

DEVELOPING A NATIONAL SHELTER STRATEGY: LESSONS FROM FOUR COUNTRIES

United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat)

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FOREWORD

The provision of adequate shelter to all sectors of the community is a complex and a daunting task, which can only be realized through harnessing of all resources at the disposal of a nation. The formulation and implementation of national shelter strategies based on the principle of an "enabling" approach, is therefore the cornerstone of the Global Strategy for Shelter to the Year 2000. National shelter strategies should provide an evolving framework for national and international action and for the allocation of scarce national resources.

Since the available global experience in the formulation of comprehensive and integrated national shelter strategies is limited, this study on developing national shelter strategies was undertaken as a first step towards developing a systematic body of knowledge on the subject, reviewing the experience of four countries which have attempted, prior to the adoption of the Global Strategy for Shelter, to develop a national housing strategy of their own. Pooling of global knowledge and experience, as well as development of a national and global feedback system, will provide countries with an opportunity to learn from each other, and improve profoundly, each country's performance in improving the shelter conditions of its people.

The study, as could be expected, does not lead to the recommendation of a step-by-step formula for shelter strategy formulation, which when followed diligently, would assure success. On the contrary, it supports the view that diverse approaches and processes, which reflect the unique socio-political needs and parameters of individual countries, are capable of producing solid and effective shelter strategies which address the urgent shelter issues facing the country. At the same time, the study also identifies several distinct patterns that would guide other countries in the process of formulating their own national shelter strategies.

I wish to thank the Finnish International Development Agency and the United States Agency for International Development for financial assistance made available for the study and also the Urban Institute, Washington D.C., and the team of consultants who undertook the study. A special word of thanks is also due to the Governments of Barbados, Jamaica, Kenya and Zimbabwe for the co-operation extended in this work.



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Under-Secretary-General
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PREFACE

This report has been prepared by Richard J. Struyk, based on monographs prepared by separate writers as described below.

The work reported on is very much a team effort. The experience of each of the four countries included has been documented in a separate monograph prepared as part of the overall project. These monographs have been the essential inputs for this analysis. Three of the four authors of the monographs - Marja Hoek-Smit, Margery A. Turner, and Christopher Walter - participated in designing the content of the study generally and the monographs in particular. In addition, after the monographs had been drafted, they were part of lively discussions about the common points and differences among the four countries and what these implied about doing better in the future. The author of the fourth monograph - Sara Wakeham - could not participate in these events because she lives in Nairobi. Nevertheless, her contribution goes beyond her monograph. During the final work of preparation done by Raymond J. Struyk, she provided a broad and wise perspective on national policy development.

Beyond these four authors, other contributors deserve recognition. Members of the staff of the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat) saw the need for this type of analysis and vigorously supported it throughout, giving insightful comments at every stage. Howard Sumka of the United States Agency for International Development was a key force behind the Agency's early efforts to assist countries in developing national housing strategies and a consistent supporter of the present publication. Outi Berghall, of the Finnish Ministry of the Environment, provided helpful reactions to the early plans, participated in the field visit for the Jamaican case study, and gave thoughtful and thorough comments on a draft. Lastly, a great vote of thanks is owed to all those people in and out of government in the four countries who gave generously of their time in helping reconstruct the details of the strategy development process and in making observations on where improvements might be made.

This study was undertaken by the Urban Institute, Washington, D.C., and a team of consultants, in co-operation with the Governments of Barbados, Jamaica, Kenya and Zimbabwe and with financial assistance from the Finnish International Development Agency, the United States Agency for International Development and the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat). Publication and distribution of the team's report by the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat) does not imply that the concerned Governments or the Centre necessarily agree with all the conclusions contained therein.

Mention of firm names and commercial products does not imply the endorsement of the United Nations.

The views expressed in this publication are those of the team which produced it and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations Secretariat.

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SUMMARY

The extraordinary challenge faced by developing countries in providing minimally adequate housing for their citizens is widely recognized. In 1988 the General Assembly of the United Nations unanimously adopted the Global Strategy for Shelter to the Year 2000 which calls for a shift in national housing policies in the direction of mobilizing the full potential and resources of all the actors in the shelter sector, with governments creating the conditions under which the private sector - formal and informal, individual families, businesses, non-governmental organizations, and community groups - can more effectively contribute to the shelter production and improvement process. It also calls for countries to engage in serious planning efforts at the sector level to increase the efficiency of housing production. Central to these planning efforts is the development of national shelter strategies.

In the years prior to the adoption of the Global Strategy a few countries had developed a national housing strategy, often with donor support. As part of the present study, detailed reviews of four of these strategy development processes were conducted, i.e., those in Barbados, Jamaica, Kenya, and Zimbabwe (a summary of each case study is annexed to this document). This report summarizes the lessons that can be drawn from these experiences so that other countries and the donor community can draw upon them to improve the process of developing national shelter strategies.

Case summaries

The following thumbnail sketches of the experience of the four countries prior to 1989 sets the stage for the summary of "lessons" which is presented below.

Barbados: The actual strategy-development phase was essentially a continuation of a longer-term policy-development process which had begun five years earlier. Before the final phase of the strategy-development process began, general agreement on the new policy objectives had already been achieved. Strategy development was supported by funding under a sector loan from a donor, including assignment of a long-term advisor to the relevant ministry who participated fully in the process. There was strong support for the policy-development effort over its extended period (1979-

1986), including the final two years on which this study focuses. Some elements of the new policy began to be implemented prior to completion of the strategy. However, for a variety of reasons, further implementation after its completion has been somewhat stalled.

Jamaica undertook a formal strategy-development effort in a compressed time-frame so that the results could be presented at the meetings held on the occasion of the International Year of Shelter for the Homeless. This planning effort built on a major sectoral policy review completed in 1982. It enjoyed strong direction and continued support at the ministerial level. The donors provided a modest amount of technical assistance. Those managing the process developed a broad backing for the policies defined. The strategy was formally adopted by the Government and it is being implemented with considerable donor co-operation and loan funds.

Kenya undertook a formal strategy development effort in a compressed time-frame so that the strategy formulated could be presented at the tenth Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Settlements held in 1987 (the International Year of Shelter for the Homeless). While those organizing the strategy-development process attempted to develop wide support for the strategy, they did not succeed, apparently in part because of the time pressures. The strategy process also failed to mobilize and benefit from direction and support at the political level. The donors provided substantial help in the form of short-term technical assistance to the process. The strategy formulated has not yet been implemented, but it has provided a substantial base for further policy development.

The **Zimbabwean** experience contrasts with the two foregoing cases in that: (a) it was a country-initiated and-led effort with no significant donor impetus or assistance; (b) it had an extended development period of about two years; (c) it has been subject to consultation and refinement during the implementation phase, rather than during development; and, (d) it was structured more as a policy paper than a strategy and therefore had a somewhat narrower scope than the strategies in the other countries. The strategy itself builds on several donor-supported technical analyses done prior to actual strategy development. In addition,

those developing the strategy had participated in broad policy-development exercises in the years immediately preceding this effort. The process enjoyed strong ministerial support throughout, and some of the policies developed are being implemented.

The strategies developed have in common that they define a greater role for the private sector in housing production and qualitative changes in the role for government agencies. The reorientation means different things in different countries: for example, the Government maintains a substantial, but significantly reduced, role in Zimbabwe compared with the situation shortly after independence in 1980.

The strategy statements generally give careful consideration to constraints to high-volume production caused by problems in land, housing finance, building and subdivision regulations, and government sector policies. However, other areas which are also important generally receive little attention. Most significantly, it is typical that insufficient information is developed on how low-income "informal" housing markets are operating. This omission is especially problematic as it means the necessary basis for truly enabling policies is absent for many components of the strategy. Moreover, housing-related infrastructure services, the demand for rental housing and the role of housing in economic growth and employment generation receive only light treatment.

Finally, only one of the statements (Barbados) contained a detailed implementation plan and schedule and therefore met the narrow test of constituting a formal strategy. The other countries produced something closer to a policy statement. The omission of the plans meant that implementation would be delayed while the plans were developed or it would proceed without firm guidance. Yet stopping short of a full strategy statement - complete with detailed implementation schedules and plans - may have been sensible in these countries, since the general thrust of the strategy had not yet received official approval. Even in these cases, however, more attention could have been given to assigning responsibility to specific actors and to outlining implementing actions. In general, future strategy development efforts could profit from a more thorough consideration of current production levels and methods, the workings of the informal

sector, and a comprehensive examination of the role of housing in the economy.

How would one calculate the "success rate" of these strategy development efforts? By almost any standard, one would classify the results in Jamaica and Zimbabwe as clear successes because there are obvious signs of subsequent programme shifts consistent with the strategy. In Barbados the development of the strategy *per se* was the best of all the countries because of its thoroughness, but a change in Government and withdrawal of support by a major donor impaired the pace of implementation. However, it is far too early to discount the ultimate effects in Barbados. Similarly, in Kenya, given a longer time-frame, it may turn out that the combination of the strategy process in 1986/87 and a new effort begun in late 1988 to look at urban land-use problems may yield significant benefits for the country. In general it seems clear that the perceived benefits of a period of concentrated policy development at the sectoral level increase over time, as the technical analyses and coalition building among the various actors involved in the shelter delivery process begin to be exploited.

Common patterns and lessons

Perhaps the clearest lesson is that diverse approaches and processes are capable of producing solid, useful strategy or policy statements which have been implemented to varying degrees. Hence, there is no single step-by-step formula which should be followed in most cases, if success is to be assured. Nevertheless, there are some common patterns associated with the development of policy analysis, strong strategy statements and the initial stages of implementation.

Getting started

Two actions prior to undertaking the development of a housing strategy are important. One is for the principal architects of the strategy to have had recent experience in the formulation of sector-level housing policy. The other is for key technical analyses, such as housing-demand analysis, a housing-needs assessment, and selected sectoral analysis (housing finance, building regulations) to have been completed. The more compressed the period for strategy development and the weaker the recent experience, the stronger the need for these

analyses to be available from the start. In general, the value of such analyses appears to be much greater over the longer term than the country or the donor community often realizes.

In initiating the strategy development process, high-level political sponsorship is a *sine qua non* of a successful outcome. This sponsorship - usually by the Minister of Housing - must be sustained through the development process and into implementation; and it must be translated into specific action - including making the requisite senior leadership and staff resources available. In instances where the housing ministry is relatively weak, and it appears it will be difficult to get other ministries to co-operate, it may be correct to limit the scope of the exercise to those areas more explicitly under its control and later to branch out - after demonstrable success has been achieved. This appears to be the model followed in Zimbabwe.

Formulating the strategy

One question which it was hoped to resolve through this study was whether there was a particularly good way to organize the strategy-development process. The answer is quite clearly "No". Successful strategy development or implementation programmes have resulted both from cases in which development was done by a single agency and where a broader coalition-building approach was taken. Under both formats those in charge found ways to develop the technical analysis, arrive at a strategy formulation which balanced the competing claims of key interest groups, and build and maintain a sufficient array of support that implementation could proceed.

A tricky problem for larger countries is obtaining necessary input from and building support with the private sector and key government bodies during the strategy-development period. Use of a system of committees on various topics (e.g., land, housing finance) created for this purpose proved unwieldy and difficult to sustain in Jamaica and Kenya. Other options for obtaining these inputs are holding a series of hearings chaired by members of the steering committee or conducting a series of workshops or seminars organized on a topical basis when the planning process is initiated and when a draft strategy is ready for review. A *prima facie* case in favour of such coalition building, regardless of how the needed inputs are obtained,

can be made on the grounds that without the discipline of formal outreach there will be a tendency for the strategy to have too narrow a focus.

A clear conclusion from examining the experiences of the four countries is that those formulating the strategy need solid technical analysis as the foundation for their work. Proper analyses of particular sectoral problems, a clear understanding of the operations of markets serving lower-income households, and an assessment of housing needs are essential. In the four study countries too much effort was probably devoted to the housing-needs assessment (although the assessment did play a useful role). Certainly in Kenya and Zimbabwe too little effort has been made to understand how informal housing markets work: how is land assembled? how are units financed? what kind and quality of housing under what tenure form is produced?¹ Answers to these queries are the foundation of innovative government policies.

As indicated earlier, not all of these analyses could or should be undertaken as part of the strategy effort *per se*. Rather, it would be desirable for most to be done in advance if the strategy development process is to be fairly brief (a year or less), with modest additional efforts commissioned to supplement the analyses already available. This was certainly the model followed in Jamaica and Zimbabwe. Alternatively, if the Zimbabwe model (described below) of first defining a "core strategy" is followed, some topics and the associated analysis can be postponed until the broader topics are addressed.

How much and what kind of technical assistance should the donors offer to provide? It appears that when one has been involved, a long-term advisor has consistently served a useful purpose in the strategy-development process. (In these cases the advisors were expatriate.) Often these people were assigned to the ministry for more general housing policy development and management tasks and were drawn into the process, frequently for a large share of their time. These consultants served various roles in providing a broader perspective on the country's problems and sometimes an enriched set of policy alternatives. The kind of steady interaction, guidance, and simple inputs so provided consistently proved valuable.

While the presence of a long-term advisor is desirable, the timing of providing one may prove difficult given the long lead period for funding, recruiting and, in the case of expatriates, placing such people in the field. Expatriates could easily not arrive in time to participate in a locally-originated strategy-development process. As a perhaps superior alternative, in some cases an appropriate local advisor may be available. Failing this, the best approximation may be two or three several-month visits by a consultant already with considerable experience and standing in the country. It is important, however, for the consultant's terms of reference to emphasize assistance rather than the production of a report for submission to the funding agency.

Short-term consultancies also proved their worth in a number of cases, but the proper management of these resources may be more demanding than that of the long-term advisor. Short-term advisors are well suited to doing the detailed technical analysis needed on a tight timetable to permit more comprehensive policy planning to go forward. In addition, they can be useful in offering policy suggestions somewhat more radical than those permanently present may be willing or able to advance. At the same time, their presence can be disruptive to the process of developing consensus and commitment to the strategy if they are accorded too prominent a role or advance their own agenda too forcefully. This suggests that the exact role which short-term consultants are to serve should be carefully defined in composing their terms of reference and this should be adhered to during their visit.

Implementation

The successful implementation of a strategy is generally crucially dependent upon the degree of support developed for it during its development and sustained into the action phase. Only in Zimbabwe, where the scope of the strategy itself was relatively limited and the implementation process deliberately involved further refinement of the implementing policies, was successful implementation achieved without developing prior support. That having been noted, it has also been observed at several points that there is clearly a variety of ways to develop the necessary backing. Obviously, success additionally requires skill, flexibility

and a deft touch in implementing the elements of the strategy.

Having stressed the need for political support for successful implementation, a key issue is how to sustain momentum in the face of shifts in leadership. While there is probably no defence against wilful lethargy at the ministerial level, the odds for success presumably increase with official endorsement of the strategy and the generation of backing among local officials, private developers and households through a quick start on implementing the more tractable parts of the strategy.

With the exception of Barbados where, implementation has proceeded slowly, none of the countries developed comprehensive action plans for implementation until after the general principles stated in the strategy were endorsed. It may be that the second stage of implementation planning is just too onerous and time-consuming for most countries to tolerate. Because there is a premium on maintaining support for the strategy as implementation is begun, quick action without undue delay for more planning may be the effective model. Detailed planning as part of implementation may be the wise course.

