

PART IV

SUMMARY OF CITY CASE STUDIES



OVERVIEW OF CASE STUDIES¹

A total of 29 city case studies on slums from around the world has been summarized and analysed on the basis of the following themes:²

- Origin of slums.
- Slum definition.
- Types of slums.
- Tenure types in slums.
- Slum dynamics.
- Slum socio-political characteristics.
- Policy actions proposed or taken.
- Policy impacts and development prospects.

The comparative analysis of these cities – despite their huge geographical, cultural, historic, economic, social and organizational differences – revealed a number of commonalities or correlations. Although each city is different and there is no such thing as a common solution, the case studies did indicate that similar issues perhaps warrant similarities in the required approaches for achieving results.

ORIGIN OF SLUMS

Almost without exception, slum formation in the 29 case study cities principally originated from four types of rapid urban population expansion that were primarily triggered by:

- 1 rural–urban migration;³
- 2 natural growth;⁴
- 3 combinations of natural and migratory growth;⁵ or
- 4 population displacement following armed conflicts or internal strife and violence.⁶

Additionally, in some of the cities, demographic forces were compounded by urban-specific transformation processes with clear segregational implications, such as inner-city deterioration, gentrification and counter-urbanization.⁷

Surges in urban population and the often-related spatial segregation of urban population segments on socio-economic and ethnic grounds have become problematic in several of the studied cities for a variety of reasons, the most common being:

- a relatively long period of general *laissez-faire* attitude on the part of the urban authorities towards illegal occupation of urban lands and commensurate flouting

of building regulations and/or of urban zoning prescriptions; and

- a general failure of housing and land markets to provide for the land and housing requirements of rapidly growing urban low-income populations in a timely fashion and in sufficient numbers and locations.

In many of the studied cities, considerable political and institutional inertia allowed slums to expand to levels where their sheer magnitude overwhelmed the capacity of existing institutional arrangements to effectively address the issues. This inertia, perhaps, even overtook any political desirability for intervention. Wherever and whenever formal urban interventions took place to address issues such as urban degeneration, explosive growth of informal housing, or illegal urban land occupancy, all too often such interventions were ad hoc, marginal and insignificant in relation to the scale and scope of the issues at hand. The nature of such interventions appears to indicate that the phenomenon of slums and the related problems are generally little understood, and that public interventions – more often than not – address symptoms rather than the underlying causes. The number of cities that consider squatting, slums and informal housing developments as a highly undesirable and temporary phenomenon to be dealt with through various window-dressing exercises, rather than addressing core issues of urban poverty, is perhaps indicative of the general lack of understanding of the forces, trends and conditions that are causing the rapid growth of informal urbanization.

The world is faced with the reality that many large- and medium-sized cities are increasingly becoming areas of impoverished urban exclusion, surrounding comparatively small pockets of urban wealth. Frequently, this trend is the spatial outcome of mismatches and disconnections between national macro-policies and the absence of coherent connections with the policies at the city level. With the rise of the city as the predominant and preferred residential locus of the majority of the world population, the spatial translation of such policy disconnections is increasingly becoming visible and problematic through urban processes such as counter-urbanization, urban fragmentation, societal stratification, segregation and the explosive growth of informal forms of urban development beyond the control of city authorities. Any attempt to address the issues by merely fighting their spatial symptoms is a futile exercise that, at best, will give some temporary relief in small locations, and which, at worst, will lead to economic, social and political

instability. Rather, the core issue of current policy mismatches, both at and between the national and the urban levels, should be addressed if any tangible impact is to be expected in terms of urban poverty alleviation and the general improvement of the living conditions in areas classified as slums. This is also a requisite to improving the general liveability of our cities.

SLUM DEFINITIONS

Of the 29 cities analysed, 8 lack any formal slum definition. On the basis of the limited sample, it was not possible to determine whether this is a result of political or institutional inertia, a lack of capacity, denial of the problem, or an indication that the magnitude of slum-related issues has become so enormous that even thinking about solutions at the urban level has ceased. Surely, any city that is seriously dedicated to effective urban-poverty alleviation strategies and to programmes aimed at upgrading the living conditions in its slums would, firstly, identify the target and its beneficiaries by defining what exactly constitutes a slum under local socio-economic conditions and under the municipal and/or national legislative system(s).

Of the 21 case study cities that have a definition of slums, the definitions vary to a large extent. The shortest definition is the one applied in Chengdu: 'Slums are shanties in low-lying areas.' Of the more elaborate definitions used by other cities, none is anywhere near comprehensive in terms of its coverage of the issues. This is unlikely to be a collective oversight; rather, it is the outcome of local-level political decisions.

It is perhaps useful to deconstruct the definitions into their components, as this will give indications of what is considered important by the local authorities. The separation of the issues covered by the various definitions is elaborated in Table 10.1.

It is revealing that the two most-referred to issues are the use of poor construction materials and the legality (or lack thereof) of land occupancy. Twelve (60 per cent) of the 21 cities with a slum definition include notions about the inadequacy of construction materials used, while 11 (55 per cent) in one way or another refer to the legal status of urban land occupancy. This is surprising in the sense that the vast majority of the slums in these cities are, to a large degree, the result of persistent *laissez-faire* attitudes on the part of the municipal authorities regarding irregular urban land occupancy and informal construction. In the case of Karachi, land legality issues are even the sole component of the slum definition. The implications of this could be that there may be a case for the development of urban policies that enhance the role and effectiveness of land-use planning and the enforcement of minimal construction standards at the urban level. This is, moreover, the case as land is the fundamental resource in any housing programme, while security of land ownership is the *sine qua non* for any investment in shelter. Clearly, with the majority of the definitions concerning themselves with the legality status of urban land use and construction, among the primary issues there seems to be a

need for increased or expanded land regulation – that is, at least at the political level.

Basic services (sanitation, water and, in some cases, electricity) supply are the runner-up in frequency, with nine cities (45 per cent) including these issues in their definition of slums. In the case of Nairobi, basic services and infrastructure are the sole criteria of the definition, which, strikingly enough, appears not to be a priority issue for the actual slum dwellers themselves.

What is perhaps the most striking aspect of the deconstruction of the slum definitions is that the term poverty only appears in the definitions applied in Ibadan and Manila, although in three other cities – Ibadan, Jakarta and Lusaka – the term 'low income' is part of the definition. It is unclear whether this is a deliberate disconnection of the two issues that are obviously two sides of the same coin, or whether, in many cases, the connection between poverty and slums simply has not been made. It must be said, however, that slum dwellers are not necessarily all poor, or poor by definition.

TYPES OF SLUMS

The case studies show that many cities do make distinctions between types of slums. In general, there is a clear separation between slums proper, on the one hand, and shanties or spontaneous housing and urban development, on the other. This distinction is often made on the basis of combinations of physical location and legality status of the built structure, urban zoning, land invasion and informal construction.

The term 'slum', or its equivalent local term, often refers to inner-city residential areas that were laid out and built several decades ago in line with the then prevailing urban planning, zoning and construction standards, but which, over time, have progressively become physically dilapidated and overcrowded to the point where they became the near exclusive residential zone for lowest-income groups.

The term 'informal settlement' often refers to illegal or semi-legal urbanization processes, or unsanctioned subdivisions of land at the (then) urban periphery where land invasion took place – often by squatters, who erected housing units usually without formal permission of the land owner and often with materials and building standards not in line with the criteria of the local building code. This type of slum is usually referred to as a shanty, or squatter settlement. Depending upon the local conditions, many local authorities recognize derivatives of this form of informal shelter as separate types of slums, such as informal settlements on vacant urban lots or on precarious urban sites along canals, on road reserves or adjacent to landfill areas.

Several of the cities without a formal slum definition nevertheless apply terms or concepts that denote different types of slum housing depending upon the construction type, location, legality status, etc. This is notably the case for Beirut, Colombo, Havana, Los Angeles, Lusaka, Mexico City, Moscow and Naples.

	No definition	Construction materials	Temporary nature	Construction legality	Land legality	Health and hygiene	Basic services	Infrastructure	Crowding	Poverty	Low income	Environment	Compactness	Crime and violence
Abidjan	X													
Ahmedabad		X	X			X	X		X				X	
Bangkok						X			X			X		X
Barcelona	X													
Beirut	X													
Bogotá				X	X									
Cairo		X		X	X		X							
Chengdu												X		
Colombo		X	X	X	X	X	X							
Durban		X	X				X							
Havana		X				X	X	X						
Ibadan		X						X		X	X			
Jakarta					X						X			
Karachi					X									
Kolkata		X	X				X		X					
Los Angeles		X			X				X					
Lusaka					X		X	X			X			
Manila		X				X			X	X				
Mexico City	X													
Moscow	X													
Nairobi							X	X						
Naples	X													
Newark	X													
Phnom Penh					X							X		
Quito				X	X									
Rabat-Salé		X			X									
Rio de Janeiro		X		X	X		X	X	X					
São Paulo		X				X	X	X	X					
Sydney	X													

TENURE IN SLUMS

The tenure status of slum dwellers is as diverse as the variety in slum typology. Security of tenure can be tied to the legality of the physical structure and/or the legality of land ownership. It can be tied to residency permits or legal proof of some form of tenure. It can depend upon ration cards or other modes of urban registration. Yet, in many cases, security of tenure is a *de facto* recognition of tenure despite illegality of the structure, thus blurring the distinction between legal, semi-legal and illegal.

On the whole, there appears to be a greater degree of security of tenure in inner-city slums. This is perhaps the outcome of the original fully legal status of many of the inner-city tenement blocks, and degenerated and former middle-income residential areas. The land in such areas is frequently formally held with deeds to prove it. Insecurity of tenure tends, obviously, to increase with the degree of illegality – such as illegal land invasions, illegal subdivisions of land and illegal construction. The overriding factor, however, seems to be the attitude of the local authorities in granting *de facto* recognition of residency rights.

SLUM DYNAMICS

The growth or decline dynamics of slums is closely linked to variations in the rural and urban economy and to related poverty levels. It is clearly also a factor of demographics in terms of household formation rates, as well as the

effectiveness of public interventions. More than half of the case study cities report that slum formation will continue.⁸ Four cities reported decreasing slum formation.⁹ In Barcelona, slums have formally ceased to exist; but the city is still an important destination for immigrants from other areas within Spain and, more recently, from overseas. These immigrants tend to cluster in areas with higher indices of social inequality and marginalization. Eight cities reported no or insufficient data on this topic.¹⁰

SLUM SOCIO-POLITICAL CHARACTERISTICS

Throughout the case studies, slum populations tend to have low average incomes, high levels of unemployment and relatively low levels of education. As a result, they are often stigmatized, leading to social discrimination. Notable exceptions are Bangkok – where only a minority of the slum dwellers is considered poor and stigmatization is, subsequently, less – and Havana – where slum dwellers have secure tenure and access to the same social infrastructure as non-slum dwellers.

The often pronounced urban isolation and victimization, difficult access to physical and social infrastructure and generally higher incidence of violence and crime generate patterns of depressed urban areas where the inhabitants, despite their heterogeneity, seek common interests on the basis of unsatisfied basic needs.

Table 10.1

Issues covered in slum definitions

POLICY ACTIONS TAKEN OR PROPOSED

Three correlations in terms of slum development appeared among the cities covered by the case studies. Firstly, the cities with the worst slum conditions and the largest slum areas display a number of common features:

- There is a long history of unbridled urban growth that is not hampered by any national urban policy or regulatory interventions; more importantly, there is an absence of a coherent city-wide set of urban policies as the basis for public regulation.
- Urban interventions that address the issues of slums are frequently triggered only by external factors, such as land development and speculation, and health and safety threats to the wealthy, and are therefore mostly reactive, rather than proactive.
- Regardless of whether action is reactive or proactive, the absence or failure of coordinating mechanisms that set the roles and jurisdictions of various levels of government inevitably leads to governance gaps, jurisdiction overlaps, competency conflicts, duplication of functions, waste of precious resources, decentralization of problematic issues, and general confusion regarding the developmental directions to be followed.
- Subsequently, slum areas and related problems grow beyond local authorities' capacity to address them, to the point that acceptance, if not total fatalism, on the part of the local, regional and/or national government takes over and slums become 'an inevitable issue that cannot be dealt with at the local level.' In practice, this means that the control over the municipal area and the urban periphery is effectively handed over to spontaneous urbanization processes that are beyond the regulatory influence of the authorities.
- There is an absence of effective and tailored urban and other policy responses to address the underlying issues and their translation into new spatial regulatory and developmental policies.

Secondly, cities that have achieved a degree of success in addressing shelter-related urban issues tend to have recognized the issues and have related these issues to the need for city-wide, pro-poor policies as their starting point for interventions. In addition, such cities tend to have adhered, in a consistent and persistent way, to combinations of housing, urban and socio-economic policies over a period of several generations, while viewing these policies and their impacts in a framework of other macro-level policies.

Thirdly, although the above appears to indicate that the consistent application of policies does have tangible impacts, it should be noted that even under these conditions the issues of slums and urban poverty do not necessarily disappear. Rather, success in addressing low-income housing and shelter-related problems tends to serve as a new pull factor that extends the range of the city's migration collection basin further into the rural hinterlands and,

frequently, even into neighbouring or far-away countries. This, however, does not suggest that urban upgrading and the addressing of urban poverty are futile exercises. On the contrary, it indicates that urban policies can be highly successful. However, they need to be implemented within the context of broader urban-regional and macro-level socio-economic policies. Particularly where there are national or international components to the urbanization process, it would be unrealistic to expect that local-level urban policies alone can address all of the outcomes of migration patterns.

POLICY IMPACTS AND DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS

The case studies clearly indicate that the world has largely begun to realize that forced evictions and slum clearance are no real option. Rather, wholesale urban renewal programmes, slum regularization, upgrading and community-based slum networking are increasingly attracting the attention of city managers worldwide. Administrative reforms for greater efficiency and reduction of corruption permit the implementation of pro-poor social policies with tangible successes in the area of social housing, transportation, education and public participation. In many cities of the developing world, however, the housing backlog is staggering, while urban populations continue to grow and current housing-delivery systems are hopelessly inadequate to even start addressing the issue.

The experiences of several cities indicate that inroads can be made with approaches that have a holistic character. These include *city-wide*, rather than ad hoc, slum improvement, environmental improvement, land regularization, housing finance provision, urban poverty reduction and partnerships with the private sector, NGOs and communities. The case studies further show the need for combining these actions with true decentralization and empowerment of local governments. Authority and resources need to be decentralized to government levels, allowing for the active involvement of both the beneficiaries and city managers in local priority setting, participatory decision-making and community-based involvement in implementation. However, if these processes are to succeed, a vital and crucial ingredient is the political will to make things happen.

There is no hope whatsoever for any municipality to even start addressing the issues related to slums if there is no clear recognition of their relation to urban poverty. Additionally, if there is no coherent city-wide set of urban policies to guide public interventions, whatever the actions undertaken, they will inevitably be ad hoc and ineffective in the long run in terms of scope and impacts.

Critical reflection on the lack of coherent housing, urban development and national macro-policies would help to reveal the reasons of world-wide failure to adequately address the spatial and socio-economic legacies of the past. Such a set of policies – particularly if they are founded on, and derived from, a coherent set of national urban policies linked to other national macro-policies – may go a long way

to addressing slum and urban poverty issues. Urban policies cannot be effective if isolated from their national and international contexts. Critical reflection on policies would also be conducive to clarifying and framing the roles and jurisdictions of different levels of government, thus serving a clear purpose in resolving the current governance trap called 'decentralization', which all too frequently is used as the excuse to delegate difficult issues to a lower level.

Furthermore, to help balance the geographical distribution of urbanization, a strong set of national urban

policies is necessary. The purpose of such policies would be to develop a balanced national urban hierarchy that can help to better spread urban growth, resulting from natural growth and rural to urban migration, while preventing unnecessary duplications of urban functions at the national level. The city, as the major venue for economic and political decision-making at the local, national and – increasingly – the international level, cannot afford to ignore the larger system of relationships.

NOTES

- 1 For the purposes of this report, 37 case studies were prepared, of which 29 were selected for summary in this part. The case study authors are listed in the Acknowledgements. Case study synopses, as well as an overview of case study major findings, have been prepared by Joseph Maseland of UN-Habitat.
- 2 Abidjan, Ahmedabad, Bangkok, Barcelona, Beirut, Bogotá, Cairo, Chengu, Colombo, Durban, Havana, Ibadan, Jakarta, Karachi, Kolkata, Los Angeles, Lusaka, Manila, Mexico City, Moscow, Nairobi, Naples, Newark, Phnom Penh, Quito, Rabat-Salé, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Sydney.
- 3 Ahmedabad, Barcelona, Bogotá, Chengdu, Durban, Ibadan, Mexico City, Newark, Phnom Penh, Quito, Rabat-Salé, São Paulo and Sydney.
- 4 Abidjan, Bangkok, Cairo and Naples.
- 5 Havana, Jakarta, Karachi, Kolkata, Los Angeles, Lusaka, Manila, Nairobi, and Rio de Janeiro.
- 6 Beirut and, to a lesser extent, Bogotá.
- 7 Bogotá, Colombo, Ibadan, Mexico City, Naples, Newark, and Rabat-Salé.
- 8 Abidjan, Ahmedabad, Beirut, Bogotá, Cairo, Havana, Jakarta, Karachi, Kolkata, Los Angeles, Mexico City, Nairobi, Newark, Rabat-Salé, Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo.
- 9 Bangkok, Chengdu, Colombo and Naples.
- 10 Durban, Ibadan, Lusaka, Manila, Moscow, Phnom Penh, Quito and Sydney.

CASE STUDY HIGHLIGHTS

ABIDJAN, CÔTE D'IVOIRE

The growth of Abidjan – and, therefore, its slums – is associated with three phases. During the first phase, from the 1930s to the 1950s, Abidjan was set up as the colonial capital, economically linked to the Abidjan–Niger railway. The town consisted of three areas: the administrative centre and European quarters of Le Plateau, and two African districts: Treichville and Adjamé.

