DARFUR:

PROFILE OF EL FASHER TOWN AND ABU SHOUK IDP CAMP
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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 Amid the gloom that pervades reports on Darfur and the decimation imposed on the lives and livelihoods of its people through conflict and constant threats, this report seeks to identify ways of operating and ways of enhancing people’s lives, despite the difficulties. Of course, serious commitment is required by all sectors of society – supported by the international community – to make positive things happen. But it is doable, presenting a real opportunity to challenge the doubters and thwart the efforts of authoritarian factions and rebel groups to keep people down.

The focus of this report is on El Fasher town and nearby camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs), particularly Abu Shouk. While there are links to the rural sector, the emphasis is on the urban environment, with the argument that it offers a greater opportunity for success at this time. The report encourages the United Nations (UN) and humanitarian operation to take greater risks by adding a longer-term perspective to present recovery programmes, while acknowledging that some non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are already pursuing this route.

The opportunities identified and the recommendations presented are believed to be achievable within a three-year time frame. The recommendations are divided into the following categories: Employment, Food Security, Income Generation, and Health/Environment (not including direct health interventions). Before these are addressed however, it is strongly advised that support structures are created in the form of an overall urban partnership (described in detail on page 25) and sectoral partnerships, as well as a clear capacity-strengthening method through the Asset-based Community Development approach. The concept of a specific foundation for Darfur is briefly presented, as is the need for the development of appropriate government policies to assist in the implementation of the recommendations.

RECOMMENDATIONS IN BRIEF:

Employment
There is no available employment data in the state, but according to the Office of Employment and Vocational Training in El Fasher, the registered number of employment seekers in 2007 was 5,334, most of whom were graduates of higher educational institutions. Of this number, NGOs employed 303 and government offices employed 800. This leaves about 80 percent for which there are no records, but it is assumed that they either are casual labourers or are unemployed.

Employment strategies are proposed through Recommendations 3, 7, and 8 – Appropriate Technology for Construction and Building Materials; Development of an Urban Refuse Collection Programme; and Rehabilitation and Equipping of the Vocational Training Centre.

Food Security
Lack of affordable food is an ongoing problem, which has been exacerbated by World Food Programme’s reduction in food aid distributions due to insecurity and soaring prices. Drought has delayed crop harvests, while many traditional farmers and livestock owners have sought other means of living, reducing local produce. Transport costs, demand for payment by different groups, and government taxes on transport companies have also driven prices up.

Food security strategies are proposed through Recommendations 4, 5, and 6 – Food Security (land allocation, construction of catchment dams, seeds, and equipment), Small Animal Restocking, and Development of a Poultry Production System.

Income Generation
Rising costs, insufficient jobs, and limited access to credit and loans are backing people into an economic corner; opportunities need to be created to assist them to lift themselves up. Options are presented to enable people to move away from dependency on aid, provide opportunities for the underemployed or unemployed, and promote small businesses.

Income generation strategies are proposed through Recommendations 3, 5, 6, and 9 – Appropriate Technology for Construction and Building Materials; Small Animal Restocking; Development of a Poultry Production System; and Development of the Microfinance Programme.

Health/Environment
An expanded and improved refuse collection system is required to address a growing environmental problem in El Fasher. Heaps of rubbish are piling up and the present municipality mechanism cannot cope. Water for human consumption is inadequate and the network only serves about 40 percent of the
town’s population. The price of water exceeds what many can afford, even for basic daily needs. Water distributed without charge to the IDP camps is then sold by IDPs to town dwellers; this has caused difficulties for water vendors, who depend on town sales for their income.

Health-related strategies are proposed through Recommendations 7 and 10 – Development of an Urban Refuse Collection Programme and Accessible Water for All Urban Residents.

Local government revenue is an essential part of developing a sustainable service delivery system, but departments face serious financial deficits and support from the central government is insufficient. In addition, insecurity has prevented external investment and has seriously affected trade. Some of the recommendations presented offer opportunities over the next few years to increase revenue, specifically through access to more agricultural land, the introduction of tax on refuse collection, and water charges to an increased number of consumers.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This study was commissioned by UN-HABITAT and the team would like to thank Dan Lewis and his staff for their support throughout the study process. Thanks are also due to the group of assistants who helped the study team. They were identified by Dr. Abduljabbar Abdullah Fadul, to whom the team is very thankful. The team is also grateful to Karen Moore of UNOCHA and Mohamed Siddig Suliman of Practical Action for their tremendous support and assistance.

Thanks must be extended to the interviewees from the numerous agencies and government departments and especially to the townspeople of El Fasher and the IDPs of Abu Shouk camp who made themselves available and contributed greatly by providing information and ideas.

The hardship that so many people in Darfur are facing is clear for all to see, but their resilience is extraordinary and presents much hope for an end to the conflict; continued and innovative support will see them one day prosper.

METHODOLOGY

The study was intent on obtaining a balanced approach to collecting data and opinions from the townspeople of El Fasher and the IDPs (mainly from Abu Shouk camp). It was important to ascertain the level of interdependency between the two communities while recognizing that the humanitarian aid programme is primarily aimed at the displaced population. The information was collected through desk research, interviews, and discussions. While seeking opinions from people from various backgrounds was part of this approach, it also encouraged people to come forward with ideas they believe could help improve their livelihoods and generally enhance the town. To this end, IDPs from Abu Shouk presented the team with written proposals based on their priorities.

There was a secondary objective to this study: creating a community development component designed to utilize and capitalize on the existing skills of people on the ground and use these to further train others, who would become a local resource for the many agencies and bodies conducting research in Darfur. The first step was to identify between four and six consultants or experienced individuals who were based in either Khartoum or Darfur and form a team to conduct the profiling. They would be supported by the external consultants to identify and train study assistants who would then become the aforementioned local resource. Seven local experts were identified over the course of two missions. However, due to time delays the profiling started later than expected, and three members of the original team could not participate and had to be replaced.

In total, 14 study assistants were identified, 9 in El Fasher and 5 in Nyala. They worked together with the team and did very well, though they need ongoing training and work to hone their skills.

Each section of the following report was researched by a team member. These were then compiled by Brian Nugent and Sonia Zambakides, who were commissioned directly by UN-HABITAT to coordinate and produce this piece of work.
The purpose of this study is to examine and propose economic opportunities for residents of El Fasher and Abu Shouk IDP camp to enhance their income and livelihoods through developing existing enterprises and offering new avenues for people who have given up their traditional way of life due to the conflict. It seeks to highlight opportunities for the international community to gradually move into recovery mode while being aware that the ongoing insecurity and frailty of the Darfur situation necessitates a cautionary transition. The study also hopes to strengthen local capacity by identifying local researchers and study assistants who could be a resource for the many consultants assessing, researching, and studying Darfur on a regular basis.

In order to come to workable, achievable solutions and recommendations, a profile of a number of sectors was carried out through desk research and individual and group interviews in the selected areas. The team identified and trained nine university graduates to assist in data collection and conducting interviews.

The study tried to access information on most sectors, excluding health and education. There was clearly more information available for some sectors than others, but the data nevertheless provided a comprehensive picture of the situation that people in the town and camp face on a day-to-day basis.

Conclusions suggest that humanitarian aid programmes have had both positive and negative outcomes. The initiatives are positive in that lives have been saved while health, income generation, and education projects continue to benefit people. The negative outcomes include the movement of some townspeople into the camps to access free distributions, the rise in commodity prices and house rents, and the phenomenon of highly qualified people taking security guard jobs with international agencies for the relatively high salary.

There needs to be a conscious decision on the part of UN agencies to shift into recovery mode while maintaining emergency preparedness. In the unlikely event that the UN operations ceased in the next three years, for example, what would remain that is truly sustainable?

Ten recommendations are proposed, with achievable outputs and realistic financial inputs. Delivering a plethora of recommendations might have resulted in confusion and demanded resources that are not available. Each recommendation focuses on at least one of the following themes:

- Capacity strengthening
- Appropriate building materials
- Employment
- Skills training
- Microfinance development and enterprise
- Food security
- Water
- Policy

There is also an overall recommendation to develop “real” strategic partnerships on both a sectoral basis and a wider basis in order to encourage the integration of assets and mutual responsibility for development.
1. INTRODUCTION

There is a sign written on a wall in El Fasher that reads: “Working Together For One Goal Our Sudan.”

Evidence from discussions, interviews, and observations, as well as information from numerous reports, would clearly indicate that there is no sense of “working together”, no semblance of “one goal” or common purpose, and a distinct lack of commitment to one region, not to mention one country. At the time of writing, the Justice and Equality Movement had just made an assault on Khartoum and insecurity in Darfur continued to be of grave concern. It is within this context that the international community, local organizations, local communities, and local government officials strive to make things happen.

The following report is a sectoral profiling of El Fasher town in North Darfur. This town of fewer than 200,000 people prior to the conflict has swollen to over 500,000; some were fleeing to safety in the wake of the fighting, while others left drought-prone areas to seek financial security in an urban setting. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) number approximately 150,000 in three large camps that surround the town; thousands more live in the town, most with relatives.

Surveys and research reports on Darfur make for very depressing reading. While the international efforts have indeed contributed significantly to saving lives and maintaining people with the basic requirements in a camp environment, report after report illustrates a decline in water tables, forests, grazing areas, infrastructure, job opportunities, household income, and household assets. They also highlight serious capacity issues at local government levels, which are exacerbated by insufficient revenue to tackle infrastructural and social needs.

Strong links have developed between El Fasher and the camps in proximity to the town. The report takes an in-depth look at Abu Shouk camp and analyses the interdependency evolving between the two areas.

This report will not seek to repeat what is in other reports, but will use information available from other sources to look for ways of illustrating possibilities in an appropriate and workable context. The financial resources and manpower required to “fix” Darfur would be monumental; therefore, the methods used to collectively engender relative prosperity, progress, and hope must be manageable.

While referring to and presenting information on a range of sectors, this report will focus on the income that can be derived from these sectors. Analysis will be done on the basis of where people are now; speculation as to how many IDPs will return and when will be left to others to estimate. The report will of course refer to a number of studies conducted over the last few years and will especially seek to complement important work done by other researchers, including Margie Buchanan-Smith and Dr. Abdul Jabbar Abdulla Fadule in their report entitled Trade and Markets in Darfur: Adaptation and Devastation.

1.1 EL FASHER TOWN

With an estimated population of over 500,000 people, El Fasher is the capital city and economic hub of North Darfur. It is a busy urban centre with hundreds of small taxis, horse-drawn carts hauling drums of water for sale, and donkeys transporting goods and sacks of water for domestic consumption. Trucks from Khartoum and other distant places are stacked high with all sorts of commodities. The main roads within the town are tarmac, while all of the side roads are dirt and sand. Most humanitarian agencies operating in the region rent offices and accommodation in El Fasher, and the influx of agencies has raised rents significantly. Water and electricity are supplied to about 40 percent of the town.

1.2 ABU SHOUK IDP CAMP

Abu Shouk was the only IDP camp we could visit during this time of the study, as insecurity prevented travelling to outer camps. With a population of 54,000 people (13,000 families), of which 12,000 are under 5 years of age, this camp lies on the edge of El Fasher town. It has existed since 2003, and while all such camps are “temporary”, offering shelter and protection during times of turmoil and danger, this camp has all the makings of a town: children go to school, men go off each day to tend to their land or trade in the town, young people do casual work, and women make bricks, work in the camp’s market, or do domestic work in houses in El Fasher.
International agencies provide food, non-food items, and water, which are traded, sold, consumed, or used to pay debts. While agencies work five-day weeks organizing distributions and running numerous medical and social programmes, local traditional structures are in place, with 14 omadas (tribal leaders) governing and organizing the camp and addressing specific issues.

This report will not discuss whether the camp’s population will return to their original homes or not, but what is obvious is that many have found a new daily routine and way of life. This is not to paint a rosy picture of camp life – women risk being assaulted as they venture out for firewood and farmers risk their lives and their produce as they travel long distances to tend to their farms. But the question needs to be asked: what do people believe are the greater risks?

1.3 LINKS BETWEEN EL FASHER TOWN AND ABU SHOUK CAMP

Links between the town and the camp will be elaborated throughout this report, but it is important to highlight early on that there are areas of significant difference and areas of commonality between the two.

Camp’s Population
- Traditionally rural dwellers, agriculturalists, and livestock owners.
- Now displaced due to insecurity.
- Receive free services.
- Live in temporary accommodation.
- Do not pay taxes.
- Have lost most of their assets.

Town’s Population
- Traditionally urban dwellers, business people, and traders (including trade in livestock and crops).
- Have businesses that are affected by insecurity.
- Pay for all their goods.
- Pay for all their services.
- Pay a range of taxes.
- Have assets in the form of property, businesses, etc.

The townspeople claim that the aid the IDPs receive is damaging their businesses. Urban water sellers cannot compete with water delivered free to the camp; many town residents travel out to the camps to buy the water for consumption or reselling in the town. Many other relief items can be purchased from markets in the camps and the town. Many El Fasher residents (though the figure was not possible to ascertain) who have relatives in the camps have left their homes, registered as IDPs, and taken up residence in the camps. They thus can rent out their urban houses, receive free commodities, and avoid paying taxes.

2. BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND CONTEXT

2.1 GENERAL SITUATION ASSESSMENT

After five years of conflict, the situation in Darfur continues to be fragile and unpredictable. The security situation in all three states remains unstable and the conflict’s impact continues to be framed according to the demographical and political context of the region. The central conflict is often characterized as beginning with the 2003 rebellion against the central government by the Justice and Equality Movement and the Sudanese Liberation Army. This portrayal represents the government as the oppressor of non-Arabs, who seek an equitable distribution of resources. However, those who are familiar with the Sahel region of sub-Saharan Africa in general and the Darfur region specifically would suggest that this analysis is simplistic. In fact, the oral history of the Darfur conflict suggests that the militias (the so-called Janjaweed) migrated from neighbouring countries during the famines of the 1980s.

Desertification pushes the Sahel further south and this encroachment creates a shortage of grazing areas and induces migration. This natural phenomenon suggests that drought, famine, migration, and internal displacement are both environmental and historical. It is the combination of these factors that make Darfur such a vulnerable and unique area. But it will be shown that despite these frailties, the resourcefulness of the population is tremendous as they work hard to eke out a living in a sea of adversity.

2.2 HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Geography
Darfur is located in the western part of Sudan in an area between the 10th and 16th degree latitude and
the 22nd and 30th degree longitude, covering an area of 510,888 square kilometres. It is surrounded by three countries (Chad, Libya, and Central African Republic) and four Sudanese states. This location has given the region strategic and economic significance. Although western Sudan is sub-Saharan, there are three climates that affect the region: semi-desert in the north; semi-mountainous (Jebal Marra Mountains); and savannah in the south and west.

**Demography**

There are more than 160 tribes in Darfur, most of whom speak local languages and have their own culture, norms, traditions, and features. These elements have played an integral part in Darfur’s old and recent history. The region’s old kingdoms did experience stability and prosperity for more than 430 years.

**2.3 POPULATION PROFILE AND BREAKDOWN**

**The 1993 Darfur Census**

Until the new census is completed (it was to take place in April 2008), the only official Darfur population figures are from the last census (1993) and the United Nations (UN). According to the 1993 census, the region’s population is 4,638,209. According to the UN Humanitarian Profile January 2008, the population of El Fasher town is 539,734.

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) reports clearly show how the deterioration of the security situation increased the number of displaced people in the camps. OCHA estimates that the current number of IDPs is 2.4 million.

The population of El Fasher and the three nearby IDP camps is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town</th>
<th>Abu Shouk</th>
<th>Zamzam</th>
<th>Al Salaam</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>539,734</td>
<td>54,141</td>
<td>45,895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>48,788</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The population of the 3 camps is 148,824, but it is important to note that within El Fasher town it is estimated that an additional 34,418 IDPs reside (UNOCHA). To all intents and purposes, the town and camps are separate entities and treated as such in many ways (policies, planning, livelihoods, etc.), as the camps are assumed to be temporary. Nevertheless, many informal links have developed and areas of interdependency have emerged, economic ones. These ties will likely only be undone by actions such as the forced closure of camps.

**2.4 POLITICAL CONTEXT AND SECURITY**

The political conflict in Darfur is deeply rooted in history. Although the various movements in Darfur often disagree, they all confirm that the main reason for the recent conflict was marginalization and neglect by the central government.

