


GAZA URBAN PROFILE

2026

Prepared by:



UN-HABITAT



Acknowledgment

The Gaza Urban Profile 2026 was prepared by the UN-Habitat Palestine Office, reflecting its ongoing technical work to support evidence-based urban recovery, planning, and reconstruction in the Gaza Strip

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Gaza Urban Profile

2026

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Intorduction

Since October 2023, the Gaza Strip has experienced the most destructive war in its recent history, affecting civilians, residential areas, infrastructure, public buildings and essential public services, including schools, hospitals, universities, electricity and water stations, sewage networks, and cultural and religious buildings. While the ceasefire announced in October 2025 provides a critical opportunity for recovery, the aftermath of the war and the ongoing crisis continue to deepen socio-economic pressures and generate urgent needs for immediate response and sustainable interventions. The devastation is reflected in the accumulation of over 57.4 million metric tons of debris, turning densely populated neighborhoods into rubble and creating severe health, mobility and recovery feasibility risks. Approximately 81% of all structures in the Gaza Strip are damaged. Among the damaged structures, UNOSAT identified 123,464 destroyed structures, 17,116 severely damaged structures, 33,857 moderately damaged structures, and 23,836 possibly damaged structures for a total of 198,273 affected structures.

Many neighborhoods have been partially or completely abandoned, with the prospects for return dependent on the restoration of basic functionality and the provision of transitional housing support. In many cases, immediate return will not be possible given the massive scale of destruction to housing, urban spaces, and essential services. Conversely, neighborhoods that have absorbed large numbers of displaced families are severely overstretched, placing intense pressure on already fragile infrastructure and services. Some areas have experienced both concentrated destruction and inward migration, further amplifying vulnerabilities. As a result, the crisis response must carefully balance the needs of populations facing potentially protracted displacement with the urgent requirements for recovery, rehabilitation, and reconstruction.

Given the unprecedented scale of devastation in Gaza, there is a critical need for evidence-based urban planning grounded at the neighborhood level. The urban profile therefore uses neighborhoods as the core unit of analysis to assess localized conditions, needs, and priorities in collaboration with affected communities, while linking these insights to broader spatial scales, including municipalities, governorates, and the Gaza Strip as a whole, to support coherent recovery, reconstruction, and long-term resilience-based urban development.

A

Purpose and Scope

The Gaza Urban Profile provides a comprehensive overview of urban conditions across the diverse neighborhoods of the Gaza Strip, covering key sectors such as shelter, infrastructure, and commercial and social services. Its purpose is to inform the prioritization, localization, and sequencing of immediate, medium- and long-term recovery and reconstruction interventions, while identifying opportunities to strengthen urban resilience and support sustainable development. The profile builds on updated data and analysis produced by multiple stakeholders and expands upon the previous Gaza Urban Profile developed by UN-Habitat in 2014.

As part of the assessment, the findings are synthesized into a neighborhood index that evaluates post-war damage based on the severity of impacts across key sectors using clear and consistent criteria. This index serves as a preliminary prioritization tool to guide coordinated and sector-specific decision-making among government institutions, humanitarian actors, development agencies, and international partners engaged in recovery, reconstruction, and long-term urban development.

B

Methodology and Tools

The Urban Profile adopts Urban Profiling and Area-Based Recovery Planning tools developed by UN-Habitat to support recovery and reconstruction in complex and fragile contexts. These approaches have been refined through application in crisis-affected cities across the region, including in Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq, and Libya combining spatial analysis with sectoral and area-based assessments to generate evidence for informed planning and prioritization.

The methodology places the neighborhood at the center of the analysis, enabling a localized understanding of damage, needs, and recovery priorities while linking findings to broader spatial levels. The assessment draws on a combination of spatial data, sectoral analysis, and stakeholder inputs to provide an integrated view of urban conditions across the Gaza Strip.

Key components of the methodology include:

- GIS-based spatial analysis: Mapping and analyzing damage patterns, service disruptions, and spatial distribution of impacts across neighborhoods.
- Sectoral assessments: Examining key sectors such as shelter, infrastructure, basic services, and the local economy to understand the scale and nature of impacts.
- Area-based analysis: Integrating sectoral findings at the neighborhood level to capture inter-linkages between sectors and identify localized recovery priorities.
- Neighborhood damage index: Consolidating assessment results into a simplified index that scores neighborhoods based on the severity of sectoral damage using consistent criteria, providing an initial tool for prioritizing recovery and reconstruction interventions.

C

Coordination and Data Sources

The Urban Profile is developed in close coordination with active institutions engaged in Gaza's crisis response, including local and central government bodies, humanitarian agencies, UN entities, and international partners. It relies on updated data and analysis from multiple stakeholders, combining primary and secondary sources with spatial datasets and narrative analysis. Collaboration with organizations conducting damage assessments was particularly significant, with the profile drawing on findings and datasets from the Gaza and the West Bank Rapid Damage and Needs Assessments (RDNA) launched by the World Bank Group, the United Nations, and the European Union to complement and validate sectoral and spatial assessments.

As recovery and reconstruction efforts evolve, the profiling process remains iterative, allowing the profile and the neighborhood index to be refined and expanded with additional data, deeper sectoral analysis, and further community-level insights.

D

Structure of Document

The Gaza Urban Profile is organized into three chapters to provide a clear and systematic overview of urban conditions and guide recovery planning.

Chapter One

Presents a snapshot of the pre-war situation, highlighting baseline conditions across sectors and neighborhoods.

Chapter Two

Provides a spatial assessment of the post-war situation at the neighborhood level, detailing damage, service disruptions, and sectoral impacts.

Chapter Three

Introduces the Neighborhood Index, which consolidates assessment findings into a scoring system to prioritize recovery and reconstruction interventions.





The Gaza Strip: Pre-War Urban Context

The Gaza Strip is a Palestinian coastal territory. It consists of three longitudinal zones, coastal sands, alluvial plains, and sandstone ridges, with the central agricultural belt historically shaping settlement patterns, mobility corridors, and the Strip's urban spine. The urban development trajectory has been shaped by an interplay of demographic pressure, political fragmentation, prolonged occupation, recurrent cycles of destruction, and evolving planning systems.

Pre-October 2023 urban context in Gaza

 Area
365 km²

 Population⁴
2.26 million

 Urbanization Rate³
87%

 Demographic Growth⁶
2.7%

 **8**
Refugee camps⁵

 **25**
Municipalities

 **5**
Governorates

1 UN-Habitat – Palestine Habitat Country Programme Document (2026-2023).

2 PCBS, Indeed, demographic 2023

3 UNRWA Jabalia Camp | UNRWA


4 UNRWA Beach camp | UNRWA

5 UN Habitat Urban Issues | UN-Habitat

6 UNRWA Beach camp | UNRWA

* Regional Areas: Areas outside municipal jurisdiction and administratively under the Ministry of Local Government.

Administrative Map of the Gaza Strip



Source: MoLG

Conflict and Governance Dynamics Shaping Gaza's Urban Landscape


The urban identity of the Gaza Strip has been shaped by a sequence of political and historical developments that have fundamentally reconfigured governance, mobility, and development patterns:



1994

Establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA)⁷


The introduction of limited self-governance under the Oslo Accords did not translate into meaningful territorial connectivity, as movement between Gaza and the West Bank remained highly constrained.



2000

Second Intifada

The escalation of violence and the construction of separation barriers significantly deepened spatial fragmentation and isolation.



2005

Israeli disengagement


While Israeli settlements were dismantled, effective control over Gaza's borders, airspace, and movement remained external, limiting autonomy.



2006 - 2007

Political Division

The electoral victory of Hamas and subsequent takeover of Gaza institutionalized the political split between Gaza and the West Bank, further fragmenting governance systems.



since 2007

Access restrictions⁸

The escalation of violence and the construction of separation barriers significantly deepened spatial fragmentation and isolation.



since 2007

Blockade and recurrent conflicts⁹

While Israeli settlements were dismantled, effective control over Gaza's borders, airspace, and movement remained external, limiting autonomy.

⁷ United Nations, Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Oslo II), 1995

⁸ OCHA, Gaza Strip | The humanitarian impact of 15 years of the blockade, 2022

⁹ UNESCO, The Gaza Strip | The humanitarian impact of 15 years of blockade, 2022


Since the early 2000s, the Gaza Strip has experienced repeated escalations and large-scale conflicts that have profoundly reshaped its urban fabric and humanitarian conditions. Major hostilities in 2008–2009, 2012, 2014 and 2021 caused extensive damage to housing, infrastructure, and essential services, repeatedly undermining recovery efforts and eroding community resilience.

Parallel political developments, including the 2014 attempt to form a national consensus government between Hamas and Fatah, failed to restore unified governance, with the reconciliation process collapsing in the aftermath of the 2014 war.

More recently, the 2023–2025 conflict represents the most prolonged and devastating escalation to date, resulting in unprecedented levels of destruction, mass displacement, and the near-total breakdown of urban systems. This has significantly deepened humanitarian needs and further complicated prospects for recovery, reconstruction, and long-term stability.

- 10 Eight years after the 2008-2009 (Cast Lead) hostilities in Gaza: lack of accountability persists | United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - Occupied Palestinian Territory
- 11 Occupied Palestinian Territory: Gaza offensive adds to scale of displacement - occupied Palestinian territory | ReliefWeb
- 12 Escalation in hostilities Gaza and southern Israel, Situation Report (as of 5 December 2012) | OCHA
- 13 Gaza Initial Rapid Assessment - OCHA report 24-26 Nov 2012 - Question of Palestine
- 14 Gaza Urban Profile 15.01.2015_Final RED.pdf
- 15 2014 Gaza conflict | UNRWA
- 16 World Bank Document
- 17 Overview | November 2021 | United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - Occupied Palestinian Territory

Damaged Structures and Associated Displacement across the Multiple Wars



Source: OCHA

1.2

Demographics and Community Structure


Following the 1948 conflict, Gaza's population nearly tripled due to the influx of refugees, fundamentally reshaping its demographic and spatial structure. Since then, and especially in recent decades, urban growth has been driven primarily by natural population increase, fueled by high fertility rates and compounded by severe restrictions on outward movement.¹⁸

The population grew from approximately 1.1 million in 2000 to around 2.3 million by the end of 2023¹⁹, with about 68.7 percent registered as Palestine refugees.²⁰ Gaza also has a notably young population, with a median age of 19.5 years and nearly 68.6 percent under the age of 30²¹, placing sustained pressure on education systems, housing supply, and employment opportunities.


