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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, KEY FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS

The Rapid City Profiling and Monitoring System

With the support of the European Union, UN-Habitat and UNFPA had undertaken the realization of the Rapid City Profiling and Monitoring System (RCPMS) for six Libyan cities in close collaboration with the Libyan Ministry of Planning and the concerned municipalities, the Libyan Bureau of Statistics and Census (BSC) and the Urban Planning Agency (UPA).

This report is the City profile for the City of Benghazi, the second major city of the country. It aims at establishing a first comprehensive Urban Information Analysis providing a detailed assessment of urban structures and facilities as well as on urban indicators related to basic services, local economy, living standards. It considers the outcomes of sectors’ assessments conducted by key informants interviews conducted in the city with the different sectors, the results of damage assessment conducted by the ground verification team and builds on assessments undertaken by UN agencies and NGOs.

The City Profiling exercise informs on humanitarian, early recovery and stabilization responses and the prioritization of urban rehabilitation interventions so that they have the largest impact to encourage urban recovery, in terms of location (spatial prioritization), sequencing, and types of interventions; and the return of displaced populations. It helps also building the capacity of local actors to evaluate and monitor the impact of the crisis on the urban functionality and services, considering the demographic changes because of the dynamic of the conflict and forced displacements.

UN-Habitat has utilized the latest high-resolution satellite imagery. The maps that were generated using GIS technology offer an evidence-based, multi-sector response planning framework and will be made available in the open data portal which will offer live up-to-date GIS mapping data whereby the concerned users can extract maps, tables, graphs and narrative reports. The urban functionality and damage assessment, undertaken by UN-Habitat, was complemented by the results of the household survey performed by UNFPA in close collaboration with the Libyan Bureau of Statistics and Census conducted in May 2018, which provides information on realities and perceptions of the life and service provisions of and to Benghazi’s population.

Executive Summary and key findings

Benghazi is the second city of the country with a population estimated between 715,000 and 812,000 inhabitants within its present administrative boundaries. Its historical districts of Old Benghazi have experienced severe damage during the conflict. The population of the municipality have been subject to significant displacements (more than half of all displaced in Libya, 1/3rd of the population of the municipality), while receiving relatively small number of IDPs. Most of the displaced remained in the region/mantika/governorate/mohafaza of Benghazi and returned to the city after the end of the conflict.

The municipal boundaries have changed significantly in 2015 following a decision of the municipal council. It is structured in 14 municipal branches/furu’, grouping 64 districts/mahalla. The neighborhood of Benina, where the international airport and some major public facilities serving Benghazi are located, had been separated in an independent municipality within the Benghazi region.

The key findings of the City profile of Benghazi could be summarized at two levels:

General Environment

- At least 30,000 people need immediate humanitarian assistance in Benghazi: 45% of them are returnees, 35% among non-displaced, 15% IDPs and 5% migrants and refugees.
- The migrant and refugee population in Benghazi and its region reached 26,880 mid-2018. They constitute only 4% of the total in Libya. Most of them originating from MENA countries and Asia. Thus, Benghazi migrant population seems to be mostly constituted of migrant workers.
Some districts in Benghazi have experienced substantial and severe damage within the historical branch of the city (Old Benghazi). They require reconstruction and rehabilitation plans.

Benghazi has conserved most of its major trade role in the country despite the long closure of its port. The economic recovery of the city and the living conditions of its population need to address unemployment and boost youth entrepreneurship issues beyond the pre-crisis mechanisms.

There is a need to address the reintegration of former combatants in public life and social reconciliation in several districts of Benghazi.

**Multi-sector needs assessment**

**Governance**

- Despite the promulgation of Law of Local Administration n° 59 of 2012, Libyan municipalities had no clear functions and source of funding, and their relations with the central administration and that of the mohafazat – the latter still do not have elected councils - need to evolve according to the law and to be specified by rules. The investment needed for recovery necessitates a proper solution of these governance issues, particularly for what concerns budgeting, public contracting and procurement. The municipal staff needs institutional support in managerial capacity-building for that purpose.

- The municipality of Benghazi has a complex branches and districts layout. The land surface within the municipality boundaries has greatly increased to 106,513 ha. This creates significant challenges of administrative and public services for a proper management by the Municipal Council.

- Many administrative offices and courts were severely damaged or destroyed, as they were located in Old Benghazi districts that experienced intense fighting. They need to be rehabilitated or replaced to reactivate their functions.

**Urban planning, land use and housing**

- The 3rd generation master plan needs to be reassessed considering the new administrative division of the municipality and the fact that it has not been applied. Especially, the distribution of public services and the axes of activities and movement of the population should be assessed in light of the transformations that occurred during the conflict.

- Significant informal constructions had been erected during the conflict to cope with the population displacement and a pre-conflict housing units deficit. The total number of housing structures has increased by 81% between 2006 and 2018.

Licenses for construction and registration of properties seem to have been stopped since 2011. This gives a peculiar vision on property rights and informal constructions before and after the crisis. The Housing, Land and Property (HLP) Right has become therefore a major concern for the proper management of the municipality, but more importantly for recovery and reconciliation.

**Destructions and damage**

- Most of the damage of the fighting areas has been recently repaired and the housing units inhabited despite their substantial or severe damage. This is except the historical and cultural area of Old Benghazi which has experienced destructions, as well as the district of Tikah in Sahel Gharbi.

- The repairs and reconstruction of the damaged neighborhoods and housings should be assessed within a comprehensive vision.

**Health**

- Even prior to the conflict, Benghazi was assessed as ill serviced in terms of health facilities in comparison with other cities in Libya. This situation had aggravated with the conflict with many hospitals, PHCs and PHUs damaged and non-operational. In particular, Benghazi has lost half of its main hospital beds
The improvement of the health services (rehabilitation of hospitals, PHCs and PHUs) is a priority.

- Benghazi, like other cities of Libya, faces a lack of medicines and for many types of medicine obtain them at high price. The commercial network for the import and distribution of medicines should be assessed and addressed as a priority.

**Education**

- Even before the conflict, there was a lack of class rooms for primary and secondary schools within the municipality and an uneven distribution of education facilities between the different districts. This problem was aggravated with the effects of the conflict.
- The rehabilitation of the campus and buildings of Benghazi University, the oldest in the country and severely damaged by the conflict, is a priority.
- There are also very few children care centers within the municipality.

**Water, sewage and waste**

- The sustainability of Benghazi as a major metropole depends on the proper operation and security of the Great Man Made River (GMMR) network along hundreds of kilometers, which constitute a major concern. The city network needs to be rehabilitated to enable proper healthy provision of drinking water. In particular, the problem of sewage intrusion into the drinking water network should be addressed as a priority.
  - The sewage system in Benghazi seems to be a major serious issue. The pre-conflict network was already insufficient and fragile, lacking maintenance. The conflict had led to the interruption of the construction of the treatment plant and the extension of the network. This is in addition to the destruction of equipment and pumping stations. Currently, sewage is leaking in some areas to the drinking water network and spilling to the July 23rd lake, which should be addressed as a priority.
- The collection of solid waste in Benghazi is irregular and the dumping sites need to be multiplied and rehabilitated.

**Electricity and energy**

- The population still suffer from electricity cuts. The power plant, substations and network need urgent repairing.
- Shortage of cooking gas and its high prices constitute also a major concern for the population, to be addressed.

**Roads and transportation**

- Two small bridges in Old Benghazi are damaged and need repairing.

**Heritage and culture**

- Finally, the Old Benghazi district comprises several historical sites and buildings which constitute the cultural heritage of the city, and a corner stone of the Libyan identity. This district has been severely damaged during the conflict with many of the heritage buildings destroyed or extremely damaged. A proper plan for the restoration and preservation of this heritage is key for Libyan reconciliation.
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1

CONTEXT
1. CONTEXT

The city of Benghazi and its regional network

The city of Benghazi is the center of the Benghazi governorate (or Sha’biya in the old naming\(^1\)); one of the 22 regions of Libya. Benghazi is also one of the 6 municipalities/Baladiyat which constitutes this governorate; the other areas being Al Abyar\(^2\), Qaminis\(^3\), Slukh\(^4\), Tucra\(^5\) and Benina\(^6\) (maps 1 and 2).

The city developed around its port and old town (Benghazi Medina). The core of its central districts is composed of the municipality branches of Old Benghazi, Slawi, Salmani, Benghazi Jadida, Al Fweihat and Al Berka, circled by Al Kuwaifyah, Bu ‘Atni, Huwari, Qwarsha, Sahel Gharbi, Al Nwaqiya, Maqzeha and Sidi Khilfa\(^7\) (map 3). These constitute the old limits of the municipality (see map 3).

The decision of the Municipal council n°13 of 2015\(^8\) had resulted in the organization of urban Benghazi in 14 municipality branches (or Fara’) and 64 districts (Mahallas).

\(^1\) http://www.wikiwand.com/en/Benghazi#/Administrative_divisions

\(^2\) To the East of Benghazi.

\(^3\) To the South-West of Benghazi.

\(^4\) Sluq to the South of Benghazi.

\(^5\) Al ‘Aqourieh, to the North-East of Benghazi on the shore.

\(^6\) Benina, surrounding Benghazi airport, became an independent municipality only in 2015.

\(^7\) It is worth mentioning that the names of the districts and subdistricts are newly established for different purposes, including eliminating names inherited from the Gaddafi period or honoring events of the 2011 “revolution”. Very often, old names or different denomination by quarters are used; what makes analysis of Libyan and international documentation on the city cumbersome.

\(^8\) Approved by the decision of the Council of Ministers n° 657 of 2015, https://akhbarlibya24.net/archives/73868.
### City Profile of Benghazi, Libya

#### Al Berka
- **Shuhada Zawiya** or Badriya
- **Ard Lamloum** or Al Karama, or Hayy 8 March as for its old district name
- **Daoud Bahri** or Buqrein or Rweissat
- **Daoud Qibli** referred to with Daoud Bahri as Majori
- **Daoud Gharbi** or Keich; correspond to the old district of Al Andalus, sometimes linked to Al Fweihat
- **Hada'iq** or gardens, also named Fweihat Sharqi, hosting the biggest Benghazi Medical Center
- **Khaled bin Waleed**

#### Al Fweihat
- **Rahba** an old quarter of Benghazi; its inhabitants fought fiercely against Gaddafi forces in 2011
- **Al Fweihat Gharbiya** with many consulates
- **Bal'oun**
- **Tablinu** or Tablitu, sometimes also called Al Fweihat Gharbiya, with its luxurious villas
- **Qaryounes** which hosts the University, the oldest in the country

#### Slawi
- **Ali bin Abi Taleb**
- **Mujahedin**
- **Al 'Uruba**
- **Al Mukhtar** or Omar Al Mukhtar
- **Shebna** a new quarter
- **Bab As Salam** or simply Salam
- **Sidi Younes** limited by the North Lakes

#### New Benghazi
- **New Laythi**
- **Old Laythi**
- **Benghazi Jadida** Or New Benghazi; the old district of Hayy Al Ansar.

#### Sahel Gharbi
- **Qanfouda Bahriya**
- **Bu Fakhir** a beach area, with the port of Mreissa
- **Tikah**
- **At Terba** a resort area

#### Bu 'Atni
- **Sidi Meftah**
- **Massaken**
- **Shuhada Bu 'Atni** a mixed industrial and residential area, hosting several military camps on the road to Benina airport,

#### Sidi Khilifa
- **Dar Al 'Areibat**
- **Sidi Khilifa** a mixed agricultural and residential area

#### Al Kwaifyah
- **New Kwaifyah**
- **Old Kwaifyah** an industrial suburb, hosting the biggest power plant in Libya
- **Bu Dzirah**

---

These 2 districts used to form the old Hayy Zeitoun (2)

These 3 districts used to form the old Al Mukhtar (6)

These 2 districts used to form the old Salam (7)

These 3 districts used to form Hayy Al Ansar (4)

These 2 districts used to form the old 2nd of March (20)

These 2 districts used to form the old 2nd of March (20)

- These 2 districts used to form the old Hayy Zeitoun (2)
- These 3 districts used to form the old Al Mukhtar (6)
- These 2 districts used to form the old Salam (7)
- These 3 districts used to form Hayy Al Ansar (4)

- These 2 districts used to form the old 2nd of March (20)
- These 2 districts used to form the old 2nd of March (20)
Benghazi is also a major port which handled in 2012 around 2.5 million MT (156,275 TEU)\(^9\) comparatively to 0.2 million MT for Tripoli (16,174 TEU), 1.1 million MT for Misrata (16,174 TEU) and 0.15 million MT for Derna. This is why it constitutes an important trade center delivering imported goods to different parts of the country. Benghazi port was closed during the 2\(^{nd}\) Libyan civil war, from 2014 until the last quarter of 2017.

The society of Benghazi is a mixture of old urban communities as well as of others originating from different regions in Libya (mainly from Misrata, Zliten, and the oases in the South) and from the numerous Libyan tribes. The tribal linkage vanished with time, mostly replaced by the influence of Sufi orders such as the Senoussi. The urban communities were famous for their trade skills, especially with Italy.

### The Urban society in Benghazi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maqzeha</th>
<th>Sidi Faraj</th>
<th>Maqzeha</th>
<th>Masqelo</th>
<th>a hilly agricultural area, hosting the Qattara dam</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Huwari</td>
<td>Huwari</td>
<td>Bu Hdima</td>
<td>Sayda Khadija</td>
<td>hosting a cement factory, a big hospital and the official cemetery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>one of the oldest quarters of the city, hosting the central post; also called Venicia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Nwaquia</td>
<td>Al Nwaquia</td>
<td>Talhiya</td>
<td>Bu Drissa</td>
<td>Bu Hdima and Khadija used to form the old Benghazi Jadida (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qwarcha</td>
<td>Old Qwarcha</td>
<td>Al Fa’kat</td>
<td>Um Mabruka</td>
<td>The names Sabri, Agharbil, Salmani, Fweihat, Bu Hdima, Kich, Huwari, Bal’oun, Rahba, Qaryounes, Sharif, Lamloum, Tikah, Slawi and Qvarsha refer to a family or tribe name</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The battle of Benghazi and the security situation

Benghazi was the first Libyan town in the revolt against the rule of Gaddafi and become home of the National Transitional Council (NTC)\(^10\). The city little suffered during this 1\(^{st}\) civil war, including when the army attacked the city from the West before it was repelled due to the foreign airstrikes and intervention. However, a chaos of militias developed in the following period, leading starting from 2012 to intense clashes between different factions, that led to the 2\(^{nd}\) Civil war.

In September 2012, “Ansar Al-Shari’a” Al Qaeda affiliated jihadists attacked the US consulate of Benghazi and an annex compound in Qwarsha branch, resulting in the assassination of the US Ambassador and 4 other US officials.

In July 2014, the fundamentalists rebels grouped under the BRSC, which included “Islamic State” (IS) affiliated groups, declared that they took control of the city after seizing different military camps including the large

\(^{9}\)http://dlca.logcluster.org/display/public/DLCA/2.1+Libya+Port+Assessment

\(^{10}\)Dissolved in July 2012 to be replaced by the National Conference until the parliamentary elections of July 2014.
compound of the special forces in the West in Bu ‘Atni. The LNA holding the airport started the operation “restore Libya’s dignity” to expel them from the city. In October, the camp of the “February 17th Martyrs” brigade in Qwarsha was taken by the LNA, as well as the University of Benghazi in Qaryounes. Benghazi Medina (or old town, the main commercial district), including Sabri and the port area, experienced heavy shelling as the rebels retreated there (see map 5).