**Political Affiliations**

Darfurians attribute the development of the modern political history of the region to two Darfurian political figures, namely Ahmed Diraige and Dr. Ali Elhaj. They are regarded as the founders of the first Darfurian political identity, a Sunni organization, after independence. This movement of an independent party did not continue for long as the two leaders joined the Umma and the Muslim Brothers Parties. Darfurian elders believe that some of those early Darfurian elites were “bought by Jalaba political leaders and parties for personal gains” and recently some are said to be “hiding in Justice and Equality Movement to reproduce [a National Islamic Front] era in Darfur”. The majority of those who are now involved in the current conflict still support and have loyalty to the Umma party and the disagreement within the Umma party across the country creates disagreements in Darfur as well.

**2.5 POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS**

The current conflict erupted with fighting between two main opposition groups and the Government of Sudan. The Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army and the Justice and Equality Movement, a faction of the Sudanese Liberation Movement, began to fight against government-supported militia groups collectively known as Janjaweed. This fighting intensified in the three states of Darfur and insecurity steadily increased until the Darfur-based Sudanese Liberation Movement attacked government military forces at El Fasher on 24 and 25 April 2003.

Hundreds of thousands of people have been forced to flee their homes since the fighting broke out, while the situation of women and children has become particularly desperate. The United Nations estimated that as a result up to 600,000 people have been displaced by the conflict.
The military groups started as allies, but disagreements appeared in May 2006. The groups differed over the Darfur Peace Agreement, which only some groups signed. This brought the disintegration of the overall movement and led to new political developments. After the agreement, the conflict took on tribal overtones; the conflict moved to the camps as they became divided according to political affiliation. The signatories of the peace agreement were targeted by non-signatories, and this developed into a conflict between the Zaghawa and Fur tribes. The camps around El Fasher were directly affected as IDPs started to move to areas dominated by their tribe. Moreover, in 2007 the conflict started to move to the Arab tribes in South Darfur, with fighting subsequently emerging between tribes.

2.6 ADMINISTRATION DEVELOPMENT BETWEEN 1937 AND 2004

2.6.1 Colonization
During colonialism, the districts were divided into provinces based on the hakura system, with special tribal consideration. Designated authorities controlled the districts, and provinces were divided into councils. These councils were further divided into rural areas, cities, and localities.

2.6.2 Independence
Independence was gained on 1 January 1956. After independence, international consultants studied the structure and established the Administrative Law in Sudan, which led in turn to a more decentralized system.

2.6.3 Decentralization
Local public law established the public council executive to administer the cities’ councils and the rural areas. The main purpose was apparently to increase the participation of local communities in the councils’ structure. Darfur was divided into North and South Darfur under the following structure:

```
South
4 councils, 1 city council, 19 locality councils, and 8 village councils

North
El Geneina
8 councils, 14 rural councils, 46 locality councils, and 418 village councils

El Fasher
```

2.6.4 Federal System
The federal system was later introduced and the entire country was divided into six regions. In 1993, Darfur was divided into three states. The Federal Law of 2003 was established, and many localities and provinces were abolished. The new law established the following structure for the three states:

- South Darfur: nine localities
- North Darfur: seven localities
- West Darfur: seven localities

The new decentralization structure limited community participation and subjected participation to constitutional and legislative conditions. The local community leaders and Darfurian politicians tend to ignore much of this legislation, as their role in the administration is limited. The situation minimizes central support for building local infrastructure in the states, resulting in the states relying on their own resources.

2.6.5 IDP Camp Administration Structure
The IDP camps have developed a new administrative structure to facilitate and coordinate activities: the local community leaders and aid workers collaborate in the management of camp activities. The Humanitarian Aid Commission is the government body that is supposed to facilitate and support aid workers, but the IDPs reject the presence of the commission in most of the camps and are reluctant to collaborate with them. Consequently, the tribal and community leaders have a significant influence on the administration inside the camp.

2.7 CONFLICT AND THE INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE

After 5 years of conflict, it is estimated that 2.5 million people have become displaced and as many as 4.5 million people in Darfur and eastern Chad rely upon some form of humanitarian assistance. The initial humanitarian response came through the formation of camps that provided water, food, sanitation, education, healthcare, and basic necessities. However, these have been extended to include the management of natural resources and income-generating activities.

Since the crisis emerged in 2003, the international response has had different approaches. The political process for peace negotiations and civilian protection has been conducted in parallel with the aid delivery process. UN agencies and international and national non-governmental organizations (NGOs) work in partnership and within a construct that coordinates the response. UNOCHA is the coordination body for all the humanitarian operations in the region; in
the Darfur Humanitarian Profile of March 2008, it stated that the number of aid workers in Darfur has risen to over 14,000, representing 860 organizations. Despite many constraints, major epidemics continue to be avoided and vaccination campaigns have been implemented successfully. There are also successful supportive projects in the areas of agriculture, livelihoods, psychosocial support, and capacity building.

The continuing insecurity, however, has resulted in population movement and a general deterioration in living conditions. Malnutrition rates have increased this year, and the results of the Annual Food Security and Nutrition Survey showed a malnutrition rate of 16 percent among the conflict-affected populations. For the first time since 2004, the rates are above the emergency threshold of 15 percent. This is in contrast to the expanded humanitarian programmes that indicate increased access to safe water, improved waste disposal systems, and lower mortality rates. Food security remains the major humanitarian problem, with only 30 percent of the conflict-affected people considered to be food self-sufficient. Most disturbingly, the Darfur Humanitarian Profile of January 2008 stated that the end-of-year harvest will be below expectations due to general insecurity and crop failure. As a result, more Darfurians than usual will be entirely dependent on food aid from as early as January 2008. At the time of writing, the World Food Programme (WFP) had cut its rations by 50 percent as a result of trucks being stolen and staff being abducted (and in some cases killed). This will have a significant negative impact on nutrition levels, particularly in the rural areas.

The NGOs play a significant role in reporting on the consequences of the conflict and the deterioration of the security situation. According to OCHA, humanitarian access in Darfur is primarily determined by a combination of two factors:

- The degree of general insecurity, which may require the United Nations and other humanitarian partners to suspend or limit operations in areas deemed unsafe for a certain amount of time.
- Random targeted attacks on humanitarians and their assets, including the hijacking of cars and abduction of personnel, physical violence directed towards humanitarians, and ambushes and armed break-ins aimed at humanitarian compounds.

In principle, and in accordance with the communiqué between the Government of Sudan and the United Nations, the humanitarian response in general and the delivery of relief and recovery assistance in particular, is a partnership. This is to say that a sustained and timely response to the humanitarian needs of Darfur requires positive collaboration and coordination between the two parties. An example of this collaboration is the 2008 Sudan Work Plan. The plan, developed by the Government of Sudan and UN agencies, outlines both humanitarian needs and recovery activities. The intended purpose is to inform and direct the humanitarian response in Darfur.

This report too wishes to inform the humanitarian response and is keen to encourage a greater focus on recovery programmes, while continuing emergency interventions where and when needed only, not because they may be written into a time frame. While it is understandable that the IDP population depends on humanitarian aid, this dependency is spreading throughout the urban society of El Fasher. This impact needs to be noted, and alternative operations should be explored that build on existing assets and maintain the traditional coping mechanisms that have seen Darfurians survive terrible hardships over many years.

In the examination of the consequences of the war on livelihoods in the table below, it is interesting to note the effect also of the humanitarian aid programme on the El Fasher area over the last five years. Table 1 identifies assets under 6 headings, and while it is not exhaustive it demonstrates areas of concern and the need for redress.

While some people have received very tangible benefits, the majority of people have been negatively affected by conflict, drought, the inability to travel, increasing commodity prices, and poor services. Women-headed households, youth, the unskilled, those with disabilities, and the aged — both in the town and camp — depend on assistance, either through international aid or through neighbours and families. The international community will not be around forever, and if a clear, constructive, and workable recovery programme is not put in place, the consequences will be grave.
### Table 1: Post-war Consequences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resources or Assets</th>
<th>Negative Post-war Consequences</th>
<th>Positive Post-war Consequences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human Capital</td>
<td>Loss of livelihoods and dependency on aid for many</td>
<td>Improved and new livelihoods for many</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brain drain to Khartoum and elsewhere</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dimension drain to Khartoum and elsewhere</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Humanitarian organizations employing highly qualified people in positions such as guards</td>
<td>Humanitarian organizations paying relatively high salaries to employees and supporting families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Impact of war on schools will seriously affect next generation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increased town population by approximately 200 percent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Large numbers of marginalized people, including those living with HIV/AIDS, the elderly, and the disabled</td>
<td>Much awareness raising carried out by UN agencies and NGOs, particularly on HIV/AIDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Capital</td>
<td>Many traditional forms of income, especially related to agriculture and livestock, have disappeared</td>
<td>As a result of the humanitarian programme, new businesses have flourished, particularly those related to property, construction, and haulage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Financial loan terms are unfavourable, as loans are regarded as extremely risky in Darfur</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Remittances have been reduced as the means of transferring money have been negatively affected</td>
<td>The aid programme is estimated to account for two-thirds of El Fasher's economy (Note: this has contributed to increasing the level of dependency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reliance on imported commodities</td>
<td>The readiness of the international community to pay extremely high rents has increased the price of materials and rents generally, resulting in increased hardship for poor people</td>
<td>Numbers employed in humanitarian organizations, haulage and taxi businesses, and the service industry increasing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Traditional jobs lost</td>
<td>IDP businesses do not pay taxes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Serious tax anomalies affecting urban businesses, livestock owners, and traders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Capital</td>
<td>IDPs have few assets of worth (apart from land, which they are separated from)</td>
<td>Some people within the town have gained assets (particularly property and vehicles, but also basic household items) not previously available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Traditional livestock keepers have lost huge numbers of animals and still lose them today as payment to rebel groups to allow access</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The yield for crop farmers is much less and many harvests are stolen by rebel groups</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructural Capital</td>
<td>Routes between urban centres are insecure</td>
<td>El Fasher roads are being maintained and paved roads are being extended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Water supply is insufficient for El Fasher's population</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Buildings in poor repair</td>
<td>Offices and rented houses being refurbished</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Vocational training centre is unused and in need of renovation</td>
<td>No local training structure is in place; training is implemented by international agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Capital</td>
<td>Cultural norms affected</td>
<td>Many local community-based organizations have been established; women and youth groups have been formed in the camps and town</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Youth are reluctant to return to traditional livelihoods, but few alternatives are available</td>
<td>More opportunities have been created for women to work for improved wages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government health and education services are poor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Natural Resource Capital</td>
<td>Depleted forests</td>
<td>Soil is available for a limited period of time for brick making (short-term gain, long-term environmental loss)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reduction in the water table</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Environmental degradation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Depleted grazing land</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
3. ECONOMY

The Darfur emergency and recovery operation is currently the largest humanitarian operation in the world. Throughout the three states there are over 14,000 aid workers engaged in directly supporting a displaced community of up to 2.5 million.

Retail sales are soaring in El Fasher, including trade in a diverse range of edible and inedible imported items, such as fruits, oils, and electronic and other goods. With an estimated 500 international staff and up to 3,000 local residents employed by international agencies, their demand for food, water, and electricity has grown alongside the demands of an expanded local population. Many of the international UN staff receive allowances of USD 160 per day, making them a huge financial force. A major high-rise building is under construction to accommodate a shopping mall, the tallest building in western Sudan and Darfur. Rental prices have skyrocketed since 2003, with monthly charges of up to USD 5,000 for a home or office. The number of petrol stations has tripled since 2003. Plots that were previously sold within the city council boundary for around USD 1,000 are now worth USD 15,000. This used to be a busy yet subsistence-based market town; it is now a bustling capital on which many people rely for livelihood security, even though this is based on a shallow foundation of what is essentially a false economy.

3.1 UNEMPLOYMENT

There is no available employment data in the state, but according to the Office of Employment and Vocational Training in El Fasher, the registered number of employment seekers in the year 2007 was 5,334, most of whom were graduates of higher educational institutions. Of this number, 303 were employed by NGOs and 800 by government offices. This leaves about 80 percent for which there are no records — it is assumed that they either are casual labourers or are unemployed.

After 2004, many people with experience in agriculture- and livestock-related work were forced by the security situation to turn to casual work in towns. In addition, according to IDPs interviewed in Abu Shouk Camp, once someone is identified as an IDP, they are given less consideration for permanent job opportunities.

Based on discussions with shop owners, business people, and youth in El Fasher, many young people do not want to follow family business traditions and instead envision travelling to Khartoum for employment or seeking work with international organizations. This reveals a lack of faith in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The continuing violence meanwhile results in short-term planning and highlights the apparent futility of planting roots in El Fasher or any other part of Darfur.

3.2 SKILLS

Skilled persons are leaving local businesses and public jobs in favour of employment with UN agencies and NGOs. There are no clear capacity-building strategies being devised by the state government. Also, there is no training budget in place. According to two senior technical skills educators at a secondary school, there is no budget for training and no definite curriculum on which to depend. They therefore rely on their own skills, which often are limited. There is no vocational centre operating at the moment; the building in El Fasher that was constructed for this purpose is lying dormant. This building offers potential for development, which will be discussed later.

3.3 BUSINESS

Businessmen interviewed in El Fasher were very disgruntled about the direct taxes and indirect payments they are expected to make, while IDPs have no such burden.

One of the interviewees, a haulier who carries goods from Omdurman to El Fasher, complained that he frequently has to increase prices, as he is expected to pay SDG 500 per truckload to the government and many other payments along the route to rebel groups. People are complaining about the price increases, and he fears he will be put out of business. Another added that while there is a huge demand for building materials at present, he is making less profit in 2008 than he made in 1998. Nevertheless, haulage and construction (house building particularly) are two of the more profitable business areas. While more people are getting into the contracting business or coming from other locations to take advantage of demand, there are few who have a reputation for quality. The calibre of artisans’ work is often questionable and requires addressing.
It should be noted that El Fasher has many advantages over other populated areas in Darfur. Its large international community has created opportunities for shopkeepers to bring in new types of commodities. "New" foods are being served, with a pizza restaurant opening to cater to foreign tastes.

There is a Chamber of Commerce in place, but the business people spoken to stated that they receive little in return for their annual contribution of SDG 50.

### 3.4 Finance and Financial Institutions

The challenges of the Ministry of Finance are symptomatic of many government departments in Darfur, in that the war and ongoing hostilities have severely reduced the confidence to plan on a long term basis. Even tax incentives are not attracting investors, who fear the insecurity and view the infrastructure as too underdeveloped for their needs.

Of the annual fiscal budget, 90 percent is coming from the central government and only 10 percent is derived from local taxes. Of the total amount, 90 percent is used to pay salaries. The annual salary bill for public servants is SDG 110 million, of which 65 percent is allocated to Ministry of Education personnel, 12 percent to the health sector, and the remainder to other ministries (source: the director of the Ministry of Finance).

In 2007, the development fund allocated to North Darfur from Khartoum was SDG 40 million, tied to agreed development projects – roads, water pipelines, and such.

Tax rates have not changed since 2003, but many business people argue that the imposition of formal taxes together with the informal payments that must be made to rebel groups and at checkpoints are crippling their businesses, forcing them to seek other sources of income or alternative but risky transport routes. Many have already entered a parallel economy, smuggling goods and avoiding formal taxation.

Banks in El Fasher have very limited capital for business (their headquarters in Khartoum regard the area as too great a risk). Branch directors have limited power to authorize loans. According to one branch director, loan amounts over SDG 100,000 must be referred to the head office. The reality of doing business in Darfur generally means that it takes more than 18 months to generate sufficient funds to repay loans, which is the maximum repayment period. One bank director stated that he cannot loan more than SDG 25,000 for a period longer than 4 months.

Banks give loans only within the framework of the Central Bank's policy guidelines (which adhere to Islamic forms of finance). Loans are approved through the morabaha form of finance, which stipulates that the bank must purchase the required inputs for the loan seeker. Some of the stated constraints of this system are procurement delays and the poor quality of commodities, which contribute to people defaulting and businesses collapsing. Delays in providing much needed equipment can particularly be seen in the seasonal business activities related to agriculture. Morabaha does not facilitate growth of business activities. Many small businesses end up returning their assets to the bank as a result of their inability to make repayments. The agricultural bank will make substantial loans to farmers, but in order to qualify, a farmer or family member must own property in town, be used as collateral.

### 3.5 Microfinance

It is widely accepted that microfinance options are a sound basis from which to launch small-scale projects; the Grameen Bank and other models show how they can have extremely positive results for poor communities.

In theory, microfinance schemes are a very viable option for the poorer people of El Fasher and surrounding camps. But in the absence of a structured system, the imposition of harsh conditions and Darfur’s “high risk” label has meant that microfinance there has had little impact on the lives of the population. That said, there are a number of NGOs that have established microfinance projects for small groups – these do create opportunities for people to buy household items and small animals and send children to school dressed well. While these projects do not have obvious community-wide benefits, they do illustrate the potential of this lending mechanism, if banking structures are improved and lending conditions (particularly for women) are made more flexible.