The second phase is associated with a number of socio-economic stimuli, including the opening of the Vridi canal and a deep-water port during the 1950s, and the establishment of industrial zones in the south-west and the commensurate growth of popular residential areas in the south.

The third phase is associated with sustained demographic growth from the 1960s onwards, and the emergence of new popular residential areas at the urban periphery.

Topographical factors, such as plateaux rising to 50 metres, added to spatial segregation of the urban area, placing major obstacles to urban structuring and functioning and considerable spatial imbalances between residential and working areas.

Slum dwellers represent one fifth of the Abidjan population. In response to a 1988 survey on why households chose to stay in slum areas, 23.7 per cent refused to answer. Among those who did answer, 69 per cent cited the cheaper cost of living; because they were born there or had family living in the slum (18 per cent); and proximity to work (8 per cent).

The case study recognizes three types of slums by area characteristics:

- 1 Areas distinguishable from formal residential areas only by their illegal land occupation forms: they primarily contain buildings of permanent materials and fair basic infrastructure. An example of such neighbourhoods is Zoe Bruno.
- 2 Poorly structured areas: these areas have more buildings of non-permanent materials and lower levels of infrastructure provision (for example, Vridi Canal, Zimbabwe and Blingue).
- 3 Irregular areas with largely non-permanent structures: these areas have little, if any, infrastructure (for example, Alliodan).

Similar to the tenure type of the Abidjan population at large, the majority of slum residents (75 per cent) are tenants,

18.7 per cent are owner occupiers and 5.8 per cent stay free of charge.

In 1995, the urban population of Abidjan had grown to 2.7 million, with an annual growth rate of 5 per cent (down from 11 per cent during the 1970s) and with a transnational demographic collection basin spanning a large area of West Africa. Despite the slowing down of growth, the numbers of urban poor, in absolute terms, will continue to rise in the foreseeable future.

The residents of slum quarters are highly heterogeneous, with 40 per cent of Côte d'Ivoire origin; 20 per cent from Burkina Faso; 9 per cent from Mali; 9 per cent from Ghana; and Togo and Bénin together accounting for 12.3 per cent. The density in slums varies from one area to another: Zimbabwe lies at the top with 340 inhabitants per hectare; Zoé Bruno has 254.5 inhabitants per hectare; and Vridi-Canal has 206 inhabitants per hectare. Blingue has the least dense concentration of 69.6 inhabitants per hectare. On the whole, slums are stigmatized and are the focus of unfavourable prejudice as dens of highwaymen, drug addicts and the hangouts of impoverished foreigners who are incapable of living within the city legally.

Although the authorities previously dealt with slums through outright clearance, slums are, today, the focus of sustained development efforts. Since the 1980s, slum regularization has been implemented with assistance from the World Bank, aiming at:

- basic infrastructure provision;
- improvement of land security;
- development of economic activities; and
- promotion of community development.

This new context provides more tolerance and, to some extent, prevents slum clearance. A shortcoming is the ad hoc nature of these interventions and the relative lack of participatory approaches.

Although the urban interventions of the public authorities have led to progress in some areas – notably, in the accessibility of social services – these efforts over the past few years have fallen well behind of expectations. In the absence of a comprehensive public policy on urban restructuring, slum regularization and the genuine involvement of all stakeholders, the slum issues to be faced and the number of poor will both remain significant. Unless public policy addresses the issues in a comprehensive manner, drawing on the capabilities and will of all stakeholders, many of the developmental efforts may remain largely marginal.

AHMEDABAD, INDIA

Ahmedabad has been a trading city throughout history. Eastern Ahmedabad, within the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (AMC) limits, but outside of the walled city, was the first area to industrialize, with textile mills near to the railway. The earliest low-income housing were the *chawls*, single-room housing units built for the industrial workers. During the late 19th and the early 20th centuries *chawls* mushroomed as the accommodation for the (migrant) workers. Controls kept rents extremely low, discouraging maintenance, and many *chawls* deteriorated rapidly. This was particularly the case following a crisis in the textile industry and the closure of the factories. From the 1950s onwards, urban growth largely took place in the eastern and, particularly, the western urban peripheries, where illegal occupation of marginal areas represents the housing option for newly arrived migrants and other economically weaker urban groups.

Although migrants who arrived after independence largely settled in informal settlements at the urban periphery, *chawls* are still present in large numbers. Eastern Ahmedabad has about 44 per cent of the total housing units in the AMC region, with 54.8 per cent of the total dwelling units in the category of *chawls* and slums. It accounts for 75 per cent of the *chawl* units and 47 per cent of the slum units in the city.

In the case study, a slum is defined as a compact area with a collection of poorly built tenements, mostly of a temporary nature, crowded together and usually with inadequate sanitary and with drinking water facilities in unhygienic conditions.

There are two dominant types of low-income residential areas found in the city: *chawls* or residential units, originally built in the mill premises for workers; and slums that represent illegal occupation of marginal areas of the city. The latter typically lack facilities and basic amenities and are found along riverfronts, in low-lying areas, on vacant private or government land.

Tenure patterns and percentages are unclear but are closely related to the possession of a ration card (71 to 75 per cent of households) and/or an AMC photo pass (2.5 to 10 per cent of households). Close to 28 per cent had neither and their tenure status remains undefined. These figures roughly appear to reflect the following percentages: owner (70 per cent), renter (about 20 per cent) and undefined (8 per cent).

The percentage of Ahmedabad housing categorized as slums increased from 17.2 per cent in 1961 to 22.8 per cent in 1971 and 25.6 per cent in 1991. It is estimated that 17.1 per cent of Ahmedabad's population lived in slums in 1971. This rose to an estimated 21.4 per cent in 1982. The last estimate, based on a population census for the year 1991, nevertheless indicates that 40 per cent of households lived in slums and *chawls*.

Muslims, scheduled castes (SCs) and other backward castes (OBCs) constitute 91 per cent of the slum households, and more than 95 per cent of slum dwellers are migrants, indicating how rural poverty levels are now spilling over into urban areas. Often fleeing rural inter-caste

exploitation and debts, slum populations require their children to contribute to the household income. Victimized by the police, municipal authorities and the upper classes alike, this group represents a particularly vulnerable section of society.

A series of shifts to improve the conditions in low-income settlements have occurred since the 1950s. From initial slum clearance, the focus is now more on environmental and slum upgrading and community-based slum networking. With 40 per cent of its population of more than 3 million living in slums, the AMC functioned, until the early 1990, as a small welfare state. It deliberately made life easier for the poor by applying a regime that did not enforce anti-poor regulations, while tolerating squatter settlements on public and private land and allowing public space to be used for income-generating activities, with forced evictions rare. The AMC even constructed a small number of low-income houses.

An amendment to the Municipal Corporation Act during the 1970s obliged the AMC to spend 10 per cent of its revenue on improving basic services in slums and *chawls*. Based on a soft international loan, the AMC extended urban services to slums in its eastern suburbs. Under the Slum Improvement Partnership, the AMC now coordinates and facilitates the activities of other agencies, while picking up a considerable proportion of the costs in an effort to link slum upgrading with city-level service-delivery standards.

Nevertheless, the AMC had still failed to fully include many of the new insights in their overall urban planning. It is, in particular, their unwillingness to grant security of tenure for periods of longer than 10 years that sends out strong negative signals. Furthermore, the labyrinth of regulatory mechanisms and the complex procedures of the urban planning process have not helped the poor either. Although the AMC has not executed wholesale slum demolitions, public housing agencies have not provided city-level shelter programmes for the poor.

BANGKOK, THAILAND

Thailand has experienced low urbanization as rural–urban migration has been comparatively very low, and excess rural population invaded forestland rather than migrated to urban centres. In 1990, less than 19 per cent of the population lived in urban areas, and the rise to 31 per cent by 2001 was largely the result of the conversion of rural districts to urban municipalities. Bangkok's major growth took place after World War II, increasing by a factor of 3.5 between 1958 and 1999 to 5.6 million. It expanded well beyond its administrative boundaries, and today the Bangkok Metropolitan Region (BMR) refers to Bangkok proper and five adjacent provinces. The growth of slums, however, is less associated with rural–urban migration than with natural growth. Of Thailand's slum population, 62 per cent is concentrated in Bangkok proper and 22 per cent in the BMR. This is explained by the fact that the urbanization of the 1960s focused on Bangkok, and only later on the BMR via the highways and development corridors of the expanding city. With the exception of Pathum Thani, with large

numbers of slum dwellers along the canals, there are comparatively few squatters in Bangkok (16 per cent) and very few street dwellers and homeless people.

The National Housing Authority (NHA) defines a slum as 'a dirty, damp, swampy or unhealthy area with overcrowded buildings and dwellings which can be harmful for health or lives or can be a source of unlawful or immoral actions, with a minimum number of 30 housing units per 1600 [square metres]'.

On the other hand, the BMA defines a slum as 'an overcrowded, non-orderly and dilapidated community with unample environment which can be harmful to health and lives and with a minimum of 15 housing units per 1600 [square metres]'.

While slums and squatter settlements are considered similar terms, squatter settlements are largely sited on illegally occupied lands, with slums being mostly on rented land. There are few cases where both land and house are owned by the dwellers.

Slum areas are on the decrease (1020 areas in 1985 and 866 in 2000). Many slums were demolished under the pressure of rising land prices, while few new slums could be established as alternative land use was more profitable. Furthermore, the proportion of slum dwellers decreased, despite growth in their absolute number. While, in 1974, 24 per cent of Bangkok's housing units were considered slums, in 1994 this number was estimated at a mere 6 per cent. This is believed to be largely the result of more affordable access to public and market housing, and the percentage that could not afford a house in the open market decreased from 80 per cent in 1980 to 50 per cent in 1993. An additional factor is that during the larger migration wave of the 1960s and 1970s, wood was a cheap and readily available building material. With a ban on tree felling, the dilapidated wooden slum house is slowly disappearing and more permanent materials are cheaper.

Crowding in Bangkok's slums is, on average, three times higher than in non-slum areas, with a dependent population of about 30 per cent (below 15 or over 60 years old). Almost 60 per cent of the population in slums were born in their existing slum. Although access to the formal housing market is now more affordable, about three-quarters of the current slum population cannot afford the approximately US\$2000 (20 per cent) down payment for formal housing. However, only a minority of the slum dwellers are poor.

The chronology of low-income housing and slum policies during the last 54 years may be summarized as follows:

- *1948–1958*: The government constructed 3462 housing units for the urban population as part of its social welfare policy.
- *1960–1971*: Public housing in the form of high-rise apartments was built to replace slums; but funding restrictions limited the output.
- *1970s*: The establishment of the NHA in 1975 came along with international funding for slum improvements. This was largely non-productive due to too narrow physical objectives.

- *1980s*: The concept of land for housing the poor was introduced. The logic is that if land is given to the poor, they will have a sense of belonging and develop their own homes and community. As a result, there were some land-sharing and slum relocation projects.
- *1990s*: Slums became more recognized through the involvement of the people and the development of savings groups to generate loans for slum dwellers.

A well-planned Bangkok would have been possible if the high-rise development option had been more widely promoted and accepted. Instead, horizontal development with the commensurate costs of additional infrastructure became the norm. Revisiting this position to achieve more intensive land use is behind much of the slum clearance and evictions. The slum problem of Bangkok is fairly limited, with only 6 per cent of the total housing considered slum. Almost all households are connected to water and electricity; the education levels of slums dwellers are improving and few slum dwellers are below the poverty line. The issues of land use, land sharing and land renting as solutions to the unacceptable housing and living conditions should be further explored as a means of equitably and effectively dealing with Bangkok's slum issues.

BARCELONA, SPAIN

Barcelona, for legal reasons unable to expand beyond its medieval walls, became an intensely overcrowded city during the 19th century. After these restrictions were lifted, the old city gradually became an industrial district with many slums. During the 20th century, three major expansion bursts occurred in Barcelona:

- 1 The 1929 world exhibition brought about an urban boom, with an influx of immigrants without commensurate housing provision, leading to the creation of shanties around the town.
- 2 Industrialization from 1945 onwards created a new industrial ring around the town and drew a new wave of immigrants. A large quantity of poor-quality housing was built that rapidly developed into slums.
- 3 The 1970s saw a third ring of industrial and housing development on a metropolitan scale.

In Barcelona, there is no formal definition of a slum, as such areas ceased to formally exist. Nevertheless, there are areas in the city with higher indices of social inequality and there are marginalized people; but both are dispersed throughout the city and there are no ghettos as such.

There have been *slums* in the old city of Barcelona in one form or another for centuries, but the development of slum conditions with the typical degraded housing, lack of services and concentrations of social inequality in the old city date from the mid 19th-century expansion of the city, and the consequent out-migration of the high-income population from this area.

The *shantytowns*, which no longer exist, date from the rapid growth of the city's population during the 20th

century, which was not accompanied by an adequate growth in housing. They largely concerned self-built structures without urban services, in areas of wasteland around the then edges of the city.

The slum conditions in some of the new *multifamily blocks* built from the 1950s onwards resulted from attempts to re-house the shantytown dwellers without dealing with essential problems relating to their social exclusion and, furthermore, from the breaking up of communities and mixing people from different communities in the same blocks.

At present, there are temporary *gypsy encampments* in areas of waste ground in and around the city. The inhabitants live in lorries and the settlements lack all formal urban services. These encampments are of a recurrent and temporary nature.

Although there are no longer believed to be slum areas or ghettos as such in Barcelona, there are areas with higher concentrations of marginalized people. The whole of the old city, and a large part of the periphery, is considered to be – if not a slum – at best, a disagreeable area, with a few exceptions of neighbourhoods that have been gentrified.

A significantly high proportion of the inhabitants of marginal areas are tenants (some 80 per cent), although reliable figures do not exist. Subletting is extremely common; especially in the marginal areas, the majority of tenants lack a written contract and have limited rights in the face of unscrupulous landlords. Tenancy with formal contract constitutes 26.5 per cent, while informal contracts constitute 47 per cent of the tenants in marginal areas.

Although Barcelona has lost population since the 1970s, it has not ceased to be an important destination for immigrants from other parts of Spain and, more recently, from overseas, mainly Latin America and North Africa.

The populations of the different areas with slum housing share certain basic characteristics: low average incomes and relatively low levels of education. However, the populations of the different areas vary in a number of respects with regard to other indicators.

Despite economic growth since the 1960s, the conditions in the slum areas improved very little until after the transition to democracy during the mid 1970s when, gradually, policies were introduced that were aimed at addressing the physical and social problems of the city. The following decades witnessed the eradication of all shantytowns, improvements in living conditions in the housing blocks, and, from the end of the 1980s, important improvements in many areas of the old city. Barcelona's municipal interventions have been instrumental in improving physical and socio-economic conditions in many (former) slum areas. Key to these successes were the combination of wholesale urban renewal programmes in specific areas, combined with major social components aimed at combating poverty. In general terms, public institutions (central, regional and local level) tended to deal with the major urban redevelopments, while NGOs worked at the individual household or community levels. Policy commitment, careful planning, coordination among agencies

and participation of affected groups determined the success of the interventions.

The policies that are still underway and that are planned for the future, although often contentious in a number of ways, continue to have important effects in improving living conditions and reducing poverty.

BEIRUT, LEBANON

Prior to 1950, the growth of Beirut and its slums largely took place in waves associated with displacement and the establishment of camps or low-income housing for international refugees (from Armenia and Syria during the 1920s and Palestine around 1948). Historically, these are the oldest slums, although these camps have now all disappeared, except for the Palestinian camps that developed into the city's current main slums. Between 1950 and 1972, successive waves of rural-to-urban migration, notably from southern Lebanon and in the wake of military conflict, created slums:

- in the form of refugee camps;
- on peri-urban agricultural lands; and
- by the squatting of land.

During this period, the total population of Beirut quadrupled from 300,000 to 1,100,000.

A third in-migration wave, during the Civil War (1975 to 1990), consisted of displaced people who occupied empty buildings or entire neighbourhoods in Beirut that were abandoned for security reasons by the original occupants, or who squatted on large plots of vacant land.

No formal definition of the slum phenomenon exists; but for the purpose of the case study, the following definition was adopted: areas of the city where the majority of residents live in precarious economic and/or political conditions, with high levels of vulnerability, and where services and living conditions appear to be lower than in other sections of the city.

Due to the complex 20th-century history of Lebanon, slums are perhaps best categorized by the cause and period of their establishment. This leads to three categories:

- 1 Camps and low-income areas for international refugees (1920 to 1955).
- 2 Housing areas for rural–urban migrants (1950 to 1975).
- 3 Squatter settlements of the displaced during and after the Civil War (1975 to 1990).

The first two categories were nearly all located in the industrial north-east of Beirut. Shortly after 1975, most of these residents were evicted and they moved to squat in the southern suburbs on empty green areas and beach resorts. Their numbers were compounded by rural-to-urban migration waves in the wake of two Israeli invasions and the occupation of southern Lebanon, thus helping to create huge informal squatter settlements in the southern Beirut region. The camps and low-income areas have, over the

years, developed into high-density areas with structures of permanent materials and reasonable levels of service provision. The illegal squatter settlements are also largely built of permanent materials, some on comparatively large plots of land. While land ownership is often legal, land subdivisions and construction violate various urban regulations and building codes.

Just as the slum typology is extremely diverse, so are tenure type and legality, which vary from UN-protected refugee camps, on the one hand – often with owner-occupied buildings on land rented by the UN – to illegal settlements with land squatting and illegally constructed buildings, on the other. Nevertheless, and perhaps as the outcome of a sustained lack of policy other than *laissez-faire*, all slums have become subject to a similar large-scale rental market. Since 1982, renting has become the primary method for accessing housing. Other options, including squatting inside camps or in informal settlements, both inside the city as in the suburbs, do exist.

The slum dynamics of the post-war era are basically not different from the conflict years. The ‘return policies’ of the Ministry of Displaced in the post-war era are aimed at ensuring the return of people. The ministry has paid indemnities and displaced most squatters from informal settlements, returning properties to their original owners. Many are returning; others choose to sell or rent to family, or, more often, rent to migrant workers, leading to congestion and unusually high percentages of a mobile male population. Poor living conditions prevail, particularly poor services, pollution and lack of social infrastructure. The general attitude of municipal authorities to such areas is hostile, as many residents are not voters and are considered ‘illegal’. Currently, an estimated 20 per cent of Beirut lives in 24 listed slum areas, though this does not account for all those living in poverty and/or poor conditions, since many shacks are spread out over the city outside of the recognized slums.

