



**END-TERM PROGRAMME EVALUATION OF THE  
KABUL STRENGTHENING MUNICIPAL NAHIAS  
PROGRAMME (KSMNP)  
2016-2020**

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March 2021



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# ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<b>ALASP</b>	Afghanistan Land Administration System Project (World Bank-funded)
<b>ANDP</b>	Afghanistan National Development Strategy
<b>ANPDF</b>	Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework
<b>AoC</b>	Agreement of Cooperation
<b>APIS</b>	Afghanistan Property Information System
<b>ARAZI</b>	Afghan Land Authority
<b>ASGP</b>	Afghanistan Sub-National Governance Programme (2006-2015)
<b>BIC</b>	Beneficiary Identification Committee
<b>CBMSP</b>	Community-Based Municipal Support Programme
<b>CBMSP</b>	Community Based Municipal Support Programme
<b>CDC</b>	Community Development Council
<b>CFA</b>	City For All
<b>CIP</b>	Capital Investment Plan
<b>CLUIP</b>	Community-led Urban Infrastructure Programme
<b>CO</b>	Country Office
<b>COP</b>	Chief of Party
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>FGD</b>	Focus Group Discussion
<b>GA</b>	Gozar Assembly
<b>GDMA</b>	General Directorate of Municipal Affairs
<b>GIS</b>	Geographic Information System
<b>GoIRA</b>	Government of Afghanistan
<b>GPS</b>	Global Positioning System
<b>HLP-TF</b>	Housing, Land and Property Rights Task Force
<b>HRBA</b>	Human Rights Based Approach
<b>IDLG</b>	Directorate of Local Government
<b>IDP</b>	Internally Displaced Persons
<b>IT</b>	Information Technology
<b>KCI</b>	Kabul City Initiative
<b>KII</b>	Key Informant Interview
<b>KM</b>	Kabul Municipality
<b>KMDP</b>	Kabul Municipality Development Project
<b>KSMNP</b>	Kabul Strengthening Municipal Nahias Programme
<b>KSP</b>	Kabul Solidarity Programme
<b>KURP</b>	Kabul Urban Reconstruction Programme
<b>LARA</b>	Land Reform in Afghanistan
<b>LED</b>	Local Economic Development
<b>LTERA</b>	Land Titling and Economic Restructuring Activity
<b>LVZ</b>	Land Value Zoning
<b>MGSP</b>	Municipal Governance Support Programme
<b>MoE</b>	Ministry of Economy
<b>MOF</b>	Afghanistan Ministry of Finance
<b>MoI</b>	Ministry of Interior
<b>MUDA</b>	Ministry of Urban Development Affairs
<b>MUDL</b>	Ministry of Urban Development and Land



<b>NCE</b>	No Cost Extension
<b>NUG</b>	National Unity Government
<b>OC</b>	Occupancy Certificate
<b>OoP</b>	Office of the President
<b>PIU</b>	Programme Implementation Unit
<b>PPE</b>	Personal Protective Equipment
<b>PRUIS</b>	Property Registration for Urban Informal Settlements
<b>PSEA</b>	Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
<b>RAMP-UP</b>	Regional Afghan Municipalities Programme for Urban Populations
<b>ROAP</b>	UN-Habitat Regional Office of Asia and Pacific
<b>RSR</b>	Afghanistan Realising Self Reliance Framework
<b>SDG</b>	Sustainable Development Goal
<b>SHAHAR</b>	Strong Hubs for Afghan Hope and Resilience
<b>SMAP</b>	Strategic Municipal Action Plan
<b>SMIS</b>	Safayi Management Information System
<b>SNAP</b>	Strategic Nahia Action Plan
<b>SOP</b>	Standard Operating Procedure
<b>TA</b>	Technical Assistance
<b>TOC</b>	Theory of Change
<b>UNEG</b>	United Nations Evaluation Group
<b>UN-Habitat</b>	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
<b>U-NPP</b>	Afghanistan Urban National Priority Programme
<b>USAID</b>	United States Agency for International Development

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## OVERVIEW OF THE EVALUATED PROGRAMME

This end-term evaluation assessed the Kabul Strengthening Municipal Nahias Programme (KSMNP) 2016-2020 that was implemented in 20 Nahias of Kabul municipality, under the umbrella City for All (CFA) programme. CFA is a flagship action of the Government of Afghanistan's Urban National Priority Programme 2016-2025 (U-NPP), the government's reform agenda for the urban sector. The KSMNP was implemented by UN-Habitat Country Office in Afghanistan, in coordination with the UN-Habitat Regional Office of Asia and Pacific (ROAP), during the period of January 2016-March 2020. It was funded by USAID with a total budget of US\$30,178,457.

The overall objective was to improve stability and stimulate local economic development in Kabul city through enhancing municipal governance and strengthening the social contract between citizens and the state. The specific objective of the project was to improve tenure security, land management and administration for inclusive urban economic growth and service delivery in Kabul city.

The expected results were the following:

- **R1:** Strengthened municipal capacities and systems for urban planning, land management and municipal revenue/finance;
- **R2:** Improved municipal service delivery and strengthened 'social contract' between citizens and municipal authorities;
- **R3:** Improved enabling environment for urban land management and administration, municipal governance, local economic development, and service delivery.

The programme was implemented using an innovative three-pronged approach, which had the following components:

### Component 1: Land Management, Land Rights and Responsibilities

Under this component, the programme was to support Kabul municipality to survey and register all properties. This would improve land management, increase security and reduce land grabbing, and expand the municipal tax base. Aligned with the land survey, the project was to address street addressing, house numbering, and street lighting. With property registration, safayi certificates would be issued by the municipality once the property occupant paid annual safayi tax. The focus was to improve land tenure security for 2.9 million people and municipal capacities for revenue collection.

### Component 2: Strategic Urban Planning

This component was to guide investments and establish a common vision for inclusive and prosperous urban future. At city level, the programme would promote local economic development (LED) to stimulate investment, and expand inclusive service delivery. The process was to be driven by local stakeholders. The planning was to be followed up with financing of sub-projects. The programme was to provide performance block grants for infrastructure at the Nahia level once certain thresholds of tax collection were met. Such subprogrammes would act as a catalyst towards implementation of the strategic plans; build the capacity in municipal finance, engineering, planning, design, implementation, monitoring; and act as incentive to motivate the collection of safayi.

### Component 3: Municipal Governance and Citizen Engagement

This component was to address central capacity development and reforms. The programme was to provide technical support to central level government authorities, including the Afghan Land Authority (ARAZI), the Ministry of Urban Development Affairs (MUDA) and Kabul Municipality to improve relevant national policies, legislation, regulations, and guidelines.

The implementation pursued a People's Process approach, which was to place the people of Kabul at the centre of the development process. It also applied a phased approach, involving key stakeholders in the identification of local problems and learning by doing. The programme intended to integrate issues of climate change, gender, human rights, and youth.

The programme was designed with an evaluation framework of mid-term and final evaluation. The mid-term evaluation was conducted in the first quarter of 2019. Its results were positive as the programme has achieved most of its targets as of December 2018. However, there were some issues that needed to be addressed and the evaluation provided 14 recommendations for improving the programme implementation for the remaining period.

