some of the social, psychological and economic impacts of crime and violence at the global, national, local and individual levels. These impacts are complex, interconnected and not easily separable. Nevertheless, some of the conditions and trends are sketched here relative to homicide, robbery, burglary and corruption. Owing to data availability, the discussion focuses more on local impacts relative to robbery and burglary. The section starts by distinguishing between primary, secondary and tertiary victims of crime and violence.


One violent crime can have many victims, including shattered families

Impacts of crime and violence: Victim categories

At the global level, homicide and other violent crimes have obvious and significant impacts, which include loss of life and physical and psychological injury to the primary victims. Data from the WHO suggests that almost one third of the estimated global violence-related deaths in 2000 were due to homicides. In some countries with easy access to weapons, the tolls have been particularly high. For example, Colombia has experienced over 500,000 deaths due to common and organized crime since 1979, which amounts to 17,600 deaths per year. Over 80 per cent of these have been due to gun violence.¹⁸⁵ The incidence of homicide is often exacerbated by civil conflicts that make weapons more available to the general population.

Figure 3.21
Expected relationship between democracy and violent crime from different perspectives

Source: LaFree and Tseloni, 2006, p33



Secondary victims include family and friends, often referred to as homicide survivors, who often experience negative psychological and physical effects, including intense grief and impairment of social functioning. These impacts are borne out by recent research on the clinical implications of homicide to surviving family and friends. They suggest staggering psychological costs that require long-term professional treatment. Worldwide, homicide survivors often experience post-traumatic stress disorder, with significant impacts on the children of homicide victims. It is clear, therefore, that one violent crime can have many victims, including shattered families.

Tertiary victims include communities and society, generally, which can experience profound shocks to health-care, social services and economic systems. The costs of crime play out very differently for individuals and their families across the world, especially when compared between developed and developing nations. For example, UNOCD compared the discounted value of the lost economic productivity costs of a typical homicide victim in Cape Town (South Africa) as US\$15,319 relative to a typical homicide in New Zealand as US\$829,000, with the difference stemming from the much higher predicted income for the latter individual. However, the death or injury of the individual in Cape Town is liable to be economically profound since there are likely to be more family members directly dependent upon the victim than in New Zealand, which also has more public and private safety nets.¹⁸⁶

Impacts on most vulnerable victims

Violent crimes such as homicide and armed robbery eat away at the social and cultural fabric of communities by threatening the covenant of trust binding people together. This is often manifested in the isolation of individuals from each other and from work, educational and healthcare opportunities, all necessary elements to building social and human capital. The most vulnerable citizens, such as the poor, elderly, women and children, are victimized in multiple ways: some become stranded in their own homes at night, some retreat into depression, while others give up life and career opportunities. For example, one author describes the experience of her neighbours in Guayaquil (Ecuador) having to live with the daily terror of violent robbers such that in one six-month period 'one in five women had been attacked by young men armed with knives, machetes or hand guns'. In speaking about the impacts of these acts, she notes that 'the streets were no longer safe after dark, so girls and young women were dropping out of night school, exacerbating their social isolation'.¹⁸⁷ In this way, violent crime tends to compound already existing patterns of discrimination against women and girls. As Box 3.4 suggests, violent crime often highlights social justice gaps between the wealthy and the vulnerable poor, and tests citizens' confidence in the willingness of public authorities to listen to them.

Some groups, such as women and those living in impoverished communities, are particularly vulnerable to violent crime. While men are the primary users of guns, women suffer disproportionately from gun violence as they

are rarely gun purchasers, owners or users. The International Action Network on Small Arms estimates that, globally, 30,000 women and girls are murdered by small arms each year, while millions of others are injured by guns and sexually abused at gun point.¹⁸⁸ Even if they are not directly victims, women become indirectly victimized when male relatives who are economic providers are murdered. This undermines families, and the effects ripple throughout communities and, ultimately, through states and globally. When viewed in psychological and economic terms, the direct and indirect impacts on children are incalculable, with many killed, injured or left economically adrift. Thus, it is worth restating that a single incident can have an enormous multiplier effect.¹⁸⁹

Economic studies suggest that domestic violence has negative impacts on productivity at broad scales. A study calculating the costs of domestic violence in terms of lost productive capacity for women found that the extrapolated total costs were US\$1.73 billion in Chile (1 per cent of GDP in 1997) and US\$32.7 million in Nicaragua (1.4 per cent of GDP in 1997).¹⁹⁰ In subsequent research, the direct medical costs plus lost productivity were calculated at being equivalent to 2 per cent of GDP in Chile and 1.6 per cent of GDP in Nicaragua.¹⁹¹ As might be expected, the costs of IPV are considerably higher in low- to moderate-income nations than in high-income countries. Unlike wealthy nations where costs of violence can be absorbed by resilient social and economic structures, in low- to moderate-income nations, the costs of violence are likely to be absorbed through direct public expenditures and negative effects on investments and economic growth.

Impacts of the fear of crime

Increased fear of crime of all types, but particularly violent crimes such as murder, has a major impact and can be even more paralyzing and costly than actual criminal events. For instance, a World Bank study in Zambia found that fear of crime in one poverty-stricken community was preventing teachers from showing up at work.¹⁹² Similarly, a study of the 'timing' of work concluded that higher homicide rates reduced the propensity of people willing to work evenings and nights in large American metropolitan areas.¹⁹³ In South Africa, about 24 per cent of respondents to a national crime survey reported that fear of crime stopped them from using public transportation systems, with more than 25 per cent indicating that they were reluctant to allow their children to walk to school, while more than 30 per cent stopped using public parks.¹⁹⁴

Although not easily quantified, these decisions translate into social quality of life and economic costs to individuals in terms of lost opportunities and added day-to-day expenditures for transportation and educational and urban services. Other 'hidden' costs of the fear of crime affecting the quality of urban life play out in the choices that individuals make in seemingly mundane decisions, such as deciding whether to walk somewhere at night, or in more fundamental ways, such as choosing where to live. In Nairobi, survey data reveals that more than half of the

Box 3.4 Serial murder in a New Delhi slum

The vulnerability of the poor is illustrated by a recent case in New Delhi (India), where an alleged serial murderer is reputed to have killed and dismembered as many as 17 women and children and disposed of their body parts in a sewer drain behind his home. The victims were all impoverished and the alleged killer is a wealthy businessman living in an upscale suburb. Police reportedly discounted reports by relatives about their missing family members until a public outcry was raised after some of the bodies were discovered behind the reputed murderer's home. One resident, who came from a nearby slum, came looking for her 16-year-old son, who had been missing for four months, and said: 'When I told the police he had disappeared, they told me to look for myself. Things would have been different if I'd been rich. Then I could have bribed them to make them investigate.'

Source: Gentleman, 2007

citizens worry about crime all the time or very often.¹⁹⁵ In a national survey conducted in South Africa, 26 per cent of respondents stated that concerns about crime prevented them from starting their own business. Such psychological impacts obviously affect individuals, but also drain resources from social service and healthcare systems.

The impacts of these decisions do not fully take into account the social and economic costs of lost work productivity, access to markets, urban sprawl (especially in developed nations) or losses incurred from misused public infrastructure, all by-products of work timing and travel decision-making. These costs are compounded in developing and transitional nations, where crime and violence can have disastrous effects on victims who are unable to access effective criminal justice or insurance systems that are widely available in industrialized countries. Both systems provide measures of indemnification against crime and violence that, in personal and financial terms, are crucial components of human resilience or the ability of people to successfully adapt to elemental life disruptions.

National impacts of crime and violence

At national levels, high homicide and violent crime rates have multiple impacts. Some of these may be illustrated by economic and healthcare indicators. The former is demonstrated in Kingston (Jamaica), where rising urban homicide rates have been cited as a factor affecting national tourism, with negative economic consequences at every level of society. The World Bank has identified the impact of crime on business as one of the major reasons for Jamaica's weak economic development.¹⁹⁶ The upsurge in violence and insecurity that characterized Kenya during the 1990s resulted in the reduction of both the influx of tourists and the contribution of tourism to foreign exchange earnings.¹⁹⁷ A similar phenomenon is noted in Papua New Guinea, where violent crime, particularly in some suburbs of Port Moresby, discourages tourists from exploring the country.¹⁹⁸ Urban crime in Papua New Guinea is seen as the most important of all business costs.¹⁹⁹ Much of the brain drain in Latin American and Caribbean nations has been attributed to fear of crime and insecurity, compounded by the lack of effective responses from state or civil society.²⁰⁰ Countries such as the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana,

Increased fear of crime of all types, but particularly violent crimes such as murder, has a major impact and can be even more paralyzing and costly than actual criminal events

Haiti, Jamaica and Mexico have been hard hit, as a large proportion of educated individuals migrate to North America and the UK.²⁰¹ Similarly, increasing levels of crime and violence played a key role in the emigration of many South African professionals to countries such as Australia, New Zealand, the UK and Canada during the 1990s.

■ Impacts of contact crimes on economic and health systems

At national levels, high crime rates are identified as major impediments to foreign investment, and also affect capital flight and the reluctance of people to invest in their own countries. Recent research in Africa showed that more than 29 per cent of business people surveyed report that crime was a significant investment constraint.²⁰² Investors generally worry about violent crime and corruption since they fear direct losses to enterprises, and about the safety of their expatriate employees. They are also concerned about the impacts of corruption on business investment.²⁰³ Findings from Latin America show that the financial burden of violence is equivalent to 25 per cent of the GDP in Colombia and El Salvador; 12 per cent in Mexico and Venezuela; 11 per cent in Brazil; and 5 per cent of the GDP in Peru.²⁰⁴ Other research in Latin America concludes that crime has substantially reduced the performance of enterprises and has had a particularly serious impact on sales growth.²⁰⁵

High homicide and violent crime rates are also associated with increased healthcare costs and social services costs. For example, the collapse of the Brazilian public hospital system in the 1980s and 1990s has been attributed to the weight of the high number of homicides and criminal injuries. The 'combination of mental health, social work, physical rehabilitation and surgeries' overwhelmed the system's resources.²⁰⁶ High homicide and violent crime also affect the provision of police services. These incidents are generally expensive and time-consuming crimes for police to investigate, and add further stress to many overburdened and under-resourced national criminal justice systems.

■ Impacts of property crime on buildings and property values

The impacts of crime on urban society are also manifested in damage to buildings and infrastructure. Together, these costs represent a significant, albeit incalculable, economic loss worldwide. To understand the full cost of property damage requires knowledge of the total number of crimes actually committed. This is not possible. Consequently, indirect methods that use survey data, multipliers to adjust differences between police data and survey results, and data extrapolation are commonly employed to provide estimates of the extent of the problem.

Research on the economic impacts of crime on property values in London found that criminal damage (graffiti, vandalism and arson) had a negative effect on property prices.²⁰⁷ Using UK-based multipliers, Australian estimates of the costs of burglaries drawing on police data and surveys suggest an average property loss and damage of AU\$1100 for residential burglaries and AU\$2400 for non-

residential incidents, for total losses estimated at AU\$1.3 billion, of which AU\$0.9 billion was identified for residential burglaries alone.²⁰⁸ Including lost output (but not medical costs), the total costs of burglaries for the country were estimated at AU\$2.43 billion. Cost for other property crimes, such as criminal damage (vandalism) and arson total almost AU\$2.7 billion, including lost output, intangible costs and the costs of fire protection and ambulance services. One point that is clear from the existing evidence is that the true costs of property crime damage are complex inasmuch as they involve many associated costs, such as work output, municipal services, decreased property values and quality of life, which are all challenging to quantify.

Local impacts of crime and violence

While crime and violence have global, regional and national impacts, the impacts are very much manifested and felt at the city and neighbourhood levels. The impact of crime and violence at such local levels relates to the 'defensible space' and provides insights into how cities and neighbourhoods can be better designed to reduce the factors that contribute to crime and violence.

■ Impacts of crime on urban flight

In terms of the impacts on cities, there is convincing evidence that rising crime rates, especially violent crime, influence population and commercial flight from central city locations, with more affluent households and those with children more likely to leave.²⁰⁹ Also known as 'human capital flight', the educated and employed middle classes flee sections of the city with high crime rates. This perpetuates an environment in which the proportion of law-abiding citizens is diminished compared to those individuals regularly engaged in criminal activity. Similarly, many businesses have left central city locations because of crime. Although substantial, the costs of such losses have rarely been quantified. On the opposite side of the equation, there is evidence that reduced crime rates are significantly associated with rising property values in some cities, an important economic variable bearing on investment decisions and the creation of societal wealth.²¹⁰

■ Impacts of robbery

As suggested above, the flight of the middle class from sections of the city affected by crime leaves impoverished populations often concentrated in such areas. The effects are cumulative since crimes, such as robbery and armed robbery, are associated with the number of motivated offenders in any one area. Furthermore, high rates of robbery contribute to a downward spiral of low property values and serve as a deterrent to investment, thereby leading to greater levels of poverty and deprivation. The result is that poor neighbourhoods are the hardest hit by a range of crimes. In this context, a connection between lesser property crimes, such as theft, and more serious crimes, such as armed robbery in poor neighbourhoods, has been proposed in the following sequence:

High homicide and violent crime rates are also associated with increased healthcare costs and social services costs

High rates of robbery ... serve as a deterrent to investment, thereby leading to greater levels of poverty and deprivation

- Poor areas provide customers, who, for economic reasons, are willing to purchase second-hand and questionable goods.
- Because there are willing customers, poor areas provide places to sell secondhand and questionable goods.
- Markets for such goods encourage property offenders to be active in poor areas.
- Proceeds from property offences are used in drug or other illegal transactions.
- Such transactions fuel more serious crimes, such as armed robbery and assaults.²¹¹

Besides the effects on specific victims, high robbery and violent crime rates affect cities by leaving some areas desolate, especially in the evenings, thereby adversely affecting the local economy. In communities, generally, but especially in high crime risk areas, fear of violence discourages pedestrians and reduces the attractiveness of public spaces. As such, it has a cumulative effect by diminishing surveillance possibilities, or 'eyes on the street', which increases risks to offenders of being observed, caught, prosecuted or, in informal systems, retaliated against. Although there remains significant debate on its efficacy, depending upon other circumstances, increased surveillance may discourage street crime generally, including contact crimes such as armed robbery.

■ Impacts of burglary

Although often committed against vehicles, burglary is the most common property crime connected to the built environment. High burglary rates have implications for neighbourhoods, cities and nations. Commercial and residential properties are frequent targets for burglaries, and data shows that, on average, one out of five urban residents worldwide report being victimized within a five-year period.²¹² Burglaries have significant direct and indirect consequences for victims, especially where there are no indemnification systems and where victims suffer significant long-term psychological effects. In one study, nearly 40 per cent of burglary victims stated that they had been very much affected and 68 per cent indicated that they felt angry as a result of burglaries and attempted burglaries. Shock, fear and difficulty in sleeping were also fairly common experiences of burglary victims.²¹³ The enduring psychological effects of burglary on its victims are just as severe as the effects related to violent crimes, such as assault and robbery.

Evidence suggests that burglars target properties that are expected to yield loot with the highest market value and some neighbourhoods become known for burglary incidents, which may depress property values, although this relationship is quite complicated. Some research has shown that other property crimes, such as criminal damage to buildings in the form of vandalism, graffiti and arson, have a larger negative impact on property values than burglary inasmuch as they are overt indicators of community deterioration that generate fear and drive off investment.²¹⁴

One manifestation of the failure of public agencies to adequately address the fear and incidence of serious property and contact crimes, such as burglary and robbery, is

the global explosion of privatized gated areas and private security forces. Many cities in developing countries have witnessed the proliferation of private security as a means of safeguarding residences and commercial enterprises. In Caracas, 73 per cent of the population have private security for their homes, while 39 per cent made contributions in terms of money and time to community and neighbourhood watch initiatives designed to reduce crime.²¹⁵ In South Africa, the number of private security guards has increased by 150 per cent since 1997, while the number of police officials has declined by 2.2 per cent during the same period.²¹⁶ In Kenya, the private security industry is one of the fastest growing businesses.²¹⁷ The proliferation of private security firms in Kenya coincides with the upsurge in crime, particularly in Nairobi during the mid 1980s. Prior to then, private security firms were a rarity. It is important to note that the use of private security in cities of developing countries is no longer the sole preserve of wealthy households: it is becoming increasingly common in informal and low-income settlements where crime is widespread.

Characterized as a 'common interest' approach to security, guarded and gated communities are found in developed nations such as the US, where they are prevalent across the south, southwest and west,²¹⁸ and in the UK, where they are growing at a significant pace in the London Metropolitan area and in the southeast of England.²¹⁹ They are also increasingly found in transitional and developing nations. Indeed, the high rates of violent crimes and the fear of crime are important in explaining the emergence of gated communities in Latin American and Caribbean cities.²²⁰ While security concerns have been advanced as a primary rationale for their increase, they are certainly not the sole reasons. Prestige, lifestyle choice, perceived urban service delivery advantages (including better policing), as well as increased land and home values, are also identified as factors contributing to their growth, depending upon local contexts.²²¹

Definitions of gated communities vary widely, but they tend to share the following functional characteristics: separation from neighbouring land by fences, walls, or by other constructed or natural obstructions, including symbolic barriers; filtered entry using mechanical, electronic or human guardianship as access-control elements; and, generally, privatized internal gathering areas and circulation systems, which may include roads, sidewalks and footpaths.

As noted, a primary rationale for gated and guarded communities is enhanced security, and some studies suggests that gating has limited short-term benefits in reducing specific crimes.²²² But research also indicates that the effects of gating tend to decay over time as offenders adapt and as environmental and social conditions change.²²³ More significant impacts of gating are seen in the real and potential spatial and social fragmentation of cities, leading to the diminished use and availability of public space and increased socio-economic polarization. In this context, gating has been characterized as having counterintuitive impacts, even increasing crime and the fear of crime as the middle classes abandon public streets to the vulnerable poor, to street

One manifestation of the failure of public agencies to adequately address the fear and incidence of serious property and contact crimes... is the global explosion of privatized gated areas and private security forces

Abused children and those who grow up in violent family settings stand a much greater risk of becoming offenders than those who have not had such experiences

children and families, and to the offenders who prey on them. Such results also tend to broaden gaps between classes inasmuch as wealthier citizens living in relatively homogeneous urban enclaves protected by private security forces have less need or opportunity to interact with poorer counterparts.

Despite these generally negative assessments and impacts, the growth of gated, privately guarded enclaves remains a fact of life. Some states and communities have regulated gating through planning and design ordinances or through general law, as in South Africa's Gauteng Province.²²⁴ Whether regulated or not, it is clear that the global expansion of guarded and bounded private communities is sobering evidence that citizen confidence in the power of the state to ensure security is, at best, fragile, especially in places where fear of crime is high, where public authorities are seen as ineffectual and where economic factors favour self-help solutions.

Neighbourhoods seen as high risk for burglaries, robberies and other forms of violence gain reputations that impede outsiders' desire to travel, work and live there, and lessen the ability of residents to receive social services, such as a decent education or healthcare, which are fundamental to the building of human capital. Moreover, residents of such neighbourhoods become stigmatized and may be excluded from outside employment opportunities. In some instances, communities are isolated from the outside world, as in the case of *favelas* in Brazil whose drug bosses cut off territorial access to outsiders, and especially those from 'enemy' *favelas*.²²⁵ Distressed communities such as these tend to aggregate pathologies, such as the concentration of offenders, which contribute to long-term stigmatization of areas and unsustainable conditions.

■ Impacts of intimate partner violence and child abuse

While the aggregate effects on cities are difficult to measure, it is clear that IPV and child abuse destroy social and human capital and contribute to the rising numbers of street families and children in transitional and developing nations. Many women who are victims of IPV not only experience negative physical and psychological effects, but are also affected financially due to lost productivity from paid work, medical care costs, mental healthcare costs, property loss and legal costs. They are also likely to earn less than women who suffer no such violence.²²⁶ Abused children and those who grow up in violent family settings stand a much greater risk of becoming offenders than those who have not had such experiences. Furthermore, abused children often perform poorly in school, thereby adversely affecting their lifetime opportunities.²²⁷ Thus, the impacts of IPV and child abuse violence reverberate across time and affect the economic prospects of families and communities for generations. By diverting resources to public and private policing and to incarceration, communities are less able to mobilize sustained collaborative efforts to grapple with the needs of battered and abused children and IPV victims. Furthermore, children who are exposed to IPV are more likely to abuse drugs and alcohol, run away from home, join

gangs and commit crimes. This ultimately diverts resources from social and human capital building programmes and services in terms of schools, libraries and medical facilities into criminal justice operations, such as increased policing and incarceration.

■ Impacts of the prevalence of street children

Street children are both victims and perpetrators of crime in cities due to survival needs and exposure to cultures of violence, including deviant peer behaviour. There is evidence that their increasing numbers in some cities are related to trafficking and organized crime. For instance, a study on beggars in Bangkok (Thailand) revealed an organized racket of child beggars built on children from poor families trafficked from Cambodia and Burma, who are forced to beg by their brokers.²²⁸ The children make nothing from their takings and are sometimes beaten. This example highlights the economic exploitation of street children, and implies that the growth in the number of street children has an economic dimension.