In February 2016, the LNA took finally control of the main military base of Bu ‘Atni after intense fighting and bombardment. The combats were also intense in Laythi districts of Benghazi Al Jadida, named “Qandahar Libya”. After a long stalemate, it was only in February 2016 that the LNA took full control of Bu ‘Atni and Al Laythi districts, followed in April by the cement factory in Huwari, of the Al Saiqa camp and of the tourist village in Qanfoudha.

In July 2016, another front was opened in South West against the LNA by the “Benghazi Defense Brigades”, claiming allegiance to the Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli. Early 2017, the fighting concentrated on Qwarsha, Qanfoudha, Sabri and Souq Al Hout (the “fish market”), where the fundamentalists were besieged. It was only in December 2017 that LNA took full control of the city (see map 5).

Currently, Benghazi and its region are fully under the control of the LNA.

June 28, the LNA took full control of Derna, while another battle erupted for the control of Sidra and Ras Lanuf on the South with oil militias and the so-called Benghazi Defense Brigades (BDB), ending June 25. The LNA and the House of Representatives (HOR) handed the oil receipts to the GNA.

The complex zones of control in Libya appear as in map 6\textsuperscript{11}.

Benghazi Location Map

City Profile of Benghazi, Libya

Distance Chart: intercity road distances in kilometres.
Old and new districts

- Neighborhood Al Ansar
- Neighborhood Al Mukhtar
- Neighborhood Al Zaytoun
- Neighborhood Al-Andalus
- Neighborhood Al-Jazeera
- Neighborhood Ali bin Abi Talib
- Neighborhood Brneeq
- Neighborhood Daoud marine
- Neighborhood Dawood tribal
- Neighborhood East Salmani
- Neighborhood Eastern Sabri
- Neighborhood Gardens
- Neighborhood Khaled Bin Al Waleed
- Neighborhood New Benghazi
- Neighborhood Qar Younes
- Neighborhood Salam
- Neighborhood Shuhada al - Salmani
- Neighborhood Sidi Hussein
- Neighborhood the first statement
- Neighborhood the second of March
- Neighborhood Sidi Hussein

City Profile of Benghazi, Libya

Map 3

Benghazi old and new districts

Neighborhoods

Old districts:
- Al Berka
- Bu 'Atni
- Al Fweihat
- Huwari
- Salmani
- Slawi

New districts:
- New Benghazi

4 km
The Battle of Benghazi

- Destroyed
- Severe Damage
- Moderate Damage
- Possible Damage

Battle of Benghazi

- Oct 2014
- Feb 2016
- Apr 2016
- May 2017
- Jul - Dec 2017
- Military Camps

Attacks & their dates

Mediterranean Sea

Map 5

The Battle of Benghazi City Profile of Benghazi, Libya
Areas of control and social composition

Territorial control (situation as known July 19, 2018)

- Arab, Arab-Berber
- Toubou
- Tuaregs
- LNA and allies
- GNA and allies
- « Islamic State »
- Toubou militias
- Tuareg militias
- Other groups / mixed or unclear control

Main Road
Local Road
Waterway
Airport
Areas
Other cities
Arab, Arab-Berber
Toubou
Tuaregs
LNA and allies
GNA and allies
« Islamic State »
Toubou militias
Tuareg militias
Other groups / mixed or unclear control

City Profile of Benghazi, Libya
2. DEMOGRAPHY

POPULATION

The population of Benghazi

The last census on the population of Benghazi *mantiqa* and municipality date respectively from 1995 and 2006. However, these censuses considered a municipality which has currently significantly expanded its boundaries and changed its map. In fact, few details are available on suburbs that are now parts of the municipality.

The censuses of 1995 and 2006 had given the total Libyan population of the Benghazi governorate (*mantiqa*) at respectively 632,069 and 622,148, meaning that there was an average decrease of population at a yearly rate of -0.14%. The non-Libyan population was given in 2006 at 52,803, representing 7.8% of total population which is higher than the national average of 6.4% (map 7).

The average size of family for Libyans in Benghazi were also assessed decreasing from 5.9 (according to 2006 census) to 5.35 (4.83 for non-Libyans).

13 See Urban planning section below.

14 أطلس الإحصائيات الحيوية، 2006.

15 The primary results of 2006 census gave 5.2 only; a total Libyan population in Benghazi *mantiqa* of 622,847 and a total number of HH of 119,257. See Urban planning section below, p12. It was later changed to a total Libyan population of 628,076 and a total number of HH of 106,428, see الهيئة العامة للمعلومات: النتائج النهائية للتعداد العام للسكان لسنة 2006, p75.

16 Information transmitted by the municipality.


In 2006, the municipality of Benghazi alone hosted 84% of this governorate population within its old limits. If the new boundaries and districts are considered, the details of censuses by district would give a total population for the (new) municipality at only 447,744 and 522,950 respectively for 1995 and 2006, constituting respectively 71% and 84% of the governorate population. However, the data for several branches and districts were not available, including some densely populated such as Laythi.

On the same basis, the municipality estimated its (new layout) population reaching at least 601,525 in 2014; but this estimation may be influenced by the population displacement following the events of 2011. The highest population growth was observed in the branches of Al Kwaiifah (5.6% yearly), Bu ‘Atini (4.3%), Qwarsha (4.2%), Sidi Khlifa (3.7%) and Sahel Gharbi (3.6%).

Taking into account all this background information, estimating the 2018 population size of the municipality of Benghazi constitutes a harder task than doing it overall Libya. This is because of the issues raised by population displacement and migrations, as well as the modifications in 2015 of the administrative boundaries in districts and branches and of the changes of names of some districts or the merge with other branches. Also, some districts have experienced significant development of informal settlement while others have been almost emptied -at least temporarily - of their population because of damage and destruction. All this makes the effort of making an estimation a complicated task, with a margin of error, which can only be cleared when a new census shall be made.

Average size of households

The census of 2006 gave an average size of households in Benghazi *mantiqa* of 5.9. In its turn, REACH gave in its 2017 MSNA survey an average size of 5.7. This is while the IOM DTMs are based on a fixed number of individuals per household of 5.; 70% of HH being constituted of more than 5 members.

The HH survey estimated the average size of individuals per HH in Benghazi of 4.4 (4.7 for the non-displaced, 4.3 for the IDPs and 3.5 for the returnees). The significant variations between the different categories of population suggest that the decrease of the average size is linked to the effects of the conflict. However, this result of the survey should be further investigated as it constitutes a major outcome that
cannot be easily related to mortality, fertility and migrations.

According to the HH survey, the distribution of households between the different categories is as follows: 73.1% are non-displaced, 4.0% are IDPs and 22.9% are returnees.

Considering the HH displacement as assessed by IOM DTMs giving 37,610 HH of returnees, HH survey leads to a first estimation of the population of Benghazi municipality of 751,164 individuals, with 724,284 Libyan nationals.

This also means that 120,064 households were non-displaced, i.e., 564,394 individuals.

### UN-Habitat methodology

UN-Habitat based its estimates on urban structures and functionalities. It has analyzed the development of urban structures (private housing) between 2006 and 2018 using high resolution satellite imagery. The typology of structures (number of stories, etc.) and their occupation are assessed through the satellite images and damage ground verification. This leads to an approximate estimation of the population for each district/mahalla of the city. This allows to assess the urban functionalities and services in each area, function of its urban development.

The analysis of the satellite images depicts a total of 152,321 potential housing units in 2006 within the municipal boundaries of today. They units hosted 577,939 individuals with an average HH size of 5.9. In 2018, they increased to 214,994 potential housing units.

Analyzing building occupations, district by district, in 2006 and 2018, leads to an estimation of the total population of the municipality of Benghazi at 715,498 with an average size of individuals per household of 5.2. If such average was 5.9 or 4.4, the population estimation would have been respectively of 811,816 and 605,422.

The population of the branches of Old Benghazi decreased (-36%), as well as that of New Benghazi (-17%), Salmani (-7%) and Al Berka (-6%). This is while the population of Huwari, Al Kwaifyah, Sahel Gharbi, Qwarsha, Bu ‘Atni and Sidi Khilfa had increased significantly.

### Population density

As a result, the branches of New Benghazi, Salmani, Al Berka and Slawi are still those with high density of population. However, among those, only Slawi has seen its density increasing.

At the level of districts, the most densely populated are Al Salmani Gharbi and Sharqi, Daoud Bahri and Qibli in Al Berka, Al Mukhtar in Al Berka, Old Laythi and Bnghazi Jadida in New Benghazi and still despite the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benghazi Branches</th>
<th>2006 new limits</th>
<th>2018 new limits 5.9</th>
<th>2018 new limits 5.2</th>
<th>growth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Old Benghazi</td>
<td>63,038</td>
<td>111,589</td>
<td>105,350</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salmani</td>
<td>115,832</td>
<td>121,983</td>
<td>107,511</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Berka</td>
<td>111,589</td>
<td>119,531</td>
<td>95,350</td>
<td>22.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Fweihat</td>
<td>25,214</td>
<td>30,918</td>
<td>27,250</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slawi</td>
<td>94,534</td>
<td>110,459</td>
<td>97,353</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Benghazi</td>
<td>89,182</td>
<td>84,095</td>
<td>74,117</td>
<td>-7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sahel Gharbi</td>
<td>8,078</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>23,664</td>
<td>193%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bu ‘Atni</td>
<td>30,107</td>
<td>73,185</td>
<td>64,502</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sidi Khilfa</td>
<td>9,284</td>
<td>23,765</td>
<td>20,946</td>
<td>126%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Kwaifyah</td>
<td>14,993</td>
<td>72,633</td>
<td>64,015</td>
<td>32.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maqzeha</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12,738</td>
<td>11,227</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huwari</td>
<td>2,125</td>
<td>50,469</td>
<td>44,481</td>
<td>193%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Nwaquia</td>
<td>3,361</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3,370</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qwarsha</td>
<td>10,602</td>
<td>35,254</td>
<td>31,071</td>
<td>224%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>577,939</strong></td>
<td><strong>571,839</strong></td>
<td><strong>811,816</strong></td>
<td><strong>715,498</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

21 Analysis performed by the Municipality of Benghazi.

22 Normal and damage induced occupation.
destructions Al Drawi and Louhichi in Old Benghazi (map 8).

Benghazi population density by Branch resulting from
UN-HABITAT housing analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benghazi Branches</th>
<th>2006 density (inh/ha)</th>
<th>2018 density (inh/ha)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Old Benghazi</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>23.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salmani</td>
<td>98.9</td>
<td>91.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Berka</td>
<td>86.8</td>
<td>81.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Fweihat</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slawi</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>75.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Benghazi</td>
<td>135.5</td>
<td>112.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sahel Gharbi</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bu ’Atni</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sidi Khifa</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Kwaifyah</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maqzeha</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huwari</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Nwaquia</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qwarsha</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.43</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.72</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

BENGHAZI POPULATION DISPLACEMENT

The conflict starting in 2011 had led to an initial flow of displacement of Benghazi population. But most of the IDPs were assumed to have settled within the Benghazi region. A second wave of IDPs followed between 2012 and mid-2014, when the “Ansar Al Shari’a” took control of Benghazi; and a third wave with the battles to liberate Benghazi, which just ended in December 2017. During these waves, Benghazi received also IDPs from other regions, which were displaced again (as for the case of Tawergha IDPs of 2011 displaced again in mid-2014)

Only 1,200 Benghazi households were accounted as displaced by the IOM during the first wave, but they already constituted 15% of total displaced population. People originating from Benghazi constituted 24% of total IDPs displaced in the second wave, while the governorate of Benghazi was assumed to host 28% of total IDPs. In 2015, those originating from Benghazi constituted 61% of the total displaced. 75% of the displaced indicated that the main reason is the fear/threat from conflict and armed groups presence.

Thus, in May 2016, the IOM accounted for 195,028 displaced from Benghazi, constituting then the largest community of IDPs (46.8% of total), settling in the Benghazi region (115,000, including Sukh and Tuca), in Al Bayda (21,500), in Ajdabiya (15,000) and other places (Al Kufrah, Zliten, etc.). In June 2016, they were estimated at 189,413, and 50,000 were assumed to have returned (19.4% of all returnees), to the Bu ‘Atni, Laythi and Bel’oun districts just taken by the LNA.

In September 2016, the returnees were 85,500, and the number remained almost the same at end of year, then increased to 132,050 during January and February 2017. They returned to Benghazi Al Jadida, Bu ‘Atni, Benina, Qwarcha and Al Fa’kat. The IDPs in Benghazi region were still 38,800 in March 2017, the highest in the country. Only around 3,000 were from outside Benghazi. But other regions remained hosting significant numbers (44,338) of IDPs from Benghazi: Misrata (11,559), Abu Slim (5,950), Al Bayda (4,449), Ajdabiya (3,070). In May-June 2017, returns were observed in to Qanfoudha and Qaryounes, making the returnees reaching 146,500. But the number of IDPs in the region also increased to 42,300. In September 2017, the returnees were 165,650, the IDPs out of the region decreasing to 28,457 and those inside the region were still at 41,950. In January 2018 and with the end of the fighting, the returnees to Benghazi reached 174,000 (51% of total returnees in the country, with especially the returns from Benghazi region to the district of Thawra Sha’abiya); while the IDPs in the region diminished to only 32,250. Finally, the last available DTM recorded 189,400 returnees, while 22,935 individuals from Benghazi are still IDPs in the

26 IOM: Libya IDP and returnee Report, May-June 2017.
28 So, the Benghazi IDPs would have been around 240,000.
31 Initial reports on return to Qaryounes were denied later in March.
34 IOM: Displacement Tracking Matrix Round 21, August 2018.
governorate, and 27,380 IDPs are outside the governorate. Only 450 IDPs from other regions were depicted in Benghazi.

These data indicates that around 240,000 individuals from Benghazi had been displaced in total during the events. This means that around 1/3rd of the municipality population had been displaced by the conflict. It is worth noting that the around 13,000 Benghazi IDPs in Misrata did not return, while they constitute half of those displaced away from the municipality.35 (Maps 9 and 10). Also, some IDPs and returnees have reported displaced several times36.

The last OCHA available report37 shows that Benghazi governorate has the largest number of population in need for humanitarian support (254,000 compare to 1.1 million for all Libya), among which 115,000 are returnees, 37,000 IDPs, 13,000 refugees and migrants and 88,000 amongst the non-displaced population. Benghazi accounts then for 22% of Libya IDPs in need, 58% of returnees in need, 23% of the non-displaced in need and only 3% of migrants and asylum seekers in need.

The recent HH household survey indicated that 73% of Benghazi population was not displaced, 23% are returnees (and 4% IDPs). Using DTM data for returnees for January 2018, this gives an estimation of the total population of Benghazi municipality at 760,000 inhabitants and of the non-displaced population at 555,560.

Also, a collective shelter camp for IDPs is reported in the South of Benghazi (Hillis in At Terba district of Sahel Gharbi)38. It hosts 330 HH (1450 individuals) who fled insecurity in their places of origin, their houses being destroyed or for lack of humanitarian aid. 14% of them are in vulnerable situation. This is despite the assessment that 78% of them receive their main income from government (but insufficient). At least, 1/3rd of them are from Tawergha.

Migrations to Benghazi

The BSC survey39 of 2012 accounted that more than 2/3 of Benghazi migrant population have left the country following 2011 events. Some has returned afterwards but fled back again when Benghazi was taken by jihadists.

