MAPPING MIGRATION IN BEIRUT MUNICIPALITY

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THREE NEIGHBOURHOODS | 2018

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FOREWORD

UN-Habitat is pleased to offer this report on how migration intersects with selected indicators of urban well-being and sustainable development. The humanitarian development of Beirut and other cities in Lebanon is closely linked to migration forms. The displacement of people from Syria since 2011 and their large-scale forced migration have resulted in demographic pressure concerns in the already stressed urban pockets of Lebanese cities.

The empirical data presented here considers aspects of vulnerability at neighborhood level across both host and immigrant communities. It is anticipated that Beirut Municipality and other partners will be able to use the data to nuance responses, noting that sustainability can only reside in actions that have reference to all residents of the area in question.

Tarek Osseiran
UN-Habitat Lebanon Country Programme Manager

Migration has long constituted a formative dynamic in the urban development of the city of Beirut and of Lebanon.

The mass inflow of people into Lebanon resulting from the Syrian crisis from 2011 onward has seen a new influx of displaced people into the cities, including Beirut.

Beirut Municipality welcomes this report as a knowledge resource to inform its ongoing response to the challenge and opportunities that international migration brings.

Jamal Itani
Mayor of Beirut Municipality

CREDITS & ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF MAPS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS & ACRONYMS

DGSG	Directorate General of General Security	**MoPH**	Ministry of Public Health
DPAR	General Directorate of Political Affairs and Refugees	**MoSA**	Ministry of Social Affairs
FGD	Focus group discussion	**MoU**	Memorandum of Understanding
FS	Field survey	**NGO**	Non-governmental organization
GoL	Government of Lebanon	**PHCC**	Primary Healthcare Centre
HRW	Human Rights Watch	**PLO**	Palestinian Liberation Organization
ICMPD	International Centre for Migration Policy Development	**PRL**	Palestine refugees in Lebanon
		PRS	Palestine refugees from Syria
ILO	International Labour Organization	**SDC**	Social Development Centre
IYCF	Infant and young child feeding	**UNDP**	United Nations Development Programme
KII	Key informant interview	**UN-Habitat**	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
MDWs	Migrant domestic workers	**UNHCR**	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
MoIM	Ministry of Interior and Municipalities	**UNRWA**	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
MoL	Ministry of Labour		

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This project is the research component of a wide Mediterranean City-to-City Migration Project led by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), aimed at contributing to improved migration governance at city level in Europe and the Southern Mediterranean, including Amman, Beirut, Lisbon, Lyon, Madrid, Turin, Tangiers, Tunis and Vienna.

A desk-based literature review on the history surrounding migrant influxes to Beirut shows that there is a wider range of migratory backgrounds that combine and interact in Lebanese cities, namely Beirut. Here, the term Beirut Municipality refers to a 21 km² administrative unit at the core of a much larger 111 km² continuously built-up area of 31 municipalities, which constitutes the city of Beirut. To create a better understanding of how migration is inserted into the urban fabric of Beirut Municipality, this profile makes usage of three case studies; the three neighbourhoods of Arab El-Maslakh, Daouk Ghawash and Karm El-Zeitoun. Each neighbourhood is inhabited by a mix of host and migrant communities, as identified during a population count by UN-Habitat.

Municipalities can play a key role in targeting the improvement of living conditions of migrant populations in the city; however, they are challenged by the lack of precise data and specific knowledge of tools that can address the needs of such a diverse group of demographic and migration backgrounds. On the short term, this profile provides the municipality with supplementary visual data and maps on migration, and on the long term, such data could inform policies through the local Beirut administration, which would be effective in reaching communities or groups that are currently being left behind due to their particular or special needs.

This scoping study visualizes migration movements in terms of population and cohorts in the three neighbourhoods; it can be stated that the Syrian cohort comprises the largest migrant population as a percentage of the three neighbourhoods' total population. Of the remainder, the Bangladeshi, Ethiopian and Palestinian cohorts are the largest groups (with varying representation across the neighbourhoods). A secondary analysis on the migration policy framework in Lebanon highlights key challenges that are derived from this framework among the Palestinian and Syrian cohorts.

Besides mapping of the identified migrants in the three neighbourhoods in terms of population, cohort and historical waves of migration, supplementary data to the migration profile was collected in order to disaggregated by the selected neighbourhoods. In addition, mapping of the key issues related to housing (typology, occupancy), migrant economies and service delivery to migrants—together with focus group discussions (FGDs) and key informant interviews (KIIs)—revealed key areas of concern. These issues included the following: involvement of residents in local decision-making, need for upgrading the direct living environment in terms of its infrastructural and public services, and need for improving safety and security in all three neighbourhoods (the latter more specifically in Daouk Ghawash). Addressing these areas of concern may additionally provide potential to improve inhabitants' sense of belonging to their neighbourhood.

This UN-Habitat Migration Profile provides an introduction to migration challenges in Beirut. While only focusing on a snapshot of immigration rather than emigration in the city, the profile aims to improve our understanding of challenges in relation to migrants in Beirut (population density, eviction threats, racial harassment, lack of affordability, etc.). The profile offers new evidence on the types of vulnerabilities facing migrants in contrasting neighbourhoods in Beirut Municipality. This may serve to highlight aspects of the nature and urgency of challenges facing migrants as a basis for considering their role in the development of the city.

PURPOSE OF THE REPORT

A. Pilot Project Background

Internal and international migration movements in the greater Mediterranean region have a direct and long-lasting impact on the development of urban areas in the region, as these are often the actual destinations of migrant populations. In order to maximize the social and economic development potential of these migrant populations, cities need effective migration governance capacities, particularly in view of the provision of access to rights and services.

Ìn this context, the Mediterranean City-to-City Migration Project aims at contributing to improved migration governance at city level in a network of cities in Europe and in the Southern Mediterranean region. The project is implemented by a consortium led by ICMPD in partnership with the United Cities and Local Governments Network (UCLG) and the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat), and with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as associate partner, in the framework of the Dialogue on Mediterranean Transit Migration (MTM). The city network is composed of the cities of Amman, Beirut, Lisbon, Lyon, Madrid, Tangiers, Turin, Tunis and Vienna.

Project activities are grouped in a dialogue component, which facilitates the exchange of experiences and policy options among the cities: a research component, which takes stock of the migration situation in the participating cities; and an action-oriented component, which produces a toolkit compiling policy options for migration governance at local level, and offers pilot projects in the southern cities participating in the project.

As an outcome of the pilot projects, the participating southern cities will benefit from improved technical expertise and concrete instruments to improve local migration governance in the respective city. Pilot projects will support the Southern Mediterranean participating cities in taking first steps

of concrete action towards improved migration governance at city level, focusing on a specific need outlined in the City Migration Profiles and City Priority Papers identified through the thematic peer-to-peer meetings and specifically requested by the participating city. The relevant city will steer the process by defining in a short proposal the type of support needed, in line with the priorities identified in the City Priority Papers. Ideas for possible action may also be further discussed at the occasion of the thematic peer-to-peer meetings to seek the input of other cities in the network. Support will include activities as needed, such as expert exchanges, awareness-raising campaigns, migrant information and help desks, or migrant counselling.

B. Beirut Municipality

This scoping study aims to provide a brief introduction to migratory challenges in Beirut Municipality, using three case neighbourhood studies, rather than providing a comprehensive municipality review. Beirut Municipality is a 21 km^2 administrative unit at the core of a much larger 111 km^2 continuously built-up area of 31 municipalities that constitutes the city of Beirut. Also, this study focuses on immigration rather than emigration. This document develops an understanding of migration policies and the mainstreaming of migration into development plans in Beirut.

Three neighbourhoods were selected: Arab El-Maslakh, Daouk Ghawash and Karm El-Zeitoun. Selection was based on discussions between Beirut Municipality and UN-Habitat to identify locations with relatively large percentages of migrant populations.

This report also provides a framework for bringing existing information from different sources together in a structured manner at both national and municipal levels. It intends to strengthen the knowledge base and can support evidence-based migration policy making. UN-Habitat advocates for the value of that accurate information in supporting an informed debate on migration-related topics.

Migration is a key governance area that requires policy coherence and coordination mechanisms at the central, local and regional levels to foster social cohesion and sustainable urban development. UN-Habitat promotes a holistic and rights-based approach to migration policies. It seeks to promote positive values, conceptions and principles in the context of the migration debate and policy development, including through the careful use of terminology.

©Photo: UN-Habitat (2018), Arab El-Maslakh

©Photo: UN-Habitat (2018), Daouk Ghawash

©Photo: UN-Habitat (2018), Karm El-Zeitoun

DEFINITION & TYPES OF MIGRATION

Migration transcends boundaries between cultures, languages, cultures, ethnic groups, and nation states. This ongoing process of the movement of individuals affects even those who do not migrate. Definitions of migration and migratory events vary along such dimensions as relation to place of birth, citizenship, place of residence and duration of stay. Also, technical definitions, concepts and categories of migrants and migration are often informed by legal, political, geographic, temporal, methodological and other factors (IOM, 2018a). According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM, 2018b), a migrant refers to "any person who is moving or has moved across an international border or within a State away from his/her habitual place of residence, regardless of (1) the person's legal status; (2) whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary; (3) what the causes for the movement are; or (4) what the length of the stay is". This report makes use of the IOM definition to focus on immigration to Beirut rather than emigration trends in the city.

When referring to international migration, international reports commonly take into consideration the movements of refugees and asylum seekers. Thus, the terms "refugees" and "migrants" are often used interchangeably, with migration becoming an "umbrella term". However, important legal differences exist between these two terms. Refugees are defined and protected under the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol (neither of which have been signed by Lebanon), as well as regional legal instruments, such as the 1969 Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, which form the most important documents in international refugee protection. A universally accepted definition that is incorporated in a legal framework does not exist for migrants (UNHCR, 2016a).