Street children have little education, are sexually active at a very early stage and, as such, stand a high risk of contracting sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV/AIDS. The females among them fall victims to teenage pregnancy, thus becoming teenage mothers and perpetuating a cycle of life on the streets. Street children are also at a higher risk than other children of abusing drugs, especially inhalants such as paint, glue, solvents or aerosols, which are inexpensive, readily available and generally legal substances.²²⁹ Street children have contributed to increasing the levels of crime and notoriety of the areas where they are found. In Kenya, they have made the streets of Nairobi highly insecure, where they specialize in mugging, purse and jewellery snatching, pick pocketing, removing of side mirrors from slow-moving or stationary vehicles in traffic hold-ups, and the extortion of money from passers-by with the threat to smear them with human waste should they refuse.²³⁰

From the foregoing, it is therefore not surprising that public opinion of street children is overwhelmingly negative, with many viewing street children as criminals, unsightly and a menace to society. Public attitudes are often reflected in abuses by police, and violence against street children is reportedly widespread in several countries, including Bulgaria, Brazil, Guatemala, India and Kenya.²³¹ Their growing numbers and needs in terms of healthcare, education, social services and security dwarf the capacities of urban governmental agencies in most developing and transitional nations.

Impacts of organized crime

As noted in the section on 'The incidence and variability of crime and violence', corruption and organized crime, especially at the grand scale, are often connected. Moreover, the impacts of organized crime vary from global to local levels, and data availability and format do not offer easy ways of separating these distinctions. In the following subsections, the interconnected impacts on cities of organized

crime in terms of corruption, as well as drug, arms and human trafficking are examined. Thereafter, the impacts of youth gangs on city spaces and services are briefly reviewed. It is difficult to disentangle these subjects (e.g. the prevalence of youth gangs in some cities is related to the supply of illicit weapons and drugs supplied by adult-organized gangs), and while separating them may be useful analytically, this can only provide a hint as to how they actually interact in cities across the globe.

■ Impacts of corruption

According to the World Bank, corruption is the largest single obstacle to development. In Africa, corruption is perceived to be even more important than other types of crime and violence as a disincentive to entrepreneurial investment.²³² Corruption subverts the ability of governments and city authorities to provide fair municipal services by distorting planning and allocation processes. It is a significant factor for those living in informal settlements since residents are generally not recognized by urban authorities as having rights to basic services, such as water, sanitation and electricity. Access to such amenities is therefore often dependent upon negotiations, which entail the paying of bribes or favours to local officials.²³³ Urban residents generally bear the brunt of corruption because they require more services from officials.

The impact of corruption is also evident in the registration of land and construction of housing. In many cities of developing countries, the registration of land, the planning approval process and the inspection of housing construction are fraught with numerous bureaucratic bottlenecks. For instance, in Nigeria, the process of registering a property is circuitous, involving 21 procedures, which takes about 274 days.²³⁴ At each juncture, this process provides ample avenues for government officials to extract bribes from prospective builders. This has resulted in the approval of shoddy plans and ineffective inspection during the construction process, during which many deficiencies are overlooked. This phenomenon partly accounts for the frequent collapse of buildings that have occurred in cities such as Lagos and Nairobi.

Corruption in many countries is particularly evident in large-scale infrastructure projects, such as the construction of roads, bridges and dams. These provide multiple opportunities for both grand and petty corruption and many entry points for organized crime. In this context, it has been suggested that:

*Bribes are paid to secure concessions and kickbacks are provided in exchange for contracts. Bid rigging occurs, shell companies are established and procurement documents are falsified. Sub-standard materials are used in construction, regulators are paid off, and prices for infrastructure services are inflated. Compensation for forcibly displaced communities ends up in the pockets of bribe-seeking local officials.*²³⁵

The operation and maintenance of existing infrastructure, which is a crucial aspect of urban management, can be harmed by corruption. Expenditures that would normally be used in maintaining existing facilities are directed towards new infrastructure projects. In extreme cases, the maintenance of existing infrastructure is deliberately neglected so that it falls into a state of disrepair to the point that it has to be rebuilt, thereby providing the opportunity for highly placed officials to extort kickbacks from enterprises that will rebuild the infrastructure.²³⁶ The question arises as to whether balanced local and community planning can take place in an environment skewed to new infrastructure that continually funnels cash into new projects at the expense of maintaining existing infrastructure.

■ Impacts of drugs on neighbourhoods and livelihoods

Organized drug trafficking reaches into communities where local settings for transactions may include outdoor drug markets on street corners or other public places that provide ideal environments for recruiting new drug users. Easy access, escape routes and vantage points from which to survey the surroundings are common environmental attributes. Such areas often provide physical and place management cues to offenders and to residents, and they attain reputations for criminal activity, often becoming no-go zones. For these reasons, the neighbourhoods in which they are located may be excluded from, or demoted on redevelopment priority lists. In other cases, such as in the *favelas* of Rio de Janeiro, drug bosses actively restrict the mobility of residents, police and public officials, cutting off access to justice systems, schools, health agencies and recreational centres.²³⁷ They accomplish this by the use of physical barriers, intimidation and death threats, with the latter enforced against residents of 'enemy' *favelas* who trespass.

Drug distribution networks in cities are varied and range from centralized complex organizations to relatively simple decentralized ones, such as those common in Central America. In a growing number of cases, such networks illustrate the evolution of gangs that have moved from being structured around identity and territory issues to those that are primarily profit-driven, highly organized criminal enterprises, whose activities include not only retail drug distribution, but also other aspects of the trade, including smuggling, transportation and wholesale distribution. Such schemes provide varying levels of income to participants and even provide benefits to some communities, particularly in the absence of assistance from formal institutions. For example, drug trafficking was a major factor accounting for infrastructure improvements in a Managua *barrio*, and was crucial to its economic survival beyond the 'mere subsistence' level.²³⁸ But drug trafficking was also responsible for significantly increased violence in the neighbourhood and increased urban segregation from below, as distinct from that prompted by elites from above.²³⁹ This illustrates the more general point that drug trafficking is often a double-edged sword from the points of view of many distressed communities. It provides benefits, including economic survival options for some residents, while simultaneously

Corruption subverts the ability of governments and city authorities to provide fair municipal services by distorting planning and allocation processes

Drug distribution networks in cities are varied and range from centralized complex organizations to relatively simple decentralized ones, such as those common in Central America

contributing to neighbourhood deterioration through increased violent crimes, which also acts to distance these communities from mainstream urban society.

■ Impacts of arms trafficking on violence in cities

The impact of the widespread availability of arms on cities is variable, although reasonably predictable relative to distressed communities globally. In some nations, such as the US, legal gun ownership is widely dispersed throughout urban neighbourhoods, while in the UK, legal gun ownership is far more restricted. In Brazil, gun ownership is relatively restricted among the general population; but some dangerous *favelas* have significant numbers of small arms that are illegally purchased, pilfered from government arsenals or traded among drug gangs.²⁴⁰ Generally, the use of both legal and illicit firearms in the commission of violent crime is more likely to take place in, or adjacent to, distressed low-income neighbourhoods rather than high-income areas. Such incidents tend to increase compartmentalization and the segregation of the former neighbourhoods as a result of fear generated by perceptions and realities of gun crime. Urban spaces that may be shunned as being dangerous are made more undesirable by the belief that weapons are available and used in such areas. This further discourages private investment, new business and the social integration of such neighbourhoods within the wider urban community, heightening cycles of violence and impoverishment.

The spatial and temporal distribution of gun violence contributes to its perception as an issue by the general public and the media in many nations. While gun violence may be concentrated in certain neighbourhoods, it also typically spreads over time and space within these areas, especially when compared with other hazards that attract public attention. India reports that more than 6000 individuals per year are killed by small arms – twice the death toll of the 11 September 2001 attacks,²⁴¹ and in the US, more than 30,000 persons each year are killed by guns. While major catastrophes galvanize media and public attention, ongoing diffused ones, such as those related to gun violence, are more costly in terms of lives and, arguably, the social and economic well-being of communities and states. Moreover, since the victims and perpetrators of gun violence tend to be the poor and marginalized, there is less sustained public and media focus directed towards this issue, at least until it rises to the level of perceived national crisis, as it has in Jamaica.

■ Impacts of human trafficking

The impacts of human trafficking at local and community levels are difficult to sort out from those at national levels since there is little research that clearly draws this distinction. It is certain, however, that there are multiple and very costly consequences for cities based on the sheer numbers of people trafficked globally and their transit routes, often taking them through or to cities. The role of organized criminal elements is clearly seen in this activity, although in many cases, this is aided and abetted by normal labour migration patterns, by local norms and values, and by crushing levels of poverty affecting the families of trafficking victims.²⁴²

Beyond the incalculable costs to trafficked individuals, who are denied their basic human rights, there are health and urban service costs to cities that can only be approximated. For example, human trafficking greatly increases prospects for prostitution and sex tourism, especially in large cities where rural women and girls are often transported by traffickers. Such activities hasten the spread of disease and crimes associated with the sex industry. A recent study by an Indian NGO, the Nedan Foundation, suggests that increased human trafficking in India's northeast region 'opens up huge possibilities for the spread of HIV'.²⁴³ Human trafficking also increases the costs of policing and the provision of social services since many victims have no resources, little education and cannot sustain themselves without government or private assistance when (and if) they are set free.

Human trafficking not only increases the healthcare costs of cities in developing countries that are already overstressed, it threatens the building of human and social capital by playing a key role in the destabilization of families. For instance, there is evidence linking child trafficking with the breakdown of family units resulting from divorce or death of a parent. Children from such families in some West African countries are at higher risk of being trafficked than children from two-parent households. Studies of trafficked children in Togo and Cameroon found that significant proportions were from households where one or both parents had died. This evidence has prompted some researchers to suggest a connection between child trafficking and HIV/AIDS – a rapidly increasing cause of orphanage in sub-Saharan Africa.²⁴⁴ Thus, trafficking is an important link in a pernicious cycle of family and, ultimately, community devastation.

■ Impacts of youth gangs on city spaces and services

Within cities, youth gangs often help to shape and redistribute urban space, dividing city territories into zones using real and symbolic markers. This is one thread in the splintering of urban landscapes, which has left some cities with a net loss of truly public space, balanced between the private enclaves of the wealthy and the no-go zones of the poor. Urban youth gangs protect and defend their territories, giving renewed emphasis to the notion of defensible space as predicated by some crime prevention theorists.²⁴⁵ For example, Nicaraguan *pandillas*, or youth gangs, are associated with particular urban neighbourhoods throughout the nation's cities and, especially, in Managua. They consist of age and geographical subgroups and are associated with significant violence in defence of their perceived neighbourhoods. One rule shared among the many *pandillas* is to not prey on local neighbours and to protect them from outside harm. One gang member is quoted as saying:

*You show the neighbourhood that you love it by putting yourself in danger for people, by protecting them from others... You look after the neighbourhood; you help them keep them safe.*²⁴⁶

Generally, the use of both legal and illicit firearms in the commission of violent crime is more likely to take place in, or adjacent to, distressed low-income neighbourhoods rather than high-income areas

Within cities, youth gangs often help to shape and redistribute urban space, dividing city territories into zones using real and symbolic markers

But gangs are not limited by local territorial concerns or identity issues. For instance, local gang membership may be a portal through which members gain entry to inter-city and even international membership. This is the case with the Mara Salvatrucha gang, also known as MS-13, which originated in the US, but is now active in many Central American countries as well. The *Mungiki* movement in Kenya, as described in Box 3.5, offers an example of a complex combination of territorial, mythical, economic and political dimensions in a group that has attracted many disaffected urban youth. Inspired by the *Mau Mau* movement and by anti-Western, anti-colonialist sentiment, the *Mungiki* are reputed to be engaged in forcefully managing Nairobi's public transport system and in offering protection to large swathes of the informal settlements that make up 60 per cent of the city. The movement is organized and large enough to attract the attention of politicians by providing security services that are perceived by residents to be better than those available through public agencies. This has potentially dire implications for citizens' confidence in public justice systems and for the provision of public services throughout city districts.²⁴⁷

Impacts of terrorism on cities

'Urban acts of terror ... destroy what development has built, in relation to both the physical and social fabric and cause cities to regress in development terms'.²⁴⁸ The current documentation and analytical focus of the impacts of terrorism tend to be skewed towards developed countries, especially since the events of 9/11. However, the impacts of the 9/11 attack on New York City, shown in Table 3.6, provide a good example of the economic impacts of acts of terror within cities – in terms of the loss of jobs and damage to physical capital and infrastructure – whether in developed or developing countries. The table shows that the total labour and capital loss in monetary terms to New York City as of June 2002 amounted to between US\$33 and US\$36 billion.

Although not clearly understood or documented, as in the case of developed countries, the effects of terrorism on cities in developing countries are likely to be exacerbated by high levels of poverty, rapid pace of urbanization and unplanned expansion of cities, as well as the inability to effectively respond to, and recover after severe terrorist attacks.²⁴⁹

One of the most profound impacts of urban terrorism is the loss of lives. Estimates for the attacks of 9/11 reveal a death toll of over 3,500.²⁵⁰ The March 2004 bombings of Madrid resulted in 191 deaths, while that of Mumbai in July 2006 led to the loss of 209 lives. In situations where victims are breadwinners and have dependants, the effects are further compounded, as secondary victims – family members and friends – experience economic loss and adverse psychological effects. In the more developed countries, part of the economic loss suffered by victims' families is covered by private insurance, given that many primary victims would have taken life-insurance policies.²⁵¹ This is not the case in developing countries, where very few people take out life-insurance policies, and, as such, it is highly unlikely that

families of the bomb blast victims in Mumbai or Baghdad would have benefited from any form of indemnity on account of the death of their breadwinner.

Physical infrastructure plays a fundamental role in development. Its destruction during acts of terrorism therefore reduces the productive capacity of cities. The damage and destruction of physical capital and infrastructure constitutes one of the most important or direct impacts of acts of terrorism in urban areas. With respect to 9/11, the most direct impact was the destruction of Lower Manhattan. Specifically, the following were destroyed or damaged: 2.8 million square metres of office space — representing 30 per cent of class-A real estate; more than 100 retail stores in the World Trade Center area; subway tunnels (Lines 1 and 9); the Port Authority Trans-Hudson train station; the streets within the vicinity of the attack sites; and parts of the telecommunication and power infrastructure, including a switching facility and substations.²⁵² The extent of the physical destruction that followed the 9/11 attack has been likened to that of an earthquake or a similar major natural disaster.²⁵³ Table 3.6 shows that in monetary terms, the

The damage and destruction of physical capital and infrastructure constitutes one of the most important or direct impacts of acts of terrorism in urban areas

Box 3.5 The *Mungiki* movement in Nairobi, Kenya

In Nairobi, the *Mungiki* movement has an important political dimension, in part owing to the sheer numbers involved in the movement. The movement is estimated to have anywhere between 200,000 and 2 million members (the actual number is difficult to assess given the movement's secretive nature). However, it is clear that the movement commands enough numbers to draw the attention of politicians. In some constituencies, where there are large numbers of *Mungiki* members, capturing the movement's votes is a clear attraction to politicians.

For example, during the 2002 general elections in Kenya, *Mungiki* members thronged the streets of Nairobi to express solidarity with one of the candidates for presidency. The police stood by as the crude weapons-wielding *Mungiki* members took charge of the central business district. This is a clear pointer to the likelihood of politicians enlisting *Mungiki*'s support to terrorize opponents into submission. Prominent politicians were reported in the press as having called on the sect's members to 'parade up and defend' the ruling party, causing worry to members of the public, and this is part of the reason why there was widespread fear of electoral violence in 2002. The involvement of *Mungiki* in the political process is mainly because of the more insidious aspect of the movement's political cum 'protection' dimension. Anecdotal evidence suggests that in the informal settlements where the group has controlled security arrangements, local residents actually benefited from improved security. The movement's rough form of justice appears to serve as a deterrent to criminals.

What *Mungiki* has been able to do is to step into a power vacuum and demonstrate an ability to deliver a vital security service better than state agencies, at least from some locals' perspectives, even though they have to pay *Mungiki* some 'taxes' for this. In addition to providing security, it is alleged that the group makes illegal connections of electricity and water, which they force inhabitants of informal settlements to buy. They also constitute kangaroo courts for dispensing their own idea of justice. During the second week of November 2006, the group allegedly unleashed mayhem and untold violence in Mathare slum in Nairobi, which led to several deaths, displacement of many people, wanton destruction of property and disruption of livelihoods.

The entrenchment of such a situation has uncertain implications for society and therefore calls for serious reflection and intervention on the part of government and concerned citizens. The issue should be viewed not as a matter relating only to *Mungiki*, but more importantly to the conditions in society that give rise to similar situations. Mob justice is such a case: citizens take the law into their own hands because of an apparent vacuum in the existing criminal justice system; but such circumstances increasingly lead to repression and are inefficient in the long term.

Source: Masese, 2007

Table 3.6

Impact of the World Trade Center attack on New York City as of June 2002

Source: Bram et al, 2002, p12

| Impact | Estimated magnitude | Notes |
|---|--|---|
| <i>Labour market</i> | | |
| Loss of human life | Estimated 2780 workers, US\$7.8 billion lifetime-earnings loss | Losses estimated as present discounted value of lifetime earnings; federal Victim Compensation Fund set up to help offset earnings losses and psychological impacts on families |
| Net job losses | 38,000–46,000 in October 2001, rising to 49,000–71,000 by February 2002, diminishing to 28,000–55,000 by June 2002 | Most of the employment losses related to the attack were in finance, airlines, hotels and restaurants |
| Net earnings losses | US\$3.6 billion to US\$6.4 billion between September 2001 and June 2002 | Based on estimates of net job losses and reduced hours |
| Attack-related productivity effects | Some increase in post-traumatic stress disorder and alcohol and drug use three months after attack | Difficult to quantify attack's impact on workers' mental and physical disabilities |
| Total labour loss | US\$11.4–14.2 billion | |
| <i>Physical capital</i> | | |
| Cleanup and site restoration | US\$1.5 billion | Completed June 2002; expenses covered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) |
| Destroyed buildings in World Trade Center complex | Approximately 14 million square feet, US\$6.7 billion to rebuild | Book value of towers at \$3.5 billion; complex privately insured |
| Damaged buildings in World Trade Center area | Approximately 15 million square feet, US\$4.5 billion | Inclusion of damage to Class B and C space raises estimate to 21 million square feet |
| Contents of buildings in World Trade Center complex | US\$5.2 billion | Significant offset from private insurance |
| <i>Public infrastructure</i> | | |
| Subway | US\$850 million | Estimated repair cost; significant offset from private insurance and/or FEMA for repair to all three components of infrastructure |
| PATH train station | US\$550 million | |
| Utilities | US\$2.3 billion | |
| Total capital loss | US\$21.6 billion | |
| Total (labour, capital) loss | US\$33–36 billion | |

Notes: The rounding of the total (labour and capital) loss figure acknowledges imprecision in the estimates. On the one hand, estimates of the labour loss may be understated, primarily for two reasons: the June 2002 cutoff for estimating earnings impacts and the possible earnings reductions due to a drop in the number of hours worked (in industries other than apparel and restaurants). In addition, attack-related declines in worker productivity (due, for example, to stress) may have affected employed workers and are not captured in our estimated earnings losses associated with declines in employment and hours. On the other hand, estimates of the labour loss may be overstated, because of the double counting of the earnings losses of some of the deceased workers and the assumption that the deceased workers would have worked in New York City until retirement. Furthermore, although this earnings-loss tally corresponds to New York City proper, these figures will overstate the net impact on the broader metropolitan area and the nation because many of the job 'losses' reflect job relocations from the city to the suburbs – largely northern New Jersey. Because these are aggregate loss estimates, the issue of distributional impacts is not addressed.

estimated magnitude of the loss of physical capital and infrastructure, including the cost of cleanup and restoration, was US\$26.1 billion. A significant proportion of the cost of destruction and damage has been offset by private insurance, while the Federal Emergency Management Agency covered the cost of cleanup and restoration. All these have contributed to reducing the long-term effects of the destruction of physical capital and infrastructure on New York City.

The impacts of terrorist attacks on physical infrastructure in cities of developing countries are equally devastating and the long-term effects are likely to be more pronounced, given the inadequate condition of such infrastructure in the first place. For example, it has been observed that the effects of the various violent assaults on Baghdad's infrastructure have been to reduce what was once a fairly advanced economy to 'pre-industrial age'.²⁵⁴ Furthermore, the poor state of the economy of many developing countries and the absence of indemnity to cover the cost of destruction on such a massive scale imply that recovery from severe terrorist attacks is likely to be very difficult, if not impossible.

