POLITICAL ECONOMY **ANALYSIS**

of Urban Resilience to Climate Change & Inclusion of Vulnerable Communities in the city-regions of Afgoye, Burco and Jowhar in Somalia

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Political economy analysis

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Cover photo: ©2023 IOM Somalia/Moustapha RAGUEH
Heavy flooding caused by El Nino in Nasteexo IDP camp, Baidoa, caused destruction and despair for thousands of displaced families.

Contents

01 Executive Summary 1

02 Introduction 7

03 Methodology 11

04 Key Findings 15

05 IDPs in Context 25

06 Afgoye Case Study 31

07 Burco Case Study 42

08 Jowhar Case Study 48

09 Bibliography 60

10 Endnotes 62

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01

Executive Summary

UN-Habitat commissioned A Political Economy Analysis (PEA) for the Adkaysi project, focusing on the impact of political economy factors in Burco, Jowhar, and Afgoye. The analysis explored long-term structural issues related to resilience and climate change, identified key stakeholders influencing resilience and climate impact reduction, examined the role of formal and informal institutions, and investigated localised theories of change.

"The resulting PEA of the target locations informs state and country-level considerations and provides insights into broader dynamics."

Findings

IDP motivations and aspirations

While insecurity, floods, and droughts can trigger displacement, IDPs are primarily driven by a strategic desire for opportunity and security rather than mere self-preservation. This pattern is consistent across Afgooye, Burco, and Jowhar. The decision to move is often familial and informed by community networks. It generally represents a long-term, one-directional move toward urban centres.

IDPs seek economic opportunities, basic services (education and healthcare), and social networks in urban areas. Access to aid is also a motivating factor. However, the reality of urban poverty often falls short of expectations, leading to hardship and disappointment.

IDP aspirations are diverse and vary significantly by age and length of time spent in the new location. Younger IDPs across all locations, particularly those under 25, tend to be more aspirational than older generations, focusing on education, skills development, and progressive employment or self-employment opportunities.

The role of clan and social networks

Clan affiliation does not appear to be a significant barrier to IDP integration or access to services in any of the three case study locations. Poverty, rather than clan-based discrimination, is the primary factor restricting access.

However, the lack of strong clan networks in their new urban homes disadvantages IDPs, limiting their access to employment, business opportunities, and social support. This is a consistent finding across all three locations. Businesses often prioritize hiring individuals from their own clans or those with established trust networks.

Despite limitations, clan structures also present potential as a tool for urban development. By engaging with these structures and addressing issues of exclusivity, it may be possible to leverage them for broader community benefit.

The role of business in urban development:

Business is viewed positively and considered crucial for economic growth, employment, and development in all three cities. However, the private sector's role in promoting inclusive development and equitable access to services and utilities is currently limited.

Businesses highlight a lack of skills, education, and trust as reasons for limited employment opportunities for IDPs. While acknowledging the need for opportunities for the poor, businesses primarily offer menial or casual labour to IDPs.

There is a clear recognition that robust, progressive economic growth, driven by the private sector, is essential for both urban development and IDP integration. However, achieving inclusive growth requires addressing barriers to employment and self-employment, particularly for IDPs and the urban poor.

The role of government and aid:

District administrations are recognised for their role in security improvements but, despite some differences between locations, are generally perceived as ineffective in contributing to broader urban development or addressing IDP needs. They are often seen as lacking resources and influenced by powerful local interests.

State and federal governments are largely absent from the narratives surrounding urban development and IDP integration. Existing policies and strategies are fragmented, lack a holistic framework, and fail to address the practical realities of implementation and financing.

While valued by recipients, aid is perceived as insufficient, fraught with controversy, and contributing little to long-term urban development or durable solutions for IDPs. Allegations of misappropriation and a disconnect from the broader urbanisation process raise concerns about the effectiveness of current aid modalities.

The challenges with aid:

Aid appears to be a controversial element that does not necessarily contribute to urban development and may even hinder it. While acknowledging that aid provides essential support to some IDPs living in camps, the report highlights a series of problems that limit its effectiveness.

Misappropriation and Diversion: The report details accusations of misappropriation, with local authorities often perceived as complicit in diverting aid away from intended recipients.

Perpetuation of Camp Dependency: The report suggests that the current aid system, focused on camps, may unintentionally create dependency and discourage IDP integration into urban areas. IDPs may choose to remain in camps, despite poor conditions, to retain access to aid, hindering their engagement with broader urban opportunities.

Lack of Strategic Alignment with Urban Development: The report observes that aid initiatives often operate independently of broader urban development plans, limiting their contribution to sustainable urban growth.

"Businesses highlight a lack of skills, education, and trust as reasons for limited employment opportunities for IDPs."

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HIGHLIGHT

The report contrasts the perspectives of different stakeholders regarding aid:

IDPs: IDPs residing in camps value the aid they receive, viewing it as a vital lifeline to manage extreme poverty. However, they also express frustration about inadequate assistance, unfair distribution practices, and the diversion of aid resources.

Businesses: Business owners generally have limited knowledge of aid operations and do not perceive it as a significant factor in urban development or business growth.

Local Authorities: Local authorities primarily view their role as facilitating the work of aid agencies and assisting with the processing of new arrivals in camps. They do not articulate a clear vision for integrating aid into urban development strategies.

Aid Agencies: Aid agencies emphasise their commitment to delivering essential assistance to IDPs, including cash transfers, shelter, education, and essential services.

"Climate change is expected to increase temperatures and sea levels in Somalia."

Climate change

While the impact on total rainfall remains uncertain, greater variability in rainfall is anticipated.

The impacts of these changes will depend largely on human activities, such as how people design and site housing and infrastructure. For example, sources note that the effects of urbanisation and a lack of planning in Afgooye have exacerbated the impact of climate change, leading to flooding. Specifically, private individuals have built houses across or near sewage systems and water canals, blocking them and leading to overflows. The Shabelle River is also more prone to overflowing due to pollution and narrowing. Sources reporting on the effects of climate change in Afgooye and Jowhar primarily focused on flooding, noting that climate change is often blamed for flooding despite evidence of development in floodplains, a lack of river defence maintenance and poorly maintained irrigation systems.

While climate change has significantly impacted Somalia's urban areas, sources noted that this often intersects with political and economic issues. For example, sources discussing Afgooye highlighted that the local authorities often cite 'climate change' as the cause of floods, although these could be prevented by better campsites, infrastructure, and maintenance. Sources also noted that the effects of climate change are often conflated with a lack of development, particularly in Jowhar.

Critical urban development priorities

Robust and inclusive economic growth, particularly in sectors that offer opportunities for the urban poor and IDPs, emerges as the most critical factor for sustainable urban development. Addressing barriers to employment and self-employment and fostering entrepreneurial initiatives are also critical.

Investments in infrastructure, particularly roads, river management, and flood control, are crucial for economic growth, access to services, and climate resilience. A collaborative approach involving the private sector, government, and development partners is needed to finance and implement these projects.

Equitable access to basic services and utilities, such as healthcare, education, water, sanitation, and electricity, is essential for inclusive urban development. Mechanisms to subsidise access for people experiencing poverty, including leveraging aid resources for urban integration, warrant exploration.

Recomendations

Shifting from a camp-centric aid approach

1

The current aid system, heavily focused on camps, may unintentionally create dependency and hinder IDP integration into urban areas. A transition towards strategies that empower IDPs to become self-reliant and integrate into the urban fabric is suggested. This could involve:

Promoting sustainable livelihood opportunities: Instead of solely providing immediate aid, initiatives could focus on equipping IDPs with skills and resources to secure sustainable livelihoods within the urban economy. This might involve vocational training programs, microfinance schemes, or support for establishing small businesses.

Facilitating access to urban housing: Efforts to integrate IDPs into urban areas should address the critical need for affordable housing. This could involve partnerships with the private sector to develop affordable housing projects or provide rent subsidies.

Fostering collaboration for integrated urban development

2

The sources highlight the need for a collaborative model involving government, business, civil society, and aid agencies. This approach should aim to develop and implement integrated urban development plans that address the needs of both IDPs and host communities. Key actions could include:

Developing joint urban development plans: Stakeholders should collaborate to create comprehensive urban development plans that consider the needs of all urban residents, including IDPs. These plans should outline clear strategies for infrastructure development, service provision, and economic growth.

Establishing transparent and accountable aid management: Addressing aid misappropriation and diversion concerns is crucial. Implementing transparent aid distribution and monitoring systems, potentially involving community representatives, could help build trust and ensure aid reaches intended beneficiaries.

Addressing financial deficiencies in urban development:

3

Sources emphasise the lack of financial resources as a significant obstacle to effective urban development in Somalia. This limits the ability of state and federal governments to implement policies and support urban development initiatives. To address this, the following steps are crucial:

Prioritising and increasing budgetary allocations for urban development: State and federal governments should commit to urban development by allocating sufficient funds for essential projects.

Exploring innovative financing mechanisms: Given the limited resources, exploring alternative financing options like public-private partnerships or engaging with international donors could provide additional funding for urban development projects.

Strengthening municipal revenue generation: Empowering municipalities to generate revenue through local taxes and fees could provide a more sustainable funding source for local development projects.

Integrating IDPs into the urban fabric:

4

The sources highlight the aspirations of IDPs for economic opportunities, essential services, and social networks in urban areas. However, they also acknowledge the challenges they face, including poverty and limited access to employment and social support. To facilitate IDP integration, the following actions are essential:

Addressing barriers to employment: Businesses cite a lack of skills, education, and trust as reasons for limited employment opportunities for IDPs. Bridging this gap requires investing in education and skills development programs tailored to the needs of the urban job market.

Strengthening social support systems: The lack of strong clan networks disadvantages IDPs in accessing employment, business opportunities, and social support. Establishing inclusive social support mechanisms, possibly through community centres or social programs, could help integrate IDPs into the urban social fabric.

Promoting inclusive business practices: Encouraging businesses to adopt inclusive hiring practices and providing incentives for employing and training IDPs can create economic opportunities and foster social cohesion.

"These ideas provide an initial path to action based on the insights from the sources. They emphasise the need for a multi-faceted approach involving shifts in aid strategy, collaborative urban planning, addressing financial limitations, and actively integrating IDPs into the urban fabric. The research team is keen to discuss them with the UN-Habitat team."

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02

Introduction

"The Adkaysi project (2023-2026) seeks to build resilience to climate change adaptation and promote social inclusion of vulnerable communities in Afgoye, Burco, and Jowhar."

Background

UN-Habitat implements normative interventions for sustainable urbanisation in Somalia. In the last three decades, Somalia has experienced climate change and population displacement to urban centres, restraining the already limited capacities of government and communities.

Displaced populations tend to populate existing, congested settlements or establish temporary sites in peri-urban areas. They seek services, safety, assistance, job access, housing, and tenure security. Major cities such as Mogadishu, Afgoye and Burco have absorbed most of the displaced populations. These urban areas face enormous pressure to cope with high urban poverty rates with limited resources.

The Adkaysi project (2023-2026) seeks to build resilience to climate change adaptation and promote social inclusion of vulnerable communities in Afgoye, Burco, and Jowhar. The European Union, as one of the largest donors in the Federal Republic of Somalia, has embarked on the "Boosting Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Change (BREACH)" programme to increase systemic resilience to climate change and food crises in Somalia. The EU has commissioned UN-Habitat to contribute to specific aspects of the programme.

Under this project, UN-Habitat seeks to improve the capacity of National, Regional, and City Governments to manage the adverse effects of climate change-induced rapid urbanisation and enhance community engagement in resilience action planning to secure livelihoods regarding climate change-induced aspects. Improved capacity and engagement are expected to lead to long-term urban resilience, more significant economic activity, and liveability at the community level.

Research Purpose

UN-Habitat required a Political Economy Analysis (PEA) to inform its engagement under the Adkaysi project. The PEA answers the question: What political economy factors influence policy, government institutions, and local communities in the context of displacement and rapid urbanisation in Burco, Jowhar, and Afgoye?

Table 1: Anaylsis areas

The analysis is to explore structures, stakeholders, institutions and pathways towards change as follows:
Structures: Long-term context-specific issues relevant to resilience and the adverse effects of climate change that are not easily influenced.
Stakeholders: The essential stakeholders and how they can affect resilience and reduce the negative impact of climate change.
Institutions: The role of formal and informal economic, political, and social institutions in cocreating social interactions and competition for power and resources.
Pathways: Localized theories of change towards durable solutions in the context of increased resilience of urban communities and local governments. What political economy factors influence policy and institutions for government (Federal, State, local government, and City-Region) and local communities such that, on a sustainable basis, these institutions and policies benefit the government and local communities?