In September 2016 and while the fighting continued in the city, the IOM accounted for 7,768 migrants in Benghazi region40, mostly Egyptians and Chadians (88% male at the national level). In June 2017, the migrants in Benghazi increased to 12,400; Egyptians (40%), Sudanese (21%) and Chadians (11%) in their majority. At the national level, the Africans migrants seeking to cross to Europe were on the rise; however, Benghazi port was still closed at that time, and the around 106 daily arrivals of migrants in the region were compensated by 136 departures to other regions of the country41; meaning that Benghazi was only a step for migrants before going to other regions in Libya. This movement of arrivals and departures slowed down significantly in September 2017, with total migrants in the region increasing slightly to 13,05042. In January 2018 and the end of the fighting, the migrants in

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Benghazi were 19,050, constituting – only – 3% of total migrant population in Libya and around the same for the population of Benghazi; meaning that migrant population did not reach the level of migrant workers before the crisis. 63% of Benghazi migrants were from North Africa (particularly Egyptians and Sudanese, see map 11), 26% from Africa and 11% from Middle East and Asia (mostly from Bangladesh)\textsuperscript{43}. One can assume that most of these Benghazi migrants (76% of them men in January 2018) were then to work in the city, as the closure of the port could not allow Benghazi to be a hub for migration to Europe. 70% of the migrants in Benghazi were there for more than 12 months, and the relationship with host communities were estimated poor, and their effect felt negative on labor market\textsuperscript{44}. The distribution of migrants by nationality confirms that they are almost all migrant workers. At the national level, 65% of the migrants were from Sub-Saharan Africa (mainly Niger and Chad), 29% from North Africa (mainly Egypt and Sudan) and 6% only from Middle East and Asia (mainly Bangladesh and Syria). 690,351 migrants all over Libya; 81% of them are adult men. 22% in Tripoli, 12% in Misrata, 10% in Ajdabiya.

In Benghazi, only 29% were from Sub-Saharan Africa, while 61% were from North Africa and 10% from Middle East and Asia.

\textsuperscript{43} IOM: DTM, Libya’s Migrant Report, Round 17, January 2018.

\textsuperscript{44} IOM: DTM Libya Flow Monitoring; Jan-Feb 2018.
The last IOM DTM reports a significant increase in the migrant community to 26,880\textsuperscript{45}; 65\% adult men, 17\% adult women and 6\% children. They were mainly concentrated in the districts of Kwaifyah and Al Mukhtar. Even with this increase, migrant population is less than 4\% of the municipality population and still much lower than pre-2011 levels of 7.9\%.

It is worth noting that Benghazi is not reported\textsuperscript{46} as a migrant smuggling hub or route-step in Libya, main or alternative. This is while 21,041 arrivals of migrants to Italy from Libya were reported in 2018 up to September 30, 2018, as well as 14,024 of migrants returned to Libya and 1,260 died in sea. Az Zawiya, Al Khums and Tripoli are reported being the most frequent places of departures\textsuperscript{47}.

\textsuperscript{45}IOM: DTM, Libya’s IDPs, Returnees & Migrants Report, Round 21, August 2018.

\textsuperscript{46}Reach: Mixed migration routes and dynamics in Libya, The impact of EU migration measures on mixed migration in Libya; April 2018.

\textsuperscript{47}IOM: Libya Maritime Update, September 30, 2018.
Benghazi Region Population 2006

- Benghazi: > 500,000
- City: 50,000 - 200,000
- Town: 10,000 - 50,000
- Small Town: 50,000 - 10,000
- Village: 3,000 - 5,000

City Profile of Benghazi, Libya
ECONOMY
3. Economy

Labor and employment in Benghazi

2012 Libyan official statistics\(^{48}\) accounted for a total population in age of work in Benghazi region of 473,430 and a total Libyan nationals labor force of 196,000; thus, with the lowest participation rate in the country (41.4%; 57.5% for males and 23.9% for females). 27.8% of the work force were females, a ratio much lower than the national average of 34.4%.

The Libyans employed in Benghazi accounted for a total of 168,100; 25.4% of which were women. This led to an employment rate of 14.2%; 11.5% for men and 21.2% for women, both below national averages of respectively 51.3% and 25.3%.

The ratio of the Libyans employed to those in age of work is then lowest in Benghazi than the Libya average. This is mainly due to a low employed to working age ratio for females (18.8% comparatively with 25.3% in average in Libya). Thus, as employment in Libya is overwhelmingly in the administration and the public sector, Benghazi women appear less involved in public salaries than other Libyan women.

The comparison of employment by sector between this 2012 survey\(^{49}\) and the census of 2006 lead to the significant observations. Benghazi had in 2006 a lower share (9.9%) of those working in agriculture & fishery than Libya average (11.0%). This activity involves mainly men. The smaller share of those working in agriculture in Libya in 2012 (0.8%) is due to security conditions and to that a 1/3\(^{rd}\) of those were foreigner, who migrated abroad following the revolt.

The share of those working in minerals and quarries in Benghazi in 2006 was 3.0%, a little more than the national average of 2.4%. 2012 survey gave the same share for Libyans at the national level. Benghazi seems then not seriously involved in the oil and gas production of the country.

5.9% of Benghazi workers were in 2006 in manufacturing, above the national level of 4.5%. 3.8% worked in water and electricity in Benghazi, comparatively to a national average of 2.7% in 2006 and 2.9% in 2012. 7.7% worked in construction, mainly men, more than the national average of 6.4% which slowed to 1.8% in 2012 reflecting the importance of foreign workers in this sector (2/3\(^{rd}\)).

14.3% worked in trade in 2006 in Benghazi, showing the importance of the city as a trade hub, while the national average was 8.6% in 2006 decreasing to 5.6% in 2012. Transportation occupied a share of 6.9% in Benghazi in 2006, with 4.4% in national average in 2006 and 2012. This also show the importance of Benghazi for logistics activities.

Also, Benghazi had in 2006 a lower share of those working in public administrations (20.6%) than Libya average (22.9%). In Benghazi, only 13.4% of women used to work in public administrations comparatively to 22.5% of men. The 2012 survey on Libyans gave 34.6% in such employment.

18.4% worked in education in 2006 in Benghazi (8.4% of men and 57.9% of women). The national average was 27.8% increasing to 32.0% in 2012. The health sector share was in 2006 of 4.3% for Benghazi (2.5% for men and 11.1% for women). In comparison, the national averages were 4.9% in 2006 and 6.8% in 2012.

It is worth noting that in September 2017 36.5% of adult members in HH indicated having a permanent job\(^{50}\); much below the national average of 47.5%. This is while 61.2% said that part of their income is derived from government salary (national average 57.1%).

Benghazi is then characterized by its important trade and transportation/logistics sectors. Benghazi is in fact a major historical port of Libya. These sectors suffered from the closing of the port (and the airport) during the fighting. However, as it shall be shown here below, the traders of Benghazi had managed to create a new hub


\(^{49}\) No details are given for this LFS city by city or region by region.

\(^{50}\) OCHA: Multi-Sector Needs Assessment, September 2017
out of the historical downtown to continue their activities and trade leadership, even if imports were made through Tobruk or Egypt.

The presence of the first and most important university in the country and of the Central Bank head office also constitute important assets for the city.

Salaries constituted 50.4% as main sources of income, retirement pensions 19.2% and social pensions another 9.4%; thus, if all salaries are from government, more of 80% of the households depend in their revenues on government (only 58% of IDPs). This is a much higher share than in Sirte, where such dependency was only 60%.

The details of the survey show that such dependency is even higher in old Benghazi (95%) and Qwarsha (87%).

8% of HH have their main income from free professions (20% in Sirte); 0.4% from selling agricultural products (6.1% in Sirte); but 5.6% of HH have their main income from trade SMEs (4.2% in Sirte). 2.7% from irregular work (4.1% in Sirte) and 4% from properties or other sources (including 1.5% from their savings).

The details of the survey show the highest share of trade in revenues in Al Nwaqia (25%) and the highest in free professions in Al Fweihat (40%).

And it is worth noting that only 0.2% of HH indicate that their main income is from UN or NGO aid (most of them...
in New Benghazi), as in Sirte; but, 4.9% of IDPs and 0.1% of returnees. This suggests that only 1,740 returnees receive aid out of the 115,000 in need, 1,490 IDPs out of the 37,000 in need, and no one among the 88,000 non-displaced and 13,000 refugees in need. This is while the UNHCR indicated distributing cash assistance to 8,084 individuals in Benghazi and non-food items to 19,317.

The major challenges facing household income were related to the late or non-payment of salaries (30.8%) and less to the rising of prices (20.9%), especially for food items (18.4%). The effect of the accelerating inflation that is eroding the purchasing power of government wages and pensions is less felt in Benghazi than in Sirte. It is worth noting that 9.6% of households complain about the lack of job opportunities (only 2.1% in Sirte), 3.9% only among the returnees and 13.8% among the IDPs. 9.5% of the HH have no challenge for their income; 6.5% among the returnees.

With the limitation of cash withdrawals by Libya Central Bank to curb inflation, the HH survey indicates that 63.5% of HH have limited access to liquidity (90% in Al Fweihat, 82% in Bu ‘Atni and 80% in Old Benghazi and New Benghazi; in comparison 71.0% for Sirte) and that 24.8% have no access at all (59% in Qwarsha, 43% in Al Berka and 42% in Slawi; in comparison 12.0% for Sirte). This is while only 2.7% consider the banking system as a major challenge (map 12).

More than 83.3% of HH were able to withdraw an amount above 300 LYD (US$ 227 at official rate and US$ 43 at black market rate), while this is the case for only 64% in Sirte. In September 2017, 91.7% were able to withdraw above 300 LYD.

The issue of cash availability and use was further addressed in the HH survey through question on the payment method used. And in this case, the comparison with Sirte is worth detailing.

70% of Benghazi non-displaced HH uses cash for payment, as in Sirte. However, checks are less used in Benghazi, replaced by credit cards (12.5% of the non-displaced) or mobile phone payments (8.5%). However, although this is a very low amount for a country with a high GDP per capita.

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it is not clear why only 14.1% of Benghazi returnees are using cash payment, while most of them were displaced within Benghazi governorate. 50.3% of Sirte returnees were using cash. This is while 49.4% of Benghazi IDPs are using cash, and a significant share of them are from Benghazi.

The details of the 2018 survey indicated that credit cards are mostly used in Qwarsha (69%) and in Salmani (30%). This is while checks are mostly used in Bu ‘Atni (55%) and Al Fweihat (16%).

In line, the survey indicates that 65.9% of Benghazi returnees complain about challenges in the banking system, while only 30.6% of the non-displaced and 19.6% of the IDPs. The details indicate that the problem of access is the most acute in Bu ‘Atni (81%).

These results need further investigation to assess the issue of cash availability, while Libya Central Bank and the commercial banks had significantly developed electronic payment systems. Per example, Benghazi hosts the largest number of points of sale of the “pay-me, Edfali” mobile payment system of the Bank of Commerce & Development (BCD).

In addition, the HH surveys address coping strategies. 5.1% of households indicate that they have spent their savings (12.0% of IDPs and 2.6% of returnees). 8.0% indicate that they have been forced to sell home appliances and assets; 8.8% among IDPs and 23.3% of returnees. Very few (around 1%) had used credit to buy food, sold their productive assets (except IDPs 5.8%), taken out children from school, reduced their spending on non-food items (NFI) (except IDPs 7.8%) or changed location to cope with income difficulties. This may indicate a decrease in negative coping strategies since 2017 when 22.7% of HH were highly using them.56

Finally, 3.5% of HH appear poor and another 3.4% below border line among food consumption groups. The shares are higher for IDPs and much lower for the returnees. When the head of the family is a woman, the shares increase respectively to 5.8% and 5.2%.

The details indicate that the highest share of poor is in Al Berka (12%), as well as the highest share of borderline (6.4%).

### Benghazi Market Assessment

Reach produced last year a market system assessment58 performed by the Libya Cash & Markets Working Group (CMWG)59 in Tripoli, Benghazi and Sebha. It concluded that “on the whole, consumers (including refugees and migrants) in Tripoli, Benghazi and Sebha have physical access to markets, with temporary access issues related to insecurity affecting smaller segments of the population as conflict peaks. The lack of access to cash is a major access issue that hinders consumers from acquiring basic commodities in quantities required to meet basic needs”.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Food Consumption group</th>
<th>Poor</th>
<th>Borderline</th>
<th>Acceptable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non displaced</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>91.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
<td>79.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returnees</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>98.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>93.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

57 Mercy Corps: Libya’s Shadow Economy; April 2017.
58 Reach: Market Systems in Libya; Assessment of the Wheat Flour, Insulin, Tomato and Sopa Supply Chain; October 2017.
59 The Libya Cash & Markets Working Group (CMWG) was created in 2016 to analyse the impact of the ongoing conflict on markets in Libya and guide the implementation of humanitarian cash and voucher interventions within those markets.
“different population groups—non-displaced, internally displaced (IDPs), migrants and refugees—interact with markets in similar ways”; however, some access limitations were found, especially for non-Libyans (migrants and refugees) who are not eligible to access food subsidies and free insulin from the local authorities”. The “assessed supply chains are functional and have the capacity to meet demand from consumers in Libya”. “The overall functionality of the supply chains has not been affected by the lack of cash. The liquidity crisis is felt on the demand side: Consumers cannot access cash at the required amounts and therefore struggle to purchase key household goods”.

This Key Informant’s based research that the majority of shops Benghazi do not accept any forms of payment other than cash, even if alternative payment modalities had particularly developed in this city. Such payment modalities still have little relevance overall and might be recently decreasing. Average waiting time at banks in Benghazi was 4.8 hours. The Price Stability Fund (PSF), in charge of providing subsidized goods to the population, is still active in Benghazi, while disrupted in Tripoli and Sebha. The Medical Supply Organization (MSO), providing freely medicines at the local public health centers, is also still operational in Benghazi. But, it lacks hard currency funds from the Central Bank to import. In September 2017, 62.4% of Benghazi HH complained not being able to access subsidized goods. The main difficulty being administrative difficulties.

It is here worth noting that the port of Benghazi closed since 2014 and was not reopened before early 2018 after the victory on the extremist groups. During this period, imports were made through the port of Tobruk. Also, the wholesale traders and the major fresh goods markets had moved from downtown districts of Benghazi towards (Sabri, etc.) the Northern districts of Sidi Khliifa. The activities continued as prior to the conflict. These wholesale traders and markets returned now to downtown, and the port reopened.

The last Minimum Expenditure Basket (MBA) of the CMWG has shown to increase by +9.0% in a month and by +9.8% in two months, mainly because of the increase of cooking fuel.

The base food items are cheaper in Benghazi than Al-Bayda and Al-Marj; like those of Tobruk, but more expensive than in Ajdabiya. This may be due to the proximity of Ajdabiya to local agricultural production. Far away from the East, they are cheaper than those in Tripoli, but more expensive than those of Sirte and Misrata.

For non-food items, Ajdabiya is also cheaper than Benghazi; what could suggest that it took a major wholesale trade role on Benghazi, maybe with the same old Benghazi traders.

In September 2017, 13.5% of HH indicated that they have difficulties to access markets. This was mainly due to the proximity of Ajdabiya to local agricultural production. Far away from the East, they are cheaper than those in Tripoli, but more expensive than those of Sirte and Misrata.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City Profile of Benghazi, Libya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Food price index</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NFI price index</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

60 Some merchants are stopping dealing with electronic payments as their banks and the CBL did not deliver to them cash, at least partially, to purchase their inputs. See: Mercy Corps: Libya’s Shadow Economy; April 2017.

