

Analytic Closure Report
National Solidarity Programme (NSP)



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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AFN Afghanis (currency)

ARTF Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund

BG Block Grant

CDC Community Development Council
CDP Community Development Plan

CFHF Community Financial History Form

DAB Da Afghanistan Bank
FP Facilitating Partner

GTZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit)

NGO/INGO Non-Governmental Organisation/ International NGO

NSP National Solidarity Programme

M&E Monitoring and Evaluation

MRRD Ministry of Reconstruction and Rural Development
PMC Project (Sub-) Management Committee – CDC level

PMU Provincial Management Unit (NSP)

RRD Provincial Offices of Reconstruction and Development

SFSR Sub-project Final Status Reports

ACKNOWLEDGMENT LETTER

The National Solidarity Programme (NSP) has been one of the flagship programs of Afghan Government and it has been implemented under the leadership of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. It is the culmination of more than 10 years of hard work and positive cooperation between many institutions and individuals, which are gratefully acknowledged.

NSP consumed huge amount of work, research and dedication. Still, implementation would not have been possible if we did not have a support of many individuals and institutions.

UN-Habitat has played a key role in assisting the Government in the design of the programme and has been responsible for implementing a significant portion of the programme (facilitating 4,133 CDCs reached an estimated 1,338,000 families comprised of 7,715,000 family members across 9 provinces, preparation of 12,591 financed sub projects with 11,579,000,000 AFS Block grant disbursement).

First of all, we are thankful to the World Bank, in particular the International Development Assistance grants and bilateral aid for their financial and logistical support and for providing necessary guidance concerning projects implementation.

We are also grateful to the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) for provision of expertise, technical support, management and supervision in the implementation. Without their superior knowledge and experience, the Project would have not achieved quality of outcomes, and thus their support has been essential.

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NSP carried out under the direction of a dedication national team and the overall guidance of international teams lead by Mrs. Samantha Reynolds. Number of internationals has contributed to its implementation as Mr. Lalith, Mr. Srinivasa Popuri, Mr. Graham lowe, Mr. Binode Shrestra, Mr. Bijay Kramcharia and others.

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Additional guidance was provided Manuel Vega Edited the report and Ahsan Saadat provided administrative support and formatted the report. The peer reviewers were Mr. Rory Robertshaw on behalf of UN-Habitat, Mr. Ghullam Sakhi Mohebi MIS Reporting Officer, Mr. Ateela Sadid Senior reporting assistant and Abdul Qadir Shakiri core trainer of UN-Habitat NSP team.

Sincerely,

Mohammad Najib Amiri Senior Programme Coordinator / NSP Manager

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

NSP INTRODUCTION

The National Solidarity Programme (NSP) was a flagship programme of the Government of Afghanistan and had the goal of building peace and solidarity amongst the people and to empower them to be responsible for local level governance and development.

As part of the NSP Community Development Councils (CDC's) were formed in each village through a transparent election process. The CDC's were empowered through a process of experiential learning to plan and undertake their own development work with the goal of being responsible for local level governance.

The design of the NSP rested on four foundational elements:

Facilitation – to assist communities establish representative and inclusive community institutions able to form consensus as to their development needs and priorities.

Block Grants – transferred to support identified rehabilitation of development activities – planned and implemented by the communities.

Capacity building – ensuring the development of the skills required by community members and leaders to plan and implement projects such as financial management and technical skills.

Linkages – building ties between local communities and the different tiers of government, as well as with other stakeholders.

NSP OUTPUTS SUMMARY

Over fourteen years, the NSP financed more than 88,000 Sub-projects that were implemented nationwide - across all 34 provinces - by 35,000 newly established, village-level, representative local Community Development Councils. By the end of the programme, 98% of the country's 398 districts had received one or more Block Grants. In doing so, over \$1.6 billion was invested directly in community development, primarily in infrastructure, projects (see Table 1).

Working in nine provinces: Balkh, Bamyan, Farah, Hirat, Kandahar, Kapisa, Nangarhar, Panjsher and Parwan, UN-Habitat played an important role in the development, capacitation and design of the programme as a whole and more specifically in facilitating its delivery. As a Facilitating Partner, UN-Habitat was responsible for implementing a significant portion of the programme -reaching 4,133 CDCs of the total of 35,075 village CDCs (see Table 2) and training more than a quarter of a million community members.

For the NSP as a whole and specially for UN-Habitat as its lead Facilitating Partner, in many instances planned targets were out-performing by a considerable distance. During NSPI, for the programme as a whole, the following performance against targets were exceeded:

Table 1. Key Indicators	NSP Delivery (30th Sept 2016) Totals	
# of community Development councils (CDCs)	35,075	
# of subprojects financed	88,614	
Block Grant (AFA) disbursed to CDCs	80,569,953,271	
Block Grant (USD) disbursed to CDCs	1,611,399,065	

Table 2. Key Indicators	UN-Habitat Delivery (30th Sept 2016) Totals
# of community Development councils (CDCs)	4,133
# of subprojects financed	12,591
Block Grant (AFA) disbursed to CDCs	11,579,690,201
Block Grant (USD) disbursed to CDCs (assuming 1 USD =50 AFA	231,593,804

NSP IMPACT SUMMARY

Any assessment of the impact of the programme should be weighed against in four significant contextual challenges that faced the NSP at its outset:

- a lack of existing local representative models
- on-going conflict and Insecurity
- powerful local-level interest groups
- the role of Afghan women in society.

Notwithstanding these four challenges, a major impact assessment of the programme, carried out during NSP2, found the programme to have had positive impact across five thematic areas: access to basic services and infrastructure; economic wellbeing; local governance; state building; and social cohesion – see Table 3.

the target of establishing 8,334 CDC was exceeded by 124%

more than 50% of women participated in their local CDC election, against a target of 40%

the target of 90% of communities contributing 10% of project costs on average was passed with 100% of communities contributing 14.5% on average

the target of 1,260,000 beneficiary families was out performed by close to 1 million additional families (2,216,917)

Labour days created by NSP Sub-projects totalled 14.4 million exceeding the target of 9.7 million – almost 50% above target

472,234 community members were trained, around 79,000 more than targeted.

Table 3. HEADLINE IMPACT MEASURE	ENDLINE RESULT	
Access	Access	
Utilities	Beneficial Impact	
Services	Beneficial Impact	
Economic Wellbeing	Economic Wellbeing	
Economic perceptions	Beneficial Impact	
Local Governance	Local Governance	
Structure	Beneficial Impact	
Function	Beneficial Impact	
State-building and Political Attitudes	State-building and Political Attitudes	
Democratic values	Beneficial Impact	
State legitimacy	Beneficial Impact	
Perceptions of Government	Beneficial Impact	
Social Norms	Social Norms	
Happiness	Beneficial Impact	
Gender attitudes	Beneficial Impact	
Gender outcomes	Beneficial Impact	

The Survey was less conclusive, however, regarding the impact of access to infrastructure; economic activity; local governance participation; and conflict reduction.

In addition to the main quantitative impact assessments, a number of qualitative studies, including the work undertaken in preparing this report, further supported and contextualised these findings, as well as acknowledge the deepening of impact as programmatic improvements were introduced to the third and final phase of the NSP.

CONCLUSION

In concluding, the NSP delivered planned outputs to a scale not previously seen in Afghanistan, resulting in a wide range of measured impacts benefiting local communities across the country.

Further than this, the NSP has been a platform for learning about community-driven development as a means to building local systems of governance and delivering much-needed service and infrastructure. Learning has taken place at many levels: government and community, individual and collective, system-level and organisational-level. Afghanistan is richer as a result.

However, complex social change, of the type stimulated by the programme, hinges on the rebalancing of power between groups that has often been entrenched for decades. This takes time, there are few quick-fixes, but iterative learning is the tool that helps direct purposive change. Important advances seen during the programme will remain tentative unless the work of the NSP is further consolidated and refined - this continuation is strongly advocated.

Eight lessons have been extracted from the review of the programme. It is hoped these lessons will help the direct planning of future rounds for the programme, other domestic approaches to community-driven development, as well as providing valuable learning for international development practice and debate.

For this reason, the last section of this report expands on some key learning that is felt to be important markers for the continued evolution of the NSP.

Lesson 1 - Whole Government Coordination

A stronger 'whole government' architecture and approach - built on enhanced collaborative decision making and shared responsibilities across all tier of

government- would tiers in other departments, help dissipate territorial disputes and gain economies of scale. A similar argument is made for the need for better Donor coordination ensuring that off-budget funding, in particular, reinforces NSP goals and objectives, does not create duplication or parallel activities that undermine state programmes and failed to contributes to the building of its long-term governance capacity.

Lesson 2 - Formalisation of CDCs

Formalising and strengthening the role of CDCs seems an important future step, and there appears much to be gained from institutionalising the model, and this could, at the very least, help address concerns regarding their long-term sustainability post-NSP.

Lesson 3 - Objective Setting and Monitoring

The NSP, or its successor programme/s, need to be sufficiently flexible in their response to evolving development dynamics. It can be argued that too much focus was placed on delivering a narrowly defined list of physical infrastructure projects at the expense of developing skills, supporting livelihoods, developing market linkages, strengthening local-governance functions and embedding participation. Likewise, the NSPs reference to targeting specific marginalised and vulnerable groups were not well followed through in terms of specific methods or provisions to achieve this.

The NSP, has adopted an iterative approach and has learnt as it has progressed. Nevertheless, there may be a benefit in improving the NSP's diagnostic capacity, both at the national and provincial levels, to assess and measure changing needs, determining broad categories for successful intervention as opposed to categories of intervention, piloting new local approach and testing cost and benefits of alternative strategies. Such an approach needs to be supported by the development of appropriate programme performance indicators.

Lesson 4 - Sustainable Facilitation

Facilitating Partners played a pivotal role in the delivery and achievement of the NSP. However, as the NSP continues to mature or evolves into new forms of community-driven development approaches, inevitably there will be a need to examine whether the intermediary role played by FPs is still warranted, since it directs resource (19% of the NSP budget)

and expertise away from government and/or local communities. This is ultimately a question of sustainability as well as one of striking the most effective and efficient national balance between the role and expectations placed on local communities, civil society and government. If over time there is a desire to see the role of FPs reduced or phased-out it is important that is done diligently, cautiously and planned properly in advance.

Lesson 5 - Flexibility Vs Control

The NSP was strongly controlled and regulated. In many respects, this was a clear strength of the programme, one that ensured clarity of purpose and accountability in a context where the state is often criticised for its poor stewardship of resources. On the flipside, however, was a perception that the programme was overly bureaucratic and too tightly controlled, to the extent it limited innovation and value adding by FPs and the communities.

A number of FPs have strong track records in a range of relevant fields. For example, having tested methods for empowering women in development processes, supporting local-level conflict resolution, addressing the livelihood needs of IDPs and returnees, working in conflict areas to name but a few. By harnessing these skills, experience and working methods, it may have been possible to enrich the programme and ultimately the communities it serves — as it stands there was a risk that the rigidness of the programme may have reduced opportunities for iterative learning and improvement.

Lesson 6 - Education and Skills

The national need for coherent and coordinated adult education programmes and technical and vocational skills provision in Afghanistan was overlooked by the NSP and the potential for cross-sectoral collaboration was missed.

Lesson 7 – Strengthen Financial Mechanisms

A number of suggestions are made to help strengthen NSP financial mechanism:

- The cap on Block Grants was not equitable and penalised the largest communities.
- Basing allocations on out-dated official village demarcations led to the exclusion of new or recently expanded communities with a likely knock-on effect for districts accommodating significant numbers of IDPs and returnees.

- Mechanisms for CDCs to combine financial allocations across clusters of CDCs (Gozar) level and attempt more complex Sub-projects were valued.
- Implementation had been smoother, with fewer delays, when the number of funding disbursements was minimised and the majority of the funding was released upfront.
- The ring-fenced allocation to support the specific development needs of women was not seen to be overly effective, but it was widely believed this was because they were too small (around 10% of the Block Grant allocation) to be meaningful.

Lesson 8 – Financial Sustainability

Ongoing funding of CDC Sub-project activity was seen to support CDC sustainability, and along with their legal status (CDC By-law) this reinforced their legitimacy. The introduction of repeat Block Grants in NSP3 was, therefore, a sensible and valid approach. However, there remains a need to consider how long-term financing of communitydriven development can be maintained and with it community confidence in government, particularly in the context of national budgetary pressures and decline foreign aid. In answering this, the need to increase the community contributions to Subprojects has been raised. It was common, during the interviews, for FPs to provide examples of when CDC has contributed well above the 10% of Subproject cost required.