The project resulted in a PEA of the target locations as case studies for state and country-level considerations. We treated Burco, Jowhar, and Afgoye as case studies. We analysed each on its merit and context, resulting in discreet reporting for each area. Then, we cross-analysed the data for each to derive findings inferring state and country-level dynamics.

We designed the PEA to inform UN-Habitat's programming decisions. The report identifies the critical power and authority groups and analyses the specific factors and dynamics that affect the prospects for successfully strengthening the resilience of government and communities.

It describes the role and influence of values, ideas, ideology, religion, and clan lineage in shaping social relations in each city region. The study and recommendations are meant to inform UN-Habitat's risk analyses and help identify promising types of intervention.

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REPORT STRUCTURE

This report is structured as follows:

3 **Methodology:** briefly summarises how we approached the study and the challenges we faced.

4 **Key Findings:** outlines the study's key findings, aggregating the evidence from all the study locations. It describes the main pathways for change instrumental in programming decisions and their implications.

5 **IDPs in context:** outlines the essential elements of the context and describes the circumstances informing the decisions of IDPs, their expectations and aspirations, and their current condition as they see it. It gathers the perspectives from respondents in Burco, Jowhar and Afgoye in a single section, as the findings are consistent between the locations.

6-8 **Case studies:** The political economy and urban context sections are divided across three case studies reported in chapters 6, 7 and 8. We note that, although we provided three distinct case studies, the findings remain consistent between location and the case studies may result a little repetitive.

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03

Methodology

The research adopted the OECD-DAC definition of 'political economy analysis', which states: "Political economy analysis is concerned with the interaction of political and economic processes in a society: the distribution of power and wealth between different groups and individuals, and the processes that create, sustain and transform these relationships over time."[1] We used this definition to answer the following research question:

"What political economy factors influence policy, government institutions, and local communities in the context of displacement and rapid urbanisation in Burco, Jowhar and Afgoye?"

We then broke down the principal research into three main lines of enquiry:

1. **Understanding the Displaced Population.** IDPs constitute a diverse group ethnically, socially, by clan identity, and in terms of age and life cycle. They bring various aspirations, expectations, and reasons for leaving their home locations. Detailing their diversity enables the research to align sub-groups more accurately with specific political or economic mechanisms at play in Afgoye, Burco, or Jowhar. The study focuses on what motivates displacement to their target locations, as well as their expectations, aspirations, and views on their current condition.

2. **Political Economy.** We focus on the different categories of actors that shape the context of displacement and concentration in the three target areas, which are rapidly growing urban environments. We ask questions about the relationships between displaced and host communities, the role of businesses, gender roles, the interests and activities of government institutions, relationships with the diaspora, aid and the interests around it. The research looks at how these actors, interests and relationships affect the distribution and contestation of resources in the context of rapidly growing urban environments.

3. **Urban Context (Jowhar, Afgoye, Burco):** This step explores how the political economy landscape operates to influence conditions or urban development processes for IDP populations. UN HABITAT's city profiles and strategies identify three urban development issues to explore: a) Urban infrastructure and Basic Services (Road Network and Public Transport, Water, Sanitation, Solid Waste Management, Drainage, Energy, Health, Education, Open and Public Space, Sport and Recreational Facilities); b) Housing (Land Allocation Process, Construction Processes, Materials and Typologies, Housing Market); c) Economy (Financial Services, Communications, Economic Sectors).

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51 Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) in total and six Focus Group Discussions (FGDs), two in each location (one with new arrivals and one with long-standing residents)

A Collection Plan (CP) and field tools were developed based on initial discussions with UN-Habitat Somalia and a preliminary literature review. The CP explores the three lines of enquiry, providing insight into structures, stakeholders, institutions and pathways and probing how underlying social relations are reproduced.

We reviewed the secondary data, incorporating client-provided documents and literature drawn from the research team's experience in Somalia to provide a snapshot of government policy, strategy or guidelines, as well as different perspectives and narratives of IDP experience and urban development.

A field team of six researchers, two in each location, one male and one female, were trained on the research tools. Together, the team identified actors, key informants, and stakeholders to interview, and discussed the interview modalities. The Team Leader continuously monitored the fieldwork and adapted the tools and targeting based on the emerging evidence.

We applied data encryption protocols for proper data safeguarding to avoid data loss or theft. The transcripts were anonymised. The team conducted 51 Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) in total and six Focus Group Discussions (FGDs), two in each location (one with new arrivals and one with long-standing residents). Fieldwork took place from May to June 2024.

Table 2: **Adaptation measures**

Category	Afgooye	Burco	Jowhar
Local administration representatives	2	2	2
IDPs, including female headed households	3	3	3
Host community leaders	2	2	2
Local business representatives	2	2	2
Aid agency representatives	2	2	2
Local CSO/NGO representatives	2	2	2
Other individuals involved in IDP camps	2	2	2
IDPs (including women and vulnerable groups)	1	1	1
Host community (including women and vulnerable groups	1	1	1
Total	**17**	**17**	**17**

Table 2 summarises the KIIs conducted by category and location. Ultimately, the research team has spoken with 73 people, 38 female and 35 male, between 25 and 45 years, with the median falling between 35 and 40 years.

The research encountered some challenges. Much of the secondary literature is dominated by the perspectives of aid agencies that commission the work, making it difficult to find documentation representing the voices of different stakeholders relevant to this study. The planned spatial analysis faced significant issues in finding or accessing datasets that described the populations and critical issues of interest. Existing datasets were often fragmentary and failed verification assessments from the researchers resident in those locations. Google and Google Maps were found to have the most current, complete, and accurate datasets for the most relevant issues.

Fieldwork also faced obstacles. Delays in contracting meant that the fieldwork commenced during the Eid holiday season, causing delays. Additionally, the researchers, accustomed to using forms for data collection, required extra training and support to conduct investigative political economy interviews. The Team Leader held several debriefing sessions with the field researchers, allowing them to contribute their perspectives as long-term residents of the research locations.

"... the research team has spoken with 73 people, 38 female and 35 male, between 25 and 45 years, with the median falling between 35 and 40 years."

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04

Key Findings

"We have articulated the main factors based on the research's main lines of enquiry - the displaced population, the political economy and the urban context."

Main Factors

IDP Context

Durable solutions for poor IDPs are linked to broader strategies for climate-resilient urban development. The challenges and goals of IDPs are likely similar to those faced by the poor members of the host community. Their development is contingent upon economic growth in the wider urban area. However, extreme poverty and a lack of networks or other assistance prevent them from accessing economic opportunities and basic services, hindering their ability to improve their condition.

Decisions to move to town tend to be made over time: they are deliberate and long-term choices rather than sudden, temporary life-preserving acts. The entire family makes these decisions, with input from the extended family and neighbours. Security, better conditions, and opportunities are key factors motivating the decision. Few of the IDPs interviewed intended to return despite the hardship of their new urban life. Such trends of rural migration and rapid urbanisation are being observed across East Africa and sub-Saharan Africa more generally.

A lack of decent income is the most critical barrier to IDP development, climate resilience and integration. IDPs describe an existence of extreme poverty, deplorable living conditions and hardship, which they say is the result of not being able to earn a decent income. With a decent income, they could live where they wish, access the required services, and properly establish themselves in their new homes. However, they say that there are few decent jobs, which host community applicants take. IDPs feel better clan networks would help them access these jobs. However, local businesses say that IDPs need more skills, education, acumen and trust for those jobs. As a result, IDPs get menial tasks as day or casual labourers. IDPs also would establish small businesses but need more networks to access capital and support.

The aid they receive is irrelevant to their underlying strategic needs or ambitions, but it is useful to help them subsist in their state of extreme poverty. In the absence of a decent income, IDPs are over-reliant on aid and camps, but the aid agencies provide does not address their underlying strategic needs and ambitions. It does not help them get decent employment or self-employment, live in dignity, build a future, or assist them or their children integrate into the local community. IDPs describe camps as crowded, sited in areas not suited for residence, poorly planned, lack basic infrastructure and services, particularly health care. They tend to live in shelters of waste materials. The camps are regularly flooded due to their location, lack of infrastructure and maintenance. The local authorities' reference to "climate change" as the cause of floods is inappropriate, because they could be prevented by locating the camps in different areas, building better infrastructure and maintaining it.

Despite the challenges, urban migration does deliver improvements to IDPs. IDPs in all three locations say security is better in their new homes than in rural areas. Also, the

move appears to be shaping different gender relations, particularly for young people and more so for those with better education. Women feel they have more opportunities and freedom as a result of moving to town, but this also adds to their workload. Children and youth are in school, which may not have been available in the village. IDPs have better access to health services, markets, water, electricity, and telecommunications, which may not have been available in their areas of origin.

Aspirations reflect the diversity of decisions to move to town and vary with time spent in the new home and age.

New IDP arrivals have hopes for their children but generally aspire for nothing more than a decent job and home. They would move from their camps if they could afford to. Some long-term IDPs in Afgooye and Burco have lived there so long that their children were born there, have built proper homes, and now seek less for themselves and more for their children (good education and future opportunities). Similarly, many IDPs in Burco are long-term residents of their camps, and some have built homes. Others intend to continue living in the camp. Obtaining tenure would allow them to build a proper house. However, younger IDPs, both women and men, have more aspirational ambitions. They do not seek aid. They want education, training, coaching and networks that can help them access progressive employment or self-employment.

Poverty was found to be the most important factor inhibiting the social and economic development of IDPs and integration into their new communities. IDPs felt welcomed and supported by the host community. IDPs did not think that clan was an obstacle to their movement, economic or social opportunities. However, In the absence of any mechanism, including aid, to protect or create opportunities, clan is disproportionately important to IDPs and acts as a de facto barrier. They describe how a clan advances or protects the interests of host communities. As such, IDPs highlighted that the problem was not local dominant clans per se, but that they lacked clan connections. Without those connections or other options, they must compete for opportunities created by or dominated by host clans. It would be the same for the dominant community if they had been displaced to the IDP homes[2] . Host communities shared this view. Generally, the host community and IDPs viewed each other positively. Instead, they agreed that extreme poverty, not clan, nor any other social or ethnic factor impeded social and economic opportunities and integration of IDPs.

Political Economy Factors

The nexus between the interests of business, government, and clan is a dominant factor, as their control over resources, services, and municipal decision-making significantly impacts the success and growth of the three urban regions. While personal, business, and clan interests often take precedence, there was no indication that these groups were unwilling to collaborate for the public good or to explore how the municipality could advance inclusive development and equitable access to services and utilities. Their engagement with these issues is limited and focused on their priorities, suggesting that an external catalyst may be required. Equally,

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external initiatives that do not recognise or engage these key stakeholders may be prone to failure.

Aid seems isolated from the broader urbanisation process. The interests of IDPs, NGOs, government, and landowners seem focused on maintaining the current IDP camp and relief-based status quo. This approach hinders the integration of IDPs and does not support climate-resilient urban development. Efforts to subsidise the urban transition and integration of IDPs are well justified. However, the current system of camps, along with camp residency requirements to access aid that is disbursed on a discretionary or biased basis, does little to promote integration or address the strategic needs of the current wave of IDPs. Instead, it incentivises displacement and concentration into secondary and tertiary towns, resulting in a parallel economy of aid diversion, with a broad set of actors involved (local administration officials, security forces, gatekeepers, local organisations, and local businesses), and encouraging fraudulent acts (fake IDPs, corrupt assignation of IDP status) or diversion of cash assistance or aid (food and non-food items). This system fails to help IDPs obtain decent employment or self-employment and hampers their ability to move towards future ambitions.

Clan advances the interest of and offers benefits to its members, but poor IDPs lack such networks in their new homes. IDPs and the host community did not feel clan was a discriminatory force. Instead, it was an insular institution which helped its own.