### EVALUATION PURPOSE, OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE

This final evaluation was mandated by the donor, USAID, and was undertaken in-line with UN-Habitat Evaluation Policy (2013) and the Revised UN-Habitat Evaluation Framework (2016) which requires that programmes and projects of over USD1 million should be evaluated by external consultants by the end of the intervention. It was conducted of international consultant (lead), Mr. Charles Schulze and national consultant, Mr. Shakirullah Shakir. It took place between December 2020 and January 2021.

The evaluation covered the implementation period of the programme, from April 2016 to March 2020 and was designed to be both summative and formative, serving purposes of accountability and enhancing learning. It reports on the theory of change, results achieved and the way they were achieved. The target audience for the evaluation findings includes USAID, UN-Habitat, Ministry of Urban Development Affairs (MUDA), Kabul Municipality, Afghan Land Authority (ARAZI), Independent Directorate of Local Government (IDLG), the General Directorate of Municipal Affairs (GDMA) and Afghanistan Ministry of Finance (MOF).

The Terms of Reference (TOR) for the evaluation (Annex 1), specified the evaluation objectives as:

- **Assess the performance of the programme in terms the extent to which it achieved planned results at the expected accomplishment (outcome) and output levels;**
- **Assess the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability, impact and coherence of the programme;**
- **Assess the planning and implementation modalities, including working arrangements and how they may have affected the effectiveness of the programme;**
- **Assess how cross-cutting issues of gender equality, youth and human rights, and climate change integrated in the programme; and**
- **Identify lessons and propose recommendations for future programming of such programmes.**

To achieve these Objectives, the evaluation undertook to answer the following key, overarching, evaluation questions<sup>1</sup>:

- 1. To what extent the programme achieved its planned results at output and outcome level?**
- 2. To what extent were implementation modalities, collaboration, and coordination among key stakeholders appropriate?**
- 3. What were the critical gaps in respect to delivery of the programme?**
- 4. What were the lessons learned, good practices, innovation efforts and recommendations for future programming?**

## EVALUATION APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

The evaluation was conducted in line with the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) Norms and Standards. The underlying logic of the programme was carefully assessed using the original Theory of Change (TOC), which was contextualised based on the evidence and theories developed by Hernando De Soto in the *Mystery of Capital* (2001). In summary, De Soto provided substantial evidence that improved economic outcomes could be achieved for developing countries through six key effects of formal property systems. The reconstructed TOC and De Soto's six effects of formal property were used to map different components of the results-chain to show how the programme was supposed to work to achieve its planned results, and whether programme performance did, indeed, correspond to these expectations.

The evaluation also applied participatory and utilisation approaches, through qualitative interactions with key stakeholders and beneficiaries, whose perceptions of the programme were documented and integrated throughout the report. A mixed methods approach was employed to collect both qualitative and quantitative data, thus facilitating triangulation. Mixed methods support effective data collection on both easily measurable outcomes and impacts as well as in abstract investigation of beliefs and attitudes. These two levels of analysis provide a rigorous combination of descriptive and explanatory power. The following tools were used in the process:

### Tool

Client Data Review

Key Informant Interviews (KII) and Focus Group Discussions (FGD) with USAID

KII/FGD with UN-Habitat & Implementing Partners

KII/FGD with Government (including MUDA, KM, ARAZI)

KII/FGD with Beneficiaries and Community Members

Given that the quantitative values for the project's Log-frame indicators had already been established by an Impact Survey conducted for UN-Habitat, which achieved a high degree of representativeness, little attention was devoted to establishing quantitative values for key indicators, with most effort dedicated to understanding the reasons, factors, and issues underpinning programmatic performance.

<sup>1</sup> The more comprehensive list of evaluation questions was enumerated within the Inception Report. They have also been included at the beginning of each of the analysis sections for ease of reference.

## LIMITATIONS

The evaluation faced a number of challenges at the outset, such as ongoing security and safety challenges and the complex working environment, which were exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. The evaluation took great care to mitigate any resulting limitations through the evaluation design and implementation. Nonetheless, Table 1 lists several limitations, which must be noted.

**Table 1: Programme Overview**

### Focus on qualitative data and analysis

This evaluation was designed to be complementary to the Impact Survey commissioned by UN-Habitat and conducted in March 2020. This Survey focused on quantitative metrics and achieved a high degree of representativeness. As such, the present evaluation has sought to build on the findings of the Impact Survey, and complemented these through a more in-depth exploration of qualitative measures of the Programme, with a particular focus on teasing apart the underlying reasons for the progress (or lack thereof) on Program Indicators, Outputs and Outcomes.

### Turnover of local authorities

Local authorities, with whom the client has endeavoured to liaise, have changed multiple times in the period of the project. Consequently, it was challenging to reach relevant stakeholders with insight into all phases of the project. The consultants worked closely with the client to ensure appropriate coverage of old and new municipal administrations.

### Mobile or difficult to contact beneficiary populations

Beneficiary populations may be mobile or may simply have changed contact numbers or addresses during project implementation, making tracking down beneficiaries a substantial challenge. The consultant worked closely with the project team to mitigate such challenges.

### Self-reported Data and Stakeholder recall or knowledge

The primary data relied (to a certain extent) on retrospective self-reported data. It is possible that participants did not recall events completely accurately and/or may have felt pressured to give responses that they deemed to be socially or (in the case of staff) professionally desirable. Alternatively, given the complexity and diversity of the situation in Kabul, it can be the case that beneficiaries do not recall one specific support they received, or one specific action undertaken at the municipal level which makes it challenging to tease out what UN-Habitat's programming (and more specifically those elements of delivery funded by USAID) impacts might have been, or to extract relevant and targeted insights for the evaluation. The consultant worked closely with the client to mitigate this challenge, without causing undue influence or bias in the data collection process. Analysis also undertook to account for any biases that may emerge from such self-reporting.

### Need for flexibility and pragmatism, responding to unforeseen challenges

In contexts such as Afghanistan, there will always arise unforeseen challenges and opportunities. This necessitated a flexible, and pragmatic approach to data collection and analysis. The consultant worked closely with in-country stakeholders to meet these challenges and take advantage of opportunities. The international consultant did not manage the entire evaluation in Kabul, posing substantial challenges to the evaluation process. However, the consultant dedicated substantial energy toward working closely with the national consultant to mitigate relevant challenges.

### Constrained timelines and resources

As with any such research exercise, resources available to explore these challenging, nuanced, and complex themes are limited; and the degree to which such exercises can achieve complete understanding of any such topic is itself limited. When this situation is compounded by issues in access and communications, research becomes even more challenging. The team worked to ensure strongest-possible outcomes within the available time and resources.

### Client staff time and availability

In-country research/evaluation activity is one of myriad competing requirements for country offices; multiple assessments, evaluations, and strategic activities all compete for the time of in-country teams, requiring careful scheduling and limiting the support they can offer. The consultants worked closely with the country office to secure required data, striking a careful balance of tenacity, persistence, and patience to achieve the required outcomes of this assignment.

### Challenging and complex subjects of investigation

The topics in focus of this study are difficult to measure, document, and describe; this can be particularly challenging when investigating subjects like democracy, good governance, quality of life, accountability, etc. These are challenging concepts to communicate across languages and cultures and can at times be subject to different interpretations and different focuses across each. The team took these challenges into consideration when designing the tools employed for data collection to ensure participants can identify and understand clearly the questions and topics discussed.