Despite its limited land area, population density varies significantly, with extreme overcrowding in refugee camps and dense urban centers, intensifying pressure on already overstretched infrastructure and services.

Gaza Strip's population

2.3 million people



Population Distribution in the Gaza Strip across the Governorates



Source: PCBS, 2023

¹⁸ Humanitarian Policy Group, Sanctuary in the city? Urban displacement and vulnerability in the Gaza Strip, 2012

¹⁹ PCBS, Estimated Population in the Palestine Mid-Year by Governorate, 1997-2026, 2021

²⁰ UNRWA, Where We Work – Registered Refugees, 2023

²¹ PCBS, 8 Billion People, Infinite Possibilities: A Matter of Rights and Responsibilities, 2025

1.3

Governance Structure and Planning Framework

1.3.1

Governance


The Gaza Strip is administratively divided into five governorates, North Gaza, Gaza, Deir al-Balah, Khan Younis, and Rafah, of broadly comparable size. Gaza City, within Gaza Governorate, functions as the primary administrative and economic hub. The territory is further organized into 25 municipalities, which, prior to the conflict, served as the backbone of urban governance, responsible for service delivery, spatial planning, licensing, maintenance, and regulatory oversight.

According to the PCBS Urban–Rural Classification (2017 Census), all local government units in Gaza are classified as municipalities, reflecting the absence of rural areas. In practice, municipalities also play a central coordinating role among sectoral agencies and act as the main interface through which residents access public services.

However, municipalities have long operated under chronic financial and operational constraints. Revenues, largely derived from user fees, local taxes, and limited economic activity, have been insufficient, requiring continued reliance on external donor support. As a result, investment capacity has remained weak, and service delivery has depended on aging and fragile infrastructure, repeatedly damaged during successive conflicts. The blockade has further restricted access to essential materials, equipment, and spare parts, undermining operational continuity.

Despite these systemic challenges, Gaza's municipalities have remained a critical pillar of urban resilience, sustaining basic services and maintaining functionality under highly constrained and volatile conditions.²²

Administrative Levels across the Gaza Strip



Source: MoLG

²² World Bank, Gaza Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment, unpublished.


1.3.2 Spatial Planning

Urban governance in the Gaza Strip has been shaped by externally imposed planning regimes, resulting in fragmented legal frameworks and limited institutional capacity.²³ While municipalities are formally responsible for planning and service delivery within a decentralized system, their ability to implement plans and enforce regulations has been severely constrained by prolonged occupation, political fragmentation, and recurrent crises.²⁴

The planning framework is governed by a mix of legacy laws, including Local Government Law No. 1 (1997), Buildings and Town Planning Regulation No. 30 (1996), and the British Mandate-era Town Planning Ordinance No. 28 (1936).²⁵

Historically, planning efforts have concentrated growth in Gaza City and Khan Younis, reinforcing a polarized urban structure and accelerating land consumption.²⁶ However, outdated regulations, limited technical capacity, and weak inter-institutional coordination have undermined effective urban planning and management.

Governance Framework across the Gaza Strip



Gaza Strip Level

The Ministry of Finance and Planning and Ministry of Local Government share responsibilities for physical planning.

Governorate Level

Governorates coordinate state services and planning oversight.

Local Level

Municipalities prepare structural plans and manage development.

Source: MoLG

²³ Abdelhamid, A., Urban Development and Planning in the Occupied Palestinian Territories: Impacts on Urban Form, 2006

²⁴ Elrantisi, I., 2013. The Influential Factors on Decision Making in Urban Planning (Case Study: Gaza Local Governments). Gaza Islamic University-Gaza.

²⁵ Al-Qeeq, F., Overview of the planning process in Gaza, 2016

²⁶ UN-Habitat, City-wide public Space Assessment, 2021

1.3.3 Refugee Camps

As a result of the continued occupation of the Gaza Strip, refugee camps, hosting a significant portion of the population, pose a unique planning challenge. Prior to the 2023 war, the Gaza Strip hosted eight official refugee camps, with a total population of 1.58 million²⁷ which constituted some of the most densely populated and socio-economically vulnerable urban areas in the territory. Established following the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, the camps evolved over time from emergency shelter sites into permanent, highly compact urban neighborhoods, characterized by extreme overcrowding, limited public space, and aging infrastructure.

Spatial Distribution of the Refugee Camps across the Gaza Strip



Source: UNRWA

Prior to the recent war, refugee camps, similar to the situation facing the majority of the population in the Gaza Strip, were already experiencing high poverty and unemployment rates, with an overall unemployment rate of 46.6 percent for the population of the Gaza Strip and 48.1 percent for Palestine Refugees living in the camps. This is accompanied by severe pressure on housing, water, sanitation, and electricity networks. Access to clean water and electricity remains at crisis level and impacts nearly every aspect of life. Clean water is unavailable for 95 percent of the population. Electricity is available up to an average of 11 hours per day as of July 2023.²⁸

The refugee camps in the Gaza Strip varies somehow than those in the West Bank. Even though the physical form of the camps is defined by narrow alleyways, informal vertical expansion, and the absence of land reserves. The service provision is limited and the opportunities for infrastructure upgrading are constrained.²⁹ The National Urban Policy (NUP) for Palestine describes the urban fabric of refugee camps as a complex environment characterized by extreme density and high levels of informality. Although these camps are managed by UNRWA rather than traditional municipalities, they are functionally of an urban nature and represent a significant portion of the de facto urban population in the Gaza Strip.³⁰

Governance and service delivery in refugee camps operated under a complex and fragmented institutional arrangement, with UNRWA responsible for education, health and mental health care, relief and social services, microcredit and emergency assistance to registered Palestine Refugees and municipalities retaining partial responsibility for surrounding infrastructure and urban management. Combined with the prolonged blockade and repeated hostilities prior to 2023, these structural conditions left refugee camps highly vulnerable and with limited resilience capacity, increasing their exposure to large-scale shocks. The MoLG expressed a strategic need to develop an integrated and sustainable urban-rural system that better accounts for the special characteristics of refugee camps and addresses the social inclusion of their residents in national development.³¹

27 UNRWA, Where We Work: Gaza Strip – Camp Profiles, 2023


28 UNRWA, Where We Work: Gaza Strip – Camp Profiles, 2023

29 UN-Habitat, Gaza Urban Profile, 2014


30 National Urban Policy, Ministry of Local Government, 2023.

31 OCHA, Gaza Strip | The humanitarian impact of 15 years of the blockade, 2022

Spatial and Demographics Overview



26 UNRWA, Where We Work – Registered Refugees, 2023
27 Where We Work | UNRWA
28 Where We Work | UNRWA
29 PCBS | Estimated Population in the Palestine Mid-Year by Governorate,1997-2026



Deir El Balah Camp

Deir Al-Balah

28,227 people

%8.8 of gov. population

0.17 (sq Km)²


%0.3 of the gov. area

Refugee Density

166,041 person/km²

Governate Density

5,700 person/km²



Bureij Camp

Deir Al-Balah

49,164 people

%15.4 of gov. population

0.5 (sq Km)²

%0.9 of the gov. area

Refugee Density

98,328 person/km²

Governate Density

5,700 person/km²



Khan Younis Camp

Khan Younis

95,550 people

%21.8 of gov. population

1.27 (sq Km)²

%1.2 of the gov. area

Refugee Density

75,236 person/km²

Governate Density

4,060 person/km²



Rafah Camp

Rafah

138,969 people

%50.5 of gov. population

1.23 (sq Km)²

%1.9 of the gov. area

Refugee Density

112,983 person/km²

Governate Density


4,235 person/km²

1.4 Housing Crisis and Tenure insecurity

1.4.1 Pre-war Housing Stock

The housing typology pre-war indicates a significant contrast between the total number of structure types and the distribution of housing units within them. While villas/houses constitute the majority of physical structures in the Gaza Strip (63.4 percent), they account for only 40 percent of total housing units. In contrast, buildings represent only 26.1 percent of structures but contain the majority of housing units (59 percent), reflecting the higher density and multi-unit nature of apartment buildings across the Gaza Strip.


Typology of the Structures in the Gaza Strip vs Housing Stock



In terms of spatial distribution, buildings constitute the predominant typology within urban centers across all governorates, particularly in the main cities. In contrast, villas/houses are primarily concentrated in peri-urban areas, especially in the northern and central parts of the Gaza Strip. Meanwhile, caravans/tents are mainly clustered in the eastern and central areas, particularly within Khan Yunis Governorate and Rafah Governorate, as well as parts of the northern Gaza Strip, where agricultural lands are more prevalent.

Prior to the recent war, the Gaza Strip was already experiencing a chronic housing and tenure crisis, driven by rapid population growth, repeated cycles of destruction, and long-standing Israeli restrictions on the movement of people and construction materials.

Affected Structures and Housing Units across the Previous Wars



These unresolved housing losses were embedded within a broader context of chronic urban stress:



Severe overcrowding,
across much of the housing stock



Acute land scarcity and weak tenure security,
limiting formal development



Persistent supply–demand gaps,
with housing provision far below needs



Widespread reliance on informal or communal tenure arrangements,
often without the legal or financial means to rebuild damaged homes



Degraded infrastructure,
further undermining habitability and resilience



Limited institutional capacity, contributing to unplanned urban expansion, irregular development patterns, and a fragmented urban form ³³

Together, these conditions significantly constrained the housing sector's ability to absorb shocks and respond to growing needs.



1.4.2 Land Ownership

Approximately 63 percent of land in the Gaza Strip is privately owned, around 2 percent is classified as Waqf (endowment land), and the remaining 35 percent constitutes public land.³⁴

Within this constrained land context, high population density and rapid urbanization have generated acute pressures on the built environment, including:



Severe shortages in housing supply



Increased reliance on informal and substandard construction




Reduced living space per household and rising overcrowding



Accelerated deterioration of buildings and infrastructure

Collectively, these dynamics have significantly limited opportunities for planned and sustainable urban growth, resulting in a built environment that is increasingly fragile and highly exposed to environmental, social, and economic shocks.