However, a number of factors supported this:

- an unambiguous line-of-sight between identified community needs and the prioritised Sub-project/s.
- benefits of Sub-project needed to be equitably distributed; alternatively, those members of the community benefiting most should be expected to pay the most
- the sustainability of Sub-projects is an important factor determining community investment
- there is a need to place greater emphasis on creating direct financial and economic benefits to CDCs and their members
- there is a need to test demand-led funding instruments as opposed to the current supply-led process. In this way, communities could be incentivised to invest in the development process.

INTRODUCTION

The National Solidarity Programme (NSP) was a flagship programme of the Government of Afghanistan benefiting from more than \$2.3 billion of donor funding. The programme had the goal of building peace and solidarity amongst the people and to empower them to be responsible for local level governance and development.

The formation of Community Development Councils (CDC's in each village through a transparent election process lay at the heart of the programme. The CDC's were empowered through a process of experiential learning to plan and undertake their own development work with the goal that they would be responsible for local level governance.

The Analytical Completion Report considers UN-Habitat's role in the National Solidarity Programme and draws from this and the wider experience of other stakeholders the lessons learned from over a decade of implementation.

AFGHANISTAN CONTEXT

In considering the continued justification and performance of the programme, it is important to bear in mind, given the programme was operational over 14 years, that the context in which it was conceived and delivered has not been constant or remained unchanged. In fact, the opposite is true, Afghanistan presents an extremely fluid environment with the socio-political environment in a state of flux as it shifts between periods of development gains and set-backs, which are in turn shaped, among others, by conflict and insecurity, environmental disasters, cycles of economic progress and decline. The country's geo-political, importance - sitting at the crossroads of South Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East - means that it is particularly vulnerable to regional and global extensions of power and influence with direct impacts on domestic affairs.

It is important, therefore, to consider the rapid and profoundly changing social, economic and political context that framed and interacted with NSP delivery. In 2002, Afghanistan was emerging from an intense period of conflict stretching back at least 30 years and spanning Soviet occupation (1979-1989), the Afghan Civil Wars (1989-1996), Taliban Regime (1996-2001) and invasion by the US led coalition (2001).

The diagram that follows juxtaposes the timing of key political events in Afghanistan against the time line of the programme. These events provided an important backdrop to the analysis offered in the report and are expanded on in relevant sections.



At the start of the NSP, Afghanistan's government was still in a transitional form and the challenges facing the country were significant, but levels of optimism high, in particular the prospect of improving security. The Common Country Assessment (2004), written two years after the initiation of the programme, cited some of the following root causes underlying challenges relating to governance, security, economic development and social well-being:

- underdeveloped human rights culture, along with lack of traditions of democracy, state-building and civil society participation
- young governance structures still in the process of establishment and/or early stages of development, and unable to curb political insecurity
- shortage of human resources that can propel democratic, economic and social reforms
- wide variations in socio-economic indicators, by gender, region and rural- urban divide
- weakened social infrastructure
- socio-cultural traditions that result in widespread marginalisation based on gender, social status or ethnicity.1

A decade later and still within the timeframe of the programme, the development agenda had shifted considerably, foreseeing the withdrawal of US and other foreign troops, the prospects of a dwindling aid budget and concerns over the renewed vigour of anti-government forces, the update Common Country Assessment (2014)² lauded many important achievements in the last decade, including national elections, improved indicators for education, health

and economic growth. At the same time however, continuing concerns were raised regarding enduing poverty and inequality; a weak and unresponsive public administration, widespread illiteracy; a youth bulge with the prospect of a chronic shortage of jobs for new entrants to the labour market; rapid urbanisation and marked patterns of internal and external migration; and continuing constraints facing women in accessing services and participating in political and economic life.

OBJECTIVES OF THE NSP

The main objectives of the NSP, through this time period, have remained unchanged. This are summarised in the highlighted section that follows. That being said, over the 14 years of the programme, a number of differing emphasises have been placed on the programme, stressing certain aspects of the programme and its delivery. They are discussed in more detail in section 1.

NSP: Goal, Objectives and Planned Outcomes

The goal of the NSP is to reduce poverty through empowering communities with regard to improved governance, and social, human, and economic capital.

The objectives of the program are:

to lay the foundations for a strengthening of community level governance, and to support community-managed Sub-projects comprising reconstruction and development that improve access of rural communities to social and productive infrastructure and services.

The outcomes that the NSP aims to achieve are:

the establishment of a framework for village level consultative decision making and representative local leadership as a basis for interaction within and between communities and with the administration and aid agencies

local level reconstruction, development, and capacity building which will lead to a decrease in poverty levels.

UN-Habitat has played a key role in assisting the Government in the design of the programme and has been responsible for implementing a significant portion of the programme (reaching 4,133 CDCs of the total of 35,075 village CDCs across Afghanistan - many in remote and insecure districts). A summary of key delivery indicators is presented in the table that follows. Beneficiaries

BENEFICIARIES

The NSP, as a national programme, had the intention of reaching all populations outside of urban centres. Conceived as a bottom-up, Community-Driven-Development approach, its primary level of engagement was a community, defined as a village of more than 25 families. In turn, a family was defined as nuclear family consisting of the man and wife/wives and their un-married children or a widow/er and his/her children

Aside from the wide aspiration of targeting all rural communities, the NSP makes some reference to the targeting of vulnerable groups and ensuring access and inclusivity – specifically referencing women, internally displaced people, returnees and ethnic minorities.

NSP PERIODS

The National Solidarity Programme was implanted over three periods. Whilst each phase followed a core approach there were variations in the modalities of delivery that are discussed in detail in section 1. One such variation worth mentioning here was that the third period of the programme allowed disbursement of repeat Block Grants to a selection of communities that had received the first Block Grants in the proceeding periods.

NSP1 – was the first period of the programme, originally planned as a pilot, the programme was quickly scaled up to full national implementation. NSP1 was initiated in 2002 (design phase) with implementation running until March 2007. It targeted 17,300 communities although only 7,300 were reached, the remaining 10,000 were rolled over into the second period of the programme.

NSP2 – The second period started immediately following NSP1 in April 2007 and ended in September 2011. It targeted 6,000 new communities on top of the 10,000 carried over from period 1.

NSP3 – The final period of the programme started before the full completion of the second period in October 2010. It included planned roll out to 16,000 new communities to meet a combined national target of 39,200. In addition, 12,000 repeat Block Grants were also planned for disbursement. NPS1 completed in September 2016.

^{1.} Common Country Assessment for the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan, 2004, UN System

^{2.} Common Country Assessment for the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan, 2014, UN System

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Executing Agency: The NSP was executed by the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) and was as such responsible for overall management and supervision of programme. The MRRD's National NSP Coordination Office oversaw programme policies and served as a liaison with other MRRD departments, government agencies, and donors. The MRRDs responsibilities included elaborating and updating the NSP Operational Manual; contracting and training Facilitating Partners; approving subproject proposals and managing Block Grant funds; and developing and maintaining a management information system to fulfil monitoring and reporting requirements.

Oversight Consultant (OC): The MRRD contracted GTZ to provide programme oversight for the first three years of the programme. FPs reported to the Oversight Consultant on physical and financial progress of the NSP in the contracted communities. In turn, the OC Quality Control Unit was responsible for tracking FP performance against agreed targets.

Facilitating Partners (FPs): The MRRD contracted 29 NGOs and one UN Agency (UN-Habitat) to work directly with targeted communities to support implementation of NSP activities at the local level (see Annex C). By December 2005, over 4,000 FP staff supported programme implementation. The primary role of the FPs was to provide support and guidance needed by communities to successfully complete programme activities. This included facilitating fair and open CDC elections and inclusive stakeholder consultations related to the preparation of Community Development Plans and Subproject Proposals; providing technical assistance; helping communities procure goods and services in the market; training communities on required skills; and conducting monitoring and reporting.

Communities: Communities, working with Facilitating Partners, were responsible for the selection, design and implementation of Sub-projects.

Donors: The Programme is financed through World Bank, International Development Assistance grants and bilateral aid. Annex B provides a full listing of donors.


Provincial Departments of Reconstruction and Development (RDDs): From 2005, RRDs played a

larger role in NSP oversight, including facilitating weekly problem solving meetings; coordinating monitoring activities; providing logistical support; maintaining documentation, such as Tripartite Agreements and CDC Registration Certificates and Community Development Plans.

Steering Committees: Acting as the guardian of national policies, norms and rules in the implementation of NSP, the NSP Steering Committee (MRRD and the Ministry of Finance) provided advice on the overall programme direction and policies. The role of the Steering Committee includes approving revisions to the Operational Manual; recognizing the CDCs; facilitating linkages with other agencies and programmes at district, provincial, and national levels; and reviewing findings of programme evaluations.

In addition, MRRD chaired an inter-ministerial committee established for policy advice and coordination (Ministries of Finance, Agriculture, Public Health, Education, Energy and Water, Labour & Social Affairs, Women's Affairs, Public Works, Reconstruction, Foreign Affairs, Refugees, Land Commission, and the National Environmental Protection Agency).

An External Review Committee consisting of donors, UN agencies, the Independent Commission for Human Rights, MoF, and MRRD also met regularly to review and endorse policy and contractual issues.



ROLE OF UN-HABITAT

Interest in community-driven development largely arose from current President Ghani, working at the time for the World Bank, awareness of the Indonesian Kecamatan Development Programme.³ In thinking about how to adapt the Indonesian model in Afghanistan the planning team, including President Ghani, became visited a community-driven development approach being implemented by UN-Habitat in Mazar-e-Shariff and in the Panjsher pre-2002. Impressed by the extent of community mobilisation achieved at limited expense the model was adopted. UN-Habitat's core team continued to play an important role, advising government in the conceptualisation, development and capacitation of the NSP programme.

Most significant, however, was UN-Habitat's role in facilitating community-led implementation of the programme. Appointed as one of, and the largest, of the programme's Facilitating Partners UN-Habitat directly supported communities to deliver around 14% of nationally achieved delivery. In doing so, UN-Habitat reached an estimated 1,338,000 families comprised of 7,715,000 family members across 9 provinces. (See Table 7.)

Thirdly, UN-Habitat played a role in the development of a package of training materials and community development facilitation tools. Much of UN-Habitat's materials were standardised by the MRRD and used by other FPs in the field. Habitat also conducted train-the-trainer sessions for other FP master trainers through which essential facilitation skills and programmatic understanding were learnt and cascaded to key workers such as Social Organiser and Technical Advisors (see section 3).



SECTION 1

OVERVIEW OF THE NATIONAL SOLIDARITY PROGRAMME

The design of the NSP rested on four foundational elements:

Facilitation to assist communities establish representative and inclusive community institutions able to form consensus as to their development needs and priorities.

Block Grants - transferred to support identified rehabilitation of development activities – planned and implemented by the communities.

Capacity building – ensuring the development of the skills required by community members and leaders to plan and implement projects such as financial management and technical skills.

Linkages – building ties between local communities and the different tiers of government, as well as with other stakeholders.

Implementation of the NSP was made according to phase. The steps comprising each phase were adjusted as part of the iterative changes introduced between NSP stages and were set-out in national NSP guidelines (Operations Manuals, versions I-VI). Additionally, Facilitating Partners, in some instances, adjusted and interpreted the Phases to suit their particular context of delivery, the organisation's underpinning development philosophy capacities.

As such, the description that follows is a generic summary reflecting the broad processes involved across the programme as a whole. The NSP process followed 6 phases (0-5). Stages 1-4 focussed on the mobilisation of target communities and implementation of projects, whilst phases 0 and 5 reflected programme management activities focussed on start-up and closure:

Start-up

- 0. Social mobilisation and CDC elections
- 1. Community Development Plan developed and Sub-project/s selection
- 2. Sub-project/s plans and first disbursement
- 3. Sub-project/s implementation
- 4. Sub-project closure, M&E, handover.

Each phase was sub-divided into a number of discrete steps and included the first engagement with the community until approved Sub-project/s were implemented (see Diagram 3).

More specifically, the focus of the first phase of the implementation was to recruit and train facilitators, and to establish a relationship with the community through household and small group meetings discussing local problem, capacities and opportunities. The second phase - building on the established relationships - saw the election of representative Community Development Councils (CDCs) having authority and responsibility for managing the local socio-economic development plans and activities. Phase 3 saw CDCs, in consultation with their communities, assess and priorities Sub-projects for submission to the MRRD for Block Grant funding.