### General limitations of social research

The mixed methodological approach adopted for this survey sought to address many of the inherent limitations of social research; nonetheless, it is rarely possible to achieve a completely true and accurate understanding of any context being researched, particularly when faced with the myriad cultural and language challenges this assignment had to contend with. So long as such challenges are borne clearly in mind when reading the final report, the multiple sources, discussions, and findings included therein can provide a strong indication of the current state of those areas being researched.

### Attribution challenges

Many of the quantitative indicators have shown shifts or changes that appear to be rather impressive; however, given the rather complex project environment, and the lack of counterfactual or control evidence on which to base analyses, conclusively substantiating attribution of change to UN-Habitat's intervention was difficult. The consultant worked to collect what evidence was available, as well as delve into qualitative data and analyses, hopefully resulting in some mitigation of this challenge.

## MAIN FINDINGS

Many of the key performance indicators were met<sup>2</sup> and it appears that the three targeted results were **partially achieved**. **Programme performance has been excellent in terms of the achievement of key indicators**, but a deeper analysis indicates that these do not fully capture the achievement of the Results. Please refer to Tables 2 and 3 for further details.

**Table 2: Overview of the achievement of the three Results and associated Indicators**

Expected Result	Indicators of Achievement	Target	Actual Achievement	Indicator Achievement	Results Achievement Appraisal
<b>Strengthened municipal capacities and systems for urban planning, land management and municipal revenue/finance</b>	1.1: "No. properties surveyed and registered"	426,273	430,077	Achieved	All but one of the indicators were met, suggesting that the programme made substantial progress towards the achievement of the Expected Result. However, a deeper analysis of the theory of change reveals a number of disconnects between Outputs and Results. Consequently, an integrated appraisal of the achievement of this Expected Result suggests that it was Partially Achieved.  Specifically, KII and FGDs indicated that there are some gaps in municipal capacities for urban planning, land management, and municipal revenue/finance. Specifically, these gaps pertain to:  I. technical skills for ongoing GIS, IT and data management; II. skills and systems for inclusive service delivery; III. skills for continued community consultation in informal settlements at the nahia level; IV. skills for revenue/financial management and resource allocation, including transparent monitoring and reporting; V. skills for improved land management, including for systematic issuing of OCs and dispute resolution; VI. internal capacity to identify capacity gaps and promote relevant capacity development; and VII. technical capacity to develop key regulatory instruments and to ensure these are reflected by law and enforceable.
	1.2: "% of surveyed properties issued with Safayi invoices"	377,911 <sup>3</sup>	363,386		
	1.3: "No. Nahia Profiles/ SNAP prepared in an Afghan-led and participatory manner, disseminated to citizens, and used by local authorities for annual planning and budgeting in target cities"	20 Nahia plans	20 Nahia Plans		
	1.4: "Number of properties issued with occupancy certificates"	13,882	14,894		

<sup>2</sup> It should be noted here that several of these Indicators were revised between programme Inception and Completion, and the programme was granted a NCE.

<sup>3</sup> Note that 26,549 properties were safayi-exempt and 25,617 properties had private cleaning arrangements and, therefore, were safayi-exempt.

<b>Improved municipal service delivery and strengthened social contract between citizens and municipal authorities</b>	2.1: "No. men, women and children reached through municipality-delivered service delivery projects in target Nahias"	3.2 million <sup>4</sup>	4.2 million	Achieved	All of the indicators targets were exceeded, indicating that municipal service delivery was improved, including through Gozar sub-projects. Moreover, KIs and FGDs with beneficiaries and community members indicated their satisfaction with Gozar Assemblies and Gozar sub-projects.
	2.2: "No. men, women and children reached through Gozar sub-projects in line with SMAPs and CIPs"	495,000	540,000 <sup>5</sup>		However, participants of this evaluation as well as the Impact Survey conducted on behalf of UN-Habitat previously reported that the delivery of some services (particularly waste collection, sewage collection, water supply, green areas, and drainage systems) remained poor. Interactions with these stakeholders suggested that community trust in the government, and therefore the 'social contract', remains weak, at present. Consequently, the Expected Result has been assessed to have been Partially Achieved.
	2.3: "Number of democratically elected Gozar Assemblies established and integrated with the Municipal/Nahia governance system"	386 Gozar Assemblies (50% women and girls)	475		

4 15/20 districts x 475 gozars x 1,200 pax x 7.5 pax per household.



5 55 gozars x 1,200 pax x 7.5 pax per household



Improved enabling environment for municipal governance, local economic development and service delivery	<p>3.1: "% urban properties/land parcels in target cities incorporated into ARAZI national 'cadastre' system"</p> <p>3.2: "No. policies, guidelines and tools prepared by central authorities, disseminated to and used by municipalities and stakeholders, and enforced/monitored by central authorities"</p>	<p>50% properties</p> <p>2 Revised Safayi Guidelines</p> <p>Land certification guidelines/ regulation</p>	<p>116%</p> <p>4</p>	Achieved	<p>Despite the good achievement of Indicators, which are likely to have contributed to the achievement of an improved enabling environment, many of the fundamental challenges faced throughout the course of this programme have been associated with the poor enabling environment. More specifically, the legislative architecture underpinning the achievement of an improved enabling environment (e.g. OC Regulation, Safayi Regulation, Informal Settlements Upgrading Policy, Policy on the Management of Vacant Plots) remains nascent, with many of these regulations and policies either not yet passed or not fully implemented. As such, this Expected Result has been Partially Achieved.</p>
<p>3.3: Number of staff at ARAZI, KM, MUDA and DMM tasked in producing, reviewing, supervising, monitoring or approving property surveys, occupancy certificates, SNAPs, sub-projects or safayi invoicing under the programme</p>	<p>Property surveys: 22</p> <p>Occupancy certificates: 38</p> <p>Street addressing: 6</p> <p>Sub projects: 25</p> <p>Safayi process: 113</p>				

As mentioned in Table 2, many of the higher-level Results and Objectives of the programme may still need further consolidation if they are to be secured and sustained in the longer term. In part, this is a consequence of the original TOC, which provided a very high-level overview of the steps to be undertaken in order to achieve the programme Objective. However, this meant that several intermediate steps were omitted or insufficiently elaborated. The programme would therefore have benefited from a more detailed roadmap to elucidate the intermediate steps and enabling conditions required to bridge the gap between the outstanding inputs and outputs to the higher-level results and objectives.