Landownership Status across the Gaza Strip



³⁴ UN-Habitat, Gaza Urban Profile, 2014

Sources: PLA – Gaza

1.4.3 Housing Land and Property (HLP) Rights

Disputes over housing, land, and property (HLP) rights in the Gaza Strip are rooted in a complex historical and institutional context shaped by successive political transitions, fragmented governance, and recurrent conflict. Even prior to October 2023, land was scarce and highly contested across densely populated urban areas, agricultural lands, public assets, former settlement areas, and refugee camps. This complexity is further compounded by a layered legal legacy, from Ottoman, British Mandate, Egyptian, Jordanian, Palestinian, and Israeli military frameworks, which has resulted in overlapping claims, unclear evidentiary standards, and fragmented interpretations of ownership and use rights.

Land tenure in Gaza has long been characterized by legal ambiguity, particularly in contexts of displacement, inheritance, and informal construction. Despite existing technical capacity within land administration institutions, systemic challenges such as high transaction costs, fragmented mandates, and low public trust have limited effective governance and driven reliance on informal practices.

These challenges disproportionately affect vulnerable groups, including women, refugees, and low-income households, who face barriers in documenting ownership, claiming inheritance, and accessing legal remedies.

Recurrent conflict has further exacerbated these vulnerabilities, leading to loss of documentation, displacement, and increased disputes over property. As a result, tenure insecurity has deepened, particularly among already vulnerable populations, while repeated crises continue to weaken HLP governance systems and widen inequalities in access to land and housing.

As a result, land tenure arrangements were often characterized by legal ambiguity, particularly in contexts of displacement, inheritance, informal construction, and post-conflict reconstruction. Although the land administration authority maintained a reasonable level of technical capacity (operating several offices, maintaining geodetic reference points, and managing largely digitized land records) significant systemic challenges persisted. High transaction costs, fragmented institutional mandates, and limited public trust in formal registration systems constrained effective land governance and incentivized reliance on informal practices, social customs, and verbal agreements to regulate property relations.

These structural weaknesses disproportionately affected vulnerable groups even before the latest escalation. Women, refugees, low-income households, and persons with disabilities frequently faced barriers in documenting ownership, registering inheritance rights, or accessing legal remedies in property disputes. Social norms, financial constraints, and complex administrative procedures often limited women's ability to formally claim inheritance or property rights, while refugees and residents of informal or densely built areas frequently relied on informal tenure arrangements lacking full legal protection.

Repetitive and prolonged periods of armed conflict have historically exacerbated these vulnerabilities. Damage or destruction of homes, loss of documentation, displacement, and the disruption of administrative institutions have repeatedly complicated the verification of ownership and the resolution of property claims. In such contexts, vulnerable household, including widows, female-headed households, and displaced families, often face heightened risks of tenure insecurity, secondary occupation, and disputes over land and housing. Consequently, recurrent cycles of conflict in Gaza have not only intensified humanitarian needs but have also further weakened already fragile HLP governance systems, deepening inequalities in access to land, housing, and property rights.

Prior to the recent crisis, the Gaza Strip was already operating under severe infrastructure constraints across transport, WASH, energy, and communications. The electricity sector faced chronic supply deficits, meeting less than 35 percent of demand for a population of over 2.2 million. The ICT sector was similarly constrained, relying on outdated second-generation (2G) networks with no access to mobile broadband, limiting connectivity and economic activity.



Restricted Connectivity

The transport system was under sustained pressure due to aging infrastructure, fragmented governance, and prolonged underinvestment. While access to improved sanitation was nearly universal and around 81 percent of the population had access to safely managed water, these gains remained highly fragile, undermined by structural vulnerabilities.

Connectivity was critically restricted, with mobility dependent almost entirely on the road network, particularly the Salah al-Din corridor, as the airport was inoperative, maritime access was blocked, and both road infrastructure and public transport systems were in poor condition.³⁵



Water Scarcity

Access to safe water and reliable electricity in Gaza remains at crisis levels, affecting nearly all aspects of daily life. Approximately 95 percent of the population lacks access to potable water. The coastal aquifer, Gaza's main water source, is severely degraded due to over-extraction, saline intrusion, and pollution, leaving most groundwater unsafe for consumption. As a result, drinking water supply depends heavily on small-scale desalination plants, limited bulk imports, and decentralized systems, including municipal and private desalination units and water trucking services, arrangements that are insufficient, costly, and highly vulnerable to disruption.³⁶

³⁵ RDNA, 2026

³⁶ RDNA, 2026



Energy Supply Constraints

As of July 2023, electricity in Gaza was available for only around 11 hours per day on average, reflecting a persistent supply deficit.³⁷ The Gaza Power Plant operates at a limited capacity of approximately 80 MW, supplemented by about 120 MW imported from Israel. Together, this covers only around 50 percent of the total electricity demand, estimated at 400–450 MW, leaving a substantial gap and resulting in chronic power shortages across the Strip.³⁸



Solid Waste

Gaza had two technically equipped sanitary landfill sites located along its eastern edge, essential for safe waste disposal and minimizing environmental and public health risks. However, these facilities were insufficient to meet demand, leading to widespread reliance on informal dumping sites with limited capacity and outdated equipment.³⁹

Solid waste management was coordinated by municipalities, Joint Service Councils (North and South), and UNRWA. The Joint Service Councils played a central role, overseeing waste collection, transfer, and landfill operations, including facilities such as Al-Fukhari/Sofa. They also managed medical waste and coordinated across municipalities, contributing to more integrated waste management and reducing environmental risks prior to the war.⁴⁰

³⁷: UNRWA, Where We Work: Gaza Strip – Camp Profiles, 2023

³⁸: OCHA, Gaza Strip | The humanitarian impact of 15 years of the blockade, 2022

³⁹: Solid Waste Crisis in Gaza: UNDP/PAPP

Expert View | United Nations Development Programme

⁴⁰: The Joint Service Council for Solid Waste Management



Strained Wastewater System

Prior to the 2023 war, Gaza's wastewater system was already severely overstretched and underperforming, reflecting years of underinvestment, rapid population growth, and restrictions on infrastructure development. Although coverage of sewer networks was relatively high in urban areas, treatment capacity lagged significantly behind demand, resulting in large volumes of untreated or partially treated wastewater being discharged into the sea or infiltrating the environment. Frequent power outages further disrupted pumping and treatment operations, leading to periodic flooding, contamination of groundwater, and public health risks. Aging infrastructure, limited maintenance capacity, and constraints on importing equipment and spare parts compounded system inefficiencies, leaving the wastewater sector highly fragile and vulnerable to disruption even before the latest escalation.⁴¹



Weak ICT Infrastructure

Gaza's ICT sector was severely underdeveloped and highly constrained, operating largely on outdated 2G mobile networks with limited fixed and mobile broadband capacity. Long-standing political restrictions, financial limitations, and infrastructure deficits curtailed investment and modernization, resulting in slow connectivity, limited digital services, and weak integration into regional and global networks. These structural constraints left the sector highly fragile and unable to support economic activity, service delivery, or crisis response at scale, even before the escalation.⁴²

⁴¹ RDNA, 2026

⁴² RDNA, 2026



Pre-Existing Socioeconomic Vulnerabilities

Even before the recent escalation, the Gaza Strip faced severe socioeconomic vulnerabilities. Poverty exceeded 64 percent⁴³, compared to around 14 percent in the West Bank⁴⁴, reflecting prolonged blockade and movement restrictions.⁴⁵ Unemployment was among the highest globally, at approximately 46.6 percent, with even higher rates among youth, limiting access to stable livelihoods.⁴⁶

However, food security in Gaza has deteriorated with 63 percent of people in the Gaza Strip being food insecure and dependent on international assistance, compared to 30 percent food insecurity rate in the West Bank. These challenges were further compounded by limited access to safe water and a heavy reliance on humanitarian assistance.⁴⁷

Social Services and Structural Economic Constraints

Even prior to the crisis, education and health services in Gaza were under severe strain, marked by chronic overcrowding and persistent underfunding. Economically, Gaza operated largely as a consumption-driven urban economy, reliant on internal trade, external aid, and tightly controlled flows of goods and people under the blockade. This model remained structurally unsustainable, constrained by long-standing movement restrictions that limited productivity, investment, and economic resilience.

Agriculture and Food System

Gaza's agrifood system operated under persistent structural constraints, further compounded by unrecovered losses from previous conflicts, high poverty, dependence on external supplies, restricted access to inputs and markets, and widespread reliance on humanitarian assistance. Despite these challenges, agriculture and related value chains remained a critical socio-economic pillar, contributing approximately 10 percent of the economy and supporting the livelihoods of hundreds of thousands across farming, herding, fishing, processing, and trade.⁴⁸

Cropland constituted a significant share of Gaza's land area, with spatial patterns showing a clear north-south distribution concentrated along the eastern and central belt, rather than the densely built coastal zone.⁴⁹

43 World Bank Issues New Update on the Palestinian Economy, World Bank, 2024

44 Humanitarian Situation Update #253 | Gaza Strip | OCHA

45 20/10/2025, الجهاز المركزي للإحصاء الفلسطيني | بياناً صحفياً بمناسبة اليوم العالمي للإحصاء،

46 UNRWA, Where We Work: Gaza Strip – Camp Profiles, 2023

47 آثار العدوان الإسرائيلي في الأمن الغذائي في قطاع غزة | توثيق استهداف وتدمير القطاع الصحي في قطاع غزة

48 RDNA, 2026

49 Cropland category map of the Gaza Strip 2023, FAO



1.7

Environment and Land Cover

Land Cover

Built-up areas in the Gaza Strip account for approximately 33 percent of the total land area, forming a dense and continuous urban fabric along the coastal corridor, interspersed with pockets of agricultural land. The remaining two-thirds of the territory is classified as agricultural land, primarily concentrated in the central and southern governorates, particularly Khan Younis (50 percent) and Rafah (40.1 percent).⁵⁰

Prior to the war, built-up areas were expanding rapidly due to sustained population growth and acute land scarcity, placing increasing pressure on arable land, open spaces, and environmental resources, and contributing to a more compact and stressed urban form.