The loss of urban employment on account of terrorist attacks is more documented in the case of developed countries, particularly in the aftermath of 9/11. Sources of livelihood have also been lost in cities of developing countries following terrorist attacks, and their effects are likely to be exacerbated, given the relatively low levels of formal sector employment. The events of 9/11 have had a disruptive effect on employment in New York City. In partic-

ular, Table 3.6 shows that the number of private sector job losses varied between 38,000 and 46,000 in October 2001, and had increased to between 49,000 and 71,000 by February 2002. These job losses varied across industries, as indicated in Box 3.6, with the most affected being financial services, restaurant, hotel, and air transportation. Other industries that were affected include business services, apparel manufacturing, printing and publishing – due to their strong concentration in Lower Manhattan.

Terrorist attacks have resulted in new and tightened security measures on public transportation systems in cities across the world. With respect to air transport in the US, some of these measures include:²⁵⁵

- About 5000 members of the US National Guard, dressed in camouflage and with M-16 rifles in hand, deployed to some 422 airports around the country.
- More (private) security personnel deployed at airports.
- Allowing only ticketed passengers in the departure gate areas.
- Better screening of passengers at airport checkpoints, for knives, cutting instruments, guns and other weapons.
- More random checks of passengers, their shoes and their carry-on luggage.
- X-raying of carry-on lap-top computers and other baggage.
- More detailed background checks on all aviation

Terrorist attacks have resulted in new and tightened security measures on public transportation systems in cities across the world

Box 3.6 Examples of employment disruptions by industry due to the 9/11 attack, New York City, US

The **financial services industry** appears to have been the most directly affected sector by far. In New York City, the number of jobs in the securities industry fell by 12,000, or 7 per cent, in October 2001, and by an additional 6000 from October 2001 to June 2002. In addition, the banking industry saw a net job loss of 8000, or 8 per cent, in October and lost another 1000 jobs through June 2002. Net job losses in these key financial industries totalled 20,000 in October and another 7000 through June 2002.

The **restaurant industry** also sustained steep job losses immediately following the attack. For the city overall, the number of jobs at bars and restaurants – which was imperceptibly affected at the national level – fell by an estimated 9000 (6 per cent) in October, but rebounded fully by December and held steady up to June 2002. However, these are net changes and do not capture the geographical distribution of employment in this industry. Thus, it is not clear if restaurant employment in the areas closest to the World Trade Center – the Financial District, Tribeca and Chinatown – has fully rebounded to pre-attack levels.

The **hotel industry** lost an estimated 6000 jobs, or 15 per cent, city-wide between September 2001 and March 2002.

Source: Bram et al, 2002, p8

This reflected the drop-off in tourism, although 5000 of those jobs were lost in October alone.

The steep decline in the number of people travelling also led to job losses in areas away from the World Trade Center site – in particular, at John F. Kennedy International Airport and LaGuardia Airport, both in the borough of Queens. The number of jobs in the city's **air transportation industry** fell by about 11,000, or 20 per cent. Almost all of this decline occurred in October and November 2001.

Although other industries, such as business services, apparel manufacturing, printing and publishing, were also presumably affected, largely because of their strong concentration in Lower Manhattan, there is no indication of any significant shift in employment trends following 11 September. However, it should be noted that many business owners and workers who did not lose their jobs evidently suffered income losses because of the disruptions in the weeks and months immediately following the attack. This is of particular concern in the restaurant and apparel industries, where workers' pay depends on business volume.

employees, and increasing restrictions on their movements on the ramps, in baggage areas and in the terminals.

- Purchasing, by airlines, of more powerful scanners that can detect explosives in baggage.
- Deployment of armed, plain clothes, Sky Marshals (security guards) on some domestic and international flights.
- Increased surveillance of baggage and baggage handlers at airports.

Increased security measures that have been undertaken with respect to seaports, bus stations and train stations are:

- Installation of more surveillance cameras to monitor daily activities.
- Deployment of more armed security guards (with guns, tear gas, pepper spray and clubs).
- Establishment of more checkpoints to scan and examine people and baggage.

Other impacts of urban terrorism include the development of an atmosphere of fear, which might be exacerbated by terror alert levels adopted in affected countries; post-traumatic stress disorder and increased depression experienced by victims of terrorist attacks; and increased spending on public security, especially in terms of surveillance, emergency planning and training of operatives in counter-terrorism. In the case of cities in developing countries, such increased spending diverts scarce resources away from productive investment in areas designed to promote growth, poverty eradication and sustainable urban development.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Although crime and violence are found in virtually all cities across all global regions, most places are safe and most citizens are neither perpetrators nor victims of crime and violence. Crime, and especially street crimes such as robbery and assaults, tends to be concentrated in certain city areas and neighbourhoods, which are often the 'worst' urban locations in terms of property value and environmental risks from disasters and hazards. Nevertheless, even though localized, crime, violence and the fear of crime remain fundamental threats to urban safety and security and to the sustainability of urban places. They are predictable and especially problematic challenges to vulnerable populations – the poor, young males, minorities, women and children – in distressed neighbourhoods, generally, and in developing and transitional countries of Latin America and Africa, where crime rates have grown dramatically within burgeoning urban centres. In this context, crime and violence rates are associated with the pace of urbanization and the size of urban populations, although these are variable predictors relative to changes in crime and violence, particularly when specific types of crimes are taken into account. Nevertheless, increasing urbanization in regions of the world that are least able to cope with existing problems portends the need for new or reinvigorated policy and programme directions to cope with crime and violence.

To be effective, these policies and programmes will need to recognize the dimensions of crime and violence at all levels and to take into account the complex risk factors that underlie them, as discussed above. Among responses that are possible in framing strategies are those aimed at better urban planning, design and governance, which incor-

porate crime prevention and reduction approaches. Some of the problems and possibilities of currently used crime prevention policies and programmes are detailed in Chapter

4, while Chapter 10 provides a view of the way forward in this field.

NOTES

- 1 Eck, 1997.
- 2 Moser et al, 2005.
- 3 Walker et al, 2006.
- 4 Thachuk, 2001.
- 5 United Nations, 2002, Guidelines for Crime Prevention, 2002, and 11th United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Bangkok, 18–25 April 2005.
- 6 UNODC (2000) 'Convention against transnational organized crime', General Assembly Resolution 55/25.
- 7 UNODC, 2004.
- 8 Helmke and Levitsky, 2004.
- 9 International Labour Organization (ILO), Papua New Guinea Red Cross Society and the US National Crime Prevention Council.
- 10 The *blat* system relies on the complex exchange of personal favours within the context of personal networks; see Butler and Purchase, 2004.
- 11 Hampton, 1982.
- 12 Schneider and Kitchen, 2007; UNODC, 2005b; Moser and McIlwaine, 2004; Levitt, 2004; ODPM (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister), 2004; Felson, 2002; Schneider and Kitchen, 2002; Monkkonen, 2001b; Clarke, 1997; Sherman et al, 1997; Clarke and Felson, 1993; Barr and Pease, 1990; Brantingham and Brantingham, 1991; Newman, 1973; Jacobs, 1961; Burgess and McKenzie, 1925.
- 13 WHO, 2002, p5.
- 14 Moser, 2004.
- 15 *Ibid*; Eversole et al, 2004.
- 16 Galtung, 1969, p171.
- 17 These include theft of car, theft from car, theft of motorcycle, theft of bicycle, burglary, attempted burglary, robbery, theft of personal property, sexual offences, sexual incidents against women, and assault/threat. Victims cannot, of course, report their own homicides, so this important index is not part of the International Crime Victimization Survey (ICVS).
- 18 Mboya, 2002. This general typology is also used by the US National Crime Victimization Survey: see www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/cvict.htm#ncvs.
- 19 Appiahene-Gyamfi, 2003.
- 20 *Ibid*.
- 21 Shaw et al, 2003.
- 22 *Ibid*.
- 23 *Ibid*.
- 24 Aggregated from data compiled by Barclay et al, 2003.
- 25 World Fact Book, 2006.
- 26 *Counts and rates increased:* (38 countries, 73 per cent: Albania, Argentina, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Maldives, Malta, Morocco, The Netherlands, Northern Ireland, Oman, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Scotland, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, the UK, Uruguay).
Counts and rates decreased: (10 countries, 19 per cent: Bolivia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Hungary, Kuwait, Latvia, Moldova, Myanmar, Nepal, Panama).
Counts increased, rates decreased: (4 countries, 8 per cent: Canada, Mexico, Portugal, US).
Adapted from UNODC, 2005a, Table 2.1.
- 27 UNODC, 2005a.
- 28 See the Urban Indicators Guidelines, UN-Habitat, 2004a. The definition is used by the United Nations Statistics Division.
- 29 While homicides are violent crimes, they are not included in ICVS reports since these are self-reported incidents. While definitions of what constitutes a homicide differ (e.g. all murders are homicides, but not all homicides are considered murders), homicide rates are, nevertheless, used as the international comparative standard for violent crime.
- 30 WHO, 2002.
- 31 Collier and Hoeffler, 2004, cited in UNODC, 2005b.
- 32 UN-Habitat, 2006c.
- 33 Briceno-Leon, 1999.
- 34 See Lemard and Hemenway, 2006.
- 35 Hagedorn and Rauch, 2004.
- 36 *Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report*, 2004.
- 37 US Department of Justice, 2006.
- 38 Institute for Security Studies, 2002.
- 39 UNDOC, 2005b.
- 40 Moser and Holland, 1997b.
- 41 Alemika and Chukwuma, 2005.
- 42 Shaw et al, 2003.
- 43 *Ibid*.
- 44 *Ibid*.
- 45 van Ness, 2005, based on ICVS data.
- 46 del Frate, 2003.
- 47 Barclay et al, 2003.
- 48 UNODC, 2005b.
- 49 WHO, 2005.
- 50 Kershaw et al, 2001.
- 51 Coker et al, 2002.
- 52 WHO, 2005.
- 53 *Ibid*; Koenig et al, 2006.
- 54 Mboup and Amuyunzu-Nyamongo, 2005.
- 55 Jejeebhoy and Cook, 1997; Rao, 1997.
- 56 UN Secretary General's Study on Violence against Children, 2006.
- 57 UNICEF, 2006.
- 58 *Ibid*.
- 59 *Ibid*.
- 60 WHO, 2005.
- 61 Currie and Tekin, 2006; WHO, 2002.
- 62 UNICEF, 2006.
- 63 Consortium for Street Children, 2003.
- 64 Willemot, 2006.
- 65 Volunteer Brazil, undated, and Casa Alianza UK, undated.
- 66 UNICEF, 2006.
- 67 Anti-Corruption, undated; Anti-Corruption Gateway for Europe and Eurasia, undated; Transparency International, undated.
- 68 UNODC, 2004.
- 69 Transparency International, 2005b.
- 70 *Ibid*.
- 71 van Dijk and van Vollenhoven, 2006, p.11.
- 72 Shorter and Onyancha, 1999.
- 73 Kenya Government Position Paper, August 2001.
- 74 Buscaglia and van Dijk, 2003.
- 75 Transparency International, 2005a.
- 76 UNODC, 2005b, p20.
- 77 UNODC, 2000.
- 78 Thachuk, 2001.
- 79 van Dijk and van Vollenhoven, 2006.
- 80 *Ibid*, p3.
- 81 *Ibid*, p6.
- 82 See UNODC, 2006a, for maps of seizure and trafficking routes for amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) (such as methamphetamine and amphetamine), ecstasy, heroin and other opiates, and cocaine.
- 83 Stohl, 2005.
- 84 Cukier and Seidel, 2005.
- 85 Small Arms Survey, 2002.
- 86 See International Action Network on Small Arms, undated a.
- 87 The case of Rio de Janeiro, prepared for this Global Report by Zaluar, 2007.
- 88 Gimode, 2001.
- 89 Okwebah and Wabala, 2007.
- 90 *Ibid*.
- 91 UNDP, 2006a; US State Department, 2001.
- 92 UNODC, 2006b, p7.
- 93 Office on Violence against Women, 2000; Schauer and Wheaton, 2006.
- 94 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 2003.
- 95 Schauer and Wheaton, 2006.
- 96 BBC News, 2001; La Oferta, 2006.
- 97 UNODC, 2005b.
- 98 Sofia Echo.com, 17 May 2006. Note that Bulgaria was admitted to the EU on 1 January 2007.
- 99 IOM (undated).
- 100 Schauer and Wheaton, 2006.
- 101 Cited in UNODC, 2006b, p61.
- 102 See www.humantrafficking.org.
- 103 Howell and Decker, 1999.
- 104 Rodgers, 1999.
- 105 Zaluar 1997, cited in Rodgers, 1999.
- 106 Moser et al, 2005.
- 107 Winton, 2004.
- 108 Hagedorn, 2005.
- 109 *Ibid*, p162.
- 110 *Ibid*, p161.
- 111 Krug et al, 2002.
- 112 Goldstein, 2004.
- 113 Beall, 2006, p106.
- 114 Glaeser and Shapiro, 2002.
- 115 Beall, 2006.
- 116 BBC News, 2006b.
- 117 Beall, 2006, p111.
- 118 Barker, 2003, cited in Beall, 2006.
- 119 Litman, 2005.
- 120 National Counterterrorism Center, 2006; FBI, 2004.
- 121 Moser, 2004.
- 122 HRW (undated a).
- 123 *Ibid*.
- 124 WHO, 2005.
- 125 Broadhurst et al, 2007.
- 126 Haines and Wood, 2002.
- 127 *Ibid*.
- 128 Lemard and Hemenway, 2006.
- 129 WHO, 2002.
- 130 Gartner, 1990; Unnithan and Whitt, 1992; Hsieh and Pugh, 1993; Fajnzylber et al, 2002.
- 131 UN-Habitat, 2003a, pp75–77.
- 132 Broadhurst et al, 2007.
- 133 Denner et al, 2001.
- 134 Moser et al, 2005.
- 135 Unnithan and Whitt, 1992.
- 136 Gartner, 1990; Fajnzylber et al 1999.
- 137 Andrienko, 2002.
- 138 Cornelius, 1969; Lodhi and Tilly, 1973.
- 139 Gavia and Pages, 2002.
- 140 Moser et al, 2005.
- 141 Gavia and Pages, 2002.
- 142 UNODC, 2005b, p8.
- 143 Boamah and Stanley, 2007.
- 144 Weber, 1899; Wirth, 1938.
- 145 Glaeser and Sacerdote, 1999.
- 146 Gavia and Pages, 2002; Glaeser and Sacerdote, 1999.
- 147 Gavia and Pages, 2002.
- 148 Monkkonen, 2001a.
- 149 Fauchamps and Moser, 2003.
- 150 Decker et al, 1982; Felson, 2002.
- 151 Manso et al, 2005.
- 152 Newman, 1973.
- 153 Originated by Jeffrey, 1977. The theory has undergone

- significant change.
- 154 Clarke, 1997.
- 155 Brantingham and Brantingham, 1991.
- 156 Schneider and Kitchen, 2002, 2007.
- 157 There is a large and growing literature in this field providing empirical research to support place- and opportunity-based crime prevention/reduction theories. For overviews, including discussions of theory, empirical work and practical applications, see Poyner, 1983; Felson, 1986; Brantingham and Brantingham, 1991; Taylor, 1999; Felson, 2002; Schneider and Kitchen, 2002, 2007; Colquhoun, 2004; Cozens et al, 2004; ODPM and the Home Office, 2004. For some examples and evaluations of specific empirical work, see Newman, 1973; Beavon et al, 1994; Sherman, 1995; Eck and Wartell, 1996; La Vigne, 1996; Clarke, 1997; Sherman et al, 1998; Loukaitou-Sideris, 1999; Schweitzer et al, 1999; Farrington and Welsh, 2002; Hillier, 2004.
- 158 Schneider and Kitchen, 2002, 2007.
- 159 Knowles, 2003a, 2003b.
- 160 Schneider and Kitchen, 2007.
- 161 Kitchen, 2005.
- 162 Schneider and Kitchen, 2002, 2007.
- 163 LaFree and Tseloni, 2006.
- 164 Wilson, 1978.
- 165 Gimode, 2001.
- 166 WHO, 2002.
- 167 Center for Family Policy and Research, 2006.
- 168 *Ibid*, 2006.
- 169 Small Arms Survey, 2006a, p297.
- 170 *Ibid*.
- 171 Levitt, 2004.
- 172 Small Arms Survey, 2006a.
- 173 World Bank, 2003c.
- 174 Saunders and Taylor, 2002.
- 175 Lock, 2006.
- 176 Moser et al, 2005; Briceno-Leon and Zubillaga, 2002.
- 177 De Cesare, 1997, cited in Moser et al, 2005.
- 178 Rose, 2006.
- 179 Sinclair and Mills, 2003.
- 180 Rose, 2006.
- 181 LaFree and Tseloni, 2006.
- 182 LaFree, 2002.
- 183 Manso et al, 2005.
- 184 Caldeira, 2000; Rodgers, 2003; Blandy et al, 2003.
- 185 Small Arms Survey, 2006b.
- 186 UNODC, 2005a.
- 187 Moser, 2004.
- 188 See International Action Network on Small Arms, undated b.
- 189 While women are extremely vulnerable to gun crimes, statistically, marginalized young men are the most likely victims of small arms violence. They can be caught up in a range of socio-cultural pressures where guns become status symbols of masculinity and power, especially in the absence of political and economic opportunities. For example, in the *favelas* of Rio de Janeiro, the combination of availability of guns, drugs and cultural values dictating that men do not accept insults have helped to push the city's homicide rates for young low-income males to record heights over the past 25 years; see Zaluar, 2007.
- 190 Morrison and Orlando, 1999.
- 191 Buvinic and Morrison, 1999.
- 192 Moser and Holland, 1997b.
- 193 Hamermesh, 1998.
- 194 UNODC, 2005b.
- 195 Institute for Security Studies, 2002.
- 196 World Bank, 2003a; Krkoska and Robeck, 2006.
- 197 Gimode (2001) notes that in 1996, tourism accounted for 13 per cent of total revenue in Kenya, which was a far cry from the preceding decades.
- 198 Boamah and Stanley, 2007.
- 199 *Ibid*.
- 200 Tewarie, 2006; Adams, 2003.
- 201 Adams, 2003.
- 202 UNODC, 2005b; Brunetti et al, undated.
- 203 UNODC, 2005b.
- 204 Londono and Guerrero, 1999, cited in Moser et al, 2005.
- 205 Gavia, 2002.
- 206 Zaluar, 2007, p.15.
- 207 Gibbons, 2002.
- 208 Mayhew, 2003.
- 209 Sampson and Wooldredge, 1986.
- 210 See Schwartz et al, 2003.
- 211 This sequence is derived from Felson, 2002.
- 212 van Ness, 2005, based on ICVS data.
- 213 Budd, 1999.
- 214 Gibbons, 2002.
- 215 Moser et al, 2005.
- 216 www.humansecurity-cities.org, 2007, p27.
- 217 Gimode, 2001.
- 218 Blakely and Snyder, 1997.
- 219 Blandy et al, 2003; Blandy, 2005.
- 220 Mycoo, 2006.
- 221 Blakeley and Snyder, 1997; Blandy, 2005.
- 222 Atlas and LeBlanc, 1994.
- 223 Clarke, 2003; Schneider and Kitchen, 2007.
- 224 See the Gauteng Provincial Legislature, which passed the Rationalization of Local Government Affairs Act in 1998.
- 225 Zaluar, 2007.
- 226 Buvinic et al, 1999, cited in Moser et al, 2005.
- 227 *Ibid*, 2005.
- 228 Humantrafficking.org, 2005.
- 229 WHO, 2001.
- 230 Gimode, 2001.
- 231 HRV, undated b.
- 232 UNODC, 2005b.
- 233 See United Nations, undated, 'Backgrounder 8', www.un.org/cyberschoolbus/habitat/background/bg8.asp.
- 234 World Bank, 2006d.
- 235 Bosshard and Lawrence, 2006.
- 236 Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997; Tanzi, 1998; Wei, 1999; Arimah, 2005.
- 237 Zaluar, 2007.
- 238 Rodgers, 2003.
- 239 *Ibid*.
- 240 Zaluar, 2007.
- 241 See *Times of India*, 2006.
- 242 See Humantrafficking.org, undated.
- 243 IRIN News, 2007a.
- 244 According to joint estimates developed by UNAIDS, UNICEF, USAID and the US Bureau of Census in 2002, the total number of living children under age 15 whose mother, father or both parents have died of AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa is 11 million (Synergy Project, 2002). See HRV, undated a.
- 245 Newman, 1973.
- 246 Rodgers, 2003.
- 247 Masese, 2007.
- 248 Beall, 2006, p114.
- 249 Beall, 2006.
- 250 Glaeser and Shapiro, 2002.
- 251 Bram et al 2002.
- 252 *Ibid*, p11.
- 253 *Ibid*.
- 254 Banarji, 1997 cited in Beall, 2006.
- 255 These measures are taken from Goodrich, 2002, p57.