Another term is "forced migration", referring to various kinds of displacement or involuntary movement across both international borders and within a single country. However, similar to the word "migration" and contrary to the term "refugees", the concept of "forced migration" is not guided by a legal framework and agreed-upon definition that enjoys international recognition. Hence, the preferred practice by UNHCR is to refer to groups of people travelling in mixed movements as "refugees and migrants". This is the best way to acknowledge that people on the move have human rights that should be respected, protected and fulfilled; and that refugees and asylum seekers have specific needs and rights that are protected by a particular legal framework (UNHCR, 2016a).

The following migration-related concepts have emerged over time and are commonly used:

Labour migrants: Individuals that move away from their country of origin to another country, or within their country—typically from rural to urban areas—with the purpose of seeking work (UN-Habitat and Ford Foundation, 2018).

Temporary labour migrants (also known as guest workers or overseas contract workers): Individuals that migrate for a limited period of time with the purpose of seeking labour opportunities.

Refugees: Individuals fleeing from their country to another country due to internal conflict, foreign aggression, occupation, violence, fear and/or other disturbing events that threatened them and/or interrupted the public order (UN-Habitat and Ford Foundation, 2018).

Asylum seekers: Individuals that have applied for a refugee status under relevant (inter)national instruments, and are awaiting the decision of their application, after they fled or following their arrival in a country different than theirs. According to Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, everyone has the right to seek and enjoy asylum (UNHCR, 2016a).

Internally displaced persons (IDPs): Individuals that were forced to leave or flee from their place of residence without crossing an internationally recognized state border, due to natural or human-made disasters, generalized violence, conflicts and human rights violations as well as those displaced due to climate change and/or development projects (UN-Habitat and Ford Foundation, 2018).

Crisis-displaced people: International migrants that are displaced within a country, or forced to flee to a third country, or return to their own country (returnees) due to human-made disasters as well as conflict in their countries of residence and work (UN-Habitat and Ford Foundation, 2018).

Gentrified or expelled people: Individuals that do not fall under traditional categories of migrants, refugees or IDPs and that are displaced from their land, home or place of residence due to land-grabbing deals, large infrastructure projects, urban-renewal programmes and/or market forces and powerful groups (UN-Habitat and Ford Foundation, 2018).

Family members (or family-reunion/-reunification migrants): Individuals that reunify with family members that previously entered an immigration destination under one of the above-mentioned categories.

Forced migration: Individuals (including refugees and asylum seekers) forced to move due to external factors, such as environmental disasters or development projects. This type of migration displays characteristics similar to displacement.

Highly skilled and business migrants: Individuals with certain qualifications, such as managers, executives, professionals, technicians, etc. Highly skilled and business migrants aim for employment through international labour markets with a scarcity of certain skills. In these cases, various countries have tailored "skilled and business migration" programmes to encourage the migration of this specific group to their respective countries.

Irre migrants (or undocumented/illegal migrants): Individuals entering a country without having the required identification documents and permits. This form of migration mostly take place to seek employment opportunities.

Return migrants: Individuals returning to their countries of origin after having resided in another country.

CONTEXT

Since the beginning of the 20th Century, multiple waves of immigration have taken place to Beirut, resulting in demographic changes that interplayed with the urban development of the city and its hinterlands. Reliable figures for these population movements are however absent. Concentrations of immigrants, including refugees, are found within and outside the municipal borders of Beirut. Multiple factors have led to this migratory pattern, from civil and international wars and social conflicts to economic crises.

Following World War I, Lebanon witnessed a wave of incoming Armenian refugees, of whom a large proportion settled in camps that have turned into permanent settlements. Regional wars brought refugees from Turkey (Kurds), Syria (Christians), and Iraq (Assyrians) since that time. Incoming migrants and refugees have progressively turned their temporary settlements and camps into permanent structures. Currently, these permanent structures are accommodating migrant labourers from various countries, most notably Iraq and Syria.

Following the declaration of the State of Israel in 1948, over 100,000 Palestine refugees arrived in Lebanon, settling in refugee camps. Palestinians first settled in temporary camps in Qarantina and later established alternative camps on rented private properties. Figures from July 2014 suggested that 53 percent of a total of 449,957 registered Palestine refugees live in the 12 recognized refugee camps located across Lebanon. However, recent figures estimate the total to be much lower at 174,422 (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2018). Living conditions in Lebanon's Palestinian refugee camps and out-of-camp Palestinian concentration are critical due to constrained access to livelihoods, poor infrastructure, lack of basic services and sanitation.

In the 1950s, Beirut witnessed population growth partly as a result of rural-to-urban migration, with Lebanese families leaving their villages to seek employment in the city. These new settlers acquired land and built houses. This contributed to the emergence of informal settlements, mainly on the peripheries of the city. At the same time, the city received a wave of economic and political migrants from Syria and Egypt that settled in the suburbs. Syrian migration to Lebanon, which continues today—albeit triggered by different reasons—supplies the main labour force in certain sectors, namely the industrial, agricultural and construction sectors.

The Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990) resulted in the internal displacement of Lebanese communities due to the establishment of a buffer zone or demarcation line in Beirut ("Green Line"), dividing the city into a western zone with Muslim factions and an eastern zone with Christian factions. Subsequently, these displacement processes led to the economic decline of migrant populations, which continues to be manifested in today's post-war dynamics. Additionally, the Israeli invasion of 1978 and the 2006 Lebanon War fuelled rural-urban migration from the south of Lebanon and the Bekaa into Beirut and its suburbs. This flow triggered the development and transformation of most empty spaces around the city.

Slums hosting migrants grew significantly in size after the end of the civil war, with migrants occupying buildings and entire neighbourhoods. Consequently, they became integrated into the urban fabric of Beirut. In addition, Lebanon has seen return migration of diasporans after the end of the civil war. Official figures on return migration to Lebanon after the end of the civil war remain unavailable and vary from close to half a million based on sociological research of the Lebanese authorities in 2004 to a loosely stated "low number" estimated by international scholars (Stamm, 2006). The contradiction in these figures might be partially explained by outward movements of re-emigration caused by failure of reintegration efforts. Demographic shifts have also been seen due to the post-war large-scale reconstruction boom, with more migrants arriving in Beirut from Syria, Egypt and other Asian and African countries. This dynamic influenced the range of sectors made open to immigrant workers by the Government of Lebanon (GoL).

Almost all territories were rendered open to construction (coastal, agricultural, natural, historic city centres), which invited investors and real estate promoters. Strategically unplanned development has negatively affected Lebanon's urban and rural landscape. This has partly contributed to a gentrification process in Beirut that, differing from perceived common norms of gentrification in Europe and North America, created a new wave of delocalization or displacement and is weakening ties between local cultural identity and place (Trovato, et al, 2016).

Finally, the Syrian crisis from 2011 has resulted in high numbers of displaced people, with Lebanon hosting the highest number of refugees per capita in the world. In contrast to Jordan and Turkey, Lebanon applied a "no-camp" policy with regard to the settlement of Syrian refugees in the country. Hence, Syrian refugees mostly settled within the low-cost residential areas of urban and rural host communities. According to UNHCR figures of February 2018 (UNCHR, 2018), 20,258 Syrian refugees are registered to Beirut Municipality. However, data on Syrian refugees is weak for several reasons: there is no clear understanding on their place of residence relative to their place of registration; at the GoL's instruction, UNHCR stopped registering Syrians as refugees in May 2015; and the number of unregistered refugees before or after that point is unknown.

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©Photo: UN-Habitat (2018), Daouk Ghawash

©Photo: UN-Habitat (2018), Karm El-Zeitoun

A. Current Migration Trends in the Arab Region

Jordan and Lebanon are currently among the host countries with the highest numbers of refugees registered by the UNHCR, with Lebanon being the third largest refugee-hosting country in the world. Migratory flows in the Arab region have been triggered by a more complex set of factors than those that can be attributed to conflict and war. Key triggers, as outlined by UN-Habitat and the Ford Foundation (2018), include:

- A lack of educational and employment opportunities, weak economies, worsening quality of life, rising living expenses, a lack of well-targeted social protection programmes, unequal distribution of public resources, rural-urban disparities in services and opportunities, governance structures that reinforce social exclusion and discrimination, and repression of freedoms.

- A loss of habitat due to human-made and environmental factors stemming from exploitation of natural resources, sales and privatization of public assets, land grabs, loss of fertile land, food insecurity, governmental neglect, massive infrastructure projects and gentrification-induced displacement.

There are three broad interrelated types of migration in the Arab region today (UN-Habitat and Ford Foundation, 2018):

- **Labour migration** (UN-Habitat and Ford Foundation, 2018, p. 12): It refers "to the often-temporary movement (whether regular or irregular) of individuals at working age for the purpose of employment and better livelihood and economic opportunities". In the Arab region, this form of migration targets Gulf Cooperation Council countries, which are rich in natural resources and have a relatively small local labour force. Employers in these countries have thus turned to both unskilled and skilled international workers. These workers come predominantly from low- and middle-income countries from such regions as South Asia, South-East Asia and the Horn of Africa. Jordan and Lebanon send out skilled migrants and receive less skilled ones; hence, they are countries of origin of and destination for migrant workers.

- **Forced migration** (UN-Habitat and Ford Foundation, 2018, p. 12): It refers "to forced population movements (whether across borders or within the same country) caused by ongoing armed conflicts, unresolved crises, life-threatening events; natural and human-made disasters, and development-induced displacements". The Arab region mostly experiences large-scale and protracted forced population movements. Specifically, the protracted crises in both Iraq and Syria have led to high numbers of IDPs and refugees. In addition, high levels of forced displacement have been fuelled by conflicts in Libya, Sudan and Yemen, and large-scale migratory flows have been triggered by sustained conflict in combination with drought and famine in Somalia.

- **Mixed migration** (UN-Habitat and Ford Foundation, 2018, p. 12): It refers "to complex large-scale irregular cross-border movements of migrants (refugees, asylum seekers, migrant workers and others) who fled their countries—often with the help of human traffickers—in search of international protection or economic opportunities, mainly in Europe". Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia and Yemen are primary mixed-migration routes stemming from or passing through the region. The Arab region has sending, transit and receiving countries.