Today, all of Beirut’s slums display an increasingly similar demographic composition, housing heterogeneous populations that include members of migrant and displaced groups (but not refugees), as well as migrant labour and low-income Beirut families. New arrivals – especially migrant workers – are largely segregated, inevitably on the basis of their poverty, and they contribute to the homogenization of the socio-political characteristics of these areas. However, these new arrivals cannot hide the effects of the religious segregation generated by the civil war and other military conflicts that have led to major population reshuffling, and the partial or complete destruction of a number of slums. In those particular slums where evictions have occurred, post-war policies that encourage the return of displaced families are recreating new religious mixes, thus distinguishing them from other war slums where no such evictions have occurred. Displaced groups, city-wide, constitute roughly one third of the population and are generally young, with a higher number of children per household and higher illiteracy rates, and are engaged in low-skill menial employment or are unemployed.

Up to 1975, policy proposals in Lebanon often followed international trends brought by foreign experts

along the hygienist and modernist schools. However, these proposals never materialized and, historically, policy actions were only taken (by international organizations) to resolve refugee settlement crises. Armenian refugees of the 1920s were housed in thousands of tents on empty terrain, situated in the north-eastern extremity of the city; but they were gradually relocated and consolidated over time in low-income neighbourhoods with better living conditions. In 1948, waves of Palestinian refugees occupied spaces in the camps vacated by Armenians before they were relocated on special United Nations-administered sites, where they were first allowed tents and, later, more permanent buildings. They remain, until today, in these special camp areas. During the 1920s, the Syriac population settled in self-help structures in the Syriac camp, in an area in eastern Beirut. Here they remained until 1995, when the Catholic Syriac Church decided to replace camp houses with a new building complex.

Despite a long history of serious income inequality in Lebanese society – that, to some extent, has been at the root of massive rural-to-urban migration – the period up to 1975 is characterized by a virtual lack of social policy or housing interventions. Public initiatives, such as the construction of two public housing projects in the Armenian quarters, depended upon specific individuals, rather than upon policy. Policies taken to address the internal population movements of the 1970s and 1980s were ineffective, slum clearance often took the form of political revenge, and upgrading initiatives never reached the level of implementation. During the 1990s, one project – Elissar – was proposed to relocate/upgrade a number of squatter settlements located on prime sea-front land. However, the project was never implemented and its social component was gradually downplayed, even in discussions about implementation. Thus, the civil war, and the (re)construction projects and policies in its wake, often generated new important patterns of displacement. Since the end of the civil war, several studies point out increases in poverty; currently, 25 per cent of the population lives below the poverty level.

Large-scale infrastructure projects are seen by central and local authorities as an appropriate occasion to halt slum development or even for slum clearance. Few, if any, upgrading projects have ever been undertaken, and slums are typically addressed with policies that call for their eradication. The highly visible southern suburb slums have been the focus of efforts, perhaps because the squatted lands have high market values, and because of the large numbers of people involved and the high political profile. Throughout Beirut, it is often the legal issue that is used as the justification not to intervene (for example, the illegal nature of developments and internal roads on private lands). When minor efforts are made to provide services, it is because of the slums’ proximity to more ‘regular’ communities. With the current perception that many slum dwellers are ‘illegal’, and the associated lack of municipal representation or voter constituency, the outlook for the future is bleak.

BOGOTÁ, COLOMBIA

As in most cities around the world that host slums areas, the slums of Bogotá are largely the result of rapid population increase without the housing and services provision that such growth demands. During the past few decades, Bogotá has seen sustained, rapid demographic growth through waves of rural-to-urban migration in the wake of general impoverishment and violence. The Bogotá urban perimeter expanded rapidly through illegal subdivisions, occupation and the development of marginal areas by immigrants. Bogotá's inner-city slums, on the other hand, are mostly the result of urban transformation processes, whereby certain downtown areas underwent progressive social and physical deterioration and, increasingly, accommodated lower-hierarchy social strata and economic activities.

Slums are defined as spontaneous settlements on the city margins that started to show up during the first years of the accelerated urbanization process, and that were manifested as groups of shacks or provisional housing; as resident communities in precarious housing conditions; and as urban settlements in which the terrain's occupation and its development are conducted without any plan and without the corresponding permits and licences that are officially required.

The slums of Bogotá can be classified as the outcome of:

- unplanned and informal urbanization through subdivisions in peripheral and marginal areas, largely characterized by an initial lack of physical and social infrastructure, but which are often – within a few years – improved by the city administration or through self-help (or combinations thereof);
- squatter settlements with generally more dire physical and social circumstances (although this category historically has had a relatively low importance);
- inner-city urban deterioration zones that came about through the progressive move of 19th-century industrial, military and other functions adjacent to the traditional urban centre to more appropriate locations, and the social, economic and physical deterioration that followed in the wake of this urban abandonment.

Although the latter concerns a relatively small proportion of the urban area, these zones stand out by their strategic location and the gravity of their social conditions. They are primarily associated with crowded and dilapidated tenement houses, commercial room-renting in marginal housing and critical social situations of poverty, drugs and delinquency.

The tenure type in the slums is closely related to geographical location and type of housing. The inner-city slums are, typically, rental housing of dilapidated tenement blocks, whereas the squatter settlements and 'pirate neighbourhoods' of the peri-urban areas are owner-occupied. The latter tend to have a more transient nature in the sense that four decades of experience with this type of

illegal urban expansion means that the very deficient conditions are often only the phenomena of the first few years. After this, gradual self-help and community improvements bring them to higher standards in terms of infrastructure and housing quality.

With an upward trend in the share of the population living below the poverty line – 19.4 per cent of the total population in 1994 and 23.0 per cent in 2000 – combined with a steady increase in urbanization and an increase of the population of Bogotá, it is expected that the proliferation of new slums will continue well into the future.

There is no clear information about social and urban homogeneity in the slum areas. There are, however, indications that the pronounced urban isolation in which the slum dwellers live – the difficulty of access to physical and social infrastructure – and the high levels of violence compared to other areas of the city, generate patterns of depressed urban areas where the inhabitants, despite their great heterogeneity, look for common interests originating from their unsatisfied basic needs. Where underlying social structures get stronger, there is a degree of empowerment that increases their ability to act and react. The non-slum dwellers would appear to view the impoverished urban groups as undesirables, expressed in the specific terms applied to describe them – *desechable* (disposable), *gamin* (street boy), *vagabundo* (tramp), *populacho* (commoner) – that are highly associated with delinquency, unproductiveness and uselessness.

During the past few years, remarkably effective actions involving urban regeneration and recuperation have been conducted in the central areas. New legal instruments and tools paved the way for reforms and political transformations at the local level and improved the quality of life for many population segments. In 2001 alone, urban improvement policies for Bogotá, including administrative reforms for greater efficiency and corruption reduction, have permitted the implementation of social policies with tangible successes in the areas of social housing, transportation, education and public participation.

With a dire need to address a growing housing deficit that currently stands at more than 500,000 units, and to stop the process of informal urbanization in the peri-urban areas, Bogotá has a daunting task before it. The combination of a growing political basis for real involvement of the affected communities and improved knowledge of the social problems of communities in the peri-urban areas will, perhaps, provide the all-important lessons for improving the living conditions in the slums, and may reflect the substantial change in political will and in the management of poverty within Bogotá.

CAIRO, EGYPT

Most Cairo slums resulted from explosive post-World War II population growth. But it wasn't until the mid 1960s that slums really started to appear, with little official resistance to informal and clearly illegal subdivision and construction on the agricultural lands at the urban fringes. Almost without exception, the slums started off from existing

satellite villages because rural housing was unregulated, and uncontrolled development could thus be 'overlooked'. During the 1967 to 1973 period of military conflict, all formal development in Cairo froze as the war effort soaked up most of the financial resources available. Demographic growth, however, continued unabated, including evacuees from the Canal Zone, and informal settlement growth boomed. Substantial urban fringe areas, already largely subdivided, were sold during this period, expanding the urban limits. This was further compounded by expansion from the satellite villages.

The 1974 to 1985 oil boom in the Gulf States and the subsequent remittances of Egyptian workers there provided investments for the population groups attracted by Cairo's urban informal areas and caused further massive informal housing activity at the urban fringes.

During the period of 1986 to 2000, the process consolidated with a reduction in new land for residential purposes due to:

- the drying-up of foreign remittances;
- significant falls in population growth rates; and
- strict control over agricultural-to-residential land conversion.

Only recently, the Egyptian government has formally recognized the existence of 'deteriorated and underserved urban residential areas' and applies the term *aashiwa'i* (random) to them, indicating their unplanned and illegal nature.

The main slum types in Cairo are as follows:

- *Informal settlements on private, former agricultural lands.* These consist of private residences built on land purchased informally from farmers at the urban fringes on informally subdivided plots and without building permits. Housing is generally of a good, permanent type, often incremental and at places even high rise (10 to 14 storeys). Although initially ignored by the government, it has now become a criminal act to utilize scarce agricultural lands for residential purposes.
- *Informal settlements on desert state lands.* These consist of private residences built informally on state-owned, vacant desert land. Strictly speaking, this is land invasion and land squatting and construction without permits; but semi-legality emerged on the basis of customary rights and nominal land rents paid. Government policy is to grant *post-facto* legalization. Housing quality and crowding conditions tend to be worse than in informal settlements on private, former agricultural lands.
- *Deteriorated sections of the old city core.* These comprise pre-1860 sections of medieval Cairo, with a mixture of dilapidated and sound buildings, with the former buildings often being the result of ownership disputes and lack of maintenance resulting from tight rent controls and non-profitability of rental. Residents are generally very poor; but the population in these areas is declining as a result of increasing conversion

of residential into commercial spaces and the collapse of entire buildings due to lack of maintenance.

- *Deteriorated urban pockets.* Various inner-city areas of Cairo, notably those from the early 20th century, have pockets of dilapidated one- to three-storey structures that house poor families. These are characterized by insecure tenure and limited housing investment. They generally attract poor families seeking the cheapest possible housing solutions. Numerically, this group is very insignificant.

City-wide, the tenure types in slums can roughly be divided into 50 per cent owner-occupied and 50 per cent rented. No figures are available on current slum dynamics.¹

In Cairo, urban poverty is not notably concentrated in particular geographic areas. Poor and ultra poor families are found mixed in with lower- and middle-income families in a wide number of older core neighbourhoods and in the vast informal areas of Greater Cairo. In most informal areas, there is a small percentage of well-off entrepreneurs and professionals. This spatial income heterogeneity is due to such historical factors as lack of residential mobility, rent control and imperfect real estate markets.

A 'Master Plan of Cairo' was published in 1956 that led, in 1958, to the Nasr City scheme, an ambitious desert fringe development organized through a public-sector concession company affiliated with the Ministry of Housing. A public housing programme was launched, and by 1965 the Cairo Governorate had constructed almost 15,000 units for low-income families. It was only during the period of 1974 to 1985 that the government started to address the booming informal areas by preserving state and agricultural lands from encroachments. The Egyptian government had only then officially recognized how vast the informal areas were, and that there were deteriorated or underserved urban residential areas, and launched its new towns policy. Starting in 1992, after some poorer urban areas were perceived as breeding grounds for political instability, the government finally launched a programme to improve informal or *aashwa'i* areas throughout Egypt.

Despite some successes in slowing down the further encroachment of Cairo on its urban fringes, informal building is still going on. In spite of the massive investments required and the rather limited success in attracting population to date, the policy of creating modern planned desert settlements remains the Government's ultimate solution to the phenomenon of urban informality, the idea being to offer alternatives which will absorb the millions who are in or would otherwise go to informal areas of Greater Cairo. Recent comparisons of satellite pictures indicate that informal encroachment on agricultural lands continues at a rate triple that of 'formal' expansion.

CHENGDU, CHINA

Since the 1950s, there have been three distinct types of slums in Chengdu, each corresponding to a specific phase in economic development and policy change. The first slums of Chengdu were formed on the banks of the Fu and Nan

rivers. Originally established as low-rent flats on the fringe of the city, from the 1970s onwards they became inner-city slums with the growth of the city and the spontaneous settlement of rural migrants and returning youth sent to the countryside during the Cultural Revolution. Although by no means destitute, location, low levels of income and education and a poor living environment contributed to their social exclusion. These slums were eradicated during the late 1990s, together with other inner-city substandard housing, and the inhabitants benefited from favourable housing-and-relocation policies and strategies.

The second phase in slum formation in Chengdu came as a result of economic reforms starting in the late 1980s. These reforms created much sudden unemployment and poverty, and a new group of suburban poor whose employer-provided pre-1970s row housing and flats became substandard and are now considered slums. Although access to physical and social infrastructure is more or less guaranteed, and while the entire areas cannot be considered slums, they are often perceived as slums by association. The improvement of their living conditions is contingent upon new sources of employment.

Rapid urbanization and urban development during the 1990s have also created a category of about 1 million low-educated peri-urban dwellers known as the 'floating population'. Recruited on a temporary basis from the rural areas, most live in rental accommodation provided by farmers on the urban border. Although adequate in terms of size and structure, they are located outside the scope and coverage of municipal services. Therefore, their long-term social, economic and living conditions are of direct concern to the municipality in terms of public health and the environment. Their status as non-resident is cause for social exclusion, as is their role and share in petty crime and prostitution.

Slums are simply defined as shanties in low-lying areas. More than 60 per cent of Chengdu's slum housing belongs to those residing in them. Of the remaining 40 per cent, all had secure tenure; but many owners of the shanties did not have legally recognized property rights. The floating population tends to live on the fringe of the city either by renting their accommodation from farmers or by constructing sheds and shacks on uncontrolled or unused land. A small percentage is homeless, choosing to sleep in the inner city in such public places as bus and train stations.

The numbers of slums and slum dwellers in Chengdu are rapidly decreasing due to effective low-income housing and urbanization policies and strategies. Slum dwellers include those without income; those with no work ability (long illnesses, injuries or the handicapped); those with no one to care for them (retirees); those people waiting for new jobs owing to the collapse of their enterprises; low-paid employees with heavy family burdens; and people who receive relief funds.

Between 20 and 30 per cent of the population living in slums have a criminal record and tend to be treated as social outcasts. Residents of slum areas also tend to have less financial security. The combination of these two factors results in higher degrees of social discrimination.

Recently, China has been pursuing a deliberate policy to raise urbanization from 36 to 50 per cent in the coming years as a means of stimulating rural and urban economic development and productivity. The strategy is to focus on 18,000 existing secondary and tertiary towns through the development of markets, infrastructure and services. Since 1996, China has invested heavily in promoting employment, eradicating poverty, and setting up social security and holistic policies of city-wide upgrading and eradication of urban poverty and slums.

Chengdu started its lowest living standards guarantee system in 1997, and implemented it in all of its areas of jurisdiction. From 2001, it focused on poor living conditions in the city centre's single-storey houses, implementing a large-scale rehabilitation, relocation and 'low-rent housing programme'. The households whose living conditions are below the poverty line standards specified by the city government can apply for apartments appropriate to their needs, with the government paying the rent. In 2001, less than 500 households filed an application with the city government and were provided with appropriate houses. The city government has planned to provide 1000 households with new 'low-rent apartments' in 2002.

Chengdu's successes in poverty alleviation, slum eradication, urban transformation and environmental improvement of the city and its rivers is based on a holistic, city-wide approach that emphasizes the thorough understanding of the underlying causes of poverty. The eradication of inner-city slums involving 100,000 urban poor and the alleviation of their poverty were successfully carried out through an affordable housing policy involving one-time equity grants, and through parallel improvements to urban infrastructure, transport and the environment.

The participatory approach adopted in the slum relocation initiative, involving the residents themselves as well as other social groups and the public at large, was a key contributing factor to the success of the endeavour. Public meetings and consultations raised the awareness of citizens of the need to simultaneously address the issues of slums, urban poverty, urban renewal and environmental improvement.

The issue of migrant workers will still require more harmonized approaches to economic development, social services and welfare. While many migrant workers witness an increase in cash income by coming to work in the city or on the fringe of the city, they represent the most recent trend in urbanization. Most of them inhabit the grey area that falls between urban and rural jurisdictions, calling for a concerted approach to rural and urban development policies.

Another possible aspect to Chengdu's success is its three-tier local government management system that covers governance issues of a metropolitan area with unusual effectiveness. The first tier – the metro-level – is in charge of formulating macro-policies and overseeing their implementation by subordinate departments. The second tier – the district government and its subordinate departments – is in charge of implementing the policies established by the first tier. The third tier – neighbourhood

committees – is in charge of specific political, social and economic affairs.

COLOMBO, SRI LANKA

Slums came into existence with the expansion of export trade associated with the rubber boom after World War II, especially during the Korean War in 1953. The character of Colombo changed in keeping with the new economic demands for warehousing, workers' housing and road networks. Colombo became more congested and the city elite moved out into more spacious residential areas in the suburbs. The central part of Colombo became characterized by predominantly low-income residential areas, mainly slums, and the northern and eastern parts contained most of the shanties. Slums and shanties are the most common types. Slums on the high lands of the old city consist of the oldest low-income housing – mostly from the 1930s and with a definite legal occupancy status. Shanties along canal banks and road reserves have emerged since independence in 1948 onwards, and consist of unauthorized and improvised shelter without legal rights of occupancy of the land and structures.