IDPs indicate a desire for the clan connections they would enjoy in their home, giving them access to businesses, government, or extended family, which is no different than local dominant clans. As such, for IDPs, it is not clan, which is problematic, but the lack of a social network to help them navigate their extreme, intransigent poverty. They have no other forms of support to help them move forward. However, in the context of these poor host communities, large numbers of very poor people already depend on or exploit their local clan structures for their existence. It may be relevant to ask to what degree a local economy and its clan structures should be expected to additionally absorb large numbers of extremely poor IDPs. Nonetheless, clan is a predominant, pervasive and multifaceted force. Even within its limitations, it has the potential to be an urban developmental tool if its exclusivity is addressed. There are points where the urban interests of the clan can overlap with those of others. Discussing clans openly and objectively can allow discussions that may benefit that community and others.

Gender, like clan, is a changing social construct for both women and men. Urbanisation and a young population are transforming traditional gender roles. Respondents suggest that wealth enables them to move beyond gender roles and clan limitations. Long-standing gender stereotypes do not capture changes to gender relations as a result of urbanisation, education and technology. Secondary literature indicates that young Somali women are becoming a strong force in the economy and society. Creating pathways to multiply this change and recognising current constraints can help harness this potential.

Municipal or local government has little to no standing in the perspectives of people interviewed, is unlikely to make an effective operational partner, but is seen to offer value on urban governance, strategy, and inclusion issues. There is little to no awareness or reference to state or federal/national governments in Somalia, except for recognising its progress to improve security in Afgooye and Jowhar. The situation is somewhat different in Burco, where there is a stronger government presence at the municipal and national levels. References to government generally reflect frustration or disappointment as they do not undertake

roles expected of them or that they exist to facilitate the work of the NGOs. In Jowhar and Afgoye, they comment that there is a total absence of local government, except to levy taxes that do not benefit the cities. They also felt that the government, if not complicit in it, was influenced by local, powerful interests and often their clan prerogatives to validate and prioritise their proposed investments or activities.

In this context, there may be more effective approaches than government-led climate-resilient urban development.

District administrations observed that policies and strategies were not implemented because they needed more financing. Also, if interviewees were aware of national or state policies, strategies, or priorities, they did not reference them in their responses.

Despite perceptions of municipal, state, or national governments, interviewees recognised gaps or limitations in the current context that could benefit from the local district administration's involvement. Urban development in the three cities was seen as ad hoc and driven by the priorities of those with resources—primarily businesses, individuals, and civil society groups. Both business and government interviewees advocated for a guiding strategic urban development plan. While businesses did not envision an operational role for the government, they supported its involvement in establishing priorities, setting standards, and financing infrastructure. IDPs, aid agencies, and some government representatives assumed that the government should provide essential services such as health and education. Across different categories and locations of the research, collaboration between business, civil society, and government was emphasised as the way forward.

Security is generally good in Burco and is reported to have significantly improved in Afgooye and Jowhar. Still, policing is said to be weak or non-existent in all locations but notably reported as problematic in Afgooye and Jowhar, where concerns of theft and violence leave IDPs feeling insecure.

Tenure was highlighted as a legal concern, but justice issues were not mentioned. Tenure, for IDPs, was mentioned in several instances where they had concerns about eviction or a desire to establish themselves. They, however, said that if they had money, they could rent or build a house wherever they wanted in the city. For IDPs who preferred to move out of the camps, this was not an issue. More generally, primary and secondary data did not report a demand for improved, formal legal instruments or functions, which does not imply there is not a need for formal instruments and functions to evolve and meet changing needs in a rapidly changing context.

Although much discussed, remittances did not appear to be an important source of revenue for IDPs and were not mentioned as a factor for urban development or business. Remittances do likely play a role in the personal affairs of others, if not as a force for urban development.

Urban Development

Robust, progressive economic growth was widely reported as the critical factor for urban and IDP development. All three urban regions were seen to be dynamic, growing and building upon a foundation of commercial relationships with outlying agricultural production.

They provide a range of commercial activities, including pharmaceutical marketing, construction, services, finance, and communications. They trade agricultural products locally and nationally. Businesses also provide utilities and basic services (with the government providing basic education and health in Burco). Respondents are generally satisfied with the variety, quality and availability of basic services in their towns. Businesspeople articulated more specific visions of growth, evolving economies and decent cities. Their vision aligns with the ambitions of youth (under 25 years old) seen in secondary literature.

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Consistently, interviewees emphasised roads or flood/river management infrastructure and, secondly, drainage and sewage as foundational to economic growth, access to services and an improved, climate-resilient urban environment. Infrastructure was consistently reported as crucial in urban improvement in nearly every interview. The current infrastructure is in poor condition and lacks maintenance, with most of it having been constructed either before the Civil War or during the colonial period. Any new infrastructure, such as roads or bridges, has been built primarily by businesses. The need for roads within towns, to outlying communities and regional centres was emphasised equally to advance commerce (including trade in agricultural products), improve seasonal movement to and within the town and for an improved standard of urban life. What is often called "climate change" is primarily attributed to the absence or poor maintenance of river management, flood prevention infrastructure, and roads. This river infrastructure found along the Shabelle includes upstream barrages, overflows, irrigation system gates, and banks, some of which were built during the Italian occupation.

Poorly maintained or non-existent river management infrastructure and urban expansion into floodplains in Jowhar and Afgooye are important determinants of floods and flood impacts, and they lead to more floods with more significant consequences.

In Jowhar, considerations of effective river management include harnessing the Shabelle River for commercial agriculture in the surrounding irrigation schemes. Lastly, housing outside of the IDP camps was felt to be adequate, or people were free to construct their own homes. However, poor IDPs in Burco noted that as temperatures increase, it becomes unbearably hot in their homes during the day due to the construction materials they use.

Businesses provide services and utilities almost entirely and are perceived as essential to urban development. Still, the government and IDPs argued for the importance of equitable access to these services. Essential services and utilities (mainly electricity) were considered foundational to economic growth and urban development. There was great satisfaction with the range and quality of services available in Afgooye, Burco and Jowhar. However, they are expensive or beyond the reach of very poor IDPs or host community members, who place importance on these services for their family's advancement. There is currently no mechanism to ensure equitable or inclusive access beyond ad hoc measures by businesses. Only the government, local leaders and aid agencies prioritised equitable access to services, although they did not offer any solutions beyond that the government should provide services. Only one interview observed the long-term risk of dependence on diesel electricity production and argued for green power generation.

"Robust, progressive economic growth was widely reported as the critical factor for urban and IDP development."

EMERGING PATHWAYS

Four pathways, to advance climate resilient urban development which would equally include IDPs, emerged. They should be considered as initial sketches showing the direction of travel. Each pathway must be studied, discussed with the relevant stakeholders and developed. New or different pathways may emerge in those discussions by incorporating broader perspectives or considerations. Nonetheless, as a first step, the four pathways are described here:

1. Inclusive economic growth
2. Improvement and construction of roads and river infrastructure
3. Mechanisms to allow for equitable access to existing social services & utilities
4. Address fundamental urban infrastructure issues

1 Inclusive economic growth.

Growing the economies of the three urban regions might involve multiple strategies that build on their agricultural and commercial services foundations and make them more inclusive and green. A starting point might be increasing agriculture and livestock production's scale, quality, or diversity, enhancing local, national, and international trade potential. There are also opportunities to build out on current commercial services (wholesale groceries, construction, household goods, office supplies, pharmacies), which report a trend towards locally sourcing or producing materials and goods currently imported from Hargeisa, Mogadishu, or abroad. These initiatives reduce costs, improve supply reliability, and add to the value chain.

Beyond, existing commercial and agricultural activity would be considerations for progressive economic opportunities, particularly for young people. These might include vocational skills (electric, plumbing, carpentry, painting, drywall), access to employment in the construction sector. office management, stockkeeping, or bookkeeping. They may also include emerging opportunities in social media (influencers, photography, reporting), digital services (web services, desktop publishing/ layout, cell phone repair), and remote working opportunities such as coding and helping them access nearshore or offshore work. Secondary literature highlights these areas as increasingly relevant in a globalised and interconnected economy that is particularly relevant for GenZ.

Addressing the sustainability of the power supply is an interesting and potentially important consideration. There is a clear recognition of the importance of electricity to the current and future economy. Current urban power production relies on diesel generators and is considered increasingly untenable in a globally greening future. This situation presents an opportunity to adopt green and micro-solutions for power, water, and other elements of business and urban life, enabling a technological leapfrog.

In this study, we must consider how to make economic growth pathways inclusive. This may require a mixed strategy to address current barriers while equipping young people with the capacity to identify and develop opportunities in the new economy. It must look beyond employment, particularly in labour markets. It may consider addressing barriers such as education, culture/ work ethic, skills, networks, and finance were frequently mentioned in interviews as obstacles to employment and self-employment. Pathways to inclusive economic development should address these barriers and, equally, foster entrepreneurial creativity, enabling individuals to engage at local, national, and even global levels. These considerations apply equally to young people in nearby rural areas and those in towns. The question of who will do this and how it will be financed still needs to be answered. Inevitably, the only immediate opportunity is greater collaboration and innovation with the private sector, looking for win-win options.

2 Improvement and construction of road and river infrastructure.

There are starting points for investment in roads, river management, and flood control infrastructure through collaboration with businesses, civil society, and government. Infrastructure investments are crucial for economic growth in the three urban regions. Reliable transportation of goods and people is essential, connecting towns internally with outlying communities and the rest of the country. In Jowhar and Afgooye, it is equally important that the Shabelle River is an asset rather than a source of economic and social disruption.

Road, river management, and flood control investments should be conceived as a joint effort by businesses, civil society, and the government. There are few alternatives. The district administration does not have these resources. Business, on an ad hoc basis, may address some issues. Civil society also lacks the resources. The aid sector tends not to invest in urban development, with a few exceptions (e.g. FAO's investment in water infrastructure in Jowhar and Balcad). A practical starting point is to build on current initiatives that break down large-scale, expensive projects or maintenance requirements into manageable tasks. This might include repairs to a section or road, a bridge or drainage as is currently done by donations in cash or kind from different stakeholders.

Similarly, small but significant projects such as the maintenance of river embankments, improvements to local flood defences, and drainage are feasible when they intersect with the interests of multiple stakeholders. Such interventions could also be more deliberate and strategic. Formally acknowledging the efforts currently made by business and civil society groups in this regard can be a helpful starting point. Encouraging leadership from civil society stakeholders can act as a catalyst. Adding elements of governance by ensuring these initiatives meet standards and comply with guidelines can integrate the roles of local and national governments.

A strategic framework aligned with pathways to equitable economic growth, such as urban plans and strategies developed by Habitat, can enhance the impact of these interventions. It can identify complementary investments to include marginalised or poor populations, requiring subsidies or investments in roads, river management, and flood control by the state or development partners. This approach also allows for the coordination and prioritisation of activities undertaken by Somalia's humanitarian community. Municipal authorities can seek financing for such projects from a range of development partners, including Turkey, the UAE, Islamic financing sources, and international development and humanitarian institutions and agencies.

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3 Mechanisms to allow for equitable access to existing social services and utilities.

Equitable access to basic services and utilities - health, education, water, sewage, and electricity - are building blocks of urban development, and the exclusion of large parts of society from these opportunities may prove to be a drag on the overall efforts for urban development. A starting point is to recognise that services exist: with few exceptions, businesses provide basic services and utilities. Collaborations between business, civil society, and government could identify principles and mechanisms to subsidise access for poor individuals.

Long-standing forms of aid to IDPs should be reassessed with an urban development goal in mind. This may involve re-framing assistance as subsidies for successful urban integration, such as providing social assistance to poor IDPs while helping them access the services and opportunities in their new homes. The strategy of isolating IDPs in camps should be reconsidered from the perspective of creating durable solutions for displaced populations that, in most cases, have moved to stay.

4 Pathways to improve drainage, sewage, solid waste disposal, and land use planning/enforcement can be approached within the context of inclusive economic development.

These efforts aim to reduce losses and improve the quality of life, making urban areas more liveable and better for business. Given the costs and scale of these projects, the pathway may be similar to that described for roads and river infrastructure.

This approach would require a mix of formal recognition of private sector contributions and initiatives, as well as engagement by municipal and state governments to foster compliance with standards and guidelines, maximising impact and equity through a strategic framework and coordination. Using private sector initiatives as a foundation, efforts to secure financial support from development partners or municipal financing mechanisms can build on ad hoc initiatives and subsidise investments needed to reach marginalised and poor populations.

The list provides suggested priorities as they emerged from the analysis, but it may be helpful to recognise some issues not explicitly mentioned in those four priorities.

IDPs are not explicitly mentioned, as their durable solutions are embedded in those of their new communities. They might be better described as the urban poor, whose needs differ little from other urban poor households.