61 Such as oil, sugar, tomato paste, wheat flour (irregular) and tea.

to issues of distance to market (20.9% of returnees and 18.7% of IDPs)\textsuperscript{63}.

**Economy during war**

Even during war, some economic activities continued and participated to the “war economy”, as it is difficult to replace some economic functions and networks that cities could have built between each other during decades and centuries. This is most probably the case for the trade activities in Libya, especially as for Benghazi which is the main port of the East and the wholesale trade hub.

During the conflict, the port of Benghazi was closed, and importations were made through the port of Tobruk. The wholesale and logistics activities of Benghazi merchants were displaced to the northern neighborhoods of the city. In general, prices of imported goods were higher in Benghazi than in Tobruk.

The application of a price measurement method of “war economy”\textsuperscript{64} shows that the general level of food prices in Benghazi are higher nowadays than those in Ajdabiya\textsuperscript{65} (see map 13). This may suggest that, because of the length of the conflict, some Benghazi wholesale and logistics activities had been transferred to Ajdabiya. This is even clearer when non-food prices (map 14) are analyzed, as no local production is involved.

In both cases, the commercial trade flow starts with imports from Tobruk or Benghazi, then Ajdabiya and Benghazi insures distribution to markets towards both the northern (Al Marj, Al Bayda, Derna) and the southern cities (Kufra). The significant price differential between Ajdabiya and Kufra is certainly due to the difficulties of logistics and security.

It doesn’t seem that there is a trade flow from the West towards to the East of the country; it could be the contrary, as prices in the East are lower than those in Sirte. Also, as for the trade flow in the East, it seems that Misrata (now a major port) had taken over some wholesale and logistics activities on Tripoli, and that Brak is the major trade hub for the South. The price measurement method suggests also flows of goods from Tunisia and Algeria.

**Reintegration of combatants in the economy and society**

Many of the 27% young population aged 15-29 had participated as combatant in the different phases of the civil war. The Libyan program for Reintegration & Development (LPRD)\textsuperscript{66} estimated in 2005 the number of combatants at more than 300,000; i.e. more than 1/3 of all males aged 15-29 or more than 2/3 of the work force of the same age.

Within its programs, LRPD had accounted in 2015 around 213,000 applicants and screened and vetted 163,000. A third among them were university graduates, and a half below the age of 31\textsuperscript{67}. The choices for reintegration of the screened combatants were astonishing. Only 6,000 wanted to join the army, while the total forces of the army were before 2011 of around 20,000. Fewer wanted to join the border police and 11,000 the well-paid oil guards. 44,000 wanted to be civil servants in the security Ministries, while 78,000 wanted to open their own businesses; knowing that the total of own-account Libyan working men in 2012 was 81,000. The LRPD program accounted for creating

\begin{itemize}
    \item Reach Libya: Libya Joint Market Monitoring Initiative, round 11, April 2018.
    \item Florence Gaub: Libya the Struggle for Security, EUISS Brief, June 2013; based on an internal LRPD survey. The total figures of the warriors screened in this brief of 2013 is higher than that of the LRPD progress report of 2015.
\end{itemize}
around 7,000 projects. The efficiency of this program is unclear.

It is worth noting that many of those who opened businesses have in fact profited from availability of hard currencies at the official rate, that they use to resell with profit to wholesale importing traders.
Map 13

Food Prices* and Trade Flow in Libya

Trade Flow
- Capital
- Main Cities
- Other Cities
- Main Road
- Local Road
- Waterway
- Airport

Territorial control
(situation as known July 19, 2018)

- LNA and allies
- GNA and allies
- « Islamic State »
- Tuareg militias
- Toubou militias
- Other groups / mixed or unclear

* The food price index was calculated by adding up the median price of one unit of each item (excluding baby milk and lamb)

City Profile of Benghazi, Libya
Multisector Assessment
4. MULTISECTOR NEEDS ASSESSMENT OF BENGHAZI MUNICIPALITY

Municipality Governance

The law n° 59 of 2012 has set the administrative divisions in the country in Mouhafazat (governorates, named sometimes Mantiqa or region), Baladiyat (municipalities or area68) and Mahallat (districts). Some municipalities could be divided in branches (Furu’ or neighborhoods). Only the governorates and the municipalities have official and financial status and can have all State executive authorities following specific rules of decentralization, under the authority of the Ministry of Local Administration. They are also to have a representative Council, elected every 4 years. The Mouhafez (governor) and the dean (‘Amid) of the municipality are elected by their respective councils.

No elections of the governorates’ councils had been held, and the only local administration active since 2012 are the municipalities. The elections of municipalities’ councils took place all over Libya in 2013, including that of Benghazi. However, with the takeover of the city by the jihadists and conflicts within the municipal Council, the military governor of the East of Libya had dissolved the council in 2015 and nominated a dean (President of the Municipal Council) and his deputy. The council of Benghazi is then today directly reporting to the Ministry of Local Governance of the Interim Government (of East Libya).

The municipalities are responsible of public services within their jurisdiction. In addition, they give the authorizations for touristic and investment projects and oversee:

- Local civil records,
- local police, local markets and slaughterhouses,
- local roads and bridges,
- local business licenses,
- local control of environment and health,
- the creation and the management of small enterprises’ incubators.

However, most of these functions and public services are still currently managed by the central government or by specialized public companies. No transfer of authority has yet been made to the municipalities. In addition, no formal process of municipality budgeting and accounting has been enforced. The collection of local taxes and fees had been stopped by the government since 2011. No official construction license had been granted since; then and all new constructions or repairs of damaged buildings made after 2011 can be considered as informal. This is while the constructions developed rapidly, notably to shelter IDPs and returnees.

According to the functionality assessment conducted by the key informants of UN-Habitat, the municipality, civil registry, administrative and law enforcement facilities are reported working partially in the city, with easy access to civil servants. However, these facilities were severely damaged, and many constraints were observed on their equipment and supplies. In all districts, local access to law enforcement authorities was considered possible, and security relatively good.
However, the access to administrative facilities were found very different between the municipality branches. People from Bu 'Atni, Sidi Khlifa, Maqzeha, and Huwari need more than half an hour to reach and administrative facility. The results for Hayy Al Zeitoun controversial.

The HH survey indicates however 57.6% of the population are distant from the nearest administrative facility by more than 6 km. Access to law enforcement was assessed possible by key Informants in all branches of Benghazi municipality. Only, in Maqzeha branch complaints about difficulties were mentioned.

Also, property registries were assessed available in most districts. But, they seem to be destroyed in the branches of Hayy Al Zeitoun, Sahel Gharbi, Huwari and Qwarsha, but available through electronic safeguard. Only in Old Benghazi, the registries are assessed to be destroyed with no back-up.

For legal affairs, the key informants’ UN-habitat ground verification shows most of the prosecutor offices and courts located in Old Benghazi are destroyed and not operational (map 15).

The situation is different for civil administration offices, as they are decentralized in the different districts (within the old boundaries). Few of them are non-operational map 16).

The public legal and registration administrations employ 1,158 civil servants.

The security conditions in Benghazi

UN-Habitat 2018 ground verification assessed most of Benghazi branches as safe, with Sidi Khlifa and Al Nwaquia considered as very safe. Only branches of Sahel Gharbi and Huwari were considered unsafe.

Consequently, the return of IDPs was considered possible or already made to the safe neighborhoods and even to unsafe Sahel Gharbi and Huwari. This is while such return was assessed impossible to Zeitoun neighborhood in Al Fweihat.

The HH survey indicated 1.9% of HH fear the presence of mines or explosives nearby (0.9% of the non-displaced, 1.2% of the IDPs and 4.4% of the returnees). The details indicate that such fear is high in Qwarsha (16%) and to a lesser extent in Salmani and New Benghazi. In 2017, 8.6% of HH reported the presence of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legal Facility</th>
<th>Staff</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Benghazi primary court</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>Operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Benghazi prosecution</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>Operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Benghazi Court</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>Non-Operational, destroyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Benghazi prosecution</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>Non-Operational, destroyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Benghazi court</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>Operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Benghazi prosecution</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benghazi Public Attorney Office</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Non-Operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benghazi Attorneys Office</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>Non-Operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benghazi Court of Appeal</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>Operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benghazi Legal Inspection Office</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People Court</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Registry Facility</th>
<th>Staff</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mukhtar civil administration</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mukhtar service center</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slawi civil administration</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berka civil administration</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sidi Hussein civil administration</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ras A'bida civil administration</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benghazi central civil administration</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qwarsha civil administration</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>partially operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Benghazi civil administration</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benina civil administration</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jumhur Hospital birth registry office</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>non-operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deceased registry office</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of returnees from migration</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax office</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
such hazards\cite{70}, what could indicate that war remnants have been removed in many areas.

Also, 0.4% of HH experienced child harm or physical or psychological or sexual abuse (0.7% among IDPs). The highest share of such responses came in Qwarsha (1.6%) and Slawi.

Also, a youth questionnaire in the survey was related to the involvement or experience of young people in violence. The involvement in violence seems to increase with age, except for the young males aged 20-24 years who have a high involvement of 4.9%.
Map 15

Legal Affairs Facilities

- Unaffected, Operational
- Severe, Non-operational

District
Branches
Municipality Boundary

City Profile of Benghazi, Libya

Benghazi Legal Affairs Facilities

Mediterranean Sea

5 km

Unaffected, Operational
Severe, Non-operational
Map 16

Service and Administration Facilities
- Green: Unaffected, Operational
- Red: Severe, Non-operational
- Blue: No Data Available

District
Branches
Municipality Boundary

City Profile of Benghazi, Libya
Urban planning

The first master plan of Benghazi goes back to 1914 and 1922 during the Italian occupation of Libya. The city was developed around the old Arabic quarters and the port (now in the branch of Old Benghazi) in European style design. Significant areas were dedicated to administrative buildings and to industrial and commercial activities, as well as to the residencies of the civil-servants and the workers.

In the middle of the 20th century, the expansion had mixed story buildings and classical Arabic houses, what led to the extension of the urbanized zones all along the sea shore towards the North-East, up to the marshes, as well as around the port which was expanded after World War II.

Following Libya oil discoveries in late 1950’s, the urbanization developed rapidly, The 1st generation master plan of (1966-1988) aimed at reorganizing the city along a circular-radial network of streets and with a new distribution of land-use focusing on the encouragement of trade and administrative services. This was followed by a 2nd generation master plan (1980-2000), and a 3rd generation master plan between 2005 and 2011, with the densification of urban areas, the creation of a green belt and the formalization of informal extensions as main concerns (map 17).

However, this 3rd master plan has never been achieved. In 2009, the master plan of Benghazi had been further developed WITHOUT detailed application maps.

The spread of the informal urban housing appeared after the second planning stage (2000) and accelerated after 2011.

This resulted in a fragmentation of the urban environment, as some central municipality branches (Furu’) and districts (mahallas) still has low population density, due to the mixture between urban and rural environment. Fenced farms are still located in some branches such Al Mukhtar in Slawi, and others.

Although, some mahallas developed high density urban environments, namely in the branches of New Benghazi, Salmani and Al Berka. The fighting and destruction concentrated in such mahallas including New and Old Laythi in New Benghazi. Informal settlements also developed significantly, per example in Bu ‘Atni, with a correlation, here again, with intense fighting and destruction.

Construction activities took then place during the fighting. Particularly, it was noticed that the year 2017 had experienced a significant (although informal) building activity in areas not affected by the combats: on the edge of Old Kwaifyah and Sidi Meftah (Bu ‘Atni).

The reconstruction and recovery effort should be made considering the perspectives of the future development of the city in its mainly radial mode. Particularly, the preservation of central green zones and the limitation of polluting industries should be major concerns, as well as the (re-)organization of the housing environment.

LAND USE

In its present limits, the municipality of Benghazi develops on a land surfacing a total of 106,513 ha. Only 54,144 ha (50%) are used; the rest is empty, hosting lakes, marshes (sabkha) or unusable land. 71% of the land of Sahel Gharbi, 63% of Al Kwaifyah, 62% of Old Benghazi, 60% of Qwarsha and 57% of Sidi Khlifa are unused.

The smallest branch is that of New Benghazi, accounting for only 658 ha, experiencing the highest density of population, followed by the other branches within the old limits of the municipality.

Slawi branch has the largest share of residential areas (66%), especially the district of Shebna (82%), followed

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73 As well as for Tripoli, and not the other cities of Libya.
74 Adel A. S. Mohamed, 2013, op. cit.
75 EMSN-033: Satellite-based conflict damage assessment of two selected cities in Libya; Indra, P11104 Ed1 v2; May 17; 2017.
by the branch of New Benghazi (54%), and then Al Berka (50%), and in particular its Badriya and Khaled bin Waleed districts (61%).

New Benghazi has the largest share of commercial areas (4%), followed by Huwari and Al Berka (3%). This is while Sabri in Old Benghazi was known to be the historical commercial area of the city.

The industrial land occupies 11% of the surface of Sahel Gharbi, especially Bu Fakhra (29%), 7% of Al Kwaifyah (11% of the district of Bu Dzirah), 6% of Old Benghazi (because of the port, with 9% for the districts of Akharbish and Jeliana), of Bu ‘Atni and of Huwari (18% of Sayda Khadija) and Al Nwaquia.

Education establishments occupy 19% of Al Fweihat (42% of Qaryounes with the main university campus).

Agriculture still occupy 27% of the land of the municipality; a surface larger that of housing. This is especially the case for the branch of Maqzeha (70%), but also Sidi Khlifa (33%), Bu ‘Atni and Al Nwaquia 21%, but 57% of the lands of the districts of Al Nwaquia and Talhiya).

### Benghazi Branches

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benghazi Branches</th>
<th>surface (ha)</th>
<th>Residential</th>
<th>Commercial</th>
<th>Governmental</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Health</th>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Religious</th>
<th>Agric</th>
<th>Transport</th>
<th>empty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Old Benghazi</td>
<td>1,736.6</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salmani</td>
<td>1,171.1</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Berka</td>
<td>1,286.0</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Fweihat</td>
<td>1,844.2</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slawi</td>
<td>1,285.5</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Benghazi</td>
<td>658.0</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sahel Gharbi</td>
<td>13,556.8</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bu ‘Atni</td>
<td>8,361.7</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sidi Khlifa</td>
<td>11,538.0</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Kwaifyah</td>
<td>11,538.0</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maqzeha</td>
<td>22,485.9</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huwari</td>
<td>4,840.0</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Nwaquia</td>
<td>8,020.5</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qwarsha</td>
<td>12,124.9</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>106,513.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>17%</strong></td>
<td><strong>1%</strong></td>
<td><strong>0%</strong></td>
<td><strong>1%</strong></td>
<td><strong>1%</strong></td>
<td><strong>0%</strong></td>
<td><strong>4%</strong></td>
<td><strong>0%</strong></td>
<td><strong>27%</strong></td>
<td><strong>0%</strong></td>
<td><strong>50%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Housing**

**Housing Units in Benghazi**

According to the 2006 census, 38,112 households in the urban part of Benghazi *mantiqa* used “Arabic houses” (38%), 17,079 “villas” (17%), 41,923 apartments (41%) and 4% other types; totaling 101,254 housing units. No indications were available on the number of housing structures (buildings, each containing 1 or several family housing units) within the municipality in 2006.