Although there are no formal definitions as such, four categories are recognized:

- 1 *Slums*: these are old deteriorating tenements or subdivided derelict houses. The slum tenements, built mostly of permanent materials, are very often single roomed and compactly arranged in back-to-back rows. The occupants have a definite legal status of occupancy.
- 2 *Shanties*: these consist of improvised and unauthorized shelter, constructed by the urban squatters on state or privately owned land, without any legal rights of occupancy. The areas are badly serviced and very often insanitary.
- 3 *Unserviced semi-urban neighbourhoods*: these are badly serviced residential areas in the suburban areas of Colombo and secondary towns. One difference from the squatter areas is that residents of these settlements have definite legal titles, and the sizes of the plots are relatively larger than the shanties.
- 4 *Labour lines*: these are derelict housing areas that belong to the local authority or government agencies, and that are occupied by temporary or casual labourers. These settlements are in an insanitary and derelict condition due to lack of maintenance over a long period of time.

About half of the urban poor have no security of tenure (unauthorized occupation or user permit only), 37 per cent have freehold and 13 per cent have leasehold.

Under the impacts of strong political will and effective housing improvement, regularization, community development and self-help efforts, the growth of slums and shanties has been brought under control, and clear impacts have been made in improving the general housing conditions of the urban poor.

Close to half of Colombo's urban population consists of communities that have been living in inadequate housing conditions for many years, and 16 per cent of the urban poor depend on poverty-relief assistance. Most economically active slum dwellers are unskilled workers or petty traders or hawkers. Youth unemployment rates are around 60 per cent, and some 20 per cent of households receive public financial assistance. All slum dwellers are subject to serious discrimination.

Prior to 1970, there was minimal government intervention as the housing of the poor either concerned privately owned or illegal property. Between 1970 and 1977, the government recognized and took action regarding the housing issues of the urban poor, including interventions in ensuring housing rights, direct housing construction and the provision of tenure rights. Between 1978 and 1994, a shift from provision towards enabling, recognition of the role of local authorities, promotion of community participation, and self-help and establishment of nation-wide housing programmes occurred. In this period, the One Hundred Thousand Houses, the One Million Houses and the 1.5 Million Houses programmes were established with strong political support from the central government. The post-1994 period saw interventions including the private sector in housing provision, urban renewal programmes and urban settlements improvement programmes.

The principles of the One Million Houses Programme clearly promoted an enabling environment (legal, institutional, financial and technical support) for people to improve their own houses. In particular, the institutional mechanism created by the government to implement the national housing programmes was very effective. The establishment of the National Housing Development Authority under the Ministry of Housing and Construction, with district offices of the authority for each administrative district of the country, and the linking of programme activities at local level through urban and rural local authorities, were notable initiatives in this context. Bottom-up information flow and decision-making processes were encouraged. Numerous shanty settlements have been regularized and improved, and very few shanties have been built in Colombo over the past 20 years.

DURBAN, SOUTH AFRICA

Durban's current pattern of informal settlement is largely a product of apartheid factors during the second half of the 20th century. The 1913 Land Act alienated Africans from most of the land, forcing them wholesale into wage employment for survival. During the 1930s, massive informal settlements formed just beyond the urban fringes. In addition, the creation, during the 1960s and 1970s, of 'independent states' adjacent to city boundaries, and including formal African residential areas, further spurred the growth of informal settlements along the urban edge. Informal settlements grew as a result of a lack of housing alternatives, as well as the devastating drought of the late 1970s and early 1980s, which forced people to seek livelihoods in urban areas.

Newer settlements that emerged during the late 1980s and early 1990s have tended to be smaller and more clandestine land invasions closer to the city centre – often within former Asian residential areas or on marginal land at risk from floods or landslides. In many cases, these newer settlements were developed by households who fled political violence.

Recent estimates have suggested that approximately 35 per cent of informal structures are located within pockets of formal settlements; 55 per cent are located on the periphery of formal settlements; and 10 per cent are peri-urban in location.

Slums are defined as erstwhile formal settlements that have degenerated to such an extent that there exists a need to rehabilitate them to acceptable levels. While there is no clear definitive statement of what an ‘informal settlement’ is, factors taken into consideration when ‘classifying’ an area as such comprise an evaluation of the nature of the structures, land-ownership, tenure situation, size of structures, access to services and land-use zoning.

The predominant form of inadequate housing in the city comprises informal settlements – characterized by constructions of varying degrees of permanence, with a variety of materials, including corrugated iron, plastic, timber and metal sheeting, or built with more traditional wattle and daub – that have developed on apartheid ‘buffer strips’: marginal land within established areas, or land that formerly lay beyond the city boundaries. Informal dwellings represent about 75 per cent of the metropolitan gross housing backlog of 305,000 units. The population living in informal areas is overwhelmingly African; indeed, nearly half of the African population of the entire municipal area lives in informal dwellings. Another form of inadequate housing comprises the dilapidated and crowded hostels developed to house and control (usually) male workers.

No data is available on the tenure in slums. Security of tenure is calculated from the general association of tenure with dwelling type and geographical location in the metropolitan area. It is estimated that 75 per cent of the households in Durban live in formal areas and have full security of tenure. Of the remaining 25 per cent, approximately 20 per cent (41,000 households) have a level of security of tenure derived from tribal land allocation systems; the rest (150,000 to 195,000 households) have little or no security of tenure. All informal dwellings that were in existence in Durban in 1996 were granted some status and security from arbitrary eviction by the local authority. The municipality resists new settlements, and attempts are made, with varying degrees of success, to keep vacant land free from occupation.

The 33 per cent of Durban’s population who live in informal areas are overwhelmingly African. 44 per cent are male, 56 per cent female and 27.9 per cent of the households are female-headed. Informal settlements tend to be popularly regarded as incubators of vice and disease, harbouring ‘those too lazy to work’ and groups regarded as the ‘undeserving poor’. The violence that erupted during 1984 in the slums was, in part, a struggle for the control of land, largely linked to the national struggle for democracy.

Between 1986 and 1992, 3228 people died of politicized urban violence in Durban; increasingly over the period, these deaths occurred in informal settlements.

The city has expanded its boundaries a number of times, largely driven by the regulatory impetus to gain control of burgeoning informal settlements that abut its borders and to protect and secure the economic privileges of the white population. Since 1996, there has been a dramatic transformation of local government focusing on issues of equity, including integrated development planning based on local-level community participation to develop a framework for better governance. The Long-Term Development Framework focuses on a development vision for the next 20 years; the Integrated Development Planning Process seeks to achieve better coordination; and the organizational transformation process of the council seeks to better reflect its development and democratic priorities. These initiatives, however, are still at an embryonic stage.

Critical reflection on housing, urban development and other policies reveals a failure to adequately address the spatial and socio-economic legacies of the past, and highlights the absence of policies that specifically deal with the issues they raise. Given lower-than-anticipated housing delivery rates and rapid population growth, a significant housing backlog remains the issue of the future. This is partly because responsibilities for implementation lie across different tiers of government, and partly because of the complexities associated with achieving coordinated public policy. Sectoral public policies that are pro-poor have far less impact when they are not implemented in a coordinated manner.

HAVANA, CUBA

The forced concentration of peasants around major Cuban cities in 1896 in order to cut their aid to Cuban patriots can be considered as the cause of contemporary squatter settlements. These settlements grew throughout the first half of the 20th century after Cuba’s independence from Spain. During 1960 to 1961, the largest and worst shantytowns were demolished and their residents built housing through self-help and mutual aid. The remaining shantytowns – formerly called *barrios de indigentes* (indigent neighbourhoods) – were renamed ‘unhealthy neighbourhoods’ to make clear that the issue was the quality of the housing and settlements, not the economic or social status of their residents. A second small wave of shantytown clearance and replacement occurred during the late 1960s and early 1970s as part of the creation of the ‘Havana Green Belt’. But aside from those efforts, shantytowns were largely ignored in the belief that rapid new construction would replace them. Nevertheless, many shantytowns continued to grow and new settlements formed. By 1987, Havana had 15,975 units in shantytowns (less than 3 per cent of all Havana dwellings). By 2001, the city had 60 *barrios* and 114 *focos insalubres*, with a total of 21,552 units, representing one quarter of such units nationally. This 50 per cent growth was seen as the result of an increase in net migration to Havana, especially from the less developed eastern provinces.

Inner-city tenements are large mansions, boarding houses or hotels that are subdivided into single-room units, or multifamily dwellings originally built for workers with single-room units built around courtyards or along narrow alleys or passage ways. Most were built more than 70 years ago and have deteriorated substantially. In 2001, more than 60,000 units were located in tenements.

The generic term 'slum' (*tugurio*) is seldom used in Cuba. Substandard housing is, instead, described by housing type and conditions, building materials and settlement type. Most slum units are concentrated in the inner-city municipalities of Old Havana and Centro Habana and neighbourhoods such as Atarés, whereas shantytowns are at the urban periphery or along rivers, creeks and former railway lines.

The Cuban government regards three housing types as inherently substandard:

- 1 *Tenements*: the typical inner-city slum dwelling is in a tenement, usually a single room with shared bathing and sanitary facilities, although often upgraded and expanded to include indoor plumbing. Indeed, according to the 1981 census, 44 per cent of tenements had indoor water and that number continued to increase during the following two decades. Nevertheless, such additions are mostly done at the expense of scarce open space, natural light and ventilation. The great majority of these rooms are located in older multifamily buildings in central areas of Havana.
- 2 *Bohíos*: thatched-roof shacks, once common in rural areas, are now almost non-existent in Havana.
- 3 *Improvised housing*: these comprise dwelling units that are primarily built of scrap material. In 1996, there were 3574 units located in shantytowns that were categorized as 'improvised'.

Other types: a small but significant number of occupied units were converted from non-residential uses (stores, garages and warehouses). With the drop in tourism after the revolution, most of the cheap hotels and boarding houses became permanent dwellings. In 1981, some 34,000 units (6.5 per cent of the total) had been adapted from non-residential uses. Of these, two-fifths became 'houses', nearly one third became tenements and the rest were apartments.

Shantytowns consist of these substandard types of units, as well as many that have been upgraded to acceptable housing but remain within a settlement still considered a shantytown.

Following the 1959 revolution, all evictions were stopped, rents were reduced by 30 to 50 per cent, and land speculation was eliminated. The Urban Reform Law established the concept of housing as a public service and established two basic tenure forms: ownership and long-term leasehold of government-owned units, while prohibiting most private renting.² Most tenants became homeowners, amortizing the price of units with their rents. Residents of slum housing remained as long-term leaseholders but, by the mid 1960s, no longer paid rent.

Beginning in 1961, the government built housing and provided occupants with lifetime leases at rents of about 10 per cent of family income.

The most recent shantytown growth occurred during the 1990s in order to absorb a growing number of new migrants to the city. Inner-city tenements continued to deteriorate and, during the 1990s, between two and four total or partial building collapses a day occurred in the city. The greatest concentration of the worst housing conditions is found in five municipalities – Old Havana, Arroyo Naranjo, Centro Habana, San Miguel and 10 de Octubre – which together have two-thirds of all units in poor condition. These municipalities also have the highest proportions of units in fair and poor condition, with Old Havana having two-thirds and the others having 40 to 47 per cent.

In market economies, most of the poor live in slums and most slum dwellers are poor. However, in Cuba, this occurs less frequently because of relative tenure security, generally low-cost or free housing, and the restricted legal housing and land markets (despite the growth in informal ones). Moreover, people living in substandard housing have access to the same education, health care, job opportunities and social security as those who live in formerly privileged neighbourhoods. Cuban slums are quite socially diverse, and poverty is relatively dispersed.

The 1960s' sweeping policies also included urban reform, with housing legislation affecting nearly all urban residents through the distribution of vacant units, innovative construction programmes reaching small numbers of urban and rural households, and assistance to private builders. Urban and regional policies of the early 1960s were largely followed for the next quarter century and were designed to:

- promote balanced regional growth, including designated growth poles;
- diminish urban–rural differences by improving rural living conditions;
- develop a network of urban and rural settlements of different sizes and functions; and
- ensure rational land use through comprehensive urban planning.

At least until the early 1990s, these policies were largely successful, although there were contradictions and problems in achieving rational land use and in stabilizing the rural labour force. Despite fleeting anti-urban rhetoric during the late 1960s, Cuba sought to increase the urban proportion of its population, reaching 75 per cent by 2000.

The Cuban government has been notable for its commitment to devoting a large share of its resources to social needs. Long-standing policies that target more vulnerable populations have mitigated the effects of various crises, but have not been able to completely counteract centuries of inherited deficiencies and inequalities. Moreover, some argue that economic reform policies that helped to revive the economy also contributed to making life more difficult for at-risk sectors. Several decades of neglect of Havana have led to the increased deterioration of a large section of the housing stock and infrastructure.

Strongly centralized policies and persistent shortages of building materials have made residents' initiatives to address their own community housing problems more difficult, while vertical planning made it more difficult to coordinate development strategies at the community level.

IBADAN, NIGERIA

The intense crowding and subsequent deterioration of Ibadan's inner city took place over a long period, closely linked to socio-economic change and limited municipal budgets. The, in principle, well-planned town thus turned into a slum. In 1963, half of the city's core area consisted of slum dwellings, growing to 70 per cent of the town's total number of derelict housing in 1985. Problems of illegal squatting, conversion of functions and extremely poor levels of service provision are compounded by the apparent lack of financial capacity and political will to upgrade such a large area. In addition, people strongly oppose resettlement due to their strong attachment to the ancestral lands.

During the past 20 years, the planned city saw a growth of squatting areas along the urban fringes and in the crowded low- and medium-income residential areas of the first half of the 20th century. Massive cash injections in urban utilities and infrastructure during the 1970s oil boom attracted a flow of rural migrants and citizens of other African states. Considerable unplanned development thus occurred along the major traffic arteries in the northern, eastern and southern directions, resulting in urban areas entirely devoid of urban management and planning. Whatever facilities were provided in these relatively prosperous times rapidly declined due to overuse and lack of maintenance. Rapid development of makeshift shelters since the 1980s largely corresponds to general, nation-wide increases in poverty.

Slums are defined as those areas that are yet to develop in terms of good planning and settlement. Some of the characteristics of slums are that they lack infra-structural facilities, have no planned layout and the residents are predominantly poor and illiterate. Slums are areas that concentrate low-income earners, low-cost houses, possibly mud houses, no layout and poor inhabitants.

The three main slum types in Ibadan are:

- 1 *Inner city slums*: these consist of the oldest (19th-century) and lowest quality residences and are characterized by severe deterioration, the city's highest population density and no identifiable sanitation facilities. They house a very high percentage of indigenous Yoruba people.
- 2 *Squatting areas*: the low- and medium-income residential districts of the first half of the 20th century – although better controlled by the planning authorities – have attracted some illegal squatting by migrants from the 1970s and 1980s onwards. Squatting is highly organized and cannot be considered as spontaneous.
- 3 *Unplanned outskirts*: from the 1970s to the 1990s, land along the major traffic arteries has attracted

slums in the north, the east and the south of the city. Here, at the outskirts of the city, 30 per cent of the derelict houses in Ibadan are found. Most of them have developed because a new labour market gave opportunities for employment, but without housing provision. Some spontaneous slums also exist in other parts of the city; but few data are available.

There are serious problems with migrants' access to land, partly because of discriminatory allocation of urban land, particularly with the last migration wave of the Hausa during the late 1970s. The uncertain political situation and the ethnic riots of the past 30 years are associated with loss of property. Migrants, therefore, prefer to rent in order to allow for a quick departure in emergency situations. There is, generally, a high percentage of poor and illiterate people; but the percentage varies from slum to slum.

Since the 1950s, Nigerian urban governance has had three separate levels of government that directly intervene: federal, state and local government. During the 1960s to the 1980s, the power of local authorities decreased. Local government largely viewed slums as inevitable and not an issue that could be addressed at the local level. Thus, only marginal interventions took place, if any. A series of interventions to improve slums and alleviate poverty took place from 1988 onwards. However, the failure to address weak local-level capacity to formulate strategies, programmes and projects, combined with rampant corruption and conflicts between various levels of governance, wasted most of the resources.

Multiple agencies responsible for generating urban policies have not been able to effect urban improvements. Rather, duplication of functions and lack of coordination has affected the entire city. Conflicts of jurisdiction and competence, the absence of effective coordination between levels of government, frequent bureaucratic changes, low priority for urban planning, and the commensurate lack of funding have caused delays and confusion in the execution of urban policies.

JAKARTA, INDONESIA

Jakarta became a post-independence boomtown, more than quadrupling in size to a population of 9.1 million between 1975 and 1995. It now has a metropolitan population approaching 12 million, though the actual figure of inhabitants is a matter of speculation. Population density is extremely high.

Indonesia uses the term *kampung*, which literally means 'village', but which has come to denote a poorer neighbourhood that is contained within a city. However, as it comprises a mix of lower and middle class and frequently contains permanent buildings, it is not really synonymous with slums. Squatters are few and most residents have some sort of title to the land. *Kampungs* are really remnants of original villages upon which cities have encroached and not vice versa. The controversial transmigration policies of the Suharto government may have eased the urban growth pressures; but rapid industrialization of the 1970s and

1980s has counterbalanced attempts to stem urban growth. Jakarta's growth is higher than the official figures, as it excludes seasonal migrants who may spend as much as ten months per year in Jakarta. It is estimated that 20 to 25 per cent of Jakarta residents live in *kampung*s, with an additional 4 to 5 per cent squatting illegally along riverbanks, empty lots and floodplains. Renters and squatters who have managed to set up homes in the 490 pockets of poverty in Jakarta are gradually being squeezed out due to skyrocketing land prices and speculation. The past 20 years saw the land area occupied by *kampung*s in Jakarta reduced by 50 per cent. As a result, nearly half of the families have been relocated to Jakarta's outlying areas.

Population projections indicate that urban dwellers will surpass their rural counterparts as a percentage of the total between 2010 and 2015, rising to 60 per cent by 2025. At the same time, land prices and land speculation have dramatically reduced available land for low-income housing. Families who were pushed out set up residence in outlying areas, creating new squatter, illegal and semi-legal settlements.

Jakarta is a melting pot of the strong ethnic identities of Indonesians; but, fortunately, a sense of shared solidarity among the poor and the near poor tends to keep social and ethnic tensions that have disrupted Indonesia for the past half decade at bay – at least within the confines of the *kampung*s.