B. Overview of Migrant Challenges in the Arab Region

The main challenges arising from migratory flows in the Arab region can be divided into the following categories (UN-Habitat and Ford Foundation, 2018):

- **Physical and environmental challenges** associated with exacerbated pressure on urban service delivery, including infrastructure, affordable housing, public transportation systems, increased urban demand for land, combined with a lack of public space, availability of health and educational facilities, depletion of natural resources and pollution.

- **Socioeconomic challenges that** stem from high unemployment levels (especially among women and youth) in the context of fragile labour markets and high urban poverty rates. This can result in competition over job opportunities (especially in seasonal and informal jobs) between host and migrant communities.

- **Urban-governance and fiscal challenges** linked to centralized decision-making and weak local institutions that lack the financial and administrative capacity to accompany city growth with sustained urban security and social cohesion. Strained municipal budgets limit the ability of local authorities to increase their funds to address urban challenges.

C. Syrian & Palestinian Migrant Challenges in Lebanon

Besides being a migrant-sending country, Lebanon is a major receiver of migrants. It has received migrants from Asia, Africa and Lebanon's neighbouring region—predominantly Syria—since the 1990s. Labour migration is controlled; foreign workers must have a sponsor that is a resident of Lebanon in order to obtain a residence permit, a system known as "*Kafala*". This sponsor/employer can apply for the permit and pays for the fees when it is permissible for non-Lebanese workers to be involved in the respective activity (see III. III [B]). Both Arab and non-Arab workers are engaged in economic activities without a work permit in the informal sector, mostly in agricultural, construction, and domestic and cleaning services (De Bel-Air, 2017).

Palestinians and Syrians are among the biggest refugee and migrant groups in Lebanon. In addition, an estimated 10,000 Iraqi refugees were registered between 2003 and 2011 (Dorai and Hiley, 2013). Besides these communities, refugees in Lebanon stem from Ethiopia, Sudan and Yemen, in addition to smaller numbers from various other African, Arab and Asian countries (De Bel-Air, 2017).

Migrant & Displaced Syrians

Prior to the Syrian crisis, Lebanon was a major destination for Syrian workers, who carried out economic activities in the construction and agricultural sectors and were involved in other low-skilled activities. It has been argued that among current Syrian refugees in Lebanon, there is a high number of Syrian labourers that could not return home and brought their families to the country because of the outbreak of the Syrian crisis. Difficulties arose in assessing available figures of Syrians in Lebanon that distinguish between different types of migrants (e.g. refugees, labourers, undocumented refugees) (De Bel-Air, 2017).

Syrians who arrived in Lebanon due to the Syrian crisis are not officially recognized as refugees by the Lebanese government as Lebanon is not signatory to the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention. Also, Syrians fall outside the scope of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that Lebanon signed with UNHCR in 2003. The GoL refers to Syrians as "displaced", and has stopped registering them since January 2015 according to domestic laws and regulations (UN-Habitat and Ford Foundation, 2018).

The GoL has however kept its borders open to the influx of refugees and has granted Syrians access to education and health facilities. The GoL has hereby played an active role in facilitating and coordinating the humanitarian response (UNHCR, 2014). New entry and exit regulations have applied since 2014, and new residency rules were introduced in 2015. Short-term visas are given to Syrian nationals that fall under specific categories: tourism, work, shopping and transit. When falling under these categories, a visa requires sponsorship by a Lebanese citizen. Since 2015, a visa can be given to displaced people under exceptional circumstances, as decided by the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA). Since May 2015, the registration of Syrian refugees by UNCHR has been suspended. The legal residency renewal for refugees costs USD 200 per family member (aged above 15) and requires a pledge to abstain from work, and proof of financial means (De Bel-Air, 2017). According to ICMPD (2017), there are currently no admitted entrance categories for those individuals that fled violence, persecution or armed conflict. However, individuals can enter under: (1) "the limited humanitarian exceptions criteria"; and (2) the category of "displaced persons" who are required to comply with the following (non-exhaustive) regulations:

1. **Tourism**: It is required to have written confirmation of a hotel reservation and amount of money proportional to the duration of stay in Lebanon. An entry visa is given for the duration of the reservation and can be renewed for a maximum of one month.

2. **Work visit**: This visa is only granted to professionals, business or religious persons for business visits not exceeding one month. Confirmation by a Lebanese company is required.

3. **Property owner**: If a person owns property in Lebanon, he/she will receive a six-month residency permit, renewable for six additional months. Under this category, family members can visit that person for a maximum of two weeks.

4. **Tenant**: If a person has a lease agreement registered with the respective municipality and the Directorate General of General Security (DGSG), and proof of financial means (i.e. bank account), he/she will get a six-month residency permit, renewable for the duration of the lease. The registration of the lease agreement with the DGSG is valid for three months. Some family members can visit the permit holder for a maximum of two weeks.

Box 1. Compliance regulation for displaced persons (ICMPD, 2017)

Palestinian Refugees

Palestine refugees in Lebanon (PRL) can be categorized into four main groups, based on their legal status and registration with United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA):

• "Registered" refugees ("Palestinian refugees"), who are registered with UNRWA and the Lebanese authorities/General Directorate of Political Affairs and Refugees (DPAR) at the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities (MoIM).

• "Non-registered" Palestinian refugees, who are not registered with UNRWA, but are registered with the Lebanese authorities/ DPAR.

• "Non-ID" Palestinian refugees, who are registered neither with UNRWA nor with the Lebanese authorities/DPAR.

• Palestine refugees from Syria (PRS), who have arrived in Lebanon since 2011.[1]

Lebanon has 12 recognized Palestinian refugee camps that are controlled by Palestinian factions. Based on the 1987 abrogation of the 1969 Cairo Agreement between the Lebanese government and the Palestinian leadership, the Lebanese army would refrain from entering the Palestinian refugee camps. Currently, Palestinian refugees are dependent on the provision of social services by UNRWA, including public education and public healthcare. The arrival of large numbers of Syrians and PRS has further overstretched these services (UNHCR, 2016b).

In 2008, non-ID Palestinian refugees were given temporary ID cards after an agreement between the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the GoL (LPDC, 2018). The situation of (non-ID) Palestinian refugees limits their opportunity to reach basic services and to exercise their human rights (UNHCR, 2016b). Similarly, this applies to those refugees that have become de facto irregular and undocumented; the MoU signed between UNHCR and the Lebanese government in 2003 grants no guarantees to refugees that arrived before 2003, or who were rejected by UNHCR.

OVERVIEW OF THE THREE NEIGHBOURHOODS IN BEIRUT MUNICIPALITY

Map 1. Location of the three neighbourhoods in Beirut Municipality

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[1] For information on the situation of PRS, see paragraphs 21 and 22 in UNHCR (2015).

A. Location & Size of Neighbourhoods

Arab El-Maslakh

©Photo: UN-Habitat (2018), Industrial zone, Arab El-Maslakh

©Photo: UN-Habitat (2018), Unused plot, Arab El-Maslakh

Map 2. Arab El-Maslakh neighbourhood location

Location: Arab El-Maslakh is in North-East Beirut, on a landfilled area that is closely located to the port and to industrial areas. The area consists of four blocks that are currently isolated within a larger area with industries and unused plots. This neighbourhood is located in a "lost area" separated from the main parts of the city by a main highway to the south, Beirut River to the east, the sea and port to

the north, and a military compound separating the area from the port to the west.

Size: It is a small neighbourhood (0.045 km²) with four main blocks, each around 200 m x 200 m—two to the north, and two to the south-west. Spatial analysis suggests that the neighbourhood used to be la e two blocks to the south-west display

slightly more homogeneous urban characteristics than the two blocks to the north. Also, two blocks to the south-east are not part of the residential neighbourhood, as they consist of office/industrial buildings.

Daouk Ghawash

©Photo: UN-Habitat (2017), Daouk Ghawash

Map 3. Daouk Ghawash neighbourhood location

Location: Daouk Ghawash is located in South Beirut. This neighbourhood is the least constructed area of the larger Sabra area. Sabra consists of three parts: the western part (towards the stadium),

mainly hosting Lebanese communities; a predominantly Palestinian area towards the central Sabra Market; and the intermediate part with fewer houses.

Size: The neighbourhood covers a total of 0.035 km².

Karm El-Zeitoun

Map 4. Karm El-Zeitoun neighbourhood location

©Photo: UN-Habitat (2017), Karm El-Zeitoun

Location: Karm El-Zeitoun is located on the edge of the eastern boundary of Beirut, where the Achrafieh Hill drops to the Beirut River valley. This area is well defined towards the east, south and north by steep slopes. A freeway exists in its northern part, and a small stripe of unused land and new industrial land is found in the eastern part. Newer, higher residential buildings can be found in the southern part, which is separated from other parts of the neighbourhood by a wider street.

Size: The neighbourhood covers a total of 0.079 km^2.

©Photo: UN-Habitat (2017), Arab El-Maslakh

©Photo: UN-Habitat (2017), Daouk Ghawash

©Photo: UN-Habitat (2017), Karm El-Zeitoun

B. History of Neighbourhoods

Arab El-Maslakh

The Qarantina and El-Maslakh area used to be inhabited by Shiites, Kurds and Palestinians (Johnson, 1986). Kurds that arrived in Lebanon between the 1920s and 1960s settled in low-income areas in Beirut—Ayn El-Mreisseh, El-Basta, Bourj El-Barajneh, the downtown sector, Furn El-Shubbak, Raml El-Zarif, and Zukak El-Blat and Qarantina/Arab El-Maslakh area. The majority of these migrants had previous labour skills in the agricultural sector, with very little educational experience. The Kurds first entered the labour market working as unskilled labourers, as

porters and box manufacturers in the vegetable market that was located in downtown Beirut. They became gradually involved in other economic activities as merchants, tailors, painters, carpenters, auto mechanics, etc. (Meho and Kawtharani, 1995).