The lack of decent housing for the very poor, including IDPs, is an urgent issue. According to responses, durable solutions for this issue would be addressed through inclusive economic growth and delinking NGO benefits from residency in IDP camps.

Issues attributed to climate change, such as drought, reflect acute hardship associated with rural poverty, which would be addressed by economic growth, the societal transition to urban centres, and livelihoods driven by young people. The consequences of floods, also attributed to climate change, affect the urban and peri-urban poor as well as economic growth in the urban region. Sustainable solutions include maintenance and improvements to road and river infrastructure, basic urban infrastructure, and inclusive economic development.

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05

IDPs in Context

"GDP has nearly doubled to USD 11 billion , and in Somaliland, it has almost tripled to USD 5.6 billion in 2023 . Foreign direct investment almost quintupled to USD 455 million in 2022."

Contextual background

Somalia and Somaliland are experiencing periods of growth and transition, with significant implications for urbanisation and the impact of climate change. This progress is reflected in the consistent growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) over the last decade. In Somalia, GDP has nearly doubled to USD 11 billion[3] , and in Somaliland, it has almost tripled[4] to USD 5.6 billion in 2023.[5] Foreign direct investment almost quintupled to USD 455 million in 2022, mainly driven by the construction sector, as well as food processing and communications, with significant investors from Turkey, the US, and Germany.[6]

Communications, internet, and financial services are undergoing significant transformations. Social media use is dominated by TikTok, Facebook, Instagram/X, and LinkedIn, though there are concerns about the widespread use of betting platforms such as 1Xbet. Commercial transactions have increasingly become cashless, and financial services are expanding by leveraging online platforms.

In 2022, international aid to Somalia and Somaliland amounted to USD 2.2 billion[7], though much of this aid does not reach the intended recipients due to agency overheads and diversion[8]. Aid programs are increasingly focused on developmental goals, such as financial inclusion for the poor, capacity building for youth, and social assistance for the poorest, particularly in urban areas.[9]

Governments and democratic processes in both countries continue to evolve. In Somalia, relative stability has facilitated the growth of state and federal governments, which have now produced their second national development plan since 2016. The longstanding peace in Somaliland has allowed for the establishment of central and regional governments, which are beginning to provide some basic services. Taxation systems vary in all three locations, with perhaps the system in Somaliland more evolved and centralised. No matter the taxation system, tax revenues are low, limiting the financing available for government operations.

The younger generation is better educated and develops new perspectives on clans and community life. The median age in Somalia is 15.2 years[10], with 75-80% of the population under 30 (UNFPA, 2014). This younger generation is more educated than previous ones [11] and has grown up in a time of peace, benefiting from cellular communications, internet access, and social media. While clans continue to play a significant role in providing mutual support and, at times, exclusion, young people are perceived to have evolving perspectives on the role of clans in society and their personal lives. Urbanisation rates are high, with estimates suggesting that between 45% and 70% of Somalia is urban or urbanising.[12] In Somaliland, it is estimated that 50% to 60% of the population is already urban or urbanising.[13]

Climate change is expected to increase temperatures in the future (high confidence, IPCC2021) compared to the recent past (1995-2014). Regional-mean sea levels are projected to rise by around 20 cm by

2050 compared to 1995-2014 levels.[14] Projections of precipitation show significant uncertainties (low confidence), making it unclear if there will be changes in total rainfall, though increased variability is expected.[15] The impacts of these changes on society and the economy will largely depend on human activities such as maintenance, management, and construction of river or urban infrastructure, housing materials and design, health behaviours, access to health services, deforestation, and agricultural practices.

Understanding IDPs

In Somalia, internally displaced persons (IDPs) experience a complex interplay of motivations and conditions. While insecurity, floods, and droughts trigger movements, these are often strategic actions seeking opportunity and security rather than desperate self-preservation. Urban migration by rural poor individuals, often driven by parents seeking better opportunities for their children, contributes to a dynamic period in Somalia.

For this part of the research, we have gathered the perspectives from respondents in Burco, Jowhar and Afgoye in a single section, as the findings are consistent between the locations. The political economy and urban context sections are divided across three case studies.

Decision-making

Decisions to leave were reported in interviews as a mix of push and pull factors. A failure by rural producers to navigate climatic conditions – droughts or floods[16] - was a commonly reported push factor.[17] In Afgooye[18] and Jowhar[19], continual insecurity between clans, or the government and al-Shabaab, may be the most predominant reason for continual movement out of these rural areas. Notwithstanding actual security conditions, many respondents claimed that clan conflict outside of Burco, in the absence of any police or security in their villages, led many to move to Burco. Several respondents in Burco simply said extreme poverty or destitution forced them to move.

In most cases, they do not describe their migration as a short-term, temporary strategy. It is overwhelmingly a long-term movement in one direction.

Against this rural hardship, several pull factors or services and opportunities that do not exist in rural areas are consistently mentioned. Amongst these economic opportunities[20], basic services (education and health)[21], social networks or members from their community or extended family[22], together with an expectation to get aid (free house, water, electricity, money, health & education).[23]

Over the past 14 years, migration to Jowhar and Afgooye has evolved from being driven by self-preservation due to conflict and economic collapse to a family and community-based decision. If the migration to Jowhar and Afgooye in 2010-11 was driven by self-preservation due to conflict, economic hardship, and the withdrawal of aid, it appears to have evolved in the past 14 years. Secondary data adds context to the primary data. Young people, describing the decision-making process in their rural homes, mentioned how it was a family decision. Also, their parents were counselled by and consulted neighbours and family members.[24]

QUOTES

"The clans fight every year, and more people get displaced."

42 Leader, Burco

"IDPs come to our town seeking refuge and opportunities for a better life. Their expectations vary, but many hope to secure stable employment, improve their living conditions, and potentially start businesses."

42 Leader, Burco

Concerns for education for both boys and girls were considered paramount, as was an ability to earn an income to meet the family's expenses. Decisions to move were collective within the family, and often as a community member .

Migration has shifted from immediate life-threatening conditions to collective family or community decisions. If there was a period where IDPs were fleeing from life-threatening situations, it appears to be replaced by a collective family or community decision, made over time and in some cases precipitated by a single event, perhaps after a failed harvest, loss of animals or change in security conditions. Traditional subsistence production may not generate an income to meet the family's needs, which makes employment more attractive. They may want access to health services, shops, electricity, or water supplies. Neighbours and extended family may be making the same decisions, with many families choosing to move together. Young people, both men and women, appear driven by a search for education and opportunity.[25]

Expectations

Expectations relate to IDPs' reasons to move and the information they gathered[26], including from those who left before. The main expectation is for employment.[27] Next to it, are access to education,[28] healthcare and essential services (including housing, water and electricity).[29] Many expect that aid agencies will provide for their basic needs and that aid agencies or businesses will provide them with work, in instances because relatives or acquaintances have told them that aid, employment, and housing were available.[30] The different context in Burco slightly changes these expectations, where IDPs expect free health care, essential services, and cheaper access to electricity and water.[31]

Some, generally older interviewees, expect to return to their home place.[32] Others may move to another location if their needs and expectations are unmet and others, perhaps most, expect to stay and build a new life.

Conditions

The actual conditions, for most respondents, fall short of their expectations. For many, the only expectation met is security.[33] Otherwise, they report disappointment and hardship. The basic problem they report is the lack of work or employment opportunities. As a result, they cannot make essential expenditures such as housing, healthcare, food, education, water and electricity.[35] Additionally, services are felt to be distant or poor, and there are claims of misallocation and mismanagement of medical aid.[36]

QUOTE

> ***"We are living in bushes provided by the host community. I was hoping to find a job, access to healthcare, clean water, and free education for my children from this city. Unfortunately, none of these expectations have been met."***
>
> ***42 Leader, Burco***

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These difficult conditions are exacerbated by poor urban planning or lacking basic urban infrastructure. In all locations, camps are said to be sited in places known to flood. Flooding in Jowhar may be the worst of the three locations. Flooding is exacerbated (or caused in some cases) by the absence of drainage or sewerage.[36] A respondent in Jowhar claimed there are three shared toilets for 500 people.[37] Regular flooding is said to cause shelters to collapse[38] or require evacuation. Flooding is often referred to as "climate change". As camps are on the outskirts, poor or non-existent roads hinder access to healthcare or city markets, particularly during the rains.[39]

Housing is poor. Houses are made from scraps of plastic, bushes or other available materials. Homes and neighbourhoods are crowded.[40] IDPs in Burco also claimed that climate change, or high temperatures[41], exacerbated by the poor housing materials,[42] are difficult to bear. Some observed that temperatures are affecting some small businesses.[43]

Safety in camps is an issue. IDPs in Jowhar and Afgooye reported that while the camp is safer than their rural locations, they did not feel safe due to localised theft, violence and the lack of law enforcement. Tenure was also reported as a concern in all locations due to a fear of eviction or an impediment to establishing themselves.

It is helpful to add some context and perspective to these reports on the challenges and hardship of camp life. Some Burco IDPs felt that life in the new home was better than their rural places,[44] "Although I don't know much about all of Burco, I came expecting it to be this good."[45] Additionally, one may consider longstanding reports of ghost IDPs, those who register in camps to access aid but live elsewhere in better conditions,[46] or of families splitting, families where some members live in town while others live in the camps to access aid. Lastly, age is an important consideration. Responses in this research mainly came from IDPs aged over 25. In contrast, research that interviewed younger IDPs gives a different perspective. 15- to 25-year-olds acknowledged the same hardship and lamented the difficulty in accessing aid. However, they see their life and future in town. Many have greater aspirations for themselves or their future families. As such, they look past immediate hardship and are more concerned about strategic factors governing future opportunities, such as education, skills, employment or self-employment.[47]

QUOTE

> ***"We have received some health assistance, but it is not enough to cover all our medical needs. The local hospital and clinics are overwhelmed, and there are frequent shortages of essential medicines. Schools are either too far away or do not have the capacity to accommodate the influx of IDP children."***
>
> ***Female Headed Household, Jowhar***

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QUOTE

" Young IDPs tend to be influenced by and participate in activities in the city, such as sports. They also have more opportunities than the older population and are often ambitious about obtaining education and improving their skills. On the other hand, the elders often feel exhausted and disappointed living in the city, longing to return to their places of origin to resume their usual work, such as farming or herding animals."

P13, Aid Agency, Afgooye

Aspirations

Overwhelmingly, the aspirations of IDPs interviewed, whether male or female, are grounded in addressing immediate challenges to daily life. However, aspirations vary depending on the length of time living as an IDP and, more importantly, by the age of IDPs. Those under 25 are more aspirational than the generation immediately preceding them.

In the views of IDPs, aid agencies and the government, the aspirations of IDPs are related to their current challenges. They would like a good job[48] or business [49] opportunities, free education for their children, free health services, stability[50], to live in a decent home[51] and settle down. Consistently, IDPs hope to educate their children and provide them with better opportunities[52]. In Burco, several respondents indicated that they feel the camp is their home and it has given them a sense of stability and permanence.[53] They have lived there for many years, had their children there, and some have already built a home there. In all locations, a few, often older interviewees, expressed aspirations to return to the rural home.[54] However, these responses were exceptional and were not consistent with the majority of responses.

Ambitions change over time. They may be different where young IDPs live in proximity to Mogadishu, such as Ceelasha. Generally, young respondents display a worldview different from that of the previous generation. This may, in part, be because they grew up in a period of relative peace and change while their parents and elders grew up during the Civil War.[55] The literature on Somali youth also describes their urban focus and emphasis on education, skills, coaching and ability to be supported to start their own business Their views are informed by better education, social media and urban experience than previous generations.

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06

Afgoye Case Study



Afgooye Town, situated on the Shabelle River, has historically served small farmers. Over the last decade, due to migration and displacement, the towns of Ceelasha, Lafoole, and Afgooye, along with the Afgooye corridor, have merged into a single urban area stretching from the Shabelle River to Mogadishu. Ceelasha functions as a satellite city for Mogadishu. While Afgooye is connected by road to Mogadishu, insecurity and poor road conditions make travel to other regional centres difficult. The town regularly experiences flooding from the Shabelle River.