Since *kampung*s are not administrative entities, nobody really knows with any real degree of accuracy how many of Jakarta's inhabitants live in *kampung*s. Furthermore, not everyone living there is poor. For more than 30 years, the Suharto government sought to impose total control over the citizenry, co-opting traditional institutions and leadership and making them subservient to government-controlled structures. Crony capitalism became commonplace, increasing the gap between rich and poor. Corruption and nepotism came to flourish to the point where even the most menial of bureaucratic tasks would seldom be completed without a bribe. The period of prolonged economic growth under Suharto saw many new roads being built and a functioning public transportation system; sewer and drainage systems were also constructed, and the national electricity grid was extended into almost all regions. However, local government revenue fell increasingly short of needs, and infrastructure deteriorated rapidly through sheer lack of maintenance. The state-owned monopolies in water and sanitation, power and telecommunications were operated with an inefficiency remarkable even by most developing country standards. Government policies and programmes for housing have been entirely inadequate in meeting the needs of the urban poor; for all intents and purposes, the government abdicated its role in the provision of housing. The reform in the wake of Suharto's resignation did little to change politics at the local level.

KARACHI, PAKISTAN

During the 1940s and 1950s, due to migration from India following partition, extensive unorganized land invasion led

to the establishment of extensive squatter settlements (*katchi abadis*) on the then Karachi periphery and on open urban lands. Traditional urban institutions based on clan, caste and religion quickly collapsed. The settlements densified over time as political instability prevented coherent urban planning. The 1950s saw sharp urban increases as infant mortality rates fell and rural-to-urban migration exploded when agricultural production was modernized. The military government shifted the squatter communities to two townships outside of Karachi. Squatter settlements within the city were bulldozed and the affected people moved to the storm drain lands that connected Karachi and the new townships. The 1960s and 1970s had increased rural–urban migration through urban pull factors. Under army rule, city institutions fell apart and the Karachi Master Plan could not be implemented due to social and political instability. From 1988 onwards, ethnic politics, conflict and violence drove industry to other parts of the country, greatly increasing unemployment in Karachi. In the absence of adequate housing programmes, homelessness and informal settlement has increased, as have densities in existing *katchi abadis*.

The government of Pakistan recognizes only two terms related to unserved or underserved settlements:

- 1 *Katchi abadis*: these are informal settlements created through squatting or informal subdivisions of state or private land.
- 2 *Slums*: these settlements consist of villages absorbed in the urban sprawl or the informal subdivisions created on community and agricultural land. Here, security of tenure is a rule; but there is no programme to improve conditions other than through political patronage.

The *katchi abadis* are of two types:

- 1 Settlements established through unorganized invasion of state lands at the time of partition; most of them were removed and relocated during the 1960s or have been regularized.
- 2 Informal subdivisions of state land (ISD), further divided into:
 - notified *katchi abadis*: settlements earmarked for regularization through a 99-year lease and local government infrastructure development; and
 - non-notified *katchi abadis*: settlements not to be regularized because they are on valuable land required for development, or on unsafe lands.

The slums can also be divided into two types:

- 1 Inner-city, traditional pre-independence working-class areas now densified and with inadequate infrastructure.
- 2 *Goths* or old villages now part of the urban sprawl; those within or near the city centre have become

formal – others have developed informally into inadequately serviced high-density working-class areas.

Notified *katchi abadis* have secure tenure based on 99-year leases; the un-notified ones have no security of tenure and are scheduled for removal. *Goths* have secure tenure, while ISD on agricultural lands only have secure tenure if declared *katchi abadis*.

Although little specific survey information is available on slum dynamics, it is clear that slums are on the rise, notably to the west and north of Karachi, as extensions of existing ISDs. Estimates indicate an increase of close to 50 per cent between 1988 and 2000 from 3.4 to 5 million people.

Estimates indicate that about half of Karachi lives in *katchi abadis*. Most individuals are employed in the informal sector. An existing analysis of 20 ISD households is too limited an example to draw city-wide conclusions about socio-political characteristics of the 'typical' slum dweller.

The first major slum upgrading and poverty alleviation programme was proposed for the 1988 to 1993 period. The programme largely failed to meet its targets and regularized only 1 per cent of the *katchi abadis* per year due to faulty land records, corruption and non-inclusion of grassroots organizations.

The Social Action Programme of 1993 supported NGOs for infra-structural improvements, but failed largely due to lack of capacity.

Although notable successes have been achieved in terms of regularization and infra-structural work (comparatively high electricity and water connections to many of Karachi's slum areas), too little has been done to effectively address poverty and poor shelter conditions. The impact of more recent programmes is still unclear due to a lack of effective impact monitoring other than yearly reviews based on the feedback of the very agencies that implement the programmes.

KOLKATA, INDIA

The slums of Kolkata can be divided into three groups: the older, up to 150 years old, ones in the heart of the city are associated with early urbanization. The second group dates from the 1940s and 1950s and emerged as an outcome of industrialization-based rural–urban migration, locating themselves around industrial sites and near infra-structural arteries. The third group came into being after the independence of India and took vacant urban lands and areas along roads, canals and on marginal lands. In 2001, 1.5 million people, or one third of Kolkata's population, lived in 2011 registered and 3500 unregistered slums.

The 1956 Slum Act defines slums as 'those areas where buildings are in any respect unfit for human habitation'. The Calcutta Municipal Council Act of 1980 defines *bustees* as 'an area of land not less than 700 square metres occupied by, or for the purposes of, any collection of huts or other structures used or intended to be used for human habitation'. The Central Statistics Organization

defines slums as an area 'having 25 or more *katcha* structures, mostly of temporary nature, or 50 or more households residing mostly in *katcha* structures huddled together or inhabited by persons with practically no private latrine and inadequate public latrine and water facilities'.

There is a host of different slum types, primarily divided into two categories:

- 1 *Registered slums (bustees)*: these slums are recognized by the Calcutta Municipal Corporation (CMC) on the basis of land title; since 1980, they have been taken over by the CMC for letting/lease to slum dwellers.
- 2 *Unregistered slums*: this comprises slums on the land encroaching settlements.

The *bustee*-type generally has some form of secure tenure or ownership rights based on land rent or lease, with structures built by the slum dwellers, or house rental/lease of structures built by third parties.

Tenure security is, in principle, not available to the unregistered land encroaching settlements on road sides (*jhupri*), along canals (*khaldhar*) or on other vacant land (*udbastu*).

It is envisaged that the number of urban poor will increase considerably in the near future due to natural growth and in-migration, combined with a lack of well-planned and long-term intervention strategies.

Over 40 per cent of Kolkata's slum residents have been slum dwellers for two generations or longer, and more than half originate from the Kolkata hinterland. With the majority engaged in the informal sector, with average monthly earnings of between 500 and 1700 rupees and a household size of five to six persons, some three-quarters of the Kolkata slum population are below the poverty line.

The standard of living of the slum dwellers caused concern even during colonial rule. For a long time, slums were treated as an eyesore and a nuisance to be dealt with for reasons of safety, security, and the health and hygiene of the urban elite. Policy interventions focused mostly on clearance and removal. The First, Second and Third Five-Year Plans laid emphasis on slum eradication and removal. Various attempts were made to address the issue in alternative ways; but all failed for different reasons.

The Environment Improvement in Urban Sector (EIUS) scheme, in operation since 1974, has been partially successful in improving the living environment of slum dwellers; but it has not helped in preventing the growth of new slums through migration or natural increase. The scheme suffers from lack of community involvement in planning, implementation and monitoring of the programme. Another initiative that has generally been effective in reducing urban poverty is the National Slum Development Programme (NSDP).

Although some considerable successes have been achieved, there is a long way to go for Kolkata in terms of addressing the issues related to urban poverty and slums. There is an urgent need to establish clear long-term strategies that address such issues as:

- land titles in *bustees*;
- unauthorized new slums around canal and roads;
- greater effectiveness of urban poverty-eradication programmes;
- public awareness-building programmes on slum population;
- the role of each actor and stakeholder;
- poverty reduction approaches to slum improvement;
- inadequate municipal institutional arrangements, including coordination of the activities of various actors.

LOS ANGELES, US

Los Angeles's history is one of both ethnic diversity and segregation. Founded as an outpost of New Spain in 1781 and incorporated as a city in 1850 after the annexation of California to the US, it did not attract many residents until the railroad reached it in 1876. Ethnic minorities who worked as railroad labourers were part of an imported underclass who lived in segregated residential areas. From around 1900, the Los Angeles port at San Pedro began to gain in significance, setting the stage for poor port workers settling in the harbour area. By 1945, Los Angeles (LA) had assumed great economic prominence and witnessed commensurate demographic growth. Much of the housing stock was, however, recorded with restrictive ethnic covenants, providing a framework for enduring ethnic segregation. This was compounded by:

- discriminatory lending and federal subsidy practices that increased the racial segregation in the metropolis, at large, and in the inner-city areas in particular;
- reductions in public transport that virtually isolated the poor; and
- industrial plant closings that diminished economic opportunities for residents of low-income areas of the city.

Ultimately, this history of segregation contributed to the conditions that led to the 1992 Los Angeles civil unrest – the largest urban uprising ever in the US.

The city does not officially use the word 'slum'. However, Los Angeles slums exist both as individual buildings and as disinvested neighbourhoods, encompassing 20 per cent of the LA area and some 43 per cent of the population. These slums share the following general characteristics:

- Deteriorated physical housing conditions.
- Low levels of resident income.
- Low levels of private investment and property maintenance.

High-density disinvested areas: this generally consists of pre-1930s, brick construction tenement-style housing stock with poor light and air circulation and located near the inner city.

Mid-density disinvested areas: this mostly consists of post-World War II, poorly constructed and/or maintained multifamily dwellings, scattered over each section of the city.

Low-density disinvested areas: these are mostly single-family housing units and low-cost expansions of liveable space, often garage dwellings. Nearly half of the residents of slum neighbourhoods live in low-density areas, reflecting the high proportion of single-family dwellings in the city.

Mixed-density disinvested areas: these areas comprise a mix of the above densities within the same neighbourhood.

Los Angeles is distinctive from most US cities in housing tenure as the majority of its residents are tenants, with less than 40 per cent of households owning their homes. In all disinvested areas, the vast majority of slum dwellers are renters: high density comprise 92.8 per cent; mid density comprise 85.5 per cent; low density comprise 62.2 per cent; and mixed density comprise 83.8 per cent.

In the wake of the urban unrest of the 1990s, the migration of wealthy and white residents from Los Angeles intensified, even though the urban economy rebounded during the late 1990s. Poverty, however, did not decline, as employment was largely low-wage employment and a steady stream of immigrants occupies these low-paying jobs. With rents rising sharply and low-income residents choosing overcrowding rather than homelessness, residential structures are increasingly deteriorating and decaying. The growth in poverty during the coming decades is, therefore, as likely to continue as the growth of disinvested urban areas in Los Angeles.

The residents of LA's disinvested areas are overwhelmingly (two-thirds) Latino, with African Americans the second largest group (one fifth), followed by Asian/Pacific Islanders (one tenth) and a small Caucasian population group. A long history of civil unrest and violent urban riots is an expression of frustration with the slow improvement of race relations and lack of equal access to economic opportunities. The largest urban uprising in the US took place in Los Angeles and was centred in the disinvested communities; it was very noticeable in these areas of the city that there was a lack of employment opportunities, adequate retail services and adequate and affordable housing.

There are three categories of policy intervention and action to improve slums and alleviate poverty:

- 1 Locational targeting, made up of national, regional and city policies and programmes to eradicate or upgrade slums.
- 2 Socio-economic targeting, consisting of national, regional and city policies and programmes to eradicate and alleviate poverty.
- 3 Non-governmental interventions, consisting of community- and NGO-based programmes to improve slums and eradicate/alleviate poverty.

Due to the economic segregation within Los Angeles, locational targeting of housing and community development programmes that focus on low-income areas and low-income households typically reach the same groups. Socio-economic

targeting provides combinations of targeted tax benefits, low-interest loans and some grants to support neighbourhood revitalization efforts. Non-governmental and community-based interventions roughly come in two groups: the consumer side (tenants' organizations, advocacy groups) and housing producers (non-profit developers, community development organizations).

Considerable impacts have been made during the past half decade, resulting from partnerships in the development and implementation stages of new slum housing policies. Largely as the result of pressure from community leaders and political activists, the LA local authorities revamped their building code enforcement in the city through better inspection, collection and data management of the city's rental housing stock. As a result of these new tools and increased transparency of information, approximately 90 per cent of landlords are now complying with repair requirements, and an estimated US\$450 million of private funding has been invested in housing in the disinvested areas of the city over the past four years.

LUSAKA, ZAMBIA

The slums of Lusaka owe their origins to the neglect of providing low-cost public housing and to short-sighted urban and housing policies, both during colonial and post-independence times. Lusaka's population grew most rapidly after 1948. The city quadrupled in size between 1963 and 1980 as a result of rural–urban migration, natural growth and extension of the city boundaries. In the absence of sufficient public low-cost housing, and with non-insistence on statutory building standards, the urban growth resulted in a series of housing crises and the growth of unauthorized settlements at the urban periphery. This was exacerbated by highly centralized forms of governance that did not delegate decision-making and revenue-raising powers to the local level.

A distinction is made between two types of slum:

- 1 *Early self-help housing*: this comprises low-income housing as it emerged on specifically allocated lands on the outskirts of Lusaka, with communal water provision, located just outside of the municipal boundaries in the post-1948 period.
- 2 *Unauthorized housing*: this comprises all other informal subdivisions, land squatting, etc, largely on privately owned lands zoned for agricultural purposes and without essential physical or social infrastructure.

Generally, there is security of tenure for the early self-help (improved and authorized) settlements and regularized former unauthorized settlements. There remains a serious lack of security of tenure for unauthorized housing settlements.

The bulk of the residents of the low-income housing areas are predominantly unskilled and semi-skilled and work mainly in the informal sector (piecework and small-scale trading activities). A few young men and women engage in criminal and anti-social activities.

The 1948 African Housing Ordinance, designed to stabilize the urban population, allowed African workers in urban centres to live with their families.

The second National Development Plan (1972 to 1976) recognized unauthorized housing as an asset that required improvement and was followed by the 1974 Improvement Area Act to pave the way for upgrading.

The Draft Decentralization Policy of 1997 (which has remained a draft since) attempts to address the failures of local-government financing and autonomy arrangements.

The successive post-independence governments have also failed to come up with permanent solutions to inadequate low-income housing in a rapidly growing city. Although the Improvement Areas Act of 1974 has shown that the solution to the critical housing shortage can be best resolved with the involvement of the residents of the slum areas, the government does not seem to have grasped the essential lessons that should have been learned from the upgrading projects. Participatory approaches are more likely to help deliver decent housing at an affordable cost to both the individuals and the government, while the traditional public provision of low-cost housing failed to deliver improved housing for the bulk of the population. This was especially the case during the period of 1966 to 1970, when enormous public resources were devoted to providing public housing.

The major problem confronting the slum areas of Lusaka today is not poor housing quality, but the sustainable provision of essential infrastructure and services, as well as effective solid waste management. Other less perceived problems are insecurity and overcrowding.

Finding answers to the problems faced by the residents of the slums of Lusaka requires concerted efforts by a more proactive and progressive leadership at all levels. Above all, it requires a more autonomous local authority, with full control over the affairs of the city, including its finances and management. Bringing that about requires the acceptance that essential urban services can only be effectively delivered by an autonomous and democratically elected and decentralized local authority.

MANILA, PHILIPPINES

Segregation has a long history in Metro Manila. As a Spanish enclave during the Spanish colonial period, native inhabitants lived in the suburbs of what are now the districts of Tondo, Sta Cruz, Quiapo and Sampaloc. The Chinese lived in the *parian*, a district that became part of the present Binondo.

Slums are now scattered over 526 communities in all cities and municipalities of Metro Manila, housing 2.5 million people on vacant private or public lands, usually along rivers, near garbage dumps, along railroad tracks, under bridges and beside industrial establishments. Slums alongside mansions in affluent residential areas are also not uncommon. Although there are relatively large slum communities, the settlement pattern of the Metro Manila urban poor is generally dispersed, located wherever there is space and opportunity.

Slums are defined as buildings or areas that are deteriorated, hazardous, insanitary or lacking in standard conveniences. Slums are also defined by the squalid, crowded or insanitary conditions under which people live, irrespective of the physical state of the building or area. Under such definitions, slum dwellers are identified as the urban poor: individuals or families residing in urban and urbanizable areas whose income or combined household income falls below the poverty threshold.

Slums cannot be clearly classified by location as they are so dispersed over Metro Manila; but they can broadly be classified by construction type:

- Temporary shelter made from salvaged materials.
- Semi-permanent shelter.
- Permanent shelter.

There is an additional category that is referred to as ‘professional squatters’ and is defined as individuals or groups who occupy lands without the owner’s consent and who have sufficient income for legitimate housing. The term also applies to those previously awarded lots or housing by the government, but who sold, leased or transferred the same and settled illegally in the same place or in another urban area as *non-bona fide* occupants and intruders on land for social housing. The term does not apply to individuals or groups who rent land and housing from ‘professional squatting syndicates’. Professional squatting syndicates are the informal and illegal organizations that covertly coordinate the activities of professional squatters.

Expenses on housing primarily involve mortgages or rents; but ‘squatters’ typically spend nothing on a regular basis on housing. However, most squatters incur initial housing investments to pay for ‘land rights’ and to build their house.

On average, three-quarters of the households in Manila’s slums are long-term residents of the area (more than five years). The settlements average 19.2 years in age and often are 40 years old, or older. The majority of the households migrated to these areas from other cities within the metro or the city. The majority of the urban poor households have been living in Metro Manila for nearly two decades. Half of the population in slums are employed in the formal sector. Informal employment largely consists of domestic help, tricycle driving, construction labour, self-employment, factory labour and vending.

Metro Manila consists of 12 cities, 5 municipalities and 1694 *barangays*, governed by their respective local government units (LGUs). The Local Government Code (LGC) mandates the LGUs to provide efficient and effective governance and to promote general welfare within their respective territorial jurisdictions. The LGUs are relatively autonomous. The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) was created in order to ensure the effective delivery of metro-wide services; the adoption and implementation of policies, standards, rules and regulations, as well as programmes and projects to rationalize and optimize land use and provide direction to urban growth and expansion; the rehabilitation and development of slum and

blighted areas; the development of shelter and housing facilities; and the provision of necessary social services.