URBAN CRIME AND VIOLENCE: POLICY RESPONSES

Chapter 3 has described in some depth the nature of urban crime and violence as they are experienced across the world. The purpose of this chapter is to examine some of the policy responses to these problems, and to explore some of the available evidence on how successful these initiatives have been. It needs to be understood, from the outset, that a high proportion of these initiatives have not been fully or properly evaluated, and that a further proportion have either not had the results of such evaluations made public at all or have done this in ways that are not readily accessible. It is also the case that much of the evidence that is available and accessible comes from the developed world, rather than from the developing world, and it should not be automatically assumed that conclusions from the former context will automatically apply to the latter. Consequently, the evidence based on what works is much thinner than the plethora of initiatives to be found.

This situation gives rise to one important policy recommendation (i.e. the importance of developing a learning culture in this field) since the absence of meaningful and publicly accessible evaluation is a major flaw with many projects. The absence of a learning culture has two clear consequences. One of these is that it becomes very difficult in these circumstances to be clear about how successful a project has been, although there are many examples of projects that have been declared successes without any effective evaluation to demonstrate the truth of this claim. A second is that the opportunity for both the participants in the project and others elsewhere to learn from this experience is undermined by the lack of effective and accessible evaluation. This latter point is of particular importance when the opportunity to learn from demonstrated good practice elsewhere is greater now than it has ever been. Both of these issues are returned to in greater depth in Chapter 10.

Although this chapter draws heavily on the base established by Chapter 3, it does not follow the same structure because in many instances the policy responses that are identifiable represent a means of approaching a range of criminal activities and not each of the types that are separately identified in Chapter 3. Two examples will serve to make this point. One of the most common responses to the problems of urban crime and violence is through the formation of partnerships that are designed to bring together

the key players involved in tackling such problems. Typically, partnerships will seek to address a range of criminal activities, usually focusing on those that are of greatest prominence or the cause of greatest public concern in their localities. There are many things that can be said about partnerships and they take many different forms; but the approach adopted here is to discuss this phenomenon in a freestanding section rather than as a component of many responses to many different types of crime.

The same argument applies to efforts to combat corruption, which is of fundamental importance to this particular field. Although tackling crime and violence is widely recognized as being about much more than just the work of police forces, for example, there is no doubt that police work of many kinds remains central to this task. Corrupt police operations, or police operations that are perceived by the public as being corrupt, are therefore very likely to undermine other efforts in this field. The same broad arguments apply to corrupt processes of political decision-making and corrupt planning processes. Since the elimination of corruption in areas such as these is a fundamental part of many attempts to tackle urban crime and violence, this, too, is the subject of a single discussion in this chapter as part of a broader examination of how tackling problems of crime and violence relates to urban governance structures and processes.

The approach that has been adopted is to address the field of policy responses to urban crime and violence in seven parts:

- levels of responses, from the global downwards;
- the significance of stages of development;
- urban governance structures and processes;
- types of policy responses to problems of crime and violence;
- institutional and community responses;
- partnerships;
- some emerging policy trends.

The greatest amount of attention is devoted to the types of policy response to problems of crime and violence since this is the core of the chapter. In effect, the first three of these sections are about contextual issues, the second group of

three sections covers policy and organizational responses, and then the final section identifies some emerging trends.

There is one overarching point that needs to be fully appreciated before the examples in the sections that follow can be understood in their proper context. In this field, the evidence points overwhelmingly to the fact that very many initiatives depend upon local circumstances and cultures.¹ What this means is that what works well in one locality will not necessarily work in another because initiatives need to be tailored to the particular circumstances in which they will be applied. So, a particular initiative drawn from the urban governance practices in the Western world could not necessarily be transplanted without considerable thought and adaptation to a developing country, where the processes, cultural norms and expectations, as well as skills available, are likely to be different.

This does not mean that it is impossible to learn from experiences elsewhere, or that initiatives that appear to have worked in one location cannot be successfully adapted to another. Rather, considerable care needs to be exercised in doing this to ensure that what is being tried relates effectively to local circumstances.

LEVELS OF RESPONSES

Much crime is characterized by the fact that it takes place in specific locations and affects specific individuals or groups, either because they have been specifically targeted or because an opportunistic offender takes advantage of a particular situation. As Chapter 3 has already pointed out, one of the most important questions in this situation needs to be about the characteristics of the locality *where* the incident took place. The *where* is as important a question as *who*, *what* or *how*. The characteristics of place can make a big difference to the opportunity to commit a crime, as can the behaviour of human beings in particular places; so efforts to understand these relationships in order to make the process of offending harder and the perception of the balance between risk and reward by a potential offender less attractive are important components in many initiatives to reduce crime.

Chapter 3 also suggests that poor planning, design and management of urban places and spaces are factors associated with crime and violence. This implies that responses at the local level are especially significant, since it is at this spatial scale that the impact of planning decisions and many crimes are most felt.² Similarly, social factors associated with crime, as indicated in Chapter 3, can also be addressed at the local level, through social policies and through interventions that involve communities or local actors. Often, even if social policies are formulated and implemented at various levels, local implementation ensures that targeted vulnerable groups are reached. Similarly, it is at the local level that integration of policies is best achieved. Nevertheless, not all crimes can be ameliorated by local action as some need to be tackled on a much broader scale. Examples include drug trafficking,³ arms trafficking⁴ and human trafficking,⁵ most of which involve illegal movements across national boundaries, which, as a consequence, require

cooperation between all the nations involved if they are to be tackled effectively.

In addition, policy and financial frameworks that govern what can be done at the local level are often put in place at higher levels of the governance hierarchy. For example, many police forces operate over much broader areas than individual cities, as do laws and many practices. Sometimes the resources needed to tackle crime problems at a local level are not available from within that locality, and so higher levels of governance have a role to play in making resources available. While the main focus of this chapter is on what happens at the urban scale and more locally, it is important to recognize the contributions that are made at broader governmental scales and to acknowledge that multi-level approaches to issues of crime and violence are an inevitable consequence of multilevel governmental structures. This section, therefore, provides a series of examples of different kinds of contributions from the international level to the sub-national level. The remainder of the chapter will then concentrate on the urban and more localized levels and on community activities. This is a vast area and it is not possible to cover it comprehensively here; but the examples discussed should give an indication of the range of possible activities and policy trends in tackling urban insecurity.

International cooperation

International cooperation and mechanisms have an important part to play in efforts to combat certain crimes in particular – for example, the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, the International Criminal Police Organization, and programmes and projects supported by international and regional organizations. They also have an important role in setting principles and guidelines, as in the case of the UN-Habitat Safer Cities Programme, which provides an integrative approach for addressing issues of crime and insecurity at city level, through city-wide processes and strategies, and for supporting local initiatives and international exchanges and learning.

■ United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime

The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime was signed by just under 150 member states between December 2000 and December 2002.⁶ The convention seeks to standardize terminology and concepts in order to create a common basis for national crime-control frameworks, and commits signatories to a series of actions. These include adopting domestic laws and practices designed to prevent or suppress organized crime; confiscating illegally acquired assets; adopting an approach to extradition that avoids the creation of 'safe havens'; mutual legal assistance; the adoption of measures to protect victims and witnesses; programmes of technical cooperation; financial and material assistance to help developing nations implement the convention; and the establishment of a regular conference to review progress.

For present purposes, it is important to note three characteristics of this convention: the commitment to

Not all crimes can be ameliorated by local action as some need to be tackled on a much broader scale

International cooperation and mechanisms have an important part to play in efforts to combat certain crimes

specific actions that signature entails; the recognition that not all nations are equally well placed to implement the convention and, thus, the creation of a mechanism to help developing nations; and the recognition of the need for a standing review mechanism. There is no suggestion that a framework of this nature will of itself resolve all the difficult problems associated with tackling transnational crime; but there can be little doubt that such a mechanism as a vehicle for encouraging appropriate cooperation between nations is of considerable importance. It could also be argued that signing a convention of this nature is the easy part, and that what really matters is what governments do over time. The convention also has a role to play in setting standards for governments to maintain and, indeed, to improve upon over time.

■ International Criminal Police Organization

Another international initiative is the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), which has 186 member countries.⁷ A key role of Interpol is to increase and improve international law enforcement in order to combat all forms of organized crime, including illicit drug production and trafficking, weapons smuggling, trafficking in human beings, money laundering, child pornography and white collar crime, as well as high-tech crime and corruption. Its functions entail the creation and operation of secure global police communications services; the maintenance and development of operational databases and data services for police organizations; and the provision of operational police support services. As many aspects of crime have become internationalized, so the need for police forces to be well connected internationally and to work harmoniously with other police forces in seeking to address common problems has become more significant. Interpol plays an important role in supporting and facilitating these processes. As well as providing support through its incident response teams at the scenes of disasters, terrorist attacks and large-scale events that required additional security, Interpol's operational support services were particularly active in 2005 in five priority crime areas: public safety and terrorism; drugs and criminal organizations; trafficking in human beings; financial and high-technology crime; and fugitives. The importance of much of this work for urban areas is that cities bear the brunt of crimes of this nature. It seems likely that, in a globalizing world, more crime will have international dimensions, and so the need for police responses which not merely range from the local to the international but which also link these effectively will become more important.

■ UN-Habitat Safer Cities Programme

A further example of a form of international cooperation mechanism of direct relevance to the concerns of this chapter is the UN-Habitat Safer Cities Programme⁸, which tackles crime and violence as issues of good urban governance, in response to a United Nations Economic and Social Council resolution of 1995.⁹ The programme, which was launched in 1996, recognizes that crime and insecurity have been strongly affected by the impact of urbanization, and as such, have become a major preoccupation for many

countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Pacific. In this context, the issue of urban crime prevention, which is the focus of the Safer Cities Programme, represents a key challenge for the sustainable development of cities and human settlements in general. A number of countries are in the process of reforming their police and justice systems with a greater appreciation of the urban environment, and inspired by international standards that increasingly recognize the central role of municipalities as key actors in coalitions and in the development of community-wide planning strategies for addressing crime and violence prevention. The prevention of crime has received more sustained attention, not only in relation to the integration of socially excluded groups, but also for victims of crime.

The programme's initial focus was on Africa, at the request of a group of African city mayors who were concerned about the extent of violence in their cities and wanted help with the development of prevention strategies. This provided a learning ground upon which the programme adapted, piloted and tested various tools within an internationally recognized municipal framework and approach to crime prevention. To date, Safer Cities initiatives are well under way in several African cities (Johannesburg, Durban, Dar es Salaam, Abidjan, Antananarivo, Dakar, Yaoundé, Douala, Nairobi), and are also being replicated at the national level in some of the pilot countries in Africa. The programme has been extended to Latin America, Asia and Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea in order to cater for an increasing need for exchange of information, knowledge and good practice between national, regional and local governments as well as civil society and non-government organizations, but also at the international level.

Although the programmes vary according to the characteristics and requirements of the particular locality, the essence of the approach is broadly common, with emphasis on attitudinal change and governance processes. Its key activities are:

- strengthening the capacities of local authorities to address urban safety issues and reduce delinquency and insecurity;
- promoting holistic crime prevention approaches implemented in collaboration with central and local authorities, the criminal justice system, the private sector and civil society;
- developing tools and documentation to support local initiatives
- encouraging city networks in order to exchange experiences;
- preparing and implementing capacity-building programmes, and bringing in qualified and experienced partners from elsewhere to help;
- focusing on three main action areas, in particular: developing social crime prevention approaches targeting groups at risk, developing situational crime prevention approaches targeting public spaces, and supporting reform of the criminal justice system.¹⁰

UN-Habitat Safer Cities Programme ... tackles crime and violence as issues of good urban governance... which ... recognizes that crime and insecurity have been strongly affected by the impact of urbanization

Box 4.1 The Safer Nairobi Initiative

The strategy involves a two-year action plan based upon four pillars:

- better enforcement of existing laws and by-laws;
- improvement of urban design and the environment;
- community empowerment; and
- socially oriented measures providing support for groups at risk, including children, youth, women and street families.

The major elements of the strategy are:

- the adoption and implementation of a local safety action plan;
- local diagnoses of insecurity, involving a crime victimization study, youth offender profiling and a study of violence against women;
- extensive discussion of survey findings with stakeholders groups, including communities, the private sector, women groups;
- a city-wide residents convention held in 2003 that approved the city-wide crime prevention strategy, later endorsed by the City Council;
- the establishment of an interdepartmental committee on safety and security within the city council under the auspices of the mayor;

- safety audits conducted in key locations;
- launch of a Safer Spaces and Streets Campaign with two pilot projects;
- publication of a quarterly newsletter on city safety and security;
- establishment of a local coordinating team and office;
- progressive development of action-oriented partnerships;
- broad-based stakeholder consultations and reviews;
- training and exchange visits; and
- lighting up of Nairobi's slums and streets.

It is still too early to draw overall conclusions on the success of the programme since it is trying to combat what are, in some cases, quite long-term trends and since it is seeking not merely to undertake specific projects targeted at specific problems, but also to change the ways in which crime and public safety issues are tackled in Nairobi. But what is already clear is that there have been some specific successes – for example, the programme of lighting Nairobi's streets and slums is seen as a success both in aesthetic terms and in addressing some of the people's fear of crime and violence. In addition, the problems of youth-related crime (including its street-life elements) are not only better understood, but are also being tackled through a longer-term strategy.

Source: Masese, 2007

Safer Cities programmes in individual cities have been developed within a democratic framework in the fight against crime based on three principles: law enforcement for all, solidarity and crime prevention. This has tended to proceed through a six-step approach, as follows:

- 1 diagnosis of problems;
- 2 mobilization and building of a coalition of partners;
- 3 developing a crime prevention strategy;
- 4 developing and implementing an action plan;
- 5 mainstreaming and institutionalizing the approach; and
- 6 continuous monitoring and evaluation.

The experience of Nairobi (Kenya) with the Safer Cities Programme has been captured in one of the case studies for this Global Report, and the main elements of the Safer Nairobi Initiative are summarized in Box 4.1.

The Safer Cities Programme is an example of an international initiative that is locally applied, and which is essentially about improved local governance, as opposed to just local government, and which includes local capacity-building and providing a framework within which the ability of local communities to tackle their own problems is improved over time. It is also about the establishment of a culture of prevention so that key issues are identified and tackled through activities that engage a wide range of key partners and local residents. In other words, its focus is not just on immediate problems, but is also on the longer term. UN-Habitat provides an integrated model, a relevant knowledge resource, much encouragement, some resources and

access to a range of contacts willing and able to help; but the main task is addressed locally in the light of local conditions and aspirations. The approach itself appears to be robust in terms of both the basic structure that it offers and the strategic approach to problems of crime and violence that it advocates. The main issues in terms of its success are likely to be more local ones, around resources, people and commitment to the long haul. It can also be seen as offering something positive where previously very little seemed to be available to many cities to help them tackle problems of crime and violence.

It is important to stress that the Safer Cities Programme is not a 'one-size-fits-all' solution to the problems of urban crime, and that many cities in the world have made progress in tackling crime and violence using a similar approach but outside the realm of the UN-Habitat Safer Cities Programme. Indeed, the number of cities participating in the UN-Habitat Safer Programme today is very small in comparison with those that have or are seeking to address these issues in other ways. One of the key characteristics of the Safer Cities Programme is that it encourages documentation, evaluation and reporting of what is being done so that there is an evidence base in relation to these activities – which is often lacking in similar programmes and projects.

Although mainly concerned with local impacts of crime prevention and capacity development, the Safer Cities Programme maintains a global outlook, as it supports global and regional debate and exchange of experiences and the development of policy guidance and generic reference

It is important to stress that the Safer Cities Programme is not a 'one-size-fits-all' solution to the problems of urban crime

Box 4.2 The key propositions in the European Pre-Standard on Urban Planning and Crime Prevention**Key propositions**

- Urban planning can affect different types of crime and the fear of crime by influencing both the conduct and the attitudes of key people, such as offenders, victims, residents and the police.
- Some types of crime, such as burglary and vandalism, are particularly amenable to urban planning activities.
- Crime and the fear of crime need to be seen as different but related phenomena.
- Fear of crime is an important issue in its own right; but to be tackled effectively, it needs to be separated out from a much broader range of feelings that people have about their living environments.
- Strategic approaches to the creation of securer and safer cities and neighbourhoods that examine the physical and social environments can be successful.

- As well as looking at planning and design issues, policy-makers and practitioners must also focus on maintenance issues.

Appropriate strategies

Planning strategies: include respecting existing physical and social structures, creating liveliness, creating mixed-status areas, and achieving reasonable urban densities.

Urban design strategies: include achieving visibility, addressing issues of accessibility, creating a sense of territory, making environments attractive, and ensuring that basic artefacts (such as windows, doors and street furniture) are robust.

Management strategies: include target hardening, maintenance, surveillance, rules for the conduct of the public in public places, the provision of infrastructure for key groups (such as youth), and good communication with the public.

Source: CEN, 2003, pp5–6, 15–17

tools in support of the crime prevention processes it promotes.

■ European Pre-Standard on Urban Planning and Crime Prevention

A final example of a form of international cooperation that is different from the first three is the work which has been done to create a European pre-standard for the reduction of crime and the fear of crime through urban planning and building design. Essentially, a technical committee reviewed both the available literature and the current practice within current and aspiring European Union (EU) member countries, paying particular attention to project evaluations where these existed and drawing on several important applied traditions, including, in particular, CPTED and situational crime prevention. This resulted in the publication of the urban planning component of the European pre-standard in 2003.¹¹ This identified six broad propositions about the field, and fifteen types of strategies that might be applied, grouped together under three broad headings: planning, urban design and management. The six broad propositions and the underlying strategies are summarized in Box 4.2.

In effect, this is a distillation of good practice across Europe as perceived by the technical committee, recognizing, as it did, that practice in this field was very variable. As such, its particular value in the short term is probably in the help that it offers to those parts of the EU and to countries aspiring to membership where practice is less well developed. In the long term, the pre-standard may play a more formal role in helping to develop EU policy and practice in this field. It should be noted that some of the strategy recommendations in the European pre-standard are not without controversy.¹² For present purposes, though, this serves as a useful example of one of the particular ways in which international cooperation can be very valuable.

These four examples – the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, the work of Interpol, the UN-Habitat Safer Cities Programme

and the European Pre-Standard on Urban Planning and Crime Prevention – show something of the variety to be found in forms of international cooperation and in the purposes behind initiatives of this nature.

National level

At the national level, responsibilities and involvement in relation to crime and violence issues vary remarkably. This is largely due to the structure of government responsibilities in each country. Key elements of the differences relate to the level of guidance or policy initiative that is provided by the national level even for local intervention, and the level of decentralization of responsibilities in this field. The US and the UK, for example, have many matters in common in relation to this field; but one of the most striking differences between them relates to the respective roles of the national government in both countries.¹³

■ Examples from the UK and the US

During recent years, the UK has seen a strong policy drive from the national government level to get crime prevention concerns embedded within the planning process, supported by extensive central government published advice.¹⁴ This process is summarized in Box 4.3 and reflects the gradual development of policy over a period of some 11 years, during which there was a change of government in 1997. The British model would not necessarily be appropriate for other countries; but what is interesting about this example is not merely its contents, but the process of policy development that has led up to the current situation.

In the US, on the other hand, where initiatives of this kind exist it is because action has been taken at the state or local level. The US constitution makes clear the respective roles of the various levels of government and in this field the main rights reside at state and local levels rather than at the federal level. Nevertheless, national security concerns will always be a matter of considerable importance to national

At the national level, responsibilities and involvement in relation to crime and violence issues vary remarkably

governments, and in the US, particularly since the events of 11 September 2001, the federal government has played a leading role in addressing the threat of terrorist attacks. Interestingly, much of the work undertaken under this banner seems to have come from the stable of CPTED and so it can be argued that the national thrust to address the threat of terror has advanced the cause of CPTED in the US further and faster than had a series of more localized initiatives during the last couple of decades.¹⁵

■ Example from Jamaica

The third example of the role of national governments in addressing urban crime and violence is taken from a developing country – Jamaica. Since Jamaica became independent in 1962, it has experienced significant growth in violent crimes. For instance, murder rates rose from 8.1 per 100,000 people in 1970 to 40 per 100,000 in 2002, and 64 per 100,000 in 2005, making Jamaica one of the nations with the highest murder rates in the world.²⁰

In response to escalating levels of violent crimes, the Ministry of National Security embarked on a major process of developing the necessary law enforcement infrastructure required to tackle the problem of crime and violence. A multilevel approach is being used that involves new crime fighting initiatives, legislative reform, modernization of the police, and social intervention programmes at the community level. For instance, modernization of police services includes improving the professional standards of the police; improving their investigative capacity, specifically using an intelligence approach to operations; introduction of new technology; and utilization of personnel from overseas. The latter has entailed forging links with Scotland Yard, UK, in which training is provided for members of the Jamaica Constabulary Force. This is in addition to seconding high-ranking police officers from Scotland Yard to work with their local counterparts in Jamaica.