Afgooye District has sheltered IDPs since 1991, with a significant increase after 2011 due to escalating conflict in Mogadishu and the region. During this period, a large IDP population emerged in the Afgooye corridor, resulting in the mushrooming growth of Ceelasha and Lafoole. Ceelasha is believed to have one of the largest IDP populations in the country.[56] IDPs in Afgooye Town live in camps in peri-urban areas, while those in Ceelasha tend to rent homes when they are not in camps, and blend into the urban landscape.

Political economy

Clan and host community

The Rehenwein (Geledi) have long been the dominant clan in Afgooye, with Hawiye (Habar Gidir, Abgaal and Murusade) also having a strong presence. The Hawiye may be a minority population but exercise considerable influence regarding security and business. There are also significant Jeerwayne (Bantu) populations, but they are marginalised. Reports indicate that businesspeople from Mogadishu are buying agricultural land for large-scale commercial farming, which could disrupt the clan-based status quo in Afgooye[57]. The new towns of Lafoole and Ceelasha have larger populations than Afgooye and are composed of people from various clans, with significantly different clan power dynamics in the district. The IDPs interviewed were drawn from Geledi, Abgaal, and Eylo clans, and FGDs were conducted with Biyamal, Jareerweyne, Mareehan, and Geledi clan members.

IDPs may have encountered some discrimination in the past,[58] but the majority of interviewees said they have been welcomed and even assisted by the host community.[59] They feel no sense of discrimination. They move and conduct their business freely.[60] They feel marginalised due to their poverty, not clan. They note that IDPs entitlement to aid, which does not reach members of the host communities, and being isolated in camps, leads to resentment.[61]

Business owners did not perceive a problem between IDPs and host communities. They do business with IDPs equally. More generally, they feel that there is a duty to welcome and assist IDPs, no matter their clan.[62] However, businesses may not extend credit to IDPs, as most often are unknown individuals to them who don't bring the collateral guarantee of belonging to a local family, or clan.[63]

Business owners feel that IDPs lack the skills, education, and trust to be employed. They tend to hire people they know, from their clan, who have the required skills.[64] Business owners tend to hire IDPs as casual labour or for menial tasks[65], which is also confirmed by the interviews with IDPs. This is a motive of frustration for IDPs, who recognise the weakness of their networks in their new home and the fact that their clan networks are unable to offer the assistance they require.[66]

Living separately from the host community adds to IDPs' marginalisation.[67] Camps physically and socially isolate them. Also, as aid agencies do not give aid to members of the host community experiencing equal levels of hardship but only IDPs registered in camps, resentment piles up.[68] However, they also report that local authorities divert aid to their clans and families regardless.[69]

The absence of a robust clan network is an impediment, particularly for young people. They consistently describe how their future depends on support to complete their education/training or coaching/financing to start a business. The only possibility is support through family connections, which too often do not exist in the new place.[70]

"We cannot afford to live in the city because of the high costs, including rent, electricity, and water expenses. How can we live in the city without even having enough food to eat or with just a single meal per day"

P17 FGD, Afgooye

QUOTE

"I take great pride in providing excellent service and meeting the diverse needs of my clientele"

P22 Business, Afgooye

QUOTE

"Most businesses do not hire IDPs because business owners provide opportunities to their relatives rather than making them available to all. The IDPs do the cleaning and sanitation work, such as sweeping businesses, cleaning houses, washing clothes, and carrying items, as well as construction work. Such occupations do not require skills or a certain level of education."

P21 Leader, Ceelasha

Gender

The move into town has important implications for gender relations, creating new opportunities (particularly for young women) and challenges for men and women. Women feel they have more opportunities and freedoms since living in town, but these are accompanied by new challenges. IDP women often must work outside the home; the work is poorly paid, and menial labour adds to their domestic responsibilities.[71] The situation seems more difficult for new arrivals than older, established IDPs. Women also feel they could contribute to the integration of IDPs into the local context and local governance, and they see extreme poverty as a key challenge. They also feel that platforms to facilitate this engagement do not exist.[72] They see as their greatest challenges access to capital to start a business, and the lack of social networks. Notably, issues connected to gender or being a woman are not cited among the challenges.[73]

Most women feel that their future will be in town. However, older women find urban poverty hard and often prefer their village life. This was particularly noted by new arrivals in camps.[74]

Urban life is felt to be changing gender relations for IDPs, particularly for younger ones. Urban living requires different roles for husbands and wives in the home, which one respondent felt contributed to a stronger relationship.[75] The town gives young women new social and economic opportunities.[76] Some respondents noted that young IDPs were adapting better to urban life and the opportunities it affords them,[77] such as socialising, seeking jobs, and playing sports.[78] They also noted that they are better able to seize these opportunities as they are better educated. This situation may be more pronounced in Ceelasha than in Afgooye Town, which is better connected to Mogadishu.[79]



"The only problem I encounter as a woman is the lack of capital to start a business."

P17 FGD, Afgooye

"Youth generally have more job opportunities than older individuals, and single women often have more opportunities than those with children."

P15 FGD, Afgooye

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"Large businesses in the city are owned by outsiders who do not reinvest their profits locally, negatively impacting the city's infrastructure and living standards."

P13 Leader, Afgooye

Business

The perceptions of business were generally positive. Business is seen as crucial for economic growth, employment, peace, and development, particularly by businesses and IDPs. Businesses describe themselves in progressive terms, underscoring basic business principles such as being client-centred, providing credit, high-quality products at fair prices, good stock management that ensures supply and minimises costs, and relationships with larger wholesalers/importers in Mogadishu.[80] They added that through their businesses, they can help their own family and others in their community.[81] IDPs and businesses believe services and goods are available to all without prejudice, though some IDPs find them expensive. IDPs report that they depend on local businesses for goods, services, and utilities.[82] The district administration and aid agencies spoke less of business and more about farming as a commercial opportunity for poor people.

IDPs overwhelmingly see business as a long-term pathway for development. Many hope to move away from casual labour to start a small business.[83] Many IDP businesses are small-scale activities, such as tailoring, salon work or cooking,[84] due to lack of capital and guidance.[85] Regarding durable solutions, an interviewee believed that reducing barriers to IDP entrepreneurship was a priority.[86] It was also noted in Afgooye Town that "the host community has small businesses, but the IDPs have nothing …making their situation incomparable to that of the host community".[87] In Ceelasha, it was felt that business is essential to the economy and that the challenges faced by IDPs were no different than those faced by the local poor.[88]

Businesses are believed to rely on networks, often clan-based. Traditional clans or families may dominate business in Afgooye, while Ceelasha, with its recent migration, may have a more pluralistic clan context. We recorded claims that wealthy individuals from Mogadishu are purchasing agricultural land outside Afgooye for commercial agriculture, upsetting the clan and power status quo.[89]

While reporting an awareness of the need for opportunities for poor people, businesses say they are limited in their ability to help. They say they are unlikely to employ IDPs, except for menial labour, not because of clan, but due to a perceived lack of skills, education, trust or understanding.[90]

Government, Law & Security

The district administration is recognised for improving security[91] and working with aid agencies.[92] Other than that, most respondents did not feel it contributes to urban development in the District. They acknowledge a contribution to reducing the threat of al-Shabaab and curbing the unruly behaviour of soldiers in Ceelasha.[93] All other references described the shortcomings of the district administration. Many respondents stated that the taxes collected by the district administration were remitted to the State Government in Baidoa, with no benefit to Afgooye.[94] Others felt that Afgooye had not realised its economic potential due to a lack of collaboration between local authorities and civil society. Also, despite the actions of community elders, "local authority failed to meet the community's needs."[95] IDPs were disappointed by the district administration's lack of engagement in their affairs.

Others feel that any critique of the government is suppressed, "if the authorities see you conducting an interview, they will arrest both you and me, as they don't want information about the district administration to get out."[96] There was no mention of the State or Federal government in any interview, nor reference to government policy, standards or guidelines. Limited provision of health services in Afgooye and Ceelasha was noted. Health services are provided by or contracted by international agencies in Afgooye, but the coverage and range of these services has not been verified by this research.

The perspectives of the local administration provided a contrasting view. The district administration emphasised its role in improving security. They reported progress in the bid to have Ceelasha recognised as a district.[97]

QUOTES

"…the city is not fortunate enough to have good leadership. The local government does not have any involvement in the camps or even in the city. They just remain in their offices chewing miraa without knowing what is going on."

P15 IDP, Afgooye

"We have not seen the local authority working on the social-interest-building roads, improving, securing, and strengthening the social connection and collaboration, even though they did not even do normal visits for assessment and recording the situation of the IDPs. The only time we meet with our local authority is when the aid organization visits the city for pre-registration assessment or the distribution of support."

P36 Leader, Afgooye

They also reported receiving very little budgetary support from the Southwest State government and, as a result, had few resources.[98] They did highlight the few services they can provide, such as private school supervision and a District Hospital (although it has no medicines) in Afgooye Town and solid waste removal and disposal in Ceelasha. They supported the quality and breadth of utilities and services provided by the private sector in the district.

They also mentioned students' success in the District in national exams (educated in private schools). The administration in Ceelesha was aware of the importance of business to urban development, and they tried to play a complementary role.

A reference was made to collaborating with local leaders and the district administration to manage conflict and disagreements. One Afgooye community leader commented:

"We do not feel secure in our current location; there is no police presence to protect us."

QUOTES

"We have not yet collected taxes from these businesses. This decision was based on advice from community elders to avoid taxing these businesses at this time. The businesses are already struggling with import and transportation costs, as goods and services are taxed at the port of Mogadishu. These businesses are growing steadily and are expected to meet any needs raised of the society in the coming future."

P21 Ceelasha, Afgooye

"We have community leaders, and... They work with our administration to solve conflicts and disagreements that arise in the community. The committee elders consist of different clans..."

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Diaspora and external family relations

There is reportedly little to no engagement from extended families for IDPs or urban development. Beyond some assistance upon arrival, IDPs do not report receiving assistance from extended family. There were no mentions of assistance or investment from the diaspora in urban projects. However, secondary literature suggests remittances may exist from spouses working elsewhere or from individual family members to another.

Aid, cliques and cartels

IDPs in camps receive aid, and while it is highly valued by those who receive it, it is fraught with controversy and claims of misappropriation and contributes little to urban development. IDPs report that part of the reason they moved was to access aid. They registered in camps to receive it and considered it an important, if inadequate, help to face extreme poverty.[99] Businesses interviewed said they did not know about aid; beyond that, aid agencies state they support IDPs in camps with the assistance of local authorities. They did not see it as a business or urban development factor.[100] Local authorities did not provide detailed information about aid beyond acknowledging their assistance to process new arrivals.[101]

QUOTE

"Aid is clearly valued by I am frustrated with the local administration for diverting aid meant for us and the host community."

P15 IDP, Afgooye

Most respondents thought that aid only meets a fraction of the needs.[102] It benefits only a proportion of IDPs, not necessarily those most in need.[103] A local leader estimated that aid only reaches a quarter of the IDPs.[104]

The government was often perceived by IDPs and leaders as complicit in the work of the aid agencies, with many alluding to collusion and misconduct. IDPs feel that local authority presence is for the benefit and security of the organisation.[105] Collusion between aid agency staff and local communities during the targeting process is claimed to divert aid to the host community or relations of leaders.[106] Also, some felt that aid agencies distribute aid via elders, and IDPs without a clan leader are excluded.[107] The aid is also seen as temporary and ad hoc, such as an aid agency project to supply medicines to the Afgooye hospital.[108] Efforts by aid agencies to provide broader forms of assistance can be frustrated by local authorities.

In contrast, aid agencies maintain that they provide IDPs with essential cash assistance, shelters, education and training, as well as basic services.[109]

QUOTES

"Some individuals from large cities with a high standard of living are attempting to register as IDPs to receive aid from organizations. Although they do not meet the criteria, they sometimes receive assistance, which is unfair and unjust."

P3 FGD IDP, Afgooye

"…the aid brought by NGOs is often misappropriated and used by the administration…Some organizations are campaigning to restore the district's infrastructure by providing equipment and funds for workers, which could benefit even the displaced people. However, the administration fails to distribute the money and equipment appropriately, as they divert it for their own use."

P19 CSO, Afgooye

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Urban Context

Economy

Interviews reflect a sense of economic growth and opportunity in the urban region of Afgooye. Residents of Afgooye Town describe opportunities in agricultural business and commercial growth.[110] In Ceelasha, commercial growth is emphasised and linked to Mogadishu.[111] Businesses feel they contribute to local economic growth, employment, and urban development.[112] Urban economic growth is well served by the district's many commercial resources and utilities, such as financial services,

"Collaboration between the local administration and business owners is vital for business growth."