Arab El-Maslakh and Qarantina were characterized as the most deprived areas around Beirut in 1975. The two areas had no running water and electricity, with the majority (85 percent) of their inhabitants living in tin huts that on average accommodated 8–14 persons each

(Kazziha, 2015). Syrians who arrived prior to the Syrian crisis settled in the neighbourhood of Arab El-Maslakh due to its proximity to the port, fish market, and construction sites in the Beirut Central District, which provided job opportunities, as mentioned during FGDs in 2017. Syrians who arrived since the Syrian crisis (2011), provided similar reasons for residing in Arab El-Maslakh area. In addition, migrants of other nationalities joined their family members who were working and living in the Arab El-Maslakh area since the 1990s.

Daouk Ghawash

The Daouk and Ghawash neighbourhood is located within the boundaries of Beirut Municipality, in the area of Sabra, which is situated in the eastern part of Beirut. The neighbourhood consists of two so-called "areas outside camps" (Abd-Al-Rhman, 2016), namely Daouk and Ghawash. Daouk and Ghawash are located outside the Sabra area's Shatila Palestinian refugee camp, with Ghawash being south of the camp, making it an Adjacent Area[2]. Situated to the west of Ghawash, Daouk was formed in 1948. This was the first year of the Palestinian exodus, when Palestinians sought refuge in Daouk, on lands owned by the Daouk family, after being expelled from their

homeland. Daouk Ghawash dates to the mid- and late-1960s, borrowing its name in 1978 from the first martyr that resided in Ghawash and who was killed during the Lebanese Civil War.

The formation of Ghawash occurred when Palestinian refugees took advantage of the rise of power of the PLO in West Beirut, illegally settling on public lands owned by the GoL, while seeking an area with affordable rents. Ghawash was first formed as one of the main military bases of the PLO. It expanded by hosting many Lebanese and Palestinian families, especially refugees from the Shatila Camp and the adjacent Sabra area during the civil war (UNDP and UN-

Habitat, 2014). The neighbourhood of Daouk Ghawash became a direct extension of the Sabra area's Shatila Palestinian refugee camp and grew during the 1960s.

Currently, the neighbourhood of Daouk Ghawash hosts families from East Asia (particularly from Bangladesh and Sri Lanka), as well as Palestinian and Syrian families. This is the result of more affordable livelihood costs compared to other areas in Beirut, including lower housing rental costs (close to prices in the Palestinian refugee camps), and cheaper goods and daily purchases (Abd-Al-Rhman, 2016).

Karm El-Zeitoun

Three groups of camps emerged in Beirut between 1920 and 1952. This was the direct result of the influx of Armenians, Syriacs and Palestinians into Beirut because of massacres in their areas of origin. After the arrival of 10,500 Armenians in Beirut in 1922, the establishment of the Medawar Camp in Qarantina created the first slum in modern Beirut. The Red Cross, the League of Nations and the French Mandate authorities established tents on empty terrains— most probably public—located in the Medawar area in the north-east of Beirut, close to the port (Keuroghlian 1970).

Armenian associations that were seeking disengagement from the camp proposed more permanent solutions instead of the camp in 1926 with the help of Mandate authorities. This resulted in the gradual relocation of Armenian refugees from the Qarantina area to Bourj Hammoud and Khalil Badawi, Karm El-Zeitoun, and other low-income neighbourhoods of the city. This marked the largest extension of the camp areas in the 1930s. These new areas were the most popular Armenian neighbourhoods at the time, and living conditions improved as these locations became consolidated over

time. New extensions emerged to the north of Karm El-Zeitoun with the arrival of Armenians from the Sanjak of Alexandretta (now Hatay Province in Turkey) and other areas of Syria in 1939 (Fawaz and Peillen, 2003).

Extensions of Armenian neighbourhoods towards Beirut's eastern industrial zone in the 1930s were first triggered by the departure of Armenians from Qarantina (Nasr and Nasr, 1976). These population movements were influenced by the demand for Armenian artisan experience that could be locally exploited, combined with the

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[2] These are concentrations of Palestinian refugees that are mainly located on the external peripheries of formal Palestinian camps.

establishment and growth of industrial zones at the boundaries of the city of Beirut. This attracted rural migrants to Karm El-Zeitoun area (Boudjikanian, 1982). The establishment of Karm El-Zeitoun in the 1930s was influenced by this type of rural-urban migration.

By 1928, 160 housing units had been built on one of the hills of Achrafieh, Karm El-Zeitoun, as well as in Getaoui, with the help of international and Armenian associations. An additional 550 units were planned for Karm El-Zeitoun. The latter gradually became a housing area with workers from various backgrounds (e.g. Lebanese, Syriac, Armenian) residing in the neighbourhood.

MIGRATION GOVERNANCE

Migration policies in Lebanon have been sidelined partly because of the country's entanglement in (ongoing) conflicts in the region. The most important governmental actors that are concerned with inward migration are the Ministry of Labour (MoL), MoSA, and MoIM—mainly the DGSG (Migration Policy Centre, 2013). Their role is to regulate the admission of foreign nationals and migrant workers, and the provision of residency and work permits. They are responsible for mitigating irregular and transit immigration in collaboration with international organizations (e.g. IOM), preventing and addressing human trafficking, and identifying refugees. Lebanon cooperates with several international organizations to tackle migration challenges in the country, including IOM, the International Labour Organization (ILO), UNHCR and the Arab League, among others. In addition, Lebanon has signed bilateral agreements with various countries to foster cooperation on migration-related topics.

The regulatory framework for migration in Lebanon consists of broader national laws, including legislation regarding the entry, stay and exit of foreign nationals, which was adopted in 1962, and the 1925 nationality law, which was last amended in 1960. The Anti-Trafficking Law No. 164 of 2011 constitutes the latest addition to migration-related legislation. Legislation differentiates between workers and nationalities.

A brief study of various aspects of migration in Lebanon conducted by the European Migration Policy Centre (2013) indicates that migration-related matters are regulated on a national level through the following legislation:

2011: Anti-Trafficking Law No. 164.

2010: Decree No. 4186, amending Decree No. 10188 of 28 July 1962 on the implementation of the law regulating the entry of foreigners into Lebanon, their stay and their exit from the country.

2010: Law No. 129, amending Article 59 of the Labor Code of 1946.

2008: Parliamentary Elections Law No. 25.

1995: Decision No. 621/1 on occupations reserved to Lebanese nationals.

1964: By-Law No. 1 7561 regulating the work of foreigners in Lebanon and its amendment.

1962: Law Regulating the Entry of Foreign Nationals into, Their Residence in and Their Departure from Lebanon.

1962: Law No. 320 on the control of entry and exit from Lebanese border posts.

1925: Decree No. 15 on Lebanese Nationality, last modified by Law of 11 January 1960.

Box 2. Migration-related legislation in Lebanon (Migration Policy Centre, 2013)

Lebanon has also signed different bilateral and international agreements on irregular migration and organized crime related to human trafficking and illegal migration, including the following:

- Agreements on the readmission of illegal migrants with Romania (2002), Bulgaria (2002), Cyprus (2003) and Switzerland (2006).

- Cooperation agreements against organized crime with Bulgaria (2002) and Cyprus (2004).

- The European Union–Lebanon Association Agreement (2002) that addresses the issue of cooperation to prevent and control illegal migration, including the readmission of illegal migrants.

- The three Palermo protocols that were adopted by the United Nations to supplement the 2000 Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, two of which are particularly relevant for the purposes of this report: The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children; and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air (Migration Policy Centre, 2013).

In terms of other international legal instruments affecting the management of migration, Lebanon has not signed neither the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees nor its 1967 Protocol. Also, Lebanon has not signed the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, which was adopted by the United Nations in 1990. Another relevant international agreement not signed by Lebanon is the Convention Concerning Decent Work for Domestic Workers, adopted by the ILO in 2011.

There is a lack of regulatory frameworks that directly target migrant workers in Lebanon. The socioeconomic status and inherent rights of migrant workers are confined

to changing public policies. Moreover, (inter)national organizations have increasingly sought to raise awareness on the rights of migrant domestic workers (MDWs) in Lebanon. To this aim, Human Rights Watch (HRW) drafted a list of recommendations for various governmental institutions in 2013. It urged governmental actors to elaborate on labour protections for MDWs in national legislation and to define the nature and conditions of domestic work (e.g. working hours, living accommodations, food provision, etc.). HRW also called for an amendment of the standard employment contracts for MDWs to take into consideration the following: (1) recognizing an MDW's right to leave his/her employer's house during time off, and (2) addressing inequality between the MDW and his/her employer by basic means, such as the right of each party to break the contract. Moreover, the HRW report advised that the monitoring of employment agencies should be improved and the illegal practice of withholding MDWs' passports during employment should be prevented. Furthermore, there is a need to establish training programmes for immigration officials and police officers to identify and respond to cases of different types of abuse of MDWs at the working place (HRW, 2010).

NEIGHBOURHOOD MAPPING METHODOLOGY & CAVEATS

A literature review was conducted to analyse the (inter)national legislative and regulatory framework regarding migration. The study also entailed the collection and analysis of secondary data on migrant challenges in Lebanon in the context of broader challenges in the region. Difficulties arose especially from the availability and accessibility of secondary sources on current national regulations, which are embedded in a complex legislative framework.

In addition, the document made usage of both quantitative and qualitative research methods. Qualitative and quantitative data is gathered using systematic questionnaires and GIS-based mapping. Data was collected through a population count, field and household (HH) surveys, a series of focus group discussions (FGDs), and key informant interviews (KIIs)[3]. Data collection was done during October 2017 and focus group participants were selected taking into account such factors as age, gender and nationality. Throughout the data collection phase, a participatory approach was adopted that engaged local partners and other stakeholders. Respondents were assured of confidentiality in all cases.

Based on visual inspection and questionnaires, the field survey involved a comprehensive population count by residential unit stratified by nationality and age; assessments of building conditions and basic urban services; and documenting of open spaces in terms of extent as well as temporality and cohort-stratified usage.

Due to a lack of available and accessible data on national demographic trends in Lebanon, making comparisons across demographic figures is a complicated exercise. A population count was done for all three neighbourhoods, surveying the population by building. Thus, the presence of various nationalities and the distribution of host versus migrant communities could be assessed per building.