With increased decentralization, the participation of NGOs and people’s organizations (POs) in the planning, implementation and monitoring of LGU-led projects has increased. The LGC prescribed the formation of local development councils or special bodies to serve as venues for representing communities, through their organizations, to express their views on issues affecting them.

The 1987 Bill of Rights grants all citizens the right of access to affordable housing. In 1986, the government was turned into ‘enabler’ and ‘facilitator’, and the Urban Development and Housing Act (UDHA) was passed. The UDHA provides for comprehensive and integrated urban development and housing, while, under the communal upgrading scheme – the Zonal Improvement Programme – the government can expropriate land for resale to the residents after developing the site and introducing basic services and facilities. The government established a viable home financing system through the revival of home financing institutions, while funding for long-term mortgages that would be affordable even to those below the poverty line was sourced from insurance funds administered by the social security system.

The strength of Metro Manila’s approaches lies in the holistic character of metro-wide action for slum improvement, regularization, housing finance, poverty alleviation and partnerships with NGOs and CBOs. The long-term effectiveness of this approach is, despite the enormity of Manila’s slum issues, likely to show that persistent adherence to urban-wide policy will lead to satisfactory results.

MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

Historically, urban segregation in Mexico City was caused by topography and colonial land use, with the flood-prone areas to the east of the city being occupied by the lower classes. With high immigration and birth rates during the greater part of the 20th century, the city’s population grew to 18 million, of which over 60 per cent are currently considered to be ‘poor’ or ‘moderately poor’. The built-up area expanded from 23 square kilometres to 154,710 square kilometres between 1900 and 2000, engulfing surrounding towns and villages and invading steep hillsides and dried-up lake beds on which slums developed. Initially, highly crowded one- or two-roomed rented tenements, called *vecindades*, provided housing for the poor. With intensive industrialization and concurrent urbanization after 1940, peripherally located *colonias populares* – irregular settlements comprised of self-built and mainly owner-occupied dwellings – emerged as the leading lower-middle and low-income housing option.

The immense scale of Mexico City’s housing poverty and the highly complex, dynamic processes preclude general official or unofficial definitions of slums comparable to the English word. Instead, terms such as *colonias populares* (lower class neighbourhoods) are used. Recently, ‘areas with high marginalization indices’ have been identified.

The following five types of slum are identifiable:

- 1 *Colonias populares*: the most critical housing conditions are in the newer or unconsolidated irregular settlements, or *colonias populares*, resulting from unauthorized land development and construction, with deficits in urban services, often in high-risk areas and with dubious property titles. Most settlements have been improved to varying degrees as property is regularized, infrastructure and services put in and houses solidly built. Yet, the *colonias* never become completely regular. Legalized properties become irregular again through intestate inheritance, dilapidation or fiscal problems. Irregular settlements constitute roughly half of the urbanized area and house more than 60 per cent of the population.
- 2 *Inner-city rental slums (vecindades)*: these slums date from the late 19th century and comprise houses abandoned by the wealthy and converted into tenements for the poor, providing the model for purpose-built cheap rental housing. After the 1940s, the production of rented *vecindades* continued in the peripheral irregular settlements; but here, unlike in the inner city, the landlords are often slum dwellers themselves. About 10 per cent of all housing in Mexico City is in *vecindades*.
- 3 *Ciudades perdidas*: this is a broad concept referring to small-scale pockets of shanty housing on vacant land or undesirable urban locations. These are no longer quantitatively important as a form of slum.
- 4 *Cuartos de azotea*: these are servants' quarters and makeshift accommodation on the roofs of apartments or early public housing. They are almost invariably well located in central areas and provide 0.4 per cent of all of Mexico City's housing units.
- 5 *Deteriorated public housing projects*: many formally produced, subsidized owner-occupied housing projects built for the working classes have become highly deteriorated, with overcrowding and other social problems. As much as 15 per cent of Mexico City's population now live in government-financed housing projects of variable quality.

The vast majority of the precarious settlements' occupants are homeowners. Only 7 per cent of the housing in the worst areas are rented, compared to a metropolitan average of 17.3 per cent. In the central areas, the traditional *vecindades* and other rental accommodation continue to lose population and to be destroyed due to ageing and land-use changes. Apart from the highly successful housing reconstruction programme after the 1985 earthquake, further projects for repopulating the city centre have had limited impact since they are severely hampered by a lack of viable finance and land for development.

Many public housing projects throughout the city are becoming slums. Inadequate self-administration of these projects has led to lack of maintenance, invasion and degradation of public space, structurally dangerous alterations and bad neighbourhood relations. All of this is

aggravated by the original cheap construction, low space standards and the increasing impoverishment of their working-class occupants, smitten by unemployment, alcohol and drug dependency, social violence and high crime rates.

Irregular settlements continue to develop in a more dispersed and differentiated manner, especially in the metropolitan municipalities. The city is growing disproportionately to demographic increase, accommodating smaller families and an ageing population. Nevertheless, most of the city has been built now, and what happens within existing *colonias* will determine the quality of future habitat for the majority of the poor. The original problems here of precarious construction, risks from landslides or flooding and insufficient services are compounded by deterioration and overcrowding. The advantages of irregular settlements are flexibility and relatively large plots that accommodate extended families and second or third generations. In the last decade, financial subsidies have been directed at formal commercial developments of mass-produced tiny single-family houses on the extreme outskirts of the city.

About two-thirds of Mexico City's population live in *colonias populares*; but by no means should all be considered to be 'slum dwellers'. In fact, most *colonias* contain some degree of social heterogeneity. The distinguishing characteristic of hopeless slums is not so much the poverty of all of their inhabitants, but, rather, the absence of middle- and high-income families.

Local government policy towards irregular settlement formation has generally been of a *laissez faire* or even encouraging nature, with some notable exceptions of mass evictions. Once established, a *colonia popular* will normally encounter few problems in obtaining electricity, although basic infrastructure may take longer, depending upon the terrain, the location of the settlement, the political climate and other localized factors. The costs are covered by the inhabitants and the local governments, with federal subsidies for certain items in the case of some specific upgrading programmes. Since 2001, the federal district government (governing the half of Mexico City that is the nation's capital) has run an innovative programme providing credits for home improvements and new extensions to owner occupiers in the more impoverished *colonias populares*. This is part of a wider policy of social investment, including monthly cash subsidies for the over-70s and the disabled, school breakfasts and community crime-prevention measures. The housing programme accounts for about one quarter of the social budget. In addition, the social prosecutor of the same federal district government runs a scheme called Housing Projects Rescue, consisting of non-repayable grants for the maintenance and repair of public housing. Similar projects might be implemented in Mexico City's metropolitan municipalities, though these have yet to be devised. An evaluation of the immediate and longer-term effects of credits for home improvement, as well as the housing project rescue scheme, is premature.

In spite of recent decentralization policies, power and resources are highly concentrated in central government. Throughout most of the 20th century, political power was virtually monopolized by the Revolutionary Institutional

Party (PRI). Political reform began during the late 1970s, slowly at first, with electoral successes of opposition parties being limited to lower levels of government, but gathering momentum towards the end of the century. The replacement of the traditional one-party clientism by competitive electioneering has altered the unwritten rules governing access to benefits and basic necessities, such as housing credits, urban services, regularization programmes and social subsidies. The role of political intermediaries has been undermined or transformed. Political reform is combined with new social policies that replace collective targeting and aspirations of global coverage through the individualization of benefits, with the aim of 'targeting the most needy'. The practical effects are, however, uneven and it is unlikely that what the needy most require is the kind of housing subsidies that are provided, and even less likely that they will obtain them.

MOSCOW, RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Since 1924, five-year plans provided national economic and urban development that was aimed at providing equal services for all. Muscovites primarily live in flats in multi-storey buildings. Moscow's population has tripled during the last 70 years and, in spite of massive municipal housing construction, there are still some people who live in shared flats, or in outdated or dilapidated buildings.

Shared flats with communal services, built between 1920 and 1955, were designed to house the needy on the basis of one family per room. Despite enormous efforts – more than 80 per cent of Moscow's housing was built during the past 30 to 40 years – about 15 per cent of the registered population still live in shared flats.

Dilapidated buildings are generally five-storey high blocks of apartments, built from pre-fabricated concrete panels during the mid 1950s. That first generation of industrial housing was followed by an improved second (mid 1960s) and a still better third generation (1980s) of mass-type housing. Due to poor maintenance and shortage of living space, about 36 per cent of Moscow's housing stock is physically or otherwise 'out of date'.

Squatter flats resulted from illegal subleasing of municipal or private housing. The post-1994 easing of the 'urban employment access to housing requirement' made Moscow the number one migration destination, including a considerable percentage of refugees.

No formal definition of slum is given, as it is generally considered that the city does not have slums, but has *communal* (shared) flats, *dilapidated buildings* and *deteriorated houses*.

Several types of accommodation in Moscow do not meet contemporary standards for housing:

- *Communal flats (communalky)*: these are apartments that are used by two or more families who share the kitchen and other facilities (including hostels, dormitories and hotels).

- *Outdated and dilapidated buildings (vethi and avariyni)*: this typically comprises the first generation of mass housing, now outdated in terms of quality of construction and facilities. Residents are entitled to housing improvement or free alternative accommodation, but queues are long and move slowly according to availability of municipal housing stock.
- *Deteriorated houses*: these are primarily post-World War II structures that are recognized as damaged or otherwise unsuitable for constant habitation.

Before 1992, almost all houses in Moscow were state owned, municipal or corporate. There were practically no private houses in Moscow for 70 years. In ten years, two-thirds of the housing stock became private through privatization and new construction. Poor people generally stay in state-owned flats that they rent or lease.

'Low-income citizens' are defined through the criterion of 'cost of living', representing a minimum basket of consumption materials and services 'necessary for preservation of health and maintenance of ability to live of the people' – this is estimated as 2900 rubles (about US\$90) per person (during the year 2002). Moscow provides financial assistance to families with actual per person income lower than the cost of living in the city, and to families *with minor children, students and youth, veterans of the Great Patriotic war, older citizens and invalids (handicapped)*.

'Needy for dwelling' people have the right to apply for housing improvement at the expense of the city. In Moscow, a family is considered in need for housing purposes if there are less than 9 square metres of floor area per person.

Moscow's poor population is also made up of illegal immigrants, refugees and seasonal workers. As the collection basin is, in principle, the entire territory of the former USSR, little specific socio-political characteristics can be attributed to this wide array of people.

The main purpose of the federal programme Dwellings for 2002–2010 is a transition to sustainable development in the housing sphere, ensuring availability of housing accommodation to the citizens, as well as a safe and comfortable urban environment. This housing reform programme comprises modernizing municipal housing and resettling citizens from shabby and dilapidated housing stock. The reforms are aimed at:

- implementing a transition to sustainable development;
- undertaking the necessary legal, taxation, privatization, housing finance and registration changes.

With accumulated public- and private-sector resources and according to the Law on Moscow Master Plan, the following changes in housing reconstruction and development are envisaged for the following 20 years:

- liquidation of shared flats and existing dilapidated housing stock by 2010;
- increase of housing stock from 176 up to 220 million–230 million square metres;

- decrease and stabilization of the total share of physically amortized and of out-of-date residential stock from 36 to 15 per cent through substitution of apartments of the first generation and by increase of annual of reconstruction;
- improvement of maintenance and operating performances of residential buildings (at the expense of increase of high-quality housing stock and a decrease of low-quality residential stock);
- improvement of the urban environment, and of socio-psychological and ecological comfort; and
- increase in the efficiency of urban territories through mixed-use development, and increase of residential and mixed residential densities.

Much of Moscow's current housing crisis is inherited from the past, exacerbated by problems inherent to the current politico-philosophical shifts of the transitional period. In both cases, the housing sector did not receive sufficient resources. Largely dependent on subsidies and unsatisfactory financing, expensive maintenance and an environment with a general absence of economic incentives or market competition, the housing crisis does not come as a surprise. In order to work itself out of these problems, considerable institutional and social reorganizations may be required.

Necessary new directions include, but are not limited to:

- finding a new balance between private and municipal roles;
- better access to housing finance;
- privatization of housing to pave the way for more owner/tenant rights in order to ease the burden on the state;
- an overhaul of municipal finance;
- the creation of more public-private partnerships;
- the establishment of resident community-based organizations to improve public control over the maintenance and effective use of government subsidies;
- subsidies going directly to recipients rather than to agencies in order to stimulate competition for maintenance services; and
- municipal support for NGO interventions.

NAIROBI, KENYA

The roots for the formation of Nairobi's slums can be traced back to the pre-independence period when the urban layout was based on government-sanctioned population segregation into separate enclaves for Africans, Asians and Europeans.³ During this period, slums essentially developed because of the highly unbalanced allocation of public resources towards the housing and infra-structural needs of the separate sections. The post-colonial period saw a relaxation of the colonial residential segregation policies, and major population shifts occurred, notably rural-to-urban migration, with little obstruction to the proliferation of urban shacks

'as long as they were not located near the central business district'. Slums sprang up all over the town in the proximity of employment. Spatial segregation during this period continued to be reinforced, but this time more as socio-economic and cultural stratification. The post-independence period also saw rapid urban population growth without corresponding housing provision, and poor population resettlement due to new developments and extension of city boundaries that included rural parts within urban boundaries, often changing the characteristics of the settlements.

There is no official definition of slums or informal settlements, and the terms slums and informal settlement are often used interchangeably. City authorities, however, view lack of basic services and infrastructure as characteristics of slums, an aspect that slum dwellers do not emphasize.

Slums accommodate the majority of Nairobi's population and are generally of two types:

- 1 Squatter settlements.
- 2 Illegal subdivisions of either government or private land.

A number of slums are located on land that is unsuitable for construction, and all have high to very high population densities, with up to 2300 persons per hectare. Slums and informal settlements are widely located across the city, typically in proximity to areas with employment opportunities.

The majority of structures are let on a room-to-room basis and the majority of households occupy single rooms.⁴ Several studies indicate that 56 to 80 per cent of the slum households rent from private-sector landlords (who, in the past, often had the political connections that helped them to protect their investments).

Between 1971 and 1995, the number of informal settlement villages within the Nairobi divisional boundaries rose from 50 to 134, while the estimated total population of these settlements increased from 167,000 to some 1,886,000 individuals. In terms of percentage of the total Nairobi population, the share of informal-settlement village inhabitants rose from one third to an estimated 60 per cent. Today, both natural growth and rural-to-urban migration continue to contribute to the growth of Nairobi's informal settlements villages.

Slums house urban residents who earn low incomes and have limited assets. Employment is largely low skill (domestic help, waiter, bar maid, guard), often on a casual basis (construction labour), small business owners (kiosk owner, newspaper seller) and other income-generating activities. Discrimination, especially along ethnic lines, exists, with most ethnic groups living in (sub) communities of their own ethnic background. Clashes between ethnic groups have been experienced. Slums are not a major source of urban unrest, although they constitute areas with a higher concentration of crime, violence and victimization.

There is a lack of a clear policy that would facilitate and guide urban development in Kenya, and urban

interventions are largely made on an ad hoc basis. Most slums are located on unplanned sites that are unsuitable for housing, and their residents are exposed to different forms of pollution. In some slums, housing and infrastructure programmes are being put in place through joint efforts of the government, donors and civil society organizations. These interventions have had mixed results.

Several policy-sensitive initiatives have been undertaken and institutions and facilities have been established to address the issue of slums, including the enabling strategy, the Nairobi Informal Settlements Coordination Committee, Nairobi Situation Analysis, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper and the Local Authority Transfer Fund. They address a series of themes, including settlement upgrading, community participation and improved access to services. The outcomes of these interventions are an increased housing stock and expanded community opportunities and participation, as well as a host of less fortunate aspects. These include:

- Proliferation of new slums.
- Exclusion of particular population groups.
- Subsidy and affordability mismatches.
- Top-down approaches.
- Gentrification.
- Erroneous focus and failing partnerships.
- Non-replicability of efforts.

It is perhaps also the lack of a precise definition of the concept 'slum' that contributes to the lack of effective and tailored policy response. Additionally, in the face of the failure to establish coherent and effective Nairobi-wide urban policies, the outlook for the situation in slums appears to be rather bleak.

NAPLES, ITALY

Slum areas of Naples are geographically divided into:

- *Historic residential periphery*: this consists of public-housing workers' quarters on the then rural areas bordering industrial plants of the early 1900s that have since closed. The older buildings are in a dilapidated state, while recent construction is of poor quality.
- *Recent public city*: this comprises two zones that were planned during the 1960s for dormitory-style public housing, now housing large numbers of residents with low socio-economic status in areas rife with organized crime activities.
- *Unauthorized city*: this is made up of areas of unauthorized construction from the 1970s and 1980s on agricultural lands (no construction permits and violating zoning; illegal but not informal expansion or construction of single-family homes). Quite a few urban areas saw this spontaneous type of development. There may be a scarcity or lack of services; but these areas, nevertheless, constitute a rich urban landscape.

- *Decaying central pockets*: this comprises some areas of the historic centre with high levels of decay, in terms of housing and social indicators, that have, at the same time, a solid and rich urban fabric.

In Naples, the concept of ghetto (a completely decayed and impoverished neighbourhood with a homogeneous social makeup in terms of income and profession) is not an appropriate one to describe the identified slum areas. In each of such areas the relationship between exclusion and poverty and relative wealth varies. Some are being renewed and there are residents who are decidedly not low income. Deep poverty can even be found in areas that are not included among the slums, although such cases do not comprise the majority.

There is no official definition of slums, or of specific decaying areas, even though the debate over this question has been raging for the past century in Naples. However, as in most European cities, the term 'slum' can be used in Naples to describe a habitat where housing maintenance is poor, where social city services (health, education, social and cultural facilities) are lacking, where incomes are low and where social indicators are clearly below the city average.