In 2004, the Jamaica Constabulary Force launched *Operation Kingfish* as a major anti-crime initiative. The purpose of the operation was to dismantle criminal networks within Jamaica and to disrupt illegal trafficking of drugs and firearms throughout the central and western Caribbean, with the assistance of international partners. In this regard, *Operation Kingfish* can be considered a partnership between the Jamaica Constabulary Force and international police agencies. The operation has targeted gangs, crime bosses, extortion rackets and narcotics trafficking. One major accomplishment of *Operation Kingfish* has been the dismantling of gangs within the Kingston corporate area. The initiative has also led to the recovery of numerous illegal firearms and equipment used in the illicit drug trade. The first major drug bust of *Operation Kingfish* came in 2004 when American law enforcement agents, assisted by Jamaica and British counterparts, intercepted cocaine valued at Jamaican \$4 billion (US\$59 million) destined for Jamaica.²¹

The envisaged changes in the crime fighting initiatives of the Jamaica Constabulary Force are meant to work in tandem with other initiatives, such as community-based policing and several social and crime prevention initiatives

Box 4.3 Getting the English planning system to engage with crime prevention

- 1994: UK Department of the Environment (DoE) Circular 5/94¹⁶ encouraged planners to consult with police architectural liaison officers.
- 1998: Section 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act placed a statutory duty on local planning authorities to take account of crime prevention issues in their work.
- 2000: The Urban Policy White Paper¹⁷ undertook to review Circular 5/94 and to make crime prevention a key objective for planning.
- 2004: The new national guidance on planning for crime prevention,¹⁸ to replace Circular 5/94, was published.
- 2005: Planning Policy Statement 1,¹⁹ the government's statement about the main purposes and responsibilities of the planning system described the primary task of planning as the delivery of sustainable development and saw safety as one of the key characteristics of a sustainable community.

implemented by the Ministry of National Security. These initiatives – specifically the Citizens Security and Justice Programme (CSJP) and the Community Security Initiative (CSI) operate predominantly within the Kingston Metropolitan Area. The former is funded through a partnership between the Government of Jamaica and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and the latter by the UK Department for International Development (DFID). These programmes were initiated to enhance community safety and security. The CSI was established to ensure efficient and effective 'joined-up action' between existing programmes on improving security and safety, reducing poverty and strengthening social development. CSJP operates in 15 violence-prone communities in Kingston and has been instrumental in providing support to residents and developing legitimate community leadership and structures.

Before moving away from the roles of national governments, it is important to note that over and above specific initiatives, the ongoing work of national governments has a huge impact on crime and violence in urban areas and how these problems are tackled.²² Three examples that relate to themes introduced in Chapter 3 are given to emphasize this point.

First, national governments often have a major role to play in providing policy, legal and financial frameworks for the work of local authorities, and so the ability of local authorities to address problems of crime and violence in their localities can be very heavily influenced by these factors. In particular, national governments often encourage local authorities and other bodies to do more in particular areas of concern by providing funding and other types of resources for these purposes. An example of this is the work of the National Crime Prevention Centre in Canada, which supports crime prevention activities through three funding programmes: the Crime Prevention Action Fund; the Policing, Corrections and Communities Fund; and the Research and Knowledge Development Fund.²³ It should be noted that some governments are active not just in providing funding internally, but also in providing funding for such projects in other countries.

Second, national governments often have a major role to play in relation to military, security and police forces in

In the US, particularly since the events of 11 September 2001, the federal government has played a leading role in addressing the threat of terrorist attacks

Box 4.4 The government of Western Australia's Community Safety and Crime Prevention Strategy

Western Australia's Community Safety and Crime Prevention Strategy is guided by seven principles: sustainability; working better together; inclusiveness; targeted efforts; evidence-based decision-making; focusing on results; and sharing knowledge. It is driven by five key goals, and under each a set of priority actions is identified. The five key goals are:

- supporting families, children and young people;
- strengthening communities and revitalizing neighbourhoods;
- targeting priority offences;
- reducing repeat offending; and
- designing out crime and using technology.

The other two primary components of the strategy involve the development of partnership processes, and the establishment of various forms of grant funding which are targeted at helping with the implementation of the priority actions. Partnerships between communities, police, local government and other public agencies are encouraged at local level throughout the state to develop local Community Safety and Crime Prevention Plans, with both state advice and resources being available to assist with this process. The

Source: Government of Western Australia, 2004

strategy also identifies five specific funds that will be established as part of a total spending of AU\$15 million on grants over four years in order to take this process forward. These five funds are the:

- Local Government Partnership Fund, which will help local partnerships to get established and produce local Community Safety and Crime Prevention Plans;
- Community Partnership Fund, which will give small grants for community crime initiatives being undertaken with, or supported by, the police;
- Indigenous Partnership Fund, which is specifically for supporting work on community safety and crime prevention in indigenous (Aboriginal) communities;
- Research and Development Fund, which is about supporting targeted and evidence-based approaches through research and related activities; and
- Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) fund, which will support the adoption of CPTED principles in the planning of new development and infrastructure improvements.

National governments often have a major role to play in relation to military, security and police forces in terms of policy, funding and disposition

terms of policy, funding and disposition. All of these elements impact both directly and indirectly upon the experience of crime and violence in cities. In particular, the ways in which police services are directed and managed are of particular significance in this context, and so it is very common to see city political and executive leaders wishing to engage in a regular dialogue about these matters, not only with national government, but also with the senior officers responsible for police operations in cities.

Third, while there is often an important local dimension in campaigns to tackle corruption of various kinds, the role of national governments is absolutely vital since the legal and judicial systems will both have important parts to play in such initiatives. National governments can also set the tone for drives against corruption, as part of a commitment to good governance. It is important that this is done otherwise individual local initiatives can quickly lose momentum.

Sub-national level

Governance arrangements vary remarkably at the sub-national level. Consequently, it is difficult to generalize about this level of activity, except to note that where it exists, and depending upon its powers, it is quite likely that important components of initiatives to tackle urban crime and violence will be found. To illustrate this, three examples of initiatives at sub-national level are described below. The first is the approach to tackling crime prevention in Western Australia, where the state has significant powers and sees the process on which it is embarking as being strategy led. In the second approach – a less direct example – the sub-

national level is responsible for putting in place tools that can provide a framework within which crime and violence are looked at alongside other elements that determine public policy priorities in municipalities. This is the process of preparing integrated development plans in the province of KwaZulu-Natal (South Africa). The third example relates to the role that legislative processes at the state level can play in crime prevention through the Safe Neighborhood Act in Florida (US).

■ Community safety and crime prevention strategy: Western Australia

The lead in developing policies and practices on crime prevention in Western Australia is taken by the Office of Crime Prevention.²⁴ It has six key tasks:

- initiating crime prevention public-awareness campaigns;
- developing and coordinating strategic and holistic policy;
- providing advice to state and local government;
- undertaking research to establish best practice to be utilized in community safety and crime prevention strategies;
- informing about relevant training and development programmes; and
- providing grant funding for community safety and crime prevention initiatives.

The state's Community Safety and Crime Prevention Strategy²⁵ is summarized in Box 4.4.

One of the most interesting elements of this example is its use of grant funding to implement the strategy. One of

the difficulties with strategies produced for large and diverse areas can be finding mechanisms that enable priorities to be pursued and actions targeted in ways that not only meet strategy objectives, but that are also appropriate on the ground. This particular example of a set of grant programmes is an interesting way of trying to address this particular issue.

■ Integrated development plans in the province of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa

The second example is the process of preparing integrated development plans in the province of KwaZulu-Natal (South Africa).²⁶ This is not specifically a crime prevention initiative as such, but a process of integrating crime prevention issues within the planning process in order to improve quality of life and enhance the safety and security of citizens. Here the responsibility for preparing integrated development plans rests with the 61 municipalities rather than with the province. However, the province performs a variety of functions to support municipalities and to guide the process. The integrated development plan is essentially a management tool that sets out the municipality's vision, objectives, strategies and key projects, and the intention of the act establishing this process is that the provisions of the integrated development plan will shape the way in which the local authority performs.

The importance of this example is that it demonstrates two characteristics that are not always to be found in work at this level of government: the commitment to a strategic approach, and the importance of thinking holistically about problems, rather than seeking to tackle them through independent streams of action. In addition, it is now a requirement throughout KwaZulu-Natal that integrated development plans covering the major urban areas must include both crime prevention policies and women's safety audits.²⁷ Integrated development plans offer a strategic vehicle for taking a holistic view of crime and violence, for embedding the actions needed to address it in the everyday work, and for mainstreaming these activities as part of agreed priorities. For example, the integrated development plan for the eThekweni Municipality for 2002 to 2006 sought to commit its community services plan to facilitate the implementation of the Durban Safer Cities strategy by ensuring that:

- The council facilitates intergovernmental cooperation with regard to the design and implementation of a Safer City Plan to be operationalized at the local level.
- Effective social crime prevention programmes exist.
- A security-conscious environmental design is adopted.
- A highly visible and effective policing service exists.
- Partnerships to increase community involvement in crime reduction are supported.
- Community education regarding crime prevention is improved and expanded upon.
- Security in targeted areas (such as transport routes and tourist areas) is improved through various measures, including surveillance cameras.²⁸

The integrated development plan initiative in KwaZulu-Natal offers an example of how government at provincial level guides and assists the review of a strategic process in order to make the end product as appropriate and effective as possible. It is also an interesting example of how tackling crime prevention and public safety needs to be seen in a broad strategic context as an integral element of the process of municipal management.

■ State of Florida: Safe Neighborhood Act

The final example relates to the role of state legislation in providing for needs that are specific to a given area. The State of Florida has enacted Chapter 163.501, Florida Statutes, commonly called the Safe Neighborhood Act. It is based on legislative findings that the 'proliferation of crime' is one of the principal causes of the deterioration in business and residential neighbourhoods in the state. The act further declares that the safe neighbourhoods are 'the product of planning and implementation of appropriate environmental design concepts, comprehensive crime prevention programmes, land use recommendations and beautification techniques'.²⁹ Under the provisions of the act, local governmental entities are empowered to develop, redevelop, preserve and revitalize neighbourhoods using public funds that may be 'borrowed, expended, loaned and granted'.³⁰ For implementation purposes, the act defines a safe neighbourhood as falling within an 'improvement district', which means an area in which more than 75 per cent of the land is used for residential purposes, or in an area in which more than 75 per cent of the land is used for commercial, office, business or industrial purposes, excluding the land area used for public facilities.

To be eligible for funding, the district must include a plan to reduce crime through the implementation of CPTED, environmental security or defensible space techniques, or through community policing innovations. The act provides districts with corporate powers, including the ability to enter into contracts, to accept grants and property, to make street and infrastructure improvements, and to raise funds by special assessments (following referendum), and provides other powers and responsibilities normally given to governmental agencies. Matching grants are available to the districts from the state up to US\$100,000. Neighbourhood councils comprised of local citizens are authorized to monitor the implementation of improvement plans and to report violations to the governing bodies (which may be city or county commissions). Furthermore, the act requires that all improvement districts:

- Collect crime data in the district using surveys and other research techniques.
- Provide an analysis of crimes related to land use and environmental and physical conditions of the district, giving particular attention to factors that support or create opportunities for crime.
- Formulate and maintain short-range and long-range projects and plans that crime-to-environment analysis, including surveys and citizen participation data, has determined are applicable.

It is now a requirement throughout KwaZulu-Natal that integrated development plans covering the major urban areas must include both crime prevention policies and women's safety audits

Legislation by itself is often not enough, and that attention needs to be paid to the processes of implementation and to the resource needs that these imply

One of the biggest issues facing cities in developing countries where crime and violence are major problems is their capacity to cope

- Prepare and implement safe neighbourhood improvement plans, including modifications to existing street patterns and removal, razing, renovation, reconstruction, remodelling, relocation and improvement of existing structures and facilities.
- Coordinate with other agencies providing relevant informational, educational and crime prevention services.
- Ensure that all capital improvements within the district are consistent with the capital improvement elements of the applicable local government comprehensive plans (Florida requires all local governments to prepare comprehensive plans).³¹

This example illustrates two points that are particularly significant. The first is the importance of legislative powers wherever they sit in the structure of governance within a country. The second is that legislation by itself is often not enough, and that attention needs to be paid to the processes of implementation and to the resource needs that these imply. The latter arises because sufficient funds have not been made available to implement the provisions of the act.³² Indeed, the implementation of the act has been hampered by low levels of funding from the Florida Legislature. Consequently, only a relatively few communities across the state have been able to take advantage of its provisions. Nevertheless, its comprehensive crime prevention elements serve as a model for other jurisdictions in the US and elsewhere.

It is important to recognize that these examples show many levels and a wide range of possibilities at each level. Under these circumstances there is clearly scope for confusion about who does what, and room for under-performance created by inadequate liaison, coordination and communication. Multilayered approaches exist for good reasons and are an inevitable consequence of multilayered governmental structures; but it is important that the scope for approaches of this nature to create barriers and to underachieve is recognized and is vigorously addressed.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT

As Chapter 3 has demonstrated, it is rather simplistic to equate the level of development of a country with the existence of a problematic scale of urban crime and violence. The examples discussed above show that crime and violence can be a major problem in the urban areas of the developed world. To this, it should be added that this is often the perception of their citizens, even when, in comparison with other countries, crime and violence may not be particularly high.³³ Similarly, while it is clear that in some developing countries urban crime and violence are a major problem, this is by no means always the case in all developing countries. Nevertheless, there are several examples of developing countries where urban crime and violence are not only a major problem, but affect economic development. It is also the case that the level of development in a country (e.g. in terms of its processes of governance and the availability of

skilled staff to operate them effectively) may affect the ability of that country to tackle problems of this nature, which creates a vicious circle requiring systematic intervention. One of the biggest issues facing cities in developing countries where crime and violence are major problems is their capacity to cope. This sense of having the 'capacity to cope', which is part of resilience, can be seen in several dimensions, some examples of which are as follows:

- Are the police and the judiciary willing and able to do their classic jobs of law enforcement so that the rule of law generally prevails?
- Does the political process (the nature of which varies hugely in cities across the world) recognize the range of functions that need to be involved in addressing crime and violence issues, and is it committed to doing so?
- Are the functions noted above broadly free from corruption, and where there is evidence that corruption might exist, is there a clear commitment to tackling it?
- Are the skills needed to support initiatives of this kind available to the process of governance in the city, and where there are shortfalls of this nature, are these identified and addressed?
- Is there a willingness to recognize the importance of community-based initiatives in tackling crime and violence issues, and a consequent willingness to make resources available to support community-level activities and to consult with communities fully and openly?
- Do agencies and communities work in genuine partnership with each other to ensure that their combined efforts work to maximum effect, preferably driven by a clear and agreed strategy?
- Is there an acknowledgement that tackling urban crime and violence has to be seen as a long-term commitment and is not the territory of 'quick fixes'?

These are not the only questions that arise when thinking about the 'capacity to cope' and resilience of systems of urban governance in this context; but the studies that have been done to date suggest that they are the kinds of questions that many cities in the developing world have struggled to answer in the affirmative. If this is not done, the gains will, at best, be short term since fundamental problems of lack of capacity in urban systems of governance will continue to cause problems that will probably undermine short-term achievements. It should also be remembered that there is a lot of evidence from studies, mainly in the Western world, that many elements of the criminal fraternity are highly adaptive.³⁴

What this means, in practice, is that it cannot be assumed that gains in terms of improvements in tackling crime and violence on the part of the process of local governance will not be matched by adaptive responses by local criminal elements. This is one consideration that needs to be factored into the notion of improving local capacity as being a long-term commitment. Many of the examples that are used in the rest of this chapter are, therefore, about (or incorporate elements of) improving the capacity of processes of governance at the urban level to address issues of crime

and violence since the evidence suggests that this may well be one of the most important needs in the urban areas of the developing world.

One of the ways in which these processes can be helped is through partnering with cities in other parts of the world that have relevant experience to offer in order to learn from that experience and also to speed up processes of capacity development. An important issue here is the need to borrow from experiences that are appropriate to local circumstances. A good illustration of this is the discussion of the extent to which planning systems (mainly) in the developed world are beginning to address crime prevention as an issue where they can have an impact through their control over physical development.

Even so, there were still many worries about how effective and how efficient the planning systems were,³⁵ and clear evidence that not all planners have responded constructively to messages about the role of planning in tackling issues of crime prevention.³⁶ These facts alone would suggest the need for a degree of caution before much younger, much less well-established, and much less well-staffed planning systems attempt to do what the British system is trying to do (see Box 4.3), even if they felt it was wholly appropriate to their local situations. Indeed, it may well be the case that one of the important issues in this field is the extent to which planning systems in the developing world are able to build concerns for crime prevention into their work. If they do not encompass crime prevention concerns, then that is one of the potential tools available for tackling crime and violence issues that will not be used. But clearly there are significant issues to be addressed before such practices are part of the planning lexicon in most parts of the world. This is further addressed in Chapter 10.

URBAN GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES

Tackling crime and violence is an issue of good urban governance. This section focuses on three issues. First, it examines some of the influences which affect the ability of processes of urban governance to address issues of crime and violence in their localities, when they are not in control of all the programmes or agencies that might need to contribute to such an effort. Therefore, it is about some of the challenges that crime and violence issues pose for urban governance. Second, it looks at two examples of efforts to undertake programmes of this nature in localities that have been very seriously affected by crime and violence: Diadema in the São Paulo metropolitan area of Brazil, and Port Moresby in Papua New Guinea. Finally, it discusses one of the big challenges that efforts of this kind too often face, which is the problem of corruption, both in the process of municipal government and directly in police operations.

It is important to note that in most cases the processes of urban governance involve exercising various types of control or influence over many of the levers that are available for use in tackling crime and violence. For example,

while the arrangements for controlling the work of the police service vary from one country to another, and often involve structures covering much wider areas than individual cities, it is not unusual to see within such structures arrangements that acknowledge the particular issues experienced in the city and that provide for close working links between the police and the local authority. Similarly, attempts to get planning systems, by virtue of their control over new development, to consider crime prevention as part of this process almost always, in practice, happen at local authority level since this is the level at which most such decisions are taken and since it is usually at this level that planning services are controlled. Getting planning and police services to work together on crime and violence issues is still relatively new.³⁷

It needs to be remembered that although this is a new field for planners, it is also very much a 'non-traditional' activity for the police. Available evidence suggests that only a limited number of police work in this kind of crime prevention activity compared with more traditional police operations.³⁸ It is also the case that local authorities will see issues of crime and violence as affecting two of their primary concerns: the quality of life of their citizens and the ability of their city to develop its economy. If these two factors are seen as being adversely affected by issues of crime and violence, then there is increased likelihood that the process of urban governance will seek to address this problem area as a major priority. So, while local authorities are, to a large extent, involved in dealing with crime and violence by virtue of their mainstream activities, there clearly are circumstances that can cause this issue to rise to, or near, the top of the agenda of urban priorities.

It can also be argued persuasively that the need to ensure that levels of crime and violence are low and that fear of crime does not intrude in any significant way into the life decisions that citizens make is an integral element in good urban governance:

Urban governance is inextricably linked to the welfare of the citizenry. Good urban governance must enable women and men to access the benefits of urban citizenship. Good urban governance, based on the principle of urban citizenship, affirms that no man, woman or child can be denied access to the necessities of urban life, including adequate shelter, security of tenure, safe water, sanitation, a clean environment, health, education and nutrition, employment and public safety, and mobility. Through good urban governance, citizens are provided with the platform which will allow them to use their talents to the full to improve their social and economic conditions.³⁹

Public safety is one of the necessities of urban life to which all citizens have the right of access. But it is clear that this desirable goal is not attained in many cities in the world. It is also clear that local authorities cannot rely simply on exercising their mainstream functions efficiently and effectively in order to change this situation. So, what is needed over and

Getting planning and police services to work together on crime and violence issues is still relatively new

Public safety is one of the necessities of urban life to which all citizens have the right of access

above what might be described as the qualities of good public administration in order to move in this direction? Three qualities, in particular, seem to stand out in this context: political will, sustained commitment to action, and strong and visible leadership.

Some examples of the application of these qualities are given in the following sub-sections, which utilize two cases, in particular, where major efforts have been made or are in the process of being made to tackle very high levels of crime and violence. These are Diadema, a suburb in the São Paulo urban region of Brazil and Port Moresby in Papua New Guinea.

Diadema, São Paulo

Diadema is a relatively recent creation as a suburb of São Paulo (Brazil). Its population grew at an annual average rate of 16 per cent between 1950 and 1980, before slowing to an annual average rate of 2.2 per cent over the next two decades.⁴⁰ These growth rates are well in excess of those experienced by São Paulo. Consequently, Diadema has become the second most densely developed location in Brazil. This rapid growth, much of it caused by in-migration of some of Brazil's poorest people, seems to have overwhelmed the capacity of civic institutions to cope, and one of the consequences of this was the emergence of 'frontier violence'.⁴¹ This relates to the fact that Diadema's high level of violence had features in common with some periods of pioneer settlement in the history of other parts of the world – precarious forms of territorial occupation, absence of government and poor local organization.