Donor enthusiasm for implementing the strategies is somewhat difficult to track. On the one hand, the strategy has served as a clear basis for donor-proposed action. This was the case in Jamaica, where the United States Agency for International Development has been very active in supporting implementation, and in Barbados, where the strategy served as the framework for developing a housing sector loan, but negotiations broke down over some specific policy points. In Kenya, where the strategy has not yet gone through the full process of being adopted by the Government, the strategy has so far not served as a focal point for action, although the donors have encouraged the Government to follow some of its recommendations. The situation in Zimbabwe falls between these two extremes.

A fundamental implication of countries adopting an "enabling" role for government agencies in the housing sector is that housing policies have become much more difficult to execute. It is quite easy to organize the construction of units compared with improving a land- registration or housing-finance system or to

reform a water-supply parastatal. Under an enabling strategy, countries will require different types of technical assistance from those in the past as well as studies of housing market operations, especially as the basis for bridging the space between policy development and the definition of a specific action plan for reforming and improving specific institutions. Obviously, under an enabling approach development of a formal strategy to guide government action is also more critical.

The final observation is that successfully designing and implementing a national housing strategy is technically and politically demanding. Few developed countries are able to achieve the type of thorough-going reform which is needed in housing policies because of the strength of vested interests and other factors. Viewed in that light, the countries examined have done remarkably well as a group. It is to be hoped that their counterparts will be even more successful as the kind of lessons enumerated above are digested and acted upon by both the countries and the donor community.

INTRODUCTION

Developing countries face an extraordinary challenge in developing policies to promote the occupancy of minimally adequate housing by all their citizens. Low household incomes, accelerating urbanization, and rapid population growth all contribute to the magnitude of the task. One analyst estimates that developing countries as a group must produce about 45 million additional units of minimally acceptable housing each of the years immediately ahead if they are to meet their housing needs. (Struyk, 1988: 11) National shelter strategies are critical road maps for reaching the ambitious objective of minimally adequate dwellings and associated infrastructure services for all households.

In 1988 the United Nations added urgency to the development of national strategies in the context of the creation of the Global Strategy for Shelter to the Year 2000, under which a concerted worldwide effort is being made to achieve adequate housing for all households. (United Nations, 1988)¹ The Global Strategy is based on the national shelter strategies that are to be prepared by all members of the United Nations. Hence, in the next few years many countries will be undertaking the development of these national strategies, most for the first time.

The donor community has strongly endorsed the Global Strategy. The Strategy statement includes a fundamental policy change in adopting an "enabling" approach under which individual households and private suppliers are the key actors in developing housing of all quality levels, and governments are assigned the demanding task of creating environments in which households, firms, non-governmental organizations and community groups - in both the formal and informal sectors - can operate effectively and efficiently. Governments will seldom act as direct developers of housing in the future but may well work closely with private entities in "public-private" partnership arrangements. The requirement for national shelter strategies to guide government action is also seen as essential, and the donor community is committed to helping. The Finnish Government and the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements

(Habitat) have already created a pilot project to assist countries in developing their strategies.

Several countries had conducted formal national shelter strategy development exercises during the period 1984 to 1988, often with donor assistance and often as a part of their preparations for the International Year of Shelter for the Homeless, 1987. Based on a detailed review carried out as part of this study of four such cases - those in Barbados, Jamaica, Kenya and Zimbabwe - and additional experience in Indonesia and Jordan, this document seeks to draw lessons about:

(a) The effectiveness of alternative ways in which countries can organize their strategy-development programmes;

(b) The type of donor assistance which is most effective and the conditions under which it can be usefully provided.²

The overall objective is to provide guidance to countries undertaking this work as well as to the donors, guidance that will enhance the likelihood that clear, workable and effective strategies will be developed and implemented.

These four countries were selected from some seven or eight countries known to have developed a shelter strategy. The criteria for selecting countries for inclusion in this study were to: achieve some range of representation among regions, i.e., not all from Africa; include countries which had undertaken formal strategy-development exercises as well as those where the strategies emerged out of less well-defined process (e.g., Zimbabwe); and, to illustrate a range of outcomes - not all cases selected were "winners". In addition, inclusion depended on the willingness of a country to participate in the study and the interest of the agencies supporting the study in these countries on other grounds.

As detailed below, the four countries included in the study followed rather different paths in developing their strategies. They also represent a

^{1/} The Global Strategy for the Year 2000 was endorsed by the United Nations Commission on Human Settlements in April 1988 and was subsequently unanimously adopted by the General Assembly in December 1988.

^{2/} The summaries of the monographs on the four countries' experiences are included in the annex. Full citations are provided in "References" at the end of the paper. The authors of the monographs and the countries they covered are: Turner, Barbados; Walker, Jamaica; Wakeham, Kenya; and Hoek-Smit, Zimbabwe.

Table 1. Basic indicators for study countries

	Barbados	Jamaica	Kenya	Zimbabwe
Population, 1985 (thousands)	254	2, 200	20, 400	8, 400
Average annual population growth, 1980-1985 (percentage)	0.5 ^a	1.6	4.1	3.7
Per capita GNP (\$US)	4, 630	940	290	680
Average annual GNP growth rate, 1965-1985 (percentage)	2.3	-0.7	1.9	1.6

Note: ^a 1970-1982.

Sources: World Bank (1987); Struyk (1988), table 2.2

wide spectrum of countries in terms of income level and population growth as shown in table 1. Differences in these factors fundamentally effect the type of housing problems each country confronts. The concern, however, is not with the details of the strategies themselves but rather with the process by which they were developed.

A. Case summaries

To understand some of the material presented about the process and outcomes it will be useful to have a brief characterization of each of the four cases before proceeding.

Barbados: The final strategy development took place after several years of advance study and the formal adoption by the Government of a statement of objectives of national shelter policy. There was strong high-level support for developing the plan throughout the total seven-year planning and strategy-development period. Once completed in 1986, however, there was a change of leadership in the sector and implementation has been slow.

Jamaica undertook a formal strategy-development effort in a compressed time-frame. It maintained high-level support and succeeded in developing broad backing. The strategy was formally adopted by the Government and is being implemented.

Kenya also undertook a formal strategy-development effort in a compressed time-frame. While

those organizing it attempted to develop wide support for the strategy, they did not succeed. The strategy formulated has not yet been implemented, although it is contributing to subsequent policy development.

Zimbabwe contrasts with the Jamaican and Kenyan cases in that it was: (a) a country-led effort with no significant donor impetus or assistance; (b) had an extended development period of about two years; (c) has been subject to consultation and refinement during the implementation phase, rather than during development; and (d) had a somewhat narrower scope than the others. It enjoyed strong ministerial support throughout.

Looking across the four strategy statements that were developed, one is struck by the extent to which they anticipate the policy redirection enunciated in the United Nations Global Strategy for Shelter to the Year 2000. To varying degrees they all move direct housing development by government bodies to the sidelines in favour of private producers, particularly individual families and small-scale entrepreneurs. However, implementation of this shift is ranging from difficult to impossible in the early years.

B. Defining a national strategy

From the outset one must be clear about the final product of the strategy. To this end the

following definition, developed by the United Nations, is quoted:

"A strategy is a plan of action that defines in specific terms the goals of the action and the ways in which they can be attained. A shelter strategy defines the objectives for the development of shelter conditions, identifies the resources available to meet these goals and the cost-effective ways of using them, and sets out the responsibilities and time frame for the implementation of the necessary measures.

The strategy must define the objective and activities on the basis of a thorough analysis of the scale and nature of needs and resources; it will also give the criteria for defining priorities among activities. While the scale of the problem must be met, the qualitative targets of the strategy can reflect the process of gradually improving conditions. The activities which can be directly set out in the strategy are those to be implemented with public resources. Given the scarcity of these resources, they should be used only for the purposes for which no other resources can be found, in particular to support low-income groups. An enabling approach in a strategy also means that the bulk of public-sector resources will be geared to removing obstacles hampering the use of non-governmental and community resources and

to stimulating their full mobilization." (United Nations, 1988; 19)

C. Outline of the presentation

The next three chapters focus on the development of the strategy statement itself. Chapter I addresses the origins and impetus for the development of a strategy in each country. Chapter II reviews the process by which each country carried out the strategy-development process, and chapter III describes the content of strategies. In chapter IV the focus shifts to the extent to which the formulated strategies have been implemented. In each of these chapters there is a review of the role played by the donors - particularly the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat), the World Bank, and the United States Agency for International Development - in promoting the development of the strategies and fostering their conversion into action by government and the private sector.

Finally, in chapter V, a series of conclusions or lessons is drawn up about the conditions under which undertaking a shelter strategy development programme is more likely to yield an effective agenda that will be implemented vigorously and enthusiastically by both public and private agents in a country.

I. GENESIS OF THE STRATEGY

The initial motivations or occasions for undertaking the development of a national shelter strategy are highly diverse across countries. Despite the diversity, however, the origins are consistently important: almost invariably how the exercise begins has a clear impact on what it accomplishes. Its origins affect where within the government structure responsibility for the strategy formulation is assigned, how it is organized, and the resources accorded to it.

A. How the process was initiated

Barbados: The process of developing the National Housing Plan was initiated by the Government. In 1976 a Planning Unit was established in the Ministry of Housing and Lands, and Plan development commenced in 1979. In 1982 the Planning Unit completed a background paper and policy recommendations. Meanwhile, in 1982 the Government agreed with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to accept a housing sector loan, and one of the conditions of this loan was completion of a detailed housing strategy. The detailed strategy was viewed by senior ministry officials as a continuation of the process already underway and not as a requirement forced on them by USAID. The Minister and the Permanent Secretary strongly supported this process. A White Paper containing the policy objectives was published by the Government in 1984, the same year in which the formal strategy-development exercise was begun.

Jamaica: By early 1986 key officials, including the Minister for Construction Housing, had determined that significant changes in the country's housing policies were needed. This conclusion was almost inevitable because macro-economic events - which caused reductions in real household incomes but sharp increases in the cost of housing and housing finance - had undermined the feasibility of the programme by which the Government developed and sold single-family homes to moderate-income families. The Minister had set up a major policy-review process, involving both the public and private sectors, in the context of preparing for the International Year of Shelter for the Homeless (IYSH) in 1987. At the ninth session of the United Nations Commission on Human Settlements, he and another senior official discussed the possibility of preparing a strategy and ultimately

committed themselves to presenting a national shelter strategy at the tenth session of the Commission. The strategy-development process began in May 1986, although the organization evolved to its final form a few months later.

Kenya: While the Minister for Works, Housing, and Physical Planning had expressed strong interest in developing a new housing policy, the timing and form of the exercise were influenced by his discussions with representatives of the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat), USAID, and the World Bank at the ninth session of the Commission on Human Settlements in April 1986. There it was agreed that Kenya would prepare a national housing strategy and the Government of Kenya suggested presenting it at the tenth session of the Commission, then one year away, as an example which other countries might emulate. (The tenth session, which was held in Nairobi, coincided with the International Year of Shelter for the Homeless.) Subsequently the Government requested technical support from UNCHS (Habitat), USAID, and the World Bank. By the time an operational plan was worked out with the donors and the donors arranged for consultants to participate in the exercise, only about five months remained for developing the strategy and producing a document for the tenth session of the Commission.

Zimbabwe: The Minister of Public Construction and National Housing in 1985 requested that the staff of the Ministry develop a new housing policy and strategy on the occasion of the need to provide the Ministry's input into the First Five-Year National Development Plan. Problems with the then-current policy favouring heavy government subsidies and direct government development was in trouble because of low production levels. About the same time the Prime Minister made a major speech calling for greater private-sector participation in the housing.

B. Prior experience, the donors, and sustained support

While the foregoing gives the basics, there are several points that deserve further attention in this context. These are the extent to which the process received continued support from senior officials, the role of the donors in launching and sustaining these efforts, and the extent to which the countries

had had prior experience in sector strategy formulation.

Sustained support

All these cases have in common that they enjoyed high-level official sponsorship as they were initiated. However, over time important differences emerged in the strength and duration of these commitments. In Kenya, active minister-level support for the exercise proved to be ephemeral, and even the attention of senior officials in the responsible Ministry was intermittent. In contrast, in Jamaica and Zimbabwe the Minister sustained his attention and senior civil servants had a prominent role. Moreover, the entire process in Jamaica was accorded genuine prominence, while this was not the case in Kenya. In Barbados, in contrast, while high-level support was sustained throughout the long process of strategy development, a change in government as it was completed has slowed down implementation of many provisions.

Prior strategy experience

It is easy to imagine that countries having engaged in a major planning or policy-formulation project for the housing sector in the recent past would have an advantage in conducting another such exercise. Staff would have gained technical and process experience. Senior officials may have learned key lessons about who must be included if a product which can be implemented is to emerge.

A full range of experience is represented among the four study countries. Barbados and Jamaica had the most immediately relevant experiences. Barbados had completed a large and thorough analysis of its housing situation and appraisal of its current housing programmes in 1982 (Jones, 1982). This review generated a good deal of discussion and resulted in a White Paper that established the policy objectives the implementation of which was to be defined in the future strategy. Jamaica had completed a major housing policy review and development effort in 1982 - a plan which achieved considerable efficiency gains among government agencies and set the broad agenda for the next five years (Government of Jamaica, 1982). Also, in 1985 the Task Force on Mortgage Finance had taken a hard look at the problems of this sector. In Zimbabwe the ministry staff had been engaged in successive rounds of policy development since

independence in 1980. Senior staff had gained valuable experience in thinking about realistic policy but had not yet reached beyond the Ministry's immediate area of responsibility.

At the other end of the spectrum, Kenya's then current housing policy was promulgated in *Sessional Paper No. 5 of 1966/67*. This had been the last major policy review and it had drawn very heavily on the report and recommendations of two United Nations consultants. Hence, current staff of the Ministry concerned had little direct experience with this type of effort.

Donor role

While a full inventory of donor involvement in the strategy- development process is provided in the next chapter, it is worthwhile to review the actions of donors in initiating the process in each country. The conscious decision by officials in Jamaica and Kenya to undertake formal housing strategy developments under a compressed time-frame in order to present the results at the tenth session of the Commission on Human Settlements profoundly influenced the timing of the decisions and very likely strongly affected the actual processes and end-products. The support of the donors was probably instrumental in these decisions. As Walker (1989) states in his review of the Jamaican case:

"By the admission of the Strategy's authors, it is doubtful whether the Strategy would have been developed at all, in its present form, had not the IYSH programme included a strategy development component, and UNCHS made consultant funds available for this purpose." (p.15)

The United States Agency for International Development was probably a modest factor at most in influencing Barbados to undertake a formal strategy exercise based on earlier policy planning. Zimbabwe offers a sharp counterpoint to the other cases: although the international agencies had discussed the need for a comprehensive housing strategy and provided support for preparatory studies and substantial technical assistance over the years, it embarked on the strategy-development process with no particular encouragement from the donor community and carried it out essentially with its own resources.

II. THE STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

There are three related but somewhat distinct interests in reviewing the process by which each country undertook development of its housing strategy. First, how was the process organized: who participated and in what ways? who controlled the process and the contents of the strategy? Secondly, what was the content of each of several steps that are essential building blocks of a strategy? Thirdly, what role did the donors play in assisting the process in each case? what form did this assistance take and how was it arranged?

A. Organization

One can usefully distinguish among three "models" for organizing the strategy development process.