Next, a HH survey[4] was conducted during October 2017. It covered at least 50 percent of the households in buildings that were part of the population count. For the purposes of this study, the survey targeted exclusively migrant populations.

One KII and two FGDs were held in Arab El-Maslakh: One FGD with two participants of the Lebanese cohort, one FGD with nine participants of the Syrian cohort, and one KII with a political party representative. In Daouk Ghawash, 16 FGDs were held with members of both the Lebanese and non-Lebanese cohorts. In addition, as part of a neighbourhood-profiling exercise carried out in Daouk Ghawash in 2017, 14 KIIs were conducted with six health-service facilities and eight education-service providers (UN-Habitat and UNICEF Lebanon, forthcoming). Finally, four FGDs and four KIIs were held in the neighbourhood of Karm El-Zeitoun, including the following: One FGD with nine participants of the Bangladeshi cohort; one FGD with eight participants of the Ethiopian cohort; one FGD with eight participants of the Lebanese cohort; one FGD with nine participants of the Syrian cohort; and four KIIs with a health centre representative, a *mukhtar*, a political party representative and a social worker.

All KIIs and FGDs were conducted in Arabic. During both KIIs and FGDs, information on the purpose of the research was provided at the beginning of each session, and participants were given the opportunity to ask questions about this. The consent of all participants was secured before the FGDs and KIIs took place.

It is recognized that the findings of a study of this nature would be increasingly robust with larger numbers of interviewees, a point to bear in mind in its interpretation.

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[3] KIIs are qualitative in-depth interviews with people who know what is going on in the community. The purpose of KIIs was to collect information from a wide range of people with diverse backgrounds, nationalities, gender and age groups, including residents and representatives of political parties.

[4] HH surveys are conducted for a representative sample based on the comprehensive population count, proportionally stratified by nationality.

DEMOGRAPHY

A. Population per Neighbourhood

Arab El-Maslakh 1,491	Karm El-Zeitoun 1,052	Daouk Ghawash 3,846

Table 1. Population count in the three neighbourhoods – October 2017

Arab El-Maslakh

Figure 1. Population distribution by cohort in Arab El-Maslakh – October 2017

The October 2017 population survey suggests an all-cohort resident count of 1,491 in Arab El-Maslakh. The majority (60 percent) of the residents comprise migrant communities. The population distribution in the neighbourhood indicates that the majority of the inhabitants are of Syrian nationality (60 percent), followed by Lebanese (37 percent), who form the second largest cohort in the neighbourhood. Other cohorts constitute a far smaller proportion of the population; the Egyptian and Ethiopian cohorts combined comprise less than 1 percent of the total population.

Daouk Ghawash

Figure 2. Population distribution by cohort in Daouk Ghawash – October 2017

The population survey (October 2017) suggests an all-cohort resident count of 3,846 in Daouk Ghawash. The majority (79 percent) of the residents are migrants. The Syrian cohort is the largest one in Daouk Ghawash (51 percent), followed by PRL (23 percent) and the Lebanese (18 percent). Besides these cohorts, Bangladeshis, Egyptians, Jordanians, PRS, Sri Lankans and Sudanese were also found in the neighbourhood in 2017.

Karm El-Zeitoun


Figure 3. Population distribution by cohort in Karm El-Zeitoun – October 2017

The population survey of October 2017 suggests an all-cohort resident count of 1,052 in Karm El-Zeitoun. The neighbourhood is almost evenly shared by host (53 percent) and migrant (47 percent) communities. This even distribution might change in the future because of the current demographic trend in the neighbourhood, as indicated during FGDs; in the case of death or departure of a Lebanese family, their house commonly becomes inhabited by a non-Lebanese family.

The Karm El-Zeitoun population count of October 2017 indicates a heterogeneous living environment, where space is shared by multiple nationalities. The majority (55 percent) of the population is of Lebanese nationality. Syrians comprise the second largest cohort in the neighbourhood (15 percent), followed by Bangladeshis (10 percent) and Ethiopians (9 percent).

During an FGD with the Ethiopian cohort in 2017, the participants

revealed that the main reasons for settling in Karm El-Zeitoun were the existence of relatives in the neighbourhood and the area's proximity to working opportunities in Achrafieh. Housing is both rented and owned, with a fairly poor provision of services in the area (Fawaz and Peillen, 2003).

©Photo: UN-Habitat (2018), Arab El-Maslakh

©Photo: UN-Habitat (2017), Daouk Ghawash

©Photo: UN-Habitat (2018), Karm El-Zeitoun

HOUSING

A. Percentage of Migrants in Buildings

Arab El-Maslakh

Daouk Ghawash

Karm El-Zeitoun

Map 5 shows the percentage of migrants living in buildings within the boundaries of the three neighbourhoods. When compared to Arab El-Maslakh and Karm El-Zeitoun, Daouk Ghawash shows the highest density of migrants, also having the highest number of migrants living within the neighbourhood boundaries. In general, 75–100 percent of residents are migrants, with only a few buildings not having migrant residents. Karm El-Zeitoun has mixed inhabitancy, with ith some buildings housing mainly migrants, while others accommodating no migrants at all. Similarly, in Arab El-Maslakh, mixed inhabitancy can be found.

Percentage of migrants in buildings

- 0
- 1–12
- 13–24
- 25–49
- 50–74
- 75–100

Neighbourhood boundary

Surveyed area

Non-residential area/missing data

Map 5. Percentage of migrants in buildings in the three neighbourhoods

B. Type of Occupancy (Individual or Family) by Nationality

Arab El-Maslakh

Figure 4. Type of occupancy by nationality in Arab El-Maslakh – October 2017

When looking at the type of occupancy (in terms of whether individual or family) by nationality in Arab El-Maslakh in 2017, the overwhelming majority of the residential units (489 out of 507 units) among the Lebanese cohort were shared by family members. Among the Syrian cohort, 515 residential units were shared and 301 were inhabited by individuals.

©Photo: UN-Habitat (2018), Arab El-Maslakh

Daouk Ghawash

No data was collected on type of occupancy by nationality in Daouk Ghawash.

Karm El-Zeitoun

Figure 5. Type of occupancy by nationality in Karm El-Zeitoun – October 2017

From those surveyed in the Karm El-Zeitoun neighbourhood, the Lebanese and the Syrians were the two main cohorts that lived in residential units as families. Specifically, from the 519 residential units occupied by Lebanese, 465 units were shared by family members, while 54 were inhabited by individuals. Among the Syrian cohort, 106 residential units were shared by families, whereas 33 units were inhabited by individuals. However, individual—rather than family—occupancy was more prevalent among the next two biggest cohorts in the neighbourhood: the Bangladeshi and the Ethiopian.

©Photo: UN-Habitat (2018), Karm El-Zeitoun

C. Population Distribution by Number of Occupants per Residential Unit

Arab El- Maslakh

The majority of the cohorts in Arab El-Maslakh inhabited residential units with four to six residents per unit. Compared to units inhabited by non-Lebanese, those occupied by Lebanese tended to contain a smaller number of residents. In 17 units among the Syrian cohort and 21 units among the Lebanese cohort, six residents shared their residential unit. In two Ethiopian cohort units, residential units housed three residents per unit.

Figure 6. Population distribution by number of occupants per residential unit in Arab El-Maslakh – October 2017

Daouk Ghawash

The majority of the Daouk Ghawash cohorts inhabited residential units with four to five residents per unit. Again, units occupied by Lebanese tended to contain a smaller number of residents, compared to those of non-Lebanese. The Syrian cohort comprises the largest cohort in the neighbourhood. In 296 units, the residential unit housed four residents; in 405 units, the unit was inhabited by five residents; and in 330 units, the unit had six residents.

Figure 7. Population distribution by number of occupants per residential unit in Daouk Ghawash – October 2017

Karm El-Zeitoun

The majority of the cohorts in the neighbourhood of Karm El-Zeitoun inhabited residential units with three residents per unit. Among the Syrian cohort, there were five residential units where one person lived in one residential unit, four units where two people lived in one residential unit, and 11 units where three people lived in one residential unit. In one case, 20 individuals of Bangladeshi nationality were sharing one residential unit.

Figure 8. Population distribution by number of occupants per residential unit in Karm El-Zeitoun – October 2017

D. Number of Individuals per Bedroom

Arab El-Maslakh

Figure 9. Number of individuals per bedroom in Arab El-Maslakh – October 2017

The majority of residential units in Arab El-Maslakh consist of two bedrooms. Most residential units of this size accommodate four individuals per bedroom. More specifically, in this type of residential unit, four individuals share a bedroom in 13 cases, 18 individuals share a bedroom in two cases, and eight individuals share a bedroom in four cases.

In the residential units that have three bedrooms, the bedrooms are inhabited by two residents per bedroom in 15 cases. In six cases, the bedrooms are inhabited by three individuals per bedroom. In 31 cases, the bedrooms are inhabited by one individual per bedroom, and in three cases, these bedrooms are inhabited by four residents per bedroom. Furthermore, in four cases, the living space is distributed among eight individuals per bedroom, totalling 32 residents in the residential unit.

Daouk Ghawash

Figure 10. Number of individuals per bedroom in Daouk Ghawash – October 2017

Most residential units in Daouk Ghawash consist of two to three bedrooms. In general, the living space in residential unit of these sizes is distributed among two to four individuals per bedroom.

Karm El-Zeitoun

Figure 11. Number of individuals per bedroom in Karm El-Zeitoun – October 2017

The vast majority of houses in Karm El-Zeitoun consist of one to three bedrooms. In most residential units with three bedrooms, the living space is used by one to two residents per bedroom. The bedrooms had two individuals per bedroom in 28 cases of three-bedroom units. In the same type of residential unit with three bedrooms, a living space distribution of one individual per bedroom is found among 55 cases. FGDs with migrants in Karm El-Zeitoun revealed that rental and other housing costs are commonly shared.