Wadi Gaza

Wadi Gaza is a regionally significant ecological corridor that supports biodiversity within the Gaza Strip and facilitates species migration between Africa and Asia, providing important ecosystem services at both local and Eastern Mediterranean levels. The wadi originates near Hebron in the West Bank, flows across Israel, and enters Gaza east of Bureij at approximately 30 meters above sea level, continuing westward across central Gaza, north of Nuseirat Camp, before discharging into the Mediterranean Sea. Along its course in Gaza, it is joined by several minor tributaries.


Due to severe land constraints, Wadi Gaza has been subject to increasing pressures, including urban encroachment, pollution, and solid waste dumping. Although originally designated as a protected area, its extent has been significantly reduced since 2000 as a result of urban expansion and agricultural activities, leading to notable degradation of its ecosystems.

Marine Ecosystem

Gaza's 40 km Mediterranean coastline provides a critical resource for the population, particularly for small-scale fishing and associated food security. However, Palestinian access to fishing grounds is subject to Israeli-imposed restrictions, typically limiting operations to a range of 3 to 12 nautical miles offshore.

Beyond its economic role, the coastline, especially the remaining undeveloped beachfront, constitutes one of the few accessible open spaces within Gaza's dense urban fabric. It has historically served as a vital public area for recreation, social interaction, and community use.

Landcover and Accessible fishing area in the Gaza



⁵⁰ UNEP, Environmental Impact of the Escalation of Conflict in the Gaza Strip: Second assessment of environmental damage and recommendations for recovery and reconstruction planning, 2025.

Sources: FAO, OCHA

1.8 Cultural Heritage

Prior to the 2023 war, the Gaza Strip possessed a rich and diverse cultural heritage base, documented through a UNESCO-supported inventory that identified 268 historic buildings and 86 archaeological sites. These assets were spatially distributed across distinct regional clusters, reflecting Gaza's layered historical and cultural landscape.

In the north, Bayt Hanun and Jabaliya featured ancient remains, historic cemeteries, and the Byzantine Church of Jabaliya, renowned for its intricate mosaic floors. Gaza City served as the principal heritage hub, particularly within the historic Daraj and Zaytun quarters, hosting key landmarks such as the Great 'Umari Mosque, al-Sayyid Hashim Mosque, Qasr al-Basha, the Church of Saint Porphyrius, Katib Wilaya Mosque, and al-Kamiliya Madrasa.

Along the coast, al-Balakhhiyya marked the site of the ancient port city of Anthedon. In central Gaza, Nuseirat, Deir al-Balah, and Wadi Gaza contained significant archaeological, religious, and natural heritage assets, including the Saint Hilarion Monastery and the Deir al-Balah cemetery. In the south, Khan Younis and Rafah hosted fortified structures, religious sites, and archaeological remains of high historical value.⁵²




Cultural Heritage across the Gaza Strip

268
Historical Buildings



68
Archaeological Sites



Sources: UNESCO, NSP-MoLG

52 Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Gaza.pdf

Gender and Multidimensional Vulnerability Situation

Recurrent conflict and prolonged socioeconomic constraints in the Gaza Strip have disproportionately impacted vulnerable groups, deepening inequalities and increasing protection risks. Even prior to the latest escalation, large segments of the population, including low-income households, women and girls, children and youth, the elderly, persons with disabilities, and refugees, faced overlapping vulnerabilities driven by chronic blockade, repeated shocks, and limited access to livelihoods, services, and protection systems.

These conditions have resulted in persistently high poverty and unemployment rates, weakened social protection mechanisms, and constrained access to quality education, healthcare, and justice. Vulnerabilities are particularly acute in densely populated and marginalized areas, where overcrowding, inadequate infrastructure, and service shortages further compound risks.

Women and girls are especially affected, facing structural barriers to economic participation, limited access to assets and decision-making, and heightened exposure to gender-based violence, particularly in contexts of displacement and crisis.

Socioeconomic inequalities and access to services

Significant gender gaps persist in economic participation. Women face structural barriers to decent work, are overrepresented in informal and low-paid sectors, and have limited access to leadership and decision-making roles. Female labour force participation in Palestine remains very low (around 17 percent), increasing economic dependency and vulnerability. Poverty is considerably higher in Gaza than in the West Bank, disproportionately affecting vulnerable groups. In 2017, poverty among refugees in Gaza reached 54.1 percent, compared to 15.7 percent in the West Bank, while female-headed households experienced similarly high rates (54 percent in Gaza vs. 18.6 percent in the West Bank). Persons with disabilities and marginalized groups face additional barriers to employment due to discrimination and limited access to inclusive services.⁵³

Gender-Based Violence (GBV) and Compounded Vulnerabilities

GBV remains widespread, driven by entrenched social norms, economic stress, and gaps in protection systems. According to the 2019 PCBS survey, 29.4 percent of ever-partnered women aged 18–64 experienced violence in the previous year, with higher prevalence in Gaza (37.5 percent) than in the West Bank (24.3 percent). Psychological violence was most common, followed by economic and social forms, alongside reported physical and sexual violence.

Conflict further exacerbates these risks. Following the 2014 war, a majority of displaced households reported increased violence, with studies indicating that nearly 40 percent of women experienced some form of domestic violence, predominantly psychological.⁵⁴

Vulnerability in Gaza is driven by overlapping economic, social, and structural inequalities, where gender, disability, refugee status, and marginalization reinforce exclusion and deepen development gaps, underscoring the need for integrated, gender-responsive, and inclusive responses.⁵⁵

Overall, multidimensional vulnerability in Gaza is shaped by overlapping economic, social, and structural inequalities. Gender, disability, refugee status, and geographic marginalization interact to reinforce exclusion and deepen development gaps, highlighting the need for integrated, gender-responsive, and inclusive policy and programmatic responses.



© Atiyah Darwish

⁵³ Social and Economic Situation of Palestinian Women and Girls July 2018 - June 2020

⁵⁴ UNWPALCOGenderAlert2019.pdf

⁵⁵ rapid_gender_analysis_23_october_2023_updated.pdf





The Gaza Strip: Post-Conflict Situation

Since October 2023, the Gaza Strip has experienced one of the most destructive war in its history, severely impacting civilians, housing, infrastructure, and essential services, including schools, hospitals, utilities, and cultural and religious sites. While the ceasefire announced⁵⁶ in October 2025⁵⁷ offers a critical window for recovery, the scale of devastation and the ongoing crisis continue to drive acute humanitarian needs and deepen socio-economic pressures. More than 68 million metric tons of debris have accumulated, leaving dense urban areas in ruins and posing serious health, access, and recovery challenges.⁵⁸ Satellite analysis indicates that, as of 11 October 2025, approximately 81 percent of structures in Gaza are damaged, including 123,464 destroyed, 17,116 severely damaged, 33,857 moderately damaged, and 23,836 possibly damaged buildings, amounting to nearly 198,300 affected structures.⁵⁹

This destruction has displaced around 1.9 million people, often multiple times, resulting in severe overcrowding in shelters, schools, and informal sites. Critical infrastructure has also been devastated, with 88 percent of above-ground WASH facilities, 76 percent of underground networks, 74 percent of roads, 94 percent of hospitals⁶⁰, and 95 percent of educational facilities⁶¹ damaged or destroyed.

The humanitarian situation is further compounded by widespread food insecurity, with over 640,000 people in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe) and 1.14 million in Phase 4 (Emergency). These conditions underscore the urgent need for coordinated, large-scale interventions that address immediate humanitarian needs while laying the foundation for sustainable recovery and resilience.⁶²

Evacuation orders were issued for 150 neighborhoods, covering approximately 314.8 km² (87 percent of Gaza's territory), triggering mass displacement and significantly altering population distribution. At the peak of the conflict, nearly 90 percent of Gaza was under evacuation orders, forcing communities into overcrowded shelters in central and southern areas.


These dynamics have major implications for urban planning and recovery, as they constrain access, reduce the availability of usable land, and complicate reconstruction logistics. This is further exacerbated by the continued deployment of Israeli forces across more than 50 percent of the Gaza Strip, including areas beyond the so-called "Yellow Line."⁶³

56. Since October 2023, ceasefire efforts in Gaza have been brief and fragile. A seven-day truce in November 2023 enabled hostage-prisoner exchanges and increased aid, but fighting resumed on 1 December. A phased ceasefire was then agreed on 15 January 2025, took effect on 19 January, and held for nearly two months before collapsing in March 2025, after disputes over extending its first phase and renewed Israeli attacks across the Strip.


57. The October 2025 Gaza ceasefire followed a comprehensive roadmap centered on an immediate cessation of hostilities. This plan facilitated a full hostage for prisoner exchange and the phased withdrawal of Israeli

Post-October 2023 urban context in Gaza

198,300 Affected Structures (81% of structures)



Food insecurity in the Gaza Strip



forces to pre-designated lines. To ensure stability, an International Stabilization Force was authorized to oversee demilitarization while a transitional technocratic administration known as the Board of Peace assumed governance. Under UNSC Resolution 2803, these steps prioritize humanitarian restoration and long-term regional security.

58. DTWG, Gaza Strip - Preliminary Debris Quantification, October 2025

59. UNOSAT, October, 2025

60. Public Health Situation Analysis - occupied Palestinian territory-September, WHO, 2025

61. UNECSO, 2025

62. Famine in Gaza: 'A failure of humanity itself', says UN chief | UN News, 2025

63. Humanitarian Situation Update 349# | Gaza Strip | OCHA, 2026

2.1

Access and Security Situation


The conflict unfolded in phases marked by temporary ceasefires that offered only brief humanitarian reprieves.

During active hostilities, new security measures reshaped Gaza's geography. The creation of the Netzarim Corridor following the unfolding of the war on 07 October 2023, a 4-kilometer-wide military zone cutting across the Strip, has effectively divided Gaza into northern and southern enclaves, severely restricting movement and fragmenting urban continuity.

Simultaneously, buffer zones expanded to 1–2 kilometers along Gaza's borders, swallowing large swaths of agricultural land and residential areas. These zones, combined with military thoroughfares, have drastically reduced accessible land for housing and farming.