> Pre-step 1 District roll-out plan and selection of target communities

> Pre-step 2 Contracting Facilitation Partners & establishment of field offices

Pre-step 3 Training of Master Trainers

Pre-step 4 Training of field staff

Step 1 Contacting key community representatives (inc. women & elders)

Step 2 Community-wide meeting - consensus & endorsement of CDC's TOR

Nobilisation & Step 3 Data collection - community assessment/

Step 4 CDC established through elections training, election, registration

Step 5 Explanation of BGs, Negative Lists, CDP process & social safeguards

Step 6 Community priorities defined (general and NSP specific) and voted on

Step 7 CDP preparation and approval

Step 8 PMC and other CDC sub-committees established

Step 9 CDC exchange visits organised

Step 10 Sub-project/s proposals and procurement plan preparation

Step 11 Social and environmental impacts & mitigations assessed & explained

Step 12 PMC trained in procurement & roposal & BG Step 12 rivic dumes dumes disbursement accounting, CDC bank account opened

Step 13 Sub-project/s finalised, shared and approved by CDC, PMU, MRRD

Step 14 Ist BG disbursement & CDC procurement activities initiated

Phase 0 Start-up

Pha

Social

Elections

Phase 2 CDP & Sub-project Selection

Sub-project

Step 15 Procurement finalised, relevant accounting documents maintained

Step 16 Sub-project implementation started (contractor/community)

Step 17 CDC reports on progress & utilisation of BG

Step 18 Community contributions agreed & collected

Step 19 Additional BG disbursements request by CDC & approved by PMU

Step 20 Sub-project/s completed

Phase 4 Sub-project mplementation

Post-step 1 Completion verified

Post-step 2 SFSR & CFHF prepared, sumbitted and approved

Post-step 3 Refresher training held

Post-step 4 Sub-project handover completed

Post-step 5 CDC re-elections and training held if beyond 3-year mandate

The fourth phase focused on MRRD approval followed by funding disbursements and procurement. During this phase the contributions, in cash or kind, were sought from the community. An additional fifth phase then followed that focused on the implementation of Sub-projects, Sub-projects monitoring, Sub-project closure and evaluation.

Each phase was given indicative timescales for implementation, with the overall the process of six phases planned over 24 months, and with the phases involving direct engagement with communities planned for 17 months (Phase 1-4). See Diagram 4.

Phases 1 to 4, the mobilisation and implementation phases of projects are further elaborated on in the sections that follows.



PHASE 1: SOCIAL MOBILISATION & ELECTIONS

Phase 1 of the programme helped mobilized communities and led to the establishment of representative CDCs.

The process of establishing CDCs and their executive committees - developed in NSP1 - was formalised in 2006 with the ratification of a CDC By-law (MRRD Rules & Regulations Article 14). The By-law includes provisions related to CDC formation, CDC objectives and performance principles, roles and responsibilities, eligibility, meetings, elections, decision-making and

4. As per NSP Operational Manual Version V, 2009 (NSP2)

5. As per NSP Operational Manual Version V, 2009 (NSP2)

financial management. As such the By-law provides a clear statutory framework governing the NSP delivery mechanisms generally and the function of CDC specifically.

Establishment of CDC

The intention to establish CDCs that were representative of local communities was realised through fair and transparent elections and though a mechanism that ensured equal representation by men and women.

For the community to develop better understanding of the election process and the role of the CDC,

the communities were first supported in developing the terms of reference of the CDC; determining it mission statement and the characteristics of membership; and the chosen method of election. During this preparatory period, communities were widely consulted in small groups culminating in large community-wide meeting/s in which approval was sought for the process as a whole.

NSP arranged CDC elections to be held using one of two methods determined by the FP in consultation with the community and depending on the size and dynamics of the community. In the first method, the 'Cluster' method, the community was divided into a number of clusters, each with approximately the same number of people. Each cluster casted votes to determine 2 representatives, from within their own cluster, to represent them - one male and one female. The two elected members from each cluster joined together to form the CDC. The size of the clusters was adjusted to ensure that the CDCs did not have more than 30 members, and ideally around 16.

The second method, the 'Community-wide' method, did not sub-divide the community into smaller clusters. Instead, any eligible voter could cast a vote for any of their peers to represent them in the CDC. The community members getting the most votes - disaggregated by gender to ensure the same number of men and women were elected – becoming CDC members.

A TYPICAL COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL MISSION STATEMENT

We the elected representatives of our community in the Community Development Council commit to improve the standard of living of our community, aimed at empowering our community, ensuring that all the families in the community benefit from our community institutions through community services implemented through a consultative process to rehabilitate our war-torn country.

With both methods, each voter, irrespective of gender, cast a single vote (one-person one-vote). Anyone over 21 years old and married was permitted to vote. Voting was done though secret ballot via an election box. At least 40 per cent of the eligible voters must have voted to validate the election. Elections were overseen by RRD Provincial Managers and in some instances by District Governor representatives, with the overall process and capacity building supported by the Facilitating Partners.

Elections proceeded without campaigns and without pre-selected candidates – all eligible voters were effectively candidates – as such no one had the right to propose or speak on behalf of any candidate including themselves. Instead, community members agreed on a list of qualities and capacities which elected members of the development council should possess and their ability to support the mission statement of the CDC (see insert XXX). Typically, desired characteristics would include good knowledge of the community and how to mobilise it; analytic capabilities; loyalty to the community and commitment to its well-being; and people well respected by the community.

Appointing CDC Office Bearers and Sub-committees

Although, equal gender balance was embedded in the CDC's membership election process, it was not always possible to ensure gender-integration in the decision-making process of the CDC once membership had been established, given strongly prevailing conservative/traditional attitudes to the role and status of women in particular regions of the country or in specific communities. While the NSP encouraged the formation of a mixed-gender CDC wherever possible, communities nevertheless had three options when determining the CDC structure and functioning office-bearer.

The first, and recommended option, was the formation of a gender-integrated CDCs with a single group of four officers of mixed-gender.

The second option was to form separate male and female Sub-committees, each with their own four officers, combined with an Executive Coordination Committee comprised of two officers from each sub-committee.

The third option, determined as an exception only for extremely conservative communities where women would not be permitted to vote or participate as representatives, a "women's working group" was formed. This was considered to be a solution of last resort.

Four primary officer bearers were elected by the CDC members: Chairperson, Vice-Chairperson, Treasurer, and Secretary – this applied for all three options. Other roles and sub-committees were determined by the CDCs as they progressed in the process of determining community needs and designing and implementing Sub-projects.

PHASE 2: CDP DRAFTING & SUB-PROJECT SELECTION

Phase 2 of the programme determined a wide ambit of community needs and built consensus as to the specific priorities that could be met through NSP funding.

Community Development Planning

Once established, CDCs set about the preparation of a Community Development Plan. The plans, as per the requirements of the CDC By-law, to encompass community development needs and identify priorities based on consultation and with particular attention given to the needs of disadvantaged groups including women, children, and disabled people.

To achieve this, FPs worked with the CDC to:

- 1. prepare detailed community profiles, including the mapping of community resources
- 2. undertake basic community needs assessments including a risk assessment
- 3. share and raise awareness with a preliminary list of potential Sub-projects with the community as a whole

PHASE 3: SUB-PROJECT PROPOSALS & BG DISBURSEMENT

Phase 3 of the NSP considered the detailed design of the Sub-projects and the mechanisms to finance them.

Financial mechanisms

The grant mechanism used to fund CDC Subprojects were known as Block Grants. The size of the Block Grant awarded to a CDC was based upon the number of families comprising it. It was calculated based on approximately US\$ 200 per family, subject to a maximum of US\$ 60,000 per community. Since the minimum permissible size of a CDC was 25 families, the minimum Block Grant allocation was \$5000.

For UN-Habitat supported CDCs the average Block Grant was a little below \$40,000 (see section 1). Block Grants could be used by CDCs to fund single Sub-projects or a number of Sub-projects. Block Grants were further supplemented through

community contributions in cash or kind, including labour. The requirement was for a mandatory minimum community contribution of 10% of Sub-project costs. In many instance communities contributed more than the minimum, for example for UN-Habitat supported CDCs, the average contribution was 12% (see section 2). The NSP emphasised that community contributions were to avoid over-taxation of the poorest families. As such wealthier families, identified through social audits, were expected to contribute a larger proportion of the required contribution.

During the first two NSP stages, only one Block Grant was allocated per CDC. In NSP3 however, a policy change allowed for the allocation of repeat Block Grants to CDCs to peruse additional Sub-project identified within their community development plans.

Sub-project Section

According to particular NSP stages different categories of Sub-projects were routinely included or excluded for Block Grant funding. In the early stages of the NSP, Sub-projects which could be considered for funding included public infrastructure projects, also Sub-projects linked to the development of human capital in particular general education and productive skills and Sub-projects targeting women (typically linked to human capital category). For example, in NSP1 the public infrastructure projects listed in Table 5 were considered eligible for Block Grant funding.



Included Public Infrastructure Sub-projects (NSP1)

Water & sanitation:	Irrigation	Power	Buildings
• latrines	• canals & aqueducts	• diesel generators	hospitals
• toilets	• reservoirs & dams	• micro-hydropower	• clinics
• public baths	• intakes	• solar panels	• schools Environment:
• reservoirs	• stream cleaning	• power lines Transport:	• erosion protection
• hand pumps	• gabions & walls	• tunnels & bridges	• reforestation
• water supply networks	• siphons	• retaining walls	
• wells	• pipes	• culverts	
• water filtration	• drainage	• roads	
	diversion weirs		

Other Sub-project categories were routinely excluded from funding. These were recorded in the various Operational Manuals and were known as negative list or menus. For example, in NSP3 a number of the Sub-project categories that had been included for funding in NSP1 were excluded. From Table 5 above, this included public baths, diesel generators and solar panels. Reasons for Sub-project exclusion included high operating or maintenance costs, extended implementation periods, the need for higher and more complex technical skills and where coordination of Sub-projects was required across multiple communities. Other commonly excluded Sub-projects activities included:

Excluded Sub-projects

- Equipment's or materials funded by other organizations
- Investments detrimental to the environment
- Land purchase or lease
- \bullet Construction, rehabilitation, or maintenance of government office buildings
- Any activity using child labour
- Any activity that supports drug crop production or processing
- Rehabilitation of structures of archaeological and cultural value
- Religious buildings.

Sub-project Preparation

Once the Community Development Plan had been compiled and community needs assessed and prioritised those Sub-projects being put forward for NSP Block Grant funding were further developed by way of a Sub-Project Proposal.

Sub-project Proposals were prepared according to a standardised format. CDCs were closely involved in their preparation, engineers working with FP we required to determine the bill of quantities and technical designs. More than one Sub-project could be submitted for consideration for a single Block Grant allocation.

The PMU was responsible for checking that Subprojects were compliant with a NSP Engineering Manual. This included meeting criteria related to site selection, technical feasibility, and assessment of budgeted costs for goods, works, and services in relation to market norms. The CDCs, supported by the FP, were also expected to prepare a realistic operation, maintenance and cost recovery plan as well as considering necessary environmental and social safeguards related to the specific subproject being proposed.

Once complete, sub-project proposals were submitted for approval, where, in addition to the various elements of the technical approval consideration was given to whether it provided equitable access to benefits for the whole community. This included the extent to which it specifically targeted priority groups such as women, children and or the disabled; and whether the required approvals from relevant line ministries and provincial departments had been sought.

Once approved, Block Grants were then dispersed, via a partner bank, to the community's account. By NSP3, 90% of the funds were released as a first tranche in order to reduce delays experience in the earlier stages of the NSP. These delays - caused by slow administrative processing - created significant problems for some Sub-projects at a critical stage of implementation.

PHASE 4: SUB-PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

Phase 4 of the programme considered aspects related to Sub-project implementation up until closure and preparation for handover.

Once transfers of the first instalments were made to the CDC bank accounts, implementation was expected to proceed immediately. The CDCs were responsible for subproject implementation including taking responsibility for the efficient and accountable use of funds and implementation progress. Dayto-day management was usually delegated to an implementation sub-committee. Supporting technical assistance, monitoring and oversight was provided engineers and social organisers working for FP.