E. Eviction Threats

Arab El-Maslakh

No
Yes

26% (14)

74% (39)

Arab El-Maslakh reported a higher number of eviction threats (14 cases) over the six-month period preceding the October 2017 survey, when compared to the neighbourhood of Karm El-Zeitoun. Eviction is used as a threat when families are not paying rent. In general, it is perceived that non-Lebanese nationals move in these evicted apartments. Some of the evicted Syrian families have returned to Syria, as explained during FGDs held in 2017. During these FGDs, concerns were voiced regarding eviction patterns and rumours of possible large development plans. Also, members of the Lebanese cohort pointed out that they have been prohibited from rebuilding or rehabilitating damaged buildings after the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990).

Figure 12. Eviction threats in the last six months in Arab El-Maslakh – October 2017

Daouk Ghawash

No
Yes

5%
(9)

95% (168)

Daouk Ghawash witnessed nine eviction threats during the six months prior to the survey of October 2017.

During FGDs with PRS and Syrians, security threats were reported as the main reason for eviction.

Figure 13. Eviction threats in the last six months in Daouk Ghawash – October 2017

Karm El-Zeitoun

No
Yes

3%
(3)

97% (86)

In Karm El-Zeitoun, eviction threats impacted three households over the six months before the October 2017 survey. During FGDs with the Bangladeshi cohort in 2017, it was reported that in some cases the landowner evicted the residents from a unit to raise the rent.

Figure 14. Eviction threats in the last six months in Karm El-Zeitoun – October 2017

©Photo: UN-Habitat (2018), Arab El-Maslakh

©Photo: UN-Habitat (2018), Daouk Ghawash

©Photo: UN-Habitat (2018), Karm El-Zeitoun

ACCESS TO JOBS & SERVICES

A. Employment Rate

Arab El-Maslakh

Pie chart with segments:
- 4% — Number of employed under 18
- 51% — Number of employed above 18
- 45% — Number of unemployed

Around half of the population above 18 in Arab El-Maslakh was working in October 2017, with 45 percent being unemployed. Compared to Karm El-Zeitoun, a slightly higher percentage (4 percent) was employed under the age of 18.

Figure 15. Employment and unemployment rates in Arab El-Maslakh – October 2017

Daouk Ghawash

Pie chart with segments:
- 7% — Number of employed under 18
- 48% — Number of employed above 18
- 45% — Number of unemployed

The employment and unemployment rates among the population above the age of 18 in Daouk Ghawash were quite similar; 45 percent was unemployed and 48 percent was employed. In October 2017, 7 percent of the population under the age of 18 was employed. On average, residents of both the Lebanese and non-Lebanese cohorts earned between USD 250 and USD 500 per month for their economic activities, as revealed during the FGDs.

Figure 16. Employment and unemployment rates in Daouk Ghawash – October 2017

Karm El-Zeitoun

Pie chart with segments:
- 1% — Number of employed under 18
- 34% — Number of employed above 18
- 65% — Number of unemployed

In Karm El-Zeitoun, more than half (65 percent) of the population above 18 was employed in October 2017, with an unemployment rate of 34 percent. A tiny percentage of those under the age of 18 were employed (1 percent). Having access to jobs and sufficient job opportunities was a general concern among all cohorts, as revealed during FGDs.

Figure 17. Employment and unemployment rates in Karm El-Zeitoun – October 2017

Methods of Seeking Employment

It was identified during FGDs that, across all cohorts, job opportunities are commonly sought through relatives. Also, the main reason for settling in one of the three neighbourhoods is the proximity of job opportunities. Syrian focus group discussants in Arab El-Maslakh mentioned going to the port daily to wait for someone that needs carriers. Their average daily payment is between USD 16 and USD 17. Both the Ethiopian and Bangladeshi cohorts in Karm El-Zeitoun seek jobs in the neighbourhood via relatives, friends or independent visits to offices in the area. However, looking for job opportunities without third parties is preferred, since recruiting offices will deduct half of their salaries, as reported during FGDs with the Ethiopian cohort in Karm El-Zeitoun.

Barriers to Accessing Livelihood Opportunities

The 1951 Convention established "the rights of refugees to engage in wage-earning employment and self-employment". By not signing this international convention, Lebanon does not grant refugees an explicit right to work. However, Lebanon has signed 49 ILO conventions (Migration Policy Centre, 2013). Individuals that have fled to Lebanon are addressed as "displaced" in line with Lebanon's general stance that it is not a country of asylum nor resettlement. This is connected to existing regulations regarding Palestinians that do not have the right to own, sell and bequeath property (Ashkar, 2017).

Prior to the Syrian crisis, there was a demand for Syrian workers in the construction sector in Lebanon that faced labour shortages. The 1993 Bilateral Agreement for Economic and Social Cooperation between Syria and Lebanon provided nationals of both countries with the opportunity to work, reside and carry out economic activities in the other country. Registered Syrian refugees were allowed to work until December 2015 in Lebanon. This right has currently been suspended by the GoL. In October 2014, the GoL declared that it would only allow the entry of Syrians in extreme humanitarian cases, meaning single women fleeing with their children, those in need of urgent medical care, and children separated from their families (De Bel-Air, 2017).

"Displaced" Syrians are required to sign a pledge not to carry out economic activities. Their status changes to "migrant workers" when they are able to obtain a work permit and sponsorship. However, UNHCR counts them as refugees. Moreover, the government considers that the "displaced" lose their refugee status the moment they start working, as they already benefit from UNHCR assistance.

Syrian refugees are granted a work permit on the condition that they are sponsored by a *kafeel*[5] and are working in the agricultural, construction and environmental (e.g. cleaning, garbage collection) sectors. Work permits in these sectors cost around USD 80. However, the ability to receive this work grant is limited, given the Syrian refugees' engagement in jobs that can be considered as highly informal. Work permits in other sectors cost USD 320, and an employer must prove his/her inability to find a skilled Lebanese worker instead (Errighi and Griesse, 2016). During an FGD with the Lebanese cohort in Arab El-Maslakh, it was mentioned that they are entitled to 30 percent of the job offerings in surrounding facilities and institutions (the slaughterhouse and port).

Palestinians were banned from 70 jobs in 1962 and an additional 46 jobs and independent professions with Decree 162/1 that was issued by the MoL in 1995. In 2005, the MoL partly lifted the ban on Palestinians holding technical and clerical positions on condition that they obtain a work permit.

Bangladeshi nationals residing in Karm El-Zeitoun expressed that obtaining a work permit is the most important difficulty to finding work.

Finding employment opportunities to sustain their livelihoods is a challenge that is shared across all cohorts. Unemployment has risen in Lebanon from an estimated 11 percent before the Syrian crisis to 18-20 percent after it (IMF, 2014). Specifically, this has negatively affected young workers (aged 15-24). Increased unemployment rates can be partially explained by the decreasing number of work opportunities and the slow economic growth, as well as the additional labour supply due to the refugee inflow.

Workplace Abuse

When asked about workplace abuse, nine focus group discussants of Syrian nationality in Arab El-Maslakh reported not witnessing abuse. In contrast, nine discussants from among the Syrian cohort in Karm El-Zeitoun reported instances of physical abuse, long working hours and no provision of job security (e.g. payment of salaries at the end of the month).

Similarly, nine discussants from the Bangladeshi cohort in Karm El-Zeitoun mentioned not being aware of physical abuse at the workplace, while being mostly concerned about finding work. Female Ethiopian nationals in Karm El-Zeitoun mentioned being aware of abuse at the working place. Among this cohort, discussants were mainly concerned about long working hours and the inability to take sick leaves.

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[5] A sponsorship system where a placement agency, company/institution or individual issues the work permits for foreign workers.

Local Economy

Residents among the Lebanese cohort saw a boost to the Arab El-Maslakh's local market due to the increased demand for goods and services caused by the influx of Syrian refugees. However, an increase in rent was reported; anecdotally, this is pushing young couples that are seeking housing to do so out of the neighbourhood. It was reported among Syrian study participants that the increased rent forced families to live together to be able to pay the rent. Based on the October 2017 study, rent varied between USD 300 and USD 600 in Arab El-Maslakh, depending on the size of the apartment. Some residents considered these prices to be disproportionate to the deteriorated building conditions in the neighbourhood.

All cohorts in the neighbourhood of Karm El-Zeitoun experienced an increase in rent since 2015. The increased rent was attributed to the construction of new expensive buildings in the area, population growth and increasing demand for housing. Rental fees varied between USD 200 and USD 300 among the Bangladeshi cohort, between USD 400 and USD 650 among the Syrian cohort, and around USD 100 among the Ethiopian cohort. For all the cohorts, the housing fees are often shared by several individuals, as indicated during FGDs.

When asked about assistance, the Bangladeshi cohort in Karm El-Zeitoun mentioned never having received assistance from (non)-governmental organizations. The main concern among this cohort was finding job opportunities to sustain their livelihood. Female Ethiopian nationals did receive assistance from the Evangelical and Orthodox churches in the form of food, clean water, legal support and medications to detainees, and to a lesser extent plane tickets to return home. Focus group discussants among the Syrian cohort reported that they have received assistance from the United Nations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as Makhzoumi Foundation, and at times the Church when having asked for support. In addition, a representative from a social centre mentioned that Filles De La Charité, and Mourouj Al Mahabba Foundation are providing assistance to migrants in the neighbourhood.

A political party in the neighbourhood of Arab El-Maslakh is cooperating with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the American Centre on teaching programs in public schools, and with the Bayt Al-Zakat wa Al-Khayrat to provide food portions to families in the neighbourhood during the month of Ramadan. Nonetheless, their assistance mostly comes in the form of political coverage rather than monetary support.