(a) The coalition-building model under which an elaborate set of committees is established, usually under the direction of a steering committee, to investigate particular sectors. Committee composition includes both the public and private sector. The broad consultative process is designed to create support for the resultant strategy as well as to improve its content.

(b) The interagency model under which the process is one handled exclusively by government agencies, or almost so, with at least some genuine consultation and co-operation in the process across ministerial and agency lines.

(c) The single-agency model under which responsibility is lodged in a single agency which develops it, drawing on consultants, other agencies, and the private sector as it thinks necessary. In using this model, government apparently believes it can achieve passage and acceptance with limited public participation (or it views the exercise as too low a priority to engage in a more elaborate process).

Among the four countries included in this analysis all three models are represented to some extent, as shown in table 2.

As indicated, both Jamaica and Kenya initially adopted "coalition-building" approaches, in part because those organizing the development process realized they would need broad support to achieve acceptance and in part because they understood that implementation would be facilitated by the involvement of the relevant agencies, private-sector firms, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).³ The two experiences differ somewhat in that Jamaica succeeded in enlisting a larger and more diverse

³ An interesting question which it has not been possible to address is whether the need for consensus building differs with the organization of the shelter finance and delivery system, i.e., the more diffuse or polynucleated, the greater the need for consensus building.

Table 2. Summary of organization of strategy process

Country	Type of organization	Location of work	Person with responsibility
Barbados	Single agency	Ministry of Housing and Lands	Chief Planning Officer
Jamaica	Coalition building/interagency	Ministry of Construction (Housing)	Permanent Secretary (Housing)
Kenya	Coalition building /single agency	Department of Housing	Chief Housing Officer
Zimbabwe	Single agency	Ministry of Public Construction and National Housing	Under Secretary

set of representatives from the private sector. Indeed, in Kenya the private sector was represented only by persons from government parastatals or government-related financial institutions. In Jamaica, however, this broad model was in a sense not deliberately chosen, since the process was initially set up to spearhead Jamaica's activities in IYSH; it was continued when the decision was made to undertake development of a strategy. In Kenya the model was specifically selected for the strategy development.

They also differ in that in Jamaica responsibility for running the process was lodged at a higher level than in Kenya. Both countries adopted a similar format, with a high-level steering committee directing the work of and receiving the results from various sub-committees. Eventually, those directing the process in both countries found it necessary to create a Task Force or a Focus Group between the steering committee and the sub-committees to direct every-day operations. The experience of the two countries was also similar in that neither was able to sustain the sub-committees as productive bodies over the course of the project. While lack of time of those serving on the sub-committees was a universal problem, in Jamaica lack of supporting staff resources permitted little more than general discussion to take place; and in Kenya the press of time at the end of the development process squeezed out the role of the sub-committee in reviewing analytic reports. As a result the breadth of involvement significantly contracted in both cases: in Jamaica around a Focus Group with somewhat broader, public and private representation, and in Kenya around the Ministry charged with responsibility for developing the strategy.⁴

Barbados adopted a different approach to organizing its strategy development, where the exercise was viewed more as a technical exercise within the purview of the Ministry of Housing and Lands. Within the Ministry, the Chief Planning Officer, working with an expatriate advisor, was very definitely principally responsible, although he kept the Permanent Secretary closely informed. This arrangement was deliberately chosen in preference to a coalition-building model and was a

4/ In Costa Rica, very encouraging results have more recently been obtained in a shelter strategy formulation exercise, based upon a consensus-building approach through broad-based sub-committees. Several factors seem to have contributed to the success of the approach in this instance. The sub-committees were assigned well-defined specific tasks, were expected to work intensively and were assisted by short-term consultants who acted as resource persons. The members of the National Task Force have also serviced the sub-committees as technical secretaries.

continuation of the one used in the earlier planning phase. Consultation with other officials and the private sector was handled informally - a process facilitated by the country's small size.⁵ Zimbabwe's organization is similar to that used in Barbados: development of the strategy was both initiated and conducted within the Housing Ministry. The task force charged by the Minister with the assignment consisted of three under-secretaries and the United Nations Development Programme technical advisor. Discussion with others really came only after the formal strategy has been developed. As will be seen, because of the initial relatively narrow scope of the Zimbabwean exercise, this tight-knit arrangement was a logical choice.

In light of the importance of institutions outside the housing area for plan acceptance and implementation - such as the Central Bank, the Ministry of Finance, and the national planning body - their involvement in the development process seems important. Perhaps surprisingly, these groups were typically involved at best only tangentially. This was certainly the case in Jamaica, Kenya and Zimbabwe.⁶ In Barbados, these bodies were brought into the process through informal consultation.

B. Three principal steps

Despite the variation among the countries in the way in which they organized their strategy-development processes, all of these efforts contained the following three common analytic steps.

(a) *Housing Needs Assessment*: an assessment of current and future housing needs and a comparison of these needs with current production levels;

(b) *Sector-by-sector assessment*: analysis of bottle-necks and constraints to the necessary levels of production and the development of alternatives for overcoming them. "Sectors" include land, infrastructure, finance, government

5/ This single-agency model with informal consultation with other government bodies and private-sector officials was also followed in Jordan in its strategy development. Jordan resembles the Barbados case as well, as will be seen below, in that in both countries USAID made very large grants of technical assistance for strategy development. In Barbados this resulted in a single full-time expatriate advisor plus some shorter-term consultants, while in Jordan a team was present for about two years.

6/ In Kenya a low-level official from the national planning agency participated in the Sub-committee produced a modest report which was not given much consideration in actual strategy development. In Jordan, co-ordination with broader interests was achieved by locating the strategy-development exercise in the Planning Ministry which had a Housing Section

housing programmes, building materials, labour (availability of workers with needed skills), and the organization of residential construction;

(c) *Development of the draft strategy using the above inputs:* typically this is an iterative process with various combinations of recommendations being tested in different forums for consistency and acceptability.

1. Housing Needs Assessment

This step is designed to define the task facing the country. In addition to assessing the current and future needs, the exercise also helps to ascertain the extent to which the shelter options provided are affordable by those in need of improved shelter. In all four countries, the analysis of housing needs was carried out using the Housing Needs Assessment Model (HNA) developed by The Urban Institute and Robert R. Nathan Assoc. for USAID.⁷ In two cases (Barbados and Jamaica) the applications were done as an integral part of the strategy development process, and in both cases efforts were led by expatriate consultants. In Kenya and Zimbabwe, in contrast, the model had been applied earlier with donor assistance. The HNA produces estimates of the number of new and upgraded units required over a 20-year period as well as the corresponding investment, given specified minimum housing quality standards. In all four countries, the process of applying the HNA caused serious reconsideration of the housing-quality standards that had up to that point been adopted by the Government.

It should be noted that the formal needs assessment methodology is not needed to achieve this result. In Jamaica a less rigorous analysis - later refined by application of the HNA - had a very strong impact from the very start of the strategy-development process, with the result being the adoption of a whole set of policies designed to

produce housing truly affordable to very-low-income households.⁸ In general, though, the figures on investment levels required to meet "official government standards" and on the inability of lower-income households to afford them catch and sustain the interest of policy-makers.⁹

Also, in all the countries, the needs estimates were contrasted with current production levels to judge whether the country was keeping up with needs (the answer was universally "No" for units meeting formal building and subdivision standards but more ambiguous for total production) and to identify targets for future production as well as required levels of inputs, particularly serviced land and housing finance. The share of GNP going to housing currently was also compared with what would be required in the future. In all cases, broad planning targets appearing in the strategy statements were based on the needs estimates.

This initial stage of analysis nearly always devoted too little care to understanding how the housing market - especially that segment serving lower-income households - is working in practice. While some analysis of the informal market was included in the background materials prepared for the Jamaican and Kenyan strategies, even these fall short of a full explanation of how this market operates - a critical input for designing effective ways for Government to facilitate the increased production of higher-quality housing.

2. Sector-by-sector analyses

There was greater diversity in the approaches used to carry out these analyses compared with the assessment of housing needs. The common thread was for those covering each sector to begin with a statement of current problems preventing an

⁷ For a general description of the model, see Struyk (1987a); a summary of the applications to 14 countries, including three of the countries included here, is in Struyk (1988). Another state-of-the-art model for analysing housing needs and the affordability and replicability of various policy options has been developed by the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat) and the Ministry of the Environment, Finland. A general description of the concepts underlying the model is presented in United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat) and Government of Finland (1984).

⁸ A danger in the computerized assessment is that the figures, especially those on production requirements, in part because they are produced with a sophisticated methodology, take on an exaggerated importance in the whole strategy development process, distracting attention from other areas, such as examination of sector constraints.

input - e.g., land, finance - from being available in adequate quantity or at reasonable cost. Stated more positively, these analyses were seeking ways to permit the full potential of various actors in the housing sector to be realized. These statements were usually informed by the results of the needs assessment and/or other background material and they dealt with the informal sector to varying degrees.

The analysis of options for overcoming the problems varied widely, but can be summarized into three groups. In some cases, there were substantial studies undertaken as a basis for formulating and considering options, which were fed to technocrats for further distillation; in other cases, analysts produced a solid review of the current situation and corresponding recommendations for consideration by the decision-makers, typically the sector sub-committee in the first instance; and, in some cases where the "coalition-building model" was employed, options were presented and discussed by members of the sub-committees themselves.

In Barbados, with its "single-agency" organization, the first option for generating data on sector-specific topics was employed: the analysis and recommendations were the work of agency staff and the consultants assigned to the project, including some additional specialized consulting services on particular topics. The process of planning and executing the technical analyses was much more deliberate and co-ordinated in Barbados than in Jamaica and Kenya, attributable to the longer time available for strategy development, the full-time assignment of both ministry and expatriate staff to the project, development of a comprehensive plan for additional analysis, and the large commitment of donor resources for local and expatriate consulting services. The resulting analytic products were passed to the two principal strategy architects - a senior ministry official and the resident expatriate consultant - who used them in formulating the strategy.

A process similar to the first procedure - involving new studies the results of which were channelled to others - was followed in Jamaica. A substantial household survey was undertaken to gather more information about the housing preferences of low-income families and the development of informal housing. These findings were given to

the Focus Group managing the process as input to the draft document.¹⁰

The second procedure - summaries and recommendations prepared by staff for consideration by sub-committees - was followed in Kenya, with the staff function being discharged by (usually expatriate) consultants. However, because of the time pressures, the sub-committees had little opportunity to digest and modify the consultants' recommendations; hence, the consultants in the end represented the sub-committees to those drafting the strategy.

A further difference between Jamaica and Kenya was that in Jamaica consultants played a much less prominent part, and where they were employed they remained in clearly support roles. Also, in Jamaica, members of the sub-committees tabled recommendations based on their own knowledge and experience in the sector (the third option noted above).

Finally, the situation for Zimbabwe differs from all the others in the relatively small number of analytic products generated in the course of considering the various sectors. There were no new analyses produced with donor support. The small overall analytic output resulted from the tightness of the operation, with all those involved coming from the same ministry. Hence, there was little need for formal reports to transmit the results of inquiries. To some extent those doing the drafting and those compiling the analyses were the same people.

An important general point is that the technical studies conducted as part of the strategy process have turned out to be a continuing resource for policy analysis in these countries. Often these studies were more rigorously and carefully done than the typical analyses, and they are correspondingly valued. In addition, in most countries those who worked on the technical studies with the expatriate advisors learned a good deal about how to conduct such analyses and in some cases became

^{10/} This pattern was also evident in Jordan where a national household survey focused on housing production and acquisition was conducted as part of the strategy-development process.

familiar with such tools as microcomputer software for the first time.

3. Draft strategy and refinement

A critical part of the strategy-development process is transforming the often large volume of technical analyses and recommendations for dealing with specific problems into a coherent strategy. While most of the study countries began with the intention of developing a range of strategic options that would be debated and refined, in reality those drafting the strategy usually constructed a single proposed strategy which was refined through some sort of iterative process. The drafting and refinement process typically involves a good deal of informal consultation between the drafters and powerful interests, and in some cases more public discussion of its proposed contents. Obviously, the extent and thoroughness of the consultation process can affect the likelihood of the strategy being successfully implemented.

Each of the four study countries had a somewhat different experience in this stage of the strategy-development process. Thus it is worthwhile briefly to review each before making any general points.

Barbados: Much less co-ordination of the final strategy was needed in Barbados than elsewhere because the strategy was being erected on top of the policy statement in the Government's 1984 White Paper on housing policy. In any event, the refinement process was largely confined to debate within the Ministry and to adjustments made on the basis of informal discussions with others outside the Ministry.

Jamaica: The secretary of the Focus Group, the body set up between the steering committee and the sub-committees to run the development process on a day-to-day basis, had primary responsibility for drafting the strategy statement. The Focus Group agreed upon an outline at the start. The secretary was in frequent contact for review and advice with senior officials, most of whom were on the steering committee, and a USAID consultant. Her task was facilitated by clear directions having been set out by the Minister to give priority to low-income, especially informal, housing. When

the draft was presented to the steering committee, chaired by the Minister, it was largely on a proforma basis. The drafting occurred in February and March 1987. The final statement was presented at the tenth session of the Commission on Human Settlements in April.

Kenya: An "editorial committee" of three consultants (two expatriate) and two staff members from the Ministry responsible for housing were appointed by the Task Force to produce an overall strategy statement. The statement gave a single plan, rather than options. A two-day seminar was held outside Nairobi on 12 and 13 March 1987 to present the draft to the Steering Committee and to obtain a general discussion. The seminar was chaired by the Deputy Permanent Secretary of the Ministry. Attendees were almost exclusively from the public sector, mostly from the housing agencies, and mostly low-level. Donor representatives and several consultants also attended. (The composition of the group was somewhat determined by the short notice at which the seminar was organized.) On the basis of the discussion the draft was moderately revised by 20 March. The revised strategy was presented at the tenth session of the Commission on Human Settlements. The whole drafting and review process took about five weeks.

Zimbabwe: The draft document was a strictly internal document of the Ministry, where it was refined until it was placed before Parliament in February 1987. The strategy document has not yet been made public since it has not been formally approved. Broad discussion began with the process of implementing parts of the strategy.

From the perspective of building support for a draft strategy, a key issue is the extent of the openness of the process for reviewing the draft strategy. Interestingly, none of these cases had a particularly open process. Even in Kenya where a formal two-day seminar was held, those attending were mostly drawn from the government agencies directly involved in housing delivery: the private sector and other important ministries, such as that controlling land tilling and related policies, did not attend. In all the other countries, an elaborate and formal process of review was apparently viewed as too unwieldy or simply not worth the effort.

C. Donor assistance

From the foregoing it is clear that all four of the study countries except Zimbabwe received substantial assistance from the donor community for developing their strategies. While the primary motivation for providing assistance is to help the country achieve maximum improvement in its housing, the donors naturally have some self-interest in having well specified strategies: the strategy, if consistent with their views of sector policy, can be used to justify assistance to the country; and, the implementation programme gives a framework for donor project support - facilitating project identification and appraisal - and co-ordination among donors. In short, solid strategies make it easier for donors to provide assistance that really turns out to have the often hoped-for but seldom realized catalytic effect in the sector.