Progress reporting to the NSP of physical completion and financial expenditure was the joint responsibility of FPs and CDCs and was linked to agree performance milestones. In addition, the CDC was required to update the wider community regarding progress on a regular basis

The PMU, supported by FPs, was required to monitor the subprojects, ensuring the distribution of their benefits. In the case of building construction, Building Certificates were required to verifying building quality. Assuming adequate progress was being made, the final disbursement/s of Block Grants were made in the lead up to project closure and handover.

CAPACITY BUILDING (CROSS-PHASE)

NSP followed a cascade model for capacity building. The NSP had a Capacity Development Department which was responsible for training a limited number of FP staff as Master Trainers. Master Trainers, in turn, trained Social Organisers (responsible for community-level facilitation), who, once trained had the task of training community members – although, in particular, capacity building focused on the elected CDC members and meeting the specific skills requirements of their roles.

Capacity building was planned as comprehensive package of training with the intention of transferring the specific knowledge and skills required to implement the different phases and steps of the NSP programme as well as process-orientated learning to foster understanding on the NSP process as a whole. The overall capacity building package is summarised in the table below (Table 6).



Knowledge Transfer	Process Oriented	
CDC Roles & Responsibilities	Social Mobilization	
Community Basic Procurement	Linkages and Resource Mobilization	
Community Basic Accounting	NSP Introduction (all 5 phases)	
Project Design & Implementation	Gender Mainstreaming	
Subproject Operations & Maintenance	Social Audit	
Environmental Safeguards	Community Participatory Monitoring	
Disaster/ risk Mitigation & Management	Social Safeguards	
Grievance Handling	Conflict Transformation	

SECTION 2

NATIONAL SOLIDARITY PROGRAMME OUTPUTS

The following section summarises NSP delivery at the national level, whilst providing detailed analysis of UN-Habitat's contribution to the national total. In doing so, it attempts to answer the question as to whether the NSP met its two overarching outputs: the establishment of a village level framework for consultative decision making; and the delivery of reconstruction, development and capacity building activities at the local level.

SCALE OF DELIVERY

Over the full 14 years of programme delivery the scale of delivery has been impressive. In total, 35,075 CDC were established, which in turn implemented more than 88,000 Sub-projects utilising Block Grants equivalent to approximately \$1.6 billion (see Table 7). With the implementation of NSP3, around one third of the CDCs (11,572) received repeat Block Grants and with these were able to meet additional community defined needs.

It is worth mentioning here that approximately 70% of donor funds went directly to communities by way of Block Grants. Of the \$2.3 billion spent on the programme, 1.6 billion was spent in the form of Block Grants. During NSP1, for example, 72% of

budget went to Block Grants, with the remaining 28% funding Facilitating Partners (19%) and administration costs (9%).

UN-Habitat, as the largest Facilitating Partner, supported the establishment of 1 in 8 of the CDCs and further facilitated the delivery by CDC of 1 in 7 of Sub-projects delivered nationally.




	Overall total			
Key Indicators	(30th Sept 2016)			
	FBG	RBG	Totals	
# of community Development councils (CDCs)	35,075	11,572	35,075	
# of subprojects financed	71,599	17,015	88,614	
Block Grant (AFA) disbursed to CDCs	58,424,095,554	22,145,857,717	80,569,953,271	
Block Grant (USD) disbursed to CDCs (assuming 1 USD =50 AFA)	1,168,481,911	442,917,154	1,611,399,065	
	UN-Habitat's Contribution to the total			
Key Indicators	(30th Sept 2016	5)		
	FBG	RBG	Totals	
# of community Development councils (CDCs)	4,133	2,088	4,133 (11.8%)	
# of subprojects financed	9,578	3,013	12,591 (14.2%)	
Block Grant (AFA) disbursed to CDCs	7,199,015,099	4,380,675,102	11,579,690,201 (14.4%)	
Block Grant (USD) disbursed to CDCs (1 USD =50 AFA)	143,980,302	87,613,502	231,593,804 (14.4%)	


COVERAGE

At its outset, the NSP covered 5 Provinces and 15 districts, but as Map 1 on the following page illustrates by the end of the programme national coverage had been achieved. The map indicates that of the country's 398 districts, 98% or 389 received


one or more Block Grants. Maps 2 and 3 allow comparison of the coverage of 1st Block Grants when compared to repeat Block Grants. Repeat Block Grants were only introduced during NSP3 and reached 157 or 39% of districts.



Map 2: NSP Coverage (1st Block Grants only)



Map 3: NSP Coverage (Repeat Block Grants only)



UN-HABITAT SUPPORTED DELIVERY⁶


As referenced, UN-Habitat was the largest single FP working in nine provinces: Balkh, Bamyan, Farah, Hirat, Kandahar, Kapisa, Nangarhar, Panjsher and Parwan. This section of the report examines, in detail, UN-Habitat's contribution to overall programme delivery. It provides insight into the success and challenges faced by UN-Habitat specifically, as well as raising issues that may have wider resonance for the programme as a whole.

Geographic Spread

Overall, UN-Habitat helped establish 3,823⁷ CDCs, with the largest concentrations being in Kapisa (699) and Kandahar (630) provinces while Balkh (69) and Nangarhar (217) received less UN-Habitat support in establishing CDCs (see Graph 1).


Likewise, it is possible to calculate the total population reached directly through UN-Habitat led intervention –7,714,000 people were reached. In terms of average family size, for UN-Habitat supported communities, these ranged from 5.0 people per family in Hirat province to 7.4 in Kandahar province.


Although average family size was smallest in Hirat, it was one of the provinces in which UN-Habitat was particularly active. As a result, Hirat province contributed the largest proportion (20%) of household members reached by UN-Habitat and comprising a total of more than 1.5 million



^{6.} Data used in this section excludes communities where only the first stages of community mobilisation were conducted, as such it excludes CDC that did not fully establish or go on to deliver Sub-projects.

^{7.} The figure of 3823 is less the total shown in Table 7 (4,133) since this total does not include those CDCs which were with withdrawn.






In the case of Kandahar province, 15% of the population reached by UN-Habitat were located there – second after Hirat. However, in terms of the numbers of families reached, Kandahar was only in fifth place, after Hirat, Kapisa, Parwan and Panjsher. This is explained by the fact that in Kandahar families were considerably larger than in other provinces (7.4 family members of average).

Block Grant Distribution


The allocation of Block Grants to CDCs was the financial mechanism enabling communities to implement Sub-projects designed to meet their identified needs.

Graph 5

Value (\$) of Block Grants (1st or Repeat)




Number of 1st and Repeat Block Grants





In total, UN-Habitat assisted 3,823 CDCs access a total of 5901 Block Grants (Graph 6) worth in total approximately \$230M8 (Graph 5) of which 36% were repeat Block Grants (\$83,623,426). The distribution of these Block Grants, not surprisingly, follow a similar pattern to CDC distribution. Of the total of 5,901 Block Grant (1st and repeat) distributed to CDCs supported by UN-Habitat, the greatest proportion where in Hirat, the province where UN-Habitat was most active - 1,160 or 20% of total Block Grants distributed (Graph 7). Balkh, in comparison, received the least – 140 Block Grants over the life of the NSP.


Graph 7



Since Block Grants were determined by the number of families comprising CDCs, the value of the Block Grants varied from community to community. The Block Grants allocated to very large CDCs were capped at \$60,000. The following graph (Graph 8) displays the average value of Block Grants for CDCs in each province in which UN-Habitat worked. They ranged from \$29,903 in Bamyan to \$52,878 in Balkh, with an average of \$41,747.

Graph 8

Average Block Grant Amount (\$) by Province



This average, \$41,747, provides an indication of the scale of Sub-projects CDCs could consider. If used efficiently, the funding per CDC was sufficient to complete significant community-level initiatives.

Average Block Grant (\$) per Family by Province





Average Block Grant (\$) per Person by Province






When converting the funding allocated to CDC to represent the funding per family shows that on average each family within the CDC effectively received \$172 (see Graph 9). If viewed from the perspective of individual CDC members, the contributions were on average \$20 per person (graph 10). When viewed through these lenses, contributions per family or per may seem small, but it is worth bearing in mind that in 2002, when the NSP started, Gross National Income per Capita⁹ was only \$220, rising to \$660 at programme end in 2014.

These converted figures are also useful in assessing the required contributions per family or per person - since communities were required to contribute a minimum of 10% of the value of the Block Grant. This topic is discussed in more detail in section 4, but it can be seen here that average minimum contributions per family were in the region of \$17 or around \$3 per person.


It is also possible to consider how Block Grants were distributed by province or by district as the following graphs indicate. The geographical spread of UN-Habitat BGs by province and district was determined by contractual agreements with the NSP. As a result, their work was not evenly distributed, for example, in Balkh province (Graph 11) only 140 CDCs were supported compared to 447 supported in a single district (Guzara) in Hirat province (Graph 15).

Graph 11




Graph 12





Graph 13

Block Grant Distribution by District in Kandahar Province



^{8.} Please note the small discrepancy between the total Block Grant value presented in the summary table on page xxx and the data presented here is as a result of the differing methods to calculate exchange rates. The former uses a fixed exchange rate for the whole programme period, whereas the latter uses dollar values calculated at the time of disbursement. 7. The figure of 3823 is less the total shown in Table 7 (4,133) since this total does 9. As recorded by the World Bank using the World Bank Atlas method http://data.worldbank.org/country/afghanistan


Sub-project Characteristics

The process of developing Community Development Plans helped CDCs determined and prioritised local development needs and then selected Sub-projects that were eligible for funding with NSP Block Grants. Completed Sub-projects have been categorised according to the infrastructure/social/economic sector and sub-sector they most closely related to.


The graph that follows (Graph 14), indicate that in total 12,550 Sub-projects were completed by the CDCs that UN-Habitat supported. The number of Sub-projects exceeds the number of Block Grants allocated (5901) since CDCs could use their Block Grants to deliver more than one Sub-project – on average just over 2 Sub-projects per Block Grant.

Graph 14

Percentage Distribution of Sub-projects (N=12,550) by Sector




CDCs were most likely to select Transport related Sub-projects (26%) followed by Water Supply and Sanitation (24%), Irrigation (21%) and Power (11%). The remaining 18% of Sub-projects were distributed across Education, Emergency Response, Livelihood, Public Buildings and Rural Development (typically the building of community centres). The low proportion of livelihood Sub-projects is discussed more in section 3. *Graph 15*



Differences can be observed in the selection of Sub-projects by CDCs depending on whether the community was using their first or a repeat Block Grant as the funding source. For example, Graph 18 above shows, that for communities who felt that Education was a priority (typically identifying the need for a primary school) this was almost always funded via a 1st Block Grant. This suggests that where educational need existed this was a clear priority for communities taking precedence over others areas of need.

It did not necessarily follow that the larger the number Sub-projects per sector the higher the Block Grant allocation used on that sector, since different type of project were relatively more or less expensive (see Graph 19). An example of this can be observed with Water supply and sanitation Sub-projects. Although these were the second most commonly implemented Sub-projects, they were only in third place in terms of the funding spent on them. The opposite was true for Irrigation Sub-projects.




Sub-sector analysis shows other interesting dynamics. The following set of graphs provide a breakdown of each sector into its sub-sectors. For irrigation, more than half of the Sub-projects concerned the building of protection walls (34%) and canals (25%). In the case of the transport sector, more than two thirds of the Sub-projects concerned the construction of tertiary roads (46%) and culverts (31%). For Water Supply and Sanitation projects more than half of the Sub-projects were dedicated to the construction of shallow wells, followed by another 23% on water supply networks.

For the power sector, first examination suggests a fairly even distribution between solar power generators (19%), power lines (22%), diesel generators (22%) and micro-hydro power generators (36%). However, the Power sector was subject to a number of Sub-project limitations arising from the "Negative Menu" – the list of Sub-projects excluded for funding. As mentioned in section 1, solar panel and diesel generator Sub-projects were initially permitted for funding, but for reasons such as poor sustainability these were removed in later stages of the NSP.

Livelihood programmes for women attracted 10% of Sub-project funding in NSP1. As such many of the sub-sector activities under the Livelihoods sector targeting women specifically – noting here that women are traditionally responsible for, or limited to, a narrow set of livelihood activities including, for example, agricultural production.