**Table 3: Key Findings of the Evaluation relative to the Evaluation Criteria and Key Evaluation Questions**

	Criterion	Rating	Justification
<b>Relevance</b>		<b>Satisfactory</b>	The programme appears to have been broadly aligned with the needs and priorities of key stakeholders, including beneficiaries, the Government of Afghanistan and Kabul Municipalities, the donor (USAID) and the implementing agency (UN-Habitat).
	<i>To what extent was the programme relevant to the needs and priorities of defined stakeholders of USAID, Govt of Afghanistan and UN-Habitat?</i>		Based on programme documentation, publicly stated priorities and interactions with the defined stakeholders, the program was highly relevant to their needs and priorities.
	<i>To what extent was the programme aligned with relevant development strategies of Kabul municipality, nahias and communities?</i>		By promoting improved municipal governance, urban planning, and citizen engagement, the program contributed directly to the achievement of relevant strategies of Kabul municipality, such as the Sub-National Governance Policy. Through the establishment of Gozar Assemblies, the program helped to empower communities to engage in decision-making; to identify, plan and implement community-led projects that had a tangible benefit to the community.
	<i>What was UN-Habitat's comparative advantage in implementation of KSMNP compared with other UN entities and key partners?</i>		UN-Habitat has extensive prior experience of implementing sector-specific development programmes in Afghanistan. As a result of this longstanding engagement, UN Habitat has a deep understanding of the governance system, with the unique ability to implement the program in a way that mobilized and strengthened local resources. Moreover, primary evaluation data suggests that UN-Habitat has gained the trust of the government and the people of Kabul.
<b>Effectiveness</b>		<b>Partially Satisfactory</b>	The programme appears to have been effective at achieving or exceeding its key performance indicators. However, the programme could have been more effective in achieving its Outcomes and strategic objective of improved tenure security, land management and administration for inclusive urban economic growth and services. The programme was, in part, constrained by external factors outside of its control. However, effectiveness may also have been limited by the programme logic, which relied heavily on a number of critical assumptions - some of which were not met – and a number of incomplete causal linkages.
	<i>To what extent did the programme achieve its targeted results (EAs) and how did UN-Habitat contribute towards these?</i>		Many of the key performance indicators were met and it appears that the three targeted results were partly achieved. UN-Habitat appears to have built on its sectoral and in-country expertise to facilitate and guide the progress made towards the programme's targeted results. Many stakeholder interactions of this evaluation have explicitly highlighted the invaluable role UN-Habitat has played.

*What evidence is there that what was achieved contributed to the strategic objective of improved tenure security, land management and administration for inclusive urban economic growth and service in Kabul city?*

The progress to date has been very positive in terms to laying the foundations for future programming towards the achievement of the strategic objective. In this context, the survey and registration of nearly half a million properties is a historic result and a crucial first step. Other important milestones include:

- Safayi booklets and Occupancy Certificates provide an important steppingstone towards improved tenure security.
- The Safayi revenue system contributes to municipal income, which can be allocated to support inclusive urban economic growth and services.
- The SMAP, SNAPs and CIPs create the basis for evidence-based land management, administration and infrastructure development.

However, some causal linkages in the theory of change may need to be elaborated in a detailed and time-bound roadmap in order to capitalize on the progress made to date and map out the critical steps towards achieving the objective.

*To what extent was the Kabul municipal capacity strengthened through the programme?*

Implemented through government counterparts, this programme was Afghan-led. Embedded technical assistance in the form of PIUs appears to have been an innovative and effective way of building the capacity of Kabul municipality through 'learning-by-doing'. The fact that programme units continue their work in land management and administration under ARAZI and Kabul municipality is a testament to the success of this approach. However, substantial capacity gaps remain, as evidenced by the challenges encountered during the street addressing component.

*How effectively did the programme measure and report on its achieved results?*

The programme reports and data were effective and clear. The programme appears to have used relatively effective measures of progress at Activity and Output level. Measuring results at Outcome level appears to have been more challenging, partly due to the qualitative nature of these objectives. It is not entirely evident that the key performance indicators fully measure the achievement of the three Results, although they do measure certain aspects thereof.

**Efficiency**



**Partially Satisfactory**

Activities and outputs were largely delivered in a timely manner (with notable exceptions such as street addressing). However, the programme was granted an NCE and several Indicator targets were revised downwards during implementation. The management structure and implementation through PIUs appears to have supported efficiency, particularly in terms of UN-Habitat's technical assistance for the development of capacity within the partner departments of the GoIRA

*How efficiently were the inputs (financial and human resources), partnerships, policies and implementations strategies used to achieve the planned outputs?*

By leveraging domestic resources and pursuing an Afghan-led approach, the programme was able to deliver a number of Outputs in an efficient manner. Conversely, this approach also introduced a number of inefficiencies in terms of delays, unplanned expenses and unexpected activities. This resulted in an NCE, as well as the downwards revision of Indicator targets.

*To what extent did the management structure of the programme support efficiency for programme implementation?*

The management structure of the programme built on existing coordination mechanisms. By leveraging domestic capacities and working with MGSP under the CFA umbrella, KSMNP was able to achieve economies of scale and expand its impact. The dual management structure working through government may have caused some inefficiencies, but this approach appears to have been both necessary and appropriate for such an ambitious multi-stakeholder programme.

*Were activities and outputs delivered in a cost-efficient and timely manner? Specifically, what was the cost efficiency of UN-Habitat's technical assistance for the development of capacity within the partner departments of GoIRA?*

There were some notable delays, but the majority have been resolved. However, this evaluation cannot justifiably assess the cost-efficiency of UN-Habitat's technical assistance for capacity development with government counterparts. Whilst substantial financial and human resources, and time, was devoted to capacity building, it was beyond the scope of this evaluation to conduct a rigorous capacity assessment relative to inputs.

Impact



**Satisfactory**

The programme appears to have had a largely positive impact, particularly with regards to the property registration, strategic urban planning, community projects and leadership, and municipal governance capacity. There appear to have been no unintended negative effects of the programme. However, the programme's impact could be enhanced by strengthening the regulatory framework for tenure security and settlement regularization, improving municipal service delivery, and a stronger emphasis on creating enabling conditions for LED.

*What positive changes have occurred as a result of the programme?*

KSMNP appears to have resulted in a number of positive changes. Most notably, the completion of a citywide survey and registration has expanded the tax base, created the baseline for strategic urban planning, contributed to tenure security and strengthened domestic capacities. These changes may generate further benefits in future.


*What were unintended effects, if any, of the programme?*

This evaluation did not find evidence of significant unintended effects of the programme. However, a number of contractual obligations were not met due to donor funding cuts, which may dilute the very positive contributions of the programme to increase trust of the programme amongst government and communities, and between the government and local communities.

*How did the programme influence the work of the Kabul municipality and nahias?*



The programme had a largely positive influence on the work of Kabul municipality and nahias by improving capacities for survey design and implementation, revenue mobilization and improved accountability.

Sustainability



**Partially Satisfactory**

Substantial efforts were made to ensure the sustainability of programme results. As a result, some of the Outputs may be sustainable, such as the survey documentation and infrastructure developments. However, the sustainability of other aspects of the programme, including revenue generation and land tenure, remains uncertain. Capacity was developed for sustainability, but considerable capacity gaps remain, particularly in context of the rapid turnover of municipal staff and administrations.