©Photo: UN-Habitat (2018), Karm El-Zeitoun

©Photo: UN-Habitat (2018), Arab El-Maslakh

©Photo: UN-Habitat (2017), Daouk Ghawash

B. Education

Arab El-Maslakh

Legend:
- Male between 6 and 18 attending school
- Female between 6 and 18 attending school
- Male between 6 and 18 not attending school
- Female between 6 and 18 not attending school

Figure 18. School attendance by gender in Arab El-Maslakh – October 2017

Primary school is the highest level of school attendance among children from 3 to 14 years of age, and intermediate school (*brevet*) is the highest reached level among youth between 15 and 24. The school attendance rate among both female and male residents between the ages of 6 and 18 in Arab El-Maslakh is around 50 percent. According to the data collected during the October 2017 survey, around 44 percent of male residents between 6 and 18 years of age did not attend school in Arab El-Maslakh, together with around 56 percent of the female residents of the same age group.

Daouk Ghawash

Legend:
- Male between 6 and 18 attending school
- Female between 6 and 18 attending school
- Male between 6 and 18 not attending school
- Female between 6 and 18 not attending school

Figure 19. School attendance by gender in Daouk Ghawash – October 2017

Around 51 percent of male residents between the ages of 6 and 18 were attending school in Daouk Ghawash in October 2017. A school attendance rate of 49 percent was found in the neighbourhood among female residents of the same age group. In Daouk Ghawash, 82 percent of the male and 18 percent of the female residents between the ages of 6 and 18 did not attend school. FGDs indicated the prevalence of child labour in the neighbourhood, with children supporting their households and not going to school, and several children working after school hours. Supporting the household financially constitutes the main reason for children to be out of school. During FGDs, tuition fees were reported as another reason for not attending school.

Karm El-Zeitoun

Legend:
- Male between 6 and 18 attending school
- Female between 6 and 18 attending school
- Male between 6 and 18 not attending school
- Female between 6 and 18 not attending school

Figure 20. School attendance by gender in Karm El-Zeitoun – October 2017

Figure 20 shows a school attendance rate of 58 percent among male and 42 percent among female residents between the ages of 6 and 18 in the Karm El-Zeitoun neighbourhood. During an FGD, it was reported that the neighbourhood does not have a public school. Two focus group discussants of the Syrian cohort reported that their children attend school outside of the Karm El-Zeitoun neighbourhood boundaries—together with other Syrian, Egyptian and Ethiopian children. Of residents between the ages of 6 and 18 not attending school in Karm El-Zeitoun, 62 percent are males and 38 percent are females.

C. Health

Network of Primary Healthcare Centres

- 🔴 MoPH
- 🔴 MoPH and MoSA
- 🟤 MoSA
- 🟠 Private

Beirut Municipality

0 250 500   1,000 m

Map 6. Distribution of Primary Healthcare Centres in Beirut Municipality

1	Saint Antoine Health Centre
2	Bachoura Health Centre
3	Beirut Development Association Centre
4	Khatam El-Anbia Health Centre
5	Directorate of Health Tarik El-Jdideh Hariri Foundation
6	Herj Health Centre
7	Directorate of Health Ras El-Nabaa Hariri Foundation
8	Makhzoumi Medical Centre in Mazraa
9	Qarantina PHCC
10	The Drouz Charity Association Health Centre
11	Dar El-Fatwa Health Centre
12	Sandouk Zakat Medical Centre
13	Mother and Child Care Association Health Centre
14	Dar El-Fatwa Health Centre
15	Msaitbeh SDC
16	Achrafieh
17	Mazraa SDC
18	Tarik El-Jdideh
19	Makhzoumi Foundation Achrafieh PHCC
20	Beirut Health Centre Talmees
21	Restart Lebanon Beirut
22	Dar Al Ajaza Allslamia Hospital
23	Bayader Charity Organization
24	The Development Centre of Beirut
25	Sandouk Zakat
26	Al Manasfi TB Centre
27	Al Rawda

Table 2. Primary Healthcare Centres in Beirut Municipality

Arab El-Maslakh

It is not possible for Syrians to access the Public Hospital in Arab El-Maslakh, due to the high related costs, as reported during FGDs with the Syrian cohort. In general, nationals among this cohort consult relatives for medical advice, and visit pharmacies to ask for medicines. For delivery, pregnant women are often brought to either the Sabra area or the Shatila refugee camp. In terms of assistance, FGDs revealed that food assistance in the form of e-vouchers was discontinued in the neighbourhood in mid-2017.

©Photo: UN-Habitat (2018), Public Hospital, Arab El-Maslakh

Daouk Ghawash

Six identified dispensaries provide accessible primary healthcare services in Daouk Ghawash: Hamad Dispensary – Tarik El-Jdideh (Makassed), El-Hursh Health Centre – Barbir (Makassed), PARD Dispensary, El-Islah Wal Arshad Dispensary, El-Hursh Dispensary and Hariri Foundation Dispensary—the first two of which are run by the Makassed Philanthropic Islamic Association of Beirut. Nonetheless, only El-Hursh Health Centre was reported during an FGD in 2017 to be accredited by the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH). Common services provided by the health facilities are the following: consultation, medication, laboratory tests, vaccination, and infant and young child feeding (IYCF) programmes. Consultation fees range from USD 5 to USD 10,

while malnutrition-management programmes for both Lebanese and non-Lebanese cohorts are available either free of charge or for up to USD 10 (UN-Habitat and UNICEF Lebanon, forthcoming).

The six primary healthcare facilities are accessible to people of diverse nationalities, including Lebanese, Syrians, Palestinians, Iraqis, Filipinos, Sudanese and Indians. Beneficiaries that access health facilities include children, women, elderly, children and adults with special needs, individuals with chronic needs, and pregnant women. In addition to serving the residents of Daouk Ghawash, Hamad Dispensary also serves people from various parts of Beirut (e.g. Sabra) and from some areas in the Chouf District of the Mount Lebanon Governorate

(e.g. Naameh and Barja). El-Islah Wal Arshad Dispensary serves people from Beirut, and PARD Dispensary serves residents of Tarik El-Jdideh, as reported during KIIs with health facilities (UN-Habitat and UNICEF Lebanon, forthcoming).

During an FGD, Lebanese caregivers reported the existence of some Social Development Centres (SDCs) affiliated to MoSA and UNRWA in the Daouk Ghawash area. Yet, the majority of focus group discussants had never visited an SDC. In addition, non-Lebanese cohorts reported the availability of organizations that provide the distribution of food vouchers through monthly visits (UN-Habitat and UNICEF Lebanon, forthcoming).

Karm El-Zeitoun

Al Sayde Dispensary in Karm El-Zeitoun offers services related to chronic diseases, but does not provide paediatric services and other health-related services to infants and children. According to a KII with the representatives of the dispensary, the health centre has limited capacity and is in need of additional financial resources. Al Sayde Dispensary has beneficiaries from all communities of the Karm El-Zeitoun neighbourhood, and especially Syrians, Ethiopians and Iraqis from among migrant communities. The United Nations provides 85 percent of the expenditures made at the dispensary among the Syrian cohort, with the

centre taking care of the remaining 15 percent, according to a KII.

It was reported during a KII that the dispensary receives donations from the Orthodox Church, with which it is affiliated; NGOs such as the Young Men's Christian Association; international donors such as the United Nations; and MoSA and MoPH. Also, the dispensary has started a programme with Children's Relief International, where American and Syrian families that live in the United States are sponsoring Syrian Orthodox children on a yearly basis.

Focus group discussants of the Bangladeshi cohort in Karm El-Zeitoun reported that this group has equal access to hospitals as the Lebanese cohort. Yet, focus group discussants of the Ethiopian cohort mentioned facing financial problems to access healthcare. Most focus group discussants from the Syrian cohort visit Makhzoumi Dispensary. It was indicated that this dispensary provides primary healthcare services. However, for special services, such as medication for blood pressure, other dispensaries need to be consulted.

D. Communal spaces

Arab El-Maslakh

0 25 50 100 m

Daouk Ghawash

0 25 50 100 m

Karm El-Zeitoun

0 25 50 100 m

Condition of communal spaces of buildings

- Emergency replacement
- Major repair
- Minor repair
- Routine maintenance

- Neighbourhood boundary
- Surveyed area
- Non-residential area/missing data

Map 7. Condition of communal spaces of buildings in the three neighbourhoods

Arab El-Maslakh

Emergency replacement
Major repair
Minor repair
Routine maintenance

©Photo: UN-Habitat (2018), Arab El-Maslakh

Figure 21. Communal space conditions by nationality in Arab El-Maslakh – October 2017

In Arab El-Maslakh, most data on communal spaces of buildings was available regarding the Lebanese and Syrian cohorts. The majority (38 percent) of buildings, housing 41 percent of the residents, have communal spaces that require minor repair. Around one sixth (16 percent) of buildings require emergency replacement in their communal spaces.

Daouk Ghawash

Emergency replacement
Major repair
Minor repair
Routine maintenance

©Photo: UN-Habitat (2018), Daouk Ghawash

Figure 22. Communal space conditions by nationality in Daouk Ghawash – October 2017

The majority (47 percent) of buildings in Daouk Ghawash, accommodating 51 percent of the residents, have communal spaces that require major repair, while 31 percent are in need of minor repair. Around 17 percent of buildings require emergency replacement in their communal spaces.


©Photo: UN-Habitat (2018), Karm El-Zeitoun

Karm El-Zeitoun

- ■ Emergency replacement
- ■ Major repair
- ■ Minor repair
- ■ Routine maintenance

13%

9%

36%

42%

©Photo: UN-Habitat (2018), Karm El-Zeitoun

Figure 23. Communal space conditions by nationality in Karm El-Zeitoun – October 2017

Figure 23 shows the condition of communal spaces of buildings in Karm El-Zeitoun needing routine maintenance, minor/major repair or emergency replacement. The majority (42 percent) of buildings, housing 43 percent of the residents, have communal spaces that require major repair. Around 9 percent of residents live in buildings that require emergency replacement in their communal spaces.