Graph 17

Percentage Distrubition of Irrigation Sector Sub-Projects (N=2,687)




Graph 18

Percentage Distrubition of Livlihood Sector Sub-Projects (N=332)




Graph 19

Percentage Distrubition of Transport Sector Sub-Projects (N=3,300)




Graph 20

Percentage Distrubition of Rural Development Sector Sub-Projects



Graph 21


Percentage Distrubition of Power Sector Sub-Projects (N=1,312)



For the Heath sector, local clinics were by far the most selected Sub-projects accounting for more than 90% health related provision. A small number of local pharmacies (4%) were also built as well as boundary walls for existing clinics (4%).


The education sector includes both physical infrastructure Sub-projects such as the erection of primary schools as well as training provision. In this respect, vocational training was the most commonly funded sub-sector within Education, however in terms of the money spend, primary school building accounted for the largest portion of funding by a significant degree.

Graph 22




The small number of literacy course (8%) is surprising since high levels of illiteracy are recorded nationally and most particular among rural inhabitants. ¹⁰ It suggests, however, that communities placed greater value on the need to generate productive skills through vocational training than for literacy per se. Low levels of literacy were also mentioned as one barrier to the successful NSP implantation – this issue is further discussed in section 4.

Graph 23



Graph 24
Percentage Distrubition of Health Sector Sub-Projects (N=26)





Sub-project Metrics

Data was recorded by UN-Habitat regarding each of the Sub-projects it supported. This information provides a useful means to quantify Sub-project delivery.

The first two graphs below consider the provision of roads and power (Graphs 28 and 29). In the case of roads, UN-Habitat oversaw the construction by communities of 1,566 kilometres of local roads. To give a sense of this in relation to national scale, the main road connecting Hirat in the east of the country to Jalalabad in the West is near to 1,000kms.

Provision of Roads (Km)





10. The United Nations Development Assistance Framework for Afghanistan 2015 -2019 records that youth and adult literacy rates in Afghanistan are among the lowest in the world at 26.2% (12.5% female and 39.3% male)


For power projects the, the typical minimum intention of CDCs was to produce sufficient electricity to power a single light bulb (60W) per household. In total UN-Habitat supported the provision 759 Kw sufficient to meet the minimum lighting requirement of more than 12,000 families.


Similar breakdowns are provided in the graphs that follow (Graphs 30 to 33) detailing the number or education building and public rooms constructed, and the number of water supply and provisions made.

Community Contributions

The NSP was designed as a community-driven development

their own needs then taking responsibility for implementing projects to address these. Clearly, when engaging in this cyclical process, which for many communities was completed more than once, required a considerable investment in the community's time and resources. If the average time contribution of community member for each CDC could be estimated across all these activities: planning, assessment, design, implementation, monitoring and training there can be little doubt that it would represent an enormous contribution. More so, for those members of the CDC holding portfolios in executive or sub-committees who were expected to manage and lead the process. Without these commitments, the NSP would have failed to deliver its mandate.






This being said, the substantial voluntary commitment of time by CDC members was not the only measure of their engagement with the programme. In addition, CDC member were expected to contribute a minimum of 10% toward the cost of Sub-project, either in cash or kind (typically through the provision of labour).

This target seemed ambitious at the outset of the programme, but was nevertheless comfortably achieved. It stands not only as a measure of people's commitment to the NSP, but also raises interesting question regarding sustainability and efficiency which are addressed in section 4.

To illustrate this further, Graph 34 summarises the contributions made by community members for UN-Habitat supported CDCs. On average CDC members contribute 12% or \$31M, more than the target, across all the Subprojects.

Contributions varied depending on the type of Sub-project being implemented. It is suggested that the propensity of communities to contribute to the project depend on several factors (Graph 35).

Sub-project Contributions



■ NSP Contribution (\$) ■ CDC Contribution (\$)

These included:

Graph 30

- the relative prosperity of the community
- the opportunities the Sub-project presented for effective in-kind contribution, for example a road building project might facilitate this form of engagement better than a power supply project given the required levels of technical expertise

- the perceived value of the project how significant was the need
- the potential of the project to sustain itself or produce revenue for the community
- perception of the degree to which government was seen to be the primary supplier of a good or services for example communities were less likely to contribute to schools, clinics and public building projects than livelihood projects
- the strength of CDC leadership in encouraging and collecting contributions
- the accountability of the CDC executive and wider project partners and stakeholders.

Timeliness

It was intended that NSP Sub-projects would be managed on average over a 16 months' period. As Diagram 8 below illustrates, 2 months were allocated for design work and 14 months for implementation.

Diagram 8

Sub-project design
- 2 MONTHS


Sub-project implementation
- 14 MONTHS

For the CDCs working with UH-habitat the target of a fourteen months' implementation period was met – on average taking 421 days (see Graph 36). There was considerable variation between sectors, for example health Sub-projects (690 days) taking almost twice as long to implement as irrigation Sub-projects (355)

This good performance was not reflected in the programme as a whole. For example, it was intended that implementation would begin immediately after approval of Sub-project design, since procurement plans were in place and approval was the trigger for funding release. However, in the case of UN-Habitat there was on average a 2-month delay (58 days) between approval and the initiation of projects. Generally, these delays were attributed to bureaucratic delays in the disbursement of funds.

Moreover, during NSP 1, where multiple Block Grant instalments were made, time to project progress milestones delays were also introducing during implementation. Payment delays, on occasion had greater implications than just delaying project completion, in some instances it was reported that if delays happened during critical construction processes remedial work including additional expenses were then required.

Average Implementation Time for Sub-projects by Sector



Capacity Building

NSP capacity building for communities took three forms: formal cascaded training; on-the-job learning; and peer-to-peer learning.

As explained in section 1, the NSP made use of a cascaded training approach by which Master Trainers trained the staff of Facilitating Partners who in turn trained community members. UN-Habitat played a role in the development of a package of training materials and related community development facilitation tools. Using the experience of the predecessor Community Development Forum project and the services of international experts, Un-Habitat produced a suite of training and learning materials. Theses comprised 5 volumes, and these training packages were widely distributed and used by other Facilitating Partners and were endorsed by the Government of Afghanistan.

This is not to suggest that other Facilitating Partners did not develop their own materials. In fact, they were a considerable resource and were frequently drawn upon. Indeed, UN-Habitat staff had a degree of freedom to adjust their training approaches to suit the needs of particular communities, picking and choosing from the resources available and developing additional materials where this was warranted. A case in point was the need to adjust training approaches to the needs of CDCs/executive

committees with low rates of literacy. In these situations, training staff relied less on formal training material and more on experiential or practical methods of learning.

On-the-job learning, reflects the learning through practice that communities achieved through the planning design and implementation of Sub-projects. The importance of this form of learning was overlooked, or was at least not clearly stated in NSP literature. However, communities themselves, through focus groups, were keen to stress the value of this particular aspect of the learning. On-the-job learning was supported by Facilitating Partners, in particular during the interaction between the technical specialist supporting project implementation.

The third form of community learning, peer-to-peer learning took place outside of the direct intervention of the facilitating partners. In essence, this learning took place in CDC meetings and during site-work when the community discussed and collaborated in taking projects forward, solving community issues, or defining needs. It reflects, to a larger extent the inherent, often untapped social capital communities possess and involved community members sharing their knowledge and life experience for the collective benefit of others involved in the vision and direction of the CDCs. Again, this aspect of learning was clearly conceived-of, but was rather an unintended positive consequence of the NSP community-driven process.

During focus group discussion, respondents referred to a new-found confidence in their own skills and abilities to shape local communities and help each other through the sharing of knowledge and experience.

In terms of the formal training process the following graphs are illustrative of the extent of participation in UN-Habitat facilitated training. The second graph below (Graph 38) shows training of CDC members from NSP1 through to the completion of NSP3 broken down by gender. In total, UN-Habitat offered communities/CDCs 17 different training courses adhering to the knowledge transfer and process orientated categories set out in the MRRD Operational Manual guidance (see section 2).


Graph 37 records the number of people attending each of the 17 training courses. The first course, NSP Phase 01 & Phase 2 was delivered to the CDC/Community members as a whole since it outlined the NSP programme and the responsibilities and expectations of different partners and stakeholders. The remaining 16 training programme targeted members of specific CDC committees or portfolio holders.

The graphs show that 759,300 people attended the community-wide training sessions, with between 40,000 to 100,000 people attending the targeted training courses. The figure of 759,300 people is the best estimate of the number of individual people receiving UN-Habitat training.




Graph 32

Number of CDC Members Trained by Topic



A different figure is calculated by adding the numbers of people attending each course - 1,673,983 people. This figure does not represent individual people trained as many people attended more than one training course. It is, however, a useful measure for assessing gender participation in training. In this respect women made up 27% of trainees compared to 73% men (Graph 38). This figure would approach 30%, if data from Kandahar is excluded – in this province, as a result of prevailing conservative attitudes, women were completely excluded from training.

Number of CDC Members Trained by Gender



the target of establishing 8,334 CDC was exceeded by 124%

the target of developing 8,000 community development plans was exceeded by 126%

more than 50% of women participated in their local CDC election, against a target of 40%

95% of communities had representation of women in CDCs, significantly above the target of 40%

the target of 90% of communities contributing 10% of project costs on average was passed with 100% of communities contributing 14.5% on average

The targeted value (\$) of Block Grants disbursed was exceeded by 135%

the target of 1,260,000 beneficiary families was out performed by close to 1 million additional families (2,216,917)

Labour days created by NSP Sub-projects totalled 14.4 million exceeding the target of 9.7 million – almost 50% above target

Provincial roll out occurred in all 34 targeted provinces, however more than 100 additional districts were reached above the target of 178

472,234 community members were trained, around 79,000 more than targeted.

OUTPUTS SUMMARY

It is apparent from the preceding discussion that UN-Habitat has been effective in delivering planned outputs at scale, contributing directly to the development objectives set by the programme.

Moreover, this finding holds true for the programme as a whole, in many instances out-performing planned target by a considerable distance. By way of example, during NSP1, for the programme as a whole, the following performance against targets were achieved:



SECTION 3

NATIONAL SOLIDARITY PROGRAMME IMPACT

This section of the report draws substantially from third party literature reviewing the impact of the NSP. This body of work has been further expanded on, from a qualitative perspective, during the interviews and focus groups conducted as part of the work leading to the publishing of the report.

The previous section looked at a range of evidence suggesting strongly that the NSP had been effective in delivering planned outputs. The scale and reach of the programme has been impressive and this reflects the success in establishing CDCs as a mechanism to address local reconstruction and development needs. However, being effective in delivering infrastructure projects and basic services does not necessarily mean that this will result in the longer-term impact assumed for the programme at its outset.

The NSP was intended to have a two-fold impact. Firstly, a positive impact on local-level governance and participation, in doing so contributing to the social cohesion and state-building implied by the programme's reference to solidarity. Secondly the programme had poverty alleviation goals and, as a multi-faceted concept, this implied a planned impact across a range of indicators such as health, education and economic wellbeing to name but a few.

The most significant impact assessment of the NSP was carried out by Beath et al during NSP2. The assessment made use of a quantitative survey administered to some 25,000 village households in 10 districts. Villages were paired on the basis of proximity and similarity (assessed on a set of socioeconomic indicators). For each pair, one village was designated a 'control' village and did not form part of the NSP programme during the research period, the other was designated a 'treatment' village and was subject to the programme. Surveys were then conducted at three points: a baseline survey in 2007 pre-NSP mobilisation in 2007, at mid-line in 2009 post CDC elections but before the majority (82%) of Subprojects had been delivered; and end-line in 2011 four years into implementation and in the majority of cases (99%) after Sub-projects had been completed.

In summary, the impact evaluation discovered a mixed picture of medium and longer-term effects, but before outlining these it is important to lodge a number of caveats:

- The ten districts were chosen on the basis that they were less likely to be effected by insecurity in the interest of the safety of the surveyors, although this clearly introduced some degree of bias.
- The survey data relates only to NSP2 and therefore any generalisations regarding the impact of NSP1 can only be made cautiously and more so for NSP3, since the findings of the evaluation were used directly for planned improvements introduced during the third phase, for example repeat Block Grants. As such, one might expect NSP3 to demonstrate improved results.
- The survey rightly assessed the impact of the program on poverty across a range of indicators across the sample as a whole. This raises a methodological issue that the evaluation itself acknowledged. For instance, health outcomes were among the measures used to assess impact, however only a subset of villages identified health as an issue and therefore chose to deliver health related Subprojects e.g. clinics. On this basis, the generalised reporting used in the evaluation have diluted the impact of sector specific Sub-projects.
- The end-line survey was completed four years after the start of the programme in the target communities, typically a relatively short period after the completion of the Sub-projects given the lengthy implementation period. As a result, the impact recorded does not reflect a long-term view of change; such change may only materialise in a number of years and, conversely, improvements seen in the short-term may not be sustained.
- As a quantitative survey, the findings are likely to be reliable and generalizable, however they do not provide the same contextual understanding and validity that can be expected from qualitative methods.
- There is little existing comparative data that would allow benchmarking of NSP performance against other reconstruction development projects in Afghanistan, or indeed from a global perspective from post conflict states using similar community-driven approaches.