As the entries in table 3 show, the greatest level of assistance was received by Barbados. It is also the case that Barbados was able to use this assistance very effectively to develop a solid strategy statement. It is far from clear, however, that this level of help is essential for such a successful outcome. In thinking about "necessary assistance", it is useful to note the level of development in Barbados and that the high skills of the Ministry's staff most involved mean that more resources might be required to have the same impact where local staff skills are less strong. Further, Barbados is the one case among these countries where a significant transfer of skills to local staff was accomplished.

1. Type of help

As summarized by the entries in table 3, the type and quantity of assistance provided by the donors differed significantly among the four countries. Three broad models can be distinguished in these four cases.

(a) Under the donor-as-partner model the donors strongly encourage strategy development and provide local and expatriate technical assistance at least episodically during the process (Jamaica and Kenya);

(b) Under the co-operative model, the country initiates the process independently and the donors provide various assistance as the process unfolds (Barbados);

(c) Finally, there is the country solo model under which the country proceeds essentially independently of the donors (Zimbabwe).

There need not be a close correlation between the model and the extent of consultant assistance, as is clear from the experience of the two countries following the "donor-as-partner model". In fact the donors were especially active in Kenya and a large amount of consulting services were funded - which resulted in donor-provided consultants taking on a larger than anticipated role due in part to the press of time for completing the strategy. In Jamaica, the role for consultants was limited, and government officials were firmly in charge throughout and understood the importance for acceptance of the strategy being clearly "made in Jamaica".

2. Cause and effect

Is it possible to point to clear instances in which the provision of donor assistance made a distinct difference in outcomes of the strategy development process? The answer is "Yes", and some specific cases are cited below. However, it must be stressed that there is a difficulty most of the time in isolating any single influence on outcomes resulting from processes as complicated and involving as many actors as those under review. Hence, the instances listed below are those in which it is believed that donor support has been a major influence but certainly not the exclusive cause. The instances cited do not include strategy implementation, which is treated in chapter IV.

The identified instances include:

(a) The encouragement by the donors to undertake the strategy- development process had a powerful effect on the timing of the development activities in Jamaica and Kenya. In Kenya, because of the compressed time-frame and the relative lack of experience of those involved in conducting such a major policy review, the timing also was a likely contributant to the alteration of both the process and the contents of the strategy from what they otherwise might have been;

(b) USAID had influenced the development of a strategy in Barbados - by encouraging its being done and providing very substantial and effective assistance in its development;

(c) In Kenya, the consultants funded by the donors pushed the strategy sharply in the direction of government taking on an "enabling role" in place of the direct development of housing for moderate- and low-income families. The extent of the shift implied by the strategy proved to be more than could be absorbed, in the short term;

(d) In Jamaica, the Housing Needs Assessment funded by the donors, with its related policy discussions, had a strong influence on solidifying the predilections to shift government activity to benefit lower-income households more clearly.

(e) While the donors did not participate directly in the strategy development in Zimbabwe, the

series of studies of housing demand, housing finance, and housing needs as well as a feasibility study for a National Housing Corporation sponsored in the years before the strategy effort was undertaken had a strong effect on the solutions contained in the strategy;

(f) In three countries the private-sector orientation emerging in the donor community was transmitted to the country and appears to have affected the direction of change to some degree. The context of USAID loans was the vehicle in Barbados and Jamaica, while in Zimbabwe it was discussions with and assistance from UNCHS (Habitat), UNDP, the World Bank, USAID and other donors.

Table 3. Summary of donor support

	Barbados	Jamaica	Kenya	Zimbabwe
Amount of assistance (\$US thousands)	200	90	152	—
Long-term expatriate advisor assigned?	Yes	No ^a	No	No ^a
Areas of involvement of donor-supported consultants:				
Housing needs assessment	Yes	Yes	Yes ^b	Yes ^b
Technical studies ^c	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Drafting strategy	Yes	No	Yes	No

Notes:

a/ A long-term advisor participated in the project but was not assigned primarily to this project for a long term.

b/ Work supported by donors but not as part of strategy development process *per se*.

c/ Either as staff to subcommittee or in other capacity.

III. STRATEGY STATEMENTS

This chapter presents a brief overview of the contents of the strategy statements that were developed. It makes no attempt to "grade" the quality of these statements in terms of their internal consistency, appropriateness of the policy proposed, or the reasonableness of the objectives set forth, since the focus of the study is on the process of strategy development and implementation. Rather, first there is an examination of the areas explicitly covered in the strategies and then a brief description of the general theme sounded in each.¹¹

A. Coverage

Table 4 summarizes the coverage of the four strategy statements in a tabular format. Three types of coverage are considered in the table. The top line indicates whether the statement included a cogent statement of the current difficulties facing the sector. The middle set of entries lists "sectors," such as land and finance, which a strategy could explicitly consider - some such as land titling can be constraints to high-volume production to be overcome; some, such as "government administrative arrangements", are tools to use in implementing the strategy; and some, like the informal sector, are areas in which knowledge may be needed to devise effective policy. The bottom panel lists some other attributes a strategy statement could have, including explicit quantitative targets (targets more detailed than those produced by the Housing Needs Assessment) and assignment of specific responsibility for carrying out certain aspects of implementing the plan.

The first row of entries indicates that without exception the strategy statements gave a clear accounting of the problems facing the housing sector. As suggested, the concrete dimensions of the shortfall in production were obtained from the Housing Needs Assessment and from analyses of the quality of the existing housing stock and associated infrastructure services.

The entries in the second panel emphasize the unevenness of the coverage across sectors. While several key sectors - finance, land, building and subdivision regulations, and government sector policies - receive thorough attention in all four cases, other sectors are less fully treated. Most remarkable is that the provision of infrastructure in support of residential development does not get full attention in three of the cases.

Some of the other areas not thoroughly covered are surprising. One is the role of housing in the economy. Although all of the strategy statements note the importance of housing investment in total GNP, they do not present data on jobs generated per dollar of investment or on the income and employment multiplier effects. In addition, the role of housing as a leading sector is ignored, when it is possible, for example, for innovations in the mobilization of funds to be a genuine contribution to the development of financial markets. These omissions are problematic because it is the economic impacts of housing which are key to eliciting support from the economic planning agency, the ministry of finance, and other key government agencies.

Painful structural economic adjustments were underway in Jamaica and to a lesser extent in some of the other countries when the strategies were formulated. Hence, the broad economic conditions were having such pervasive effects on the ability to conduct "business as usual" that not much analytic attention to this situation may have been seen as necessary. Indeed, the economic difficulties in Jamaica propelled the Ministry of Construction (Housing) to look for new approaches to dealing with the country's housing problems.

The current production of housing in the informal sector, and how to improve the quality of such units and the efficiency with which they are built, is really only considered in the Jamaican strategy statement. As noted earlier, this absence means that there is little understanding of how most housing is being produced. In Jamaica and Kenya ways in which the Government could work with informal providers were proposed. But the specific actions are not consistent with the importance of the sector in overall production. At some level, of course, the lack of detailed attention to informal housing reflects the lack of real

11/ While the final strategy statements for three of the countries are available, the statement for Zimbabwe has not yet been officially released as it remains before Parliament. In the absence of this definitive document, the remarks made here are based on other descriptions of the strategy, such as the statement presented by Zimbabwe at the meetings in connection with the International Year of Shelter for the Homeless.

Table 4. Summary of strategy statement contents

	Barbados	Jamaica	Kenya	Zimbabwe
Current conditions	A	A	A	A
"Sectoral" coverage:				
Finance	A	A	A	A
Land	A	A	A	B
Infrastructure	B	-	A	-
Building and Subdivision regulations	A	A	A	B
Construction labour force	-	-	-	A
Building -materials supply	A	A	-	A
Government sector policies	A	A	A	B
Government administrative arrangements	B	B	A	A
Role of housing in macro economy	B	-	B	B
Informal housing sector	n/a	A	A	-
Contents:				
Annual quantitative targets	A	-	-	B
Broad statement of strategy	A	A	A	B
Implementation plan				
Responsibility assigned	B	B	A	-
Work plan specified	A	B	-	-

Notes: - Not included in the statement.

A/ Topic is given reasonably thorough treatment in statement.

B/ Topic is lightly treated in statement.

n/a Not applicable; Barbados essentially has no informal housing as traditionally defined.

understanding about how this part of the market operates.

Similarly, rental housing generally receives insufficient attention, especially in Kenya and Zimbabwe where the majority of lower-income families live in such housing. The strategy statements for Barbados and Kenya address the policies for operating the existing stock of publicly-owned rental housing, and in Kenya

explicit attention is given to enabling actions that would improve the quality of infrastructure services associated with new privately-developed rental units. But the private rental sector is given at best cursory treatment in Barbados, Jamaica and Zimbabwe. Some omissions, such as not explicitly dealing with labour, may reflect that an area was not viewed by those leading the strategy development as needing high-priority attention when compared with other areas. On balance,

however, the strategy statements are all somewhat partial in their coverage.

The final panel gives some indication of the extent to which the strategy statements dealt with basic implementation issues. A glance at the entries shows that only Barbados went very far in constructing an explicit action plan as part of the strategy development *per se*. There short-, medium- and long-term actions were each specified; among the other countries, only Jamaica made any distinction in the expected timing of various actions.

An idea of a somewhat "typical" treatment of implementation is described by Hoek-Smit for Zimbabwe:

"There is no specific section in the strategy dealing with the implementation structure of the strategy. Under the present system the MPCNP [Ministry of Planning, Construction and National Housing] assists the local authorities in the planning and, sometimes, in the construction of housing developments, particularly small local authorities. There has been a gradual shift to an increased autonomy of local authorities, reinforcing present national trends in local government. The strategy document does not clarify the impacts of the proposed National Construction and Housing Corporation on this implementation structure.

"The functions of and linkages between the different ministries and agencies involved in housing development are not mentioned in the strategy. Yet for crucial factors such as land and water, and the granting of borrowing powers to access money from the Housing Fund, the local governments depend on strategies of other ministries."

As noted earlier, the "annual quantitative targets" refer to targets rather more detailed than those produced by the Housing Needs Assessment but consistent with these totals. Thus, these targets include such items as the number of serviced lots produced and the number of housing loans made to low-income families. It is exactly in defining these detailed targets, as done in Barbados, that the "enabling strategy" takes form. To specify them the analyst must decide on which facilitating actions will be emphasized (based on the prior analysis of bottle-necks in both the formal and informal sectors). As such these targets are more critical than the "production targets"

generated by the HNA: they shift the focus to how to produce and improve housing units rather than how many units to produce.

Based strictly on the coverage of the strategy statements developed by the four study countries, one would have to conclude that only Barbados succeeded in producing a full strategy, since it is the only one which included a clear and detailed plan of action to implement the policies defined. The other three countries really produced something between a policy statement and a strategy. Barbados had the advantages of a much longer time for developing its strategy and a comparatively simple housing market - one which virtually lacks an informal sector. However, as discussed in section IV. B, there may well be a critical trade-off between the length of time it takes to develop the strategy and its successful implementation.

B. Major country themes

Beyond the simple description just given, it is interesting to note the objectives and directions of national shelter policy embodied in these policy statements.

1. Barbados

In Barbados the National Housing Plan outlines three broad approaches for achieving the Government's overall goal of improved housing conditions in Barbados. These approaches flow directly from the objectives and principles stated in the 1984 White Paper.

First, the private sector was to be encouraged to expand its role in the production of new homes and in home improvements. The Government was to scale back its programmes of direct involvement in housing production, and assume a supportive role that increases the productivity of the private housing industry. The Government was to encourage financial institutions to expand their services to low- and moderate-income families, and to enter into joint ventures with the private sector to produce low-cost housing.

Secondly, the Plan stresses actions to maintain and improve the existing housing stock. The Government's role was to expand the range of programmes and financing mechanisms for improving existing housing units.

Finally, public-sector housing solutions were to be designed at the lowest possible per-unit costs, so that the limited pool of government resources could benefit the greatest possible number of households. The Government was to move away from providing high-cost, deeply-subsidized housing solutions and to expand its programmes of developing serviced lots and modest new homes. In addition, the Government's financing programmes were to maximize cost recovery and be targeted on lower-income families.

2. Jamaica

The overarching objective of the Jamaican shelter sector strategy is to increase the flow of housing resources to the poorest segments of the population while at the same time reducing the direct governmental role in housing production. The objectives enunciated in the strategy include:

- (a) Increasing the flow of resources into the shelter sector;
- (b) Concentrating on the upgrading of existing housing rather than construction of new units;
- (c) Facilitating lower-cost housing solutions, through land and infrastructure service extensions;
- (d) Encouraging more private-sector, and less public-sector, production of housing units.

The Government is to concentrate on facilitating the flow of housing finance to poor households, sometimes by providing subsidies, and on increasing the availability of secure titles for plots with at least minimal infrastructure services. This strategy, like that formulated in Kenya, clearly presages the shift in housing policy called for in the Global Strategy for Shelter statement. In both Jamaica and Kenya strategies call for national housing development parastatals to limit sharply the development of completed housing units and to take on new functions such as the development of house plots with basic services.

3. Kenya

In Kenya, the broad objective of the strategy is stated as:

"[to] produce a concrete plan of action for the period 1987-2000 by which the public and private

sectors working together and in collaboration with the international community can produce a high volume of acceptable quality housing, infrastructure and community facilities sufficient to meet the needs of new households and make inroads into upgrading the existing stock of substandard housing in urban and rural areas."

The strategy document specifies an enabling approach in which public-sector resources are to be used to remove constraints which are preventing the full and effective mobilization of non-governmental, private and community resources. The main statement to this effect is

"to achieve the maximum addition to the stock of acceptable housing it will be necessary for Government to specialize in performing a higher volume of those activities which the private sector cannot do or can do only ineffectively, e.g., land transfer and infrastructure provision. In order to be able to carry out these functions, they will have to be done on a self-sustaining basis, with full cost recovery being the consistent basis for pricing services. An increasing share of all housing will be developed by the private market, with Government acting to facilitate production."

It follows that the public sector was to be the main provider of funds to finance trunk infrastructure services and that an increasing share of all housing finance would be provided through finance institutions. Other principles include the targeting of low-income groups for governmental action and increasing the involvement of local communities in the formulation of housing programmes.¹²

4. Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe's statement contrasts with those just reviewed in the indicated degree of shift from government to private housing production. Nevertheless, from the perspective of the very strong government role adopted around the time of independence,¹³ the shift toward an expanded private role is certainly significant. The Government was moved to this position by the

¹² This description is taken almost directly from Wakeham (1989).

¹³ The housing policy formulated in 1982 had, for example, envisioned construction of housing for moderate- and low-income families being done primarily by construction brigades along the Cuban model.

its ambitious housing production goals could not be achieved with public funds alone.

The policy goals presented in the strategy reflect the somewhat more limited orientation of the strategy development process in Zimbabwe. These goals are as follows: (Hoek-Smit, 1989)

(a) Publicly funded housing schemes in both urban and rural areas should be strictly for those without houses;

(b) Both the public and private sectors are to mobilize their resources to meet the housing needs in the country;

(c) Individual family savings for housing are to be encouraged to promote self-reliance;

(d) Home ownership is to be the major form of tenure with a small percentage of houses in all publicly and privately developed housing projects being for rental;

(e) All houses, including low-cost housing, are to meet minimum planning and building standards;

(f) Selection and allocation of public housing is to be done through a national waiting list based upon lists maintained by the local authorities and monitored by the proposed National Housing Corporation;

(g) Research on cost-effective housing delivery and building technology is to be carried out by the proposed Building Research Institute.