The third generation plan for the municipality of Benghazi (within its old limits) accounted for 59,795 housing structures, constituting 99,968 housing units, occupying 5,057 ha, what constitutes 48% of the built area in the municipality land. These residential structures were distributed as follows:

- 41,700 Arabic houses (70% of structures) constituting the same number of housing units (42% of total);
- 12,356 villas (“dar”, 21% of structures) constituting the same number of housing units (12% of total);
- And 5,739 buildings (10% of structures) constituting 45,912 housing units (46% of total).


Around half of the population residing within the old limits of the municipality used then to live in apartments. The “Arabic houses” and “villas” types of housing were found to be often constituted of more than a ground floor, including 1, 2 or 3 additional floors.

76 الهيئة العامة للمعلومات: النتائج النهائية للتعداد العام للسكان لسنة 2006، ص. 284.

Most of the ground floors of buildings were used for non-residential purposes.

The UPA report noted that a significant share of the housing units was in bad conditions and that a large development of informal housing occurred in the 1st decade of the 2000’s. In addition, the Office for Development of Administrative Centers (ODAC) and the Housing and Infrastructure Bureau (HIB) had developed housing projects in the 2000’s comprising 57,035 housing units capable of hosting 285,175 inhabitants. Not all have been completed.

In 2016, the housing in Benghazi municipality (new limits) was assessed to be constituted of 140,000 units. 53% of these units are traditional Arabic style houses, and only 5% in villas. The remaining 41% were apartments in buildings. Informal settlements occupied 13% of the used housing areas. They were mostly concentrated in the newly developing municipality branches of Sahel Gharbi, Qwarcha, Nowakiya, Maqzeha and Sidi Khilfa. However, the branches of Huwari and Al Kwaifya inside the limits of the 3rd generation plan still have small portions of informal settlements.

The districts/Mahallat of At Terba, Um Mabruka, Budrissa and Maqzeha seemed to be only made of informal settlements. But the largest areas of informal housing are in the districts of Sidi Khilfa (28%) and Fa’akat, which occupies a wide surface (map 19).

The notion of informal housing should however be considered with precautions. In fact, before the conflict old informal housing had been declared “formalized” without clear vision on property registries. After 2011, the municipality and the administration services seem to have stopped registry of properties. This is while the housings are connected to water, electricity, sewage, etc.

Is there a housing deficit in Benghazi?

An assessment on housing in Libya had indicated that the 2006 census registered 5,323,991 inhabitants and 886,978 households with only 659,122 housing units. In face of such deficit in housing (46% of total), forcing several families to share their lodging, the government had granted 120,318 housing loans between 2006 and 2010.

The assessment concluded that in 2014 there was still a deficit of 353,139 housing units (overall Libya, in addition to those with those built with the loans. These constituted 54% additional housing units to the total of 2006. The study expected this deficit to increase to 1,164,134 units in 2033. It is probable that following the revolt of 2011, a rapid development of informal housing had resulted from this existing deficit.

80 Ali Abhire: Analysis of the cumulative housing deficit in Libya until 2033; 2018 (key informants, in Arabic).

81 Including renewal of aging houses.
Thus, informal housing developed significantly in Benghazi, while some building structures, non completed, as in Sahel Gharbi continue to be empty.

The property registry

Libya has started using the property registry following the Ottoman land law of 1858. The State started creating “Khaqani registry” offices in each “Wilayet” (administrative region) including Libya. All lands, houses and buildings had been registered, after verifying ownership, as “masqufat” (roofs, houses or buildings), lands (used for agriculture or other or even unused), “waqf” (endowment) or “amiri” (public).

During the Italian colonization in 1911, the law n° 48 of 1913 had been issued to register properties, followed by law n° 1207 of 1921. The old Khaqani properties had been mostly recognized. These laws stayed in force after the independence in 1951, until the issuing (in September 28, 1965) of a new national property registry law, inspired by the Egyptian law of 1946.

Following the coup of 1969, new rules had been established, limiting the size of land which can be owned, confiscating lands and properties owned by the former royal family and key figures, seizing directly lands and houses considered over the needs of owners and distributing such properties, the waqf and those of the State (public) to new owners.

Fearing claims from old owners, the former regime burnt most of the property and cadaster documentation. This has culminated in the memorable day of November 17, 1985, when members of the “popular committees” intervened to burn the property registry offices in every major city. Also, the law n° 11 of 1988 canceled the validity of all former property documents and a new law n°12 of the same instituted the “socialist property registry”.

However, a reform was undertaken following the constitution of a committee of experts that had led to issuing the Law n°17 of 2010. This new law recognized some aspects of the royal period law and instituted proper mechanisms to identify properties, for their registries and for solving disputes. But this law never came in force as the “Revolution” erupted in early 2011. Any new registration of property has been stopped until the country is in a stable environment. The office of property registration and the committees formed still have to solve the claims of the old owners before 1969, recognized by the new constitution, and to create new fair bases and rules.

In the HH survey, 92% of the households declare that they own their housing, and only 5% rent their residence place. It is also noticeable that 5% of the households obtained their housing freely from the State or from NGOs. However, the projects of social construction had been stopped since 2011.

**Satellite mapping by UN-Habitat**

An analysis of satellite images of 2006 was conducted. It shows 51,504 housing structures (buildings) within...
the old limits of the municipality and 57,439 within the new limits. The total number of structures is close to that assessed by UPA.

The majority of “ground floor” only structures were found outside the old limits of the municipality. Also, a significant share (+36%) of “ground floor +5” structures were found outside the limits, due to the new construction projects.

The same GIS satellite imagery analysis was conducted for mid-2018. The total number of structures had increased in 12 years to 104,126; thus 81%. This large increase was mainly due to that of “ground floor” structures, which had been multiplied by 7.5 times. The “ground +1” structures had been multiplied by 2.3 times, and most of the building construction came with the “ground+4” structures which has increased by 35%.

### Benghazi housing types 2006 according -UN-Habitat GIS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benghazi housing types</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ground floor</td>
<td>2,152</td>
<td>5,354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground +1</td>
<td>3,047</td>
<td>4,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground +2</td>
<td>15,863</td>
<td>19,785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground +3</td>
<td>9,921</td>
<td>10,472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground +4</td>
<td>698</td>
<td>949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground +6</td>
<td>673</td>
<td>680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>51,504</td>
<td>57,439</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Benghazi housing types 2018 according -UN-Habitat GIS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benghazi housing types</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ground floor</td>
<td>5,354</td>
<td>40,119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground +1</td>
<td>3,499</td>
<td>8,201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground +2</td>
<td>16,700</td>
<td>19,191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground +3</td>
<td>19,785</td>
<td>20,719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground +4</td>
<td>10,472</td>
<td>14,086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground +5</td>
<td>949</td>
<td>1,069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground +6</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>741</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>57,439</td>
<td>104,126</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

82 A building with several apartments on the same floor was accounted for in the GIS analysis as a many structures (per example 2 apartments = 2 structures).

The branches of Qwarsha, Al Kwaifyah, Al Nwaquia, Huwari, Sahel Gharbi, Bu ‘Atni and Sidi Khlifa had seen most of these new constructions. It is the branch of Sahel Gharbi which has seen the large new constructions of “ground +4”. The initially densely built areas had seen much slower development.
The following images show the satellite images comparison between 2006 and 2018 for the branches and districts of Bu ‘Atni, Old Kwaifyah and Bu Dzirah.

The GIS imagery analysis gives a base number of housing units of 141,587 within the old limits of the municipality and 152,321 within the new limits, well above the 99,968 given by the UPA, meaning that not all of them were finished, used and occupied in 2006. If no damages and destruction had occurred, the number of housing units would have been 214,994 in 2018.

The HH survey indicate 58% of HH living in “Arabic houses”, 9% in “villas”, 29% in apartments and 4% in “others”.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benghazi Branches</th>
<th>G</th>
<th>G+1</th>
<th>G+2</th>
<th>G+3</th>
<th>G+4</th>
<th>G+5</th>
<th>G+6</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Old Benghazi</td>
<td>905</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>1,554</td>
<td>1,923</td>
<td>1,144</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>6,237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salmani</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>1,237</td>
<td>5,022</td>
<td>3,332</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>10,462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Berka</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>2,285</td>
<td>5,740</td>
<td>3,801</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>12,684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Fweihat</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>2,553</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>4,028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slawi</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>1,593</td>
<td>4,141</td>
<td>3,983</td>
<td>1,240</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11,090</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Benghazi</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>72</td>
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<td>1,567</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5,332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sahel Gharbi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bu ‘Atni</td>
<td>1,657</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sidi Khlifa</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Kwaifyah</td>
<td>1,545</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maqzeha</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huwari</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>998</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Nwaquia</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qwarsha</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>5,354</td>
<td>3,499</td>
<td>16,700</td>
<td>19,785</td>
<td>10,472</td>
<td>949</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>57,439</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benghazi Branches</th>
<th>G</th>
<th>G+1</th>
<th>G+2</th>
<th>G+3</th>
<th>G+4</th>
<th>G+5</th>
<th>G+6</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Old Benghazi</td>
<td>1,283</td>
<td>638</td>
<td>1,617</td>
<td>1,999</td>
<td>1,183</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>7,035</td>
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<tr>
<td>Salmani</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>1,312</td>
<td>5,234</td>
<td>3,451</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>10,977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Berka</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>2,440</td>
<td>5,859</td>
<td>4,147</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>13,503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Fweihat</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>2,766</td>
<td>807</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>4,862</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slawi</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>1,998</td>
<td>4,814</td>
<td>4,229</td>
<td>1,327</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12,518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Benghazi</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>3,711</td>
<td>1,606</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5,633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sahel Gharbi</td>
<td>5,886</td>
<td>645</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2,761</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9,388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bu ‘Atni</td>
<td>8,860</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10,364</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sidi Khlifa</td>
<td>2,834</td>
<td>928</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3,895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Kwaifyah</td>
<td>9,037</td>
<td>1,372</td>
<td>703</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11,554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maqzeha</td>
<td>2,168</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huwari</td>
<td>3,562</td>
<td>877</td>
<td>1,320</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6,126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Nwaquia</td>
<td>648</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qwarsha</td>
<td>4,945</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5,455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>40,119</td>
<td>8,201</td>
<td>19,191</td>
<td>20,719</td>
<td>14,086</td>
<td>1,069</td>
<td>741</td>
<td>104,126</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Satellite images 2006-2018 Bu Dzirah district
DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

Benghazi experienced severe damage in the urban areas during the battle of Benghazi of the 2nd Libyan civil war. The damages are related to the intensity of the battles that took place. They were mostly concentrated in Slawi district (267 battles\textsuperscript{83}), in Old Benghazi, particularly Sabri (126 battles), in Al Laythi and Souk Al Luhum (102 battles), Bu ‘Atni (61 battles), in Qanfouda (65 battles), in Huwari (50 battles), in Qwarsha (47 battles) and near the University in Al Berka (37 battles).

A first damage assessment\textsuperscript{84} was conducted between August 2015 and April 2016, during the battles. It concerned 13 districts of the city, with a primary focus on the 5 most damaged branches: Laythi (New Benghazi), Bu ‘Atni, Huwari, Venicia (Berka branch) and Benina (now out of the limits of municipality) where the airport is located. 3 categories of damage were considered : destruction (75-100%), severe (30-75%) and moderate (5-30%). The satellite imagery analysis, complemented by key informant observations, showed that the damage increased greatly between the two assessment dates (the number of damaged structures more than doubled), and was still concentrated in the same fighting areas: Old Benghazi (385 structures), Sabri (172), Lethama (80), Salmani Charqui (23), Salmani Gharbi (39), Tablinu (10), Bu Hdima (15), Bel‘oum (16), Venicia (123), Huwari (860), Laythi (142), Bu ‘Atni (1398) and Benina (81).

A second damage assessment was performed in 2017\textsuperscript{85}. For the most damaged districts and quarters (except the severely damaged Bu ‘Atni which was not covered) and for similar typology of damages, it reported 700 structures in Old Benghazi, 423 structures in Sabri, 315 in Huwari, 323 structures Laythi/Benghazi Jadida and 540 structures in Benina. The damaged structures had consequently greatly increased. It is worth noting that both satellite and key informant assessments noticed sizeable numbers of other structures with possible damage, missing assets and changes due to urban reorganization.

For this report, a ground damage assessment has been conducted by Un-Habitat for Benghazi using the adopted analysis methodology. The satellite maps of damages of April 19, 2018 has been used as a basis.

The ground verification assessment showed that the severe damages were concentrated in the municipal branches of Old Benghazi (in 10 districts out of 16, especially those near the port and Sabri, Sidi ‘Obaid and Thawra Al Sha‘biya), Slawi (in 2 districts out of 10, especially in Salmani and Shuhada), New Benghazi (in 5 districts out of 8, in particular The Gardens and Huwari), Bu ‘Atni (in 3 districts out 4), Benina (in 1 district out of 3, on the road to the airport) and Qwarsha (in 3 districts out of 4, especially Al Fa’akat).

The GIS analysis on housing allowed to depict the situation of occupation in mid-2018. Only 9,315 building structures were found not occupied, constituting 9.8% of the total number of structures within the municipality. This result is consistent with a recent survey\textsuperscript{86} giving 30% of HH living in buildings with some damage, 9% living in buildings with substantial damage and 1% in buildings with severe damage.

The non-occupied building structures were mostly concentrated in the branches of Old Benghazi (33% of structures, mainly because of destructions and severe damages) and of Sahel Gharbi (68%, where most of the “ground+4” new constructions in the districts of Bu Fakhra and Qanfouda Bahriya are unfinished and damaged and many of the “ground floor” structures of Tikah are unoccupied). Most of the other branches have then seen their housing structures repaired and occupied again, except the branch of Bu ‘Atni where there is still around 5% of non-occupied structures.

462 structures were completely destroyed in Old Benghazi (see map 20), mostly in Zrir’iya (130), Sabri (76), Chebbi (77) and Agharbil (64). 2,148 structures were severely damaged, mostly in Zrir’ya (634), Sabri

83 Figures on battles are derived from ACLE database; https://www.acleddata.com.

84 IMPACT: Greater Benghazi damage Assessment, August 3, 2016; in collaboration with the Municipality of Benghazi, the Civil Initiatives Libya and the European Commission.


86 NRC: Benghazi Assessment on Housing, Tenure Arrangements and Civil documentation; March 2018.
City Profile of Benghazi, Libya

(468), Akharbish (385) and Agharbil (276). 1/3rd of the moderately damaged structures were in Sabri.

The damage ground verification confirmed the continuous presence of war remnants in the branches of Old Benghazi, Sahel Gharbi and Bu ‘Atni, but also in other branches.
Benghazi Informal Settlements

Map 19

City Profile of Benghazi, Libya

Informal Settlements
- Residential/Agricultural
- Residential

Formal Settlements
- Before 1927
- Before 1954
- Before 1966
- Before 1989
- Before 2006
- After 2006

Archaeological Sites

Branches

Municipality Boundary

Residential/Agricultural

Residential

Informal Settlements

Formal Settlements

Benghazi District

Mediterranean Sea
Old Benghazi Damage Map

Map 20

City Profile of Benghazi, Libya
HEALTH

The health sector in Benghazi

Health was considered in the past a right and a public service in Libya, the patients receiving freely health care and medicines. However, private health practices, clinics and hospitals developed significantly in the country due to insufficient service provisions.