• As a result of the limited number of districts sampled, variations arising from differences in the capacities and approaches taken towards implementation by FPs may have varied.

The survey considered impact in relation to five thematic areas: access to basic services and infrastructure; economic wellbeing; local governance; statebuilding; and social cohesion. For each set of impact assessment findings, which are summarised below, these are compared and contrasted to other information sources considered as part of this review. In particular, reference is made to the qualitative interviews and focus groups that, in part, explored respondent's perceptions regarding the perceived impact of the programme.

ACCESS TO BASIC SERVICE AND INFRASTRUCTURE

HEADLINE IMPACT MEASURE	ENDLINE RESULT	
Access		
Utilities (including water and electricity)	Beneficial Impact	
Services (including female counselling, education and health)	Beneficial Impact th)	
Infrastructure (including irrigation and transport)	No Evidence of Impact	

Focus Group and Interview Findings

• Unanimous support was found among community members interviewed regarding the benefits of water projects. Aside from providing safe portable water, in many instances directly to homes, the community (CDC) often benefited financially from levies charged for connection and metered use, which were in turn invested in operations, maintenance and in additional community initiatives.

- Micro-hydro power Sub-projects were widely valued, but diesel generator provision usually resulted in failure, since communities could not afford to purchase diesel or spares to maintain their operation
- Solar panel projects were included in the negative menu – many communities felt this was a mistake and more should have been done to facilitate their use.
- Communities largely welcomed formal education projects (primary schools) and in particular the opportunities afforded to girl's pupils. However, it was felt that low literacy levels has not been addressed. There was general acknowledgement that the line ministry had managed to provide the required educational services on completion of formal school building.
- Many respondents referred to the unmet need for technical/vocational skills aligned to market opportunities.
- Health projects were limited and national rules regarding the provision of health services on a per capita basis meant that smaller settlements were not able to benefit from health Sub-projects. Some concern was expressed as to the ability or commitment of the line ministry to support community health Sub-projects.
- Although scoring poorly in the study, no negative views were expressed regarding the benefits or Irrigation or Transport Sub-projects, with the exception in some cases regarding the limited life span of gravelled, as opposed to tarmac/concreted, roads.
- Many examples were given by CDCs of non-NSP funded initiatives to train (informal) community members, support livelihood projects, provide counselling for women, youth, drug users, etc. as well as provide a wide range of community services.

^{11.} Beath, Christia, Enikolopov (2013) The NSP: Assessing the Effects of Community Driven Development in Afghanistan, International Peace Keeping Journal 22-4.

^{12.} Barakat et al (2006) Mid-term Evaluation Report of the NSP Afghanistan, University of York

^{13.} Boesen (2004) From Subject to Citizen: Local Participation in the NSP, AREU

^{14.} Mghenyi (2013) Impact Evaluation of NSP: Using Findings to Strengthen the Programme, NSP Evaluation Task Team

^{15.} Lessons from the NSP in Afghanistan (2013), ReCom

^{16.} Barakat et al (2012) Study of NSP's Impact on IDP/Refugee Returnee Reintegration in Afghanistan, University of York

^{17.} Beath, Christia, Enikolopov (2013) Randomised Impact Evaluation of Afghanistan's NSP, National Solidarity Programme

ECONOMIC WELLBEING

HEADLINE IMPACT MEASURE	ENDLINE RESULT
Economic perceptions	Beneficial Impact
Economic stocks and flows (Including income, consumption, assets and borrowing)	No Evidence of Impact
Production and marketing (including agricultural and non-agricultural)	No Evidence of Impact
Migration	No Evidence of Impact

Focus Group and Interview Findings

- The focus groups, unlike the impact assessment, did not generally express positive perception regarding economic perception. This difference may be linked to reduced aid flows in the national economy and its inability to absorb new entrants to the labour market, a situation that has arisen after the time of the assessment (see section 1).
- Respondents (often women) strongly lobbied for a renewal of the NSP, but wanted a much stronger focus on delivering livelihood outcomes, particularly linked to agricultural production. However, they were realistic as to the need to link productive activities to regional and national markets.
- CDC Executive members, representing CDCs in Hirat Province spoke about how new arrivals to the communities had put additional strain on the service they were providing that is to say services provided through the NSP Block Grants. These new arrivals were, in the main, internally displaced families fleeing conflict in Farah (the neighbouring province). Although, the CDC was keen to support these families and appeared to welcome them, the point being made was that the government and the NSP specifically should have provided additional or larger Block Grants for this purpose in the examples given, the communities had grown almost double in size over the life of the programme.
- York University conducted a separate study considering the impact of the NSP on IDPs and Returnees, it concluded that the NSP had a positive effect on these groups although they may not have been targeted directly. They did, however identify a number of areas where support to these groups should be improved.

• Examples were given of community members, including women, receiving and repaying community-savings loans organised through the CDC to pursue business and other productive activities.

LOCAL GOVERNANCE

HEADLINE IMPACT MEASURE	ENDLINE RESULT
Local Governance	
Structure	Beneficial Impact
Function	Beneficial Impact
Quality & participation	No Evidence of Impact

Focus Group and Interview Findings

- Widespread acceptance was expressed of the role (past and on-going) of CDCs from a range of state institutions, including District Development Associations, Provincial Governors, NGOs, MRRD and line ministries. No one interviewed questioned their role or legitimacy.
- A number of respondents welcomed the CDC By-law, but also mentioned the need to formalise the role of CDCs further, suggesting that NSP CDC should be the only state-backed mechanism for working with the community. That is to say they
- questioned the practice of some line ministries and NGOs in particular of establishing parallel community structures to help deliver their programmes. In addition, some respondents suggested that there was no longer a role for traditional shura and that CDC should absorb these. This being said, there were many example shared of other projects and programmes working through the established CDC structures. UN-Habitat alone was able to list four major programmes it was currently implementing with the support of CDCs, spanning urban safety to land management.
- Community members were often vocal in their criticism of government led-development and service provision on occasion, they suggested they were now more aware of the responsibilities of government and had a greater desire to hold them to account. However, some respondents also

expressed a new understanding of the complexities of government and meeting local needs as a result of the understanding they had developed through the programme.

- On a few occasions community members and leaders were critical of corrupt government officials and felt that the levels of accountability CDCs were subject to in the NSP should be equally applied in government.
- CDCs mentioned the lack of efficiency in government-led infrastructure provision. They questioned the excessive costs and time it takes government outside of the NSP to establish new infrastructure in this respect the interviews, when probed, eluded to corrupt practices resulting in the escalation of price or else profiteering contractors, or the failure to utilise local labour or materials.
- CDC representatives were included in the structures of District Development Associations sometime after the impact evaluation. This innovation was well received both by CDC members as it was for district and provincial authorities. It was seen as a useful extension to the participation of local people in decision-making.

STATE BUILDING AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES

HEADLINE IMPACT MEASURE	ENDLINE RESULT
State building and Political Attitudes	
Democratic values	Beneficial Impact
State legitimacy	Beneficial Impact
Perceptions of Government	Beneficial Impact
Conflict	No Evidence of Impact

Focus Group and Interview Findings

• Community members appear to fully accept and value representative and democratic local elections and decision-making. On occasion, they made links to the national democratic process and how the former had helped build their understanding of the latter.

- There was widespread acceptance that women should be involved in decision making although differences were expressed as to whether this should be done collectively with men or as a parallel process. There was also acknowledgment that there were still many parts of the country where attitudes towards women still strongly held back their participation in democratic processes.
- Few community respondents were able to confirm or articulate how the NSP, or community development initiatives may have impacted on levels of armed conflict.
- At the level of local disputes, CDCs often explained how CDC members or specifically established conflict resolution sub-committees had intervened successfully in local disputes. In this respect, the training received on conflict resolution had been useful and was applied in practice.
- Supporting the previous two observations, Oxfam surveyed communities as to what they saw as the most important roles of CDCs. Problem solving and liaising with government scored joint highest with 22%, whereas conflict resolution received the lowest score of 4.3%.
- Whereas people were generally complimentary about the governments initiative to implement the NSP programme this had not substantially changed people's broader perceptions that government was failing people on a number of fronts: continuing conflict, corruption, lack of public goods and services, in-fighting, self-interest declining economic performance and failure to invest in the creation of jobs.

SOCIAL NORMS

HEADLINE IMPACT MEASURE	ACT MEASURE ENDLINE RESULT	
Social Cohesion	No Evidence of Impact	
Basic skills	No Evidence of Impact	
Happiness	Beneficial Impact	
Gender attitudes	Beneficial Impact	
Gender outcomes	Beneficial Impact	

Focus Group and Interview Findings

- Communities widely valued the skills they had developed as a result of NSP training and through learning-by-doing. However, respondents regularly mentioned the need for more attention to be given to the development of productive skills supporting employment or self-employment.
- Ring-fenced Block Grants for women in NSP1 had been primarily used to support training and small-scale income generation projects. Their removal in NSP2 was sometimes criticised as it limited direct support to the needs identified by women and in general since training needs were often eclipse by more pressing needs for basic services and infrastructure.
- People widely referred to shifts in attitudes to gender as a result of the NSP programme. Women expressed having understood their rights and the desire to exercise these in their family and community life. Gains in freedom of movement, freedom of association and economic and educational participation, where these had occurred, appeared to be particularly valued by women.
- The evaluation by Oxfam (FP) found strong evidence of the participation of women in CDCs. It further stated that 'without CDCs, women would most probably –still be out of governing structures'. It did however suggest that there were concerns that in some instances and in some specific cultural contexts women's participation was nominal and as a result the degree of empowerment questionable.
- Men, in mixed group settings and when interview in the absence of women, acknowledged that their perception of women had, in many instances, shifted, they were now more likely to accept that women could lead and could implement projects successfully. There did not seem to be a common desire to revert back to more conservative or traditional arrangements.
- Although changes relating to gender norms and women right had most certainly been impacted by the NSP, it remains important to keep this in perspective. The reality of the lives of women in Afghanistan, even where there have been some impressive gains, remain highly constrained and in the most conservative communities there is little to support change having taken place at all. What is clear, however, is that the NSP has helped forged new relationships and ways of men and women working together for the common

good. This practice needs to be built on and sustain if a long-term impact on gender relations is to be claimed.

• The question of happiness and wellbeing was not directly addressed in the interviews and focus groups.

IMPACT SUMMARY

In judging whether the achievements of the programme justify the time and resource invested is, at the best, complex. As a starting point, it is fair to recall and acknowledge quite how significant a number of the programmatic elements were – to the extent the NSP has been referred to as a radical experiment. This radicalness stems from five main contextual challenges which, on the one hand, the programme intended to address while on the other hand, made the prospects of making good progress a remote prospect (see Diagram 9).




Firstly, in 2002 there was no widespread familiarity with democratic processes, no national model that could be readily adapted to the processes of electing CDC leadership or determining community priorities. This experience, as respondents were at lengths to point out, provided a catalyst for wider participation in national political dialogue and democratic processes.

Secondly, Afghanistan's peace process was incomplete - although often describe as a post-conflict country – the country had an active and on-going insurgency that intensified through the life of the programme. This backdrop of conflict required communities and practitioners to negotiate this risk-prone environment – there can be no doubt that this impeded progress,

in some instances prevented delivery or even transferred state assets or the public revenues derived from them into the hands of insurgents. However, these instances were limited – for example, during NSP2 the government reported that FPs had had to suspend programmes in just 5% of communities. This resilience may stem from two causes: as a result of the strong system of accountability that limited the misdirection of resources. Also, since CDCs were viewed by insurgents as community organisations working or collaborating with the state, rather than as part of the formal governance structure although ironically this was part of the intention of the NSP.