<p><i>Were the results achieved sustainable?</i></p>	<p>Some of the results achieved are likely to be sustainable. For example, the survey maps and property registry will continue to exist to inform urban development. It is possible that tangible results, like SNAPs, provide communities with the tools to hold their government accountable through the fora of the Gozar Assemblies. However, the sustainability of other aspects of the programme, such as enhanced municipal revenue, remain uncertain and may require further strengthening.</p>
<p><i>To what extent was Kabul municipal capacity developed in order to ensure sustainability of the results and benefits achieved?</i></p>	<p>Kabul municipality capacity was developed significantly, and some government stakeholders expressed confidence in the new capacities to sustain and scale the program approach and results. However, the government's capacity to sustain these results appears to be one of the biggest sources of concern for community members, implementing agency, and donor representatives alike, as well as government stakeholders themselves.</p>
<p><i>What accountability and oversight systems were established to secure the benefits from the programme?</i></p>	<p>A comprehensive set of accountability and oversight systems were established in the hopes of securing benefits from KSMNP. These included an independent oversight mechanism, a as well as a Dispute Resolution and Anti-Corruption mechanism. In addition, programme activities sought to improve accountability, including through improved safayi systems and oversight mechanisms and community oversight.</p>
<p><b>Coherence</b></p>  <p><b>Satisfactory</b></p>	<p>The programme appears to be coherent and implemented in synergy with other municipality finance and capacity building programmes, including the donor-funded MGSP, ALASP, KMDP and SHAHAR, as well as the Afghanistan Urban-National Priority Programme. It added value and avoided duplication of effort with these complementary interventions.</p>
<p><i>Was the programme coherent and implemented in synergy with other municipality finance and capacity building programmes?</i></p>	<p>The programme was coherent and implemented in synergy with numerous relevant interventions, such as the Afghanistan U-NPP. It was designed to complement and reinforce the achievement of the objectives of other municipality finance and capacity building programmes.</p>
<p><i>Was the programme coherent or complementary other donors' development interventions?</i></p>	<p>KSMNP dovetailed with other donors' development interventions. It was implemented in concert with the EU-funded MGSP, and several interventions funded by the World Bank and other donors.</p>
<p><b>Social Inclusion</b></p>  <p><b>Partially Satisfactory</b></p>	<p>The programme, by design, sought to integrate the needs of different groups and promote social inclusion. However, it appears to have been difficult to fully realise these intentions during implementation.</p>
<p><i>To what extent were the social inclusion issues of gender, human rights, climate and youth considerations integrated in programme design, implementation, monitoring and reporting on the programme?</i></p>	<p>Human rights were an underlying consideration across the program. Gender considerations were incorporated into planning, but male-dominated community workshops and municipal nahia offices limited the focus on women during implementation. Youth were given some opportunities to engage during planning and implementation, and sub-projects were also beneficial for youth. Climate appears to have been considered for some relevant aspects of the programme, such as SNAPs and infrastructure development projects.</p>
<p><i>Are there any outstanding examples of how these issues were successfully applied in the programme?</i></p>	<p>The titling of women through occupancy certificates is a remarkable and unprecedented result.</p>

## CONCLUSIONS

KSMNP was an ambitious programme with several positive impacts. In particular, the citywide survey and registration has expanded the tax base, created the baseline for strategic urban planning, contributed to tenure security and contributed to strengthened domestic capacities.

KSMNP has successfully laid the foundations for strategic urban development and local economic development. The most prominent challenges to achieving these objectives pertain to the regulatory frameworks and government capacity to secure and sustain the achieved results.

UN-Habitat appears to have built on its sectoral and in-country expertise to facilitate and guide the progress made towards the programme's targeted results. Many stakeholder interactions of this evaluation have explicitly highlighted the invaluable role UN-Habitat has played.

## LESSONS LEARNED

The following lessons highlight new knowledge and insights that came about as the result of the implementation of programme activities, the interaction between programme stakeholders, the Outputs produced by the programme, and the Outcome and impact of the programme stakeholders and beneficiaries. The lessons are informed by the programme reports as well as novel findings from the primary data collection conducted during the process of this evaluation.

**An integrated approach can achieve remarkable results**

**Community-driven approaches are key to sustainability**

**Bringing together government, nahias and gozars was a positive approach to strategic urban planning**

**The majority of property owners in Kabul support the implementation of community projects by Gozar Assemblies**

**Learning by doing proved to be an effective tool for capacity building**

**Develop a detailed and time-bound roadmap to chart the course of action in detail before implementation**

**Male dominated community workshops and municipal nahia officers resulted in fewer women-focused sub-projects**

**Clarify the legal basis and economic value of tenure documents to unlock their potential**

**Interventions that seek to strengthen the social contract need to monitor citizen and state compliance**

## RECOMMENDATIONS

### **Continuity and Tashkeel for Future Programmes**

**Ensure Service Continuity after Funds End**

### **Continuity Planning between Mayoral Administrations**

**Frame TOCs, and Project Objectives, in a Longer Term Way – Roadmap for Actions**

**Plan Concretely for Inclusion of Women, Youth, and Vulnerable Groups**

**Strengthen and Expand M&E**

**Complete Surveys and OC Issuance**

**Address Issues Surrounding Informal Settlements**

**Build on Street Mapping and Surveying Work**

**Finalise Incomplete Policies and Laws**

**Work to Convert OCs to Ownership Documents**

**Work to Gain Acceptance of OCs, or Whatever Replaces Them, as Enforceable Documents**

**Continue to Strengthen and Empower Gozar Assemblies, Community-based Approaches**

**Increase Focus on Capital- and Economic-focussed Impacts**

**Empower Municipal Advisory Boards**

**Implement the property values assigned through Land Value Zoning**

**Integrate climate considerations as a foundational component of all programming, particularly related to infrastructure**

# 1. INTRODUCTION

Afghanistan is undergoing a wave of urbanization. Kabul, as national capital city, has the highest percentage of urban population in the country and its annual population growth rate is estimated at 10%. In January 2020 it was estimated that about 4.27 million people lived in the city of Kabul. However, the city has expanded without strategic and spatial plans and has limited access to formal land and housing. There is inefficient land use (e.g vacant plots), land grabbing, tenure insecurity, limited well-located plots for housing for middle and low-income households, and undeveloped land-based financing for local urban-based service delivery.

As of 2014, the challenges of urban poverty, unemployment, gender inequality, youth exclusion, and socio-economic marginalization were getting worse. Urban poor households, IDPs, and female headed households continued to be most affected by macro-economic changes. In 2014, the new National Unity Government (NUG) of Afghanistan recognized the transformative role of urbanisation and is prioritizing urbanisation in its 'Self-Reliance' reform agenda, noting that cities should be drivers of economic development, and municipalities and urban development can contribute to national state-building and peace-building objectives.

Since 1992, UN-Habitat has been working in Afghanistan in partnership with communities and the Government. It has provided basic services and worked with the Government of Afghanistan and local authorities, including on policy support and institutional capacity strengthening. The Kabul Strengthening Municipal Nahias Programme (KSMNP) was implemented by the UN-Habitat Country Office in Afghanistan, in coordination with the UN-Habitat Regional Office of Asia and Pacific (ROAP), during the period of January 2016-March 2020. It was funded by USAID with a total budget of US\$30,178,457.

## 1.1 DESCRIPTION OF THE PROGRAMME

The USAID-funded "Kabul Strengthening Municipal Nahias Programme (KSMNP) 2016-2020" was implemented in 20 Nahias of Kabul municipality, under the umbrella City for All (CFA) programme. CFA is a flagship action of the Government of Afghanistan's Urban National Priority Programme 2016-2025 (U-NPP), the government's reform agenda for the urban sector.

The overall objective was to improve stability and stimulate local economic development in Kabul city through enhancing municipal governance and strengthening the social contract between citizens and the state. The specific objective of the project was to improve tenure security, land management and administration for inclusive urban economic growth and service delivery in Kabul city.