The 2012 official statistics accounted for 15 hospitals in Benghazi region, with 3,645 beds. This is same number of hospitals for Tripoli but with half the number of beds. These hospitals are distributed between 10 specialized, 3 central and 2 suburban hospitals. Moreover, there was 6 combined clinics, 27 public health centers (PHCs), 1 dental center and 39 primary health-care units. In addition to these public health services, there was 12 private clinics, with 205 beds, 49 physicists and 27 dentists’ consultations and 185 pharmacies. These health facilities covered a total surface of 147 ha (153 in 3rd generation master plan), the biggest being in the districts of Huwari, Fweiheit Gharbiya, Bal’oun and Sabri.

The SARA survey conducted end of 2016 indicated that the Benghazi region had 20 public hospitals, with 8 specialized, 8 central and 4 suburban/rural. The difference with above figures mainly results from the change of municipality boundaries. 9 other health facilities were proposed to be upgraded to hospitals. Moreover, there were still the 12 impatient private hospitals/clinic with their 205 beds, 49 OPD clinics, 27 dental clinics, 185 pharmacies and 24 laboratories.

The survey indicated that 12 hospitals were still operating while 8 were closed, 5 among which for being severely damaged. Staff wise, 7,329 were working in the still open hospitals, while 4,164 did not have access to hospitals to serve patients. From the 43 PHC reported, 18 were closed mostly for non-accessibility.

The assessment of health services utilization, measured by the number of outpatients visits per capita per annum, was made on the last reported data

The survey pointed out that Benghazi, with Sirte, had the lowest density in total number of still operating hospitals in the country: less than 2.0 per 10,000 inhabitants. The same observation was made in terms of total functional hospital beds in Benghazi: 1,014 beds (instead of 3,645 in 2012 official statistics); i.e. an impatient bed density of 14 for 10,000 inhabitants, well below the set target of 25.

Concerning pregnant women delivery services, and while the national average of 13 maternity beds for 1,000 pregnant women met the international standard of 10, the situation in Benghazi was more of a concern with only a density of 9.31 below the international standard.

For the core health work force, including physicians, medical licentiates, clinical officers, registered nurses and midwives, SARA survey gave on the contrary 41 per 10,000 population in Benghazi, well above the international standard of 23, but much lower than the national average of 76.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What is the necessary time to reach a health facility. Source: Ground Verification UN-Habitat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Old Benghazi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than half an hour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Half an hour to an hour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than an hour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Survey conducted between August and December 2016. WHO and Libyan Ministry of Health: Service Availability and Readiness Assessment (SARA) of the Public Health Facilities in Libya; 2017.
during 2013-2014 before that the 2nd Libyan civil war developed in Benghazi. Even at this time, Libya in general underscored the target of 5 visits, with an average of only 1.78. This is while **Benghazi, as a major city, gave an even lower average ratio of 1.11 visits.** The analysis of hospital admissions gave similar results, with only 7 admissions per 100 inhabitants per year, suggesting that **Benghazi population was using hospital facilities of neighboring cities such as Ajdabiya.**

The average of all these criteria, expressed in terms of a service availability index, showed a score of 73% for Benghazi in comparison with a national average of 81%. But even with such availability, there were considerable number of limiting factors that hinder the proper provision of many general services. Thus, the score of Benghazi for the general services readiness at hospitals was given at 67%, with a national average of 69%. The **lack of basic medicine was observed to be the main limiting factor, 22% readiness score for an although low national average of 44%**. This indicates that there is a major issue in providing medicine in the country, aggravated in Benghazi, especially in primary health care (PHC) facilities.

Un-Habitat ground verification in 2018 stressed on the lack or low health services in the city. The **few still operating hospitals lack staff and are critically short of medicines, especially those for chronic diseases.** Also, the small number of available beds and the lack of children vaccines were pointed out.

Key informant interviews conducted in the different branches of Benghazi municipality shows that the **lack of staff and medical framework** is the major issue. Also, the Key Informants pointed on the non-availability of some specialties and the lack of safety in health facilities, as well as on the non-availability of PHCs in the branch and the problems of transportation.

Map 21 shows the layout of health facilities of Benghazi and their ground verification status. It indicates clearly the lack of health facilities in Sahel Gharbi, Qwarsha, Bu ‘Atni and their uneven distribution. Many of the already existing health facilities are not operational.

Concerning **medicines**, the major issue is their **prices and the non-availability of most categories**. The availability issue seems to be prominent. Some branches complained about total absence of medicines and even on **discriminations** in the provision of health services.

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89 Report of ground verification team on the situation in Benghazi and the major challenges.
The HH survey confirms the issue of distance to health facilities. 47.9% of HH need to travel more than 6 km to reach a health center; a constraint seeming less stringent on returnees. The details by branch showed that the problem is more severe in Al Nwaqia (100%), Salmani (75%) and Al Berka (68%). The key informants of UN-Habitat ground verification had shown however that the problem of distance is acute for the quarter of Zeitoun in Al Fweihat and to a lesser extent for the branch of Bu ‘Atni.

But the survey gave the high cost of services as the main difficulty impeding access to health services (50.9% of HH, 68.0% of refugees). The lack of staff and health framework came only with 4.3% of the answers of the survey. The issue of cost was the most acute in Bu ‘Atni and Huwari (85%); that of non-availability of services in Old Benghazi (48%).

The health conditions in Benghazi

The HH survey indicated that 91.7% of HH have no access to hygiene products (78.1% for IDPs). The main reason is the high prices (79.0% of answers). This is while 92.5% of HH report positive availability of soap near sink. Only 3.6% of respondents indicate to have diseases due to drinking water.

11.3% of individuals are suffering from chronic diseases (11.7% of women and 10.9% of men). 61.2% of those face problems to procure their medicines. The main reason for 66.4% is the lack of medicine at health centers and pharmacies and 31.5% their high prices.

The survey indicates also that 14.5% of pregnancies did not end with a baby alive delivery. And, 66.1% of pregnant women could not take tetanus vaccine injection during their pregnancy. 75.8% of Benghazi women delivered in a public hospital of health center; while 23.0% needed a caesarean.

In Benghazi, there is major issues in health, ranging from the rehabilitation of hospitals, PHCs and PHUs to the availability of medicines; the latter being the most acute. There is clearly a need of a deeper SARA type analysis of the situation of health facilities in the city, to identify priority interventions.

EDUCATION

Former situation

In 2006, it was estimated that Benghazi serviced 185,000 children in basic schools, 24,000 in secondary and professional colleges and around 40,000 in universities and vocational training. The 2010 statistical book gave 135,404 children in basic schools (public and mixed public-private), serviced by 10,205 public teachers in 201 schools as well as by 9 private schools.

This is in addition to 25,179 students in secondary schools, serviced by 57 schools (48 public).

This is while the 3rd generation urban plan of 2009 gave for Benghazi 5 kindergartens, 84 basic schools, 105 college, 54 secondary schools, 20 professional institute, 3 training institutes, 10 university faculties and 10 other education institutions. This is for a total of 117,256 basic students and 37,825 in secondary

education\textsuperscript{94}. The analysis showed that most schools were concentrated in central districts. There was, already in 2009, a deficit in elementary schools, but more significantly in secondary schools which are crowded with students, by school and by class. The plan suggested then to create 54 new secondary schools and 534 classrooms. It was suggested to increase the surface of facilities.

\textsuperscript{94} Mentioned as figures for 2007.

\textbf{Primary Schooling}

The ground verification assessment documented 161 operational public primary schools in Benghazi, servicing 96,543 children (see map 22). They were distributed on 4 branches: Benghazi Center, Slawi, Al Berka and Sidi Khlifa.

In addition, 338 private establishments were documented, servicing 72,006 children\textsuperscript{95}. The share of primary establishments may have increased significantly these last years.

\textsuperscript{95} Part of these students may be in secondary classes.

Key informants indicated that in all branches of the municipality more than 80% of the 5-14 years old children attend school; except for Hayy Zeitoun and New Benghazi which reported that only 41 to 60% are attending.

The HH survey reported that 96% of children aged 6-14 years are attending school, with even a slightly higher attendance for girls than for boys.

\textbf{Secondary Schooling and vocational training}

The municipality documented 48 secondary schools in Benghazi 4 departments, servicing 16,809 boys and girls. It documented also 15 vocational training institutes (professional colleges); 4 were damaged and not operational\textsuperscript{96}. The ones working serviced 677 young boys and 628 young girls (total 1,305). 1,070 teachers were involved in this vocational training.

\textsuperscript{96} The others being lightly damaged.

Here also, the number of students seems to have decreased significantly from 2010 and even 2006.

Here it is worth comparing the number of concerned populations with those attending schools. If the total population is 750,000, the 17% aged 5-14 total 127,500,
and the 25% aged 5-19 total 187,500. This is while the today functioning primary, secondary, private and vocational training schools service 186,657 boys and girls.

Universities

Benghazi is the oldest university in the country. It has established its premises in Qaryounes in 1955 on a surface of 450 ha. The main campus contains 12 major buildings providing around 600,000 m² of accommodation space. 6 faculties were located in 2006 in the Qaryounes campus (Engineering, Sciences, Arts, Economics, Law and information technology) while 9 other faculties are distributed within the city. 35,000 students used to register at this period, serviced by 1,187 staff.

Through the municipality, the University of Benghazi documented 53,534 students attending in 2016-2017. 2% of the students were not Libyans, and there were more females (51%) than males (47%). Female students were largely dominating not only in Literature, but also in Law, Medicine, Dentistry, Pharmacy, Education and Nursing.

The number of students is much less than that prior to the conflict when 95,000 students used to attend, with around 5,000 teachers and 12,000 staff.

In fact, the University witnessed fierce fighting with the extremists. In November 2016, the damage assessed was significant.

A plan for the reconstruction of the University has been established, with a total cost of LYD 1,874 million. LYD 1,153 million has already been contracted, mainly to Libyan or Turkish-Libyan consortia. They mostly concern the maintenance and the refurbishment of the lightly and moderately damaged buildings. Only 14% have been disbursed to contractors so far, function of the progress of the works.
the progress of the works. Otherwise, only 30% of the necessary full reconstruction of buildings were contracted. The total value of the remaining projects still be started is estimated at LYD 720 million. Recently, it was estimated that even the contracted projects need to be reassessed as the progress of works is far from progressing normally.

**Child care**

Ground verification reported 7 child care centers in Benghazi. 4 of them are not operational, with 2 destroyed (all 4 in Old Benghazi). The total number of children still serviced are around 2,500.

The HH survey indicated that only 8.1% of HH profit from child-friendly space center in the neighborhood (11.4% for the non-displaced), while 9.1% not using them. 33% of HH mention that there is no center in the neighborhood and 43% have no knowledge about such centers.

The highest use is in the Salmani branch (18%), followed by Al Berka (8%) and New Benghazi (5%). Most of the other branches responded not using such facilities, because they were remotely located or apparently by choice.

**In Benghazi, the major issue in education seems to be the rehabilitation of the facilities of the University, the oldest of the country, which has been severely affected by the conflict.**
**DRINKING WATER**

The Benghazi area is rich in underground water, that constituted historically a major resource for the development of the city. This underground water is mainly pumped and collected in two stations: Benina (near the airport) and Sidi Mansour (in old Kwaifyah). Natural springs exists also in Ain Zayanah in Al Kwaifyah. The Benina water (around 150 m underground) suffers from salinization, while that of Sidi Mansour access underground rivers of fresh water and is used for drinking after collection and storage in Benina.

Small dams were also erected in the neighborhoods of the municipality to collect rain water, particularly in the depression of Qattara and in Wadi Zaza. The water is reinjected in the underground to combat salinization. A water desalinization plant had been built in Bu Dzira (Al Kwaifyah) with a capacity of 16 million m$^3$/year. Its water was also assumed to be reinjected underground. However, due to the lack of maintenance, the production of this plant had greatly decreased since the 1990s.

Today, 70% of the water necessary for the city and its surroundings is delivered by the Great Man-Made River (GMMR), initiating near Al Kufra in the South of the country (as far as 600 to 800 km from Benghazi). The branch arriving to Benghazi (the Srir-Sirte-Tazerbu-Benghazi –SSBT- branch) can deliver 2,200 million m$^3$/year. The water is stored in a major reservoir near Maqzeha and then transported to feed the Benina main starting point of water distribution system (see map 23). The quality of this water is excellent by WHO standards.

The ground verification launched by UN-Habitat indicates that generally the drinking water network is partially operational after experiencing severe damage during the conflict with the extremist groups. Major difficulties are encountered to provide consumables and repair equipment to rehabilitate the network.

The key informants depicted that the municipality branches of Huwari and Maqzeha are assessed no more connected to the network and are extracting water from wells with pumps (as well as partially the branch of Bu ‘Atni). This is also the case of Sidi Khlifa (see map below). This assessment is probably due to the fact that these branches experienced the largest development of informal settlements after 2011.  

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101 See section on informal settlements and map xxx.
It was noted that the chemical analysis of the water in the network is excellent, except in Humaidah quarter (Khaled bin Waleed/Al Berka) and in Old Benghazi branch. There, the analysis showed the presence of nitrate, which could be related to a mixing between drinking water and sewage system. This results from the damage experienced during the conflict as well as from the little maintenance the both networks as the soil is chemically aggressive (old marshes). In fact, a contract had been signed in 2008 for the refurbishment...
of the networks, but it had been stopped following the events of 2011\textsuperscript{102}.

Several drinking water facilities had been damaged during the conflict: the water service centers in Benina, Sabri, Qaryounes and Qwarsha; the pumps maintenance center and storage facility in Sidi Mansour/Benina; the vehicles workshop in 602 (Salmani) and numerous water tanks.

The HH survey of 2018 indicates that more than 87% of the households are connected to the general network, while around 3% use wells (more than 7.4% of IDPs) and 9.5% water delivery or mineral water bottles (mostly amongst the non-displaced and the returnees)\textsuperscript{103}. It is worth mentioning that there is information on the drilling of numerous individual \textit{informal wells} accompanying the rapid development of informal housing during the conflict.

The details of the survey indicated that the branch of Al Nwaqia doesn’t have access to the drinking water network, while Al Fweihat has low access (32%).

90% of households assess the quality of water good while the remaining assess it suspicious. 3% of the non-displaced and the IDPs find it generating diarrheas, against 1.6% of the returnees. It is in Qwarsha that HH complain most about the taste and smell of water (39%) and in 12% that they point it causing diarrheas.

Consequently, 3.6% of households observed symptoms of diseases because of the water quality and lack of wash material; the highest rate being among the non-displaced and the lowest among the IDPs.

\textsuperscript{102} Key informants.

\textsuperscript{103} In 2017, only 64.2% reported using public network as the main source of water in Benghazi, 29.4% bottled water and 4.6% protected well (OCHA: Multi-Sector Needs Assessment, September 2017).
The sustainability of Benghazi as a major metropole depends on the proper operation and security of the GMMR network along hundreds of kilometers, what constitute a major challenge. The city needs also a serious rehabilitation effort of its network to enable proper healthy provision of drinking water. In particular, the problem of sewage intrusion into the drinking water network should be addressed in priority.

**SEWAGE SYSTEM**

The nature of the soil in Benghazi and the surroundings, with significant underground water resources and marshes covering parts of the land, induces a peculiar sewage system. It greatly relies on mechanical equipment which need continuous maintenance.