Commercial banks in Sudan are expected to allocate 12 percent of their total annual lending portfolios to microfinance, but in practice this does not happen. It is estimated that microfinance in Sudan has only...
3 to 5 percent of the current market covered, which indicates its potential. Khartoum and other large urban areas are the main focus of microfinance projects. The International Fund for Agricultural Development’s North Kordofan Rural Development Project has been working with the Agricultural Bank of Sudan for some years, with many microfinance initiatives and successes recorded.

The report from the Microfinance Best Practices in Conflict-affected Countries meeting held in Khartoum in November 2007 clearly showed that there is a keen interest on the part of the government and international community to develop microfinance in Sudan. It demonstrated that the country has to focus more on the poor sector of society and that more investment is required, more experienced staff are necessary, and greater risks need to be taken by the banks and lending institutions. This is an opportune time to capitalize on the focus microfinance is receiving.

Darfur presents a challenge: most existing loans will be defaulted on, due to the loss of assets resulting from the conflict. So from where does the incentive come to tackle this problem? Developing microfinance programmes in urban locations such as El Fasher is less risky and presents greater monitoring options than rural-based projects (in the present circumstances). Developing flexible conditions that allow more women to access loans is essential, since the present system depends on owning urban assets and therefore eliminates the possibility for most women to access the system. Discussion with banks to encourage them to ease restrictions, increase loan amounts, extend repayment terms, and introduce moratoriums for serious cases will go a long way to putting this financial mechanism on a more sound footing.

3.6 REMITTANCES

Many Darfurians have emigrated to countries such as Libya, and remittances traditionally have been an important addition to household incomes. Young et al. (2005) noted that in 2004 the Sudanese Embassy reported that there were 320,000 Darfurians working in Libya. Remittances from these emigrants ranged from USD 40 to 900 per annum. If one takes a crude average of USD 400 per person per year, which is a total of USD 128 million, it gives a rough idea of the financial magnitude of remittances in Darfur.

However, it is certain that this level has been reduced significantly as access routes have become more difficult to travel; carrying money is extremely risky given the many rebel groups now roaming the region.

4. INFRASTRUCTURE

4.1 BACKGROUND

El Fasher town began to expand in the early 1970s. This increase was caused mainly by large-scale migration from rural areas affected by drought and desertification. At that time, the town was divided into 4 quarters, with a total of 30 residential areas.

Over time the population grew; in 2003, the conflict caused many people to flee to the safer environment of urban areas. Now there are 96 residential areas in addition to 3 major IDP camps. The total estimated number of inhabitants of El Fasher increased from about 40,000–50,000 in the early 1970s to about 700,000 (including the camps) in 2007 (North Darfur state authorities).

It is worth noting that there is no master plan for El Fasher. Planning has been carried out on a piecemeal basis, but the local authorities recognize that a long-term plan is required as demands for land and services increase.

4.2 HOUSING

Land allocation

Land is allocated through a classification system that is determined by the local authority’s grading system. The available residential land is identified as being first, second, or third class and has specific costs accordingly. First class residential or business areas cost USD 2,000–5,000 per plot, second class costs USD 750–1,000 a plot, and third class costs USD 200–300 a plot (source: Ministry of Construction and Planning).

Looking only at El Fasher’s residential areas, it is reckoned that first class covers 5 percent of the town, second class covers 15 percent, and third class covers 80 percent. There are other allocations for business, investment, and agriculture, but information on their distribution and costs were difficult to come by.

Houses in El Fasher reveal the town’s standard of living to a certain extent. It is estimated that 60 percent of the dwellings are constructed of relatively temporary
local materials such as timber poles and mud plaster with thatched roofs, while 40 percent are constructed of blocks, red bricks, or mud bricks. Inhabitants of the latter are more likely to have access to electricity and running water. Inhabitants of the former need to carry out repairs or totally reconstruct once every two years, at a cost of approximately SDG 2,000.

Building materials have risen significantly in price over the last five years, preventing most people from constructing durable dwellings. One thousand red bricks sell at SDG 180 and one metric ton of cement costs SDG 2,500. Today, building a small house for one family using temporary materials costs 750–1,000 US dollars (source: municipality engineer).

Since 2003, when African Union troops, UN agencies, and NGOs arrived in the region, many townspeople have invested in building houses for rent. Those engaged in the activity include businessmen, government officials, retired employees, and ex-army officers.

Houses are rented out for anything between USD 1,500 and 5,000 a month. More and more houses are being built. Many people employed by the international agencies have taken the opportunity to build new houses or upgrade their existing house, which is a good indicator of the indirect benefits provided by the international community.

Camps

By nature, camp dwellings are small and temporary. Dwellings sit on approximately ten square metres each, with larger plots given for agency offices, community buildings, schools, etc. There is a very large market in Abu Shouk camp, where all sorts of foodstuffs, UN distribution goods, and other commodities are available. This is a thriving business environment and a hive of activity as hundreds of people sell their wares; there is a constant flow of trucks delivering supplies, and many taxis wait to shuttle people between the town and camp.

4.3 OTHER BUILDINGS IN EL FASHER

- State legislative council
- State government headquarters
- Army headquarters for the western area
- State ministries
- El Fasher airport
- National and international NGOS
- Government institutions
- Headquarters of the Transitional Regional Authority
- Seven banks
- Mosques
- El Fasher Church
- Secondary and primary schools
- El Fashir University
- African Union/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) headquarters
- El Fasher Training Hospital
- Military hospital
- Police hospital
- Six dispensaries
- Sixteen pharmacies
- Training institutions
- Educational training institution
- Midwifery school
- Medical assistants school
- Nurse training school
- Sudan Language Teaching Institute

4.4 WATER

The water supply to El Fasher was never planned to service the present population size. As Yaqoub Abdalla Mohamed points out in his paper Impact of Improved Rural Water Supplies on Settlement Distribution in Western Sudan: The Case of East Kordofan and El-Fasher Districts (1978), water points spawned villages and were important places for social interaction and exchange of news. His paper sought to identify the optimum water supply for meeting human and animal consumption needs without degrading the environment. The recent war has resulted in huge numbers of people coming together in one location and expecting to access sufficient services. But the present water supply to the town, which was adequate for the town dwellers of the 1960s when it was constructed, now serves only 40 percent of the population. Water is pumped from two reservoirs west of the town, but the supply lines are often damaged and require constant maintenance. Water storage systems are very limited, and there is little evidence of household-level rainwater catchment or storage.

Recently droughts have been common. Over the past 50 years, it is estimated that annual rainfall fell by around 34 percent for Darfur generally. About 65 percent of northern Darfur is dominated by sandy goz soils. In addition to the variable and low rainfall, surface water sources include wadis and groundwater. Surface water is trapped in haffirs for human and
animal consumption. Groundwater (held in three reservoirs) is the only permanent water source; the most reliable is the Nubian Aquifer, which covers about 53 percent of Darfur, including substantial parts of North Darfur.

Three of the 33 wells at Abu Shouk are dry. It was assumed at planning stage that the per capita consumption would be 4 gallons per day within the camp, and the camp was designed for 40,000 persons. This consumption was underestimated – the average is 6–15 gallons per day, including domestic use and sales. International per capita requirements are thought to be four times higher.

Water Sources
The Golo dam was constructed in 1947 some 5 km west of El Fasher to provide water to the town. It remained the main source of water for more than 20 years up to the end of the 1960s. Golo water is still servicing the town but now is going through a purification station. In addition, many wells 6–10 metres deep were constructed inside the town around the water pool, which divides the northern part of town from the southern part. Most of these are now dry, as the water table has been significantly reduced.

There are other nearby water sources, but these are contaminated. Nevertheless, nearby villagers use this water for human consumption, as well as for their animals (donkeys, cows, sheep, goats, and camels).

El Fasher’s daily water needs were estimated to be between 30,000 and 35,000 cubic metres in 2007, while in 2000 it was only 20,000 cubic metres (source: Water Corporation of El Fasher).

There is much pressure on the municipality to embark on projects to provide an increased amount of potable water, as the population requires more than is presently delivered. In 2007, a new pipeline was constructed from Shagra (23 km from El Fasher); when running at optimum capacity, it will serve the needs of the town and IDP camps. But like the many wells and 13 boreholes (many constructed by UNICEF) that are being affected by the falling water table, the Shagra pipeline will require augmenting by other sources in the not too distant future.

A more sustainable source appears to be the Sagelnaam basin, which is 45 km south of El Fasher. Experimental drillings were carried out in

an agreement between Sudan and Libya in the mid-1970s and demonstrated a very high yield. Further studies have been conducted that confirmed this finding, but to date funding has not been available to develop this source. The estimated cost of the project is USD 73 million, with USD 50,000 required to rehabilitate the laboratory (source: Darfur Reconstruction and Development Funds).

Many people in El Fasher purchase their water from water vendors, who get the water from distant wells, private wells, and water supplied to the camps. It is estimated that households pay water vendors between USD 30 and USD 50 per month; for many this payment is prohibitive and they therefore ration it as much as possible.

4.5 ELECTRIC POWER SUPPLY

Small-scale electric power came to El Fasher in 1967 through the installation of one generator. It took from then to 2007 to have a somewhat reliable system without regular power cuts. The system was improved through the installation of more powerful generators and was run on a prepaid system to insure that income was available to maintain the service. The service provides power to about 35 percent of the town and the cost comes to USD 12 for 100 kilowatts.

Local government information suggests that the electricity supply to El Fasher has the capacity to supply the whole town – 9.5 megawatts are available, and it is estimated that the requirement is 8 megawatts. Despite this, less than 40 percent of the town actually receives electricity, as the funds are not available to extend the service. Furthermore, most people could not afford power even if it was available to them.

The local authorities have a plan to increase the supply to 60 megawatts over a period of 7 years (2008–2015), at an estimated cost of USD 1.15 million. This is in anticipation of investment and greater industrial development. The number of people employed by the power supply department is 115 (source: Darfur Reconstruction and Development Funds).

4.6 TRANSPORT

The main mode of mechanized transport in El Fasher is the small North Korean Tico car, which is the local taxi. The head of the taxi trade union reports
that there are 3,500 in the town. The price of petrol is USD 4.5 per gallon (4.5 litres), and it is reckoned that the daily average fuel consumption for these vehicles is around 1 gallon. The average daily income for a taxi driver is between USD 20 and 30, of which the driver retains one-third (while also paying for the fuel and oil) and the owner retains two-thirds. Therefore, it is reckoned that a driver earns between USD 3 and 6 per day.

A new Tico costs around USD 15,000, while a second-hand one would be approximately USD 8,000–10,000. Government officials, merchants, and army and police officers are among the owners of these cars. It is claimed that money gained through illegal means is often used to buy taxis and run taxi companies.

The taxi industry is a major source of local government revenue, with an annual license fee per car of SDG 260, dues of SDG 100, and *zakat* of SDG 100. There are also many payments that are paid informally to traffic police.

4.7 ROADS

There are about 25 km of tarmac road inside the town, with another 25 km of gravel road. There is a municipality plan to extend the tarmac road by another 15 km.

4.8 DRAINAGE

The drainage system, constructed during the colonial era, was based on the contour map of the town. It is in poor shape and functioning in certain parts of the town only. There is a plan to construct a proper drainage system, but funding is not available. In the meantime, the town “pool” is used as a water collection point, which is a health hazard and a breeding ground for mosquitoes. Nevertheless, the commissioner of El Fasher supervised the cleaning and deepening of the pool, which was finished in December 2007. Apparently, the main purpose behind this is to increase the capacity of the pool and to sell the water to local people involved in construction and brick making as an additional source of revenue.

4.9 AIRSTRIPS

There is one airport in El Fasher.

4.10 RAILWAY

There is no railway in the state.

4.11 GARBAGE COLLECTION

It is estimated that 300 tons of garbage are produced in the town each day. The municipality has 5 tractors and 1 truck at its disposal, with a total work force of 50 staff for the whole town. There is only one waste management office, with no substations. Strangely, while there are many types of taxation in El Fasher, there is none related to refuse collection. Rubbish is dumped in open wasteland outside the town.

5. LAND USE, NATURAL RESOURCES, AND LIVELIHOODS

5.1 BACKGROUND TO NORTH DARFUR

The total area of North Darfur is estimated to be 296,420 square kilometres. Geographically, most of the state is classified as arid (with mean annual rainfall ranging between 0 and 100 mm) and semi-arid (100–250 mm). The arid zone is dominated by sandy soils and fine sand, alternating with non-cracking clay soils. The semi-arid zone mainly has sand dunes interspersed with cracking clay soils (vertisols) and very limited coarse gravel soils. There are three main wadis crossing the arid zone and three crossing the semi-arid zone. The soil types and distribution of rainfall have largely determined the pattern of livelihoods and production systems. In arid areas, vegetation is confined largely to the wadi beds and seasonal water courses. In semi-arid areas, acacia species and grass (mainly annuals) are especially found where fallowing is still carried out, where woodcutting is restricted, and away from livestock routes. The land-based economy has divided the population broadly into different livelihood strategies: pastoralists with camels, sheep, and goats in arid zones who focus on trading activities, and agro-pastoralists with cattle and sheep who have very strong marketing links with the urban population. A further breakdown is presented in Table 2 below.

During the last three decades, farming and pastoralist systems have been exposed to many shocks and stresses as a result of successive droughts, desertification, civil war, and tribal conflicts. To adapt, these systems have
gone through many changes in land use techniques, cropping patterns, and coping mechanisms.

Between 1983 and 1985, Darfur residents experienced their first major “famine” and first major relief food programme. This arose from the Sahelian drought and led to widespread displacement (especially in the drier North Darfur), rapid growth in urban populations (many of whom became marginalized over time), major shortages in food and fodder, and inter-community conflict over land and natural resources. Mortalities were much higher in North Darfur than elsewhere in the region, deeply affecting the Zaghawa (north-west) and Meidob (north-east) peoples and camel, goat, and sheep populations.

5.2 LIVELIHOODS AND FOOD ECONOMY ZONES

The major production systems and food economy zones for North Darfur are presented in Table 2. Over one-third of all farms producing food were previously located in goz (plains and low hills of sandy soil) and wadi zones. Millet is the most important food crop, together with cash crops such as watermelon. These areas supported small numbers of livestock, including donkeys, camels, sheep, goats, and cattle. As an economy zone, the goz lands cover Um Kedada, Mellit, Sayah, most of El Fasher, and northern Al Salaam administrative areas. Poorer households provide agricultural labour, which supplements their income from crop and livestock production. The middle-level income households in the goz zone engage in trade and raise livestock, though many also benefit from remittances.

Most of Sudan’s tobacco is grown on fertile clay wadi soils in western El Fasher and parts of southern Al Salaam, Taweila, and Korma. Households receive income from the tobacco or exchange it for required items. They provide labour in return for food and grow millet, which they supplement with wild foods. El Fasher is a major tobacco market. In this zone, the better-off households are among the wealthiest in North Darfur1. Karkade (roselle, a species of hibiscus) is a well-known product from mixed farms in the Al Salaam area. Gum arabic from both Acacia senegal and Acacia seyal was traditionally produced, but a volatile international market, poor government incentives, and ecological changes led to a drop in production. A decline in the practice of fallowing, which sustained soil fertility, has also lowered general production levels.

In the northern desert and semi-desert lands, annual rainfall varies between zero and less than 200 mm, and continues to decline farther north. Livestock are central to life and an economy of sheep and camel trading dominates the Mellit, Kutum, and El Fasher markets. Cattle husbandry is no longer viable in northern areas due to climatic shifts, but cattle-based systems predominate towards the south. Direct export to Libya and Egypt is common, (camels) while goats are mainly sold or exchanged locally. Wild foods supplement diets and are used in exchange for agricultural produce and other goods.