On 20 October 2025, the Israeli military announced that works began to demarcate the Yellow Line separating the ceasefire zone from the Israeli military-controlled area.⁶⁴ The Israeli military remains deployed in over 50 percent of the Gaza Strip, beyond the so-called "Yellow Line," which remains largely unmarked on the ground and where access to humanitarian facilities and assets, public infrastructure and agricultural land remain severely restricted or prohibited.⁶⁵

Yellow Line and Restricted Area



Source: OCHA

64. OCHA, Humanitarian Situation Update #334 | Gaza Strip, December 2025.

65. OCHA, Humanitarian Situation Update #349 | Gaza Strip, December 2025.

2.2

Housing and Tenure Security

2.2.1


Affected Structures

The most recent conflict has caused catastrophic damage to Gaza's housing stock. According to UNOSAT, as of 11 October 2025, approximately 81 percent of all structures in the Gaza Strip are damaged. This includes 123,464 destroyed structures, 17,116 severely damaged, 33,857 moderately damaged, and 23,836 possibly damaged, totaling 198,273 affected structures.⁶⁶

Compared to the 2014 conflict, when 14,798 structures were affected, the scale of damage has increased dramatically, by nearly 1,080 percent, or almost a 12-fold rise. This reflects an unprecedented level of destruction, with a broader geographic spread and higher intensity of damage, placing significantly greater pressure on housing recovery, infrastructure rehabilitation, and service provision.


Affected structures in the Gaza Strip as of October 2025

198,273 Affected Structures
(81% of all structures)




66. UNOSAT, Gaza Strip Comprehensive Damage Assessment, 11 October 2025.

Affected Structures



Source: UNOSAT

Damage Classification of Affected Housing Unit per Structural Typology



The data indicate that most affected housing units fall within the “Building” typology (apartment units). “Villa/House” typologies represent a significant secondary share, accounting for over 40 percent of destroyed units and around 25 percent of severely and moderately damaged units, reflecting the increasing shift toward apartment-based housing since 2014.

Across Gaza’s eight refugee camps, buildings and villas/houses remain the dominant housing types. However, damage patterns differ slightly: in most areas, both typologies are affected at comparable levels, while in refugee camps, approximately two-thirds of damaged units are apartment buildings, with the remaining third consisting of villas/houses.

2.2.2 Affected People and Overcrowding

This destruction compounds the ongoing mass displacement crisis, with more than 1.45 million people, 65.3 percent of Gaza’s population, rendered without homes and forced to live in informal, overcrowded, and unsafe shelters, significantly heightening the risks faced by vulnerable groups.

The sharp contraction in rental supply and economic affordability have pushed displaced families into extremely precarious and hazardous living conditions.⁶⁷

The devastation has further intensified the vulnerabilities of women, particularly female-headed households, widows, people with disabilities, and children, and has contributed to rising gender-based violence and social exclusion.⁶⁸



67. No numbers regarding the shelter affordability are mentioned in the RDNA, 2026 Housing sector.

68. RDNA, 2026


2.3 Displacement

2.3.1 Compounded Displacement Crisis in the Gaza Strip

Displacement from previous wars to be added. The history of displacement in the Gaza Strip, as reflected in the data, reveals a harrowing pattern of shifting zones of danger. The 2008-2009 war set up a devastating precedent, displacing 100,000 people across the entire Gaza Strip, demonstrating that no area was immune⁶⁹. This was followed by a more geographically contained escalation in 2012, which displaced 15,000 people to the south of Gaza City.⁷⁰ The scale of displacement then grew exponentially in 2014, when half a million people—a quarter of the population at the time—were forced to flee, to Rafah and Gaza City.⁷¹ The 2021 war saw 113,000 people displaced, primarily to the south and western areas, underscoring how each subsequent conflict has continued to uproot entire communities and redraw the map of habitation in Gaza.⁷² According to the Shelter Cluster 8,250 people remain displaced, as their houses were destroyed or so severely damaged they are uninhabitable.

Displacement escalated rapidly following the issuance of mass evacuation orders in October–November 2023, initially affecting large parts of North Gaza and Gaza Governorate. By late 2023, more than 1.9 million people had been displaced, with successive evacuation waves from North Gaza and Gaza driving further southward movement.⁷³

Temporal trajectory of displacement (since October 2023)⁷⁷



69. Occupied Palestinian Territory: Gaza offensive adds to scale of displacement - occupied Palestinian territory | ReliefWeb

70. Gaza Initial Rapid Assessment - OCHA report 24-26 Nov 2012 - Question of Palestine

71. 2014 Gaza conflict | UNRWA

72. Overview | November 2021 | United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - Occupied Palestinian Territory

73. Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel - reported impact | Day 85 | United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - Occupied Palestinian Territory

Displacement slightly decreased through early to mid-2024, peaking around May–June 2024, when over 1.7 million people were displaced following expanded evacuation orders across central and southern governorates.⁷⁴

Throughout 2024, displacement became increasingly cyclical rather than linear. Repeated evacuation orders, rescinded and reissued across the same areas, resulted in multiple secondary and tertiary displacements within single months, particularly affecting households previously displaced from North Gaza.

By November 2024, approximately 1.9 million people, or 79 percent of Gaza's population, were internally displaced, while around 82–87 percent of Gaza's territory had been placed under evacuation orders at various points, indicating near-total spatial exposure to displacement pressures.⁷⁵

From November 2024 and until the ceasefire in October 2025, 1.9 million people of Gaza's population, were internally displaced, while around 84 percent of Gaza's territory is under Israeli-issued evacuation orders.⁷⁶

74. Reported impact snapshot | Gaza Strip (26 June 2024) | United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - Occupied Palestinian Territory

75. Gaza war: expected socioeconomic impacts on the State of Palestine

76. Reported impact snapshot | Gaza Strip (22 October 2024) | United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - Occupied Palestinian Territory

77. Population and internal displacement since 7 October 2023 | Gaza Strip | United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - Occupied Palestinian Territory

2.3.1 Displacement Trends in Gaza:

Protracted and cyclical

Displacement has become protracted and cyclical, with many families forced to relocate multiple times before settling in makeshift tented sites under extremely harsh conditions. As of 11 February 2026, an estimated 1.4 million people (two-thirds of the population) are living across approximately 1,000 displacement sites, often overcrowded and lacking adequate privacy and protection.⁷⁸

Site Management

Only 40 percent of sites currently have Site Management Cluster partner presence, indicating significant gaps in coordination and service delivery. Displacement sites are heavily concentrated in central and southern Gaza, particularly in Khan Younis (46 percent) and Deir al Balah (29 percent), followed by Gaza Governorate (16 percent), North Gaza (7 percent), and Rafah (2 percent).


Makeshift sites

Makeshift sites dominate (81 percent), with the remainder consisting of collective centres (15 percent) and scattered sites (just over 1 percent), highlighting the precarious and informal nature of current shelter conditions.⁷⁹

Overcrowding

Mass displacement has forced the vast majority of Gaza's 1.9 million IDPs into just 21 percent of the territory, placing extreme pressure on central and southern areas. Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis have become primary hubs, with populations rising to 749,000 and 916,000, respectively. This has led to a sharp increase in population density, more than doubling to 13,375 people/km² in Deir al-Balah (from 5,700) and 8,481 people/km² in Khan Younis (from 4,060).⁸⁰

Temporal trajectory of displacement (since October 2023)



78. Site Management Cluster Palestine, Statement On Escalating Forced Displacement in Gaza, September 2025.

79. OCHA, Gaza Humanitarian Response | Situation Report No. 66, 9 February 2026


80. Population and internal displacement since 7 October 2023 | Gaza Strip | United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - Occupied Palestinian Territory

2.3.3 Secondary Occupancy and HLP Challenges in Gaza

Housing, land and property challenges in crisis-affected neighbourhoods are increasingly shaped by displacement dynamics, secondary occupation, weakened enforcement mechanisms, and the erosion of formal documentation systems. These issues sit at the intersection of property rights, humanitarian protection, municipal service delivery, and recovery planning. Addressing them requires an integrated legal, humanitarian, and area-based approach that protects legitimate rights while ensuring safe, dignified, and gradual solutions for displaced households.

- Widespread secondary occupation of private homes following mass displacement, which is compounded by the limited ability of original occupants to reclaim their property due to humanitarian constraints and lack of alternative shelter.
- Reliance on informal, community-mediated solutions rather than formal legal mechanisms
- Occupation of public spaces (municipal buildings, parks, cultural centers), disrupting services and governance
- Operational strain on municipalities in managing shelters while maintaining basic services
- Legal ambiguities and weak enforcement around property rights during crisis conditions
- Growth of informal settlements on private or undocumented land, increasing risk of disputes
- Risk of long-term ownership conflicts and potential claims over occupied land
- Insufficient documentation of property ownership, complicating restitution processes
- Need to balance property rights with humanitarian protection, delaying evictions
- Dependence on coordinated humanitarian response for safe and gradual relocation
- Lack of formalized occupancy agreements, increasing uncertainty for both owners and occupants
- Requirement for due process, adequate notice, and alternative housing in line with international standards
- Overall need for integrated legal and humanitarian approaches to address housing, land, and property (HLP) challenges

Spatial distribution of tents – associated population



Source: UNOSAT

2.4 Debris Analysis and Damaged Structures

2.3.1 Debris: Compounded Crisis in the Gaza Strip

Spatial analysis of debris in the Gaza Strip (as of October 2025) indicates an unprecedented accumulation of approximately 68 million metric tonnes, representing more than 19 times the total debris generated by all other conflicts in the region since 2008.⁸¹ This scale is directly linked to the extent of destruction, with around 81 percent of structures, approximately 198,273 buildings, damaged or destroyed.⁸²

Debris Composition



Source: UNEP

The debris is primarily composed of reinforced concrete, masonry, metals, asphalt, and mixed construction materials, often contaminated with hazardous substances such as asbestos, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and toxic residues.⁸³ These contaminants pose serious risks to public health, environmental safety, and humanitarian access. In addition, hazardous materials associated with munitions can have acute and long-term ecological impacts, including toxicity to plants and animals, bioaccumulation in the food chain, and persistent contamination of soil, groundwater, and marine environments. These risks are particularly critical during debris removal and handling operations.⁸⁴

81. Gaza Strip - Preliminary Debris Quantification (October 2025) - occupied Palestinian territory | ReliefWeb

82. UNOSAT


83. Environmental Impact of the Conflict in Gaza: Preliminary Assessment of Environmental Impacts | UNEP - UN Environment Programme

84. UNEP, Environmental Impact of the conflict in the Gaza Strip, 2025.

85. Gaza Strip - Preliminary Debris Quantification (October 2025) - occupied Palestinian territory | ReliefWeb

Spatial distribution of debris

The northern governorates (North Gaza and Gaza City) exhibit the highest concentrations, reflecting the intensity of destruction in dense urban areas. Central areas (Deir al-Balah) show predominantly low to moderate densities, indicating more dispersed damage patterns. In the south (Khan Younis and Rafah), debris is unevenly distributed, with localized hotspots in urban centers, suggesting concentrated or corridor-based damage rather than uniform destruction.⁸⁵



2.5

Infrastructure and Basic Services

90% Fully Destroyed



Source : RDNA, 2026

348

Municipal Facilities Affected

including administrative buildings, garages, markets, community centers, warehouses, libraries, and cultural facilities.