Except for a few gypsy camps on the edge of the city, there are no cases of informal housing built with precarious materials, nor are there areas with significant numbers of dwellings without public services. Most of the illegal structures are actually associated with middle-class neighbourhoods. Perhaps the best candidate for a slum label is the basso, a ground-floor dwelling with a door onto the street that serves as the only source of light and ventilation. Usually it is just one room divided to create a kitchen and bathroom.

There is insufficient data on slum tenure, although there are indications that in the slum areas only one third are owner occupiers.

Population is more or less stable, a result of negative natural growth compensated by a positive migratory balance. Population movements are no longer to the urban periphery but, rather, to towns in the province. The areas of Scampia and Ponticelli (recent public city-type areas) are slowly growing.

There is no data on the income of slum inhabitants, while there are fairly reliable figures for the social, employment and crime situation. The sectorial nature of policies that support the vulnerable social segments, largely implemented by national structures through various ministries, does not allow for data to be compared even for the same zone. The increase in the number of interventions conducted by NGOs has led to greater knowledge of the situation; but there has been no centralization that might help to share data.

The population decline in Naples between 1981 and 1991 was sharp, especially in the historic centre areas (particularly, Pendino, Porto and Vicaria), with the exception of the Scampia, S. Pietro, Pianura, Chiaiano and Ponticelli neighbourhoods. Within the former central areas, the decay of the ancient housing stock has allowed low-income classes to stay in private homes, while those with the means to leave

preferred to go elsewhere. In the latter case, the smaller drop in population can be explained by the low income of the residents of these quarters. In fact, the exodus from the city mostly involved young middle-class white-collar families and stably employed blue-collar families, and was most evident in middle-class, central and hilltop residential neighbourhoods.

The main policies for urban slum areas are national programmes that support employment and entrepreneurship. The late 1990s saw the launch of the Urban Renewal and Local Sustainable Development Programme (PRUSST). This funds the planning of projects with the support of local owners and private capital for promoting the recovery and improvement of urban aspects of the cities; promoting social services offered in city slum areas; the creation of services and infrastructure; and renovation and renewal, taking advantage of the existing urban landscape and construction patterns.

The Naples City Social Plan is trying to create a shift from government, which is the exclusive province of the state, to local governance. With a long history of highly permissive urban governance forms, Naples had become a haven of illegal (not informal) construction that flaunted construction permit systems, land zoning and building regulations. This is hardly surprising: during the three decades to 1993, the city had 26 different city councils that were characterized by serious governance discontinuity.

Rises in unemployment were particularly sharp during the 1970s, in the wake of the closing down of major industrial plants, and during the mid 1990s, when central government interventions ceased, demonstrating how almost the entire southern Italian economy had become overdependent upon public funds. Insufficient growth of the service sector could not make up for the job losses. Combined with the prolific presence of organized crime, it is little wonder that the city is in a somewhat precarious position.

It is premature to evaluate the results of the Naples City Social Plan. Overall, changes taking place in Naples show how deep social and urban decay remains. Considering that these conditions are the result of countless inter-playing factors, urban renewal can only take place with a comprehensive plan of social, urban and environmental reorganization, matched by measures aimed at increasing and improving the services needed to attract economic activity and to integrate those segments of the population that currently face increasing marginalization, within the social and economic fabric of the city. Naples needs to develop a city-wide holistic plan that simultaneously places its urban economy within the national economy, while developing an overall urban strategy to help address urban and socio-economic issues alike.

NEWARK, US

Although Newark is a city on the rise, it remains a troubled city with highly unequal opportunities. During the 1960s and 1970s, Newark experienced an exodus of the middle class and the wealthy to the suburbs, leaving the working

class and poor behind in the city. Today, Newark and the surrounding suburbs have reached extremes in ethnic segregation, exacerbated by a declining municipal tax base with grave consequences on service delivery and the quality of life in the city. Record rates of immigration, notably from South America, have made up for the exodus of the better-off groups in terms of urban population. The city is highly densely populated, with 11,500 persons per square mile. The city suffered major employment losses between the 1970s and 1990s and most neighbourhoods contain evidence of poverty, dis-investment and abandonment. An estimated 170,000 households in Metro Newark have 'worst case' housing needs, defined as renters with less than 50 per cent of the area's median income, spending more than half of their income on rent, or living in severely inadequate housing, while not receiving government housing assistance. Today, 4000 households are on the public housing waiting list, which has been closed for years, and the wait for rental assistance is ten years.

The housing stock in poor neighbourhoods includes a small number of high-rise multifamily buildings, some low-rise public housing blocks dating from the 1940s and 1950s, new public housing developments consisting of town homes, and older wood-frame houses for one to four families. Because of the city's old housing stock, 90 per cent of the housing units are likely to be contaminated with poisonous lead paints.

The tenure type is largely rental, although the North Broadway neighbourhood has an uncharacteristically high 35 per cent owner-occupier rate. With the recent economic slump, unemployment has risen to 11.4 per cent and is double the state average. Nearly 30 per cent of Newark residents are poor. The most affordable housing clearly under-serves the needy. Although considerable neighbourhood upgrading is in process, the poorest are not directly benefiting.

Many of the city's poorest sections are racially segregated, with pluralities of either blacks or Hispanics and small white populations. For example, of the three neighbourhoods profiled, two of them have black populations that make up 89 per cent of the neighbourhood's households. In the third neighbourhood, the black population declined from 56 per cent to 31 per cent during the 1990s, while the Hispanic population grew from 40 per cent to 60 per cent. More and more immigrants arrive from South America – notably, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Ecuador.

For more than 20 years, the Newark Housing Authority has been transforming its housing stock, reflecting shifts in federal housing policies from the 1990s, rooted in concerns about concentrated poverty and a belief in market forces. Nearly all high-rise housing has been demolished and replaced with town units of lower density, while some low-rise complexes have been renovated. Poor neighbourhoods also receive assistance through state programmes. The focus of federal programmes shifted to lower-density mixed-income communities; but whether such mixed-income communities will improve the neighbourhood environment, while providing a better quality of life, remains to be seen.

Encouraging housing (re)development has also been a priority of the current mayoral administration, with particular attention to increasing the home-ownership rate.

Two state policies have addressed the problem of regional disparities. Both stem from court battles, one related to housing inequity and the other to school inequity. In theory, if housing affordability and school quality were more equally distributed across the region, Newark would not endure the level of need that it endures today. The city's strategy for economic development has been described as largely relying on ad hoc deals secured with tax abatements, rather than carried out according to a master plan. In addition, fighting crime has been a key concern. Long-range trends show the crime rate declining, although 2001 and 2002 saw increases in homicides. City leaders see crime reduction as integral to successful economic development and home-ownership.

In some respects, elements of city governance can be characterized as anti-democratic. Some have characterized city government as exclusionary and/or dis-empowering, noting that grassroots community organizations have had little success in penetrating the city hall or in influencing development policy, and that a set of well-established non-profit organizations receive regular funding, effectively keeping them from criticizing the administration. Over the years, city officials have been convicted or accused of corrupt practices, including extortion, taking pay-offs, theft and fraud.

PHNOM PENH, CAMBODIA

At the end of the Pol Pot regime, returnees to Phnom Penh were authorized to occupy buildings on a first-come, first-served basis. The few professionals alive occupied vacant dwellings close to the places of employment in the civil service. These new owners took many centrally located buildings, which some then subdivided and sold, even in the absence of formal titles. Once all buildings were occupied, people started to settle on vacant lands, creating the communities that are now considered illegal.

Low-income settlements were created by:

- rural migrants fleeing the countryside because of indebtedness or lack of economic opportunities;
- refugees returning from camps; and
- internally displaced persons.

Most came to Phnom Penh for economic reasons and settled close to where they could earn a living. Afterwards, the slum population increased through natural growth, through migration by relatives of existing slum dwellers and through seasonal migrants. People who move regularly in and out because of floods account for seasonal variation in settlements sizes.

Two types of slums may be recognized:

- 1 *Squatter settlements*: these consist of dwellers and housing units on illegally occupied private or public lands.

- 2 *Urban poor settlements*: these comprise low-income families with some sort of recognized occupancy.

However, there exists no clear distinction between legal and illegal occupancy in Phnom Penh as all private ownership of land was abolished in 1974, and no clear ownership system has since been implemented. Almost no one has full ownership title and most city dwellers could be considered squatters.

Slums on public lands largely developed along wider streets, railway tracks, riversides and *boengs* (water reservoirs). On private lands, slums tend to consist of squatting in dilapidated, multiple-occupancy buildings. Increasingly, there is also rooftop squatting in and around the city centre, while, since 1995, rural migrants have formed squatter settlements at the urban periphery on marginal public lands. Most slums are made of low-cost, recycled materials (paper, palm leaves and old wood). These structures are vulnerable to winds and heavy rains, and can be easily destroyed by fire. Those who own brick and cement houses are typically financially better off.

The land tenure situation in Phnom Penh is complex as there is no clear distinction between legal and illegal occupancy and/or ownership. Although, recently, some have been granted social concessions by the government, no family yet holds any certificate of ownership. Families with a registration book may feel more secure than those without, but it does not give them any strong claim to ownership. These unclear rights of tenure make eviction a constant threat. Most low-income settlers are officially regarded as squatters. Yet, at least 75 per cent consider themselves owners of the plot that they purchased from the local authorities or previous owner, who themselves may not have had ownership rights. Transactions are recorded on handwritten receipts; although without any legal authority, it is often enough to claim compensation in case of municipal relocation. Renters are either short-term seasonal migrants or the poorest of the poor who cannot afford to purchase in a squatter settlement and rent on a weekly or monthly basis, with the constant threat of eviction by their slum landlord.

Until 1999, the Municipality of Phnom Penh (MPP) kept a rigid position of not recognizing 'squatters' as legitimate inhabitants of the city, and its agencies did not support development activities to reach slum dwellers. Rather, they evicted squatters, often violently, without compensation or support to relocate. The municipal efforts to develop tourism in Phnom Penh led to the removal of many slum communities.

Nevertheless, in 1999, the MPP and UN-Habitat, after consultations with NGOs and community-based organizations (CBOs), developed an Urban Poverty Reduction Strategy (UPRS) to improve access to basic social and physical infrastructure, enhancing economic opportunities and strengthening participatory governance mechanisms.

In 2000, Prime Minister Hun Sen redefined squatter dwellers as 'temporary residents', while publicly recognizing their economic value to the city. He emphasized that helping them to rebuild new, liveable communities in locations

outside of the city had become a priority of the municipality. This change of status coincided with a first step of implementing the UPRS.

The term 'squatter', long used in Phnom Penh to classify most inhabitants of low-income settlements, conveys much more than a connotation of illegality. In Khmer, it refers to 'people living in anarchy', and is strongly linked to immorality, disorder and criminality. At the official level, this gives the MPP grounds to refuse dialogue with squatters and not to acknowledge the legitimacy of their claims for public recognition. This official view is quite widely shared by the middle and upper classes, who consider squatters an aesthetic nuisance to the city and a threat to public order, all feelings based on the same stereotypes of anarchy and reinforced by a poorly informed media. Relations between the MPP and poor communities remain tense as, until recently, the MPP did not engage in dialogue with representatives of squatters, who were considered illegal. In this way, the most vulnerable populations are not included in the political process.

MPP governance is severely restricted by the limited authority to plan and finance its activities. Although the MPP officially gained financial autonomy in 1998, its budget remains constrained as a national law predefines all lines, the minister of interior must approve the budget and the national assembly ratifies it. In addition, the city has little power or incentive to raise its own revenue.

The UPRS, however, suggests that poor communities in Phnom Penh can improve their living conditions and prospects for human development, provided that:

- they receive security of tenure, education, training, credit and technical advice;
- the MPP removes legal, procedural, financial and practical barriers to self-improvement;
- urban poor communities, the government, NGOs and the private sector develop partnerships;
- decisions on policies and programmes that affect the urban poor are made at the lowest possible level of government, in close consultation with those affected;
- harassment by corrupt officials and the current lack of legal recourse by slum dwellers is redressed; and
- the general perception of the problem of illegal squatters rises above the level of 'places where anarchy and confusion reign'.

QUITO, ECUADOR

Between 1950 and 2001, Quito grew from 200,000 to 1.4 million inhabitants and evolved from a centrally oriented city to an urban agglomeration through the incorporation of minor urban centres and the peripheral area. The urban structure has been conditioned by the scarcity of flat land, topographic irregularities of the surrounding mountain system and the numerous east-west slopes.

The phenomenon of popular neighbourhoods in Quito is relatively recent. It started during the mid 1970s as a result of massive migration to Quito. Low-income populations

seeking housing settled on the peripheral areas of the city, in deteriorated houses in the historical centre, and also in houses located in nearby towns. This process has consolidated during the last decade. Recent settlements located in areas of irregular topography, in the northern and southern peripheries of the city, are composed of dwellings such as huts, hovels and small houses, built with inadequate materials. There is no drinking water, no sewage and few of these dwellings possess latrines. The rubbish collection service is nonexistent or inefficient, and the main or secondary access roads are in poor condition, as is the street lighting.

The municipality defines slums as *barríos ilegales* – illegal settlements, meaning that these neighbourhoods don't possess an official approval and an urbanization licence.

In Quito, there are three main types of slums:

- 1 *Barríos periféricos*: these are popular neighbourhoods located on the urban edge.
- 2 *Conventillos*: these comprise deteriorated tenements in the historic centre.
- 3 *Rural neighbourhoods*: these house low-income families who commute to the urban area.

Most low-income households are located in the *barríos periféricos*. Many of the urban slum dwellers do not own the land on which they live and only some 24 per cent have secure tenure. However, the urban periphery neighbourhoods developed through the subdivision of agricultural plots, and most of these residents own the house and land. Only an estimated 10 per cent of them are in rented accommodation.

Income poverty, low levels of education, high unemployment rates and unsatisfied basic services affect a massive 82 per cent of the slum dwellers. Slum dwellers' perception of their status, however, is one of forthcoming integration through strategies for the progressive upgrading of living conditions and social inclusion.

Since 1993, the Law of the Metropolitan District of Quito (LDMQ) has provided a wider legal framework than the traditional municipal competencies. Applicable only to the urban and rural management of the Metro Quito, the LDMQ has generated important administrative changes with respect to decentralization.

The Quito local government, apart from strong investments in conventional infrastructure, is undertaking a massive process of land regularization and has adopted two innovative strategies to upgrade slums:

- 1 A programme to provide security of tenure has delivered property deeds to 13,000 families.
- 2 A metropolitan land and housing enterprise, conceived as a public-private partnership, intends to regulate the prices of land through direct participations in the market.

In 1996, approximately 200 poor families invaded and built their slums on a piece of public land zoned as a park near the historic area of Quito. For over six years the problem

was untouched until a new municipal administration took office and developed a process of negotiation. In a very short time, the municipality was able to provide another plot of land and a private company built several blocks of flats to accommodate all of the families. The project was financed with a loan from a cooperative owned by the Chamber of Commerce, with further financial support provided by the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development. An NGO provided technical support and the required international seed money. The invaders are now moving to their new apartments and the city has recovered the land.

Quito's urban planning process has largely been motivated by technical rationality, although it was, in practice, often based on legitimization of *de facto* situations. Weak enforcement of land zoning and other regulatory controls have been at the root of today's problems, together with lack of sufficient involvement of the underprivileged groups. After 30 or 40 years of attempted solutions to Quito's slums and poverty problems, it seems clear that unilateral and small-scale efforts have lower success rates. Results were also limited when authorities and public entities adopted an authoritarian position that failed to include the communities and their organizations.

The lesson learned is that slum improvement and poverty alleviation efforts require precise targeting from the supply side, rather than coping with the situation from the demand side. Undesirable urbanization aspects and gradual construction of houses have been permitted for too long as an alternative to the difficulties posed by economic crises. Recent experiences, however, indicate that partnerships and agreement among stakeholders can lead to adequate solutions if executed in combination with political will and perseverance.

RABAT-SALÉ, MOROCCO

In Rabat-Salé, a slum is defined as any settlement of precarious housing either on private plots of land, or with the settlers being provisionally tolerated on publicly owned plots of land. The main categories in Rabat-Salé are:

- *Médinas*: these are the old neighbourhoods of the pre-colonial city. Their deterioration resulted from the out-migration of middle and well-off classes and of economic activities. This double loss impoverished the neighbourhoods. Lack of maintenance of houses that were rented room by room led to a rapid deterioration. The médinas continued to constitute a source of informal and irregular employment that allowed underprivileged populations to live and work there, attracting poor external populations. Médinas are comparatively well preserved and, although damaged in part, other sections have been rehabilitated. For some, the only problem is general urban development.
- *Intra-muros*: these shanties are slums with precarious buildings in sheet metal or adobe that date from the 1960s on rented or squatted plots of land. They emerged as spontaneous settlements on easily

occupied lands near industrial or agricultural activities. Originally peripheral, they should have been integrated as the town was developing. These slums have been gradually and partially rebuilt with more permanent material. They have better urban integration, with some services and self-improvements of tertiary road, rail and waterways and organized garbage collection. However illegal, those slums that have existed for a long time are often tolerated by the authorities.

- *Peripheral slums*: these emerged in a similar way to the *intra-muros*, on easily accessible community land or near economic activity. However, their history is less marked by formal and structured interventions. They are still able to accommodate new populations because of lower densities. Their sheer numbers force the authorities to tolerate them.
- *Illegal districts*: these are groups of concrete buildings that more or less resemble traditional low-cost buildings built on purchased plots of land but without any permit. They are deprived of basic services and infrastructure. However, depending upon age and stage of legalization, their situations do vary. This is why it is difficult to consider them as similar to the previous categories, and to the 'slums' category in general. They are primarily designed in anticipation of legality. Populations in illegal districts are more heterogeneous than in the former categories, both in terms of origins and in socio-economic terms. Today, the oldest formations of illegal neighbourhoods are completely integrated within the urban environment. The first settlements were on rented or leased lands. The most recent settlements (since the 1970s) started as subdivided agricultural properties. The majority of the population is of lower-middle class, for whom these neighbourhoods were the only access to home-ownership.