1. **Goz**
   Um Kedada, Mellit, Sayah, most of El Fasher, and northern Al Salaam administrative areas
   - Cultivation-based
   - Rainfed on sandy soils
   - Poorer households provide agricultural labour supplementing their income with crop and livestock production
   - The middle level income households in the goz zone engage in trade, benefit from remittances and livestock
   - Millet (staple), groundnuts, sesame, watermelon, etc., on farms with an average of 10–16 feddan
   - 50 percent decline in millet over the past 40 years, from 99 kg to 50 kg per feddan
   - 2006/2007: 1.78 million feddan, 65 percent under millet (>90 percent in previous seasons)

2. **Wadī**
   Western El Fasher and parts of southern Al Salaam, Taweila, and Korma
   - Cultivation-based
   - Seasonal access to water on heavier clay soils, but high labour and input costs; main tobacco producing area in Sudan
   - Tobacco, sorghum, and vegetables are grown on farms an average of 1–5 feddan
   - Better-off households are among the wealthiest in North Darfur; El Fasher is an important tobacco market
   - Where security allowed, wealthier farmers expanded this area through tractor cultivation by up to 70 feddan, for renting
   - Sorghum area increased in 2006/2007 to become 34 percent of the staple food crop
   - Tobacco producers receive SDG 250–500 per feddan

3. **Pastoralism**
   Desert and semi-desert areas of North Darfur
   - Livestock-based, with camel, sheep, and goat husbandry and marketing around seasonal migration
   - Annual rainfall varies from zero to less than 200 mm, declining farther north
   - Direct export to Libya and Egypt was common (camels), with goats mainly sold or exchanged locally
   - Poorer households rely on wild foods for consumption and exchange
   - Some communities are switching livelihood strategies
   - Limited movement over 11 main migratory routes through Darfur, impacting animal health and livelihoods
   - Access to markets is poor and families are holding assets in ‘enclaves’

4. **Mixed cash crop and livestock farming**
   North Darfur around southern Al Salaam
   - Cultivation- and livestock-based
   - Rainfall can reach 300 mm per annum
   - Groundnuts, watermelon, sesame, and karkade (roselle or hibiscus) are grown, and households tend sheep, goats, some cattle, and camels
   - Al Salaam is an important market town

5. **Irrigated farming**
   (a) Shallow wells
   - Cultivation-based
   - Established by the Agricultural Bank of Sudan
   - Use of shallow wells and canals and relatively intense reliance on seeds, tractors, pesticides, and loans
   - Potatoes, fruits, and vegetables
   - Various water catchment methods, both by hand or using bulldozers
   - Favourable by the government in recent years
   - Pilot project has been affected by the events since 2003; farmers have unpaid loans

(b) Water harvesting

6. **Urban livestock keeping**
   - Dairy cows (hybrid), poultry, and goats
   - Milk production is most commonly based on zero-grazing cows and their calves, using dry rations and fodder
   - Usually 2–3 dairy animals, 5–10 poultry, and 2–3 goats
   - Up to 30 percent of residents keep animals
   - Milk production had a sharp increase since 2003, up to 400 percent or more; daily yields are 10–15 litres in the dry season and up to 20 litres per day after calving in the wet season
When labour requirements and gross margins for the main cropping systems are estimated, farmers producing millet, sorghum, and potatoes in North Darfur are shown to incur losses for a number of reasons. A fall in soil productivity has directly affected millet and other crop output, and food relief has resulted in low prices, especially for sorghum. Potatoes have high transport costs, given their bulky nature (more than 40 percent of the value of the crop). Tomatoes and tobacco are the two crops which show viability — both rely on supplementary irrigation (Appendix 4).

**Urban Agriculture**

Urban agriculture started to contribute significantly to the food security of the state in 1984, when the traditional rural farming systems collapsed as a result of drought and ecological degradation. It has grown by an estimated 400 percent in the past five years and has linked enterprises such as those that supply dry rations, fodder, and water.

The system normally entails a household keeping poultry (5–10), goats (2–8), and/or lactating cows (2–4). Around 30 percent of the urban population of El Fasher keep small animals and/or 2 to 4 cows. The size of a large herd would be 15 to 50 cattle, mainly lactating cows and calves (90 percent), of which all are hybrid. The management system depends mainly on animal ration feeding and dry fodder in the dry season. In the rainy season, the owners depend on natural pasture. Milk yields per day in the dry season for hybrid breeds is estimated to be 10–15 litres per cow compared to 3–5 litres from local breeds in the dry season, and about 20 litres compared to 6 litres in the wet season.

Livestock keepers in urban El Fasher are either themselves experienced in animal husbandry or have the resources to hire experienced labour. Unfermented milk is highly perishable, but the demand for fresh milk continues to grow while supply from the rural areas has fallen due to poor access and insecurity. These are factors that act as an incentive for the local production to meet the high demand from the resident population, including the camp population and large humanitarian community.

### 5.3 CROP MARKETING AND TAXATION IN EL FASHER

The crop marketing centre in El Fasher is organized into several blocks, and each allocated to a certain crop. The main blocks are for grains (millet, durra, and wheat), groundnuts, potatoes, dried tomatoes, vegetables, fruits, and forestry products. Each crop has its own licensed traders, each paying an annual licence fee of SDG 60. At the time of the profiling study in March 2008, a number of products were out of season: sesame, watermelon, karkade, and gum arabic. Table 3 below shows the turnover for groundnuts, millet, mixed fruits, and dried tomatoes between December 2007 and March 2008. It was found that sorghum and cooking oil sourced from the food aid operation are retailed at average consumer prices of SDG 20 (50 kg) and SDG 48 (jerrycan of 15 litres) respectively, providing significant profit margins to retailers. Local people and merchants noted the supply was in general poor; deficits were expected for the coming season, with prices expected to continue to rise.

There is no formal tax on commodities inside the marketing centre, but there are informal taxes imposed by different factions at checkpoints, such as a SDG 2,000 tax on fruits (per truck) and a SDG 1,000 tax on dried tomatoes (per truck). As a consequence, merchants increased their prices by more than 50 percent in late 2007 to SDG 30 per carton of dried tomatoes, SDG 35 per box of fruit, and SDG 5–7 per sack of groundnuts. Hence, roughly 15–50 percent of the value of the crops is related to transport costs (at the time of the assessment).

**Table 3: Profile of Food Products in El Fasher Market (December 2007 to March 2008)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Groundnuts</th>
<th>Millet</th>
<th>Sorghum (relief)</th>
<th>Oil (relief)</th>
<th>Fruits</th>
<th>Dried tomatoes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total supply</td>
<td>3,000 sacks</td>
<td>900 sacks</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>4,572 boxes*</td>
<td>1,800 sacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average price producer SDG</td>
<td>30–60</td>
<td>75–80</td>
<td>10–22 sacks (50 kg)</td>
<td>48–49 jerrycans</td>
<td>3–8 per dozen</td>
<td>80 upwards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average price consumer SDG</td>
<td>40–65</td>
<td>80–90</td>
<td>20–30</td>
<td>60–70</td>
<td>5–12</td>
<td>60–100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trader margin</td>
<td>5–10</td>
<td>5–10</td>
<td>8–10</td>
<td>12–21</td>
<td>2–4</td>
<td>20–50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Box = 40–60 dozen; sacks 50 kg
5.4 NORTH DARFUR LIVESTOCK MARKETING IN EL FASHER

This is a key livestock market for Darfur in general and the main centre for North Darfur. Two other important centres are Mellit to the north and Kutum. The El Fasher livestock market centre was established in the 1970s and currently occupies about 10 hectares. The marketing centre was originally designed for cattle, sheep, and goats, each fenced off separately. With an increase in the number of camels, horses, and donkeys, a separate section was established. The market days are Saturdays, Tuesdays, and Thursdays. Other areas have markets operating on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Sundays to ensure that options are available for livestock keepers.

The El Fasher livestock market centre was established in the 1970s and currently occupies about 10 hectares. The marketing centre was originally designed for cattle, sheep, and goats, each fenced off separately. With an increase in the number of camels, horses, and donkeys, a separate section was established. The market days are Saturdays, Tuesdays, and Thursdays. Other areas have markets operating on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Sundays to ensure that options are available for livestock keepers.

The main actors in livestock trading are the traditional owners, rural merchants (galaga), grantors (doman), middlemen (sababa), export traders, and butchers. All the actors in the marketing chain require a licence from El Fasher Municipality, which costs SDG 30–50 (Box 1).

**Box 1: Stakeholders in the Livestock-based Marketing Chain**

*Traditional producers (sedentary agro-pastoralists and pastoralists)*
This comprises livestock keepers who only sell their animals to cater for urgent household needs (food and health), social obligations, and times of stress. They often experience unfair terms of trade, accepting prices way below the market price. They are frequently uninformed about market prices due to their reliance on other people for information and for selling their animals.

*Rural market traders (Galaga)*
These traders travel from village to village purchasing from the local livestock keepers. Given the ongoing insecurity, they take enormous risks to make a living. They gather information about the traditional producers’ supplies, assess the risks involved in crossing conflict areas, and inform themselves about the “taxes” to be informally paid and the demands made by the middlemen and grantors. The number of rural market traders is estimated at 200 to 300 in North Darfur. The peak of their activities is from July to December. They usually have high market margins due to the risk involved in crossing war zones and the illegal taxes imposed on them by rebel factions in conflict areas.

*Grantors (Doman)*
Grantors act on a much wider scale, usually representing tribes. The function of a grantor is to provide identity cards, verify ownership of livestock, and witness loan procedures. They are also a key source of information on market trends and prices.

*Middlemen (Sababa)*
Like middlemen everywhere, they have their finger on the sector’s pulse – from the producer to the export market to the consumer. They also are skilled in grading livestock for regional sale or export.

Supply and Demand and Profit Margins
The peak supply of and demand for livestock is from July to December, with demand peaking during Ramadan and Haj. From December 2007 to March 2008, the total supply is estimated to have reduced by 30 percent, 58 percent, and 59 percent for cattle, sheep, and camels respectively, due to a drop in the market prices – 15 percent for cattle and 30 percent for sheep and camels. This was largely attributed to a ban on imports by Saudi Arabia following an outbreak of East Coast Fever. Up till then Darfur had contributed 22 percent of all animals exported from Sudan. Closure of the border between Sudan and Libya led to a cessation in the export trade, which can be 20,000 camels and 25,000 sheep annually.

Despite the removal of all types of taxes from livestock (herd tax, locality dues, jihad tax, wounded tax, and zakat), the traditional producers’ share of the market value is relatively low (73–85 percent) compared to the rural traders’ (95–97 percent), as shown in Table 4. The highest producer margin is for camels. In terms of head of animals, the highest turnover was for cattle. Considering cattle, sheep, and camels together, the number of animals on the market fell over the two-month period, as did their prices.
Table 4: El Fasher Livestock Market Margins (December 2007 and February 2008 Figures)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Cows</th>
<th>Sheep</th>
<th>Camels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average monthly supply December 2007</td>
<td>2,600</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average monthly supply February 2008</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent decrease</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average price December 2007 (SDG)</td>
<td>975</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>1,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average price February 2008 (SDG)</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent decrease</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marketing fees per animal</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grantors</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middlemen</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeding and watering per animal</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural trader margin</td>
<td>798 (97 percent)</td>
<td>147.5 (95 percent)</td>
<td>956 (96 percent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Producers' share</td>
<td>598–648 (73–79 percent)</td>
<td>112.5–117.5 (72–76 percent)</td>
<td>800–850 (80–85 percent)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.5 AGRICULTURAL AND LIVESTOCK SERVICES – NORTH DARFUR

5.5.1 The Public Sector

Since the colonial period to the present, government support for traditional farmers was confined to the provision of agricultural services such as pest control. It was later expanded to cover domestic pest and extension services through the Department of Plant Protection and Extension Services. The main services provided by the department are to control pests in coordination with the national government, to control domestic pests in coordination with the regional and local governments, to supervise the quality and use of pesticides, and to manage four keratin centres at the state level in El Fasher, Mellit, Kutum, and Teena.

The headquarters at El Fasher operates at state level with 7 sub-offices and 20 centres. There are 2 specialists and 30 inspectors at state level. However, due to insecurity, service delivery has been confined to El Fasher and immediate areas, as well as other urban locations. NGOs have conducted training for 450 farmers on integrated protection management in recent years.

Extension services have more or less ceased, with no government presence in rural areas. There are six inspectors who work within and close to El Fasher town. There was a government radio advice programme broadcasted to rural farmers, but unfortunately this stopped due to a shortage of funds.

The Animal Resource Department provides the following services:
- Immunization
- Diagnosis of diseases and treatment
- Keratin service
- Slaughterhouse services
- Veterinary extension

The department has 72 staff, including veterinarians and medical assistants. It has six equipped mobile clinics. The services are intended to cover the 13 localities of the state. At the rural level, the administration – with support from OXFAM, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, and CHF – trained 500 community animal health workers. During the last two years, the insecurity negatively affected delivery of these services, especially after the looting of three mobile clinics in Kutum, Mellit, and Kabkabiya and the suspension of keratin services. State requirements for the immunization programme are estimated at 14 million units (2008), but the department only received 1 million units. The slaughterhouse is operating under unhygienic conditions, and the department officially requested the local authority to build a new one, which has yet to be done.
The private sector’s involvement is confined mainly to the transport of inputs to farmers and livestock keepers and outputs from the rural locations. The rural markets provide financial services to the traditional producers in the form of *sheil*, which is a cash loan repaid in kind to the traditional producers. Recently the government helped to organize the activities of the private sector at urban central markets, specifically the supply of seeds, pesticides, fertilizer, and animal drugs.

There is only one private store at the state level for seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides. There are several “illegal” places that supply vegetable seeds and pesticides. Most of these inputs are imported from Libya, and prices are 30 to 50 percent lower than those in the formal system.

The animal drug market is much more developed than the agricultural subsector. There are 14 animal drugs licensed at state level, 7 within El Fasher town. The initial capital for the establishment of a veterinary drugstore is estimated to be between SDG 25,000 and 50,000. Each year, a licence costs SDG 100, shop rent 400, and annual taxes and zakat 3,000–5,000. The main constraints facing the sector are insecurity in rural areas, the high cost of transport from Khartoum, and heavy taxation imposed by the government.

The Farmers Union had 14 sub-offices at locality level, organized into 8 chambers, for traditional farmers, mechanized farmers, vegetable and fruit producers, mixed farmers, tobacco growers, and gum arabic producers. Through this structure, the union provides various services:

- Seed supply
- Lobbying and advocacy services
- Collateral services
- Distribution of government-subsidized agricultural inputs

In the 2006–2007 season, the union distributed 1,500 tons of improved seeds (millet, *dura*, groundnuts, and watermelon) to farmers, but the demand was for 18,000 tons, and the distribution was confined to towns and nearby areas.

The union became a grantor for 490 vegetable farmers to facilitate tractor service hire from the Agricultural Bank of Sudan. Recently the union discussed the constraints of the conditions of this loan (land registration and lack of collateral) at the state and national levels. As a result, the government modified loan conditions to ease access to formal financial services. The government provided 20 tractors and 20 discs and, in collaboration with Agricultural Bank of Sudan and the State Ministry of Agriculture, formulated a financial policy for accessing tractors.

The agricultural industrial sector is very limited, and most crops and animal products are exported raw—both internally and internationally.

The main agricultural industries relate to tobacco, oil, flour, skin tanning, and tomato dehydration. At household level, handicrafts are made, milk is processed, and vegetables are dehydrated. Local and international NGOs have supported a number of these initiatives over the past five years. There is wide variation among these industries in terms of production capacity, equipment used, types of fuel used, and number of people employed. The sector faces many problems on both the demand and supply sides. Recently, transport costs have increased by more than 500 percent and production of raw materials has declined, while taxes and zakat remained. The impact of these constraints is more serious for the modern industries with large capital assets. For the household-based enterprises, the main constraint is fuel availability; some resort to using charcoal (at SDG 24 per sack). The study looked at two cases in the local vegetable oil production industry to better understand trends and viability.

In both the modern and traditional system, the value of a 15-litre jerrycan of processed oil was estimated at SDG 80 each. A secondary output is oil seed cakes valued at SDG 2.8 each. The latter are a useful diet supplement for livestock. On a daily basis, the income is SDG 5,475 and 1,124 for the modern and traditional mills respectively. Transport costs of the raw materials are significant, however, representing almost 25 percent of the product value. The current value added tax of 15 percent is also relatively high for small-scale enterprises.

These factories had been established with the assumption that the raw materials would be produced locally with very limited transport costs; in fact, the production area is outside the state. Another
important factor is that local production cannot compete with the relief commodities (one jerrycan of oil is SDG 49). Four local mills ceased operations in recent years due to the above-mentioned factors.

### 6. NATURAL RESOURCES

#### 6.1. SETTLEMENT AND LAND-USE PATTERNS

The spatial distribution of the human population in Darfur was very influenced by access to natural resources such as water, the ecology, and, more recently, varying degrees of in-migration, outmigration, and emigration (to countries such as Chad). In the past five years, a major settlement upheaval took place, with an estimated 2.5 million dead. By April 2007, an estimated 4.1 million people were affected, of which 2.1 million are registered as IDPs and around 200,000 are refugees in Chad, Libya, or Egypt. Others left the region as labour migrants. Thus a shift has taken place, eroding a predominantly rural-based population and economy and moving towards rapid, unplanned urban and camp-based growth. In 2004, the estimated human population in Darfur was 6.5 million persons, suggesting that almost 70 percent of the population was affected. Thirty percent were officially registered as IDPs living permanently away from their homes. The population in El Fasher is estimated at 500,000 persons.