P20 Leader, Afgooye

"...there is no effective business in the district. Youths sit idly on walls with no jobs or education, lacking training in skills. Some resort to migration, and others use drugs."

P19 CSO, Afgooye

electricity, transport, and communications.[113] Road improvements were repeatedly mentioned as critical to growing trade and commerce, particularly with Mogadishu and other regional centres.[114] Flood control infrastructure in Afgooye was also considered crucial to the city's growth. The administration recognised businesses' leading role in the district's economic development.

Promoting business growth was felt to require capital, business acumen, good location and supportive infrastructure.[115] Municipal authorities emphasised the role of continued security for business growth, particularly in Ceelasha, where government efforts in the last year made business improvements, "Now businesses are open late into the night."[116] Illegal checkpoints and insecurity on the road to Mogadishu were also mentioned as an ongoing impediment to growth.[117] An IDP leader felt that the most important factor for economic growth is good leadership elected by society.[118]

IDPs, aid agencies, local leaders and CSOs mentioned that economic growth in the district must include poor and young people.

Businesses were aware of the value of inclusive economic development.

Creating business opportunities, including for small agricultural producers, through micro-funding, training, or assistance for farmers, was suggested as a means of including poor people in economic growth.[119]

QUOTES

"There is a lack of interaction between the host community, IDPs, and local authorities, increasing disparities and hindering business growth. Although large business owners have created some jobs for residents, the number of jobs is minimal. To improve the situation, the local government, community elders, and international organizations should enhance access to financial investment, provide business skills training, construct roads inside and outside the city, and ensure affordable electricity. These measures will help reduce disparities, promote business growth, and improve living standards in Afgoye"

P13 Clan Leader, Afgooye

"My main goals are to expand my business by having more goods both from the country and importing directly from the abroad.... I also aim to open more shops, by doing so will create more employment opportunities and I am committed to reducing unemployment in the community by providing more job opportunities."

22-Business, Afgooye

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"I cannot say that the city is doing well from the perspective of development; it is just declining day by day especially during the rainy season when we encounter challenges of not being able to walk to work study or shop."

14 IDP Afgooye

Infrastructure and Services

Improving roads and river management were generally prioritised generally for urban development. IDPs and aid agencies, additionally emphasised access to services and utilities for equitable urban development.[120] While road and river management improvements were globally valued for urban growth, IDPs and aid agencies also recognised their importance in allowing access to markets, schools and basic services for IDPs.[121] They also added the importance of providing sewage, and drainage, which, in their absence, led to "unliveable" conditions during the rains.[122] Roads within Ceelasha are also very poor and are in urgent need of improvement.[123]

No clear pathways to address these issues were proposed. Municipal representatives said they could do little until there is a unified tax collection policy and better resource sharing between local administrations and the Southwest State.[124]

Individuals noted the same, and that despite collecting taxes there has been no investment by the government in the city's infrastructure. It was, however, suggested that private organisations, local administration, and NGOs should have been working together to plan and construct roads.[125]

Equitable access to services (including job training) and utilities was emphasised by IDPs and aid agencies as they believed that it is important not only for equity but also to advance social cohesion.[126] IDPs and local poor cannot afford these privately provided services and utilities.[127] The free services they currently receive – health and education are limited.[128] Municipal authorities equally recognised the private sector provision of services and utilities and the importance of ensuring that poor people could access them. They, however, had no suggestions on how that could be done.[129] In addition to equitable access to services, it was also felt that having aid agencies and local administrations work without clan bias and distributing the aid fairly would make important progress toward social inclusion.[130]

Despite diverse perceptions of government and urban development, interviewees often suggested that there remains an important role to be played.

Housing

Housing in Afgooye Town, Ceelasha, and Lafoole is generally considered adequate, except in the IDP camps, where it is deemed highly inadequate. Families in these camps live in undignified and difficult conditions, often cramped into rudimentary shelters or even living "under a tree." These camps are frequently located in areas prone to seasonal waterlogging and flooding, requiring residents to temporarily relocate.[131] IDPs and the district administration highlighted the lack of drainage and sewerage systems in the camps as well as for much of the city. Camps are situated on land owned by private individuals, and it is third parties (aid agencies or the district administration), not the IDPs themselves, who have negotiated for their stay and the provision of aid services. These landowners act as "gatekeepers," and IDPs can be evicted at any time.[132] Camps are felt to isolate IDPs and hinder their integration and access to jobs or employment and services.[133] Despite the poor conditions, some IDPs have lived in these camps for many years, while others reside in town[134]. IDP camp residents feel free to live anywhere in town but stay in the camps to avoid paying rent.[135] Additionally, remaining or at least registering in camps allows them access to aid benefits, such as money, free schools, and clinics.[136] Researchers and secondary literature note that IDP families may sometimes divide, with some members staying in camps to access aid while others live elsewhere in town.

Climate change is frequently referenced concerning the regular flooding seen in many areas of Afgooye City, not just in the IDP camps. However, the effects of urbanisation and a lack of planning are also mentioned in relation to climate change. It is notable that climate change and flooding are not mentioned concerning Ceelasha.

"…private individuals have occupied land and space in the sewage system and water canals. They block these areas by expanding their houses, which are located near the sewage systems and canals. Second, the river has been polluted for a long time, causing it to narrow and overflow easily, leading to floods during the rainy season."

P13 Civil Society, Afgooye

07

Burco Case Study



Burco, Somaliland's second-largest city, is situated on low-lying hills on the plateau above Berbera and along the dry river, Toghdeer. It has grown considerably over the past decades and hosts one of the region's largest livestock markets, maintaining a strong tradition in livestock keeping and trade. Since the war with Somalia ended in 1991, Burco has remained relatively peaceful. The government in Somaliland has a stronger presence than in Somalia, resulting in government-provided basic education and healthcare in Burco.

Economically, the city is growing, with a robust private sector that provides commercial services, some industry, utilities and most basic services. The commercial livestock trade and exports to Berbera remain strong and stable. Despite being to the east of the main highway connecting Berbera, Hargeisa, and Ethiopia, Burco is perceived as less economically vibrant than Hargeisa, offering fewer opportunities. The rural areas around Burco, which commonly relied on traditional livestock keeping, are often desperately poor, leading to high levels

of urban migration. Many migrants end up in IDP camps surrounding Burco Town. Inter-clan violence in rural areas also contributes to rural migration into the IDP camps. The city also has a largely young, educated population.

Political Economy

IDPs are welcomed and helped, and there are no clan-based barriers to business or services. The economic situation determines access to goods or services. Sub-clans or family lines serve as mutual support networks, and for IDPs, the lack of such a network is considered an obstacle to advancement.

Clan & Host Community

Burco and its surrounding area are predominantly populated by the Isaaq clan (Habar Yoonis), with significant numbers of Isaaq-Haber Jeclo. This homogeneity sets it apart from Afgooye and Jowhar. Despite occasional tensions between sub-clans or local differences, IDPs and the host community report no prejudice or exclusion.[137] IDPs reported having been welcomed by their host community.[138] Their poverty restricts their ability to access services.[139] With good jobs, they believe they would have the time and resources to integrate fully into their new home.

Businesses did not perceive a problem between IDPs and host communities. They do business with them equally.[140] Businesses feel that IDPs lack skills, education and the trust to have jobs in their businesses. Instead, they tend to hire people known to them and who have the required skills. Businesses say they do hire IDPs as casual labour or for menial tasks. IDPs confirm this situation.[141] They also express frustration with it as their own networks are weaker[142] and offer little or no assistance, leaving them with few opportunities to do menial tasks.

Gender

The move into town has important implications for gender relations, creating new opportunities (particularly for young women) and challenges. Women feel that they have more opportunities and freedoms since living in town which are accompanied

by new sets of challenges. They are preferred recipients of aid.[143] Women also feel they could contribute to the integration of IDPs and local governance.

Most women feel that their future will be in town.[144] Urban life is felt to be changing gender relations for IDPs and particularly for young IDPs.[145] Town gives young women new social and economic opportunities.[146] Some respondents noted that young IDPs were adapting better to urban life and seizing opportunities in Burco although these opportunities may be less when compared to Hargeisa.

QUOTES

" it's the best place for them to find new and better opportunities."

P33, Burco

" I don't think we can easily find jobs here, but creating and operating a business seems more realistic. The environment is more supportive for entrepreneurship than employment."

FGD New Arrivals, Burco

Business

Perceptions of business were generally positive. Business is seen as crucial for economic growth, employment, peace, and development, particularly by businesses and IDPs. Businesses describe themselves as forward-looking, planning to grow by expanding their operations countrywide. Their business norms are progressive and socially minded.[147] IDPs and businesses believe services and goods are available to all without prejudice. IDPs report they depend on local businesses for goods, services and utilities, which some find expensive.[148]

IDPs, overwhelmingly see business as a long-term pathway for development. Many hope to move away from current casual labour to start a small business. They, however, lack the networks which could provide them with the financing or guidance they need.[149]

Businesses are believed to rely on networks, often clan-based. Certain families dominate business in Burco. They have organised themselves to build local infrastructure, including road improvements and bridges. Their influence may surpass that of the government. Businesses, while reporting an awareness of the need for opportunities for poor people, do not employ IDPs not because of clan, but due to a perceived lack of skills, education, trust or acumen.[150]

Government, Law and Security

The district administration is recognised for security[151], taxation, and certain basic services such as primary education and health (including Burco's main hospital and some clinics), but otherwise are not felt to contribute to urban development in the district. Most references described the shortcomings of the district administration. The government helped aid agencies to assist IDPs, but they said they lacked the resources to provide any assistance themselves. The government was also said to be influenced by clan, where lobbying by influential clan members or business people will determine if a road is built or improved.[152] Corruption is believed to have resulted in the delay of road improvements or in their poor quality.[153]

The perspectives of the district administration provided a contrasting view. It emphasised their role in conducting research to inform a new zoning plan. They also reported that as they receive very little budgetary support from Hargeisa they are unable to implement the plan. They were supportive of the quality and breadth of utilities and services provided by the private sector in the district.

Diaspora and external family relations

IDPs said that they received no assistance from extended family, as they, too, were experiencing financial difficulties.[154] There were no mentions of assistance or investment from the diaspora in urban projects. nonetheless, secondary literature suggests that remittances may exist in the form of spouses working elsewhere or from individual family members to another.

Aid, Cliques & Cartels

IDPs may also question the relevance of traditional hierarchies used for aid distribution. Their current situation may not align with these hierarchies, and they may not perceive new arrivals as necessarily being the poorest in their community.

QUOTE

> *"You've referred to me as one of the prominent elders, but I want to emphasize that there's no hierarchy or superiority in our village. Everyone here is equally valued, and in terms of money, newcomers can sometimes have more money than you."*
>
> *P40 Leader, Jowhar*

Aid is received by IDPs in camps, and while it is highly valued by those who receive it, it is fraught with controversy. There are claims of misappropriation and that it contributes little to urban development. IDPs report that part of the reason they moved was to access aid.[155] They registered in camps to receive it and considered an important, if inadequate[156] feature, to help them manage their extreme poverty. They continue to live in camps in part to continue accessing aid.[157] Some feel that aid plays a more important role in their lives than the government.[158] Businesses interviewed said they did not know about aid, beyond that aid agencies gave it to IDPs in camps with the assistance of local authorities.[159] They did not feel aid was relevant to business or urban development.

Aid is widely viewed to meet a small proportion of the needs of those receiving it.[160] It is targeted to whoever happens to be in the camp on days when it is delivered,[161] which is more often women as men tend to be off working.[162] and raises questions about ghost IDPs or collusion. Women are expected to develop networks to learn more about aid distributions in the camp and how to access it.[163] In contrast, aid agencies maintain that they provide IDPs with essential cash assistance, MCH services, and training on farming.[164]

Urban Context

Economic

Interviews reflect a sense of economic growth and opportunity in the urban region of Burco. Residents describe opportunities in commercial livestock and business growth.[165] Businesses feel they contribute to local economic growth, employment and urban development. Urban economic growth is felt to be well served by the many commercial resources and utilities in the district, such as financial services, electricity, water, transport, and communications.[166] Road improvements were repeatedly mentioned as critical to growing trade and commerce. While the main roads in town and to Hargeisa or Berbera are considered good, roads in town and feeder roads to outlying communities are poor.[167] Business is expected to drive the district's economic development.[168]

Promoting this business growth was felt to require capital, business acumen, and supportive infrastructure.[169] IDPs, aid

QUOTE

> *"The current slow rate of economic growth in Burco suggests a need for initiatives to stimulate economic activity and create an environment conducive to business growth and innovation."*
>
> *P30, Burco*

QUOTE

"As an IDP, I find that I have more freedom to conduct business and engage in entrepreneurial activities in my new home. The IDP camp environment often fosters a sense of community support and resilience, which can provide opportunities for women to explore their entrepreneurial aspirations.."