The expected results were the following:

- **R1:** Strengthened municipal capacities and systems for urban planning, land management and municipal revenue/finance;
- **R2:** Improved municipal service delivery and strengthened 'social contract' between citizens and municipal authorities;
- **R3:** Improved enabling environment for urban land management and administration, municipal governance, local economic development, and service delivery.

The programme had the following components:

### **Component 1: Land Management, Land Rights and Responsibilities**

Under this component, the programme was to support Kabul municipality to survey and register all properties within Kabul municipality. This would improve land management, increase security and reduce



land grabbing, and expand the municipal tax base. Aligned with the land survey, the project was to address street addressing, house numbering, and street lighting. With property registration, safayi certificates would be issued by the municipality once the property occupant paid annual safayi tax. The focus was on land management to improve land tenure security for 2.9 million people and municipal capacities for revenue collection.

## **Component 2: Strategic Urban Planning**

This component was to guide investments and establish a common vision for inclusive and prosperous urban future. At city level, the programme would promote local economic development (LED) to stimulate investment, and expand inclusive service delivery. The process was to be driven by local stakeholders. The planning was to be followed up with financing of sub-projects. The programme was to provide performance block grants for infrastructure at the Nahia level. Such subprogrammes would act as a catalyst towards implementation of the strategic plans; build the capacity in municipal finance, engineering, planning, design, implementation, monitoring; and act as incentive to motivate the collection of safayi. Such grants were to be provided once certain thresholds of tax collection targets were achieved.

## **Component 3: Municipal Governance and Citizen Engagement**

This component was to address central capacity development and reforms. The programme was to provide technical support to central level government authorities, including the Afghan Land Authority (Arazi), the Ministry of Urban Development Affairs (MUDA) and Kabul Municipality to improve relevant national policies, legislation, regulations, and guidelines.

The implementation of the project included the UN-Habitat's Peoples' Process approach, which was to place the people of Kabul at the centre of the development process. It also applied a gender lens and phased approach, involving key stakeholders in the identification of local problems and learning by doing. The programme intended to integrate cross-cutting issues of climate change, gender, human rights, and the youth.

Key stakeholders in the project included the UN-Habitat Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific (ROAP), Ministry of Urban Development Affairs (MUDA), Kabul Municipality, Afghan Land Authority (ARAZI), Independent Directorate of Local Government (IDLG), the General Directorate of Municipal Affairs (GDMA), Afghanistan Ministry of Finance (MOF); the municipal staff, the Wakili Gozars, other Government actors, and donor community to align their urban investments. The programme was aligned with Afghanistan UNDAF 2015-2019; the UN-Habitat Country Programme of Afghanistan 2015-2019, and UN-Habitat Strategic Plan.

KSMNP was implemented by UN-Habitat Country Office in Afghanistan, in collaboration with all other stakeholders under the following organisational programme management structure:

- The National Programme Management Unit (PMU) is the technical secretariat of this programme. It was comprised of all relevant institutions (ARAZI, KM, MUDA, IDLG), represented by technical-level staff. It was responsible for programme steering, implementation and monitoring and officially met on a quarterly basis to review progress, take corrective action where necessary, and develop reports and inputs for decision making in the national coordination mechanism. These staff were located in the Kabul Municipality main office.
- Nahia Managers, heading Nahia Offices, were responsible for day-to-day programme implementation, with technical assistance from programme staff. Nahia managers will report to the PIU using standard weekly and monthly reporting templates. Provincial Authorities and line departments coordinated with the programme through the Nahia-level activities. They were engaged in the urban strategic planning activities, ensuring their assets and priorities are reflected in the Nahia plan.
- Communities, through the Gozar Assemblies, cooperated with Nahia officials through structured engagement mechanisms (e.g. Nahia meetings, workshops, etc), supported by programme staff. Gozars presented sub-project proposals to them for review and approval.

- UN-Habitat, as the implementing partner, provided dedicated technical assistance at all these levels, including senior international staff supporting the planning and implementation of the national coordination mechanism and PIU meetings, qualified Afghan technical staff embedded in the Nahia office, and experienced community organisers and engineers at Gozar level.

## 1.2 EVALUATION PURPOSE, OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE

The programme was designed with an evaluation framework comprising a mid-term and a final evaluation. The mid-term evaluation was conducted in the first quarter of 2019. Its results were positive, as the programme had achieved most of its targets by December 2018. However, there were some issues that needed to be addressed and the evaluation provided 14 recommendations for improving the programme implementation for the remaining period. By July 2020, nine recommendations had been implemented, and four were in progress. One recommendation was not accepted.

In order to conduct the End-Term Programme Evaluation of the KSMNP 2016-2020, this evaluation sought to:

- **Assess the performance of the programme in terms the extent to which it achieved planned results at the expected accomplishment (outcome) and output levels;**
- **Assess the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability, impact and coherence of the programme;**
- **Assess the planning and implementation modalities, including working arrangements and how they may have affected the effectiveness of the programme;**
- **Assess how cross-cutting issues of gender equality, youth and human rights, and climate change integrated in the programme; and**
- **Identify lessons and propose recommendations for future programming of such programmes.**

To achieve these Objectives, the evaluation undertook to answer the following key, overarching, evaluation questions<sup>1</sup>:

- 1. To what extent the programme achieved its planned results at output and outcome level?**
- 2. To what extent were implementation modalities, collaboration, and coordination among key stakeholders appropriate?**
- 3. What were the critical gaps in respect to delivery of the programme?**
- 4. What were the lessons learned, good practices, innovation efforts and recommendations for future programming?**

6

The more comprehensive list of evaluation questions was enumerated within the Inception Report. They have also been included at the beginning of each of the analysis sections for ease of reference.

## 2. APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

The evaluation was undertaken by an evaluation team consisting of international consultant (lead) Mr. Charles Schulze and national consultant Mr. Shakirullah Shakir. It took place between December 2020 and January 2021.

This section briefly describes the approach and methodology of conducting the evaluation to achieve its objectives as described in the TOR (see Annex 1).

### 2.1 APPROACH

The evaluation was conducted in line with the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) Norms and Standards for evaluation in United Nations System. The underlying logic of the programme was carefully assessed using the reconstructed Theory of Change (TOC), informed by the graphical TOC as conceived during the initial programme design (both have been included in the appendices for reference). The reconstructed TOC reflected the evidence and theories given by Hernando De Soto in the *Mystery of Capital* (2001).

In summary, De Soto provided substantial evidence that improved economic outcomes could be achieved for developing countries through six key effects of formal property systems. The reconstructed TOC and De Soto's six effects of formal property were used to map different components of the results-chain to show how the programme was supposed to work to achieve its planned results, and whether programme performance did, indeed, correspond to these expectations. The evaluation also applied participatory and utilisation approaches, to enhance the utilization of evaluation results and engagement of the stakeholders in the evaluation process.

### 2.2 METHODOLOGICAL STRATEGY AND TOOLS

A mixed methods approach was employed to collect both qualitative and quantitative data. Mixed methods support effective data collection on both easily measurable outcomes and impacts as well as in abstract investigation of beliefs and attitudes. A further advantage of the mixed-methods approach is that quantitative data is often most useful for understanding 'what', while qualitative data often provides a more detailed and nuanced understanding of 'how and why'. (Denscombe, 2010; Hart & et.al, 2007); these two levels of analysis provide a rigorous combination of descriptive and explanatory power.