The en masse displacement refers mainly to the cultivating communities, made up of the Fur, Masalit, and Berti. Camel herders such as the Kababish, Meidob, and Zaghawa (in the north) and cattle-keepers such as the Rizigat, Habbaniya, Halba, and Beni (in the south) experienced major disruptions in their migratory patterns and in their trading-exchange systems. A new paradigm emerged as pastoralists, many of whom cultivate when water is available, “took over” farmland that was abandoned. Others found they were enclosed in enclaves holding accumulated wealth (animals) but were unable to access grazing, water (on a seasonal basis), or markets. In addition, there has been an influx of Chadian refugees (up to 45,000) into mainly western areas.

#### Population and Natural Resource Base

A rise in human population density is ongoing in Darfur. The population density was estimated at 3 persons per square kilometre (1,080,000 persons) in 1956, rising to 18 persons per square kilometre (6,480,000) by 2003. North of 16 degrees the density is sparse. Population growth rate estimates vary in the literature, but in southern and western areas are around 4 percent, slightly above the national average.

The natural resource base is not expanding, nor is it being replenished under artificial conditions, despite efforts by international NGOs such as Practical

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2 Assuming an estimated human population of 6,556,000, a mid-2004 estimate by UNFPA.
4 Republic of Sudan, 2006. *Darfur Joint Assessment Mission – Status of Natural Resources and Environment (draft).*

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### Table 5: Groundnut Oil Production Cost Comparison between the Traditional and Modern System in El Fasher 2008 (SDG)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Traditional mill</th>
<th>Cost per unit</th>
<th>Total cost/value</th>
<th>Modern mill</th>
<th>Cost per unit</th>
<th>Total cost/value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Production per day (jerrycan x 15 litres)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13 x 80</td>
<td>1,040</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>4,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cakes (sacks)</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.8 x 30</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>22.5 x 30</td>
<td>675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>3,250</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport cost (El Dien)</td>
<td>150</td>
<td></td>
<td>750</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Packing</td>
<td>78</td>
<td></td>
<td>360</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxes</td>
<td>168.6</td>
<td></td>
<td>487.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>1,110.6</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,410.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Action and Sudanese NGOs such as the Sudanese Environmental Conservation Society. Successive droughts and a fall-off in bush fallowing have reduced resources. In addition, there has been intense reliance on the natural resource base for biomass, water, cultivated lands, and building materials.

There are no reliable data on the extent of forest or other land uses in Darfur. However, it is known that during the 1950s and even into the 1960s, Darfur supported the second wealthiest forest resources in Sudan, next to southern Sudan. Broad estimates from 1956 showed that up to 48 percent of Darfur supported forest and tree cover; this is now thought to be 18 percent and lower and in southern and south-western areas.

Until 2003, 60 percent or more of households relied on charcoal and wood for food preparation. Figures vary on the biomass required, with some households using up to 355 trees annually and others as few as 12. In North Darfur, above-ground plant biomass is a scarce commodity, and natural alternatives such as roots are commonly used. In 2005, the government issued a directive forbidding wood collection for personal use, except by the internally displaced. The decline in bush fallowing mentioned above is tied to a fall-off in the gum arabic trade, and a decline in fallowing on farms is associated with a loss of on-farm woody biomass.

6.2. URBAN ENVIRONMENT – EL FASHER

Two urban environmental issues were highlighted in the 2006 UNEP study entitled The Environment and Darfur: (i) water, environmental sanitation, and waste management and (ii) town planning of evolving settlements. Without planning action and engagement with urban planners, it was foreseen that the existing IDP camps would evolve into informal and slum settlements attached to urban areas such as El Fasher.

There is a further matter relating to the state of the environment around the city. Fertile clay soils are being overlaid with sand dunes or thin sandy layers, impacting millet, tobacco, and gum arabic production. The movement of sand to the south is at a rate estimated to be 5 km annually. Even prior to the establishment of camps and rapid population expansion, much village land in the vicinity of El Fasher was already degraded. As compared to a satellite image in 1987, an image in 2000 showed little vegetation on agricultural land or along wadis.

Demand for biomass as an energy source (in the form of fuelwood or charcoal) by city and camp residents is high and constantly impacting the extent and quality of vegetation. Gas, electricity, or liquid petroleum alternatives are not easily available nor are they widely used, except by the wealthy, including international workers. This is also true for piped water. Within the town and its environs, fuel is required for thriving bakeries, hotels, restaurants, brick-makers, and households, both in town and in the camps. Timber and wood poles are required for an expanding construction industry and related joinery enterprises.

It was reported that up to 90 percent of IDP families in Abu Shuok, Al Salaam, and Zamzam camps around El Fasher miss meals due to a shortage of fuelwood (or another energy source) and that up to 80 percent of families are forced to purchase fuelwood or exchange part of their food ration for it. Approximately one full bundle is required to cook each meal. With each bundle costing about USD 0.4 (2005), up to USD 1.3 is spent each day, or just under USD 500 per year. Charcoal is available within the camps at USD 0.04 per 5 grams, but is seen as inefficient; most camp dwellers thus rely on wood. The energy supply chain generally involves the harvesting of wood and its transportation by horse-drawn cart or lorry to the camp sites, with an average of 150 bundles and 4,000 bundles of firewood carried per trip respectively (Box 2).

Fuel efficient stove projects are in operation in all three camps, and by 2005 there were at least 50,000 women who had participated in training on the manufacture and use of fuel efficient mud stoves. One of the earliest was based on the Practical Action model, which reportedly reduced wood consumption by between 30 and 50 percent. Still, many women are known to continue to travel and collect the same volume of firewood, selling the excess. In addition, the quality of the stove depends on the mud “mix”, drying procedures, and maintenance.

2 UNEP July 2006. The Environment and Darfur – Interim Findings from the UNEP Sudan Post-conflict Environment Assessment.
6.3 The Politics and Economy of Land in Sudan and Darfur

Historically, mixed settlements were common in Darfur; in some cases, farming was done by more than one group, even if their land rights were not well defined. This sharing of an area generated economic gains. Once allocated, cleared, and continually utilized, it was difficult even for the leadership to repossess the land unless it was abandoned. Women’s rights were recognized and defended under the hakura system in Darfur, although traditionally access for women results from being a member of a family to whom the land is allocated rather than having ownership themselves. Gum arabic trees (hashab, Acacia senegal, and to a lesser extent Acacia seyal) and baobab (Adansonia digitata) trees were registered, the former because of its economic significance, the latter because it was a water source.

City planning in El Fasher will require a multifaceted approach involving revising municipal policy, redefining priorities, and establishing a new institutional framework beyond settlement planning for housing, water, sanitation, and related infrastructure. Re-zoning procedures are required if the camp populations are to be accommodated. A large proportion of the current city and camp population lost assets, livelihoods, and security of tenure under hakura or other traditional systems. Access to finance is difficult without registered title to property within the city boundary. Access to land is difficult due to the boom in the land “market”, although it is known that a number of IDPs who travelled with valuable assets secured access and are engaged in peri-urban agriculture. Securing secondary land rights may be difficult in the competitive environment around El Fasher.

6.4 Ecology in North Darfur and Urbanization

Rural–urban interdependence is very high, not least because of the “isolation” factor in North Darfur – there is a heavy reliance on neighbouring Libya rather than Khartoum for employment, trade, and remittances. There are strong economic, socio-cultural, and political ties between urban and rural producers. Urban enterprises, aside from humanitarian-related operations, rely on rural
producers, while the livestock and crop producers rely heavily on secure access to urban markets such as El Fasher.

Indirect short-term threats to urban livelihoods in Darfur, especially in North Darfur, relate to the natural resource base and its capacity to meet increasing demands. This base is already severely eroded through a combination of climatic and human-related factors, including the establishment of large camps based on false assumptions regarding energy and water needs.

7. SOCIAL AND COMMUNITY GROUPS

The following is based on discussions held with mainly youth and women’s organizations from both the town and Abu Shouk camp. The objective was to ascertain what structures already exist, to understand what activities are undertaken, and to identify the constraints that are faced.

7.1 WOMEN’S GROUPS

There are quite a number of women’s organizations in place, formed either through government initiatives such as the Women’s Union, through local informal mechanisms, or through the assistance of NGOs. There is a women’s network that seeks to link the various groups carrying out activities.

The activities in which most of the women appear to partake are traditional and based on what has been done over many years or handed down from generation to generation. Apart from some initiatives by experienced NGOs, the conventional package provided to women includes embroidery, handicrafts, food making, and food processing. This vicious circle of repetitively promoting an unchanging set of skills that does not generally pay off economically needs to be thought through.

These types of economic activity have many limitations, the main one being that they are being chosen without any knowledge of the availability of other options. For example, the women interviewed knew very little about microfinance options. Work is required to have orientation sessions that will introduce women to wider horizons and more options.

Women in Sudan, like in so many countries, face cultural, social, and economic discrimination. They are less educated than men and lack the power to challenge policy and decision makers. Women from the IDP camps are responsible for hardship tasks such as gathering firewood and thus risk sexual assault and beatings. Many now engage in brick making, work as housekeepers in the town, or sell food or other items in the market. Many have seen their lives improve through employment with a humanitarian agency, and there are many stories of how they are now the breadwinners and are financing their children through school. The war has therefore facilitated opportunities that otherwise would not have been forthcoming. Numerous examples illustrate that when women have financial opportunities, they grab them with both hands and make the best of them. Yet they face difficulties getting bank loans, do not have collateral, and are not regarded as reliable business people. It is essential that financial inputs are meaningful and substantial enough to create life chances, not only through direct employment, but also through microfinance projects and the provision of seed capital and loans.

7.2 YOUTH

The youth are a very vulnerable group and are often partially educated and unskilled, with bleak futures. If they do not decide to leave Darfur for Khartoum or other large towns, they are ripe for recruitment into one of the many militia groups, afterwards basking in the power that role gives them.

There are no social outlets for young people, places where they can gather in safety to conduct specific activities or just socialize. It is sad to say that they do not have the opportunity to be “young” and do what young people do in a hostility free, protected environment. They are expected to work, join military groups, or become politically involved in the Youth Union or initiatives such as one entitled the “Role of Youth in the Peace Building Process”. This is noble and important, but it is unfortunate that youth have to partake in such activities as a result of a war caused by others. Social outlets and opportunities to develop skills are two areas that will be examined under “Recommendations” below.

7.3 OTHER MARGINALIZED GROUPS

The study did not have time to assess the level and extent to which the war has impacted on other vulnerable groups, such as people living with HIV.
and the elderly, nor discuss what may be required
to ease their plight. This is something we suggest
be followed up when activities begin under new
programmes that result from this study.

8. JUDICIAL SYSTEM

Administrators of formal and informal laws come in
various forms throughout Sudan, depending on ethnic,
religious, and political factors. Judicial courts are
provided for under both statutory and customary law,
while informal community practices also rely on local
chiefs known as sultans to resolve disputes between
community members. Customary laws generally consist
of non-state dispute resolution systems that are usually
based on local customary, traditional, or tribal systems
of justice. Given Sudan's ethnic and religious plurality,
customary laws and practice differ from tribe to tribe
and community to community.

The judiciary seems to have been compromised, as
evidenced by the arbitrary dismissal of qualified
judges, attorneys-general, and law officers. Existing
legislation fails to provide guarantees for human
rights and fundamental freedoms, while military
decrees and emergency laws undermine rights
currently protected by statutory law. Though the
constitution provides for an independent judiciary,
in practice it appears that the judiciary is subject to
the President or the security forces, particularly in
cases of crimes against the state (source: Sharanjeet
Parmar, 2007).

Lawyers throughout Sudan must belong to the
Sudan Bar Association, which is based in Khartoum.
The association has endured its difficulties over time.
In 1992, the government amended the Advocate Act
of 1983 in such a way as to question the association's
independence. For the first time in its history, the
Sudan Bar Association has been reduced to being
basically another trade union. The association has
actually been registered with the Registrar of Trade
Unions. According to the US Department of State,
members of the legal profession viewed as political
opponents are harassed by the government; some
have been detained, including the director of the
Darfur Lawyers Association, who was later released.

There are calls for a serious review of the judicial
system; the rights of women and children are not
secured, as women suffer rape and abuse in Darfur,
while children are kidnapped and forced to fight for
different groups.

9. TAXATION

From the government information available and
verbal reports from business people it is clear that
the taxation system is skewed and does not act as an
incentive for investment and business development.
While ostensibly the government has introduced
pro-investment policies such as the Investment
Encouragement Act (1999) and reduced the
corporate tax to 10 percent, there is little to illustrate
their impact. The World Bank has stated that after
“the incomplete process of decentralization (initiated
in 1992) through which public services such as
education, health, infrastructure and agricultural
management were delegated to state and local
authorities, but without revenue or administrative
capacity to execute the mandates... According to
the 2003 Local Government Act, revenue sources
assigned to state and local authorities are the taxes
on economic activities in the region. The result
is a proliferation of various taxes on productive
enterprises” (World Bank, 2007: 252).

Formal and informal taxation has severely impacted
the private sector, to the extent that people often
turn to illegal trading or incur other means to avoid
paying taxes. Traders are susceptible to numerous
taxes on their goods and vehicles; when travelling,
the factions “ruling” different areas each demand
their cut (in cash or goods), which is regarded mainly
as a protection payment.

Margie Buchanan-Smith and Dr. Abdul Jabbar
Abdulla Fadule illustrate clearly the tax imposed on
traders in their report and show that taxes have risen
by a minimum of 200 percent, and in some cases
400 percent, since the conflict began (source: Trade
and Markets in Darfur: Adaptation and Devastation
2008).

10. CONCLUSION

AND OVERALL

RECOMMENDATION

The vast majority of the 700,000 people of El Fasher
and the surrounding camps have suffered greatly,
but none more than the IDPs who have lost family
members, possessions of value, and livelihoods.
Others have seized the opportunities that the conflict
and humanitarian aid programme have presented to
them and are prospering, at least for the short term.
The government structures are weak, and assistance
from the central government is inadequate. The
economy, which once depended on agriculture, livestock, and local resources, now depends for the most part on the job opportunities, transport programmes, cash circulation, and commodities offered by the international community. While aid interventions are crucial in their provision of basic needs to keep people alive, it has to be recognized that they have also contributed to a major shift in how people live. Qualified people have taken relatively low-level jobs with international agencies, as the wages are high; rental prices are very high, which affects proper shelter; some traditional urban businesses such as the selling of water have been affected by access to free water in the camps, which can be brought to the town and sold.

Conflict, lack of free mobility, and drought have also resulted in farmers and livestock owners shifting from their traditional livelihoods to take up or seek urban employment, possibly never to return to their preferred work. The various rebel factions that roam the territory demanding food, animals, and cash as payment for safe passage have also forced people to seek alternative ways of surviving, and in most cases they head to urban locations.

The sad irony is that while the conflict and those with the guns are changing many people’s way of life, the emergency solutions through the aid programme are indirectly doing the same.

It is essential that the international community and particularly the UN agencies agree on a policy of shifting to recovery mode and longer-term perspectives, while remaining prepared for emergencies. It is only through such a mechanism that local people can take ownership of their futures and over time reduce the level of aid presently required.

The relative security of the town and the vision and often false hope of new urban livelihoods have been attracting people to El Fasher and other towns for many years. When people again feel secure in their areas of origin, it is likely that most will remain in towns, either fearing that the conflict will recommence or believing that there is greater economic security with urban employment.

This report identifies opportunities to increase incomes and survive through sustainable mechanisms rather than direct emergency aid systems. But it argues that these mechanisms need to focus initially on the camps and towns, as they offer a greater chance of success than providing longer-term solutions in Darfur’s rural areas within the present climate.

It may be argued that this focus will only attract more people to already crowded locations. However, urbanization is a phenomenon driving through Africa, despite the fact that there is sufficient rural land available. The migration had been happening in Darfur for a number of years before the current conflict. The reduction in arable land, frequent droughts, lack of water, and undependable political situation had forced people to seek alternatives. Instead of showing reluctance to inject financial assistance, so as to not be blamed for urban population growth, why not be prepared for the inevitable and assist in preventing more urban poverty by having the necessary systems and mechanisms in place?

10.1 OVERALL RECOMMENDATION ON STRUCTURES AND PARTNERSHIPS

This report will be presenting a series of project proposals seen by the team as achievable steps towards addressing a variety of social and economic issues facing the communities. These are practical and measurable projects that involve a number of organizations working together to ensure the objectives are actually achieved.