P21, Jowhar

agencies, local leaders and CSOs mentioned that economic growth in the district must include poor and young people. Businesses were aware of the value of inclusive economic development.

IDPs almost universally describe starting businesses or employment as their pathway to economic development and as a means of moving beyond current underemployment as casual labour or poorly paid menial tasks. Some felt it was easier to start a business than get a job[170], but it required capital and business skills, which they did not have.[171] Younger IDPs were more hopeful and optimistic about their prospects, while older individuals may face additional barriers to integration and employment.[172]

Infrastructure & Basic Services

While road improvements were globally valued for urban growth, IDPs and aid agencies also recognised their importance in allowing access to markets, schools and basic services for IDPs.[173] Secondly, improvements to sewage and drainage were prioritised.[174]

No clear pathways to address these issues were proposed. Municipal representatives said they can do little as they had no resources,[175] which was also the impression of others.[176] It was also reported that at least some government funds are available for feeder roads, on a 60/40 cost-sharing basis with a local community. While perhaps innovative, it excludes poor communities who cannot raise the funds.[177] They felt in principle that collaboration with business was felt to be essential to advancing these issues. Businesses had made improvements to roads and built bridges.[178] It was noted that aid agencies were not relevant to infrastructure initiatives.

Individuals noted the same, and that despite collecting taxes there has been no investment by the government in the city's infrastructure.

QUOTE

" a construction company contributed to the local government to build a road leading to its business area. Additionally, prominent businessmen, such as Dahabshiil, sometimes fund the construction of roads or bridges for public benefit. While there may be personal gains, such as marketing opportunities, the overall impact benefits the community."

P33, Burco

Equitable access to services (including job training) and utilities was emphasised by IDPs and aid agencies as they believed that it is important not only for equity but also to advance social cohesion. IDPs and local poor cannot afford these privately provided services and utilities.[179] The businesses which provide utilities, prioritise wealthier sections of the city, where there is greater demand and clients will pay.[180] As a result, electricity supply to camps is either non-existent or irregular.[181] Free education and basic health care are valued by IDPs but they do not consider them adequate to their

needs.[182] Municipal authorities recognised the private sector's provision of services and utilities and the importance of ensuring that poor people could access them.

Despite the varied perceptions of the government, interviewees suggested that it has an important role in urban development, providing strategic oversight and financing.

Climate change was blamed for flooding, despite the knowledge that there is growing development with no maintenance or provision for drainage or sewage

Housing

Housing in Burco is considered adequate, except in the IDP camps. Families in these camps live in difficult conditions, often cramped into rudimentary shelters,[183] far from the city and work opportunities.[184] Nonetheless, some find conditions in the camps better than in their home places. [185] These camps can flood due to a lack of drainage.[186] Some IDPs indicate they wish to move elsewhere in town but are assigned camps to live in by the government.[187] IDPs and The district administration highlighted the lack of drainage and sewerage systems in the camps as well as for much of the city. Camps are situated on land owned by private individuals or the government. Authorities can evict them at any time.[188] Camps are felt to isolate IDPs and hinder their integration and access to jobs or employment and services. It also requires they spend significant amounts on transport into town for work.[189] Despite the poor conditions, some IDPs have lived in these camps for many years.[190] IDP camp residents feel free to live anywhere in town but stay in the camps to avoid paying rent. Additionally, remaining or at least registering in camps allows them access to aid benefits, such as money, free schools, and clinics. Researchers and secondary literature note that IDP families may sometimes divide, with some members staying in camps to access aid while others live elsewhere in town.

Climate change was not mentioned except with respect to "increasing mid-day temperatures" [191], which respondents also felt was in part due to the building materials they used for the houses.[192]

UNDP

08

Jowhar Case Study



Jowhar shares many similarities with Afgooye. Both are situated on the banks of the Shabelle River, have rich traditions of farming and livestock keeping, and have been significantly affected by insecurity, receiving large numbers of IDPs over the last 14 years. However, Jowhar differs in several key aspects. It is at the centre of an extensive agricultural irrigation network and is one of the locations most impacted by annual flooding in Somalia. Additionally, Jowhar is further from Mogadishu, with a notoriously dangerous road, leaving it significantly more isolated. Despite this, there is regular movement of goods and people by both road and air.

Jowhar has provided refuge to IDPs since 1991, with a significant increase after 2011 and throughout the last decade due to insecurity and rural hardship. While many narratives describe IDPs fleeing violence or famine caused by drought, these accounts do not fully capture the breadth of motivations for relocation or the expectations of those moving to towns.

The unique perspectives and motivations of youth are particularly underrepresented in much of the humanitarian IDP literature, often conflated with those of their parents or elders in interview responses. Currently, IDPs in Jowhar live in "camps" or peri-urban areas, enduring very poor housing conditions.

Political economy

Clan & Host Community

Jowhar is formally governed by a Jareer Wayne (Shiidle) District Commissioner, but the Hawiye (Abgaal) clan maintains considerable influence. The government primarily provides security and some basic education. Business is largely controlled by the Hawiye (Abgaal), and with commercial agriculture largely controlled by the Hawiye (Galjecel and Hawadle). Aid distribution is controlled by the Hawiye (Abgaal and Galjecel). The city is predominantly inhabited by the Hawiye (Abgaal) clan, followed by the Jareer Wayne (Shiidle), Hawiye (Galjecel, and Hawadle). IDPs do not report any clan-related impediments to accessing goods or services;[193] instead, their poverty restricts their ability to access services[194]. Generally, IDPs feel welcomed and assisted by the resident community[195]. With good jobs, they believe they would have the time and resources to integrate fully into their new home. While they do not express problems related to clan affiliation, the absence of their own family networks is seen as an impediment to accessing opportunities.[196]

Businesses did not perceive a problem between IDPs and host communities. They do business with them equally.[197]

Businesses feel that IDPs lack the skills, education, and trust to have jobs in their businesses. Instead, they tend to hire people known to them, from their own clan, that have the required skills.[198] Businesses say they do hire IDPs as casual labour or for menial tasks.[199] IDPs confirm this situation. They also express frustration with it as their own networks are weaker and offer little or no assistance nor do they have access to social networks of host populations, leaving them with few opportunities to do menial tasks.[200] One IDP observed that it is difficult for them to start their own small businesses in sectors controlled by two major clans.[201]

QUOTE

"To be an IDP is not what prevents us from getting a better job or business opportunities, but the lack of opportunities in Jowhar overall is the problem"

P1 Old IDP, Jowhar

QUOTE

" Jowhar itself struggles with widespread poverty, making it difficult for the town to accommodate the large IDP population fully"

P08 Leader, Jowhar

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"...in most IDP situations, women are the breadwinners. I can see that women have more opportunities than men in IDP settings."

P7-IDP, Jowhar

Gender

The move into town has important implications for gender relations, creating new opportunities (particularly for young women) and challenges for men and women. It is hard for everyone both men and women (the poverty)[202] women have more opportunities than they might have before.[203] Some feel it is easier for IDP women to get work than men[204], but often the work is poorly paid, menial labour adding to their domestic responsibilities.[205] Urban life is felt to be changing gender relations in the home. Urban living requires different roles for husbands and wives in the home.[206] The new roles and changed social context create new risks for women, such as exploitation and GBV.[207]

Women also feel they could contribute to the integration of IDPs and local governance, which extreme poverty prevents. They also feel that platforms to facilitate this engagement do not exist. One male respondent commented that gender is a problem for women to have a voice... *She must be from a big clan and family with money*.[208]

Most women feel that their future will be in town. However, older women find urban poverty particularly hard and often prefer their village life.[209] This was particularly noted by new arrivals in camps. For the female members of the IDP population, the barriers to securing better jobs and achieving financial stability are pronounced. Due to the weak local economy, their lack of skills and local clan domination of small businesses leave them despairing of finding a decent job or being able to start a business.[210] The simple fact of having a child can become a major obstacle, as employers may be reluctant to hire women with dependent family responsibilities,[211] or decent child-care is not available.[212] Job training, and other resources that can empower them to build better lives[213] were identified as important to help women establish in town.

Some respondents noted that young IDPs were adapting better to urban life and the opportunities it affords them, however due to a lack of skills, networks it is very difficult for them to establish decent livelihoods.[214]

QUOTE

"For the female members of the IDP population, the barriers to securing better jobs and achieving finacial stability are even more pronounced."

P44, Jowhar

Business

Perceptions of business were generally positive. Business is seen as crucial for economic growth, employment, peace, and development, particularly by businesses and IDPs. Businesses describe themselves in progressive terms [215]. Business is believed to be growing every year.[216] IDPs and businesses believe services and goods are available to all without prejudice, though some IDPs find them expensive.[217] IDPs report they depend on local businesses for goods, services and utilities. In the future, security is felt to be foundational to continued business growth as well as improved road networks to surrounding communities, Balcaad, and other regional centres/Mogadishu.[218] Currently, existing roads are seasonally flooded and impassable.[219]

The Government recognises the need to speak with businesses to realise the town's developmental goals. They add that the business community is small but important, [220] providing examples where they have come to the administration to request permits to build roads important to their businesses[221] CSOs consider that the town's electricity and water services are relatively well-managed, thanks to private sector involvement.[222]

Some IDPs hope to move away from current casual labour to start a small business. They, however, lack the social networks which could provide them with the financing or guidance they need. Businesses are believed to rely on networks, often clan-based. Traditional clans or families may dominate business in Jowhar.[223]

While businesses report an awareness of the need for opportunities for poor people, they say they are limited in their ability to help. They say they are unlikely to employ IDPs, except for menial labour,[224] not because of clan but due to a perceived lack of skills, education,[225] trust,[226] or acumen.

"Major commercial activities, such as owning shops and operating in the local markets, are often controlled by individuals or groups affiliated with the dominant clans, who leverage their connections and land ownership to maintain their hold on the local economy."

P33 IDP, Jowhar

Government, Law and Security

The district administration is recognised for improvements to security and for working with aid agencies to help IDPs, but otherwise are not felt to contribute to urban development in the District. Government was reported to have reduced the insecurity resulting from al-Shabaab.,[227] Although travel to Mogadishu remains precarious. All other references described the shortcomings of the district administration. Taxes collected by the district government were remitted with no benefit to Jowhar Town.[228] IDPs were disappointed by the lack of engagement by the district administration in their affairs. Businesses perceived the government's role was to assist NGOs in IDP camps. They did not feel that the government practically contributes to urban development.[229]
One civil society respondent felt that the government's limited revenues posed an important challenge to the town's economy and development.[230] An aid agency respondent claimed that NGOs were doing something about health and agriculture, but they have not seen any actions taken by the government.[231]

The perspectives of the district administration provided a contrasting view. Municipal administration emphasised their role in improving security as well as securing World Bank funding to construct a main road in town. With this same funding, they will build more bridges.[232] They also reported evacuating and assisting IDPs who are badly affected by "recurring flooding", as well as constructing water wall blocks to divert water and reduce flood impacts in town.[233]

QUOTES

" I have worked and collaborated with different organizations to improve the lives of the affected communities in Jowhar."

P9, Jowhar

"The absence of a proactive government role is evident."

P! CSO, Jowharr

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They also report working with aid agencies. They said that they receive very little budgetary support and as a result, had few resources to implement activities.[234] They were supportive of the quality and breadth of utilities and services provided by the private sector in the district.

IDPs felt that camps were not safe due to violence and robbery as well as retaliation from an adversary clan in their place of origin.[235] Tenure was mentioned as an issue, with IDPs continually fearing of eviction. Some IDPs felt that they had no voice in the governance of their new homes.

QUOTE

"I see NGOs sometimes giving cash to the people in the IDP camps, but I don't think that encourages them or impacts the growth of the economy. The government is not involved in that, but the business community is trying to invest more in the town, and we have managed to grow our economy."