The sewage network is composed of 6 main branches and is theoretically independent from the rain water collection and evacuation system. The network covers only 40% of the municipality territory and was developed in the 1980’s (constituted of 150 to 2000 mm diameter pipes). It suffers of many issues (blockings, absence of covers, breakage, etc.) which had led in many occasions to the expansion of sewage waters in the streets of city (map 24).

In addition, the sewage system comprises 25 sewage pumping stations and 6 rain water collection stations. 25 other stations are also outside the municipality boundaries.

These sewage and rain water collection networks were already assessed insufficient in 2009, as most residential areas were not then connected. Also, the July 23rd lake has been deepened to receive rain water excess and in emergency sewage water. However, sewage was discharged to the lake continuously.

[Image of expansion of sewage water in Old Benghazi. Source: Key informants]

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The key informants interviews indicated that only some central districts of Benghazi are assessed to be connected to the sewage system, while in Al Nwaqia not even a proper base system is installed.

Otherwise, it is noticeable that the main sewage system treatment plant, as well as the rain water recycling plant, are situated within the municipality boundaries in Qwarsha, which is only branch of the city outside the old limits which is serviced by the sewage system (see map of Key Informants answers on sewage disposal).

This is while the HH survey indicated that 96.7% of households have separate toilet facilities (85.8% only for IDPs) and 97.7% of the HH have their toilets connected to a sewage network (85.8% for IDPs). The details did not show any significant difference between in the different branches of the municipality.
A recent report\textsuperscript{106} of the water & sewage company indicates that most of the sewage pumping stations are today out of operation, and only 3 had been maintained.

The municipality and the water & sewage company had conducted some maintenance operations, and the former municipal council had contracted the refurbishment and installation of water and sewage networks for the district of Khreibish (Old Benghazi, where a major flood with sewage water had occurred recently, see figure in beginning of section) and several surrounding streets (Qasr Hamad, Ra‘idh, Bin Gheshir, Othman Behih, etc.). 96 lines had been executed. The current municipal council intends to contract for the maintenance of the main pipe in Khalij Arabi street and 12 secondary pipes. However, the situation creates serious concerns, as only 30% of the 170 broken pipes had been subject to repairing contracts. Moreover, the municipality has extreme financial difficulties since 2011 to establish contracts with local public works companies to perform these repairs.

\textbullet{} LYD 0.96 million for cleaning up the remnants of war in fighting areas;

The situation of the waste treatment plant in Qwarsha is not clear in August 2018. A report on an engineering visit on that date to evaluate phases 2 and 3 of the project (45-163,000 m\textsuperscript{3} per day, total cost LYD 51.7 million, started in 2008) showed that the progress of the construction/refurbishment works for this plant (The Libyan General Co. for Building & Construction and WABAG Co.) had only advanced by 17%. It was noted that the fence of the plant has been eliminated and

\[\text{Scheme of the sewage network.} \quad \text{Source: Key informants}\]

\[\text{Damage in the equipment.} \quad \text{Source: Key informants}\]
parts of the dedicated land proposed for sale, or even sold. The plant has not been connected to the electricity grid (10.5-kV substation) and parts of the equipment were still at the port.

The sewage system in Benghazi seems the to be a major serious issue. The pre-conflict network was already insufficient and fragile, lacking maintenance. The conflict had led to the stopping of the construction of the treatment plant and of the network. This is in addition to the destruction of equipment and pumping stations.

Currently, sewage is leaking to the drinking water network and to the July 23rd lake. Addressing this issue is a priority.

WASTE MANAGEMENT

The waste and cleaning activities in the municipality of Benghazi are distributed in several functions:

- The transportation of waste produced by residential, commercial and industrial activities;
- The transportation of rubbles, the construction remnants and metallic structures;
- The cleaning of streets and public squares;
- The cleaning and decoration work, including the painting of the borders of roads and trees trimming.

The solid wastes are collected in the different neighborhoods, taken to open waste disposals in Sidi Khilha or Qandoudha. The wastes are dumped and there is no waste separation or treatment plant (see map 24).

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107 Information transmitted by the municipality of Benghazi through key informants.
A compost bioprocessing plant existed with a capacity of 400 tons/day. However, this plant suffers technical problems since a decade and is not operating.

These activities are performed by a public company, but often sub-contracting to private companies is made by the municipality or even the public company itself.

Daily, 1,100 tons of wastes are collected with 435 tours of small trucks and 110 tours of larger trucks (10 tons). The 2 waste disposal sites are no more adequate. 2 additional sites have been dedicated in Lethama/Old Benghazi and Sidi Khlifa. They are only used for emergencies and are closed now. A third waste disposal site has been planned in Al Kwaifyah not yet adapted.

The Public Services Company, in charge of the cleaning, suffers from different issues: inefficiency of human resources, accumulation of non-qualified labor, severe shortage of garbage collection boxes and transportation vehicles, compressors and sweepers. This is, as well as bad maintenance, what increases the cost in comparison with revenues.

Key informants mentioned major problems of waste collection, especially in the branches of Huwari and Old Benghazi. In many other branches, the rhythm of collection was assessed low. This is while only Al Slawi and New Benghazi were assessed to have daily waste collection, as well as Al Fweihat and Salmani. Al Nwaqia branch indicated that it uses private company to collect waste.

This had led to the accumulation of waste in some neighborhoods. Only New Benghazi, Sahel Gharbi and Al Fweihat mention no garbage on the roads. The situation seems more dramatic for Huwari, Salmani, Old Benghazi and Sidi Khlifa (see key informants maps).

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108 The key informants’ response was that waste collected less than once a month in these municipality branches.

109 The answer was that waste was collected one a week.
The waste collection utility transmitted to key informants the organization of the daily rounds of collection. The frequencies of the rounds had been mapped and show very low daily frequencies in the most of Old Benghazi and in the district of Huwari where collection was reported “less than once a month”. It showed that the frequencies were low in most of the other branches, while they were apparently sufficient in some districts such as Oruba, Mujaheddin and Ali ibn Abi Taleb in Slawi, as Daoud Bahri, Daoud Qibli and Khaled bin Waleed in Al Berka and as Bu Hdima and Sayda Khadija in Huwari. This correlates well with the assessment given by key informants.

The HH survey indicated that 61.7% of HH have their garbage collected by the municipality. This was the case of Slawi (80%) and New Benghazi (70%), but also astonishingly for Old Benghazi (89%), and Qwarsha (71%). The survey mentions also that some neighborhoods burn their garbage, and it is in Bu ‘Atni that the highest share (23%) of HH are reported burn or bury their garbage.

The presence of still remaining war rubble was also mentioned in several branches of the municipality, especially in Old Benghazi and Al Fweihat-Hayy Al Zeitoun. Only New Benghazi and Al Fweihat-Muntazah mention no rubble of war remnants.

The municipality conducted analyses on the waste materials. The origin and composition of the waste have been identified in the perspectives for a better treatment of these wastes, including the reactivation of the compost facility.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Buildings</th>
<th>Houses</th>
<th>Industries</th>
<th>Hospitals</th>
<th>Large scrap</th>
<th>Slaughterhouses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>59.5%</td>
<td>31.0%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organic</th>
<th>Plastics</th>
<th>Paper</th>
<th>Glass</th>
<th>Textiles</th>
<th>Wood</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>54.1%</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Presence of rubble and war remnants in Benghazi districts](image)
Map 23

Benghazi Drinking Water System

- Water Pollution
- Water Desalination Plant
- GMMR Administration
- GMMR Benghazi Reservoir
- Recycled Water Plant
- Great Man Made River
- Urban Area
- District
- Branches
- Municipality Boundary

Map highlighting various water-related locations and facilities in Benghazi, Libya, including drinking water systems, water pollution locations, and administrative and district boundaries.
ELECTRICITY AND ENERGY

Electricity

Electricity for Benghazi and a large part of the Eastern region is generated through a 750 MW combined cycle power plant situated in Al Kuwaifyah. This plant is connected to the national grid through a 400 kV network as well as to the nearby sea water desalination plant; the distribution within the municipality is made through 220 kV and 33 kV lines (see map 25).

The power plant is fueled by gas or alternatively by light fuel oil and diesel. It is comprised of 3 gas turbines of 130 MW commissioned in 1995, 1 gas turbine of 130 MW commissioned in 2003 and 2 steam turbines of 150 MW commissioned in 2005 and 2006110. The Islamic Development Bank participated to its financing. An Egyptian company refurbished the plants following the events of 2011111.

Municipality ground verification teams commissioned by UN-Habitat reported in March 2018 still observable serious damage on electricity networks. The equipment is functioning partially, however there are difficulties in the provision of repair components and consumables.

110 http://globalenergyobservatory.org/geoid/41585

The power plant is partially operating as it had experienced rocket and mortar shelling during the conflict with the jihadists. Only one 400 kV substation is working, situated near the power plant. The superficial damage had been repaired. Another high voltage substation in Sidi Faraj (Maqzeha) is out of operation as the network is severely damaged nearby. This is while the 2 other high voltage substations, situated at Bu ‘Atni and Bu Fakhra (Sahel Gharbi, not fully erected) had been destroyed (see map 25).

The 6 220/30 kV substations are operating, despite that 3 of them have some superficial damage (in Qwarsha, Hadiqa/Salmani and South). 13 30 to 11 kV substations had been destroyed during the conflict. The remaining

111 https://www.pgesco.com/projects/benghazi-power-plant-750-mw/

12 similar substations are reported partially destroyed and operating.

27 distribution substations are destroyed and 110 are still operating while they need repairs. 2 towers for the 400-kV network (total length 20 km) are damaged and not operating. 45 towers of the 220-kV network (total length 70 km) are also destroyed; 6 towers of the 30-kV
network (total length 20 km) are equally destroyed as well as large parts of the low voltage distribution network (total length 400 km).

Also, the ground verification showed difficulties in electricity availability from the network in Hayy Zeitoun which has access to electricity only 1 to 2 hours per day and in the municipality branch of Huwari, which receive it only 2 to 4 hours per day. Also, the branches of old Benghazi, Slawi and Maqzeha receive electricity 8 to 12 hours daily.

The household survey indicates that more than 99% of Benghazi population receive electricity from the general grid. However, more than 20% of households complain from power outages\footnote{They were 50.5% in 2017, with an average duration of cuts of 2 hours (OCHA: Multi-Sector Needs Assessment, September 2017).}. The HH of Slawi (42%), Al Berka (32%) and Qwarsha (30%) complain most about such shortages. Thus, 33% of the households inform that they have their own electrical generators, especially amongst the returnees and the non-displaced. The HH of Al Fweihat (61%) and Qwarsha (42%) have the largest ownership of generators.

The 2018 household survey indicates that for cooking, 98% of households use standard gas cylinders. However, the percentage is only 70% for IDPs who use instead small gas heaters. 29% of the households express permanent difficulties to procure gas cylinders and another 24% occasional difficulties\footnote{In 2017, 37.6% of HH reported irregular access to cooking gas (OCHA: Multi-Sector Needs Assessment, September 2017).}. The difficulties are more significant for IDPs and for the Old Benghazi branch (75% of HH). The difficulties are the most significant in Salmani and Al Fweihat.

**Street lighting**

For street lighting, the damage is indicated in map xxx. But the key informants UN-Habitat ground verification shows that other branches/districts have low access to street lighting because of initially lack of equipment. Only Al Fweihat has operating public lighting. All the remote branches from center have none. And the others have partial availability because of damage (see map 26).

**The rehabilitation of the electrical network in Benghazi seems also to be a critical priority.**
ROADS & TRANSPORTATION

Transportation in Benghazi city, like all that of Libya, is based on cars. The situation of Benghazi roads is mostly acceptable, while it requires maintenance.

The lack of maintenance is creating big difficulties and traffic jams on secondary roads. In addition, two bridges linking Lethama to Zrir’ya and Sid ‘Abid (Old Benghazi) had been blown up by the extremists during the fighting and need to be rebuilt (see map 27).
Electricity Network Map

- Substation 220 KV
- Substation 30 KV
- Substation 400 KV
- Oil Gas Well
- Power Plant
- Non-operational
- Partially operational
- Electricity Transmission Lines
- District
- Branches

City Profile of Benghazi, Libya
CULTURE and HERITAGE

Old Benghazi had been severely damaged during the conflict, while it contains many of the historical sites constituting the identity of the city and of Libya: the old historical center and the Italian quarter in Khreibish (the old Barneeq), as well as the site of Hesperides and the antique cemetery.

Most of the old beautiful seaside streets (Ahmad Rafiq Al-Mahawi and 23th of July streets) with arch-covered walkways had their buildings destroyed or severely damaged. This is including the old court house, the old Benghazi Immigration department and the Qasr An-Nil Hotel. It is similarly the case for the whole neighborhood, as well as for the district of Sabri.

The Governor Palace

This historical building was established in two phases:\(^{114}\); the seaside in 1913 and the street side in 1928. It uses to host the Italian governor of Libya, but in 1951 it hosted the declaration of independence of Libya by the king Idriss Senoussi the 1st and became its residence.

The building suffered greatly during World War II and was repaired. In 1954, it was granted to the University of Benghazi to constitute its headquarters. It hosted later the faculty of Languages of Qaryounes University.

The building was burned and looted during the events following February 17, 2011 and was severely damaged during the fighting with the extremists.

The cultural house of the city

This is one of the oldest houses of the city, built during the Ottoman period. It has been transformed to a museum and cultural center hosting most of the intellectual and literature events in the city. The Administration of Historical Cities is also hosted there. It was also severely damaged during the fighting.
Banco di Roma & the Bernicci theater

The Banco di Roma building was established in 1932-34, designed by the architect Guido Feretza. The Bernicci theater was designed by Luigi Biccinato and Marcello Biangentini. They have been both severely damaged.

Souk Al Rabi’ and Souk Al Hout

The two buildings of Souk Al Rabi’ (the market of the spring) and Souk Al Hout (The fish market) were established between 1928 and 1930.

Omar Al Mukhtar street

It hosts many historical buildings from the Italian period.
The municipality square

It hosts the municipality building since the Ottoman period, but the building was rebuilt again during the Italian period between 1925 and 1930. It was severely damaged during the fighting.

The Tree square

It was called during the Italian occupation as the Piazza Ammiraglio Cagni. In 1954, it was renamed “Omar Tusson” square, honoring the support of this prince to the fight of Libyans against occupation. Then it was renamed again the Tree Square, after a big tree in the center of the square.

Rebuilding the historical area

The historical area in Old Benghazi has been the most affected by destruction and severe damage. The Administration of Historical Cities has made recently significant efforts to report on the history and situation of the different buildings and neighborhoods in the related districts. However, no rebuilding effort...
has been started and despite some removal of rubles, there is still war remnants present.