By the 1990s, Diadema experienced murder rates which were among the highest in the world – 141 per 100,000 individuals in 1999. Gang violence and intense inter-gang rivalry were widespread. This period was characterized by anarchy and complete breakdown of law and order. The inability of the police and legal system to tackle crime and violence meant that a group of people called the *justiçeiros* dished out their own version of law and order, which included killings. All of this had a generally negative impact on the quality of life of the people and on the opportunities available to them. Problems of this magnitude are clearly not going to be tackled by a single initiative; but critical to the process of turning this situation around was the desire of some of the mayors of Diadema over a period of time to make a difference. The progress that Diadema has experienced over the past decade or so is described as follows:

We easily can exaggerate the progress in Diadema. Its broad central avenues, with bus terminals, supermarkets, fast food restaurants and automobile distributorships, no longer create the impression of a poor city... However ... homicide rates are still high, despite their reduction in recent years. The average monthly income of family heads in Diadema in 2000 was half the average for the municipality of São Paulo. But the combined effect of its political

*structure, of the strengthening of its public institutions and the expansion of commerce has been very positive, showing how much its people value stability. Diadema has also shown that the problem of homicides can be reduced fairly quickly with a political effort based on a community consensus and more effective action by the authorities. Four decades after the start of the migratory surge of precarious settlement, Diadema no longer is a city trapped in a downward spiral of apparently insoluble crises. Instead, it is showing the strength of democracy and is emerging on the crest of a process of civilization.*⁴²

One initiative that seems to have been important in this process was the enactment and the enforcement of a law to close all bars in the city after 11.00 pm. The reason for this was that a high proportion of the murders in the city took place in or near these bars between 11.00 pm and 2.00 am.⁴³ The process of making this happen involved a protracted period of discussion in the city council around three issues, in particular. These were a recognition of the need to confront many vested interests if such a new law was not going to be undermined by exceptions;⁴⁴ the need for an intense campaign of publicity and persuasion; and then the need to commit to a major enforcement effort which would have to involve partnership between several public institutions that had not always worked in the past. This seems to have had an immediate effect since the monthly homicide rate in the first month of enforced closures fell to eight from previous figures that were typically four or five times higher than this.⁴⁵

One element in this process may well be the fact that homicide rates in the Greater São Paulo area were falling anyway during the early years of the 21st century, with Diadema being both a leading element in this process and a beneficiary of the general economic forces that seem to have been helping it. One of the particular characteristics of this process is that locations that were once crime hotspots are being turned over to new forms of economic activity that are pushing out crimes and criminals, as the following assessment illustrates:

The public space exposed to violence is shrinking. As in the rest of Greater São Paulo, few streets in Diadema remain without paving and lighting. In the periphery, a spontaneous quarantine is developing that tends to isolate bandits from citizens who want to live in peace and avoid problems. Each group recognizes and respects the sphere of the other, but keeps its distance. A force reducing the space for violence is the expansion of commerce at all levels, from the new supermarkets to street sellers and small neighbourhood repair shops, to women selling candy and cake out of their homes. At the edge of Jardim Campanario, a vacant municipal lot used to be a killing ground

Box 4.5 Key conclusions from the 2003 Port Moresby survey of people aged 15 to 35, undertaken for its Safer Cities Programme

The key action points were summarized according to the following four headings:

Law enforcement:

- Improve professionalism, transparency, effectiveness, efficiency and accountability in government, police and criminal justice systems.
- Focus more attention on crime prevention and restorative justice, and on the re-socialization and rehabilitation of offenders.
- Link traditional village courts and mediation structures to the criminal justice system.
- Strengthen coordination among law enforcement agencies.

Community development:

- Improve community access to basic urban services.
- Involve youth and marginalized groups in decision-making.
- Strengthen the family–community–church partnership to engage youths at risk.

Urban management and planning:

- Principles of safety, convenience and sustainability should be integral features of a functioning urban environment.
- Improve urban governance through broad-based partnerships.

- Include squatter settlements in planning and management, including a review of land tenure opportunities.
- Strengthen the participation and coordination capabilities of the staff involved in planning and management.

Culture and family:

- Promote social cohesion through programmes aimed at maintaining social harmony.
- Educate communities on the benefits of crime prevention.
- Encourage mediation and conflict resolution at the family level.

A key need was seen to be the *strengthening of institutional capacity*. Further recommendations in this regard included:

- Strengthen the ability of existing institutions to manage urban safety and security issues.
- Promote public, private and community interfaces to address safety and security issues.
- Improve the capacity of community groups to prepare and implement crime prevention action plans.
- Improve coordination of the roles and responsibilities of the institutions involved in urban safety and security.

Source: Boamah and Stanley, 2007

*and a dump for corpses and the carcasses of stolen cars after their saleable parts were removed. Now this space is occupied by SESI, a sports and swimming complex used by local families, with new high-rise apartments for the middle class in the background.*⁴⁶

The case of Diadema illustrates what can be achieved by political will, sustained commitment to action, effective partnership, and strong and visible leadership, starting off from a very poor position where crime and violence were clearly impeding the progress of the settlement and its people. Nevertheless, Diadema still has a long way to go before its homicide rates are down to what would be regarded as 'normal' rates in many other parts of the world. For example, its 2003 homicide rate of 74 per 100,000 people, while being little more than half the rate that it had experienced four years previously, was still 50 per cent larger than that for Greater São Paulo and more than ten times the rates experienced in many other world cities.⁴⁷ Clearly, the need here is to continue with the sustained commitment to action that has been exhibited in recent years, and to recognize that this will need to be seen as a long-term initiative.

Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea

Port Moresby in Papua New Guinea has several themes in common with Diadema. Probably the most significant is the very high crime rates that the city has experienced, particularly the high levels of violence associated with criminal activities – 48 per cent of crimes in Port Moresby involve a

high level of violence. The city has a population of over 330,000, which makes it the biggest urban centre in Papua New Guinea. Its population is characterized by a rapid growth rate of 3.6 per cent per annum, a high proportion of migrants, high cultural and ethnic diversity, and a very young structure.⁴⁸ The rapid rate of urban growth, coupled with inadequate land legislation, has resulted in the creation of some 40 squatter settlements around the city, which house about 50 per cent of its population. These areas are regarded as havens of criminal activity. Another characteristic that appears to be a significant factor in the city's experience of crime and violence is its very high reliance on the informal economy for employment, given limited opportunities in the formal sector. This means that young men often have little experience of employment and resort to other means of making a living, often in association with gang membership. Box 4.5 summarizes the key points from a survey of 1500 young people aged between 15 and 35, undertaken in 2003 as part of the process of establishing Port Moresby's Safer Cities Programme.

The points summarized in Box 4.5 undoubtedly represent a huge agenda, and the Port Moresby Safer Cities Programme is only in the early stages of tackling it. At present, it can only be seen as a useful case study of what is involved in establishing a sound basis of understanding in order for a start to be made in such a difficult situation. But this is of value in itself because sometimes the process of making a start can appear bewildering given the nature and intensity of the problem. Inevitably, the first phase of this programme has concentrated on the things needed to get it started and running effectively.

Campaigns to reduce and, if possible, eliminate corruption are of considerable importance to the prospects for success in tackling crime and violence

There are many kinds of responses to issues of crime and violence, with evidence suggesting that the most successful ones are those that are tailored to the particular circumstances being addressed

There can be little doubt that if the Port Moresby Safer Cities Programme is to succeed, it will need to be seen as a relatively long-term activity, and to sustain such a programme successfully over such a period will require the three characteristics noted earlier: political will, sustained commitment to action, and strong and visible leadership. Early signs indicate that these characteristics will be present in the Port Moresby initiative.

Corruption

Another frequent problem in developing countries is corruption, especially in the various arms of municipal government and the police. In essence, the very organs that citizens should be looking up to in tackling problems of crime and violence are not trusted because they are corrupt, or at least are seen as having very questionable linkages with criminal elements. Where this is the situation, it seems likely that efforts to tackle crime and violence will be undermined by relationships of this nature. It is clear that the process of rebuilding citizens' trust of their local government structures and police services is fundamental to any campaign against crime and violence. For these reasons, campaigns to reduce and, if possible, eliminate corruption are of considerable importance to the prospects for success in tackling crime and violence. These, too, require the same characteristics as noted above – political will, sustained commitment to action, and strong and visible leadership.

Although in both cases it is clear that wide-ranging programmes of action were necessary in Diadema and will be necessary in Port Moresby, it is difficult to see how problems on the scales exhibited in these two cities can be tackled without strong political support from the outset, and sustained for significant periods of time. Another necessary condition for success appears to be that efforts need to be made to ensure that the implementing arms of the local authority and other public agencies are fully behind action programmes and are pulling in the same directions. In order to achieve this, the role of the decision-making processes is crucial: the link between a local diagnosis or audit, the development of a strategy, possibly through consultation and involvement of different actors, and its implementation through targeted actions should support buy-in and involvement of different departments and actors, including communities. Partnership mechanisms are one of the most important tools available to achieve these latter objectives, and this is the subject of a fuller discussion later in the chapter.

The key point to emphasize is that the actions described in this section have to be seen as part of a long-term commitment on the part of local authorities, as well as central and regional/provincial/state governments, to reducing crime and violence to the point where their effects upon the lives of citizens and the prosperity of the city are under control. The kind of leadership role needed to sustain this is likely to fall to the city's political leaders. This also needs to be complemented by sustained support and commitment from the heads of local authorities and key programme areas. This does not in any way denigrate the contribution of

community-based initiatives or deny the necessity of full community engagement with processes of this nature. But experience suggests that there is an essential role for political leaders committed to the view that safer cities are an essential aspect of good governance and that good governance is a fundamental key to successful crime prevention initiatives.

TYPES OF POLICY RESPONSE TO PROBLEMS OF CRIME AND VIOLENCE

There are many kinds of responses to issues of crime and violence, with evidence suggesting that the most successful ones are those that are tailored to the particular circumstances being addressed, rather than those that are essentially standardized based upon experience elsewhere. It is possible to classify these responses into six broad groups of approaches as follows:

- 1 *Enhancing urban safety and security through effective urban planning, design and governance.* Poor planning, design and management have been identified as among the constellation of factors associated with crime and violence. This group of activities is therefore mainly about manipulating and maintaining the physical environment, which is the setting within which most crimes take place.
- 2 *Community-based approaches to enhancing urban safety and security.* Activities of this nature are essentially about getting communities to take ownership of initiatives. Very often this will mean that community groups or individuals will either be the source of project ideas or will play leading roles in implementing them.
- 3 *Strengthening formal criminal justice systems and policing.* This could be seen as the 'classical' approach to problems of crime and violence, regarding them as being the primary territory of the police and the criminal justice system. Initiatives in this area are also often undertaken at the city or even broader scale.
- 4 *Reduction of risk factors.* These approaches tend to focus on groups that are likely to be perpetrators of crime or on groups that are at risk of being victims of crime. The aim here is either to reduce the likelihood of such groups getting involved in criminal activities or to reduce the problems faced by victims.
- 5 *Non-violent resolution of conflicts.* This essentially is about seeking to manage situations in which conflicts often arise in order to reduce the likelihood of this happening or to find solutions to the problems that do not result in violence.
- 6 *Strengthening of social capital.* This includes improving the ability of people, groups and communities as a whole to challenge the problems of crime and violence and the provision of community facilities that facilitate or provide more opportunities for processes of this nature.

There are two points that need to be made about these policy responses. First, they are not watertight compartments but involve considerable areas of overlap. A simple illustration of this is the fact that a programme targeting young men because this group commits a high proportion of crime will often seek to deflect their activities in more acceptable directions, including investing in strengthening social capital in areas such as education, sport and recreation, and cultural activities. Second, it is not necessarily a question of choosing between these approaches because it is possible to combine elements of several or all of them. Indeed, available evidence suggests that a carefully managed programme that combines several elements of these approaches in ways that recognize the connections between them and their appropriateness to the local context has a better chance of success than merely focusing on a single element. This is because deeply-embedded problems of crime and violence are rarely amenable to simple, one-dimensional solutions. Programmes of this nature are often generated and promoted through partnerships of various kinds.

Enhancing urban safety and security through effective urban planning, design and governance

The process of enhancing urban safety and security through effective urban planning, design and governance is still in its infancy in many parts of the world, although in some countries such as the UK, the US and Canada it is more advanced. The attempts of the UK government to get the planning system to regard crime prevention as one of its major objectives in the drive to secure sustainable development have already been referred to earlier. But such a 'top-down' process would be of little value by itself unless it is accompanied by effective action at the local level. The

Bradford case study prepared for this Global Report⁴⁹ explores this area (see Box 4.6). It is clear from this case that key issues here include the following:

- An important role for the police service based upon its experience in handling crime is providing advice to the key players in the development process about how the opportunity to commit crimes can be reduced or eliminated through the ways in which buildings and spaces are designed.
- There should be a recognition of the opportunity provided by the development control part of the planning service to ensure that crime issues are carefully considered in approving development proposals, including the possibility that projects that do not do this might be refused planning permission.
- Since the planning system in the UK is 'plan led',⁵⁰ appropriate policies need to be in the development plan to provide a formal basis for this activity.
- Effective working relationships must exist between all of the key players in the development process and, in particular, in this context between planners and police architectural liaison officers.⁵¹

Deeply-embedded problems of crime and violence are rarely amenable to simple, one-dimensional solutions

The Bradford case study demonstrates that much has been achieved in moving towards a situation where crime prevention is well integrated within the planning process. However, it also shows that there is still work to be done in developing effective working relationships and agreed stances between the key players. This is clearly one of the important lessons that can be drawn from this case – the major elements can be in place, but a lot still depends upon effective working relationships between the key players.

Available evidence shows that CPTED-based approaches to the processes of shaping new development

Box 4.6 The Bradford Unitary Development Plan on planning for crime prevention

The Bradford Unitary Development Plan (which is the formal development plan for the City of Bradford) was adopted in October 2005. It includes Policy D4, which is its most specific policy on planning for crime prevention, and its central message is that 'Development proposals should be designed to ensure a safe and secure environment and reduce the opportunities for crime.' At its heart, what this is seeking to do is to get developers to think about crime prevention as part of the design process, rather than as a later add-on, so that when proposals are presented to the planning system for formal approval, crime prevention is already integral to them. As such, it draws heavily on the traditions of CPTED, as expressed through the British police's Secured by Design scheme. To this end, developers are expected to think, in particular, about the following issues:

- natural surveillance of public and semi-private spaces, especially in relation to entrances to developments, paths, play spaces, open spaces and car parks;

- defensible space, which should be created with the clear definition, differentiation and robust separation of public, private and semi-private space so that all spaces are clearly defined and adequately protected in terms of use and ownership;
- lighting of the development and, in particular, of streets and paths;
- design and layout of pedestrian, cycle and vehicular routes into and within the site, including how these integrate with existing patterns;
- landscaping and planting, especially to avoid the creation of hiding places and dark or secluded areas.

The policy also advises developers to make early contact with the police architectural liaison officer for Bradford when considering significant development proposals, and it promises that more detailed guidance will be published in future to supplement the outline provided by Policy D4.

Available evidence shows that crime prevention through environmental design-based approaches to the processes of shaping new development have an important contribution to make to crime prevention

Community-based approaches clearly have an important role to play in the litany of responses to crime and violence

have an important contribution to make to crime prevention.⁵² This approach, which focuses on the setting of crime, links crime prevention and reduction to changes in physical design. To date, most of the experience of applying this approach has been in the developed world. But subject to two important conditions, there is no reason why approaches of this nature cannot be successful in developing countries. The first of these conditions is the need for support for these approaches to be generated among the development communities of such localities so that attempts to apply them do not become a running battle between developers, planners and the police. The second condition is that appropriately trained staff must be available in order to put these approaches into practice. These issues are further taken up in Chapter 10.

A final example of a type of initiative that is common in many parts of the world is the use of closed circuit television cameras (CCTVs). The UK is an example of a country which has deployed CCTV cameras widely during recent years, not just in public places such as shopping centres and car parks, but also in some residential areas.⁵³ This latter element has been very controversial in the US because of the implications for civil liberties of installing cameras in residential areas. There are other areas of controversy, such as who owns and operates CCTV cameras and what uses those responsible are allowed to make of the pictures taken. But the biggest controversy probably centres on the question of whether or not they work as crime prevention tools. Do they actually deter people from committing crimes, or do they just make the subsequent process of tracking down perpetrators easier? Do they ease people's fears of crime in public places, or after a while do people get used to the presence of cameras and take little or no account of them? Do they encourage adaptive behaviour by criminals, which might include the displacement of crime into other areas where cameras are not ubiquitous? These are questions that are still hotly debated; but what is clear is that CCTV cameras have now become a commonplace part of initiatives against crime and violence in many parts of the world.⁵⁴

Planning and design interventions are generally geared towards reducing vulnerability of targets (people and property) by increasing protection and discouraging delinquents. They also reduce general risk factors by reducing opportunities for violence. Finally, they favour the development of other resilience factors, linked to socialization, community involvement and policing. They are therefore largely overlapping and contributing to other types of interventions.

Community-based approaches to urban safety and security

Community-based approaches clearly have an important role to play in the litany of responses to crime and violence. It is, however, important to understand that this can mean a wide range of possible ways in different local circumstances. At one end of the spectrum, some approaches are about helping the development and implementation of initiatives where the main impetus is from the community itself, and where

community members will have an ongoing responsibility for the initiative. In such instances, the role of the public sector is likely to be primarily an enabling one. At the other end of the spectrum, community involvement in place-based initiatives mounted by the local authority seems to be essential if they are to have the maximum chance of success: such initiatives should be 'done with' communities rather than 'done to' them. Communities may not be the initiators; but they still have a central role to play in shaping initiatives based both upon their local knowledge and upon the fact that, in their daily lives as residents, what they do or do not do can make a difference to what happens on the ground. It is also possible that the role of communities and their representatives may grow throughout the life of a project, so that they may take over as local wardens or stewards once community acceptance has been secured. So a wide range of project types might fit under this heading; but central to all of them is the concept of community engagement as being vital to the success of such projects.

It is also important to understand that community responses to crime and violence are not just about communities banding together to tackle problems, whether or not this involves working in partnership with the state. People, where they have or can put together the financial resources, also respond to problems of crime and violence through increasing urban segregation, with the affluent often choosing to live in gated communities or closed condominiums which they regard safer than the rest of the city. This has been extensively studied in Latin American cities, where the leading work has traced how rising crime and insecurity in São Paulo transformed it from a city characterized by open circulation to one with a large number of 'fortified enclaves'.⁵⁵ This came about not so much through any act of deliberate public policy, but rather through the exercise of individual and community choices on a considerable scale by those who were rich enough to make such choices. While this is wholly understandable from the point of view of such individuals, the effect on both the physical and the social functioning of the city can be very negative.

The above discussion is largely about how relatively wealthy elites in São Paulo have chosen to segregate themselves physically from the problems being experienced in the rest of the city. The conclusion should not be drawn that processes of this nature inevitably leave the urban poor in such cities helpless and unable to do anything about their circumstances. For example, the story of how crime and violence have been addressed in Diadema is about taking positive action to tackle crime and violence in part of the same São Paulo conurbation of 'fortified enclaves'. It is mainly about the importance of political leadership, about the process of partnership between key agencies, and about determined action to tackle deep-seated problems.⁵⁶

But one element of the Diadema story is also about the community itself, and about the desire of that community to see the extreme problems being tackled and to take advantage of the new opportunities being provided in order to build better ways of life. What is illustrated here are two sets of phenomena that appear to exist side by side: private action by elites to insulate themselves from what they see as

unacceptable levels of crime and violence in the city, and public and community action in some or all parts of those cities designed to tackle these problems.

■ Community involvement in Toronto, Canada

A good example of a city where several different forms of community involvement exist in its approaches to crime prevention and safety is the city of Toronto (Canada).⁵⁷ Toronto is one of the world's most ethnically diverse cities, with people from over 200 nations who speak more than 100 languages. As such, it epitomizes the point that 'community' means very many different things when looking at large cities. One of the most striking elements of the 2004 Toronto Community Safety Plan 2004⁵⁸ is the emphasis on crime prevention through social development. This is the idea that spatially targeted or area-based interventions are necessary to tackle the particular problems of specific neighbourhoods. The approach recognizes the different social and structural factors at work in each of these neighbourhoods, and programmes seek to build on the strengths of the neighbourhoods.

At the time that the Toronto case study for this Global Report was being drafted in 2006, 13 'at-risk' neighbourhoods⁵⁹ had been identified both for preparing crime prevention programmes and for securing the resources to support them. The approach adopted in each of these areas was to develop a Neighbourhood Action Plan through partnership between the city council, residents, community leaders, the police and relevant local agencies. The intention behind this process is that the interventions that are considered to be appropriate in each case should build the local community's capacity to improve safety and to prevent crime, especially violent crime. Examples of these initiatives are summarized in Box 4.7.

Although this approach appears to have considerable potential to reduce crime, it is too early in the life of this initiative to offer much by way of evaluation. But three elements stand out: its wide-ranging and imaginative nature; the various ways in which local communities are directly involved in programme delivery; and the targeted nature of what is being attempted. This set of activities also illustrates the point made earlier about not seeing initiatives as if they are in tightly sealed compartments because the examples in Box 4.7 illustrate a range of ways in which communities can get involved and could also be seen as illustrating initiatives on reduction of risk (particularly the emphasis on activities to keep youth away from crime) and strengthening of social capital.