Looking across the four strategy statements that were developed, one is struck by the extent to which they anticipate the policy redirection enunciated in the United Nations Global Strategy for Shelter. To varying degrees they all move direct housing development by government bodies to the sidelines in favour of private producers, particularly individual families and small-scale entrepreneurs. However, implementation of this shift is ranging from difficult to impossible in the early years following development of the policy.

IV. STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION

Obviously an elegant and compelling housing strategy statement will be of little benefit if its provisions are not implemented. At the completion of the strategy-development stage the four study countries were at rather different points in moving toward implementation. Some had paved the way for political acceptance while others had not. Most strategy statements did not contain clear allocations of administrative responsibility under the new policies nor did they provide schedules for implementing various provisions.

Given this diversity, this chapter begins by discussing the individual country experiences and then makes some general points.

A. Country experience

1. Barbados

In Barbados, the Government adopted the objectives of its new housing policy in 1984 - about the same time as the formal strategy exercise was launched - and during the strategy development period was pursuing new approaches to shift government-assisted production to private contractors using the proceeds of the USAID housing sector loan. Therefore, to a considerable degree, it was implementing its strategy while it was still being developed. The National Housing Plan contained a detailed and explicit five-year action programme for the sector which built on this experience.

However, once the strategy was completed in 1986 and incorporated into the overall national plan for Barbados, four events occurred which had the effect of knocking implementation seriously off stride. First, funds from the USAID loan were fully expended, causing activity levels in the initiatives supported by them to decline sharply. Secondly, USAID determined that Barbados had graduated from the pool of countries needing assistance; therefore, funds to sustain some of the initiatives were not immediately forthcoming. Thirdly, both the Minister and Permanent Secretary changed; the new team is reportedly less committed to the programme developed earlier. Finally, negotiations for a World Bank loan which would have

supported important components of the strategy¹⁴ - development of serviced sites and upgrading of slum areas, as well as reform of the rental housing programme - ended in failure to resolve questions about the future direction of the country's public rental housing programme.

2. Jamaica

Shortly after completion of the strategy statement in Jamaica, the Minister obtained Cabinet approval and based his May 1987 budget submission on the strategy. The Government then moved directly to implement many of the provisions of the strategy without first making a detailed action plan. It is noteworthy that the commitment to the strategy has weathered a change of Government.

The shift to the Government assisting in the provision of house lots with very basic services for low-income families is well underway, although production by the Government's parastatal for the production of homes for higher-income households continues at a reduced and declining rate. The Government has also begun taking action to deal with institutional constraints, such as high official building standards, slow processing of subdivision applications and the like. Experiments with using non-profit and community-based organizations as originators for housing loans are underway.

Donor assistance for implementation has been relatively plentiful. A "Donors Meeting" was convened in June 1987 to introduce the strategy to several donors and to express Jamaica's interest in obtaining help to implement it. USAID responded by designing a \$50 million sector loan around the strategy's serviced-sites thrust, and disbursements are tied to implementing the policy changes stated in the strategy. USAID has also provided short-term studies and technical assistance in several areas and training for government staff. In addition,

(a) The United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat) has agreed in principle to support studies of investment in the housing sector and a review of the rent control law;

¹⁴ These negotiations were quite advanced and the assistance to be provided had been incorporated into the Plan's production schedules.

(b) The Inter-American Development Bank has provided assistance in improving the land-titling process;

(c) The World Bank has indicated a willingness to make a long-term sector loan contingent on reforms on the role of Government's financial parastatal in the sector.

As one would expect, despite the positive accomplishments, impediments to implementation remain. Development standards remain high and lenders are very hesitant to relax underwriting rules or to try somewhat different standards. Provision of infrastructure - especially water - to plots being developed for low-income families remains a problem; and there is genuine need for technical assistance to the National Water Commission to overcome certain operational problems. Nevertheless, the overall progress in implementation is impressive.

3. Kenya

In Kenya, 22 months after the presentation of the strategy statement at the tenth Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Settlements, the strategy still had not been published by the Government in the form of a Sessional Paper or presented in Parliament. The donors appear not to have made its provisions the cornerstone of their programmes and have not pressed for the strategy's implementation. Indeed, in the spring of 1989 there was an urban land development exercise underway which had major implications for the housing sector - this had higher-level backing and a more coherent and less compressed process. In particular, Wakeham (1989) describes it as follows:

"In October 1988, the President set up The National Co-ordinating Committee on Urban Land Use, Planning and Development. This is chaired by the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Lands and Housing and has very broad terms of reference to prepare proposals for the allocation, use and servicing of land in urban areas throughout the country. The representation on the committee is high level and full time... The committee is looking at housing as a major user of land and the Chairman is anxious that the new housing strategy should follow from its recommendations rather than precede them in order to avoid any conflict."

In terms of the original strategy development effort, the essential barriers to implementation can be summarized as:

(a) A basic disagreement about the roles of certain central agencies has led to a lack of enthusiasm for supporting the strategy and consequent inaction;

(b) An operational framework for continuing the development of the strategy and overseeing its implementation was not set up as part of the original exercise;

(c) Institutional changes have occurred which have put emphasis on other priorities and changed the nature of the process.

The strategy prepared in 1986-1987 has however, formed the basis of further policy thinking. Some of the recommendations in the strategy appear in the Sixth National Development Plan for 1989-1993, which was launched in April 1989. In particular, these reflect the recommendations that local authorities should concentrate on the provision of serviced land and that private-sector financial resources should be mobilized for the construction of housing. In addition, a strategy statement has been approved by the Cabinet which draws heavily on the technical analyses and recommendations of the earlier attempt. Following this approval, a sessional paper is currently being drafted on the basis of the strategy statement. The sessional paper will also draw on the findings of the urban land-use review exercise.

4. Zimbabwe

In contrast to the other study countries, in Zimbabwe implementation has involved a joint process of strategy refinement as well as actual implementation. The strategy that was presented to Parliament in February 1987 was intended to be largely a policy document, with operational details deferred to a later stage. Parliament raised questions about some elements of the strategy - particularly those involving creation of new government agencies - which by early 1989 had not been resolved. The responsible Ministry, however, has been able to move ahead with implementing the other parts of the strategy. Implementation has been rapid in those areas directly under the Ministry's control, including

regulatory relations with the local authorities concerning the formulation of their housing programmes. Also, the Cabinet has given approval to certain actions - such as permitting building societies to offer tax-free bonds.

Gradually since 1985, and particularly since early 1987, the Ministry had moved to a more open posture, one in which it was able to develop a dialogue eventually with the local authorities and other government-related bodies (such as the Association of Local Authorities and the Association of Directors of Housing and Community Services) as well as private-sector groups. The Ministry moved slowly and cautiously in establishing serious contact with these organizations and waited until it felt it could make a commitment to change from some prior policies. In this milieu the process of strategy refinement has worked well. The most prominent example has been securing the involvement of the building societies in financing low-income housing by collaboratively working out a procedure for the societies to issue tax-exempt bonds with 25 per cent of the issue amount earmarked for lending to low-income households. Progress has also been made in encouraging employers to help provide housing for workers. One might characterize this process as one in which the Ministry set out objectives in the strategy with some ideas for implementation - with the ideas clearly open to revision, depending on the feedback received.

Having said this, one must still note that progress has lagged in dealing with other government agencies in crucial areas including efficient land titling. Likewise, the Ministry itself has not made any significant changes yet in the politically sensitive area of delining low-cost subdivision and building standards affordable by low-income households.

The experience of Zimbabwe has been similar to Kenya's with respect to there being little visible response by the donors to the strategy but against a very different background. USAID essentially withdrew from Zimbabwe during much of 1986 and 1987. Hence, it was not in a position to assist with implementation of the strategy. At the same time a World Bank project funded earlier was experiencing serious implementation difficulties. However, with changing conditions, the donors did take cognizance of the strategy. Some

technical assistance was provided by UNCHS (Habitat) for designing ways for the Government to work with private developers. A country project, supported by UNCHS (Habitat) and the Government of Finland, is currently providing technical assistance for the further consolidation of the strategy and the development of regional housing strategies. This work has led, among other things, to the downward revision of the housing standards for the lowest-income households. A loan proposal tabled by the World Bank in 1988 was consistent with the strategy's thrust, although it definitely had a character of its own.

B. General points

How should one calculate the "success rate" of these strategy development efforts? By almost any standard, one would classify the results in Jamaica and Zimbabwe as successes because there are clear signs of subsequent programme shifts consistent with the strategy. In Barbados the development of the strategy *per se* was probably the best of all the countries in terms of the thoroughness of the strategy developed, but various events have impaired the pace of implementation. Still, the ultimate effect in Barbados remains to be seen. The perceived benefits of a period of concentrated policy development at the sectoral level may grow over time, as the foundation - in terms of technical analysis and coalition building - erected during strategy development and implementation continue to be exploited. Similarly, in Kenya, given a longer time-frame, it may turn out that the combination of the strategy process in 1986-1987 and the current effort will yield important benefits for the country. All of the strategies project a greater future role for the private sector in housing production. In three (all but Zimbabwe) the plans call for a clear diminution of the role of the Government's housing production agency. In Barbados and Jamaica, this policy has taken effect to some degree. In contrast, Zimbabwe's strategy presses for the creation of a government housing development corporation, primarily on the ground that it would be more efficient than current arrangements in delivering the share of production assigned to the public sector; a larger role for government production does not appear to be implied. Thus far, Parliament has not dealt explicitly with this proposal.

One particularly interesting point from the above summaries is the variation in the extent to which the donors have actively supported implementation of the strategy in the three countries where the process proceeded that far. Jamaica stands quite alone as a case in which the donor community strongly followed through, using the strategy statement as a guide. One may not be able to attribute this to special aspects of the strategy *per se*. Yet there was a close working relationship between the USAID Regional Housing and Urban Development Office, located in Kingston, and the Ministry charged with strategy development. Still, the harmony between the two in implementation suggests an unusual degree of agreement on objectives and policies, and strong compatibility at the staff level. The disagreement between the World Bank and the Government of Barbados has already been noted; nevertheless the strategy did serve as a framework within which the loan project was developed. In Zimbabwe, the donors appear not to have actively promoted the implementation of the strategy, although the World Bank's loan package introduced in 1988 is consistent with the Government's strategy statement. Lastly, in Kenya movement on implementation has been stalled by the urban land-use renewal exercise and a long drawn-out approval process exacerbated by fundamental issues raised by the strategy statement which require resolution.

As suggested, in concept the strategy could serve as a vehicle for co-ordinating as well as guiding external assistance. In both Barbados and Jamaica an attempt was made to do exactly this, but only in Jamaica did this tactic have some success. From the information at hand it is hard to judge whether the countries, the donors, or both found it preferable to deal with individual projects on an *ad hoc* basis rather than to work within the framework and priorities defined by the strategy.

It is also useful to consider the desirable length of the strategy-development period, in terms of possible effects on successful implementation. Longer periods - assuming the time is productively used - have significant potential for improving the chances for success. A longer period provides time to initiate more complete analyses of sectoral bottlenecks and to work out specific technical solutions to some problems; it allows more time for difficult jurisdictional questions to be resolved be-

tween ministries and for more consultation in general, possibly in the form of the "consensus-building" model; it provides a perhaps necessary margin of time for proposed radical changes to be digested; it permits the process of working together to become "internalized" and thus carry over into implementation; and it may allow the development of implementation plans, as was the case in Barbados. Against these advantages, however, there may be a risk of losing the high-level support under which the strategy-development process was initiated. In this vein, one cannot help but be struck by the nearly universal rating of new Heads of State, and sometimes cabinet officers, after 100 days or other brief periods in office. The motivation for administrators to act with extraordinary celerity to formulate and introduce new policies is to display "leadership" and to give them a chance to oversee the initial implementation of their programmes during their tenure in office and thus insure the programmes' survival to a greater degree. This kind of behaviour is, of course, a reflection of the rapid turnover in such positions.

Thus, there is a real tension in strategy development between more time to refine the strategy and develop comprehensive implementation plans and the urgency to begin implementation - the first step being obtaining the essential political acceptance. Speed, of course, has its price. If the strategy is too hastily composed, it may embody serious flaws or omissions and fail to be adopted; or it may suffer the same fate because insufficient support was garnered. Even after official adoption, the implementation of the strategy may suffer due to lack of commitment to the new ideas which were not understood or digested by the officials due to the short time available for discussions and consensus-building during the strategy formulation process.

There may be a middle ground between a strategy statement being rapidly developed and only containing general guidelines or policy statements and a long-term strategy-development process which generates a detailed implementation plan. This middle ground might be found in the policy recommendations being made with substantial specificity supported by an implementation strategy in outline, which divides identified activities into short-, medium- and long-term tasks based on their urgency and political support and assigns responsibilities for implementation. While this may make

official endorsement more difficult to obtain, it would have the advantage of launching the implementation process with significant momentum. Since shelter strategy development is a continuous and an incremental process which should be based upon regular assessments of the performance of the sector, this approach would also allow for shelter strategy formulation and its implementation to improve with knowledge gained and experience gathered.

Lastly, whether the implementation plan is drawn up as part of the strategy itself or evolves more gradually, a key question is whether the institutions assigned various responsibilities are competent to discharge them and, if not, are the means for increasing their capacity explicitly considered. None of the four strategy statements directly addressed this point. Failure to consider institutional capability can well foreshadow a disappointing record of plan implementation.

V. SOME LESSONS LEARNED

What conclusions can be drawn from the experiences of the four countries that have just been described? Perhaps the clearest lesson is that diverse approaches and processes are capable of producing solid, useful strategy statements which have been implemented to varying degrees; hence, there is no step-by-step formula which should be followed in most cases, if success is to be assured. At the same time, however, some distinct regularities have emerged from the experiences just recounted; and these can give important guidance on how to proceed in developing and implementing a national housing strategy.

This chapter presents the "lessons" from the four study countries and some broader experience in strategy formulation. A key input was a very useful day-long discussion with three of the authors of the country monographs about consistencies observed across the cases. For expositional convenience these have been grouped into three sections - those dealing with beginning the process, those concerned with developing the strategy statement itself, and those focused on implementation.

A. Getting started

What happens before the strategy-development process begins appears to influence the entire process. Specifically, two types of prior activity can increase the odds for a comprehensive, cogent strategy being successfully developed and its implementation undertaken. One is for the principal architects of the strategy to have had recent experience in the formulation of sector-level housing policy. Such experience appears to raise the ability to think about policy changes in a broad way and to enhance the consideration of ways to organize the process effectively - both the technical process and building support for the new policies. Where such experience is lacking, it may be appropriate to begin with a more limited policy development objective.

The other precondition is for key technical analyses, such as housing demand, housing needs assessment, and selected sectoral analysis (housing finance, building regulations) to have been completed. In Barbados, for example, the equivalent was the major sector report prepared by the Chief Planning Officer. Invariably these studies

proved to be critical inputs to the process. Typically, the requirement for these basic analyses to be done in advance increases as the time over which strategy development occurs is reduced: often there simply is insufficient time to commission and execute such studies as part of the strategy-development process *per se*. Where more time and resources are available for actual strategy development, as in Barbados, less need be done in advance. Alternatively, if the Zimbabwe model of first defining a "core strategy" is followed, some topics and the associated analysis can be postponed until the broader topics are addressed or, as an alternative, the definition of the strategy can be based on the analysis of technical information available and plans to improve the database can be made during subsequent planning cycles. In general the long-term value of these basic studies and data-collection efforts - often financed by the donor community, with only modest interest at the time from the country - can be very much larger than is usually perceived.