P10, Jowhar

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Diaspora and external family relations

IDPs said that they received no assistance from their extended family. Their extended families are also living in poor conditions as IDPs or in rural homes and are unable to provide help.236 There were no mentions of assistance or investment from the diaspora in urban projects. Nonetheless, secondary literature suggests that remittances may exist in the form of spouses working elsewhere or from individual family members to another.

Aid, Cliques & Cartels

Aid is received by IDPs in camps, and while it is highly valued by those who receive it, it is fraught with controversy and claims of misappropriation and contributes little to urban development. IDPs report that part of the reason they moved was to access aid. They registered in camps to receive it and considered it an important, if inadequate, feature to help them manage their extreme poverty. They continue to stay in camps to receive aid and avoid paying rent in town,[237] although they feel this aid is inadequate and will not lead to their sustainable development.[238] Businesses interviewed said they did not know about aid, beyond that aid agencies gave it to IDPs in camps with the assistance of local authorities.[239] They did mention that part of the urban water supply is the result of a German initiative.[240] They did not see aid or assistance to IDPs as a factor for business or for urban development.[241] Local authorities did not provide detailed information about the aid beyond that they assisted aid agencies to process new arrivals.[242]

IDPs feel that local authority presence is for the benefit and security of aid organisations,[243] or at least that the government works with aid agencies. Several references indicated it was inadequate.[244] Collusion between aid agency staff and local communities during the targeting process is claimed to divert aid to host community or relations of leaders.[245]

In contrast, aid agencies maintain that they provide IDPs with essential cash assistance, shelter, health, education and trainings.[246]

QUOTE

" To be honest, no, it's been a long time since I saw aid agencies come to our camp. But what I know is that when aid is distributed, priority is given to the vulnerable groups, even though some of us say that it's just another strategy to cover up clan discrimination."

P4-IDP, Jowhar

QUOTE

"You've referred to me as one of the prominent elders, but I want to emphasize that there's no hierarchy or superiority in our village. Everyone here is equally valued, and in terms of money, newcomers can sometimes have more money than you."

P40 Leader, Jowhar

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" By focusing on infrastructure improvements, supporting the education and health sectors, and fostering collaboration with the local business community, the government is taking a comprehensive and strategic approach to addressing the recurring flood issues and driving the long-term development of Jowhar town."

P6, Jowharr

Urban Context

Economic

Interviews reflect a sense of economic growth and opportunity in the urban region of Jowhar. Residents describe opportunities in agricultural business and commercial growth.[247] Businesses, leaders, and administration feel local businesses make important contributions to local economic growth and urban development.[248] Urban economic growth is felt to be well served by the many commercial resources and utilities in the district such as financial services, electricity, water, transport, communications. Road improvements were repeatedly mentioned as critical to growing trade and commerce. Roads to outlying communities as well as connections to Baaclad, Mogadishu and other urban centres in the country were mentioned. Flood control infrastructure to better exploit local irrigation schemes as well as to reduce flood related economic losses was also felt to be crucial to the city's growth. Government recognised the leading role that business would play in the district's economic development.

Promoting business growth was felt to require capital, business acumen, good location and supportive infrastructure. One business owner highlighted the need to begin exploring alternate, green power sources to ensure continued business growth.

QUOTE

"Electricity access and renewable energy development are also critical to sustaining economic momentum. Consistent power supply is essential for businesses, industrialization, and improving living standards. Investing in renewable sources like solar and wind could help Jowhar meet its growing energy needs in a sustainable way."

P10 Business, Jowhar

Municipal authorities emphasised the role of continued security for business growth. Illegal checkpoints and insecurity on the road to Mogadishu was also mentioned as an ongoing impediment to growth.

IDPs, aid agencies, local leaders, and CSOs mentioned that economic growth in the district must include the poor, marginalised, and young.[249]

Government, Civil Society and NGOs must work together with businesses to pursue sustainable solutions for economic growth.

Embedded in these processes remain clan bias which serves to exclude the poor or those without family connections. Including the poor or IDPs in urban economic development requires recognition of such bias' and mechanisms to counterbalance them.

QUOTE

"Developing financial infrastructure is crucial through investments in banking, microfinance, and investment services, alongside promoting equitable economic development and job creation for shared prosperity. Inclusive growth can be fostered by implementing policies that empower underrepresented groups, ensuring fair access to public services and decision-making processes, and encouraging community engagement to address diverse resident needs effectively."

P2, Jowhar

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QUOTES

"While the government and international aid organizations have failed to catalyse broader social and economic progress, these private sector actors continue to make valiant efforts to keep the town's economy afloat and serve the local population. Moving forward, it will be crucial for the government, NGOs, and UN agencies to enhance their engagement and support for the business community. By working in close collaboration with these private sector leaders and providing the necessary resources and enabling environment, we can unleash the full potential of Jowhar's entrepreneurial spirit and drive sustainable, equitable development that uplifts the entire community. The fortitude and adaptability displayed by the town's business owners in the face of adversity is a testament to their commitment to Jowhar's future. With the right public-private partnership model, we can harness this energy to transform the social and economic landscape better."

P44, Jowhar

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" Anyone who can afford to operate a business is free to do that but the chance of someone from the IDP to run a successful business in Jowhar is small."

P1, Jowhar

Infrastructure & Basic Services

While road, bridges or infrastructure for river and irrigation management improvements were globally valued for urban growth[250], IDPs and aid agencies also recognised their importance to allow access to markets, schools and basic services for IDPs. They also added the importance of providing sewage and drainage as essential for urban progress.[251]

No clear pathways to address these issues were proposed. Municipal representatives said they could do little as they had no resources assigned to them. They mentioned World Bank support as enabling them to implement their plans.[252] However, businesses and others commented that the road the government was building was delayed and intimated there were issues of quality.[253] Some felt that collaboration with business, civil society and government was felt to be essential to advancing these issues.[254]

Equitable access to services (including job training) and utilities was emphasised by IDPs and aid agencies as they believed that it is important not only for equity but also to advance social cohesion. IDPs and local poor cannot afford these privately provided services and utilities.[255] IDPs and government interviewees felt the government or NGOs/UN should provide these services.[256] Municipal authorities equally recognised the private sector's provision of services and utilities and the importance of ensuring that poor people could access them.

Interviewees suggested that there is a need for strategic direction and holistic vision to direct urban development.

Climate change was blamed for flooding, despite the knowledge that there is inadequate planning growing development in flood plains with no maintenance of river defences and irrigation systems.[257]

QUOTES

" The government is responsible for collecting taxes, but it seems they hardly do any infrastructure work. As a result, the government's role is missing when developing roads, hospitals, and schools."

P7, Jowhar

"It is clear that Jowhar, in its current state, does not provide the kind of inclusive, equitable environment that would allow all its residents, including IDPs, to reach their full potential."

P44, Jowhar

"a holistic approach to urban planning and service delivery is required to create an equitable environment. This could involve initiatives like improving access to healthcare, education, and other social services - ensuring that all residents, regardless of their background, can benefit from the town's development."

P43, Jowhar

Housing

Housing in Jowhar is generally considered adequate, except in the IDP camps, where it is deemed highly inadequate.[258] Families in these camps live in undignified and difficult conditions, often cramped into rudimentary shelters and a "single tree".[259] These camps are frequently located in areas prone to seasonal waterlogging, flooding requiring residents to temporarily relocate[260]. IDPs and The district administration highlighted the lack of drainage and sewerage systems in the camps as well as for much of the city.[261] Camps are felt to isolate IDPs and hinder their integration, access to jobs or employment and services.[262] They are also exposed to eviction as they have no tenure in camps.[263] Despite the poor conditions, some IDPs have lived in these camps for many years, while others reside in town.[264] IDP camp residents feel free to live anywhere in town but stay in the camps to avoid paying rent and utilities.[265] Additionally, remaining or at least registering in camps allows them access to aid benefits, such as money, free schools, and clinics. Researchers and secondary literature note that IDP families may sometimes divide, with some members staying in camps to access aid while others live elsewhere in town or at the rural home.

One NGO respondent felt that helping IDPs establish their own home was the first step toward moving towards integration and long-term solutions.

QUOTE

"Without secure, well-constructed homes, the IDPs are especially vulnerable to the consequences of Jowhar's substandard urban planning and development. This further marginalizes an already vulnerable population, highlighting the need for more inclusive and equitable urban planning to address the displaced community's specific housing and infrastructure needs."

P6, Jowhar

"IDPs need decent housing and a job. They will build the rest by themselves with these foundations."

P11, Jowhar

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09

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10

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62. P18.
63. P3, P8, P9, P17.
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111. P21.
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113. P20, P21.
114. P13, P20, P21, P13, P36.
115. P18.
116. P21.
117. P12.
118. P13.
119. P20.
120. P37, P44.
121. P1, P3, P9, P14, P46.
122. P8, P29, P31.
123. P21.
124. P20, P21.
125. P13.
126. P12, P13.
127. P1, P3, P18, P19, P27.
128. P9, P14, P18.
129. P20, P21.
130. P37.
131. P44.
132. P40, P41.
133. P44, P45, P42.
134. P14.
135. P1, P3, P5 P9 P18, P19, P27, P29, P31, P37, P40, P41, P46.
136. P28.
137. P2, P10, P12, P13, P23, P26, P35.
138. P2, P10, P13, P23, P26.
139. P10, P23, P35, P36.
140. P32, P33.
141. P13.
142. P12.
143. P4, P12, P23, P44, P10, P39.
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145. P29, P27.
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147. P32, P33.
148. P2, P12, P13, P23, P26, P35.
149. P4.
150. P10, P15, P24, P36.
151. P2, P23.
152. P36, P44.
153. P24, P36.
154. P2, P21, P23, P26.
155. P2, P13, P23, P26.
156. P2, P12, P23, P26.
157. P26, P30, P36, P39, P44.
158. P26, P30, P36.
159. P32, P33.
160. P2, P12, P23, P26.
161. P21, P24.
162. P24, P36.
163. P2, P13, P21, P23.
164. P23, P24.
165. P24, P30, P35, P36, P39.
166. P24.
167. P12, P13, P23, P39.
168. P24.
169. P28, P30, P31, P32.
170. P2, P21.
171. P13, P21, P35.
172. P22.
173. P10, P12, P15, P21, P23, P26.
174. P10, P12, P15, P26, P30.
175. P28, P30.
176. P15.
177. P35, P39.
178. P32, P33.
179. P2, P12, P13, P23, P26, P35.
180. P21, P24.
181. P12, P13, P15, P23, P24, P30, P39.
182. P2, P13, P23, P26.

183. P10, P13, P21, P23.
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189. P12, P21, P35.
190. P23.
191. P2, P21, P23.
192. P21, P23, P35.
193. P6, P20.
194. P10, P4.
195. P20, P22, P33.
196. P17, P22, P25, P38.
197. P9, P10.
198. P9, P37, P40, P46, P41.
199. P3, P8, P14, P29, P5, P37, P41.
200. P11, P17, P32, P38, P45.
201. P17.
202. P17, P4, P22, P33.
203. P4, P16, P33.
204. P17, P42, P20, P33, P34.
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207. P11, P16.
208. P34.
209. P3.
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211. P25, P32.
212. P6, P16, P25, P32, P34.
213. P6.
214. P3, P4.
215. P9, P10.
216. P7.
217. P9, P10.
218. P7, P10.
219. P7.
220. P6.
221. P6.
222. P44.
223. P5, P33.
224. P10, P9
225. 227 - P1
226. P7, P16, P32.
227. P6, P7, P10, P8.
228. P10.
229. P10, P9.
230. P1.
231. P2.
232. P6.
233. P6.
234. P1, P6.
235. P11.
236. P10.
237. P6, P7, P38, P43.
238. P25, P32, P34.
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240. P10.
241. P9, P10, P1.
242. P6, P7.
243. FGD Long Term.
244. FGD New Arrival, FGD Long term, P10, P3, P4.
245. P20, P22, P34.
246. P1, P2.
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252. P9.
253. P9.
254. P7, P9, P10, P1.
255. P7, P22, P25, P32, P33, P42, P43, P45.
256. P20, P22.
257. P6, P7, P16, P17, P32, P33.
258. P6, P20, P22, P25, P34, P17.
259. FGD17.
260. P6, P22, P33, P34.
261. P7, P9.
262. P1, P44.
263. P17, P33, P34.
264. FGD Long Term.
265. P6, P11, P16, P17, P32, P34, P38, P45.

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