But presenting projects is the easy part. It is a more complicated, though crucial, process to encourage people, humanitarian organizations, and the public and private sectors to combine their efforts and pool their knowledge, thus ensuring that the results are true and benefits widespread.

Therefore, before presenting “what” will be achieved, a method to achieve the “how” will be presented, which is also a mechanism that can facilitate greater cooperation among the various parties and be a process towards conflict management.

10.2 PARTNERSHIP ARRANGEMENTS

Historically, working through partners (in development terms) means that a certain institution holds the purse strings and the recipients carry out their tasks under the donor’s terms. It is rarely an equal relationship. A true partnership is the coming
together of a number of groups on equal terms to combine their resources for a common purpose.

In Darfur, a system is required that will bridge a number of sensitive gaps. There are cultural differences, ethnic grievances, discrimination (against IDPs), and mistrust of government officials, and all of these types of antagonism create major blocks against constructive development and the achievement of mutual objectives. The humanitarian response since 2003 has further isolated nomadic communities, there is vulnerability around access to and ownership of assets, and integrating greater Darfur and its diverse community into the national development agenda has failed. A rural–urban disconnect has taken place in the past five years or so.

The creation of a forum used to further common aims for the good of the community, in which everyone has an equal say and equal status, reduces hierarchies and tensions and creates an avenue for shared success across political and socio-cultural divides. In the Darfur scenario it can go even further by helping to reconcile differences and illustrating by example what can be achieved by working together.

To this end, and to ensure that appropriate development initiatives are adopted, the formulation of partnerships is being recommended. Governments, donors, and humanitarian organizations often use the term “partnership” to illustrate joint strategies towards common goals, while in reality they are hierarchical arrangements in which conditions are laid down and penalties incurred by the “superior” body (e.g. the donor–NGO relationship). The model being proposed here is based on the success of the European social development movement, executed in a number of countries, which emphasizes creating opportunities for all.

Partnerships can represent a multi-sectoral approach: a region, town, city, or rural location can form a partnership to identify major issues to be addressed and accept mutual responsibility for the formulation of strategies and implementation of projects and programmes.

Specific examples for El Fasher and surrounding camps are given below.

10.2.1 Urban Partnership

This is proposed in the context of recognizing that the urban agenda and economy sit in a framework that requires urban–rural interaction and sensitivity to the “non-displaced” – affected and relevant stakeholders such as the nomadic and semi-nomadic pastoralists and other producers who may not have left their traditional lands.

Responsibilities

1. Identify the social, financial, infrastructural, and environmental changes required to bring the sectors to the next level of development and progress towards creating opportunities that heretofore were not available to the people.

2. Formulate comprehensive proposals that will be presented to the government and international donors for the resources necessary to carry out appropriate, practical, visible, and measurable programmes. These proposals would include the full North Darfur “community” spectrum to ensure peace sensitivity in development interventions, with attention to the natural environment.

3. Monitor and report on the activities.

Membership

In the case of El Fasher, the broad guide on the membership required for such a comprehensive approach would be representatives from the following five sectors.

Public Sector – The municipality (1) and relevant government departments (1 each), especially planning, health, education, roads, environment, employment and enterprise, and community development

Business sector – Chamber of Commerce (1); businesses (2); trade associations (2); and banks (1)

Social sector – Community representatives (3) and local organizations (5) (representing women, youth, the disabled, people living with HIV, farmers, and pastoralists)

Non-profit sector – UN agencies; NGOs (2); and trade unions (2)

Training and education institutions (2)

It is important to consider here the IDP camps dimension. Some may prefer a separate partnership arrangement for the camps, but ideally, in order to close the gaps and encourage a greater understanding of perspectives and obstacles faced, representatives of the camps should sit in the main partnership group. Therefore IDP representatives could number about six people.

This overall number of over 30 people on such a forum may seem unwieldy, but it is essential that all sections of the community are represented.
However, such a large forum requires assistance, and therefore it would be important to establish a facilitation office to support the work of the partnership. This, at a minimum, would consist of an office and support system for a manager, an accountant/administrator, a project organizer, and a receptionist. These would be paid staff, while those on the partnership forum would not be paid.

The estimated budget per year is USD 275,000.

10.2.2 Sector Partnership
A second type of partnership is one that is formed for a specific sector. For example, if there is a proposal to address unemployment and develop enterprises, the make-up of the forum could be as follows:
- Municipality (1)
- Department of employment and enterprise (2)
- Vocational training institute (1)
- Employers (3)
- Trade unions (2)
- Youth groups (2)
- Women’s groups (2)
- UN ILO (1)
- Relevant NGOs (3)

Note: This form of partnership would not need the same level of inputs as the broader partnership and can have a specific time frame according to activities.

It is important to point out at this stage that each member of a partnership has their own role to play. They need to outline to the other members what their organization/agency/group does, they need to have ideas to contribute, and they need to be prepared to work on finding information, influencing proposals, and suchlike. They also have to share information by informing their constituency what the partnership is doing and bringing information and ideas from their organization to the table.

10.2.3 The Establishment of a Foundation
Should such a partnership be formed, it could become the controlling mechanism or the board of trustees for the establishment and running of a foundation.

Its initial fund should be a moderate figure of USD 1 million, of which it agrees to use a percentage and retain the remainder to act as a reserve, but primarily to generate interest. For example, it could retain USD 600,000 and use USD 400,000 for grants and loans. This money would be allocated based on specific criteria drawn up and agreed on a legal basis. Its aim would be to assist businesses and enterprises, as well as social projects. The foundation or trust would employ a person to manage the business, and a committee would be formed to decide on applications.

To kick off the fund, an initial injection would be needed from a lone source (a government or philanthropist) or a combination of sources (donors and suchlike). It could also be made attractive for the Darfuri diaspora to contribute to. Over time, depending on the achievements and integrity of the scheme, it could generate substantial funding and be extended to the Darfur region. Given the recognition Darfur has globally, the potential is huge and the establishment of a “Darfur Foundation” very achievable.

The one-off budget input would be USD 1 million.

11. RECOMMENDATIONS

This report has confined its recommendations to ten to allow an opportunity to focus on results over a manageable period of time after which others can be taken on board depending on the success of these proposals.

Why these recommendations?
- They are achievable
- They can be divided among UN agencies for direct intervention or support
- They have measurable outcomes
- They are affordable
- They are complementary and can be part of an overall programme
- They can be funded and implemented for both the camps’ and town’s populations
- Those who will benefit include women (Recommendations 2–10), youths (Recommendations 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10), businesses (Recommendations 1, 3, 4, 8, 9), the camp population (Recommendations 1–6, 8, 9), and the town population (Recommendations 1–10)

Before these are addressed, however, there are key factors that the team believes United Nations organizations must discuss in order to create momentum. During the study, discussions with UN
agencies clearly indicated that they are restricted by policy to focus on emergency programmes only, which would prevent their involvement in many, if not all, of the proposed recommendations. Leaving aside what determines emergency and developmental (or recovery) projects, if we were to focus only on time frames, all of the following proposals could be implemented over a two- or three-year period. If it is recognized that a number of larger, better funded initiatives have been implemented over the last five years without changing the situation significantly, it surely justifies the notion that different or at least complimentary approaches are required. This requires a determined shift on the part of all concerned.

11.1 RECOMMENDATION 1

Policy Development

Objective
State government to review existing policies and introduce new policies, as appropriate, towards the creation of flexible approaches to assist people to produce local food, access finance, and create employment.

Much work still needs to be done to bolster state government departments to achieve the capacity required to govern and be of viable service to the Darfur population. Finance, incentives, skill development, and inputs to boost morale are required. Facilitating departmental integration would be important for planning, for implementing town improvements, and for improving relationships with both the town and camp populations. For example, a joint planning initiative with residents, IDPs, and the private sector would create greater dialogue towards a common purpose and go a long way to addressing trust issues.

The state government needs to be seen as a support system to the people, not an obstacle and threat. They must generate viable ideas and implement programmes beneficial to the community. They have to impose taxes along the way, but if they clearly show how this revenue is spent and how it benefits the infrastructure, schools, health system, etc., people will appreciate the improvements being made. This may be an obvious function of government, but North Darfur’s record is poor, and clear strategies need to be formed to enhance their image. There are some extremely powerful personal and corporate development tools that can be used to strengthen government departments. Training in certain skills (finance, planning, etc.) is an ongoing and important feature of performance enhancement supported by UN agencies, but it will count for nothing unless public servants’ commitment and motivation are increased. There are numerous programmes that can be implemented to achieve this outcome, which can be discussed further if there is a decision to proceed down this route.

Recommendations 2–10 that follow clearly require support and input from the state government and relevant departments. Examples of issues that require action and input from the state include land, taxation, and public-private partnerships.

Land
The Darfur Peace Agreement clearly outlines structures and responsibilities with regard to land policies. There is a proposal to establish a land commission, which has not yet been enacted. In the meantime, the governor’s office makes the decisions on land matters in the towns. In rural areas, customary law dominates and has served the people well for hundreds of years. Introducing a more authoritative approach whereby land is registered and allocated through a structured procedure (which is the plan under the Darfur Peace Agreement) is a complicated and potentially volatile process.

The practicality of embarking on an expensive and complicated exercise of land registration needs to be measured against the benefits and general acceptance of the traditional mechanisms. As Morton (2008) accurately points out, property rights are governed by social consensus and supported by the political leadership, not by laws. It is with this in mind that Recommendation 4 on food security suggests that land be set aside for people to cultivate, thus enhancing food production. Town land is a different matter and the swelling El Fasher population requires planning and order. Again, this can be done through consultation with residents, bringing their suggestions and concerns on board.

Taxation
Taxation is a sensitive area and a subject that received criticism from the public during this study. A review of the tax system is recommended to determine where taxes are imposed and how services are supported through tax revenue. If the business sector is to be supported, more palatable tax rates are required. A viable area to generate revenue is through refuse...
collection and disposal services; with an improved service (see Recommendation 7), payment by the public would be justifiable.

Outside investment is required to stimulate the economy, and while current conditions (insecurity, lack of incentives) do not promote investment, a menu detailing sectors eligible for tax relief should be put together to entice investors, particularly in preparation for a more peaceful environment.

An even more complex and sensitive area to consider regarding taxation is the position of the IDPs, primarily those within Abu Shouk. It is a bone of contention among the townspeople that they pay taxes while IDPs do not, yet the IDPs are generating income for the most part because of their proximity to and trade relationship with the town. The IDPs on the other hand refuse out of hand any attempt to pay taxes, stating that they have lost all of their belongings as a result of the conflict, they do not have homes, and they do not receive services from the state government. But to all intents and purposes the camp has become a “suburb” of El Fasher, and at some point a decision will have to be made as to the permanency of the camp dwellers and the possibility of permanent structures being built. Such a decision will require extending services, incorporating the population into the urban framework, and requiring the payment of taxes.

Public-private Partnerships
Public-private partnerships, which have been developed in many countries, have resulted in many mutually beneficial outcomes. The opportunities presently existing in El Fasher are few, but it is something that should be explored, particularly should security improve and the number of investors increase. If the oil industry develops in Darfur, the opportunities will be immense, but it will be incumbent upon the government to ensure that this development comes about through a process of social responsibility whereby communities benefit through employment, infrastructure (community centres, training centres, clinics), and suchlike. That is for the future, but a policy should be prepared well in advance, so that such conditions exist before foreign companies are offered contracts.

11.2 RECOMMENDATION 2
Capacity Strengthening

Objective
Through the Asset-Based Community Development (ABCD) approach, work with communities to empower themselves to address the many difficulties they face – with support from rather than dependency on outside aid.

Outputs from the Project
- 6 community organizers employed
- 200 people trained in the ABCD approach
- 10,000–12,000 people involved
- At least 20 projects proposed by the communities in 3 years

Outline of the Project
Capacity strengthening is sewn into most programme proposals as a worthy and important component, whose existence ensures the growth of an organization and the sustainability of projects. However, methods to achieve this aim are few and are often confined to training only; while effective, this is often not enough to enable an exit strategy for the international organization that provides the comfort of knowing that future projects are in safe hands. There has to be something more, which moves beyond improving someone’s project or financial skills to engendering ownership, responsibility, and a feeling of independence.

This capacity-enhancing strategy has to be aimed at the community itself, to the point where people genuinely feel powerful enough to democratically challenge that which damages their livelihoods and threatens their future. It has to instil the confidence to recognize what is best for the community and the determination to access the resources that will assist them to achieve their aims.

It was noted that the voluntary and civil society sector in North Sudan, including Darfur, has a history dating back to the late 1960s and early 1970s; it initially focused on displaced and street children in the large urban areas and on environmental conservation. This feature of Darfur society remains, and cross-community women’s groups pursue economic and peacemaking activities, often supported by agencies such as Practical Action, SUDO, and SPCR (South Darfur).
One community development tool that strives to work from the inside out is the Asset-based Community Development model. The ABCD model works by first identifying the existing assets of a community; when fully recognized, these assets are pooled, built upon, and used to take the people from where they are to the next level.

The populations of El Fasher and its IDP camps and the area’s nomadic pastoralists have faced war, drought, displacement, deaths of family members, economic hardship, discrimination, and marginalization over a very long period of time. They want what everyone in the world wants: peace, a safe environment, and real opportunities to make a living. The resilience of the people is phenomenal, so why not give them the steering wheel and allow them to steer in the direction they wish to go, not the one they are forced to go?

It is recommended that the IDPs, townspeople, and linked stakeholders are presented with a new way of taking control of their own lives; the establishment of the ABCD approach would be a powerful means to this end. (Please see Appendix 5 for a summary of the approach, drawn up by Cormac Russell.)

If this approach were adopted, it would necessitate the development of a programme that incorporates the employment of “community organizers”, who would be people from the area trained in the skills of ABCD. They would link with selected areas with approximately 1,000–2,000 people each, listing assets, identifying existing groups, and forming associations. Through this process they will identify the strengths and requirements of the community and develop appropriate ways to address them, e.g. lobbying the government, seeking funds to support projects, and developing local initiatives. The community organizers work for the community, who after a three-year period will either employ an organizer or take on the responsibility themselves.

It is proposed to establish this programme in El Fasher town and Abu Shouk camp. Based on the outcomes, an expansion can be considered.

**Estimated Budget over Three Years:** USD 400,000

It is proposed that this programme is facilitated by a UN agency or NGO.

### 11.3 RECOMMENDATION 3

**Appropriate Technology for Construction and Building Materials**

**Objective**

Generate employment and income through developing a consistent approach to the production of appropriate materials for low-cost and sustainable housing.

**Outputs from the Project**

- 400 people gain employment
- Block making is systematized
- 2,000 houses constructed in 3 years
- A house design and materials are agreed upon and consistently used

**Who Will Be Involved?**

UN-HABITAT; UNEP; community representatives; Department of Housing; El Fasher Municipality; NGOs.

**Outline of the Project**

UN-HABITAT is currently identifying in Sudan local, affordable building materials that will seriously reduce the level of environmental degradation being caused by the hundreds of IDPs (primarily) making fired bricks as a source of income. An associated objective is to ensure that this income can be maintained through the acceptance of an alternative brick-making system.

Presently the brick makers require local clay and water, which are mixed and fired. The firing process uses trees, which, along with the collection of firewood for other uses, has caused serious deforestation and clearing of scrubland.

The ongoing testing is to determine the appropriateness of developing stabilized soil blocks, which require soil and water and a bonding and strengthening agent such as cement. This completely eliminates the need for wood. The testing will also look at developing interlocking techniques to reduce the need for mortar.

As previously pointed out, the labour at present is supplied by the IDPs, who construct houses and other small buildings in the town. The construction of permanent units in the camp is prohibited. However, there are an estimated 34,000 IDPs living in El Fasher town, most with relatives. The need for small affordable housing is increasing at a very fast
pace, but there is no quality control monitoring the strength, durability, and resistance of the bricks being produced. This is an area that must be addressed.

The population of El Fasher is estimated to have grown by 250 percent in 5 years. In 2008 alone, 150,000 more Darfurians have been displaced, and the assumption is that they will end up living in camps or towns. A more ordered approach to construction is thus required, whereby plots of land are given over to residential usage and a number of houses are constructed.

There is an urgent need for projected town planning for the next ten years at least. The planning authorities have already drawn up proposals that see large tracts of land given over to housing development, but with insufficient detail given to the provision of services, markets and shops, and community buildings.

UN-HABITAT is heading up a forum in El Fasher that is to work with the government on such matters, while at the same time working with NGOs and technology centres to agree on the most suitable building block. This will see thousands of houses being constructed in a fast, efficient, affordable, and environmentally friendly manner.