228

Public Spaces Demolished

or rendered unusable, many now serve as informal displacement sites.




Source : RDNA, 2026

487

Vehicles Destroyed

Critically constraining solid waste collection, debris removal, and emergency response.



Source : RDNA, 2026



© Ashraf Amra



Electricity

Since October 2023, the energy sector has sustained extensive damage, with over 90 percent of electricity infrastructure reported destroyed or non-functional.⁸⁶

UN-Habitat conducted an analysis of nighttime light imagery that further illustrates the scale and progression of this disruption in electricity services. The temporal sequence of images, spanning January 2023 to March 2025, highlights both the rapid deterioration and the widening spatial extent of electricity outages across the Gaza Strip.

Patterns:

Prior to October 2023, nighttime illumination was relatively widespread across the territory, reflecting the presence of functioning electricity supply and active urban centers distributed throughout the coastal strip.


Following the escalation of hostilities in late 2023, the imagery shows a rapid and extensive decline in nighttime illumination that expands spatially across the entire territory.

Spatial Analysis:

The reduction in light intensity is not confined to a single locality but instead spreads across northern, central, and southern areas, indicating a systemic collapse of the centralized electricity grid rather than isolated infrastructure damage.

Over time, the spatial pattern becomes increasingly uniform, with most areas experiencing prolonged darkness and only scattered

Light Intensity Patterns



pockets of activity. These localized concentrations of light are likely associated with critical facilities, humanitarian sites, or limited alternative energy sources that continue operating at minimal levels.

This spatial distribution highlights how the disruption of electricity has affected the territory as an interconnected urban system, severely constraining the operation of essential infrastructure, including water supply, wastewater treatment, healthcare services, and communications, while also limiting economic activity and mobility across neighborhoods.

⁸⁶. National Urban Policy, Ministry of Local Government, 2023.



WASH

Since the onset of the conflict in October 2023, the WASH sector has experienced widespread devastation, with approximately 88 percent of above-ground assets and 76 percent of underground networks partially or fully damaged.⁸⁷ The destruction of Gaza's WASH sector has triggered a profound humanitarian crisis. This has sharply increased waterborne disease risks and environmental contamination. Such widespread service failures mean that health facilities, schools, and displacement sites are operating under critical constraints that directly undermine protection, human dignity, and overall public health outcomes.

All six wastewater treatment plants are non-functional, centralized wastewater treatment has completely halted, and 70 percent of sewage pumping stations are inoperable.

One of the three main seawater desalination plants and two of three bulk water supply connections are non-functional, severely constraining Gaza's largest sources of safe water.

Stormwater infrastructure has also been heavily impacted, with 88 percent of pumping stations damaged and basins increasingly contaminated with untreated sewage.

The destruction of WASH services has had severe human and cross-sectoral impacts.

Access to safe water in Gaza has collapsed. Only a small share of the population currently receives piped drinking water, while the breakdown of wastewater treatment and solid waste services has significantly increased risks of waterborne disease, flooding, and environmental contamination. Average water consumption has dropped from 79.8 L/person/day⁸⁸ pre-October 2023 to just 3–5 L/person/day, far below WHO minimum standards.⁸⁹

Women and girls are disproportionately affected, facing increased burdens in water collection, hygiene, and menstrual health, often without adequate supplies or privacy. Health facilities, displacement sites, and schools are operating under severe WASH constraints, undermining health outcomes and human dignity.⁹⁰

Damage to WASH infrastructure is concentrated along Gaza's main north–south corridors, particularly the Salah al-Din and coastal roads, where network breaks disrupt critical system connectivity. Repairs in these key junctions would have the greatest impact in restoring service continuity.

Damage Classification of WASH lines



87. RDNA, 2026

88. كمية المياه المتاحة للمحافظات الجنوبية (قطاع غزة) | سلطة المياه - دولة فلسطين

89. Domestic water quantity, service level and health


90. RDNA, 2026



Transportation

AI-Enhanced analysis of satellite imagery indicates that approximately 74 percent of Gaza's 4,500 km road network is destroyed, with an additional 13 percent partially damaged.⁹¹


Destruction is most concentrated within major urban centers, North Gaza, Gaza City, Khan Younis, and Rafah, where dense clusters of damage severely disrupt internal circulation and fragment neighborhood connectivity. Partially damaged road segments are more widely distributed around these urban cores, indicating reduced functionality where routes remain physically present but operationally compromised.



Road accessibility remains a major constraint across many neighborhoods, with 57 percent of the total area of the affected neighborhoods experiencing major loss in accessibility within these neighborhoods. In these areas, movement of residents, service providers, and emergency responses is significantly restricted, directly affecting the safe return and recovery conditions of the population.

Around A further 40 percent of the total area of the neighborhoods fall within the moderate loss in accessibility category, where some mobility is possible, disrupted connectivity may still hinder access to housing, services, and debris removal operations.

Damage Classification of Road Network




Source: UNOSAT, 2025

91. RDNA, 2026

2.6 Socio- Economic and Livelihood Impacts

2.6.1 Education

The education system in Gaza has effectively collapsed. Approximately 90 percent of educational facilities, including over 97 percent of schools⁹², have sustained damage, with more than 1,300 buildings destroyed and over 880 partially damaged.⁹³




As a result, more than 750,000 school-aged children have been out of school for over two years.⁹⁴ In response, the Education Cluster has established 502 Temporary Learning Spaces, reaching around 297,500 children⁹⁵, while UNRWA supports over 296,000 students through digital and self-learning modalities. However, these efforts are severely constrained by ongoing electricity shortages and connectivity disruptions.⁹⁶

750,000 Children
Out of school for TWO YEARS



Source: RDNA, 2026

297,500 Children
Temporary Learning Spaces
(502 Temporary Learning Spaces)



296,000 Children
digital and self-learning modalities
(Through UNRWA)



Spatially, damage to educational facilities mirrors broader destruction patterns, with the highest concentrations in North Gaza and Gaza City, as well as Khan Younis and Rafah, while Deir al-Balah has experienced comparatively lower levels of impact.



2.6.2 Healthcare

The health sector in Gaza has sustained extensive and severe infrastructure damage, with particularly high concentrations of destruction in the northern regions. Spatial analysis of mapped health facilities indicates that the vast majority have been physically impacted, including approximately 1,138 facilities destroyed and 538 partially damaged.

1,138

Facilities Destroyed

538

Partially Damaged



Source: RDNA, 2026

Damage is unevenly distributed, with the highest density of destroyed and severely damaged facilities in North Gaza and Gaza City. The southern governorates of Khan Younis and Rafah also show significant levels of damage, while Deir al-Balah has experienced comparatively lower levels of physical impact.

Despite these geographic variations, the health system is functionally compromised across the entire Strip. Hospitals have been most severely affected, but damage extends throughout the network, including primary healthcare centers, clinics, pharmacies, and laboratories, severely constraining the delivery of essential health services.

92. After Two Years of War: Gaza's Education System on the Brink of Collapse | UNICEF State of Palestine, UNICEF, 2025


93. RDNA, 2026

94. RDNA, 2026

95. Humanitarian Situation Report | 6 March 2026 | United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - Occupied Palestinian Territory

96. UNRWA Situation Report #208 on the Humanitarian Crisis in the occupied Palestinian territory (the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem), UNRWA, 2026.

Damage Classification of Healthcare Facilities



Source: UNOSAT, 2025



2.6.3 Agriculture

The conflict has led to a near-total collapse of Gaza's agrifood system. More than 95 percent of agricultural infrastructure, including cropland, orchards, greenhouses, irrigation networks, wells, roads, storage and processing facilities, markets, bakeries, solar systems, and fisheries assets, has been destroyed. Approximately 98 percent of cropland is damaged, inaccessible, or both, leaving only negligible areas cultivable, many of which are currently occupied by displaced populations. This has effectively halted agricultural production at scale, disrupted value chains across crops, livestock, and fisheries, and pushed markets into informal channels, forcing households to adopt subsistence-level coping strategies.⁹⁷

Spatial analysis reveals a highly uneven pattern of destruction, with the most severe impacts


concentrated in the northern governorates. Cropland damage reaches 84.1 percent in North Gaza and 75–80 percent in Gaza City, forming a continuous belt of severely degraded agricultural land. High-resolution imagery confirms extensive losses of productive assets, including 73 percent of orchards destroyed in North Gaza, 90 percent in Gaza City, and near-total greenhouse loss in areas such as Beit Lahia, indicating near-complete agricultural collapse in the northern half of the Strip.⁹⁸

Critical farming infrastructure has also been heavily affected. Around 52.3 percent of agricultural wells are damaged, with the highest concentration in Gaza City and North Gaza. Greenhouse losses are similarly severe, with 50.5 percent of structures damaged overall; the Gaza Governorate records the highest proportional loss (77.8 percent), while Khan Younis has the highest absolute number of damaged greenhouses (1,023 units). These losses underscore the breakdown of essential water and climate-control systems required for local food production.⁹⁹

Damage toll in the Agricultural Sector

95%

Agriculture Infrastructure Destroyed




97. RDNA, 2026

98. FAO, Agricultural Damage Assessment in the Gaza Strip, 2025.


99. FAO, Agricultural Damage Assessment in the Gaza Strip, 2025.

Spatial distribution of the damaged greenhouses across the Gaza Strip




The map illustrates the spatial distribution of damaged agricultural land, with high-density clusters concentrated in the northern governorates and along the central corridor. In contrast, the southern areas, particularly around Rafah, retain relatively larger pockets of less-affected agricultural land. This pattern highlights severe and widespread disruption in the north and center, while indicating that the southern governorates may serve as critical short-term zones for stabilization and residual food production.