In initiating the strategy-development process, high-level political sponsorship is a *sine qua non* of a successful outcome. Typically, this sponsorship has been by the Minister charged with formulating and executing housing policy. Sponsorship must, however, go beyond simple expressions of support. First, not all housing ministers have equal power: some can be counted on to "deliver" co-operation from other critical players (such as the ministries charged with responsibilities in land and infrastructure), some cannot; some have the power to deal effectively with the agencies responsible for the macroeconomic planning and the national budget, others do not. In cases where the Minister's powers are relatively weak, prior to launching a full development effort he should consult closely and personally with his more powerful counterparts and see to it that their interest is secured.

Secondly, it is essential for the need for the new strategy to have been independently perceived by a senior official, e.g., the Minister, and the process initiated by that official, rather than by a donor agency. Thirdly, ministerial sponsorship must be translated into visible commitments. Chief among these are clear public backing and promotion of the strategy development and the assignment of high-quality and sufficient volume of staff to work on the strategy; the leadership position for day-to-day

responsibility is crucial - ideal is a respected senior official who can devote adequate time to the task. Finally, and something impossible to judge at initiation, the Minister must remain committed and interested throughout the process and well into implementation.

Some of these points can be assessed prior to or at the start of strategy development. Is the Minister co-ordinating with the other principally involved ministers before announcing that a new strategy will be developed? Who is he suggesting will be charged with day-to-day operations and for the ultimate drafting of the strategy? Is this the "first team"? If not, is he taking steps to augment it, possibly through donor assistance?

In instances where the housing ministry is relatively weak and it appears difficult to get other ministries to co-operate, it may be correct to limit the scope of the exercise to those areas more explicitly under the ministry's control and to branch out later from there - this appears to be the model followed in Zimbabwe.

The role of the donors at initiation should be limited. Offering technical support if strategy development is to be undertaken is clearly appropriate. (What type of assistance might be provided is discussed below.) Beyond this, creating some reasonable incentive may be useful for propelling the development process to timely completion. Examples include tying the appraisal of a loan to completion of the strategy, i.e., the loan proceeds would be used in implementation.¹⁵

There are two important caveats to the foregoing points. First, unless key technical analyses already exist, creating strong time pressure for completing the strategy may be counterproductive, leading to policy decisions not adequately founded on fact. Secondly, the idea for developing a strategy should not come exclusively from the donors; if the genesis is essentially external, there is a good chance that a formal exercise will be completed but not be vigorously implemented.

B. Formulating the strategy

One question which it had been hoped to resolve through this project was whether there was a particularly good way to organize the strategy-development process. The answer is quite clearly "No". Successful strategy development and implementation programmes have resulted from both the single-agency and the coalition-building models. In both cases those in charge found ways to develop the technical analysis, arrive at a strategy formulation which balanced the competing claims of key interest groups, and build and maintain a sufficient array of support that implementation could proceed. In short, there is plenty of room for alternative approaches.

Having said this, there are nevertheless some lessons to be drawn. The coalition-building model, as tried in Jamaica and Kenya, turns out to be difficult to sustain over the course of the development process. Although the more recent experience in Costa Rica has been encouraging, one problem is the time commitment required from the members of the sub-committees; especially among those from the private sector, devoting the necessary time can be a serious burden. Another problem is finding the staff resources to support the work of the sub-committees adequately. Without proper support, the incentive for members to participate declines. Finally, while the sub-committees collapsed in both Jamaica and Kenya before the final drafting of the strategy statement, one can imagine that an iterative review process involving several distinct sub-committees would be cumbersome.

As suggested, strategies developed under the single-agency model were successful, and so it may be that the broad approach of the coalition model is unnecessary. This is probably wrong; in some cases broad and formal outreach may be essential. In larger countries with more complex decision-making processes and more true "power centres" in government, the type of informal process used in Barbados may well not work. One alternative for achieving broader inputs without the sub-committee structure, which was tried in Kenya during late 1988 and early 1989 as part of the new strategy process, is to hold a series of public hearings chaired by members of the steering committee at which important actors in the private sector are invited to make statements; those appearing could include developers of informal housing. Another alternative would be to hold

^{15/} As an example of a strategy being tied to additional donor support, in late 1989 the World Bank encouraged Indonesia to undertake development of a housing strategy by wanting to use the strategy as a partial basis for the design of its second housing sector loan.

one-day workshops or seminars with key people in each sector (e.g., land) at the start of the process and after a draft strategy is available.¹⁶

A *prima facie* case in favour of the consensus-building model, regardless of how the needed inputs are obtained, can be made on the ground that without the discipline of formal outreach there will be a tendency for the strategy to have too narrow a focus. The agency in charge will naturally concentrate on those items directly under its control, as was the case in Zimbabwe.

A clear conclusion from examining the experiences of these countries is that those formulating the strategy definitely need solid technical analysis as the foundation for their work. In-depth analyses of particular sectoral problems, a clear understanding of the operation of housing markets serving lower-income households and some form of needs assessment are essential.

Some caution is appropriate in the application of housing needs models, as their output can easily be viewed as being more central to the strategy than is warranted: the needs estimates can really only provide a context for detailed policy analysis and help identify problem areas—such as an insufficient volume and poor allocation of housing finance. The primary emphasis should be on market operations and sectoral problems and actions by government to permit the non-government sector to overcome them. The needs estimates can be more productively used as the basis for quantifying the necessary size of programmes enabling private production, especially in the informal sector, e.g., the volume of serviced sites, the percentage of rental housing required and the number of small loans and the associated volume of finance.

More emphasis needs to be placed on understanding operations of the low-income segment of the housing market, i.e., the "informal market," which delivers most of the housing. In Kenya and Zimbabwe such understanding was generally lacking as a basis for the policies devised and this is often reflected in their lack of attention to the Government working effectively with households and

small-scale entrepreneurs to produce low cost housing.

Not all of the needed analyses could or should be undertaken as part of the strategy effort *per se*. Rather, most should be done in advance if the strategy-development process is to be fairly brief (a year or less), with modest additional efforts commissioned to supplement the analyses already available.¹⁷

How much and what kind of technical assistance should the donors offer to provide? Obviously every case will be different and no blanket "rules" can be formulated. Still, some guidance can be based on the experiences reviewed. It appears that a long-term consultant has consistently served a useful purpose in the strategy-development process, where one has been involved. Often they were assigned to the ministry for more general housing policy development and management tasks and were drawn into the process, frequently for a large share of their time. A long-term policy advisor being drawn into the process was the case in Jamaica and Zimbabwe. In Barbados the advisor's terms of reference explicitly included assisting with the strategy among other tasks. These consultants served various roles in providing a broader perspective on the country's problems and sometimes an enriched set of policy alternatives. They were often very effective in getting the most out of short-term consultants and in feeding the results of these consultancies into the overall process. The kind of steady interaction, guidance, and simple skills so provided consistently proved valuable.

While the presence of a long-term advisor is desirable, the timing of providing one may prove difficult given the long lead period for funding, recruiting, and, in the case of expatriates living outside the country, placing such people in the field. Expatriates could easily not arrive in time to participate in a locally-originated strategy-development process. In some cases an appropriate local advisor (an expatriate or national) may be available. Failing this, the best approximation may have

16/ This type of model is being followed in Indonesia which launched its strategy-development process in early 1989; the first set of meetings was held in April and a second series may be held later.

17/ This is certainly the model followed in Indonesia, where the strategy-development process begun in early 1989 followed completion of an ambitious set of technical studies aimed at understanding informal-sector production and was expected to take only another six to nine months.

to be two or three several-month visits by a consultant already with considerable experience and standing in the country.

Short-term consultancies also proved their worth in a number of cases, but the proper management of these resources may be more demanding than that of the long-term advisor. Short-term advisors are well suited to doing the detailed technical analysis needed on a tight timetable to permit more detailed policy planning to go forward. In addition, they can be useful in offering policy suggestions somewhat more radical than those permanently present may be willing or able to advance. At the same time, however, their presence can be disruptive to the process of developing consensus if they are accorded too prominent a role or advance their own agenda too forcefully. This suggests that the exact role which short-term consultants are to serve be carefully defined in composing their terms of reference and this plan adhered to during their visit. For those countries with little prior experience with housing strategy-development efforts, a couple of months of technical assistance before the effort is formally announced might be very helpful in structuring the breadth and organization of the effort, including the types of analyses to be done and helping organize the logistics of executing them.

C. Implementation

Successfully implementing a strategy generally depends crucially on the degree of support developed for it during its development and sustained into the action phase. Only in Zimbabwe, where the scope of the strategy itself was relatively limited and the implementation process deliberately involved further refinement of the implementing policies, was successful implementation achieved without developing prior support. Having said this, it has also been noted at several points that there is clearly a variety of ways of developing the necessary backing. Obviously, success additionally requires skill, flexibility and a deft touch in implementing the elements of the strategy.

Having stressed the need for political support for successful implementation, a key issue is how to sustain momentum in the face of shifts in leadership. The following two points reach beyond the direct experience in the four countries. First, in the

end there is probably no defence against wilful lethargy at the ministerial level. If the new minister dislikes the strategy, the chances of implementation are remote. Secondly, the odds for success are likely to increase with prior official endorsement of the strategy and generation of backing among local officials, private developers, the finance community, and households, through a quick start on implementing the more tractable parts of the strategy.

With the exception of Barbados, where implementation has proceeded slowly, none of the countries developed detailed, comprehensive action plans for implementation after the general principles were endorsed and before taking implementing action. It may be that this second stage of planning is just too onerous and time-consuming for most countries to tolerate. Because there is a premium on maintaining support for the strategy as implementation is begun, quick action without undue delay for more planning may be a successful model. Without at least an outline implementation plan, however, the desired policies may not be implemented at all, even though regulations are written and programmes launched. In the absence of a clear blueprint these implementing actions may well be ineffective or even at cross-purposes.

Zimbabwe offers an important prescription for those countries in which support for broad housing sector reform is likely to prove very difficult to develop. Those charged with strategy development could design the strategy development deliberately to be of limited scope and work hard to achieve these initial limited objectives. However, the overall framework should be defined more broadly so that as it becomes possible to expand policy revision into additional areas - based on success in those initially targeted - the full policy programme maintains its coherence and cogency.

Donor enthusiasm in implementing the strategies is somewhat difficult to track. On the one hand, the strategy has served as a clear basis for donor-proposed action. This was the case in Jamaica, where USAID has been very active in supporting implementation, and in Barbados, where the strategy served as the framework for developing a housing sector loan but when negotiations broke down over some specific policy points. In Kenya, where the strategy has not yet been adopted by the

Government, the strategy did not serve as a focal point for action, although the donors urged the Government to follow some of its recommendations.

A fundamental implication of countries adopting an "enabling" role for government agencies in the housing sector is that housing policies have become much more difficult to execute. It is quite easy to organize the construction of units compared with improving a land- registration or housing-finance system or to reforming a water-supply parastatal. Under an enabling strategy a different type of technical assistance will be needed from that essential in mounting production programmes. Studies of how the segment of the housing market serving low-income families operates and analyses of specific institutional bottle-necks will be needed, both to define and successfully to implement new policies. Strategy development in Indonesia, Jamaica and Jordan all involved careful analyses of the informal housing market. Examples of still-needed studies include: in Jamaica, there should be an analysis of government -NGO linkages and institutional arrangement required to channel support to the informal sector as well as of

the policies and operations of the public water supply company and a work plan developed so that it will service lots occupied by low-income families who possess less than perfect title to the land; Zimbabwe reportedly needs a careful analysis of the costs and benefits of its rent control régime as a precursor to serious debate about change; and in both Kenya and Zimbabwe, with the majority of low-income families occupying rented premises, an in-depth study on demand for rental housing would seem necessary.

The final observation is that successfully designing and implementing a national shelter strategy is both technically and politically difficult. Few developed nations are able to obtain the type of thorough-going reform which is needed in their shelter policies because of the strength of vested interests and other factors. Viewed in this light, the countries that have been examined have done remarkably well as a group. One hopes that their counterparts will be even more successful as the kind of lessons enumerated above are digested and acted upon by both the countries and the donor community.

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Annex

EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES OF COUNTRY CASE STUDY MONOGRAPHS

- I. The Barbados National Housing Plan: a case study
- II. Jamaica National Shelter Strategy development
- III. Kenya country monograph
- IV. The case of Zimbabwe

I. THE BARBADOS NATIONAL HOUSING PLAN: A CASE STUDY ^a

In 1976, the Government of Barbados initiated a formal process of policy review and planning for the housing sector. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) provided substantial support for the final stage in this overall process. Specifically, USAID made completion of the National Housing Plan a condition for approval of a Housing Guaranty Program loan in 1982, and funded technical assistance and consultant studies over the period 1984-1986.

Prior to the introduction of USAID assistance, the Ministry of Housing and Lands (MOHL) made substantial progress towards strategy development. The Ministry's Housing Planning Unit conducted an extensive data collection and analysis effort focusing on housing problems and housing market operations in Barbados. This effort culminated in a 1982 technical report which provided the basis for a 1984 Government White Paper on Housing. The White Paper presented the following policy recommendations:

- (a) The Government should encourage homeownership at all income levels;
- (b) The Government should promote the maintenance of the existing housing stock;
- (c) A range of housing solutions should be designed that are affordable at various income levels;
- (d) The housing finance system should be rationalized;
- (e) The Government should expand the availability of developable land for housing;
- (f) The role and functions of the National Housing Corporation should be revised;
- (g) The Government should seek to reduce housing construction costs;
- (h) Private sector involvement in national housing initiatives should be expanded.

In 1982, USAID offered the Government of Barbados a Housing Guaranty Program loan to capitalize the Housing Credit Fund (HCF), which

would provide financing through existing institutions to households below the median income. One of the conditions tied to the loan funds was completion of a national housing plan, and to support the development of a national housing plan, USAID provided a technical assistance grant, which paid for a senior housing advisor as well as a number of consultant studies. This assistance (which became available in 1984) expanded and accelerated the planning activities that were underway in MOHL. However, responsibility for preparation of the National Housing Plan remained an internal activity, controlled by the Housing Planning Unit within MOHL.

Staff of MOHL clearly viewed the preparation of the National Housing Plan as an internal, staff function - even a technical function. They did not see the need for a formalized "consensus-building" process, but were confident of their ability to obtain outside information and to review as needed through informal contacts in the Government of Barbados and in the private sector. The civil servants in the Housing Planning Unit had regular access to both the Permanent Secretary and the Minister, and provided frequent briefings for these officials on technical reports, plan targets, and draft versions of the final plan. The Minister was an active supporter of the planning process, and every draft document prepared as part of this process was summarized for his review.

Preparation of the National Housing Plan consisted of three broad, overlapping phases. First, a series of technical reports was commissioned from Ministry staff, local consultants, and United States consultants. Next, the National Housing Plan was drafted, reviewed and revised. Finally, an executive summary of the Plan was prepared for general distribution. Originally, the entire process was expected to be completed in 12 months - January-December 1984. Ultimately, however, plan preparation consumed two years, ending in 1986.