Thirdly, the prospect of promoting equal participation of women in local level governance was seemingly fanciful given the deeply ingrained cultural and traditional norms present in many of the more conservative, Pashtun dominated rural areas. It is all the more remarkable, therefore, that the impact on gender attitudes and outcomes recorded in Table 9 were achieved. Underlying these headlines were gains across a number of sub-indicators including women's participation in political activity, local governance, work and society, primary education for girls and to some extent mobility.

Fourthly, the state itself was new, untested and in some respect untrusted given historically validated suspicion of the state and its intentions. Afghanistan's reputation for corruption,20 ranked internationally in among the worst performing countries in the world, that coupled with being a historically highly centralised and inefficient state. The prospect of diverting funding away from top-down bureaucratic control to local communities ran against the grain and required unwavering national leadership and commitment. It is interesting to note that the MRRD, established in 1988, historically had little involvement in nationwide delivery of goods and services,²¹ let alone those governed trough participatory community-led processes. Economic Rates of Return provide some insight into the efficiency of programmes. Accordingly, the World Bank measured the cost efficiency of NSP financed projects, including consideration of both overheads and facilitation costs. The results displayed in the Graph 39 below are impressive, with an average return of 63% and in many instances this stands in contrast to the efficiency of many donors funded programmes that are reliant on government delivery.



Fifthly, the NSP sidestepped traditional governance structures (Jirgas and Shuras) that had developed, over decades, out of either the absence or ineffectiveness of the state. These structures were typically dominated by, older males (elders), religious leaders and local power brokers. The prospect of establishing new CDC structures in parallel to those that existed, and at the same time giving voice to women, younger people, and the needs of the poor. Such an approach risked creating local resistance to the programme at the least or potentially more overt conflict between the different local interest groups. In part, both resistance and conflict occurred, but this seemed only to be a significant issue in the early stages of the programme, with traditional committees being slowly won over as a result of the hard work of the FPs or on seeing the genuine interest and support of local people in the NSP process.

The size, scale and importance of the NSP warrants further in-depth longitudinal study over all three of its phases before concrete judgement can be made as to its long-term impact. During the short-period of qualitative fieldwork undertaken to inform this study much evidence and testimony was gather as to the resilience and sustainability of the NSP approach, of the established CDCs and many of their functioning Sub-projects - with or without continuing state funding. Additionally, the desire and motivation of women to continue to participate in local decision making structures and projects and indeed the wider acceptance of their right to do was keenly evident - at least in the CDCs visited in less conservative districts. If anything, the focus groups reinforced what must be seen as a strong set of early-impact finding confirmed in the main NSP study. However, this is not to say the programme was without its challenges. These challenges are explored in the following section leading to the extraction of lessons learned for future iterations of the community-driven development approaches in Afghanistan and wider afield.

^{19.} Calder, Hakimi (2009) Statebuilding and Community Engagement without Reconciliation: A Case Study of Afghanistan's NSP, FutureGenerations Graduate School

^{20.} At the time of drafting the United Nations Development Assistance Framework for Afghanistan 2015 -2019, Afghanistan ranked 180 out of 182 countries in Transparency International's Annual Corruption Perception Index.

^{21.} Torabi (2007) Assessing the NSP: The Role of Accountability in Reconstruction, Integrity Watch Afghanistan

SECTION 4

LESSONS FROM THE NATIONAL SOLIDARITY PROGRAMME

In concluding, the NSP has delivered planned outputs to a scale not previously seen in Afghanistan, resulting in a wide range of measured impacts benefiting local communities across the country. More than this, the NSP has been a platform for learning about community-driven development as a means to build local systems of governance and deliver much-needed service and infrastructure. Learning has taken place at many levels: government and community, individual and collective, systemlevel and organisational-level. Afghanistan is richer as a result. However, complex social change, of the type stimulated by the programme, hinges on the rebalancing of power between groups that has often been entrenched for decades. This takes time, there are few quick-fixes, but iterative learning is the tool that helps direct purposive change. Important advances seen during the programme - such as improved participation of women in community governance - will remain tentative unless the work of the NSP is further consolidated and refined. Ground gained can quickly revert to the status quo once interventions cease. For this reason, the last section of this report expands on some key learning that is felt to be important markers for the continued evolution of the NSP – this continuation is strongly advocated.

This final section of the report extracts eight lessons from the review of the programme's design, implementation, outputs and impact. It is hoped these lessons may help to direct planning of future rounds of the programme, other domestic approaches to community-driven development, as well as providing valuable learning for international development practice and debate.

The lessons are set out below and are arranged according to three groupings: institutional arrangement, technical support, and financial mechanisms.

INSTITUTIONAL AND PROGRAMME ARRANGEMENTS

Lesson 1 - Whole Government Coordination

A stronger 'whole government' architecture and approach - built on enhanced collaborative decision making and shared responsibilities across all tier of government- would tiers in other departments, help dissipate territorial disputes and gain economies of scale. The coordination and relationships between the MRRD and line ministries were not always effective or well managed. In its conception, the NSP had strong articulations with the work and responsibilities of many Ministries – Education, Health and Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled to name but a few. The domination of a single Ministry over such a large and important programme without effective mechanisms to systematically engage other departments risked weakening the programme's political legitimacy, created duplication, confused local communities and diluted effectiveness.

A similar argument can be made for the need for better Donor coordination ensuring that off-budget funding, in particular, reinforces NSP goals and objectives, does not create duplication or parallel activities that undermine state programmes and failed to contribute to the building of its long-term governance capacity.

Lesson 2 - Formalisation of CDCs

Based on the obvious success of the NSP in establishing, at scale, CDCs as effective representative bodies that engage local communities in deliberations and actions to foster local development and support governance raises an important question about their future role in wider development initiatives and governance arrangements.

The Constitution of Afghanistan (2003) and the Sub-National Governance Policy (2010) provide for four tiers of subnational government: Province, District, Municipality, and Village. Each tier is intended to have elected executives and councils. However, this has only been the case so far for Provincial-level government. There has been some interest in consolidating CDCs as the Village-level tier of sub-national governance and in 2013 CDCs were designated as the interim Village Councils pending further discussion and political consensus.

Formalising and strengthening the role of CDCs seems an important future step, and there appears much to be gained from institutionalising the model, and this could, at the very least, help address concerns regarding their long-term sustainability post-NSP. However, any steps to formalise the roles of CDCs should be taken cautiously. Firstly, careful thought should be given as to what responsibilities would be

vested at this sub-national level. It may be opportune to consider widening the CDC mandate to include new responsibilities or to formalise currently ad-hoc practices. For example, a community governance role might include registration functions (births, marriages and deaths); resolving local-level conflict and disputes over land, water access, etc.; formal consultation on district-level development plans; and the collections of local taxes and levies.

Each potential function creates opportunities, but challenges too. Formalisation of CDCs may lead to their increased politicisation and sharpen the interests of powerful local elites in control and functioning. The layer of protection afforded to CDCs from the attentions of insurgent groups as a result of their arm's length relationship with government (see section XXX) may be lost should formalisation of their role be pursued. The result of this might be to further limit the access of CDCs as a mechanism to meet local needs in insecure areas.

Lesson 3 – Objective Setting and Monitoring

As local development needs are met, not surprisingly, new ones arise. If a local road is built connecting two neighbouring villages to support local agricultural production and distribution, we might expect in the future that the two villages will be interested in improving the road that connects both villages to the regional market. This suggests, therefore, that the NSP, or its successor programme/s, need to be sufficiently flexible in their response to evolving development dynamics.

Some criticism has been levied at the NSP in that it has been too rigid in some of its prescriptions and to lose in others. For example, it can be argued that too much focus was placed on delivering a narrowly defined list of physical infrastructure projects at the expense of developing skills, supporting livelihoods, developing market linkages, strengthening local-governance functions and embedding participation. Likewise, the NSPs reference to targeting specific marginalised and vulnerable groups (as detailed in the Operating Manuals and founding documentation) were not well followed through in terms of specific methods or provisions to achieve this.

Inevitably, there is a contradiction between the need for centralised planning, control and accountability while allowing knowledge and aspirations of local people to determine their development paths. The right balance is hard to find and indeed hard to maintain since the environment is fluid and with it a need for continuous justification of methods and approach. In fairness, the NSP, has adopted an iterative approach and has learnt as it has progressed. Nevertheless, there may be a benefit in improving the NSP's diagnostic capacity, both at the national and provincial levels, to assess and measure changing need, determining broad categories for successful intervention as opposed to categories of intervention, piloting new local approach and testing cost and benefits of alternative strategies.

Such an approach needs to be supported by the development of appropriate programme performance indicators. If these, as was the case with the NSP, focus primarily on measuring and rewarding quantifiable physical development, there should be little surprise that the NSP organised with this objective in mind. As such, the responsibility of refining the programmatic approach becomes a share one between donor, the government and communities, especially as the latter commit a greater proportion of their time and resource in meeting their needs.

TECHNICAL PROCESSES AND CAPACITIES

Lesson 4 - Sustainable Facilitation

Facilitating Partners played a pivotal role in the delivery and achievement of the NSP. Without them, it would be hard to imagine the programme would have been the success it was. To replace FPs would have required either local communities to take on greater responsibly without having the necessary experience or capacities, or it would require government, in its highly-centralised form, to extend its reach, efficiency and effectiveness. Neither of these options would have been justified at the outset of the programme.

However, the as the NSP continues to mature or evolves into new forms of community-driven development approaches, inevitably there will be a need to examine whether the intermediary role played by FPs is still warranted, since it directs resource (19% of the NSP budget) and expertise away from government and/ or local communities. This is ultimately a question of sustainability as well as one of striking the most effective and efficient national balance between the role and expectations placed on local communities, civil society and government. In their favour, FPs are seen to:

- have longstanding experience and the necessary institutional platforms to reach dispersed communities
- offer linkages and complementary activities
- are familiar with needs-driven development
- offer impartiality and decreased security risks
- are flexible and non-bureaucratic
- have developed systems of accountability
- can share longstanding institutional knowledge.

If over time there is a desire to see the role of FPs reduced or phased-out it is important that is done diligently, cautiously and planned properly in advance; with the costs and benefits of different options being fully considered.

Lesson 5 - Flexibility Vs Control

The NSP was strongly controlled and regulated. In many respects, this was a clear strength of the programme, one that ensured clarity of purpose and accountability in a context where the state is often criticised for its poor stewardship of resources.

On the flipside, however, was a perception that the programme was overly bureaucratic and too tightly controlled, to the extent it limited innovation and value adding by FPs and the communities. A number of FPs have strong track records in a range of relevant fields. For example, having tested methods for empowering women in development processes, supporting local-level conflict resolution, addressing the livelihood needs of IDPs and returnees, working in conflict areas to name but a few. By harnessing these skills, experience and working methods, it may have been possible to enrich the programme and ultimately the communities it serves – as it stands there was a risk that the rigidness of the programme may have reduced opportunities for iterative learning and improvement.

By providing greater flexibility into the delivery arrangements, or by providing formal mechanisms to allow for the approval of variations, when combined with an effective system of monitoring and assessing (such as 'developmental evaluation') the impact of these adjustments could have potentially speeded up the process of learning and ultimately have led to stronger outcomes.

Lesson 6 - Education and Skills

The national need for coherent and coordinated adult education programmes and technical and vocational skills provision in Afghanistan was overlooked by the NSP and the potential for cross-sectoral collaboration was missed. Successive Common Country Assessments (see section 1) have identified persistently low literacy rates as a barrier to growth and development. Also, the Common Country Assessments have identified the challenges of providing the skills and opportunities to address the 'youth bulge' by providing access to the labour market.

National education and skills issues were not set apart from the objectives of the NSP or indeed the needs of the local communities it served – they were in many ways integral to it. Low levels of literacy were a tangible barrier to community mobilisation and capacity building processes, especially for women. The reality of this on the ground meant that FPs were required to undertake a greater proportion of the work originally planned for communities themselves in terms of the design and management of Sub-projects. This limited learning, participation and empowerment as well as creating long-term dependency on the role of FPs. For a programme that ran for 14 years, the lack of concerted and coordinated attempts to address literacy through or alongside the programme seems a missed opportunity, particularly given that nationally, government and donors were investing substantial funding to meet Millennium Goal literacy targets.

In the case of skills, the NSP offered an opportunity to create formally accredited on-the-job training programmes linked to infrastructure delivery. NSP was reasonably effective in developing the clerical skills of literate members of the community, but training in crafts, trades and artisanal skills was inconsistent. The skills market requires certified, transferable skills to operate efficiently, and workers with hands-on experience require accredited certificates of competency in order to secure new work opportunities. Given this, a real opportunity was lost to support the employability of the many thousands of community members who provided labour to the Sub-projects.