Spatial distribution of the damaged agricultural land



A complementary analysis of greenhouse damage, represented by red points in the below map, shows a widespread but uneven distribution of impact. The highest concentrations are observed in the southern governorates, especially Khan Younis and Rafah, with additional clusters in Deir al-Balah, while the northern areas exhibit more dispersed and fragmented damage patterns.

Spatial distribution of the damaged cropland



Source: FAO

The assessment indicates extensive impacts on agricultural land, with over 77.0 percent of the total areas across the neighborhoods in the Gaza Strip experience severe destruction to agricultural land, suggesting widespread damage to cultivated areas and a significant reduction in agricultural productivity and local food production capacity.

Only 1.8 percent of the total area in the Gaza Strip are reported to sustain minor destruction in agricultural lands, indicating substantial implications for local economic recovery, particularly in neighborhoods dependent on agriculture for income generation, food supply, and household self-reliance.




Environmental pollution

The war in Gaza has caused severe and widespread environmental degradation, compounding an already fragile ecosystem. Large-scale destruction has generated tens of millions of tons of debris, much of it contaminated with hazardous materials such as asbestos, heavy metals, and unexploded ordnance, posing long-term risks to soil, air, and water quality. The collapse of wastewater treatment and solid waste systems has led to the discharge of untreated sewage and uncontrolled dumping, increasing pollution and public health hazards. Agricultural lands have been extensively damaged or rendered inaccessible, while groundwater resources, already over-exploited, face further contamination. Coastal and marine ecosystems have also been affected by debris runoff and wastewater discharge. Together, these impacts threaten biodiversity, undermine natural resource systems, and create lasting environmental challenges that will significantly constrain recovery efforts.

Remote sensing analysis confirms the severe environmental impacts of the conflict across the Gaza Strip. In 2025, a significant increase in aerosol concentrations in southern Gaza indicates the continuous re-suspension of debris dust driven by large-scale population movements and vehicle activity, resulting in deteriorating air quality in areas hosting high concentrations of displaced populations.

2.6.4 Industry, Commerce, Tourism




Since October 2023, Gaza's productive base has been largely devastated, with the majority of commercial, industrial, and tourism infrastructure reduced to rubble. By October 2025, approximately 92 percent of assessed establishments were affected, including 72 percent completely destroyed and 20 percent partially damaged.¹⁰⁰

Spatial analysis reveals a highly concentrated pattern of destruction in the northern governorates, particularly North Gaza and Gaza City, where dense clusters of damaged facilities align with key urban corridors. In Deir al-Balah, the pattern shifts to a more linear and fragmented distribution, largely following the main north-south transport axis. Further south, in Khan Younis and Rafah, damage is more dispersed, with isolated affected sites across sectors.

Commercial and industrial facilities are the most extensively impacted, with damage extending from dense urban centers into surrounding areas. Tourism assets are primarily concentrated along the northern coastline near Gaza City, with limited presence in the south. Overall, the pattern reflects intense, concentrated destruction in northern urban hubs, contrasted with more scattered impacts in central and southern areas.

100. RDNA, 2026

Damage to Industrial, Commerical and Tourism Facilities





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3

Neighborhood Functionality Index

Neighborhood Functionality Index and the situation Pre-War

Prior to the conflict, Gaza's neighborhoods functioned as interconnected urban systems that supported daily life through a combination of housing, mobility networks, economic activities, public services, and community structures. While the level of service provision and development varied between neighborhoods, most areas maintained a degree of functionality that enabled residents to access housing, move safely through the urban environment, reach essential services, and sustain social and economic activities. Establishing this pre-war functionality baseline is critical to understanding the scale of disruption caused by the conflict and provides the reference point against which current neighborhood conditions are assessed.

At this stage of the urban profiling process, **a clear and standardized Neighborhood Functionality Index (NFI)** is applied to assess the extent to which neighborhoods have retained or lost their ability to support everyday life. The index is built on a comparison between pre-war and post-war functionality, measuring the degree of functional loss rather than physical damage alone. Each neighborhood is assigned a score based on the severity of sectoral impacts using consistent and transparent criteria. The index serves as a rapid prioritization tool that helps identify neighborhoods requiring immediate stabilization and recovery interventions, while also highlighting areas with greater potential for recovery, reconstruction, and the restoration of urban life. As such, it provides a practical foundation for evidence-based planning and decision-making, while remaining an iterative tool that will be refined as additional information becomes available.

The methodology is informed by the Neighborhood Functionality Assessment Model (NFAM), applied on the neighborhood level, which evaluates neighborhoods across multiple interrelated dimensions of urban functionality. However, given current data availability, the present assessment focuses on three key indicators that provide an initial proxy for neighborhood physical functionality: (1) damage to the built environment, (2) road network accessibility, (3) the distribution of population, (4) the accessibility in terms of protections and safety, and (5) the presence of accumulated debris. Together, these indicators offer a preliminary understanding of the extent to which neighborhoods can support the return of residents, the restoration of services, and the recovery of socio-economic activities.

Post-war neighborhood Physical Functionality

The post-war NFI reveals a severe and widespread decline in the physical functionality of neighborhoods across the Gaza Strip, reflecting extensive damage to the built environment, infrastructure networks, road accessibility, housing, and essential service facilities that support daily life.

Approximately 44.2 percent of the Gaza Strip falls within the Very Low category, while a further 39.1 percent is classified as Extremely Low. Together, these two categories account for approximately 83.2 percent of the Gaza Strip. An additional 11.9 percent is classified as Low, meaning that around 95.2 percent of the area in the Gaza Strip post war now demonstrates low, very low, or extremely low functionality. Only 4.8 percent remains within the Medium functionality category, and no neighborhoods are classified as having high functionality.

This represents a fundamental shift from the pre-war spatial pattern. Before the war, approximately 37 percent of the Gaza Strip was classified as having high to medium functionality, mainly concentrated within established urban centers. In the post-war classification, the remaining medium-functionality areas are limited to relatively few neighborhoods within the Gaza and Deir Al Balah governorates. It is noticeable that the deterioration is no longer primarily associated with peripheral, rural, or restricted areas; it has extended deeply into the urban cores that previously accommodated the greatest concentration of services, infrastructure, economic activities, institutions, and employment opportunities.

The severity of functional decline varies across governorates. Rafah demonstrates the most critical situation, with approximately all of its area classified as Extremely Low.

In North Gaza, the majority of the areas have witnessed serious deterioration with approximately 54.2 percent of its area classified as Extremely Low and 33.4 percent classified as Very Low.

A similarly severe pattern is evident in Khan Yunis, where approximately 67.1 percent of the area is Very Low and 20.3 percent is Extremely Low. No medium-functionality areas remain in Rafah, Khan Yunis, or North Gaza.

The Gaza Governorate presents a somewhat more varied pattern, although approximately 80.1 percent of its area remains classified as Very Low or Extremely Low. Only around 13.6 percent retains medium functionality.


Deir Al Balah maintains the largest relative concentration of the remaining low and medium-functionality areas, which together account for approximately 43 percent of the governorate. Nevertheless, around 57 percent of Deir Al Balah is still classified as Very Low, demonstrating that even the comparatively better-performing central areas continue to experience substantial functional constraints.

Neighborhoods located behind the Yellow Line exhibit particularly severe deterioration in physical functionality. All of these neighborhoods are classified as having Very Low or Extremely Low physical functionality. Many of these areas sustained extensive damage during the early stages of the war, resulting in widespread destruction of buildings, roads, infrastructure networks, and essential service facilities. This deterioration has been further compounded by the prohibition of civilian access to these areas, preventing residents from returning, assessing damage, restoring services, or resuming normal neighborhood activities.


Overall, the remaining areas of medium and low functionality are spatially limited and fragmented and are unlikely to operate independently from the surrounding severely affected neighborhoods. The results consequently indicate not only localized neighborhood damage, but a broader breakdown in the interconnected urban systems required to support daily life and enable recovery across the Gaza Strip.

Neighborhood Functionality Assessment (Pre-War)

- High Functionality
- Medium Functionality
- Low Functionality
- Very Low Functionality
- Extremely Low Functionality



Neighborhood Functionality Loss (Post-War)



Annex I: Neighbourhood Functionality Matrix

Neighborhood Code		Pre War Functionality	Post War Functionality
North Gaza			
Beit Hanon			
1	2455274001	Medium	Very Low
2	2455274002	Low	Extremely Low
3	2455274003	Medium	Extremely Low
4	2455274004	Low	Extremely Low
5	2455274005	Low	Extremely Low
6	2455274006	Low	Extremely Low
7	2455274007	Medium	Extremely Low
8	2455274008	Medium	Extremely Low
9	2455274009	Low	Extremely Low
10	2455274010	Medium	Extremely Low
Beit Lahia			
11	2455269501	Medium	Very Low
12	2455269502	Medium	Very Low
13	2455269503	Low	Extremely Low
14	2455269504	Low	Extremely Low
15	2455269505	Medium	Very Low
16	2455269506	Medium	Very Low
17	2455269507	Low	Very Low
18	2455269508	High	Very Low
19	2455269509	Medium	Low
20	2455269510	Medium	Low
21	2455269511	Low	Very Low
22	2455269512	Low	Very Low
23	2455269513	Low	Extremely Low
Jabalia			
24	101	High	Very Low
25	2455279003	Medium	Low
26	2455279004	Medium	Low
27	2455279005	Medium	Low
28	2455279006	High	Low
29	2455279007	Medium	Very Low
30	2455279008	Medium	Very Low
31	2455279009	Low	Very Low
32	2455279010	Medium	Very Low
33	2455279011	Low	Extremely Low
Um Al Nasser			
34	993	Low	Extremely Low