The evaluation also employed a participatory methodology. This approach undertook to incorporate the views and feedback of key stakeholders at every stage, ensuring relevance, appropriateness, and ownership of both the process and findings of this evaluation.

The instruments collected data across the full range of indicators as described in the project log frame, as well as across the preceding key evaluation questions. Multiple instruments collected data against individual indicators / evaluation questions, engaging in a process of 'triangulation' of findings (Denscombe, 2010; Hart & et.al, 2007).

An overview of the data collection tools is provided below (please see Annex 3 for detailed descriptions of these tools).

Tool
Client Data Review
Key Informant Interviews (KII) and Focus Group Discussions (FGD) with USAID
KII/FGD with UN-Habitat & Implementing Partners
KII/FGD with Government (including MUDA, KM, ARAZI)
KII/FGD with Beneficiaries and Community Members

Given that the quantitative values for the project's Log-frame indicators had already been established by the Impact Survey, little attention was dedicated to establishing quantitative values for key indicators, with most effort dedicated to understanding the reasons, factors, and issues underpinning programmatic performance. Recognizing that the Impact Survey, which was conducted by a national consultant contracted by UN-Habitat in March 2020, sampling 1600 households, had already achieved a high degree of representativeness, and further informed by resource limitations, the sample approach was a purposive and pragmatic one. Specific participants were selected through consultation with UN-Habitat and other key stakeholders during the Inception Phase of this project.

The total respondents per tool have been presented in Table 4.

**Table 4:** Total respondents per tool used in the Evaluation

	Interactions	Participants per Interaction	Total Individuals	
			Male	Female
<b>Donor KII/FGD</b>	1	2	2	
			2	0
<b>Implementing Agency &amp; Partner KII/FGD</b>	7	1-3	8	
			7	2
<b>Government KII/FGD</b>	10	1-2	11	
			10	1
<b>Beneficiary &amp; Community Member KII/FGD</b>	16	3-9	97	
			94	0
<b>SUM TOTAL RESPONDENTS:</b>			<b>118</b>	
			<b>115</b>	<b>3<sup>7</sup></b>

## 2.3 CROSS-CUTTING CONSIDERATIONS

Issues of vulnerability were appropriately considered throughout all stages of the evaluation. Vulnerability is a multidimensional concept, but in this review, persons were defined as vulnerable if they are disadvantaged due to any personal demographic. This could include income, socio-economic status, gender, disability, or belief system. Instruments were designed to be sensitive to considerations of vulnerability whilst also fully aligned with a 'Do No Harm' approach. The evaluation took great care to ensure the inclusion of vulnerable persons and make them feel safe and comfortable during engagements so that they are able to express their views freely and on an equal basis. Data were analysed in a manner sensitive to gender, with data disaggregated by gender and reported as such where appropriate.

PSEA (Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse) measures were also taken to protect vulnerable people from sexual exploitation and abuse. PSEA considerations were fully integrated across the evaluation process (see Annex 5 for a summary of these measures).

### 2.3.1 COVID-19 Safeguarding Protocols

An informed and adaptable approach was undertaken to make adjustments given the pandemic and ensure the safety of all staff and respondents. These measures included an adapted sampling approach and tool adaptation, the use of personal protective equipment (PPE), physical distancing and dedicated staff training. These measures are further detailed in Annex 4.

## 2.4 DATA ANALYSIS STRATEGY

Since most of the quantitative data had already been collected and analysed in the Impact Survey, the majority of relevant quantitative analyses were drawn from that report, particularly as they relate to measures of programme effectiveness. The primary data, once appropriately coded, organised, and validated, was analysed using statistical (primarily descriptive) and non-statistical methods, with the intent of beginning to identify relationships between relevant inputs, activities, practices, structures, and outcomes, as well as key themes in response (Tashakkori & Teddli, 2010, pp. 614-616; Denscombe, 2010, pp. 235-237).

## 2.5 LIMITATIONS

The evaluation faced a number of challenges at the outset, such as ongoing security and safety challenges and the complex working environment, which were exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. The evaluation took great care to mitigate any resulting limitations through the evaluation design and implementation. Nonetheless, Table 5 lists several limitations, which must be noted.

**Table 5:** *Limitations of the evaluation*

### Focus on qualitative data and analysis

This evaluation was designed to be complementary to the Impact Survey commissioned by UN-Habitat and conducted in March 2020. This Survey focused on quantitative metrics and achieved a high degree of representativeness. As such, the present evaluation has built on the findings of the Impact Survey, and complemented these through a more in-depth exploration of qualitative measures of the Programme, with a particular focus on teasing apart the underlying reasons for the progress (or lack thereof) on Program Indicators, Outputs and Outcomes.

### Turnover of local authorities

Local authorities, with whom the client has endeavoured to liaise, have changed multiple times in the period of the project. Consequently, it was challenging to reach relevant stakeholders with insight into all phases of the project. The consultants worked closely with the client to ensure appropriate coverage of old and new municipal administrations.

### Mobile or difficult to contact beneficiary populations

Beneficiary populations may be mobile or may simply have changed contact numbers or addresses during project implementation, making tracking down beneficiaries a substantial challenge. The consultant worked closely with the project team to mitigate such challenges.

### Self-reported Data and Stakeholder recall or knowledge

The primary data relied (to a certain extent) on retrospective self-reported data. It is possible that participants did not recall events completely accurately and/or may have felt pressured to give responses that they deemed to be socially or (in the case of staff) professionally desirable. Alternatively, given the complexity and diversity of the situation in Kabul, it can be the case that beneficiaries do not recall one specific support they received, or one specific action undertaken at the municipal level which makes it challenging to tease out what UN-Habitat's programming (and more specifically those elements of delivery funded by USAID) impacts might have been, or to extract relevant and targeted insights for the evaluation. The consultant worked closely with the client to mitigate this challenge, without causing undue influence or bias in the data collection process. Analysis also undertook to account for any biases that may emerge from such self-reporting.

### Need for flexibility and pragmatism, responding to unforeseen challenges

In contexts such as Afghanistan, there will always arise unforeseen challenges and opportunities. This necessitated a flexible, and pragmatic approach to data collection and analysis. The consultant worked closely with in-country stakeholders to meet these challenges and take advantage of opportunities. The international consultant did not manage the entire evaluation in Kabul, posing substantial challenges to the evaluation process. However, the consultant dedicated substantial energy toward working closely with the national consultant to mitigate relevant challenges.

### Constrained timelines and resources

As with any such research exercise, resources available to explore these challenging, nuanced, and complex themes are limited; and the degree to which such exercises can achieve complete understanding of any such topic is itself limited. When this situation is compounded by issues in access and communications, research becomes even more challenging. The team worked to ensure strongest-possible outcomes within the available time and resources.

### Client staff time and availability

In-country research/evaluation activity is one of myriad competing requirements for country offices; multiple assessments, evaluations, and strategic activities all compete for the time of in-country teams, requiring careful scheduling and limiting the support they can offer. The consultants worked closely with the country office to secure required data, striking a careful balance of tenacity, persistence, and patience to achieve the required outcomes of this assignment.