Classical response to crime and violence: Strengthening formal criminal justice systems and policing

Strengthening formal criminal justice systems and policing could be seen as the classical response to problems of crime and violence. This is because the criminal justice systems and policing were seen to be the main societal tools designed to address this issue before the broadening of the

response agenda in recent years. However, criminal justice and police systems are often perceived by the public at large as being part of the problem rather than part of the solution. Many people would like to be in the position of being able to engage in discussions with their local police force about crime prevention initiatives in their areas, but feel unable to do so because either they do not trust the police or they feel that there are protective links between the police and criminal groups.⁶⁰

The case of Diadema discussed earlier contains elements of this in the days when its streets were characterized by lawlessness. One of the issues that this initiative had to tackle was the need to develop more positive relations between the police and the local communities.⁶¹ In this case, improvements to policing, in particular through the efforts of a charismatic senior police officer (who himself was subsequently murdered), were very important in securing the success of the initiative to close bars in the city much earlier than previously. Therefore, improving the performance of these 'classical' services that tackle crime and violence has an important part to play; in particular, actions to tackle corruption are central to efforts to improve the confidence that communities have in these services. This requires implementation of initiatives that improve the ability of the police to respond to community needs and priorities and the ability of those communities to participate in prevention efforts. It is difficult to imagine measures to tackle crime and violence being successful if they have to try to bypass criminal justice and police systems, even where they are seen as uncooperative or operating in ways that support criminal activities.⁶²

■ Changing approaches to policing in Hong Kong

The Hong Kong case study undertaken for this report⁶³ suggests that changes in styles and processes of policing since the 1960s appear to have been an important factor in the achievement and maintenance of Hong Kong's low crime rates. The essential change here has been a move away from a traditional 'command-and-control' approach and towards the evolution of a more community-based approach to policing. The various stages of this process are summarized in Box 4.8.

This story of a change process over a protracted period of time illustrates the point that significant adaptations to complex structures such as police forces are unlikely to be accomplished quickly, partly because there is likely to be intense debate about what the right steps are in the particular circumstances and partly because the task of 'winning the hearts and minds' of all the staff members involved is a large one. Nevertheless, it is of fundamental importance that changes of this nature can and do happen if police forces are to play their full part in the fight against crime and violence.

■ Guardianship approaches in New York City's Bryant Park

One related type of initiative that seems to be becoming more common, and can work well in appropriate circum-

Criminal justice and police systems are often perceived by the public at large as being part of the problem rather than part of the solution

It is difficult to imagine measures to tackle crime and violence being successful if they have to try to bypass criminal justice and police systems

Box 4.7 Examples of initiatives undertaken as part of the Crime Prevention through Social Development programme of Toronto's Community Safety Strategy

Youth Opportunity Initiatives: Training

This initiative is about providing opportunities for young people to develop employment-related skills and to obtain relevant experience through activities such as internships and apprenticeships. It involves close cooperation with community organizations, businesses and trade unions.

Youth Opportunity Initiatives: Jobs for Youth

The provincial government has provided Cdn\$28.5 million in funding over three years so that the city can offer summer employment opportunities to youth from the priority neighbourhoods. Community-based organizations administer the funds, recruit and select job candidates, and work with employers. In 2004, over 300 young people living in Toronto's 'priority' neighbourhoods secured summer employment.

Youth Challenge Fund

The Province of Ontario has a Cdn\$15 million fund to support local programmes, training and jobs for youth living in Toronto's 13 'at-risk' neighbourhoods. In particular, this supports ideas for community safety that come from people living in these areas, and community organizations are encouraged to apply for funds that will enable projects of this nature to be implemented. In April 2006, the premier of Ontario challenged the private sector to match this public investment and promised that if that happened, further private-sector contributions up to a maximum of another Cdn\$15 million would then be matched over the next three years, taking the total up to a potential Cdn\$60 million.

The Community Crisis Response Programme

This programme focuses on getting city services to respond in a coordinated manner to support neighbourhoods following 'trauma-inducing events', such as killings or violent assaults. Programme staff work with neighbourhood residents to identify and implement appropriate and culturally sensitive interventions that are intended to facilitate the recovery process.

Community Use of Schools

This recognizes that there is often a very valuable resource locked up in schools during evenings, weekends and the summer months, and so schools have been opened in a number of neighbourhoods to provide free access to community and recreation programmes. The aim of this is to break down financial barriers and to promote participation in a range of community activities.

Grassroots/Community-Based Youth Services

These services are essentially about providing support for not-for-profit community-based agencies to provide programmes and services for youth in at-risk neighbourhoods. These include violence prevention, anger management, conflict resolution, mentorship and peer support, individual and family counselling, academic programming, life skills training, and gang prevention/exit programmes.

Expanded Healthcare Centres

Healthcare facilities are being improved in at-risk neighbourhoods to ensure that teams with a wide range of skills are available locally to deliver a range of programmes and support services for youth, young children and families.

Source: Thompson and Gartner, 2007

One related type of initiative that seems to be becoming more common, and can work well in appropriate circumstances, is the use of uniformed security staff

Uniformed staff can convey to the public the same sense of presence as police officers do and, in practice, can provide a level of visibility that stretched policing resources are unable to achieve

stances, is the use of uniformed security staff. There is an example of this initiative in the New York case study for this Global Report, which examined the regeneration of Bryant Park. This had become a major problem area during the 1980s, described by local businesses as being a 'war zone';⁶⁴ but a series of physical and social improvements has turned around both public perception of the park and its economic impact on the surrounding area. One of these improvements has been the establishment of a visible security presence in the park, which is particularly important because while physical improvements tend to take place at a particular point in time, an ongoing security presence helps in maintaining the quality of what has been achieved and therefore its attractiveness to the general public. In addition, the visible presence of uniformed security staff can change public perception of how safe a place is. Both of these elements seem to have been important in the Bryant Park case.

Strictly speaking, uniformed security staff are not part of the police force, although there are various forms of relationships here. For instance, some of them are former police officers. The important point is that uniformed staff

can convey to the public the same sense of presence as police officers do and, in practice, can provide a level of visibility that stretched policing resources are unable to achieve. This may well be the kind of measure which is more limited in its value when it is undertaken by itself; but in the Bryant Park case, this was undertaken alongside other types of activities. It must be emphasized that uniformed security staff operate in cities of developing countries as well. They are quite visible in 'public spaces' in cities such as Kingston, Johannesburg, Lagos and Nairobi. It is also important to acknowledge that such arrangements do not always make a positive contribution to tackling problems of crime and violence. But in appropriate circumstances, initiatives of this kind can add considerable value to what the police and criminal justice systems would otherwise achieve.

Informal and formal approaches to policing and conflict management

The emergence of vigilante groups is a very common way in which poor and not so poor community groups respond to escalating levels of crime and violence in the perceived absence or ineffectiveness of the police and judicial system.

Box 4.8 Changing styles of policing in Hong Kong since the late 1960s

The process of shifting from a traditional 'command-and-control' form of policing in Hong Kong, where the priority of the colonial government (including the police) was to provide an environment where trade could be conducted smoothly, to one which is much more community based, has taken place over a period of 40 years. One key element in this process of change is that the police force has become very largely a force drawn from local communities, rather than one that was more typical of a colonial military organization housed in barracks – and the likelihood is that this major change in the composition of the police force has been an important element in the growing public acceptance of the police force in Hong Kong over this period.

A trigger for change appears to have been the recognition during the late 1960s that the traditional style was a factor in three major civil disturbances during that decade, and that it had also contributed to much public hostility to the police. A factor that was clearly of considerable importance in this particular case was the reversion of Hong Kong from British colonial to Chinese control in 1997, not only in the sense that this date was a watershed in its own right, but also because the fact that this change was due to happen clearly influenced events during the preceding years. The major phases of change are as follows:

- A tentative start was made between 1968 and 1973, where the main focus was on improved communications with the public.
- From the early to mid 1970s, this process was intensified, with an emphasis on promoting police–community relationships as a two-way process and on involving the public in the fight against crime. This included major campaigns such as the Fight Violent Crime Campaign, the establishment of the Police Community Relations Officer Scheme in 1974 and the creation of neighbourhood police units. By 1983, 90 neighbourhood police units were in operation throughout Hong Kong. A major effort was also put into liaison with schools, and today

the Junior Police Call Scheme is still the largest youth organization in Hong Kong, with 505 primary school clubs, 383 secondary school clubs, and 144,203 members territory wide.

- There was an element of retrenchment in the community relations efforts of the police in the 1980s, where the emphasis during a period of reorganization was on trying to use limited resources as effectively as possible. Neighbourhood police units were scrapped; but to help make up for this loss, Neighbourhood Watch schemes were piloted during the mid 1980s in two public estates that had experienced a surge of burglaries and sexual offences. It was evident during this period that there were some tensions among police senior managers between those who favoured more conservative approaches and those who favoured approaches based on community policing; but by the late 1980s it had become clear that the latter was the preferred model.
- In the period of the run-up to the reversion to Chinese control in 1997, 1989 saw the appointment of the first Chinese commissioner of police and the last British governor, who brought with him in 1992 the idea of a customer-based service culture. The development of a culture of service throughout Hong Kong government activities as a whole included a public pledge to transform the then Royal Hong Kong Police into a 'service of quality'.
- The final stage, which continues, has been the adoption of more localized perspectives and the promotion of a new image of a people's force with its citizen-centred slogan of serving the community, including embracing modern information technology. This process has had to cope with a less quiescent public than in the past; and so periodically there are still tensions between the police and groups in the community which continue to raise questions about the balance being struck between serving the community and fighting crime.

Source: Broadhurst et al, 2007

This has become an increasingly familiar phenomenon in Brazil, Ghana, Jamaica, Kenya, Nigeria, Peru, South Africa and Tanzania.⁶⁵ Vigilante groups have also started to emerge in many other countries for the same reasons. Though well-intentioned initially, vigilantism has obvious limitations. The activities of vigilante groups have often been abused in that they have the tendency to degenerate into anarchy and become extra legal, whereby innocent persons are assaulted, maimed or even killed in cases of mistaken identity or false accusations. In addition, vigilante groups have been used to settle personal and political scores. All of this further exacerbates the problems of violence and lawlessness. The solution to problems of this nature is for the state to examine why vigilante groups have come into being, and to see whether this reflects a failure of formal systems of policing and criminal justice that should be addressed.

In terms of changes to the justice system, one development that has been visible in several parts of the world is the idea of restorative justice. This is based on ideas that

were originally part of tribal or clan-based cultures that stand the risk of disappearing in the face of modernization. For example, with respect to Port Moresby, Box 4.5 indicates that there is significant public support for reconnecting with former tribal systems of justice. The idea here is that the harm caused by criminal behaviour is emphasized, and, as a consequence, restorative justice models encourage communication between the crime victim and the offender in order to facilitate healing, reconciliation and rehabilitation. A similar system known as penal mediation was established in France in 1992.⁶⁶ It entails finding a negotiated solution to conflicts, where perpetrators are made to face their victims; if restitution is made, the case is not taken to court. Another example of this is the idea of family group conferences, which have been part of Maori culture in New Zealand for centuries and were adopted by Israel during the 1980s as part of the development of that country's restorative justice strategies. Several Latin American countries have also implemented projects of this

The emergence of vigilante groups is a very common way in which poor and not so poor community groups respond to escalating levels of crime and violence in the perceived absence or ineffectiveness of the police and judicial system

The activities of vigilante groups have often been abused in that they have the tendency to degenerate into anarchy ... whereby innocent persons are assaulted, maimed or even killed

nature. For example, in 1995 the Colombian government launched two *Casas de Justicia* (Houses of Justice), which are based on face-to-face meetings between parties in conflict and which include the provision of access to legal services for low-income families.

Strategies aimed at reducing risk factors

The main elements in strategies designed to achieve the reduction of risk factors appear to be measures to tackle violence against women, programmes to prevent youth (particularly young males) from slipping into a life of crime, as well as programmes to help people in both of these groups who have become victims of crime.

■ Focusing on violence against women

In some parts of the world violence against women appears to be deeply etched in society; but it is also clear that there is growing pressure for this to be ended as part of securing basic human rights for women. One publication seeking to offer practical advice to this end in Eastern and Southern Africa notes:

*The call for an end to violence against women is growing ever louder. Increasingly, women's rights are seen as a cornerstone in the promotion of human rights and the realization of social justice. Clearly, women cannot live free, safe and dignified lives when violence, or the threat of violence, pervades their public and private experiences. Without the basic right to live free from fear, all other gains are compromised... The challenge for activists now is to translate these visions of women's rights into practical projects and activities that promote meaningful change in the lives of women, men, families and communities.*⁶⁷

The approach suggested for tackling domestic violence against women has five phases:

- 1 *Community assessment*: gathering information about attitudes and beliefs, and beginning to build relationships with community members.
- 2 *Raising awareness*: increasing awareness of domestic violence and its consequences, not just among the community at large, but specifically with various governmental and professional sectors.
- 3 *Building networks*: encouraging and supporting community members and professional sectors to begin considering action and changes that uphold women's right to safety.
- 4 *Integrating action*: making action against domestic violence part of everyday life and of the policies and practices of institutions.
- 5 *Consolidating efforts*: strengthening activities in order to ensure their sustainability, continued growth and progress. Such actions might well include gathering data to provide evidence of what has been achieved

since positive evidence of this nature can of itself provide a stimulus to further action.⁶⁸

This is just one example of an initiative to offer practical advice and support in tackling domestic violence in a part of the world where this is a major problem. The process of tackling domestic violence requires long-term commitment since it often seeks to address cultural habits and practices that are deeply ingrained. This requires committed leadership and the ability to keep going in the face of setbacks. An important element that has been promoted widely and increasingly by both activists and municipalities is the development of partnerships and joint initiatives, in which voluntary work, institutional support and access to networks and infrastructures is facilitated by pulling together resources and capacities. One of the trends during recent years in this context has been that what were often previously isolated initiatives of this kind have not only been supported by international organizations, but have also been able to link with other groups in other parts of the world for advice, support and encouragement. Initiatives of this nature are much facilitated by the development of electronic communication, including the internet,⁶⁹ and by the ability of groups to come together at major world events to exchange experiences.⁷⁰

■ Women's safety audits

A starting point for many projects that seek to tackle violence against women is the use of women's safety audits. Essentially, these involve exploratory walks by groups of three to six people, mainly women designed to identify specific problems in the local environment from a woman's safety perspective. At each specific site, participants identify where the potential for crime is high or where women, or others, may feel unsafe. This helps to suggest appropriate corrective action. Women's safety audits not only provide valuable information, but also increase awareness of violence against vulnerable groups, and help decision-makers to understand how men and women experience their environments.⁷¹ Box 4.9 summarizes the experience of Durban in this regard.⁷²

■ Grappling with youth crime

The fact that cities as different as Port Moresby (see Box 4.5) and Toronto (see Box 4.7) both recognize the need to pay particular attention to youth crime is suggestive of the ubiquitous nature of this problem. A significant proportion of the crimes that occur in cities across the world are perpetrated by young males.⁷³ In many instances, this is because they have few options. Consequently, strategies designed to show young people that there are better alternatives and to encourage them to experience employment opportunities or engage in sporting or cultural activities in preference to a life of crime are increasingly becoming popular. The value of such strategies can be seen in both their short- and long-term effects. In the short term, strategies of this nature can deflect young people away from criminal activities and therefore can positively affect one of the groups most prone to crime. There are examples of short-term successes of this

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nature in Kingston (Jamaica), where in the Grants Pen area the creation of a peace park has provided recreational opportunities for young people that were previously absent and contributed to a lowering of the murder rate in the area.⁷⁴ In the long term, such strategies offer the possibility that individuals who benefit from them will contribute more fully and effectively towards the development of their community and society than would otherwise have been the case, thus becoming much less of a burden on overstretched police and criminal justice systems.

One of the major problems in this area is the extent to which young people see criminals as role models and thus seek to emulate them. For example, a study of a poor community in Managua⁷⁵ has argued that the most ostentatiously wealthy people in that community (as reflected in the quality of their houses, clothes and cars) are those involved in drug trafficking.⁷⁶ Under these circumstances, it is not wholly surprising that some young people see this as something to be aspired to. This is particularly the case when it is associated with a culture where the macho-type behaviour often exhibited by such people is seen as evidence of their significance in the community. This is apparently the case in many Latin American cities, where attitudes of this nature help to encourage the recruitment of child soldiers to gangs at a relatively young age.⁷⁷

From the policy perspective, the problem of youth crime underscores two points. First, the problem of disaffected young people who see themselves as being largely outside the formal economy and who turn to crime and violence in preference to the other alternatives can rank among the most intractable issues that national and city authorities have to contend with. Second, the response to problems of this nature goes beyond a concern with crime and violence – a holistic perspective is necessary. The establishment of good governance, with comprehensive national and urban policies that pay specific attention to the needs of children and youth, is essential. It is likely that encouraging participation in economic activity will constitute a large part of this kind of response, with job-related training and experience being made available and major efforts being made to ensure that beneficiaries are able to move into employment. The response will also involve investing in alternative activities such as sporting and cultural activities. But it will also need to offer to young people a vision of what life as a member of the community can be like, a vision that is able to compete successfully with what other visions can offer to them. Finally, it is important to realize the potential of the youth themselves, and to engage their participation in the development of appropriate responses and solutions. All of these are likely to be challenging and to require significant inputs of resources over significant periods of time.

Non-violent resolution of conflicts

The non-violent resolution of conflicts is perhaps more of an approach to issues based upon a particular moral philosophy⁷⁸ than a specific policy response to crime and violence. It, however, deserves a short discussion given its potential to contribute to the range of ways of thinking about what can

Box 4.9 The role of the women's safety audit in Durban (eThekweni), South Africa

The inspiration for undertaking a women's safety audit in Durban came from the discussion of best practice in this area at the first International Women Seminar held in Montreal in 2002. The pilot project was conducted in KwaMakutha, a peri-urban area experiencing both high levels of social crime and unemployment. The process entailed going out and identifying problems on site, as well as a needs assessment and a strategic planning workshop undertaken with service providers. The key environmental factors that were taken into account in this process were lighting, signage, isolation, movement predictors, entrapment sites, escape routes, maintenance and overall design. Since the pilot project was undertaken, this process has been extended to other parts of the city as part of Durban's partnership approach to tackling rising levels of crime and violence. Although this approach has not eradicated crime, it has managed to contain it in comparison with previous experiences.

The key challenges that the auditing process faced included getting local authorities to buy into it; establishing and developing the necessary relationship between local authorities and local communities; and effective implementation. This latter point was seen to be particularly significant. This is because of the risk of disillusion and eventual apathy on the part of the community if nothing happened after all the effort that had been expended in the process. Much of the action that was identified in specific localities involved applying the principles of CPTED, and thus one of the important tasks was the need to train city employees who would need to be involved in the implementation of the principles of CPTED.

Source: Zambuko and Edwards, 2007

be very difficult problems.⁷⁹ This idea can also be linked with the earlier discussion on restorative justice since elements of that approach which emphasize involving families of both perpetrators and victims seeking solutions also highlight non-violent methods of resolving difficulties. Put simply, this approach is about achieving results by means other than violence. It has been extensively used as a philosophical idea by the labour, peace, environmental and women's movements. It has also been extensively employed in political actions, especially against repressive regimes in several parts of the world. It is also an important philosophy in relation to education, where conflict resolution education is part of the curriculum in many schools and where conflict resolution techniques are applied to the resolution of many of the difficulties experienced by pupils.⁸⁰

The avoidance of violence in schools is an important issue in its own right, not least because of its potential for inculcating appropriate habits among young people, but also because it is central to the effective functioning of the school itself and to the quality of the educational experience that it offers its pupils.⁸¹ In this sense, this concept of non-violent approaches to conflict resolution also relates to the discussion of tackling youth crime, where school experiences can be of vital importance.

There appear to be four broad approaches to conflict resolution education, the last two of which will be taken together because, in principle, they are very similar:

- *Process curriculum*: this is where educators teach the principles and processes of conflict resolution as a distinct lesson or course.
- *Peer mediation*: this is where trained youth mediators work with their peers to find resolutions to conflicts. It

It is important to realize the potential of the youth themselves, and to engage their participation in the development of appropriate responses and solutions

Initiatives to reduce crime and violence are likely to be of help to the city as a social and economic entity by addressing one of the main barriers that it faces

accepts as a fundamental principle that young people are more likely to be comfortable with, and respond positively to, attempts at mediation by other young people rather than adults.