FINANCIAL MECHANISMS

Lesson 7 – Strengthen Financial Mechanisms

Many of the people interview for this report, including CDC members, FPs and government officials were interested in exchanging views regarding the specific modalities of the NSP financial mechanism. There appears to be wide consensus as to a number of recommendations to strengthen this aspect of the programme.

- The cap on Block Grants of \$60,000 was not equitable and penalised the largest communities.
- Basing allocations on out-dated official village demarcations led to the exclusion of new or recently expanded communities with a likely knock-on effect for districts accommodating significant numbers of IDPs and returnees.
- Mechanisms for CDCs to combine financial allocations across clusters of CDCs (Gozas) level and attempt more complex Sub-projects were valued. Where FPs, such as the Agha Khan Development Network, had piloted Goza-level implementation this had been met with some success.
- Implementation had been smoother, with fewer delays when the number of funding disbursements was minimised and the majority of the funding was released upfront.
- The ring-fenced allocation to support the specific development needs of women was not seen to be overly effective, but it was widely believed this was because they were too small (around 10% of the Block Grant allocation) to be meaningful.

Lesson 8 – Financial Sustainability

Ongoing funding of CDC Sub-project activity was seen to support CDC sustainability, and along with their legal status (CDC By-law) this reinforced their legitimacy. The introduction of repeat Block Grants in NSP3 was, therefore, a sensible and valid approach. However, there remains a need to consider how long-term financing of community-driven development can be maintained and with it community confidence in government, particularly in the context of national budgetary pressures and decline foreign aid.

In answering this, the need to increase the community contributions to Sub-projects has been raised. It was common, during the interviews, for FPs to provide examples of when CDC has contributed well above the 10% of Sub-project cost required.

However, a number of factors supported this. Firstly, there needed to be an unambiguous line-of-sight between identified community needs and the prioritised Subproject/s. That is to say that undue influence on CDCs to prioritise the Sub-project choices most desired by FPs, traditional leaders, government officials, local power brokers, etc. resulted in greater reluctance of CDC members to contribute. In simple terms, the greater the community's need, the more it is likely to contribute towards meeting that need.

Secondly, the benefits of Sub-project needed to be equitably distributed; alternatively, those members of the community benefiting most should be expected to pay the most. For example, irrigation projects that benefit landowners most, as well as benefiting the landowners at the head of the system more than those at the end.

Thirdly, the sustainability of Sub-projects is an important factor determining community investment. Where communities are clear that Sub-projects can be maintained and operated in the long-term the greater their reported propensity to contribute, more so, when the Sub-project creates stable revenue flows that can be reinvested into the Sub-project or other community initiatives. A good example of this was observed in water network projects, initial NSP funded Sub-projects had demonstrated to communities the potential for self-sustain water provision, and on this basis, extensions to the networks had been directly financed by the community.

Fourthly, and related to the point above, there is a need to place greater emphasis on creating direct financial and economic benefits to CDCs and their members. As such, by strengthening the income-generating aspect of the programme or designing Sub-projects that support local market activity and infrastructure the sustainability of the approach can be enhanced, the contribution of communities maximised and efficiency of the programme increased.

Fifthly, the NSP could consider testing demand-led funding instruments as opposed to the current supply-led process. In this way, communities could be incentivised to invest in the development process. Included here would be the use of top-up grants or matched funding to drive local community investment. These mechanisms could be further adjusted to explicitly reward the needs of key target groups or for work carried out in the more insecure areas.

ANNEXES

ANNEX A: METHODOLOGY

The methodology for determining the findings of the Analytical Completion Report followed two strands so as to strike a reasonable balance between reliability, validity and representativeness. Evidence supporting findings, as far as possible, was triangulated by testing with multiple respondents using differentiated techniques in order to develop broadly supported findings or areas of the programme which are contested or viewed differently.

Strand 1

Firstly, the report relied substantially on existing project data, both qualitative and quantitative. This included a review of literature and data pertaining to the project that was available from a number of sources: UN-Habitat, the Government of Afghanistan, programme implementation partners and the relevant donors, in particular the World Bank. This data took a number of forms including: project plans, baseline measurements, project reports and monitoring data, evaluations and impact assessments including those conducted by independent third parties.

Strand 2

Secondly, a three-week field research period was used to collect supplementary qualitative data. This was used to explore key report themes and to provide deeper contextual understanding for the analysis of information gathered during Strand 1.

Method 1: Focus Group Discussions – held with beneficiaries (Community Development Councils – CDCs).

A total of four focus groups were planned. These included 2 CDCs in villages in Balkh Province and two CDCs in villages in Hirat Province. Focus groups included at interviews with both male and female CDCs. Focus groups included between 5-8 respondents including CDC members with portfolios (Chair, Vice-Chair, Secretary, Treasurer) as well as general members. Where possible focus groups included CDC members who met the criteria of vulnerable groups as determined by the programme (internally displaced people, returnees, victims of drought, etc.)

Method 2: Semi-Structured Interviews

A series of semi-structured interviews were held

with core project stakeholders including: managers and field staff of UN-Habitat, National government and provincial government officials (MRRD and NSP Programme Management Unit). Provincial level interviews will be held in Mazar-e-Sharif and Hirat.

A questioning framework was developed prior to each interview. The questioning framework guided the interview discussions, but allow for a free-flowing conversation that responded to ideas and issues as they arose. Common to all, the questioning frameworks explored the following:

- What has worked well and what has not, and why? What is/was recommended to address areas that did not work well?
- What is considered to be of good practice or to be examples of success?
- What challenges were faced by the programme?
- What obstacles do women face when participating in development and community organizing activities? How did the NSP overcome these?
- What lessons (technical, institutional, social, environmental, financial) have been learnt?
- What have been the impact and/or achievements of the programme?
- How did the NSP impact on lives of women, for example changing gender relations in the family or community, improving economic status or supporting daily activities?
- What has been the significance of UN-Habitat's role in the conceptualization, implementation and development/evolution of the programme?
- How sustainable is the programme, how should it evolve or be replicated in other contexts?

Interviews were one-to-one or involved small groups (2-5) of respondents grouped by theme or area of work.

The interviews were mindful of practical issues relating to access to respondents; theoretical issues relating to local-level governance and capacity development for the provision of social and productive infrastructure; and ethical issues arising from the identified methodology including safeguarding and confidentiality.

Method 3: Self-Assessment Workshop

A facilitated self-assessment workshop will be held with the project team and selected stakeholders. The workshop, run over a half-day for up to 20 participants and explored the strengths and weaknesses of the programme in relation to OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) quality standards as they relate to the planning, design and implementation of the programme. In this respect, the following DAC standards were among those discussed:

- 1. Relevance capacity of the NSP programme to answer to the needs and expectations of beneficiaries and target groups.
- 2. Effectiveness analysis of achievements (and variations) of the NSP programme in comparison with the plan, taking into account potential unplanned positive and/or negative effects.
- 3. Efficiency: consideration of the means of implementation and their cost, with respect to the related achievements.
- 4. Impact: Assessment of the NSP programme impacts on target groups and final beneficiaries, with an analysis of potential long-term effects.
- 5. Sustainability: Identification of the leverages of sustainability created by the NSP programme.
- 6. Coherence/complementarity: Study of coherence and complementarity of the NSP programme with other actions.

Method 4: Project Site Inspections

During field trips to Mazar-e-Sharif and Hirat provinces, visit to NSP/CDC infrastructure projects were made. Several projects sites were inspected diring each of the visited.

Within the limitations of the approach set above below, efforts were be made to ensure that the work undertaken met best practice in terms of empowerment and accountability for analytical reviews - placing strong emphasis on sharing information, best practice and recording lessons learnt.

ANNEX B: NSP FUNDERS

An estimated US \$ 2.7 billion donor funding supported the NSP from the beginning of the programme until the end of NSP Phase 3 (mid-2015).

Funders included:

- European Union EC/EU (ARTF)
- Government of Australia (ARTF)
- Government of Belgium (ARTF)
- Government of Canada (ARTF)
- Government of Czech Republic (Bilateral)
- Government of Denmark (ARTF)
- Government of Finland (ARTF)
- Government of France (Bilateral)
- Government of Germany (ARTF)
- Government of Italy (Bilateral)
- Government of Netherlands (Bilateral)
- Government of Japan (JAICA/JSDF)
- Government of New Zealand (Bilateral)
- Government of Norway (ARTF)
- Government of Slovak Republic (Bilateral)
- Government of Spain (ARTF)
- Government of Sweden (ARTF)
- Government of Switzerland (Bilateral)
- Government of the United Kingdom (ARTF)
- Government of the United States (ARTF)
- World Bank/International Development

Association (IDA)

ANNEX C: NSP FACILITATING PARTNERS

1			Coverage Area (Provinces)
	ABCD	Afghan Business Capacity Development	Uruzgan
2	ACTED	Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development	Baghlan, Badakhshan, Faryab, Kunduz, Takhar
3	AA	Action Aid	Jawzjan, Kabul
4	AAD	Afghan Aid	Badakhshan, Ghor, Nuristan, Samangan
5	AKDN	Agha Khan Development Network	Badakhshan, Baghlan, Bamyan, Parwan, Takhar
6	AREP	Afghan Rehabilitation & Education Programme	Paktya
7	ANCC	Afghan National Re-construction Coordination	Uruzgan
8	BDN	Bakhtar Development Network	Herat
9	BRAC	Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee	Nangarhar, Helmand, Paktika, Badghis, Samangan,Takhar
10	CARE	Cooperative for Assistance & Relief Everywhere	Baghlan, Balkh, Ghazni, Paktya, Parwan, Wardak
11	CHA	Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance	Balkh, Faryab, Ghor, Herat
12	Concern	Concern Worldwide	Badakhshan, Takhar
13	DACAAR	Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees	Badghis, Faryab, Ghazni, Herat, Laghman, Paktya, Parwan
14	Flag Int	Flag International	Ghazni, Badakhshan
15	FG	Future Generation	Ghazni , Nangarhar
16	GAA	German Agro - Action	Faryab, Jawzjan, Nangarhar
17	GRSP	Ghazni Rural Support Program	Baghlan, Kunduz
18	HRDA	Human Resource Development Agency	Kandahar
19	IRC	International Rescue Committee	Herat, Khost, Logar, Nangarhar
20	MADERA	Mission d'aide au Dev.des Economies Rural	Ghor, Kunar, Laghman, Nuristan
21	NPO/RRAA	Norwegian Project Office /Rural Rehabilitation Association for Afghanistan	Badghis, Herat, Nangarhar, Kunar
22	OXFAM	Oxford Committee for Famine Relief	Daikundi
23	PIN	People in Need	Baghlan, Balkh, Nangarhar, Paktya
24	PSD	Partners for Social Development	DaiKundi
25	RI	Relief International	Kunar, Nimroz
26	SCA	Swedish Committee for Afghanistan	Wardak
27	SDO	Sanayee Development Organization	Kabul
28	SOSSMBC JV NTHDOA	Social for Social Services Madhya Bharat Chapter JV New Talash Health and Development Organization for Afghans	Khost
29	UN-Habitat	United Nations Human Settlements Programme	Balkh, Bamyan, Farah, Herat, Kandahar, Kapisa, Nangarhar, Panjshir, Parwan
30	ZOA	ZOA Refugee Care for Afghanistan	Jawzjan , Saripul

ANNEX D: NSP CERTIFICATE OF COMPLETION



NATIONAL SOLIDARITY PROGRAMME (NSP)

The National Solidarity Programme (NSP) has been one of the flagship programs of Afghan Government and it has been implemented under the leadership of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. It is the culmination of more than 10 years of hard work and positive cooperation between many institutions and individuals, which are gratefully acknowledged.

NSP consumed huge amount of work, research and dedication. Still, implementation would not have been possible if we did not have a support of many individuals and institutions.

UN-Habitat has played a key role in assisting the Government in the design of the programme and has been responsible for implementing a significant portion of the programme (facilitating 4,133 CDCs reached an estimated 1,338,000 families comprised of 7,715,000 family members across 9 provinces, preparation of 12,591 financed sub projects with 11,579,000,000 AFS Block grant disbursement).

Analytic Closure Report

National Solidarity Programme (NSP)

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