Neighborhood Code		Pre War Functionality	Post War Functionality
Gaza			
Al Mughraqa			
35	2460294501	Low	Very Low
36	2460294502	Low	Very Low
37	2460294503	Low	Very Low
38	2460294504	Low	Very Low
39	2460294505	Low	Very Low
40	2460294506	Low	Very Low
41	2460294507	Low	Very Low
42	2460294508	Low	Very Low
Al Zahraa			
43	997	Low	Very Low
44	202	High	Low
45	2455279001	Medium	Very Low
46	2455279002	Medium	Low
47	2460282501	Medium	Extremely Low
48	2460282502	Low	Extremely Low
49	2460282503	High	Low
50	2460282504	High	Medium
51	2460282505	Medium	Extremely Low
52	2460282506	Low	Extremely Low
53	2460282507	Medium	Very Low
54	2460282508	High	Medium
55	2460282509	Medium	Low
56	2460282510	Medium	Medium
57	2460282511	Medium	Very Low
58	2460282512	High	Medium
59	2460282513	Medium	Very Low
60	2460282514	High	Medium
61	2460282515	High	Medium
62	2460282516	Medium	Low
63	2460282517	Low	Very Low
64	2460282518	Low	Very Low
65	2460282519	High	Very Low
66	2460282521	Medium	Very Low
Wadi Gaza			
67	994	Low	Extremely Low
68	995	Low	Very Low

Neighborhood Code		Pre War Functionality	Post War Functionality
Deir Al Balah			
Al Buraij			
69	303	High	Low
70	996	Low	Very Low
Al Maghazi			
71	312	High	Low
72	2465321501	Medium	Low
73	2465321502	Medium	Low
74	2465321503	Low	Low
75	2465321504	Low	Low
76	2465321505	Low	Low
77	2465321506	Low	Very Low
78	2465321507	Low	Very Low
79	2465321508	Low	Very Low
80	2465321509	Low	Very Low
81	2465321510	Medium	Low
82	2465321512	Low	Very Low
83	2465321513	Medium	Low
Al Musadar			
84	991	Low	Very Low
Al Nusairat			
85	309	High	Medium
86	2465307001	Low	Low
87	2465307002	High	Low
88	2465307003	Medium	Low
89	2465307004	Medium	Low
90	2465307005	Low	Low
91	2465307006	Medium	Low
92	2465307007	Low	Very Low
93	2465307008	Medium	Low
94	2465307009	Medium	Low
95	2465307010	Low	Very Low
96	2465307011	Low	Very Low
97	2465307012	Medium	Low
98	2465307013	Medium	Low
99	2465307014	Medium	Low
100	2465307015	Medium	Low
101	2465307016	Medium	Low
102	2465307017	Medium	Low

	Neighborhood Code	Pre War Functionality	Post War Functionality
103	2465307018	Medium	Low
104	2465307019	Low	Low
105	2465307020	Medium	Low
106	2465307021	Low	Low
107	2465307022	Low	Very Low
108	2465307023	Low	Very Low
109	2465307024	Low	Very Low
110	2465307025	Low	Very Low
Al Qarara			
111	2470337004	Low	Very Low
Al Zawaida			
112	2465318001	Low	Low
113	2465318002	Medium	Low
114	2465318003	Medium	Low
115	2465318004	Low	Low
116	2465318005	Low	Low
117	2465318006	Low	Low
118	2465318007	Low	Low
119	2465318008	Low	Low
120	2465318009	Low	Low
121	2465318010	Low	Low
122	2465318011	Medium	Low
123	2465318012	Low	Low
124	2465318013	Low	Low
125	2465318014	Low	Low
126	2465318015	Medium	Low
127	2465318016	Medium	Low
128	2465318017	Medium	Low
129	2465318018	Low	Low
130	2465318019	Low	Low
131	2465318020	Low	Low
132	2465318021	Low	Low
133	2465318022	Low	Low
134	2465318023	Low	Low
135	2465318024	Medium	Low
136	2465318025	Low	Low
137	2465318026	Medium	Low
138	2465318027	Low	Low
139	2465318028	Medium	Low

	Neighborhood Code	Pre War Functionality	Post War Functionality
140	2465318029	Medium	Low
141	2465318030	Medium	Low
142	313	High	Medium
143	2465324001	Medium	Medium
144	2465324002	High	Medium
145	2465324003	Low	Low
146	2465324004	Low	Medium
147	2465324005	Medium	Medium
148	2465324006	Medium	Medium
149	2465324007	Medium	Medium
150	2465324008	High	Medium
151	2465324009	Medium	Medium
152	2465324010	Medium	Medium
153	2465324011	Medium	Low
154	2465324012	Medium	Very Low
155	2465324013	Low	Very Low
156	2465324014	Medium	Low
157	2465324015	Low	Low
158	2465324016	Medium	Medium
159	2465324017	Medium	Low
160	2465324018	Low	Very Low
161	2465324019	Low	Very Low
162	2465324020	Low	Very Low
Wadi Al Salqa			
163	992	Low	Very Low
Khan Yunis			
A'basan Al Jadida			
164	2470343001	Medium	Extremely Low
165	2470343002	Low	Extremely Low
166	2470343003	Low	Extremely Low
167	2470343004	Low	Very Low
168	2470343005	Low	Very Low
169	2470343006	Low	Extremely Low
170	2470343007	Low	Very Low
171	2470343008	Medium	Extremely Low
172	2470343009	Medium	Extremely Low
173	2470343010	Medium	Extremely Low
174	2470344501	Medium	Extremely Low
175	2470344502	Low	Very Low

	Neighborhood Code	Pre War Functionality	Post War Functionality
176	2470344503	Low	Very Low
177	2470344504	Medium	Very Low
178	2470344505	Low	Very Low
179	2470344506	Low	Very Low
180	2470344507	Low	Extremely Low
181	2470344508	Medium	Extremely Low
182	2470344509	Low	Extremely Low
183	2470344510	Low	Extremely Low
184	2470344511	Low	Very Low
185	2470344512	Low	Very Low
186	2470344513	Low	Very Low
187	2470344514	Low	Very Low
188	2470344515	Low	Very Low
189	2470344516	Low	Very Low
190	2470344517	Medium	Very Low
191	2470344518	Low	Very Low
192	2470344519	Low	Very Low
193	2470344520	Low	Very Low
194	2470344521	Low	Very Low
Al Fukhari			
195	2470348501	Medium	Extremely Low
196	2470348502	Low	Extremely Low
197	2470348503	Low	Extremely Low
198	2470348504	Low	Extremely Low
199	2470348505	Low	Extremely Low
200	2470348506	Low	Extremely Low
Al Qarara			
201	2470337001	Low	Very Low
202	2470337002	Medium	Low
203	2470337003	Medium	Low
204	2470337005	Low	Very Low
205	2470337006	Low	Very Low
206	2470337007	Low	Very Low
207	2470337008	Low	Very Low
208	2470337009	Low	Very Low
209	2470342506	Low	Extremely Low
Bani Suhaila			
210	2470342501	Medium	Very Low
211	2470342502	Medium	Very Low

	Neighborhood Code	Pre War Functionality	Post War Functionality
212	2470342503	Medium	Very Low
213	2470342504	Medium	Extremely Low
214	2470342505	Low	Very Low
215	2470342507	Low	Very Low
216	2470342508	Medium	Very Low
217	2470342509	Medium	Very Low
218	2470342510	Medium	Very Low
219	2470342511	Medium	Very Low
220	2470342512	Low	Very Low
221	2470342513	Low	Very Low
222	2470342514	Low	Very Low
223	2470342515	Medium	Extremely Low
224	2470342516	Medium	Very Low
225	2470342517	Medium	Very Low
226	2470342518	Medium	Extremely Low
227	2470342519	Medium	Very Low
228	417	High	Low
229	2470342001	High	Low
230	2470342002	Medium	Very Low
231	2470342003	Medium	Very Low
232	2470342004	Medium	Low
233	2470342005	Low	Very Low
234	2470342006	Low	Very Low
235	2470342007	High	Low
236	2470342008	Medium	Low
237	2470342009	Medium	Low
238	2470342010	Medium	Very Low
239	2470342011	Low	Very Low
240	2470342012	Low	Very Low
241	2470342013	Medium	Very Low
242	2470342014	Low	Very Low
243	2470342015	Low	Very Low
244	2470342016	Low	Very Low
245	2470342017	Low	Very Low
246	2470342018	Medium	Low
Khuza'a			
247	2470347001	High	Extremely Low
248	2470347002	High	Extremely Low

	Neighborhood Code	Pre War Functionality	Post War Functionality
249	2470347003	Medium	Extremely Low
250	2470347004	Medium	Extremely Low
251	2470347005	Medium	Extremely Low
252	2470347006	Medium	Extremely Low
253	2470347007	Medium	Extremely Low
254	2470347008	Medium	Extremely Low
255	2470347009	Medium	Extremely Low
256	2470347010	Medium	Extremely Low
257	2470347011	Medium	Extremely Low
258	2470347012	Medium	Extremely Low
259	2470347013	Low	Extremely Low
Rafah			
Al Fukhari			
260	2475350501	Low	Extremely Low
261	2475350502	Low	Extremely Low
262	2475350503	Low	Extremely Low
263	2475350504	Low	Extremely Low
264	2475350505	Low	Extremely Low
Al Nasser			
265	999	Medium	Extremely Low
Al Shoka			
266	2475350506	Medium	Extremely Low
267	2475350507	Low	Extremely Low
268	2475350508	Low	Extremely Low
269	2475350509	Low	Extremely Low
270	2475350510	Low	Extremely Low
271	2475350511	Medium	Extremely Low
272	2475350512	Low	Extremely Low
273	2475350513	Medium	Extremely Low
274	2475350514	Low	Extremely Low
275	2475350515	Low	Extremely Low
276	2475350516	Low	Extremely Low
277	2475350517	Low	Extremely Low
278	2475350518	Low	Extremely Low
279	2475350519	Low	Extremely Low
280	2475350520	Low	Extremely Low
281	526	High	Extremely Low
282	990	Medium	Very Low

	Neighborhood Code	Pre War Functionality	Post War Functionality
283	2475349001	Medium	Extremely Low
284	2475349002	Medium	Extremely Low
285	2475349003	Medium	Extremely Low
286	2475349004	Medium	Extremely Low
287	2475349005	Medium	Extremely Low
288	2475349006	Medium	Extremely Low
289	2475349007	Low	Extremely Low
290	2475349008	Low	Extremely Low
291	2475349009	Low	Extremely Low
292	2475349010	Medium	Extremely Low
293	2475349011	Medium	Extremely Low
294	2475349012	Medium	Extremely Low
295	2475349013	Medium	Extremely Low
296	2475349014	Low	Extremely Low
297	2475349015	Medium	Extremely Low
298	2475349016	Medium	Extremely Low
299	2475349017	Medium	Extremely Low



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