From the start, preparation of the Plan and the supporting technical reports was very systematically organized. The technical studies conducted as background for the National Housing Plan fall into three basic categories. Two reports provide

^{a/} Summary of a paper prepared by Margery Austin Turner.

descriptive summaries of existing Government of Barbados activities in the housing sector. Six reports focused either on critical housing sectors, or on constraints limiting the production of housing in Barbados. One report documented housing problems in Barbados and provided estimates of current and future housing needs.

While the coverage and quality of the technical reports varied, they were widely viewed as extremely valuable and unquestionably worthwhile. These papers carefully explored some of the most widely held myths about housing problems in Barbados, and produced a quite consistent set of findings and recommendations. Even after the passage of several years, participants in the Barbados housing sector emphasize the lasting value of these technical reports, which have continued to serve as reliable sources of information and analysis on key housing issues. These papers helped educate the MOHL staff, as well as being of interest to staff in other government ministries.

The National Housing Plan for Barbados begins with an overview of the Government's overall housing strategy, consistent with the 1984 White Paper on Housing. It then presents five-year targets for housing production, investment, financing, and government expenditures, and outlines policies and programmes needed to achieve these targets. The Plan is extremely clear and explicit. While it begins with broad statements of public-sector objectives, it also includes concrete statements regarding target levels of housing production, upgrading and financing. The relative contributions of the public and private sectors to these targets are explicitly articulated, and the Plan lays out the public-sector initiatives—short-term, medium-term, and long-term—needed to achieve the targets.

The National Housing Plan outlines three broad strategies for achieving the Government's overall goal of improved housing conditions in Barbados. These strategies are consistent with the policies articulated in the White Paper on Housing, but they are considerably more focused and specific in the Plan:

(a) The private sector will be encouraged to expand its role in the production of new homes and home improvements, while the Government scales back its direct involvement in housing production,

and assumes a supportive role that increases the productivity and efficiency of the private housing industry. In particular, the Government will encourage financial institutions to expand their service to low- and moderate-income families, and will enter into joint ventures with the private sector to produce low-cost housing;

(b) The level of resources for maintaining and improving the existing housing stock will be increased. The Government's role will be to expand the range of programmes and financing mechanisms for improving existing housing units;

(c) Public-sector housing solutions will be designed at the lowest possible per-unit costs, so that the limited pool of government resources can benefit the greatest possible number of households. The Government will move away from providing high-cost, deeply-subsidized housing solutions, and will expand its programmes of developing serviced sites and modest new houses. In addition, the Government's financing programmes will be designed to maximize cost recovery, limiting subsidies to those with the most severe needs.

In the same year that the National Housing Plan was completed (1986), a new Government was elected in Barbados. As a result, the Minister for Housing and Lands who presided over the entire process of plan development is no longer in office. The Permanent Secretary of MOHL has also been replaced. The new Government has not abandoned either the White Paper on Housing or the National Housing Plan, but, in the words of one observer, the new Minister "is taking some time to be convinced of the correctness of the plan recommendations." Therefore, implementation of the National Housing Plan is stalled; while some progress on implementation was achieved even before the National Housing Plan was completed, MOHL is not currently taking active steps to ensure that the government activities outlined in the Plan are being pursued or that the plan targets are being achieved.

There is currently no outside source of pressure on the Government of Barbados to resume active implementation of the National Housing Plan. It remains to be seen whether the new Government will ultimately "adopt" the Plan as its own, and take active steps to implement it, or whether

the Plan will gradually drift into obsolescence as events pass it by.

There are several important lessons to be learned from the Barbados experience in strategy development-an experience which produced an exceptional plan document, but which has yet to result in systematic implementation efforts:

(a) Strategy development was widely viewed as a success in Barbados because it was initiated, directed, and largely carried out by Barbadians;

(b) Providing a resident housing advisor for a year or more-along with funds for consultant studies-proved to be a very effective way for the international donor community to support strategy development;

(c) The in-depth studies of housing problems and housing market conditions, conducted as part of the strategy-development process contributed substantially to the quality of the National Housing Plan, and will serve as valuable resources to policy makers for years to come;

(d) The "single-agency" approach to strategy development does not appear to have prevented the MOHL Housing Planning Unit from soliciting contributions from other key actors both inside and outside the Government;

(e) Despite the exceptionally high quality of the National Housing Plan itself, implementation is at least temporarily stalled in Barbados, primarily due to the change in political leadership in 1986;

(f) There is no evidence that a more public, "consensus-building" approach to strategy development would have avoided the current hiatus in implementation of the National Housing Plan. However, active political support is clearly required to achieve implementation.

The international donor community might have been able to encourage the new Government to give higher priority to implementation of the National Housing Plan, but it has not done so.

II. JAMAICA NATIONAL SHELTER STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT^b

Context of strategy development

As in most developing countries, the Jamaican housing production system does not generate enough units of sufficient quality to house the entire population. This situation appeared to have worsened considerably in the early to mid 1980s, with declining investment in the sector, rising costs of finished units and, declining private and public-sector production. As a result, the informal sector now produces upwards of 70 per cent of the country's housing.

The Government's shelter production policies in the early 1980s largely concentrated on the production of finished units: core houses, starter homes, and housing schemes for moderate-income households. The cost of these solutions, however, was beyond the reach of most Jamaican households. (Several demonstration projects, including support from USAID, did begin to address settlement-upgrading issues.)

From the early 1980s, the country's institutional network for housing delivery and its production policies have been under review. The 1982 Housing Policy and the 1985 Task Force on Mortgage Finance highlighted the housing affordability issue and the constraints to financial resource flows into the sector. These two efforts lay the groundwork for development of the National Shelter Strategy.

Genesis of the strategy process

At the ninth session of the United Nations Commission on Human Settlements in Istanbul in May 1986 the then Minister of Construction (Housing) committed Jamaica to producing a Shelter Strategy Report. This commitment was seen as a way to continue the country's policy development process, and to position the country to receive international support.

The commitment to produce a formal strategy fitted extremely well with the general policy review process already in place as part of the country's national activities in connection with the International Year of Shelter for the Homeless (IYSH). The IYSH Steering Committee and its sub-committees already had mobilized most of the country's intellectual resources, from all sectors,

for a comprehensive look at shelter policies and programmes.

The IYSH Steering Committee, chaired by the Ministry's Permanent Secretary, was designed to provide overall guidance to a series of specialized sub-committees which were expected to report findings and recommendations to the overall Committee. Because the sub-committees had no staff, no compelling deadlines, and sometimes unclear direction from the Steering Committee, little of substantive value was accomplished. Under pressure of the international obligation, direction for the effort was concentrated into a Focus Committee, which henceforth would guide the strategy effort.

Strategy-development process

The Focus Committee consisted of two senior government members, the Permanent Secretary and the Director of the Urban Development Corporation; two members of the financial community, the Director of the parastatal National Housing Trust and the head of the Association of Building Societies; a representative of the non-governmental organizations (NGOs); a specialist in technical education; and three mid-level government officials (one supported by USAID).

The Focus Committee managed the process of developing analytic inputs for the strategy report. This consisted, for the most part, of managing the work of two donor-funded efforts: (a) a Housing Needs Assessment and sector constraints analysis, funded by USAID; and (b) a market study and draft strategy preparation, funded by the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat). Both efforts involved the use of local consultants; the latter effort did so completely.

The Focus Committee attempted to use the sub-committee process to conduct analysis of the constraints in each sector. Under pressure of an upcoming sub-regional conference, for which a country presentation was to be made, the Focus Committee consolidated the sub-committees and redrafted terms of reference. This new structure,

^{b/} Summary of a paper prepared by Christopher Walker.

still lacking staff support, fared no better than the earlier process.

The bulk of analytic inputs to the strategy-development process consisted of published secondary materials, though much of the document's content represented the original thinking of its principal author. The Secretary to the Focus Committee drafted the strategy document through an intensive process of chapter-by-chapter drafting, review and revision. Under serious pressure of time, the drafting process took place at the same time as the analytic inputs were being developed.

The strategy document, with full Focus Committee approval, passed through the Steering Committee process with no opposition. The Minister used the strategy as the basis for the Government's budget presentation to Parliament, and subsequent discussions with donor agencies have relied on the strategy document as a firm statement of the Government of Jamaica's policy line.

Role of donor assistance

Donor resources supported a large portion of the staff effort in the strategy-development process: the Housing Needs Assessment; a sector constraints analysis; a seven-community housing market study; and the strategy preparation itself.

The Focus Committee took great pains to ensure local control over the strategy-development process. The original USAID offer to use external consultants in developing the analytic inputs and draft the strategy was rejected; instead a collaborative external-local process was used. The similar offer by the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat) was modified to include only local consultants.

The Housing Needs Assessment, funded by USAID, provided useful analysis of the dimensions and magnitude of the housing need. The market study, in essence a study of housing development and finance in squatter communities, accorded process participants new insights into the informal sector. Arguably, the most useful of the donor inputs were the donor-funded analyses conducted in the several years immediately prior to the strategy effort.

The project-specific support given by donors could have been more effective. The sector-by-sector analysis funded by USAID as a companion to the needs assessment work presented an organized resumé of current thinking about sector issues, but developed no new analysis of problems in the sector. The UNCHS (Habitat)-funded market studies developed valuable data that could have dramatically improved the needs assessment results, but time constraints prevented this application. The UNCHS (Habitat) support, however, also funded the work of the national housing consultant, whose assessment of sector constraints and resources provided the analytic underpinning of the strategy report.

The donor resources contributed to the strategy-development effort undoubtedly helped produce a better-documented strategy report. The principal impact of donor assistance in terms of strategy contents was to reinforce the policy directions that the Focus Committee and the Minister were interested in furthering, by providing the necessary resources to support locally-generated analyses.

The strategy statement

The strategy document clearly articulates the Government's new shelter policy of targeting resources to the housing needs of low-income households, and removing public-sector barriers to more efficient private-sector provision of housing units. The strategy report, in addition, contains a fairly detailed inventory of most of the barriers to low-income shelter development.

The Strategy's major strength is its attention to the characteristics and housing needs of the informal sector, and the policies advocated in the Strategy are appropriate responses to the needs as identified. But while the needs of the informal sector are clearly defined, the capacity of NGOs and government agencies to deal effectively with these needs is not so well addressed.

The Strategy's principal weakness is its inattention to the details of implementation (though a once-proposed plan of action is now being developed). While the policies that are feasible for implementation in the short, medium and long term to meet each of the core objectives of the Strategy are clear, the means to implement them are not.

Especially critical is the lack of attention to the links that would have to be established between the Ministry of Construction (Housing), as the lead body in the sector, and NGOs. The development constraint posed by the organization of infrastructure services, particularly water and sewer services, is a key omission in terms of sector policy.

Strategy implementation

The Strategy underlies the Government's official social policy. The Social Well-Being Programme, presenting the three-year objectives for health, education, shelter and other sectors, quoted verbatim the principal findings and recommendations of the Strategy Report.

The Strategy already has proved to be an effective way of organizing external assistance. As a comprehensive examination of the sector, the Strategy demonstrates the country's commitment to broad policy change at the same time as USAID is shifting from project- to sector-based lending. The World Bank, similarly, is expected to regard the effort favourably as evidence of Jamaica's commitment to sector financial reform.

The priorities of the Strategy have been accepted by USAID as priority areas for funding through its recently approved Housing Guaranty Program loan. The Program targets USAID project assistance to settlement-upgrading and serviced-sites development, and focuses technical assistance on areas identified as bottle-necks in the Strategy.

Given the broad participatory process used to formulate the Strategy, the clear statement of need for production alternatives for finished units, and the financial support for major strategy priorities given by USAID, the recent change of Government is quite unlikely to diminish the country's commitment to implementing the Strategy as written.

Major lessons for future strategy development

The lessons from the Jamaican experience should be read with an eye to the unique features of that experience. Jamaica is a liberal State, with a strong Parliamentary tradition, competitive parties, and an entrenched private sector. In addition, housing finance and production is decentralized,

with each sector in the private-sector delivery network fairly well-organized-financial institutions, builders, architects-and multiple public-sector organizations responsible for planning and production. This environment is a powerful stimulus to coalition politics, and the organization of the strategy process was built around this consensus-building task.

With this overall context in mind, the lessons from the Jamaican experience, briefly summarized, are:

(a) While a broadly inclusionary process of coalition formation can work well to co-opt major sectors involved in shelter provision, it is not a particularly promising vehicle for mobilizing analytic resources. Unless a sub-committee structure is liberally staffed, meaningful inputs beyond defining issues cannot be expected;

(b) Commitment from the highest levels to support the outcome of the process is essential. The Minister articulated the major directions of policy, but was not involved in the day-to-day elaboration of the Strategy. Nevertheless, the strategy process, with the broadest inclusion of shelter sector actors, implied some risk that the results would not be absolutely consistent with ministerial priorities;

(c) Attention to implementation is extremely important where new relationships are being forged. The Jamaican Strategy calls for a decisive shift into support for the informal sector, but a great deal of uncertainty remains concerning Government-NGO links and the capacity of NGOs to carry out the role envisioned for them. As a result, the Government of Jamaica has approached the United Nations Development Programme to request funding for a study to assess how NGOs can be strengthened and better included in the development process;

(d) Donor support can be extremely valuable in developing the analysis needed to support strategy formation, but in order to be implemented, the actual strategy should be of local authorship. A strategy produced by external consultants may have the considerable virtue of technical merit, but fail to formulate a consensus forged through genuine participation;

(e) Aside from the pressure brought to bear by funding priorities, donor assistance for strategy development is unlikely to deflect local efforts into areas not already a local priority. Perhaps obviously, donor assistance is most effective where it reinforces the incipient policy directions already established;

(f) Some type of mechanism to force closure on issues is key to the success of the strategy-

development process, if this process is to result in the discrete formulation of a new policy consensus. In the Jamaican instance, the presentation to the impending tenth session of the Commission on Human Settlements forced final strategy formulation, while the IYSH sub-regional conference brought ministerial approval of the overall strategy outline.

III. KENYA COUNTRY MONOGRAPH^c

Objectives of the exercise and the time span

Kenya's housing policy in the form of *Sessional Paper No. 5 of 1966/67* is over 20 years old. The Government's objective in undertaking the exercise was to review this policy in the light of the many changes which have taken place in the sector, especially in recent years, and to formulate a new strategy to the year 2000. The exercise received support from the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat), the World Bank and USAID.

The timing of the exercise was affected by the decision to prepare the new strategy for presentation to the tenth session of the Commission on Human Settlements which was held in Nairobi in April 1987. This decision was made in July 1986 and the work got underway in November 1986, which meant that there was very little time available for the exercise.

Approach used

The main agency responsible for the policy review was the Department of Housing, then in the Ministry of Works, Housing and Physical Planning. The exercise was overseen by a Steering Committee representing all the main agencies responsible for various sectors related to housing. A separate Task Force under the direction of the Chief Housing Officer was responsible for synthesizing the work of six sub-task forces which reviewed the separate sectors. An editorial sub-committee of the Task Force prepared recommendations for ratification by the Steering Committee.

International and local consultants were funded by UNCHS (Habitat), the World Bank and USAID to assist the Task Force and the sub-task forces. The consultants prepared background material, assisted and prepared reports for the sub-task forces, and as members of the editorial sub-committee were responsible for preparing the report of the Task Force. Consultants also prepared the report of the recommendations of the Steering Committee.