Training of people (including existing brick makers) in new systems that use manual compacting machines will be necessary.

**Estimated Budget over Three Years:** USD 1 million

### 11.4 RECOMMENDATION 4

**Food Security**

**Objective**

Present opportunities for IDP camp dwellers and townspeople to produce food locally to complement other inputs and reduce dependency on food aid.

**Outputs of the Project**

- Direct benefits to 1,000 families
- Increase in food availability by 30 percent
- Development or rehabilitation of two surface dams
- 250 acres of land made available

**Who Will Be Involved?**

Departments of Planning, Agriculture, and Water; El Fasher Municipality; community representatives; WFP; FAO; and NGOs.

**Outline of the Project**

An examination of long-term food security needs to look at alternatives to food aid and reliance on market-driven food security. Food aid can be seriously disrupted by insecurity and looting, something that was illustrated on more than one occasion in 2008. WFP’s recent cut in food rations by 50 percent due to staff being murdered and trucks being stolen clearly shows the vulnerability of this mode of survival. Coping mechanisms have evolved over hundreds of years, and while food support is essential to ensure survival and maintain people’s lives, it should not be allowed to eliminate traditional systems. The town’s expanding population is becoming more reliant on food coming through the markets and therefore susceptible to the vagaries of the prices, which are continually rising.

Recommendations 5 and 6 propose complementary and related inputs to improve domestic access to essential food products through small animal holdings and poultry. But, as has already been reported, livelihoods dependent on crop production and livestock keeping have been seriously affected over the last six years due to insecurity, drought, theft, and informal and formal tax burdens. Land has been lost, with people either fleeing for safety to IDP camps and urban locations or deciding to abandon their traditional way of life and seek alternative livelihoods in towns. This results in more pressure on dwindling resources, higher prices, and the importation of foodstuffs from distant locations. With an increase in urban populations and an IDP population that might never return home, this pressure is only going to increase, unless alternative measures are introduced.

It will be necessary to allocate new tracts of land for cultivation, based on relative proximity to the town and accessibility to water. These can be divided into plots and allocated for household or small group production for a given period of time or until routes to personal land and property become safe to travel.

Surface dams for small-scale irrigation and watering animals will be rehabilitated or constructed. These can be expensive undertakings, but FAO and the international NGOs have constructed at least two, which are extremely beneficial to agriculturalists and livestock owners. Costs will vary depending on the size of the dam or the amount of soil to be excavated. They can also be done mechanically or through food-for-work or cash-for-work programmes. It is
suggested that the initial fund required would be USD 500,000.

Seeds and tools will be provided under FAO. The government will provide security. As a project of this type will necessitate people travelling from the town and camps, it is incumbent upon the government to ensure people's safety and secure specific routes to these places of work. The planned peacekeeping forces may be an option.

The initial aim is for 1,000 households to produce enough for themselves and also sell at the market.

**Estimated Budget:** USD 500,000

**11.5 RECOMMENDATION 5**

Small Animal Restocking (Nutrition and Income Focus for Poor Households)

**Objective**

Provide a means to improved nutrition and income opportunities to selected households in the town and camp.

**Anticipated Outcomes**

- Linkages with organizations carrying out similar activities
- Measurable improvements in nutrition and incomes of selected households
- Skills development, particularly for women
- Direct involvement of the Department of Livestock

**Who Will Be Involved?**

Department of Livestock; FAO; NGOs; and interested camp and town community groups.

**Outline of the Project**

One of the proposals presented to the study team by the *omdas* of Abu Shouk camp was for restocking goats. Their proposal suggested that each family (1,500 families) be allocated one male and two female goats, with the objective of improving nutrition, generating income for households, and providing an overall improvement to their livelihoods.

The study agrees with the basic idea of distributing goats to families, but a more cautious and strategic approach would be recommended. The purpose is to provide an input at household level, not to flood the market with animals that may otherwise only encourage the immediate sale of the animals, benefit traders, and eventually leave the poorer households back where they started.

It is proposed that 100 female goats and 6 males are allocated equally to Abu Shouk camp and selected townspeople in the early phase. This could be based on a local management plan for the provision of water and fodder that is acceptable to all local stakeholders. Women should be the recipients, as they and their children are generally the minders of small animals.

There are existing women's groups in both communities, and it is suggested that the project works through structures that are already in place. It is recommended that the groups divide the animals among them in order to benefit from the milk produced. But a facility should be established whereby offspring, or a percentage of offspring, is in turn allocated to carefully selected households – those headed by females and those with low incomes, for example.

Training would be required for the groups to enhance their general and financial management capacity. Agencies such as Oxfam UK and Practical Action have engaged in similar enterprises in the past. There are animal health-care workers trained by Practical Action who could assist the groups.

Initially, the programme would have to pay for appropriate vaccinations, but subsequently the community group would pay for such treatment. However, it is the responsibility of the Department of Livestock to support such initiatives, and they will be involved if government resources are available.

The animals initially should be purchased from local small herders.

This programme could be taken on by a local NGO, with assistance with the initial capital and technical support from FAO.

**Estimated Budget for One Year:** USD 15,000
11.6 RECOMMENDATION 6

Development of a Poultry Production System

Objective
Supplement both the nutrition and income of poor households in El Fasher town and Abu Shouk Camp.

Who Will Be Involved?
Selected groups from both communities supported by a microfinance institution or organization; and FAO and/or the Department of Livestock.

Outline of the Project
- 500 layers are distributed among 100 households, 50 from each community.
- A core group will access the loan, purchase the hens, and select the households for distribution, according to agreed criteria.
- 20 roosters are rotated among the households.
- The focus for the first 18 months will be on the production of eggs for consumption and sale; after that period, when egg production usually reduces, the initial hens will be sold and the income used to replicate and expand the programme.
- Initial training will be given by FAO who will recommend on care, treatment, and appropriate business models.
- Technical support should be accessible from the Department of Livestock, who will provide vaccinations against Newcastle’s disease and monitor for avian flu and other threats.

Estimated Budget
The initial financial requirement will be approximately USD 5,000, but a detailed financial plan with projected gains will be conducted after accessing information about the cost of hens and associated inputs in the El Fasher area.

The project is to be implemented by local organizations.

11.7 RECOMMENDATION 7

Expansion and Development of the Urban Refuse Collection Programme (Environment and Employment Focus)

Objective
Establish an expanded refuse collection and sanitation programme for the town of El Fasher.

Outcomes
- Strengthened capacity of the municipality
- 50 people employed
- Cleaner environment
- Greater awareness among the townspeople of the need for cleanliness and a better environment
- A clear proposal on appropriate recycling processes

Who Will Be Involved?
Municipality of El Fasher; UNICEF; NGOs and community-based organizations; Department of Health; Department for the Environment; the business community; community representatives; and UNEP.

Outline of the Project
As outlined previously, the waste management sector is inadequately staffed and equipped, as 50 workers and 2 trucks for an urban population of over 500,000 people (10,000 per worker!) is not workable. Without serious efforts to address this issue and with the likelihood of the population increasing, there is a grave risk of increasing disease outbreaks.

There is a proposal to privatize this sector, but the details of this were not available to the team. However, we will look at two scenarios – improving the existing set-up and privatizing the sector.

Extra money and new equipment alone will not achieve a “clean town”; there is also a need to develop a new sense of responsibility among the residents and create a feeling of pride in the area they reside. The waste collection system must be viable and people must believe it is possible to have environmentally safe disposal or recycling of market, domestic (including camp), industrial, and hospital waste.

Therefore, it is proposed that a sanitation partnership committee be established, based on the model outlined above. This committee will comprise of representatives from El Fasher Municipality, NGOs
and community-based organizations, UNICEF, the health department, the environment department, the business sector, and the community, and will draw up a programme covering a three-year period, which will transform the sector and change the present image of the town.

While this is being done, there is an immediate need for a minimum of 3 more garbage trucks, another 50 workers, and better management of disposal sites. Training will be required for all employees on their specific roles. There is also a need to erect refuse bins and organize a publicity campaign to encourage people to use them.

An important issue for the partnership to look at is the potential for recycling – particularly plastic bags and other plastic materials.

In the absence of information on the possibility of handing this responsibility over to the private sector, it would be a useful exercise to draw up terms of reference and invite tenders from private companies. The partnership arrangement would still be recommended to appraise tenders, develop terms of reference, and monitor the programme.

**Estimated Budget for Phase 1:** USD 400,000

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**11.8 RECOMMENDATION 8**

**Rehabilitation and Equipping of the Vocational Centre**

**Objective**

Rehabilitate, equip, and expand the vocational centre to develop a functioning and effective training institution and incorporate a community meeting and social facility.

As there is no vocational training centre presently functioning it is important that a facility is created to assist such a large population. It is also an opportunity to organize the centre in such a way as to create a venue for community groups (youth, women’s groups, etc.) to meet and carry out social activities.

**Aims**

- To establish a fully functional vocational training centre, which would be run by the appropriate government department after an initial period of three years
- To train a minimum of 200 people per year in a range of skills such as carpentry, bricklaying, electrics, and motor mechanics
- To provide a community venue for meetings and activities

**Outline of the Project**

A building was constructed before the war for the purpose of vocational training, but it was never equipped or staffed. Therefore, repairs and construction are required, and the offices, workshops, and social areas must be equipped. This could allow for the pilot usage of unique building materials and equipment, focusing on alternative technologies and alternative fuel supplies. Staffing will include management, instruction, administration, cleaning, security, and catering staff.

This is a big project, but the high levels of unemployment, the issues youth face, and the low quality of workmanship show that there is a dire need for a professional centre that will offer a range of skills training.

It is recommended that an agreement be made with the government whereby the centre would be run by an experienced NGO or reputable educational institution for the first three years, before it comes under a government department. During this period, seconded staff from the government would work in the centre and be trained in the management and running of such a facility.

A board should be formed to oversee the management of the centre, comprised of representatives of training and educational institutions, the department of education, the UN, NGOs, and community groups.

**Suggested Budget**

The budget is for three years, giving the centre the opportunity to generate funds to become an economically viable entity. Financial and staffing commitments from the government would be crucial before any agreements are signed.

**Estimated Budget:** USD 1.5 million
11.9 RECOMMENDATION 9
Development of the Microfinance Programme

Objective
Strengthen the microfinance structure in El Fasher and develop a more comprehensive and coordinated approach to allocating loans.

Anticipated Outcomes
- The establishment of a transparent and more flexible microfinance and microcredit facility
- The development of easy access to credit for women
- Strengthening of the system through greater confidence shown by both lenders and borrowers
- A maximum 10 percent default rate
- Measurable and visible businesses and microenterprises

Outline of the Project
The opportunities existing in Sudan to develop the microfinance sector (as presented on page 8) need also to be taken by people, businesses, organizations, and financial institutions in Darfur. The conflict has left banks (e.g. the Agricultural Bank of Sudan) incurring large debts due to loan defaulters, so their confidence needs to be raised to encourage them to establish viable lending mechanisms and be a key component of enhancing the local economy of El Fasher. Risk will be a big factor, but it is suggested that for an initial period microfinance facilities are afforded to urban dwellers only, people who can be followed up, supported, and monitored. Special programmes should also be available to the IDP camp populations, especially for small groups of people wishing to start microenterprises and those who may not have collateral.

A strategic approach is recommended whereby all organizations and institutions involved in allocating loans or financing microprojects are identified and a central data collection point is agreed. A partnership approach is strongly suggested that would include representatives from the various institutions and agencies agreeing on a common strategy to:
- Establish clear guidelines on priority targets, such as women's groups, other socially marginalized groups, and microenterprise individuals or groups.
- Agree on a set of terms and conditions for loans, taking into consideration the obstacles faced by women and other groups who have no collateral.
- Organize the training of staff involved in lending and monitoring loans.
- Publicize information on microfinance.
- Hold workshops that give a human approach to the programme; allow question-and-answer sessions; and ease difficulties for people with literacy problems.

While this approach will not interfere with the independence of each entity, it will offer a more “shared” approach, which will in turn develop confidence among all concerned. Shared information will indicate possible proposals to avoid, illustrate areas that should receive greater focus, and present a clearer picture of the impact microfinance is having on the community as a whole.

This will need coordination, and it is suggested that one of the UN organizations – UNICEF, UNDP, or UNIDO – be requested by the partnership to take on this role.

A related programme for UN-HABITAT to consider is developing a microfinance project for community groups in the town and camp that focuses on making appropriate construction materials and constructing affordable houses.

As a test case, 10–15 people can be identified from a specific area of the town. They are trained in basic business and construction skills. They are then given a loan to build an agreed number of houses, which must be sufficient to pay 75 percent of the initial loan, make enough profit to pay themselves, and commence further construction or undertake the repair of existing houses.

It is recommended that this develops into a “social business”, as opposed to a profit-making enterprise where each individual pays themselves according to the level of profit made. A social business stipulates that there is an agreed payment to people notwithstanding the profit made, and the remainder goes back into the project. This system ensures that, while people receive a steady income, the essence of the project, which is to provide homes to poor people, remains. This is purely a suggestion and it would be up to the group and organization to decide on their methodology.

It would be necessary that technical backup is available and, where appropriate, links are developed with organizations involved in house construction, such as Practical Action and CHF.

Estimated Budget for Two Years: USD 60,000
11.10 RECOMMENDATION 10

Accessible Water for All Urban Residents (Consultancy over Six Months)

Objective
Collate existing research documents on the natural water availability for El Fasher and produce a workable programme to enable the delivery of water to all residents of El Fasher.

Outline of the Project
It has been reported that the majority of people in the town of El Fasher have no direct access to water except through trekking to wells and boreholes or purchasing from water vendors. The water table is reducing; surveys suggest that there are other potential sources and that the government has a plan to seek funds to expand the water scheme for the town.

If this were to succeed, it would still mean that many people could not afford the payment required. Different options must be looked at, with the goal of supplying clean, safe water to all El Fasher residents. The recommendation here is to look at payment on a sliding scale, according to people’s income and living conditions. Such a system would require the government to subsidize the water supply for many, and it may also result in those who can afford the full payment actually paying more.

A very thorough examination of the existing scheme needs to be carried out, as well as a determination of the likelihood of the government proposal actually materializing – there is nothing to be gained by basing the proposal on “ifs, buts, and maybes”! The proposal would need to clearly illustrate the financial details of how the scheme would ensure that the local government receives sufficient revenue to maintain the scheme and that it is affordable to the majority of consumers.

Research carried out over many years reveals varying opinions, from the existence of underground water sources that could easily supply a town of one million people to a more cautious stance based on the belief that existent sources are part of a dwindling water table that will not serve the existing population.

This consultancy should examine reports, corroborate facts, examine government proposals, analyse the potential to access the funds required, and make a solid workable recommendation on the most viable steps forward.

Estimated Budget: USD 20,000
12. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS AND BUDGET

Provisional Total over a Three-year Period: USD 5,932,500

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Estimated Cost USD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cross-cutting</td>
<td>Establishment of an urban partnership</td>
<td>Structural; organizational</td>
<td>Three years</td>
<td>750,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-cutting</td>
<td>Establishment of a foundation (or access to existing foundations)</td>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>Multi-year, but a once-off setting up amount</td>
<td>1 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Policy Development

State government to review existing policies and introduce new policies, as appropriate, towards the creation of flexible approaches to assist people to produce local food, access finance, and create employment.

Government policy review | Ongoing | 0 |

2. Capacity Strengthening

Through the Asset-based Community Development (ABCD) approach, work with communities to empower themselves to address the many difficulties they face – with support from rather than dependency on outside aid.

Development of a stronger civil society | Initially for three years | 400,000 |

3. Appropriate Technology for Construction and Building Materials

Generate employment and income through developing a consistent approach to the production of appropriate materials for low-cost and sustainable housing.

Employment; shelter provision; income generation | Initially for three years | 1 million |

4. Food Security

Present opportunities for IDP camp dwellers and townpeople to produce food locally to complement other inputs and reduce dependency on food aid.

Food production; construction of surface dams; income generation | Two years | 500,000 |

5. Small Animal Restocking

Provide a means to improved nutrition and income opportunities to selected households in the town and camp.

Health and nutrition; food production; income generation | One year | 15,000 |

6. Development of a Poultry Production System

Supplement both the nutrition and income of poor households in El Fasher town and Abu Shouk Camp.

Health and nutrition; food production; income generation | One year | 5,000 |

7. Expansion and Development of the Urban Refuse Collection Programme

Establish an expanded refuse collection and sanitation programme for the town of El Fasher.