The main policy on people living in slums involves resettling them in public housing estates; more rarely does the policy involve restructuring. Until quite recently, no differentiation was made between urbanized and peripheral slums. Urban policies never had the objective of improving slums or their social conditions. Interventions tried either to get rid of slums as obstacles to urban development or to minimize their impacts on the urban landscape and on the city image. In the past, reasons to 'clean up' slums and force their inhabitants to reception sites have included: political or security imperatives; the need to undertake big infrastructure works; urban modernization or improvement requirements; land or property pressures; and accidents or natural catastrophes. These sites are generally less central than the primary settlements (often outside of the urban area) and quite often lack adequate services. Alternatively, urban cosmetic operations that were meant to hide the unsightly or disturbing effects of slums, and to encapsulate them by limiting their expansion, were carried out.

During the 1970s and 1980s, some more positive interventions took place, prompted by the conviction that

improvement *in situ* can resolve the problems of the poor in a more efficient way because it is adapted to their real conditions. These interventions came in two categories:

- 1 *Limited improvements*: neither part of programmes nor formal policy, they are mainly in the form of daily political management, and ad hoc negotiations involving elected representatives, local authorities, private agencies and populations regarding NGO and community-based action.
- 2 *Restructuring*: this encompasses upgrading projects implemented on a large scale and decided at the national level as policy popularized during the 1970s and 1980s. The interventions brought basic infrastructure and services to existing shantytowns, regularized occupational status and allowed the occupants to build on their plots. From then on, the site is considered as integrated within the formal city. The best known operation is the Urban Development Project that integrated spatial and physical upgrading with social, economic or institutional improvements. This restructuring soon raised disputes, was called into question and was abandoned at the end of the 1980s. The central contentious issue concerned the quality of the final product – housing – as well as neighbourhoods.

The rapid evolution of legal urbanization around slums has generated strong pressures for their eradication. This pressure is sharply felt by the inhabitants and deepens the feelings of extreme marginalization. Cleaning up interventions, except for the recovered urban space ready for new urban development, does not achieve any improvement in housing conditions for the previous inhabitants. Confidence in resettlement as the perceived unique and best answer to the slum issue has entirely ceased during the last 15 years.

The only hope for Rabat-Salé lies in the steady promotion of regularization interventions, combined with massive basic infrastructure and services provision to underserved areas. This can only happen if Morocco is prepared to seriously step up its national- and local-level interventions in a holistic approach to urban poverty alleviation and to support social programmes that help slum inhabitants to emerge from their marginalization and societal exclusion. To achieve this, the general perception of slum dwellers has to be considerably improved nation-wide, and far greater emphasis must be given to participation and partnerships that involve all stakeholders and beneficiaries. Coherent urban policy must be promulgated as a start to creating a national system of urban governance that includes all sections of society.

RIO DE JANEIRO, BRAZIL

The history of Rio's slums is a long story of industrial and infrastructure development, high fertility rates and urbanization that persistently led to the displacement of the urban poor. Segregation initially took place in and along the

urban periphery, reinforced during the late 1920s by Rio's first urban plan. The 1930s and 1950s saw mass construction of cheap housing in the suburbs, away from the city and its infrastructure. From the 1950s onwards, the suburbs became so crowded that only swamps, mangrove areas, steep hills and riverbanks were left for occupation. Lack of affordable housing and of a suitable mass transportation system promoted the further spread of *favelas* all over Rio, and the eastern parts in particular. The 1960s saw massive slum clearance, notably for speculative construction. By the 1970s, 13 per cent of the city population lived in slums. The 1980s saw not much change other than the promotion of self-construction and improvement that would hopefully lead to regularization. Despite the development of a new municipal housing policy during the 1990s, the magnitude and complexity of the issues faced are so enormous that slum issues continue to increase, as does the socio-spatial segregation of Rio's poor.

Sub-normal settlements (*agglomerado subnormal*) are settlements with the following characteristics:

- Residential settlement with more than 50 inhabitants.
- Houses of precarious materials or raw appearance due to lack of external finishes.
- Houses built without legal permit on land owned by someone else or whose status is unknown.
- Houses built in areas deprived of official street names and numbering, lacking infrastructure and services.

Four types of slums are identified:

- 1 *Favelas*: these are highly consolidated residential areas of self-construction on invaded public and private land and without infrastructure. They exist in large numbers all over Rio.
- 2 *Loteamentos*: these comprise illegal subdivisions of land not in compliance with planning rules or infrastructure. They are considered irregular if submitted for regularization by the planning authorities and clandestine if they have not. They are located mainly in the eastern part of Rio.
- 3 *Invasões*: these consist of irregular occupation of public or private land still in the process of consolidation. They are frequently located on riverbanks, swamps, hills or in residual public areas, such as under viaducts and along roads throughout Rio.
- 4 *Cortiços*: these comprise social housing formed by one or more buildings located on a single plot, or shared rooms in a single building. The rooms are rented or sublet without contract. The dwellers share bathrooms, kitchen and sometimes even electrical appliances. Houses lack ventilation and lighting, they are frequently overcrowded, and one room may house many people while accommodating multiple uses. Services are deficient, and they are mainly located in the city centre.

Throughout the city, different types of illegality are often mixed, and it is difficult, in many cases, to recognize

boundaries. There is no specific data on slum tenure. However, most slums are illegal, leaving the inhabitants without secure tenure. In practice, however, eviction is a low risk and a lively real-estate sector operates within slums. There is no visible end to growth.

A number of significant slum programmes are currently operating. The Programa Favela-Bairro follows the basic approach of urbanizing *favelas* and, at the same time, promotes social programmes of health and education. It does not cover the construction of housing units – unless in cases of resettlement – and it is focused on the improvement of the social inclusion of neighbourhoods.

The recently launched *Programa de Arrendamento Residencial* (PAR) reserved about US\$1.1 billion for new dwellings in the metropolitan regions of Brazil. It supports public and public–private partnerships. Its key feature is the establishment of a 180-month rental contract, with an acquisition option, without interest.

State governments also have programmes of housing finance and urbanization. At the local government level, two types of private–public partnership can be discerned:

- 1 *Mobilization of municipal and community resources:* this encompasses local authority efforts to mobilize resources for low-income housing, and the use of small individual savings channelled through cooperatives and associations.
- 2 *Special funds:* these are created by local authorities with resources coming from (i) the municipal budget; (ii) urban instruments; (iii) national and state funds; (iv) payments and refunds of housing loans; and (v) mortgages given to housing projects.

Despite being innovative, programmes have been difficult to implement given:

- excessive and time-consuming administrative requirements;
- the exclusion of many potential candidates;
- lack of banks at the municipal level to speed up the process of resource mobilization; and
- difficulties for developers to use alternative technologies for sanitation, paving and housing.

The Favela-Bairro programme perhaps constitutes a best practice example in housing policy. Its innovative aspect is the introduction of social projects within the urbanization programme. By promoting articulation between several sectors of the municipal administration, it has managed to go forward in the required procedures for land ownership – one of the main demands of the population living in sub-normal settlements. The continuity of the programme will allow the improvement of some managerial aspects and structures, consolidating the key idea of integration between areas of social exclusion and the formal boroughs of the city – a segregation that is characteristic of the city at present.

SÃO PAULO, BRAZIL

São Paulo, a small trading town until the mid 19th century, slowly grew in importance through coffee exports. By the turn of the 20th century, the city was socially divided between the geographically high and low areas, with the wealthy in the higher central districts – the places of formal urban interventions – and the poor on the floodplains and along the railways.

Between 1930 and 1980, urbanization accelerated greatly, with an intense process of migration from the countryside, building on the existing socio-spatial segregation. At the end of the 1970s, the pattern of a wealthy centre and poor periphery began to change with, initially, different urban social groupings living in adjacent areas as a result of steadily growing numbers of poor migrants in all areas of the city. The ‘lost decade’ of the 1980s saw spiralling growth of shantytowns in the urban periphery, known as *favelas*, and inner-city slum tenements, known as *cortiços*. The *cortiço* was the dominating São Paulo slum type until the beginning of the 1980s, when the *favela* broke out of its traditional urban periphery confines and spread all over the city to become the new dominant type of slum. They did so by occupying just about every empty or unprotected urban lot and on lands where building is difficult, or of limited interest to the formal market. *Favelas* and *cortiços* have the following characteristics:

- *Favela:* these are agglomerations of dwellings with limited dimensions, built with inadequate materials (old wood, tin, cans and even cardboard) distributed irregularly in lots, almost always lacking urban and social services and equipment, and forming a complex social, economic, sanitary, educational and urban order.
- *Cortiço:* this is a unit used as a collective multifamily dwelling, totally or partially presenting the following characteristics: (i) made up of one or more buildings constructed on an urban lot; (ii) subdivided in several rented, sublet or ceded units on any ground whatsoever; (iii) several functions performed in the same room; (iv) common access and use of non-constructed spaces and sanitary installations; (v) in general, precarious circulation and infrastructure; and (vi) overcrowded population.

The *favela* is, in general, a squatter settlement type of accommodation – an owner-occupied structure located on an invaded lot and without security of tenure – while the *cortiço* is, generally, inner-city, dilapidated rental accommodation. The *cortiço*'s origin dates back to the 19th century as the *legal*, market alternative of popular housing. The *favela* is a much younger phenomenon and represents the *illegal* market alternative, utilizing invasion and squatting of open and unprotected lands. Unlike the *cortiço* dweller, who is subject to the laws of the market, to rent and to payment for services, *favela* dwellers are seen as having ‘an easy life’, not paying for anything.

The *favela* is largely owner-occupied, albeit often on squatted or invaded lands, whereas the *cortiço* is predominantly private-sector rental accommodation. Although figures depend upon the methodology applied, *favela* inhabitants now roughly outnumber *cortiço* dwellers at a rate of 3:1.

The industrial deconcentration of the 1980s caused medium-sized Brazilian cities to grow at rates much above those of the metropolises.⁵ In large metropolises, this caused lower central area population growth rates or even a decrease. The peripheral areas, however, continued to grow at almost double the national urban rate. São Paulo's transformation from an industrial into a service metropolis was responsible for considerable further economic and social polarization and a rapidly growing income gap between the richest and the poorest. This process continues to fuel the growth and emergence of *favelas* and, as a whole, tenure patterns are therefore changing accordingly.

Both *favelas* and *cortiços* are popularly seen as a space for the city's 'shady characters, bums, troublemakers and dirty'. The medical metaphors 'cancer' and 'wound' are recurrent. The prejudice is quite ingrained, especially among neighbours, who see their property devalued by the slum. The image of the São Paulo *favela* dweller is confused with that of the 'marginal' and not so much with the crook or trafficker, as, for instance, in Rio de Janeiro.

The year 1971 saw the establishment of the first overall master plan for São Paulo, intended to establish guidelines for all municipal policies and urban zoning. The plan, however, did not cater for the peripheral areas, effectively excluding thousands from planning and public investments. A 1988 constitutional amendment expanded municipal decentralization and autonomy. However, in the face of insufficient national and federal fund disbursements to the local level, this had comparatively little impact. The latter is, moreover, the case as highly polarized local-level politics – with often opposing public policy priorities – tend to cancel each other out.

The *favelas*, however, had emerged during the 1970s as a target for limited public policy. Nevertheless, this largely involved cheap voter-drawing attempts rather than structurally addressing the issues. During the early 1990s, the *favelas* for the first time became the target of widespread action with a programme that served 41,000 families in its first two years. In the programme's ten-year existence, some US\$322 million was invested. The *cortiço*, however, did not see any similar attention until recently when the central area real-estate price recovered and profitable activities started in these areas.

Currently, a new action plan for *favelas* is being implemented, which aims to reach 52,000 slum dwellers in the next three years with legalization of tenure and upgrading of slum areas, and to network with other social programmes.

The impact of all of these efforts is multiple, although not always convergent, and very little evaluated. It is therefore difficult to find out what their real impacts are. Programmes are frequently paralysed by changes in public administration and subsequent policy swings. Additionally,

neither state nor federal investments in poverty reduction reach São Paulo for technical reasons. Public policies conducted in highly unequal and polarized countries such as Brazil produce their own conflicts, tensions and impasses, since a common development project for all social classes is no longer easily visualized.

SYDNEY, AUSTRALIA

Since the 1840s, Sydney's housing development has historically followed a cyclical pattern of booms – in which large areas of poor quality housing were hastily erected on vacant land – and busts, in which poverty and misery combined with rapidly deteriorating and unserviced housing to create traditional slum areas. The first economic and population boom during the 1850s was followed by a depression during the 1860s, in which Sydney's first large slum areas emerged.

From 1906, the resident population began to fall in inner-city slum areas and some areas were razed to make way for commercially profitable redevelopments, especially factories and warehouses. Secondary employment centres began to be constructed further afield as the city expanded. The post-World War II wave of assisted immigration tripled Sydney's population within 50 years. Huge new, sprawling single-family homes in suburban areas were built, assisted by housing loans at concessional interest rates, and home-ownership rates soared to 70 per cent by 1960. The construction of urban services at these low densities was expensive and providers had a great deal of trouble keeping up. By 1970, it appeared that the whole inner-city area would be completely redeveloped for business purposes and that the working-class inhabitants would be displaced. However, inner-city areas with their historical precincts came to be seen as better located and more colourful than suburbia, and most inner-city slum areas were steadily redeveloped, sometimes by building new houses, but more often by refurbishing. The wave of gentrification spread south over the next 30 years to encompass much of the south Sydney local government area, though improvement has been patchy and still eludes some areas. Land became too expensive for industry and much of it has relocated to the outer west. The century-long population flow out of the inner areas has reversed: between 1995 and 2000, the population of Sydney's inner suburbs grew by an average of 15 per cent each year, which was among the fastest growth rates in the country.

There is no official definition of slums. The term is regarded as offensive and is rarely used. Three types of area with relatively dilapidated housing are considered:

- 1 Inner-city former slums, now partly gentrified.
- 2 Extensive public-sector estates toward the periphery.
- 3 Areas with cheap housing, centred about 20 kilometres to the south-west of the central business district (CBD), where many new immigrants and other disadvantaged groups live.

Accommodation in the inner areas are mostly private rental, though with an increasing proportion of homeowners and some public housing. The estates are primarily public housing, with some 'right-to-buy' ownership and private rental. In some places, housing associations are becoming established. The immigrant areas have a good proportion of home-ownership and public housing, but private rental is increasing.

Apart from a few run-down suburban blocks and areas, Sydney no longer has any slums as is normally conceived, although there are many areas where disadvantaged people live in high concentrations. Its traditional inner-city slum areas have moved from squalor to mixed-income status, with high proportions both of advantaged and disadvantaged people and culturally disparate groups. The city is shaped by multiculturalism and a fairly profound spatial separation of social and income groups – mediated through globalization – through which the slums of the future might possibly emerge. There are large deteriorating tracts of poorly maintained public housing estates near the outskirts that form the focus of most social interventions for the disadvantaged. To the south-west of Sydney stretch some 60 kilometres of flat suburban sprawl, standing in sharp contrast to the wealth and privilege of the northern suburbs. Here, the bulk of population increase is taking place, where the new immigrants increasingly settle, and the disadvantaged can find affordable housing and support mechanisms. The city is fairly clearly dividing between a 'new economy' around the CBD area, and an 'old economy' of poor households ringed by suburban families to the west.

During the 1980s and 1990s, the gap between the rich and the poor widened considerably, although in absolute terms everyone was better off. With regard to the three 'slum' types:

- 1 Despite gentrification and the impact of higher income or shared professional households, low-income people still live in significant concentrations in inner Sydney. It is the middle class and families that are absent in their usual numbers.
- 2 Market rent policies have caused average incomes to fall rapidly in the old public housing estates, and most people are on pensions and benefits. Single mothers are particularly prevalent.

- 3 Ethnic groups improve their status with time and move to better suburbs, so that successive waves of new immigrants tend to occupy the cheapest housing – currently, Vietnamese, Lebanese and Somalis. Studies have shown no essential difference between second-generation immigrants and the general population.

The two major governmental housing programmes are public housing (mostly post-1945) and rent assistance (since the late 1980s), as well as very large programmes of concessional housing loans to lower middle-income groups from 1945 to 1990 – although these have become less necessary due to low interest rates and secondary mortgage markets. From the late 1970s, public housing became 'welfare housing' and is now restricted almost entirely to the most disadvantaged groups, who are heavily subsidized. During the late 1980s, it became obvious that public housing construction was never going to keep up with increasing demand, and that the majority of disadvantaged people would remain in the private rental sector. Rent assistance has become the largest housing programme, with national outlays of about US\$700 million, compared with US\$550 million for public housing. Housing policy has been in something of an impasse for a decade, with the Commonwealth unwilling to take responsibility for the public housing deficit from the states (which would enable the states to expand the stock).

The marginalization of public housing has resulted in many social problems on the larger estates, and the lack of rent-paying middle-class households has reduced operational funds below the level required for sustainability. Almost no new public housing is being constructed in Sydney, with capital funds now devoted to upgrading existing estates. In the meantime, with continuing work-force restructuring, family breakdown and population ageing contributing to polarization, the demand for public housing continues to grow. Some joint ventures with the private sector to build more affordable housing have been tried, but these have been small scale. Cooperation between tenants and a housing association in one estate to police social problems and improve run-down housing has reduced social problems considerably. Joint programmes between state departments of housing, health, education and social welfare to provide a comprehensive improvement strategy for problem areas are taking place.

NOTES

1 However, the following circumstantial indications may be helpful. With a labour force growth rate of 3 per cent due to the large youth bulge in the population pyramid now reaching working age, it must be assumed that household formation is perhaps also in the

region of 3 per cent. As the informal sector absorbs about half of the city's labour, and while this percentage is growing, the indications perhaps hint at a new possible growth in informal settlement formation.

2 The goal was eventually to make housing free.

3 Although the segregation by ethnicity was government sanctioned, there are indications that, at least initially, there was also a voluntary cultural segregation.

4 All of those households covered in the rapid survey except one were renting.

5 Between 100,000 and 500,000 inhabitants.