The strategy-development process involved the following steps: (a) needs assessment undertaken by consultants with some local input; (b) sector-by-sector assessments undertaken by the sub-task force reports into a Task Force report by

the editorial sub-committee and the preparation of the recommendations of the Steering Committee following discussion of the Task Force report.

The end-product of the policy review was the report of the recommendations of the Steering Committee, which was adapted slightly for presentation to the tenth session of the Commission on Human Settlements. It was the intention at the start of the exercise that the Steering Committee's report would form the basis of a Sessional Paper to be presented to Parliament. This formalization of the strategy statement has not yet taken place, although a strategy statement has been approved by the Cabinet and a Sessional Paper is being drafted. Some of the recommendations made in the strategy statement have been incorporated into the housing section of the Sixth National Development Plan for 1989-1993 which had just been launched.

Content of the Strategy

The main objective of the National Housing Strategy as set out in the Steering Committee's report is to: "produce a concrete plan of action for the period 1987-2000 by which the public and the private sectors working together and in collaboration with the international community can produce a high volume of acceptable quality housing, infrastructure and community facilities sufficient to meet the needs of new households and make inroads into upgrading the existing stock of sub-standard housing in urban and rural areas."

The guiding principle in the formulation and implementation of the Strategy was "that an increasing share of all housing will be developed by the private market, with government acting to facilitate production."

The main sub-sectors of housing finance, land, planning and construction, and administrative arrangements were reviewed, and constraints to achieving the major objective of increased production of housing through government support to the private sector were defined. Ways of overcoming the constraints were reviewed and recommendations made for changes in legislation,

^c Summary of a paper prepared by Sara Wakham.

regulations and institutional arrangements necessary for successful implementation.

The Strategy proposed was therefore consistent with the definition of an "enabling strategy" in the Global Strategy for Shelter to the Year 2000. But it stopped short of being a strategy as defined in the Global Strategy, as it did not specify in detail the responsibilities and time-frame for implementation. A strategic plan of action was to follow as part of the Sessional Paper.

Implementation of the Strategy

Twenty-two months after the presentation of the Strategy to the tenth session of the Commission on Human Settlements, it had still not been developed in the form of a Sessional Paper, approved by the Cabinet or presented to Parliament. Since the policy-review exercise took place, a number of important changes have occurred in the government agencies concerned which have affected this process. The Department of Housing has been transferred to the Ministry of Lands and the Department of Physical Planning to the Ministry of Local Government. The issue of land use in urban areas has recently been given priority by the new Minister of Lands and Housing, with housing being seen as the major user of land. The Government is currently giving a higher priority to housing following various Presidential statements on the subject of urban squatters and a further review of the sector leading to the production of a Sessional Paper is expected in response to this.

The Sessional Paper will be prepared by officials who were not involved in the previous exercise, working under the guidance of the Housing Projects Development Committee. This Committee replaced the previous Housing Policy Steering Committee, and is composed entirely of officials from the Department of Housing and the National Housing Corporation. It remains to be seen whether the recommendations contained in the Steering Committee's report will be used to form the basis of the revised Strategy in these changed circumstances.

Some of the recommendations made in the strategy statement have been incorporated into the housing section of the Sixth National Development Plan. The general strategic approach of mobilizing non-government finance for house construction

and concentrating local authority efforts on the servicing of land for housing is incorporated in the Plan. The Plan also states that the "pool housing" system for government employees will be replaced by housing loans to enable civil servants to provide themselves with housing. In general, however, the Plan is vague on other issues tackled in the strategy document, and a strategic plan of action is still required which will clearly point the way towards implementation.

The main problems with the process

Although the strategy statement represents a good response to the realities of the situation in Kenya, it is in danger of remaining just that, a statement which will never be implemented. This is because the strategy-review exercise failed to create a strong commitment to the proposed strategy on the part of the agencies responsible for its implementation. The exercise also failed to set up an appropriate institutional framework capable of carrying forward the process of refining the statement into a strategic plan of action and ensuring its implementation. For these reasons, it appears unlikely that the strategy produced under this particular exercise will survive intact the institutional changes which have recently taken place, although it is possible that the considerable amount of groundwork which was undertaken will be used to inform the final document.

The Kenyan experience demonstrates how easy it is to sacrifice process to product. The production of an end-product, in this case the paper for presentation to the tenth session of the Commission on Human Settlements, became the end in itself, and took over from the more important issue of setting up a structure capable of carrying it forward to implementation.

The problems experienced in Kenya stem mainly from the lack of status of the Department of Housing relative to other agencies the co-operation of which was vital for the effective implementation of the Strategy. Influential officials of these agencies did not get involved in the exercise and did not give it priority for staff time.

A second reason for the problems experienced was the very short time available for the exercise. This resulted in most of the work being undertaken by the consultants, including the preparation of the

sub-task force reports, the synthesis of the recommendations and the drafting of the Steering Committee's report. The lack of availability of national staff to attend meetings of the sub-task forces at which the consultants' findings could be discussed meant that little was learned from the exercise and the consultants' ideas on innovative options and solutions were not fully debated. Also, because of the short time available for discussion of the recommendations by the Task Force and the Steering Committee, these ideas were not properly understood and digested, a factor which led directly to a lack of commitment to their implementation. Some officials did not understand the reasons behind what was being proposed and felt threatened. Their reaction was to let things lie rather than become actively involved in promoting the new proposals.

The lack of time also meant that the dynamics of informal housing development were not explored in any detail and an appropriate strategic response could not be made. The exercise was confined to central government agencies discussing a top-down approach. Representation from private informal developers and the local authorities might have infused the discussions with more reality. The consultants were left to present their case for them, though it would have been far better for central government officials to discover the realities for themselves.

Without the consultants' inputs on these and other realities it is unlikely that they would have been considered at all. But the very tight schedule did not allow enough time for the presentation and discussion of ideas and prevented the consultants from adopting a truly "working with" approach, which is essential if their experience is to be passed on.

Lessons learned

The Kenyan experience has demonstrated that the following points are not only important to the success of a strategy-formulation exercise but essential if the Strategy is to be carried forward to implementation:

(a) *Initiation* - The exercise must be initiated in response to an interest at the highest level. Only then will the support and continued involvement of

those with the power and influence to affect decisions be assured. It follows that the process must be initiated by the country concerned, the pace must be set locally and the end-product must be what is necessary to ensure the formal recognition of the strategy and its absorption into the local system. In the Kenyan case, this would mean a Cabinet memorandum leading to a Sessional Paper, rather than a statement for an international conference.

(b) *Structure of the strategy-development process* - The approach in which a series of committees is set up to investigate particular sectors and synthesize the findings into a co-ordinated strategy is a good one. It will only work, however, if the following points are observed:

(i) Representation on the steering committee should be intersectoral and include people at the highest possible level. The committee should include not only high-level civil servants and local authority personnel but also representatives from the private sector and NGOs. It is particularly important to include some members with a knowledge of the private financial market. Civil servants rarely have a solid knowledge of housing finance and it is important that the committee is informed about the mechanics of private-sector financial institutions as well as the Government's macro-economic policies;

(ii) The sector committees should be directly responsible to the steering committee. A separate working committee or task force is unnecessary. Individual steering committee members should be directly responsible for the work of particular sector committees. They would then have to understand the material prepared by "their" sector committee in order to be able to present it to the steering committee;

(iii) A sub-committee composed of members of the steering committee should be responsible for synthesizing the sector committee reports, reviewing the inter-sectoral implications and preparing the recommendations for discussion by the steering committee;

(iv) The process would benefit from more direct representation at the local level. The committee should visit recent informal and formal sector

developments to hear for itself the opinions of the individuals responsible for their construction. Sub-committees could be appointed to represent local interests in a number of urban and rural centres throughout the country to review the particular nature of the local housing situation and report to the steering committee;

(c) *Implementation of the process* - The steering committee should be responsible for directing the whole process. It would review available background material, note any deficiencies and prepare the terms of reference and the work plan for the exercise. Only when this has been done can the need for consultants be determined. If consultants' assistance is thought to be required, the steering committee would approach the donor agencies for funding of consultants to undertake specific tasks within the time-frame provided by the work plan. The consultants would be approved by the steering committee and report to its chairman. Consultants

will be used effectively only if they work closely with local counterparts. They should agree on their terms of reference and exactly what role they will play with the steering committee from the start. Both donors and consultants must understand that the consultants' role is to assist the process, not simply to produce a report. It is important that time for consultation and discussion of findings is not curtailed by the need to produce a specific output.

(d) *Use of donor assistance* - The steering committee should be encouraged to discuss the proposed work plan with the donors and to sound out their opinion at the start of the exercise. Potential donor inputs can thus be explored and planned for. As well as providing technical assistance in the form of consultants, donors may be prepared to fund national staff or to provide logistic support such as transport and per diem payments for field visits. Donor funding is essential for these aspects of the work.

IV. THE CASE OF ZIMBABWE^d

Background

Many developing countries confront challenging tasks in housing their growing urban and rural populations. There is an increasing realization of the complexity of the required actions needed to solve the housing problems. Several countries have recently formulated comprehensive housing strategies using a variety of technical planning inputs and political choice procedures to reach consensus on a plan of action.

This study of the Zimbabwe strategy formulation process is part of a comparative study of different procedures used to formulate housing strategies and the varied role of external assistance in this process. It is assumed that the process followed to develop a housing strategy has an important impact on the comprehensiveness of the strategy statement itself as well as on its successful implementation.

Zimbabwe was selected as a country where strategy formulation has gradually evolved as an incremental and interactive process. External aid did not play an important role in the formulation process directly, but was used to prepare technical studies required to provide a proper context for strategy formulation.

Zimbabwe began the formulation of its current housing strategy in 1985. Although a first draft was prepared by Ministry staff within two months, the subsequent discussions and redrafting took two years. During this long period of discussions, an effective system of consultation and communication developed gradually which drew in the major actors in the housing-delivery process.

Zimbabwe's housing context

The first transitional housing plan after independence in 1980 was a strong reaction against former colonial structures and against the predominance of the white-minority-controlled construction industry. The emphasis of the first plan was on high minimum building and planning standards, homeownership and construction of houses by

building brigades and self-help. The public sector was considered as the main funder and developer for all low-income housing to be constructed during the first planning period. The private sector was supposed to take care of middle- and high-income housing demand.

A decrease in economic growth and a realization of the magnitude of the housing problem forced the Government to reconsider some of its priorities, particularly concerning the role of the private sector in low-income housing provision. It agreed on the need to stimulate the participation of the housing finance industry and private employers in the supply of low-income housing. It did so cautiously however. The new housing strategy proposes not only to increase the role of the private sector, but the capacity of the public sector as well, particularly in construction- and building-materials production. While the Cabinet has approved changes to accommodate an increase in the role of private financial institutions, it has not granted approval for the establishment of a National Housing Corporation or a Building Research Institute. The relative roles of each of the private and public actors are continuously reconsidered in a process of consultation between the different parties.

The strategy-formulation process

The immediate incentive for the formulation of a new comprehensive housing strategy was the preparation of the First Five-Year National Development Plan of 1986-1990. The Minister of Public Construction and National Housing considered this a good opportunity to consolidate several developments which had taken place in the housing field since the transitional plan was drafted.

During 1984 and 1985 several preparatory studies had been undertaken with assistance from international development agencies; a Housing Demand and Preferences Study (USAID/World Bank), a Housing Needs Assessment (USAID), a Study of the Housing Finance System (USAID), a Feasibility Study for a National Housing

^{d/} Summary of a paper prepared by Marja C. Hoek-Smit.

Corporation (USAID/UNCHS (Habitat)). Also, an evaluation had been carried out of an important pilot project funded by UNDP/UNCHS (Habitat). These studies and implementation experiences served as critical inputs in the development of the strategy.

The strategy-formulation process itself was, however, considered an internal ministerial responsibility. A Steering Committee was set up which was composed of the Minister, and the Heads of departments and sections in the Ministry. A task force of four people was appointed: three under-secretaries and the long-term UNDP Chief Technical Advisor, who was attached to the Ministry. This task force first prepared the terms of reference for the proposed strategy document and, with input from the various branches in the Ministry, prepared a first draft of the strategy within two months. No consultations took place at that stage with parties outside the Ministry and issues which fell outside the direct mandate of the Ministry were only included as constraints, e.g. land issues and the problem of borrowing power, as well as labour resources at the local authority level.

The following steps were followed in the strategy-development process:

(a) The definition of the magnitude of the housing problems in urban and rural areas;

(b) An analysis of the constraints in the housing-delivery process: financial resources, human and institutional resources, shortage of building materials and equipment and serviced sites;

(c) The development of specific housing programmes for urban and rural sectors. These were, however, formulated as programmes and no specific plans of action were formulated;

(d) The formulation of separate Cabinet Papers on proposed major institutional changes, such as the creation of a National Housing Corporation and a Building Research Institute;

(e) Submission of the Cabinet Memoranda to the Cabinet for approval.

The various documents went through a painstaking process of review by the Minister and Heads

of departments within the Ministry, a process that took two years to complete. Ministerial approval was given to the final documents and the Cabinet Papers and the Cabinet Memoranda were submitted to the Cabinet Committee on Development in February 1987. Cabinet approval has only been granted on issues related to the increased participation of the financial institutions in lending for low-income housing. Other issues, such as the National Housing Corporation and Building Research Institute, as well as the approval of the overall strategy, are still pending and budget allocations to the housing sector have not significantly increased. However, those parts of the Strategy which need ministerial approval only are being implemented. Furthermore, during some important speeches the Prime Minister endorsed the importance of private-sector involvement in the housing sector. This has stimulated the interest of the private sector in the implementation of employer-provided housing projects.

Continuous strategy refinement

Because the strategy document was written directly for submission to Parliament it lacks detail and an operational plan of action. In Zimbabwe the operationalization of government policies and strategies takes place by issuing government circulars to the various government bodies involved. While in the past the circulars were used simply as government directives, an important change has taken place in the communication process between the Central Government and local authorities and private-sector groups. This shift is related to the increasing importance and organization of interest and professional groups in Zimbabwe. Local government associations such as the Local Government Association of Zimbabwe, the Association of Urban Councils, the Association of Directors of Housing and Community Services, and private-sector organizations, such as the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries, organize yearly meetings. These meetings are increasingly used as political platforms where various ministries are invited to explain their strategies and where they receive feedback on the feasibility and acceptability of the proposed actions. This process follows well-defined steps and has proved invaluable to further develop and gain support for important government strategies.

The fine-tuning of the broad strategies proposed in the strategy statement has further been assisted by additional studies and analyses. An example is the UNDP-funded study to detail upgrading strategies. Also, a training programme has been initiated with assistance from UNCHS (Habitat) and the Finnish Government to expand the general housing-strategy principles to the local and regional level, and the feedback received from this programme helps in the further consideration of the national shelter strategies.

Thus, although the task of strategy formulation was considered, the responsibility of the Ministry, processes of communication and feedback, information and training are used to continuously refine

and adjust the Strategy and incorporate other stakeholders in the formulation process.

The role of external assistance in this process is most important in the preparatory and refinement phases through the provision of technical studies and the facilitation of training processes at the local levels. By using the principles of the Strategy in the formulation of projects, international lending agencies have had a powerful impact on the implementation and strengthening of the Strategy as well. External technical assistance inputs have, however, been rather piecemeal in the past and only during the preparatory phase in 1984/85 was a clear plan formulated outlining the type of technical inputs needed for strategy development.