Employment; health; environmental | One year | 400,000 |

8. Rehabilitation and Equipping of the Vocational Centre

Rehabilitate, equip, and expand the vocational centre to develop a functioning and effective training institution and incorporate a community meeting and social facility.

Employment; capacity strengthening | Three years | 1.5 million |

9. Development of the Microfinance Programme

Strengthen the microfinance structure in El Fasher and develop a more comprehensive and coordinated approach to allocating loans.

Business development; employment | Two years | 60,000 |

10. Accessible Water for All Urban Residents (Consultancy)

Collate existing research documents on the natural water availability for El Fasher and produce a workable programme to enable the delivery of water to all residents of El Fasher.

Health; revenue | Six months | 20,000 |

13. MEETING THE UN’S MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS

The proposal presented will contribute in some small way to 50 percent of the stated Millennium Goals through addressing food shortages (Goal 1); promoting gender equality and empowerment of women (Goal 3); reducing child mortality (Goal 4); addressing environmental degradation (Goal 7); and developing a global partnership for development (Goal 8).

The specified Millennium Development Goals:

Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education
Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women
Goal 4: Reduce child mortality
Goal 5: Improve maternal health
Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases
Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability
Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development
1. Khalid Gudo Ahmed
BSc Agriculture (Rural Development)
Diploma for computer, electronics
Certificate for First Aid and fighting against HIV
Telephone number 0122868781
Comment: Performed well during conducting interviews and collecting data but further training required on data analysis.

2. Liamon Adam Faris
BSc Agriculture (Rural Development)
Diploma for computer
Certificate for women's development, extension, and literacy
Telephone number 0916358150
Comment: Assisted in the area of social development; performed well in data collection but further experience required, as well as further training in data analysis.

3. Aya Musa Suliaman
BSc Agriculture (Rural Development)
Telephone number 0913676129
Comment: As for No. 2 above.

4. Safa Adam Mohammed
BSc Agriculture (Rural Development)
Telephone number 0913676129, 0122415858

5. Abdoalsater Abdalrahman Mohammed
BSc Agriculture (Rural Development)
Telephone number 0911612144
Comment: Both No. 4 and No. 5 worked in the collection of finance and business data. They demonstrated that they can work independently with little supervision; they were given a prepared checklist to interview families about income and livelihoods, both in town and AbuShouk camp. The result was consistent and concise data. Abdoalsater showed an aptitude for taking notes.

6. Entisar Adam Hamid
BSc Agriculture (Rural Development)
Telephone number 0915026678

7. Fatima Abdalla Ibrahim
Ministry for Social Affairs
Telephone number 0910140063

8. Zobyda Abdelmagid
BSc Agriculture (Rural Development)
Telephone number 0122329087

9. Alhaj Imam
BSc Agriculture (Rural Development)
Telephone number 0122423294
Comment: Trainees 6–8 showed capabilities with supervision and conducted themselves satisfactorily in interviewing and data collection.

General Remarks
All the trainees who attended the programme (three males and six females) said that the programme duration was short but that they have learned new concepts from the workshop, daily sessions, and fieldwork (interviews) – e.g. the merits of Asset-based Community Development versus the needs-based development approach, and the concept of partnership (stakeholders) in community (and goods delivery mechanisms). They participated in identifying constraints and suggesting solutions for economic and community issues.
### Appendix 3: Cost of Managing a Herd of Cattle in an Urban Setting (Herd Size: 45 Cows, 43 Calves, and One Bull)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Cost per unit (SDG)</th>
<th>Total cost (SDG)</th>
<th>Returns (SDG)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Dura</em> (sorghum)</td>
<td>2 sacks per day x 30</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cakes (feed)</td>
<td>1 sack x 30</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1,050</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water for calves</td>
<td>2 tankers x 30</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>360</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watering of cows</td>
<td>45 cows x 30</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,350</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hay or crop residue</td>
<td>100 bundles x 30</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Cost</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>12,700</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milk production</td>
<td>350 litres x 30</td>
<td></td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal residue</td>
<td>4 trucks</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>320</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Income</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>10,820</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net returns</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-1,880</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Appendix 4: Labour Requirement and Gross Margins for Crop-Based Systems in North Darfur (SDG)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Millet</th>
<th><em>Dura</em></th>
<th>Tomato</th>
<th>Potato</th>
<th>Tobacco</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Breakdown</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Breakdown</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Breakdown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land rent</td>
<td><em>feddan</em></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>250 x 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seeds</td>
<td><em>kg</em></td>
<td>4 kg x 1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3 x 0.36</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planting</td>
<td><em>mandays</em></td>
<td>3 x 7</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4 x 7</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>4 x 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First weeding</td>
<td><em>mandays</em></td>
<td>6 x 8</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>9 x 8</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>10 x 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second weeding</td>
<td><em>mandays</em></td>
<td>3 x 7</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3 x 7</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5 x 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deflowering</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tractor ploughing</strong></td>
<td><em>feddan</em></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>70 x 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrigation</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harvesting</td>
<td><em>mandays</em></td>
<td>3 x 7</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>7 x 7</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>600 x 0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Processing</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spraying</td>
<td><em>feddan</em></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Packing</td>
<td><em>sack</em></td>
<td>1 x 4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5 x 4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>30 x 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td><em>sack</em></td>
<td>1 x 5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5 x 5</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>600 x 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Storage</td>
<td><em>sack</em></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total cost</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>124</td>
<td>216.1</td>
<td>2,236</td>
<td>3,165</td>
<td>2,694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output</strong></td>
<td><em>kg</em></td>
<td>75 x 0.9</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>600 x 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gross margin</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>-56.5</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>763</td>
<td>1,806</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 5: SUMMARY OF THE ABCD APPROACH

Asset-based Community Development – An Overview

What Is ABCD? It is an approach to community-based development, based on the principles of:

- Appreciating and mobilizing individual and community talents, skills, and assets (rather than focusing on problems and needs).
- Community-driven development rather than development driven by external agencies.

It builds on:

- **Appreciative inquiry**, which identifies and analyses the community’s past successes. This strengthens people’s confidence in their own capacities and inspires them to take action.
- The recognition of **social capital** and its importance as an asset. This is why ABCD focuses on the power of associations and informal linkages within the community, and the relationships built over time between community associations and external institutions.
- **Participatory approaches to development**, which are based on principles of empowerment and ownership of the development process.
- **Community economic development** models that place priority on collaborative efforts for economic development that makes best use of its own resource base.
- Efforts to strengthen **civil society**. These efforts have focused on how to engage people as citizens (rather than clients) in development, and how to make local governance more effective and responsive.

How Is ABCD Facilitated?

ABCD is a process of self-mobilization and organizing for change. This process has happened spontaneously in many communities. The challenge for an external agency, such as an NGO, is to stimulate this process in other communities without having the opposite effect of creating dependency. There are a set of methods that can be used, but it is important not to consider this a blueprint, but more as guidelines for achieving community-driven development. We are already seeing variations in how ABCD is facilitated by different NGOs.

1. Collecting Stories
To begin building confidence in the community, informal discussions and interviews that draw out people’s experience of successful activities and projects will help to uncover the gifts, skills, talents, and assets people have. Not only does this uncover assets that people have not recognized before, but it also strengthens people’s pride in their achievements. This celebration of achievement and realization of what they have to contribute builds confidence in their abilities to be producers, not recipients, of development.

2. Organizing a Core Group
In the process of collecting stories, particular people will emerge as leaders in the community – people who have shown commitment and leadership in the past or who are currently taking a leadership role. The next step is to organize a group of such committed individuals who are interested in exploring further the community’s assets and acting on the opportunities identified. Each of these individuals will have a network of relationships inside the community whom they can draw in to the process. Each of these individuals will have a personal interest – something that motivates him or her to act.

3. Mapping Completely the Capacities and Assets of Individuals, Associations, and Local Institutions
Mapping is more than gathering data. It is very important that citizens and their associations do the asset mapping themselves so that they themselves build new relationships, learn more about the contributions and talents of community members, and identify potential linkages between different assets.

**Mapping the local economy** is an exercise that helps people in the community understand how the local economy works, showing how well local resources are maximized for local economic benefit. Are products and services imported that could be produced locally?

4. Convening a Broad Representative Group to Build a Community Vision and Plan
During this part of the process, assets are matched with opportunities around an “organizing theme” – a vision for community development. An activity is selected within that organizing theme for the community to begin working on right away. It needs to be concrete (people know what to do to succeed, and what success will look like), immediate, achievable with community resources, unifying (it brings people together), and strengthening (people’s skills are used and valued).
How is this process managed? It is important that the representative group that is convened reflects the energy that has been identified at the associational level. Institutions take a backseat role, leaving decision making to those who have been identified as leaders in the community with key links to associational networks.

5. Mobilizing Assets for Community Development
The process continues as an ongoing mobilization of community assets for economic development and information sharing purposes, initiated by the associational base. Associations are encouraged to engage by appealing to their interests, finding common ground and ensuring that they are contributing on their own terms. Eventually, an “association of associations” emerges.

6. Leveraging Activities, Investments and Resources from Outside the Community to Support Asset-based, Locally Defined Development
The process of realizing the community vision begins with associations asking themselves “What can we do to make this vision happen?” External resources are not tapped until local resources have been utilized. This puts the community in a position of strength in dealing with outside institutions.

APPENDIX 6: TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE ECONOMIC PROFILING MISSION IN DARFUR

Background:
The conflict in the Sudan has had devastating impacts on overall development in the country, particularly in the southern region and in Darfur. The level of infrastructure is low. Access to markets has been made difficult, not only due to intensity of conflict, but due to lack of useable roads. Links between communities have been cut off. Basic services, water, electricity and the like are scarce, increasing the burden on communities, particularly on women. The displacement of populations as a result of the conflict and scarce economic opportunities is the highest in the world. There have been an estimated 4 million IDPs inside the Sudan and an additional 570,000 refugees in neighbouring countries. In particular the escalating levels of conflict and the increasing level of insecurity and targeting of humanitarian agencies have severely impacted on the civilians of Darfur. It is estimated that the number of affected people according to the UN Darfur humanitarian profile No. 27 April 2007 is 4.1 million, of which 2.1 million are registered IDPs.

Compared to April 2006 the caseload of conflict affected populations has increased by 550,000, while access has dropped from 78 percent to 68 percent. Virtually the entire population of Darfur may be considered to be affected by the war. Communities have been severely impacted or destroyed. Apart from the 80 percent of displaced who have lost everything they owned, every community whether they be sedentary rural farmers or nomadic pastoralists, public sector workers or urban dwellers have seen their livelihoods severely disrupted. Basic services are overloaded or have ceased, markets are curtailed, and freedom of movement and personal security are severely threatened and compromised, through gender-based violence and physical attacks on people and property.

In the current crisis, the joint programme of the Resident Coordinator’s Office, UNEP, and UN-HABITAT aims to safeguard and begin to build up sustainable livelihood options, minimizing environmental degradation and potential conflicts. In this context, it is difficult to measure the absolute economic benefits of the situation, particularly with no baseline information available. The overall objective of the UN-HABITAT programme component is to build a foundation for post-conflict sustainable recovery in Darfur through adaptation and implementation of woodless building techniques and strengthening capacities on land regularization and dispute resolution processes. The programme component will enable IDPs to reconstruct their
shelter and community infrastructure through aided self-help using local material resources. The programme will enable the community to:

1. Improve its housing situation. This has implications on household well-being and wealth.
2. Acquire new skills that will enhance their income-generating possibilities.
3. Provide land security of tenure, which further enhances shelter investment and improvement.
4. Mitigate deforestation, which leads to protecting environmental resources and enhancing community livelihoods.
5. Stimulate the formation of small businesses among community groups, including building materials providers, contractors, and tool makers.

At the national level, shelter investment has a positive multiplier effect on the economy, especially if it is labour-intensive and utilizes local human and materials resources. It generates employment and has forward and backward linkages with other sectors of the economy.

It is anticipated that large movements to urban areas of perceived economy opportunity will take place. It is important that support be provided to improve existing infrastructure and establish necessary systems in areas where people are expected to converge. It is important that infrastructure is viewed as a comprehensive need, linked closely with economic needs of the populations as they move. Additionally, these issues combine in the longer term to form the critical foundations for sustainable human settlement development in Darfur. Infrastructure and economic opportunities will also have a great impact on the process of securing peace and re-establishing connections among and between communities. This is a vital component in the long-term stability and development of the region.

In light of this, the economic profiling entails identifying areas of existing or potential economic opportunity in Darfur; determining the impact of these opportunities on host and returning communities; developing a clear picture of requirements (technical assistance, capacity building, infrastructure support, etc.) related to key areas of economic opportunity in Darfur; and preparing recommendations for primary economic activities in the region. The implementation methodology entails the training of local assessment teams on the assessment methodology. The first two economic profiling assessments will be conducted as a joint exercise by two profiling experts and the local economic profiling assessment teams. This way the programme will also sustain local capacity for undertaking follow-up assessments.

The profiles gather and assess relevant socio-economic information on a participatory basis to identify opportunities and key needs for settlement recovery to reduce existing poverty and unemployment.

**Target Study Locations:**
The two economic profiling assessments will be undertaken in two Darfur towns and their environs. The exact locations are to be confirmed.

**Phase I – Scoping Mission to Khartoum and Potentially to Darfur (One Week)**
The objectives of the scoping mission are the following:
- Familiarization with local conditions, environment, and dynamics.
- Meeting with programme partners and stakeholders.
- Preliminary data collection.
- Conducting an introductory workshop for potential trainers to introduce the assessment methodology and assessment objectives.
- Selection of two assessment teams.
- Two-day training workshop for the assessment team.
- Preparation of a work plan for the economic profiling exercise for November–October 2007.

Mission outputs:
- Confirmed composition of the two assessment teams.
- Initial training on the assessment methodology.
- Work plan for the economic profiling mission.

Scoping mission implementation:
To be undertaken by two consultants over a period of one week in Khartoum and/or Darfur (to be confirmed).
Phase II – Economic Profiling for 2–3 Weeks at the Target Locations

The objectives of the economic profiling are the following:

- Identify areas of existing or potential economic opportunity in Darfur.
- Determine the impact of these opportunities on host and returning communities.
- Develop a clear picture of requirements (technical assistance, capacity building, infrastructure support, etc.) related to key areas of economic opportunity in Darfur.
- Prepare recommendations for primary economic activities in the region.

Expected mission inputs:

- Use of appropriate data collection instruments and methodologies for socio-economic data collection at each of the identified locations sufficiently comprehensive to deliver the expected outputs (see below).
- Use of appropriate data analysis assessment instruments/methods for delivering the expected outputs (see below).

Expected outputs:

- Two study area socio-economic reports.
- Each report containing a section on information and analysis as relevant and as follows:
  - General Situation Assessment covering a crisis situation to be addressed, main economic problems identified, affected population groups, gender/socio-cultural issues, any structural issues impacting on the target area, economic situation, human rights and political context, social system and programmes, legal and administrative framework, international and local assistance programmes, and active development organizations in the area.
  - Capacity Assessment for Constituents covering the community in general, local authorities, local economic actors, local development organizations, and others of relevance.
  - Sectoral Assessments for Programme Planning covering vocational training and public employment programmes, social security protection, labour market and employment prospects, social dialogue, microfinance and credit services, business advisory and technical services, potential for labour-intensive works, and special target groups.
  - Economic Gaps Relevant to the Study Area.
  - Socio-economic Information covering any macro-economic data available, historical timeline, population information, climate and environment, buildings and facilities, water resources and infrastructure, roads infrastructure and transport, housing infrastructure, power supply resources, telecommunications and information flows, airports/airstrips, important economic sectors and currencies, important market centre relationships, inventory of town businesses and main employers, grazing resources and livestock migration, vegetation and wildlife resources, and sites of interest – historical, archaeological, touristic, etc.
  - Legal and Regulatory Framework covering the judicial system, business licensing, taxation, land allocation systems, and other issues as relevant.
  - Socio-economic Dynamics covering a resource map, seasonal calendar, market day, development dimensions, socially sensitive segments/areas, income sources and preferences, information and commercial flows for each active economic sector, and any other monetary flows (remittances, etc.).
  - Expressed Needs of the Community.
  - Local Resource Persons.

- Each report containing a section on conclusions and recommendations as relevant and as follows:
  - General Study Conclusions.
  - Conclusions and Recommendations – infrastructure (including opportunities for labour-intensive works).
  - Conclusions and Recommendations – development of the capacity-building sector in preparation for transition to post conflict development.
  - Conclusions and Recommendations – interventions in sectors with business growth potential and potential for improving/creating livelihoods and jobs.

Mission implementation:
The field inputs will be delivered by two consultants over two to three weeks at the target locations.
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