©Photo: Genevieve Kim (2018), Daouk Ghawash

E. Infrastructural Network

Focus group discussants of the Lebanese cohort in the neighbourhood of Arab El-Maslakh shared a general dissatisfaction with municipal services, such as the municipality's responsiveness, provision of infrastructure, access to the neighbourhood's renovated playground, and the nearby temporary garbage dump. Similarly, focus group discussants from among the Syrian cohort reported that the neighbourhood suffers from neglect. This pattern has not only been identified in the Arab El-Maslakh neighbourhood; all cohorts in the neighbourhoods of Karm El-Zeitoun and Daouk Ghawash have similarly reported the need to upgrade infrastructural services. In the Karm El-Zeitoun neighbourhood, there was a request to upgrade the water and electricity networks, and to improve garbage collection. However, during an FGD, Bangladeshi nationals reported overall high satisfaction with regard to municipal services. During the FGDs with the Lebanese cohort, it was mentioned that the municipality has promised to upgrade the neighbourhood's infrastructure.

©Photo: UN-Habitat (2018), Electricity network, Arab El-Maslakh

©Photo: UN-Habitat (2017), Electricity network, Daouk Ghawash

©Photo: UN-Habitat (2018), Electricity network, Karm El-Zeitoun

A main challenge in the neighbourhood of Arab El-Maslakh is its degraded environment, due to gases and waste that are produced by surrounding facilities and dumpsters, as indicated by a political party representative during an FGD. At the time of the FGD, waste had piled up in front of Beirut's slaughterhouse. Other general suggestions included: spraying pesticides for pest control, improving street lighting, prohibiting trucks to reach the port, providing financial and material assistance to people with special needs.

The residents' limited involvement in local decision-making and the municipal actors' limited accountability and responsiveness are critical issues in all neighbourhoods. The Lebanese cohort reported that the current regulations surrounding the election of municipal government actors limited the possible improvement of their level of involvement in local decision-making processes. The area of registration by birth is the only area where the Lebanese population is allowed to vote for governmental actors. Migrants can only get involved in local decision-making after naturalization.

©Photo: UN-Habitat (2018), Water network, Arab El-Maslakh

©Photo: UN-Habitat (2017), Water network, Daouk Ghawash

©Photo: UN-Habitat (2018), Renovated public garden, Arab El-Maslakh

©Photo: UN-Habitat (2017), Public space, Daouk Ghawash

SOCIAL STABILITY, SAFETY & SECURITY

A. Social Stability

When two focus group discussants of the Lebanese cohort in Arab El-Maslakh were asked about the perceived impact of migrants on the neighbourhood, both described that the arrival of migrants had little effect on the residents. This differs from the perception of the Lebanese cohort in Karm El-Zeitoun, who reported increased socioeconomic tensions in the neighbourhood, such as increased labour-market competition between host communities and migrants. Previous infrastructural and economic challenges in the neighbourhood of Arab El-Maslakh were exacerbated by the arrival of Syrian refugees, presenting new challenges to the neighbourhood, as argued during a KII with a representative of a political party. However, it was mentioned that the neighbourhood has a local economic potential and advantages that, if channelled in the right direction, can help improve the livelihoods of both host and migrant communities, and enhance overall social stability.

The neighbourhood of Arab El-Maslakh is generally considered as a "tight-knit" community based on traditional norms and values and family relationships, as pointed out by two focus group discussants from among the Lebanese cohort. Nine focus group discussants from the Syrian cohort had a different perception of social stability, when compared to the Lebanese cohort, with little "sense of belonging" to the neighbourhood of Arab El-Maslakh and experiences of discrimination. Similarly, female Ethiopian nationals in Karm El-Zeitoun mentioned having no "sense of belonging" to the neighbourhood. This contrasts with FGDs involving nine Bangladeshi nationals in Karm El-Zeitoun, who reported experiencing a "sense of belonging" to their direct living environment. Furthermore, it was reported in the FGD that the mobility of migrants without any type of identification and/or legal papers (e.g. residence or work permit) was limited. This is considered one of the most important challenges in all three neighbourhoods.

©Photo: UN-Habitat (2017), PARD association, Daouk Ghawash

©Photo: UN-Habitat (2018), Social centre, Karm El-Zeitoun

B. Safety & Security

The neighbourhood of Arab El-Maslakh is generally considered a safe area by the Lebanese and Syrian cohorts, as highlighted during FGDs in 2017. However, among the Syrian cohort, it was reported that the peripheries are unsafe at night, as individuals of Syrian nationality got robbed on their way back home during night-time.

The Bangladeshi and Ethiopian cohorts in Karm El-Zeitoun revealed that they generally feel safe in the neighbourhood, except during night-time. Nonetheless, female Ethiopian nationals mentioned instances of robbery and verbal abuse. Focus group discussants from among the Syrian cohort also reported a general sense of safety in the neighbourhood, combined with high levels of awareness of being a newcomer to the neighbourhood and living a solitary life to avoid potential problems.

Tight communal relationships in the neighbourhood of Karm El-Zeitoun were identified by the Lebanese cohort as an important factor in ensuring safety. Conflicts have emerged between migrant and host communities in the neighbourhood. Neighbourhood security is guaranteed by the Lebanese Internal Security Forces, the army, the Maaloumat (information) and intelligence services.

Residents reported Daouk Ghawash to be generally unsafe area that faces various problems, specifically with regard to infrastructural services, overcrowding, drug abuse and robberies. Children in Daouk Ghawash predominantly reported their homes and buildings as the safest area in the neighbourhood. Parents commonly do not allow their children to leave the neighbourhood of Daouk Ghawash. Furthermore, members of non-Lebanese communities identified cultural differences and problems over access to housing as the main reasons for disputes in the neighbourhood. Most disputes are resolved via the intervention of community dignitaries or of host communities.

Across all non-Lebanese cohorts, neighbourhood safety is one of the main general concerns. In order to improve the overall safety and security in the neighbourhood of Arab El-Maslakh, it was suggested to bring more security forces to the area. Yet, during an FGD, it was reported that the municipality intervenes in the neighbourhood when problems arise.

## C. Migrants' Desire to Return to Place of Origin

Arab El-Maslakh

Figure 24. Population count on consideration of returning to place of origin in Arab El-Maslakh – October 2017

The majority (58 percent) of all migrants in Arab El-Maslakh answered "yes" when asked whether they consider returning to their place of origin. A quarter of all migrants did not consider returning to their place of origin, while 17 percent did not know.

Daouk Ghawash

Figure 25. Population count on consideration of returning to place of origin in Daouk Ghawash – October 2017

An equal percentage (31 percent) of all migrants in Daouk Ghawash answered "do not know" and "yes", when asked if they considered returning to their place of origin, while 38 percent answered "no". The high rent was the main reason for the anticipation of moving among the non-Lebanese cohorts, according to FGDs.

Karm El-Zeitoun

Figure 26. Population count on consideration of returning to place of origin in Karm El-Zeitoun – October 2017

Contrary to the Arab El-Maslakh neighbourhood, when questioned whether they would consider returning to their place of origin, 51 percent of all migrants in Karm El-Zeitoun answered "do not know", followed by "no" (30 percent). A far smaller percentage (19 percent) of all migrants in the neighbourhood answered "yes" during the HH survey.

CONCLUSION

Using three case studies, this mapping of immigration presence provides an introduction to migratory challenges in Beirut Municipality. Based on the three neighbourhoods of Arab El-Maslakh, Daouk Ghawash and Karm El-Zeitoun, an empirical insight is given into how migration is inserted into the urban fabric of the municipality, and what the aspects of the impact are on the neighbourhoods.

From this scoping study, it can be stated that the Syrian cohort comprises the largest migrant population as a percentage of the neighbourhoods' total population in all three cases. Of the remainder, the Bangladeshi, Ethiopian and Palestinian cohorts are the largest groups (with varying representation across the neighbourhoods).

The majority of residential units in all three neighbourhoods is shared by families. In some cases, residential units were shared by a large total number of residents, likely to constitute overcrowding. FGDs revealed that this might be explained by the sharing of rent among residents in one residential unit, to compensate for increasing rental fees.

FGDs and KIIs indicated that the majority of migrant populations have "little sense of belonging" to their direct living environment. This may be reflected in the analysis of FGDs in both Arab El-Maslakh and Daouk Ghawash; when asked about their consideration of returning to their place of origin, a high percentage among migrant populations in both neighbourhoods answered "yes".

Critical areas of concern that were raised during FGDs and KIIs are: lack of inclusive involvement of residents in local decision-making, need for upgrading the direct living environment in terms of its infrastructural and public services, and need for improving safety and security in all three neighbourhoods (the latter more specifically in Daouk Ghawash). Addressing these areas of concern may provide potential to improve the inhabitants' sense of belonging to their neighbourhood.

These concerns are likely to be of great interest to both governmental and communal neighbourhood actors, as migrant communities currently comprise the majority in both Arab El-Maslakh and Daouk Ghawash neighbourhoods as a percentage of the neighbourhoods' total population. Although part of a wider urban and national phenomenon, this demographic composition may change further in the neighbourhoods, impacting the demographic balance between migrant and host communities in various ways.

Currently, 41 percent of females in Arab El-Maslakh and 72 percent of males between the ages of 6 and 18 in Daouk Ghawash are not attending school. Improving the accessibility and availability of public services to all cohorts in the neighbourhood is of great importance to improve the social stability in the neighbourhood. Hereby, it should be emphasized that "no person is left behind" in accessing education and healthcare facilities to enhance urban inclusion and prosperity in all three neighbourhoods.

This study made usage of both qualitative and quantitative research methods during data collection. Besides primary field data analysis, this profile provided secondary desk-based data analysis on the national regulatory framework regarding migration. Social services and access to livelihood opportunities are key challenges identified by respondents in this study; this emphasizes the critical nature of migration policy as well as policies indirectly affecting the well-being of migrants and of the mixed communities of which they are in some cases a major component.

Main caveats in this study relate to the small-scale sampling, complicating quantitative analysis. As the empirical findings suggest, improving the body of knowledge as to the scale and nature of migrant presence in the city can enhance our understanding of the features of migratory flows and the opportunities as well as challenges these present to neighbourhoods. This study can be a starting point for further and more fulsome studies of the topic at the neighbourhood, municipal and city levels.

©Photo: UN-Habitat (2018), Karm El-Zeitoun

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