The way the reconstruction of the old Benghazi shall be made will greatly influence the preservation of Benghazi identity, and thus the Libyan identity.
Appendix 1: Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BAM</td>
<td>Bunyan Al Marsus alliance of combatants</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bpd</td>
<td>Barrels per day</td>
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<tr>
<td>BSC</td>
<td>Libyan Bureau of Statistics &amp; Census</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBL</td>
<td>Central Bank of Libya</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMWG</td>
<td>Cash &amp; Markets Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Danish Refugee Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>DTM</td>
<td>Displacement Tracking Matrix</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>The European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCS</td>
<td>Average Food Consumption Score</td>
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<tr>
<td>FMP</td>
<td>Flow Monitoring Points</td>
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<tr>
<td>GIS</td>
<td>Geographic Information System</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross domestic product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GMMR</td>
<td>Great Man-Made River</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNA</td>
<td>Government of National Accord</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNC</td>
<td>General National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>HH</td>
<td>Household</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIB</td>
<td>Housing and Infrastructure Bureau</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labor Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>IS</td>
<td>“Islamic State”</td>
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<tr>
<td>JMMI</td>
<td>Joint Market Monitoring Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>JRC</td>
<td>Joint Research Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCMWG</td>
<td>Libya Cash &amp; Markets Working Group</td>
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<td>LFS</td>
<td>Labour Force Survey</td>
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<tr>
<td>LNA</td>
<td>Libyan National Army</td>
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<td>LNGOs</td>
<td>Libyan Non-Governmental Organizations</td>
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<td>LPRD</td>
<td>Libyan Program for Reintegration &amp; Development</td>
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<td>LYD</td>
<td>Libyan Dinar</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEB</td>
<td>Minimum Expenditures Basket</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSNA</td>
<td>Multi-sector Needs Assessment survey</td>
</tr>
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<td>MSO</td>
<td>Medical Supply Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NFI</td>
<td>Non-Food Items</td>
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<tr>
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<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>Office for Development of Administrative Centers</td>
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<td>Rapid City Profiling &amp; Monitoring System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Small &amp; Medium Enterprises</td>
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<td>Price Stability Fund</td>
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<td>UIAMF</td>
<td>Urban Information Analysis and Monitoring Framework System</td>
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<td>UN</td>
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<td>UNFPA</td>
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<td>The United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>United Nations Human Settlements Programme</td>
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<td>UN World Food Programme</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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Appendix 2: RCPMS Methodology

The Rapid City Profiling and Monitoring System (RCPMS) provides a comprehensive and multi-sectorial needs assessment to the humanitarian needs and aims to formulate a response plan at the level of districts and districts affected by conflicts. It also reflects the impact of the crisis on the urban systems with their various components of infrastructure, facilities, services and housing. Through multi-territorial level analysis (i.e. region, city, and district), monitoring helps to identify the most affected residential areas and groups through which interventions are prioritized according to their classifications and sectors in coordination with the intervening parties. This is to achieve the best response
to the most vulnerable groups by adopting a set of criteria associated with damage, access to urban services and the level of availability and operationality.

The monitoring and evaluation includes all urban areas of a municipality constituted of districts, and eventually of branches of municipality. This territorial division reflects the administrative boundaries adopted by the existing municipal council. This division was adopted in the establishment of the digital and geographic databases and the field assessment and analysis of sectors and damages.

The methodology is based on a set of monitoring and analysis tools designed to assess the urban facilities and damages through a comprehensive initial inventory that enables the diagnosis of the sector’s reality, operationality and level of damage. As for the urban sectors, they have been evaluated in terms of structure, capabilities and operational capacities on the one hand, and facilities on the other hand. The assessment of the sectors and facilities was based on the technique of the targeted groups, which was secured by a group of outsourced field observers (service sector technicians, municipals and districts’ selectors). This is in order to identify the operational level of each utility (drinking water and sanitation, waste lifting systems, lighting, education, health and care, economy, housing, energy, civil registry, courts, etc.) in terms of equipment, access to personnel, access to supplies and consumables, and finally through the level of damage. In order to deepen the evaluation of utility services, districts-level interviews were conducted to identify the reality and difficulties of service provision to users.

With regard to the spatial assessment of damages, the technical team trained in the approved methodology made a field counting of damages and put them on the maps prepared by the UN-Habitat Office – Tunisia. This is along with approving criteria for classification of buildings according to their locations, functions and degree of damage.

All such data were used to create geographic databases, which in turn helped to prepare maps, analyze the reality of sectors and damages and identify humanitarian needs at the level of districts and districts. This system will enable the decision-makers at the city level to follow up the urban expansion and its impact on the needs of the population, direct their priorities to vulnerable districts and groups with urgent needs, establish dynamic urban observatories and develop recovery plans and rehabilitation at the short and medium terms.

Appendix 3: Questions to Key Informants (UN-Habitat/Municipality)

UN-Habitat elaborated a questionnaire to the municipalities concerning the different sectors, to be answered by key informants district by district. For each sector, the key informants were mainly the deans or directors responsible of the concerned services.

1. **Drinking water and sanitation**
   Assessment of facilities
   1. **Working status of facilities**
      - Working
      - Not working
      - Working partially
   2. **Equipment**
      - Easily accessible
      - Accessible with constraints
      - Not accessible
   3. **Access to staff**
      - Easily accessible
      - Accessible with constraints
      - Not accessible
   4. **Access to supplies and consumables (fuel, motor oils, vehicle spare parts, equipment)**
      - Easily accessible
      - Accessible with constraints
      - Not accessible
   5. **Level of damage**
      - Light and superficial
      - Moderate
      - Severe
      - Completely destroyed

Assessment of services
6. **What is the main source of drinking water?**
City Profile of Benghazi, Libya

- Public network 1
- Common public faucet 2
- Well with a pump 3
- Well without a pump 4
- Supervised source 5
- Non-supervised source 6
- Lake/pond 7
- Rainwater 8
- Car equipped with water tank 9
- Mineral water in glass or plastic 10
- Filling clean water against payment 11
- Others: 12

7. How many hours of tap water are available from the public network during the last month?
   - Less than 2 hours 1
   - 2 to 4 hours 2
   - 4 to 6 hours 3
   - 6 to 12 hours 4
   - More than 12 hours 5

8. Did the residents spend more than two consecutive days without water during the past month?
   - Yes once or twice 1
   - Yes almost all time 2
   - No 3

9. What was the frequency of diarrhea in the area over the past six months?
   - Continuous 1
   - Occasional 2
   - Little 3

10. Where is sewage disposal located?
    - The General Sewage Network 1

- A random covered well (a domestic sewage tank) or a hole in the ground 2
- On the public road / in a valley / in the nature 3
- Other (specify) ......................... 4

2. Disposal of solid waste

Assessment of facilities

11. Working status of facilities
    - Working 1
    - Not working 2
    - Working partially 3

12. Equipment
    - Easily accessible 1
    - Accessible with constraints 2
    - Not accessible 3

13. Access to staff
    - Easily accessible 1
    - Accessible with constraints 2
    - Not accessible 3

14. Access to supplies and consumables (fuel, motor oils, vehicle spare parts, equipment)
    - Easily accessible 1
    - Accessible with constraints 2
    - Not accessible 3

15. Level of damage
    - Light and superficial 1
    - Moderate 2
    - Severe 3
    - Completely destroyed 4

Assessment of services

16. What is the common way in which waste is collected/disposed of in Mahalla?
    - Garbage collection by the public sector (free of charge) 1
    - Collection of garbage by the private sector (against payment) 2
    - Garbage is disposed of by families to the place of dumping 3
    - Garbage is left in open areas 4
    - Garbage is dumped or burnt 5

17. How many times has the garbage been removed in Mahalla during the past month?
    - Once a day or more 1
    - Once a week 2
    - More than once a week 3
    - Once in two weeks 4
    - Once a month 5
    - Less than once a month 6

18. What best describes the situation in the district concerning garbage disposal in the last month?
    - Most neighborhoods in the area are clean and without garbage on the way 1
    - Most areas are clean with garbage concentration around the roads 2
    - Some areas are clean and others have garbage piles on the way 3
    - Most areas have garbage piles in the way 4

19. What best describes the situation of the district as a matter of solid waste and remnants of war?
    - Most neighborhoods in the area are clean and without waste 1
3. Assessment of the services of the education facilities

Assessment of facilities

20. Working status of facilities
   - Working 1
   - Not working 2
   - Working partially 3

21. Equipment
   - Easily accessible 1
   - Accessible with constraints 2
   - Not accessible 3

22. Access to staff
   - Easily accessible 1
   - Accessible with constraints 2
   - Not accessible 3

23. Access to supplies and consumables (fuel, motor oils, vehicle spare parts, equipment)
   - Easily accessible 1
   - Accessible with constraints 2
   - Not accessible 3

24. Level of damage
   - Light and superficial 1
   - Moderate 2
   - Severe 3
   - Completely destroyed 4

25. What percentage of children in the neighborhood are enrolled in schools and institutes?
   For basic education (5 to 14 years)
   - Less than 20% 1
   - 20 to 40% 2
   - 41 to 60% 3
   - 61 to 80% 4
   - More than 80% 5

   For secondary education (15 to 20 years)
   - Less than 20% 1
   - 20 to 40% 2
   - 41 to 60% 3
   - 61 to 80% 4
   - More than 80% 5

26. Reasons for dropping out / leaving school
   - Lack of teaching tools
   - The limited capacity of the school to absorb new students
   - Social and psychological inequalities
   - Exclusion and discrimination
   - Lack of health conditions in school

27. Did the children of the region and their parents fail to reach the test centers during the final exams of May / June 2017?
   - Yes, many of them 1
   - Yes, some 2
   - No 3

4. Energy sources and supply

Assessment of services

28. Working status of facilities
   - Working 1
   - Not working 2
   - Working partially 3

29. Equipment
   - Easily accessible 1
   - Accessible with constraints 2
   - Not accessible 3

30. Access to staff
   - Easily accessible 1
   - Accessible with constraints 2
   - Not accessible 3

31. Access to supplies and consumables (fuel, motor oils, vehicle spare parts, equipment)
   - Easily accessible 1
   - Accessible with constraints 2
   - Not accessible 3

32. Level of damage
   - Light and superficial 1
   - Moderate 2
   - Severe 3
   - Completely destroyed 4

Assessment of services

33. What is the average number of daily electricity supply hours in the last 30 days? (One choice)
   - Nothing 1
   - Less than one hour 2
   - From 1 to 2 hours 3
   - 2 to 4 hours 4
   - 4 to 8 hours 5
City Profile of Benghazi, Libya

34. How can you describe the level of damage to the power grid?
   - Completely damaged 1
   - Partially damaged 2
   - Not damaged 3

35. How can you describe the status of the public road lighting network?
   - Does not work 1
   - Works partially 2
   - Works 3
   - Inexistent 4

5. Healthcare

Assessment of facilities
36. Working status of facilities
   - Working 1
   - Not working 2
   - Working partially 3

37. Equipment
   - Easily accessible 1
   - Accessible with constraints 2
   - Not accessible 3

38. Access to staff
   - Easily accessible 1
   - Accessible with constraints 2
   - Not accessible 3

39. Access to supplies and consumables (fuel, motor oils, vehicle spare parts, equipment)
   - Easily accessible 1
   - Accessible with constraints 2
   - Not accessible 3

40. Level of damage
   - Not accessible 1
   - Light and superficial 2
   - Moderate 2
   - Severe 3
   - Completely destroyed 4

41. The provision of health care services
   - Working 1
   - Not working 2
   - Working partially 3

42. What are the main obstacles to access to public health services during the last month? (3 possible answers by importance)
   - High prices of services 1
   - Lack of transportation / distance and time 2
   - High transportation prices 3
   - Services not available 4
   - Some medical specialties are not available (Dentistry / Radiology /Analyzes ...) 5
   - Difficult access to injury-related services 6
   - Lack of staff and medical framework 7
   - Lack of medical framework for women 8
   - Lack of security limits access to services 9
   - Lack of safety in health facilities 10
   - Discrimination in the provision of health services 11

43. What difficulties have hindered access to medicines during the last month? (3 possible answers)
   - Some types of drugs are not available in the designated stores 1
   - Most types of drugs are not available in designated stores 2
   - Not available at all 3
   - Expensive and not available for most categories 4
   - The quality of the drugs is not controlled 5
   - The medicines are available but expired 6

6. Housing

Assessment of facilities
44. Working status of facilities
   - Working 1
   - Not working 2
   - Working partially 3

45. Equipment
   - Easily accessible 1
   - Accessible with constraints 2
   - Not accessible 3

46. Access to staff
   - Easily accessible 1
   - Accessible with constraints 2
   - Not accessible 3

47. Access to supplies and consumables (fuel, motor oils, vehicle spare parts, equipment)
   - Easily accessible 1
   - Accessible with constraints 2
   - Not accessible 3

48. Level of damage
   - Light and superficial 1
   - Moderate 2
   - Severe 3
   - Completely destroyed 4
Assessment of housing services

48. To what extent do houses guarantee adequate protection and respond to the needs of their inhabitants: (1 to 3 symbols per answer) (1 = less protection, 2 limited protection, 3 more protection)

- Natural hazards (heat / cold / rain / flood / wind / fire / sand ...)
  - 1
- Human Hazards (Attacks / Fighting / Robbery and Looting / Animals)
  - 2
- Structure of the house and the building materials used
  - 3
- The external infrastructure of the neighborhood (roads / sewage)
  - 4
- The security of external areas (children's playgrounds / mobility of women outside ...)
  - 5
- divisions of the spaces in the house in relation with the number of rooms and their uses.
  - 6
- Responding to family members' privacy and psychological well-being
  - 7
- Responding to the needs of women / girls
  - 8

49. What percentage of revenues the household dedicates to pay rent or to pay for housing costs (bank loans / bills / royalties / taxes ...):

- Less than 30% 1
- 30 to 40% 2
- 41 to 50% 3
- 51 to 60% 4
- More than 60% 5

50. To what extent can the availability of rented housing be considered in the neighborhood?

- Yes widely available 1
- Somehow available 2
- Not available at all 3
- Do not know 4

51. how you estimate the distance between your neighborhood and the nearest health service facility (time)?

- Less than half an hour 1
- Half an hour to an hour 2
- More than an hour 3
- Do not know 4

52. how you estimate the distance between your neighborhood and the nearest school / institute / university (time)?

- Less than half an hour 1
- Half an hour to an hour 2
- More than an hour 3
- Do not know 4

53. how you estimate the distance between your neighborhood and the nearest administrative services(time)?

- Less than half an hour 1
- Half an hour to an hour 2
- More than an hour 3
- Do not know 4

7. Civil registry and access to law enforcement institutions and courts

Assessment of facilities

54. Working status of facilities

- Working 1
- Not working 2
- Working partially 3

55. Working status of facilities

- Working 1
- Not working 2
- Working partially 3

56. Equipment

- Easily accessible 1
- Accessible with constraints 2
- Not accessible 3

57. Access to staff

- Easily accessible 1
- Accessible with constraints 2
- Not accessible 3

58. Access to supplies and consumables (fuel, motor oils, vehicle spare parts, equipment)

- Easily accessible 1
- Accessible with constraints 2
- Not accessible 3

59. Do you have access to law enforcement in the neighborhood (police, courts, municipal guard, reconciliation committees ...):

- Possible 1
- Possible but with limitations 2
- Not possible 3
- Inexistent 4

60. How do you describe the security situation in this neighborhood:

- Very safe 1
61. Is there legal authority to determine property rights?
   • Yes 1
   • No 2

62. Is there a legal authority that issues civil records that you can access in your area?
   • Yes 1
   • No 2

63. What are the most prominent types of real estate registration records to prove possession and can be used? (dependent on municipality and providing services to the Mahala)
   • Permanent records of real estate affairs 1
   • Municipal records 2
   • Electricity and water bills 3
   • Other (specify) 4

64. What is the status of property records in this neighborhood? (One choice)
   • Available in paper form 1
   • Damaged and not available in digital format 2
   • Damaged, but available in digital format 3
   • Non-damaged / no damage 4

65. How can you describe the intention of people to return to the neighborhood?
   • Not possible 1
   • Very complex 2
   • Complex 3
   • Possible 4
Rapid City Profiling and Monitoring System