- *Peaceable classroom and peaceable school*: these approaches incorporate conflict resolution within the core subjects of the curriculum and within classroom and institutional management processes. An important feature of approaches of this nature is that they seek to involve everyone connected with the unit of management in question (e.g. individual class or whole school), irrespective of their roles. Peaceable school approaches challenge both youth and adults to act on the understanding that a diverse, non-violent society is a realistic goal.⁸²

The US Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention summarized the experience of applying these approaches in 1997 as follows:

*Most conflict resolution and peer mediation programs, an estimated 7500 to 10,000, have been implemented in our nation's elementary, middle and high schools. However, conflict resolution programs are also a meaningful component of safe and violence-free juvenile justice facilities, alternative education programs, and community mobilization efforts to combat violence.*⁸³

During recent years in the US, there have been cases of armed individuals (including students) gaining entry to school grounds and killing or injuring staff and pupils. Typically, this has caused school authorities to revisit issues of school security in order to make entry of this kind more difficult, often including the application of the principles of CPTED.⁸⁴ Thus, strategies of this nature can often co-exist alongside the application of non-violent methods of conflict resolution both inside schools and in their surrounding communities.

It is probably fair to say that compared with many of the other policy responses discussed in the chapter, this one is still in its infancy in terms of its application to issues of crime and violence. But the evidence from American experience suggests that it has much to offer as an element in the range of responses. For example, an evaluation of the New Mexico Centre for Dispute Resolution's Youth Corrections Mediation Programme found that the recidivism rate among youth trained as mediators was 18 per cent lower during the first six months after returning to the community than for a control group not trained in mediation.⁸⁵

Strengthening social capital

Elements of approaches to the strengthening of social capital can be found in many of the discussions of other policy responses since this seems to be a very common factor in crime prevention programmes that combine several of these approaches. This is particularly the case because the

approach adopted earlier in this chapter to the definition of social capital is a broad-based one. It is not only about improving the ability of groups and communities to respond positively to problems of crime and violence, but is also about the creation of community assets that assist with these processes. More broadly still, it can also be argued that the economic prospects of cities, the social welfare of their citizens, and the safety of the public realm are interrelated.

Initiatives to reduce crime and violence are likely to be of help to the city as a social and economic entity by addressing one of the main barriers that it faces. Similarly, measures to improve what the city offers its residents and users in terms of education, employment, sporting and cultural activities are likely to be helpful in tackling crime and violence because they improve opportunities to participate positively in the life of the city, and offer positive lifestyle alternatives to individuals. This approach is reflected in UN-Habitat's Global Campaign on Urban Governance, which takes as its theme the idea of the inclusive city, where all urban inhabitants, regardless of economic means, gender, race, ethnicity or religion, are able to participate fully in the social, economic and political opportunities that cities have to offer.

A particular feature of efforts to improve social capital in many of the case examples is the use of this approach to address issues of youth crime. This is very visible in the Toronto programmes summarized in Box 4.7, where there is a strong emphasis on employment, on appropriate training and on work experience. It is also evident in the Diadema case, through educational opportunities and participation in cultural activities.⁸⁶ The argument in both cases is essentially the same: young people need to have opportunities for them to participate in, and to contribute to, society that offer them better alternatives than a life of crime. Therefore, investing in the creation of these opportunities for young people is also investing in the future welfare of the city and its citizens. It is also envisaged that this will develop the willingness in these individuals as adults to contribute positively to the welfare of their communities in the future.

There are several examples in individual UN-Habitat Safer City Programmes that can be seen as including the creation of social capital. These include:

- Durban, where urban renewal efforts have concentrated on areas with the highest rates of poverty, unemployment and violent crime, with several projects in these areas that provide employment opportunities for local youth;⁸⁷
- Dar es Salaam, where pilot projects have included employment creation and skills training for youth;⁸⁸ and
- Support for street lighting initiatives, as well as for improvement of community and recreation facilities in slums (Nairobi, Dar es Salaam and Douala).

There can be little doubt about the importance of activities of this nature because they address some of the underlying causes of crime and violence in cities by offering youths a better alternative. But it is also clear that efforts of this nature can be financially demanding, involve a wide range of

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partners, and be pursued consistently over a period of time if they are to make a significant difference.

INSTITUTIONAL AND COMMUNITY RESPONSES

Institutional and community responses to problems of crime and violence are integral to many of the policy activities reviewed. This section identifies a few key points in this regard. Institutional responses to crime and violence can come from all levels of the hierarchy of governance, and very often this is what is required in a comprehensive response to problems of crime and violence. One of the challenges in these situations is to get the whole range of responses to work together in a coordinated manner, based upon a broad strategy and programmes of action. For cities, a typical problem might be that they do not control the police and criminal justice systems, but want these systems to do particular things to support a city-wide or more localized initiative.

For higher levels of government, they can typically find this kind of spatial differentiation difficult to achieve, either because it challenges their broad policies or organizational structures, or it would involve moving resources around and giving priority to one location over another. Thus, getting all levels of the hierarchy to focus in a coordinated way on a city or more localized initiative can be difficult. This, in turn, explains why the efforts of the various arms of the public sector that are apparently contributing to a project can appear to local people to be less well integrated than would be desirable for the success of the project. This is one of the reasons why the role of the local authority is absolutely crucial in this process.

Local authorities are uniquely placed to take an overview of their locality and its needs, to represent the interests both of the city as a whole and of its individual residents, and to work with others to ensure that an integrated programme of action is drawn up, agreed and implemented. They control many of the services that need to be fully involved in this process, and they have good working relationships with a range of other service providers. Usually, there is no other key player in the process of whom all this could be said, which is why leadership of this process often falls to the local authority. Players should also have one other asset that is fundamental in this process: the strength of their links with local communities.

Many initiatives to combat crime and violence are started and implemented by communities. Where this is the case, the role of local authorities may be limited to issues such as the granting of necessary permissions and offering various forms of assistance. But many initiatives, by their nature, are more likely to be initiated as part of a more comprehensive programme and to be put into practice by one or more partners of that programme. In this case, the community role is more likely to be about any or all of the following:

- consultation and the generation of community support since it is very difficult to mount successful initiatives in the face of community opposition;
- the provision of local information because the knowledge base of local community members is potentially of vital importance; and
- negotiation over the detail, including what the expectations are of local communities and what kind of contributions they are able and willing to make, because even if communities are not project initiators, they can often play important roles in helping projects to succeed.

These are highly important to the success of initiatives in their own right; but community involvement in, and support for, projects is important in another sense as well. For example, an initiative to encourage members of the public to come forward and report crimes to the police depends upon whether or not people are prepared to put aside the reasons for not doing this previously and cooperate, which, in turn, might depend upon many other issues (e.g. trust in the police in relation to matters such as witness protection schemes).

Many initiatives stand or fall based on their ability to engage local communities as active participants or even as passive participants. Sometimes, the way in which people talk to each other about projects in their areas as part of their daily conversations can make a difference to how positively or negatively people feel about such projects. Failure to engage local communities in the past has stopped many ideas that in their own right may well have been good ones from achieving their full potential. Community engagement is central to initiatives in this field since community members are the ultimate beneficiaries of such initiatives. This being the case, the basic principle here which derives from people's rights as citizens is that initiatives should be 'done with' them rather than 'done to' them.

PARTNERSHIPS

Partnerships can be seen as both a specific mechanism that can be used to encourage interested parties to work together and a more philosophical approach that recognizes the multifaceted nature of the problems of crime and violence. The partnership approach in this latter sense is becoming more frequently utilized in initiatives to tackle urban crime and violence because experience has demonstrated that if such initiatives are to succeed they need to acknowledge the complex and multidimensional nature of the problems they are seeking to address. This inevitably means that a wide range of players will be involved in processes of this nature, which, in turn, creates the requirement for mechanisms to ensure that these contributions operate in integrated and coherent ways.

Partnerships offer both a mechanism of this kind and a framework within which individuals and organizations can commit to holistic approaches. In addition, there is considerable evidence to support the view that initiatives are more likely to be successful if they are part of an integrated

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programme, supported by a broad strategy and based on an understanding of the local context. Partnerships offer a vehicle for undertaking tasks of this nature and for agreeing on the outcomes of these processes, including tapping into the knowledge and understanding of partners at the appropriate times. These reasons show why both as a mechanism and as a process, partnerships have become so common in this field.

There are, however, some important cautionary words that are necessary, not least because *partnership* is in the same class as *community* when it comes to concepts that are seen in some quarters as being the equivalent of magic dust. In reality, the theoretical virtues of the partnership approach will only materialize if the partnership works effectively, which, among other things, requires a significant commitment of resources by partners. Partnerships can also be exclusive, as well as inclusive: who is not there can be as significant in determining outcomes as who is there, and can often be a controversial issue in a locality. Indeed, achieving a proper level of representation around the partnership table can be a real challenge in its own right, not least because there may well be very different views about what 'proper' means in relation to particular sectors or organizations.

The workings of partnerships can also be difficult to understand from the outside, especially if their communication processes are not very effective and their procedures are complex, bureaucratic and difficult for potential participants to follow. Partnerships run the risk of being too cosy in the sense that a relatively small group of people can agree things among themselves without taking account of much wider community views and wishes. Partnerships also need to have an action focus so that they avoid the danger of drifting into becoming mere talking shops that actually do very little. Finally, it is important that a sensible balance is struck between the importance of the leadership role and the absence of the domination that sometimes comes with this. Effective partnerships need good leadership; but partnerships should never become merely a rubber stamp for the views of whoever is in the leading role. These are just some of the dangers that exist in relation to partnerships and, indeed, some of the things that some critics have said about them.⁸⁹

There are many examples of partnerships of all kinds, some of which are good and some of which are not. However, the potential advantages of partnership are very real. Indeed, it is difficult to think of other mechanisms that have the same potential. But it is equally clear that partnership is not a magic formula. It is something that has to be worked at in particular circumstances.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Inevitably, a discussion of emerging policy trends across as diverse a set of policy responses to crime and violence as reviewed in this chapter involves being selective. Nevertheless, there do appear to be some significant policy trends that are visible. This section discusses what may be the most notable.

The most important policy trend in the field over the

past two decades or so has been the move away from the idea that crime prevention and tackling violence are essentially matters for the police and the criminal justice system, and towards the idea that these are complex phenomena which require broad-based responses. The emergence of urban crime prevention as a specific concern of urban policy and urban actors is an indication of such shift. As a result, the range of policy responses described in this chapter has become more commonplace, with, to some extent, each of them seeing significant development as the search for solutions has broadened. This does not imply that the roles of the police and the criminal justice system have become unimportant, or that developments have been mainly in other areas rather than in these. Instead, the historic reliance on a limited number of areas has been replaced by a more broad-based range of responses that recognize the need to find other ways of addressing crime and violence. Four of these areas, in particular, seem to have attracted interest, although the nature and the intensity of this have varied across the world.

First is the idea that through the manipulation of the physical environment it is possible to reduce the opportunity for certain kinds of crimes to be committed. This recognizes the point made in Chapter 3 that the physical environment poses risks of crime and violence and that, as a consequence, the *where* of crime is an important issue which, until recently, was often neglected. There is now an understanding that it is possible to make a difference to the opportunity for crimes such as burglary to be committed by design choices, and that it is possible to make a difference to people's feelings about the safety of the environment in which they move around through similar processes.⁹⁰ In particular, much attention has been paid to the residential environment,⁹¹ which is important since housing is by far the most extensive urban land use. This interest has been extended in some areas to an exploration of the role of the planning system through its control of development in addressing these aspects of crime prevention.⁹²

The second of the policy responses is the idea that approaches need to be more community based. The broad reasons for this have been discussed. It seems to be the case that this means different things in different parts of the world, and it is an area of considerable controversy since many practices that are claimed as being community based would not be in other areas. There is still considerable scope for further development of this area and for the development, in particular, of a better understanding of what community involvement means. Interestingly, as is demonstrated in the Hong Kong case study,⁹³ these issues have also affected discussions about appropriate policing strategies, with the process of moving in the direction of community policing taking place over a period of 40 years and being influenced by the major change in 1997 when Hong Kong was returned to China.

The third area relates to the focus on particular groups in society that are either vulnerable to, or perpetrators of, most crimes. This has been a key feature of many UN-Habitat Safer Cities programmes, where the focus has been on women at risk of violence and on young people,

especially young men, who commit a larger proportion of crimes.⁹⁴

The final area where there has been significant policy development is in the strengthening of social capital. This represents a recognition of the fact that to deflect youths from a life of crime and to offer them more attractive alternatives, the city needs to become a place where opportunities abound for young people to participate fully in economic, social, cultural and sporting activities. The importance of this is that it is not a traditional 'crime and violence policy', but essentially about addressing the social and economic circumstances that cause young people to choose a life of crime and violence.

Over and above these broad policy trends, there is a further trend that appears significant. This has to do with the processes used. Increasingly, it is being recognized that initiatives need to be part of an integrated and comprehensive programme, backed up by a broad strategy and founded on good understanding of the issues addressed, as distinct from an *ad hoc* basis. Consequently, it is now common to find programmes of this nature containing elements of many of the policy responses discussed in this chapter, which

recognize their mutually reinforcing nature. Very often, the mechanism chosen for moving this approach forward is the partnership mechanism, which is often accompanied by an attempt to engage local communities in decision-making and implementation.

There are two final points that also constitute emerging policy trends. The first is the acceptance that solutions cannot simply be borrowed from elsewhere where they may have appeared to have worked, but must be adapted to the local context. This raises important issues for the nature of international assistance in this field since it suggests that it needs to be as much about assisting with this process of adaptation as it is about helping with the application of tried and tested practices from home locations. The second and related point is the need to evaluate what is being done properly and to publicize such evaluations so that others can learn from them. There are still far too many initiatives that are not properly evaluated,⁹⁵ but the recognition of the need to do this does seem to be becoming more widespread. In addition, the potential for evaluation to contribute to collective learning is greater than it has ever been by virtue of the spread of internet access.

NOTES

- 1 See the discussion of this issue in Chapter 3.
- 2 It is also the case that crime has a very particular impact at the individual level since it is very often individuals and the households of which they are part who are the victims of crime.
- 3 It should be noted that the consequences of drug trafficking are often experienced locally.
- 4 A similar issue applies in this case as well. The consequences of the use of such weapons in criminal activities are, of course, felt locally.
- 5 And the same applies here also since much human trafficking results in illegal activities, such as prostitution in urban areas.
- 6 See http://untreaty.un.org/English/TreatyEvent2003/Treaty_1.htm.
- 7 Interpol, 2006.
- 8 See www.unhabitat.org/programmes/safercities/approach.asp.
- 9 ECOSOC resolution 1995/9 of 24 July 1995.
- 10 UN-Habitat, 2005f, p27.
- 11 CEN, 2003.
- 12 Schneider and Kitchen, 2007.
- 13 Kitchen and Schneider, 2005
- 14 ODPM and the Home Office, 2004.
- 15 Schneider and Kitchen, 2007, Chapter 7
- 16 DoE, 1994.
- 17 DETR, 2000.
- 18 ODPM and the Home Office, 2004.
- 19 ODPM, 2005.
- 20 The discussion of the response of the Government of Jamaica draws heavily from the case study of Kingston prepared for this Global Report by Sherrian Gray (Gray, 2007). See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jamaica_Constabulary_Force.
- 21
- 22 Most of the evaluative work that has been done on this issue relates to countries in the developed world, and very little such work has been conducted on the specific initiatives undertaken by national governments in the developing and transitional worlds to support efforts at the urban level to tackle problems of crime and violence.
- 23 National Crime Prevention Centre, 2005.
- 24 The information utilized here has been taken from the Government of Australia's Office of Crime Prevention's website at www.crimeprevention.wa.gov.au.
- 25 Government of Western Australia, 2004.
- 26 Fox, 2002. See also the illustration in UN-Habitat, 2006j, p13.
- 27 Women's safety audits are discussed in more detail later in this chapter; when measures to address the risk of violence towards women are reviewed. There are several ways in which audits of this nature could be carried out; but, in essence, they involve small groups going out on site and looking at local environments from the perspectives of women's safety (usually including women who can bring some local experience to bear on this process) as part of an intensive process in order to identify potential problems and to suggest solutions to them.
- 28 UN-Habitat, 2006b, p13.
- 29 Florida Legislature, 2006.
- 30 *Ibid.*
- 31 *Ibid.*
- 32 Schneider, 2003.
- 33 For example, in the UK the English Best Value User Satisfaction Survey for 2003/2004 showed that the top response of citizens to a question about what makes somewhere a good place in which to live was a low level of crime (ODPM, 2005a).
- 34 See, for example, Ekblom, 1997.
- 35 DTLR, 2001.
- 36 Morton and Kitchen, 2005
- 37 Schneider and Kitchen, 2007, Chapter 4.
- 38 *Ibid.*
- 39 UN-Habitat, 2006b, p15.
- 40 These figures, and other material in this section, are taken from Manso et al, 2005.
- 41 *Ibid.*
- 42 *Ibid.*, p12.
- 43 *Ibid.*, p1.
- 44 *Ibid.*, 2005.
- 45 *Ibid.*, 2005.
- 46 *Ibid.*, 2005, pp11–12.
- 47 *Ibid.*, 2005, p11.
- 48 The material here and in the paragraphs that follow is taken from Boamah and Stanley, 2007.
- 49 Kitchen, 2007.
- 50 This, in essence, means that planning decisions are taken in accordance with the provisions of the development plan unless there are clear, cogent and relevant reasons why this should not be so.
- 51 In some UK police forces, the officers carrying out this work go by different titles; but for convenience they will all be referred to as architectural liaison officers.
- 52 Schneider and Kitchen, 2007.
- 53 Schneider and Kitchen, 2002.
- 54 For a fuller discussion of many of the issues surrounding CCTVs, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Closed-circuit_television.
- 55 Caldeira, 2000.
- 56 Manso et al, 2005.
- 57 The material reported here is taken from Thompson and Gartner, 2007.
- 58 This document can be found at <http://www.toronto.ca/safety/sfyrprt1.htm>.
- 59 The basis of the definition of 'at-risk' neighbourhoods was not just their experience of crime and violence, but also their economic and social circumstances.
- 60 This was noted particularly during much of the discussion in the sessions dealing with crime and violence at the World Urban Forum in Vancouver by delegates from cities in Central and South America and Africa.
- 61 Manso et al, 2005.
- 62 Zalar, 2007, suggests that this was a factor in the high level of shootings that were not properly investigated in that city.
- 63 Broadhurst et al, 2007.
- 64 Macedo, 2007.
- 65 Benevides and Ferreira, 1991; Bukurura, 1993;

- Vanderschueren, 1996; Allen, 1997; Baker, 2002; Adinkrah, 2005; Nwankwo, 2005.
- 66 Vanderschueren, 1996.
67 Michau and Naker, 2003.
68 *Ibid.*, 2003.
69 For example, see the Women in Cities International website at www.womenincities.org.
- 70 For example, Women in Cities International, together with their partners, organized a programme of events across the five days of the World Urban Forum in Vancouver in June 2006, which amounted, in total, to 17 advertised sessions.
- 71 UN-Habitat, undated, p5.
72 Durban case study undertaken for this Global Report (Zambuko and Edwards, 2007).
- 73 Reliable international comparisons in relation to this statement are very difficult to find because of differences in the ways in which data is recorded.
- 74 Kingston case study (Gray, 2007). In this instance, the community of Grants Pen had not recorded a single murder during 2006 until the point when this case study was drafted. This goes against the trend for murders in Jamaica, which rose from 8.1 per 100,000 people in 1970 to 40 per 100,000 in 2002, and 64 per 100,000 in 2005, making Jamaica one of the nations with the highest rates of murders in the world.
- 75 The community in question is Barrio Luis Fanor Hernandez.
- 76 Rodgers, 2005.
77 Presentation by Robert Lawson at the networking event Security and Safety: Public Policies, Urban Practices, at the World Urban Forum, Vancouver, 20 June 2006. Lawson suggested that the average age of recruitment to gangs in Colombia was 11 to 14 years, and that the gangs that these young people joined were often better armed than the police.
- 78 See, for example, the discussion at <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-violence>.
- 79 Although, as yet, this approach does not seem to have been widely attempted in public programmes designed to address crime and violence, the initial experience of the programmes recently instituted in Kingston (Jamaica) suggests that non-violent processes of conflict resolution can be utilized effectively in such circumstances.
- 80 UNESCO, 2002.
81 The Rio de Janeiro case study prepared for this volume (Zaluar, 2007) underlines the significance of these considerations when it points to the importance of improving schooling as one of the central themes of efforts to get young people in the city away from a life of crime and violence.
- 82 US Department of Justice, 1997. See also the discussion paper at <http://www.ed.gov/offices/OSDFS/actguid/conflict.html>.
- 83 US Department of Justice, 1997.
84 Florida Department of Education, 2003.
85 US Department of Justice, 1997.
86 Manso et al, 2005.
87 Durban case study undertaken for this Global Report (Zambuko and Edwards, 2007).
88 UN-Habitat, undated, pp 11–12.
89 One of the well-known examples of a partnership process in the field of crime prevention are the statutory crime and disorder reduction partnerships introduced in England as a result of the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act.
- 90 Schneider and Kitchen, 2007.
91 Town et al, 2003; Poyner 2006.
92 Schneider and Kitchen, 2007, Chapter 4.
93 Hong Kong case study prepared by Broadhurst et al, 2007.
94 UN-Habitat, 2006b, p23.
95 Sherman et al, 1997.