### Challenging and complex subjects of investigation

The topics in focus of this study are difficult to measure, document, and describe; this can be particularly challenging when investigating subjects like democracy, good governance, quality of life, accountability, etc. These are challenging concepts to communicate across languages and cultures and can at times be subject to different interpretations and different focuses across each. The team took these challenges into consideration when designing the tools employed for data collection to ensure participants can identify and understand clearly the questions and topics discussed.

### General limitations of social research

The mixed methodological approach adopted for this survey sought to address many of the inherent limitations of social research; nonetheless, it is rarely possible to achieve a completely true and accurate understanding of any context being researched, particularly when faced with the myriad cultural and language challenges this assignment had to contend with. So long as such challenges are borne clearly in mind when reading the final report, the multiple sources, discussions, and findings included therein can provide a strong indication of the current state of those areas being researched.

### Attribution challenges

Many of the quantitative indicators have shown shifts or changes that appear to be rather impressive; however, given the rather complex project environment, and the lack of counterfactual or control evidence on which to base analyses, conclusively substantiating attribution of change to UN-Habitat's intervention was difficult. The consultant worked to collect what evidence was available, as well as delve into qualitative data and analyses, hopefully resulting in some mitigation of this challenge.

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# 3. MAIN FINDINGS

## 3.1 ACHIEVEMENT OF EXPECTED RESULTS/OUTCOMES

This section sets out the main findings as they pertain to the achievement of the expected Results and Outcomes. The programme performance was rated using the performance evaluation criteria developed by the KSMNP Programme, as follows;

	Performance is good (Achievement meets or exceeds indicator target)
	Performance is satisfactory (Achievement is 50-99% of indicator target)
	Performance is less than satisfactory (Achievement is 0-49% of indicator target)
	Performance is difficult to determine and/or cannot be determined

**Table 6: Extent of Achievement of Planned Results**

Indicator <sup>8</sup>	Target	Actual Achievement	Evaluators Assessment	Results Statement
<b>Overall Objective</b> To improve stability and stimulate local economic development in Kabul city through enhancing municipal governance and strengthening the social contract between citizens and the state.	Percentage increase in safayi revenues (per nahia)	27% increase <sup>9</sup>	Although revenues increased only marginally, the number of Safayi invoices paid increased by 88% between 2016 and 2019. The average Safayi invoice amount decreased by 33%.	Partially Achieved
	Percentage of projects implemented with contribution from Kabul Municipality	30%	100%	Annex C of Completion Report reports that KM contributed a total of 705,150 USD (14.3% <sup>10</sup> ) of the total spent on nahia projects, with a financial or in-kind contribution of up to 30% in all 22 nahia projects.

<sup>8</sup> Performance is rated against revised programme indicators, as per the revised Programme Document and Completion Report

<sup>9</sup> Between 2016 and 2019

<sup>10</sup> KM contributed 705,150 USD to nahia projects. Total CFA+KM contribution to nahia projects was 4,924,166 USD (705,150 + 4,219,016). Therefore % contribution of KM was (705,150 / 4,924,166) \* 100



<p><b>Specific Objective:</b> To improve tenure security and land management and administration for inclusive urban economic growth and service delivery in Kabul city</p>	<p>Percentage of surveyed properties that have paid annual safayi</p> <p>50%</p>	<p>19.3%<sup>11</sup></p>	<p>Safayi compliance increased from 31% in 2015 to an average of 51% between 2016-2020 (20% increase). However, the impact survey reported that Safayi payment rates decreased in 2019 compared to 2018. 66% of the property owners paid Safayi revenue in 2018. 82,327 property owners (38%) paid Safayi in 2019.</p>	<p>Partially Achieved</p>
<p><b>Expected Result 1</b> Strengthened municipal capacities and systems for urban planning, land management and municipal revenue/finance</p>	<p>Percentage of registered properties issued with occupancy certificates</p> <p>100%</p>	<p>3.3%<sup>12</sup></p>	<p>According to the impact survey, circa 10% of households who had paid Safayi invoices were issued with occupancy certificates. 36% of eligible households (as identified by BICs) was issued with occupancy certificates</p>	<p>Not Achieved</p>
<p>1.1: "No. properties surveyed and registered"</p>	<p>426,273</p>	<p>430,077</p>	<p>Stakeholder interviews indicated that circa 142,000 new properties have not been surveyed yet and the property registry may already require updating as many properties which were initially registered as single properties have now been converted into residential buildings with many flats/apartments.</p>	<p>Achieved</p>
<p>1.2: "No. of surveyed properties issued with Safayi invoices"</p>	<p>377,911<sup>13</sup></p>	<p>363,386</p>	<p></p>	<p>Partially Achieved</p>
<p>1.3: "No. Nahia Profiles/ SNAP prepared in an Afghan-led and participatory manner, disseminated to citizens, and used by local authorities for annual planning and budgeting in target cities"</p>	<p>20 Nahia plans</p>	<p>20 Nahia Plans</p>	<p></p>	<p>Achieved</p>

11 (82327 Safayi invoices paid / 426273 properties surveyed and registered)\*100

12 \*13,882 / 426273) \* 100

13 Note that 26,549 properties were safayi-exempt and 25,617 properties had private cleaning arrangements and, therefore, were safayi-exempt.

	1.4: "Number of properties issued with occupancy certificates"	13,882	14,894	Achieved
<b>Expected Result 2</b> Improved municipal service delivery and strengthened social contract between citizens and municipal authorities	2.1: "No. men, women and children reached through municipality-delivered service delivery projects in target Nahias"	3.2 million <sup>14</sup>	4.2 million	Achieved 22 nahia projects were completed; 7 more than the target. See Annex C of Completion Report.
	2.2: "No. men, women and children reached through Gozar sub-projects in line with SMAPs and CIPs"	495,000 55 Gozar Assemblies 412,500 residents (50% women and girls)	540,000 <sup>15</sup>	Achieved 60 gozar sub-projects were completed; 4 more than the target. See Annex D of Completion Report
	2.3: "Number of democratically elected Gozar Assemblies established and integrated with the Municipal/Nahia governance system"	386 Gozar Assemblies	475	Achieved

14 15/20 districts x 475 gozars x 1,200 pax x 7.5 pax per household.

15 55 gozars x 1,200 pax x 7.5 pax per household

<p><b>Expected Result 3</b> Improved enabling environment for municipal governance, local economic development and service delivery</p>	<p>3.1: "% urban properties/land parcels in target cities incorporated into ARAZI national 'cadastre' system"</p> <p>3.2: "No. policies, guidelines and tools prepared by central authorities, disseminated to and used by municipalities and stakeholders, and enforced/monitored by central authorities"</p> <p>3.3: Number of staff at ARAZI, KM, MJDA and DMM tasked in producing, reviewing, supervising, monitoring or approving property surveys, occupancy certificates, SNAPs, sub-projects or safayi invoicing under the programme</p>	<p>50% properties</p> <p>2 Revised Safayi Guidelines Land certification guidelines/ regulation</p>	<p>116%</p> <p>4</p>	<p>The target was exceeded; 501,035 Kabul property records transferred to ARAZI by KSMNP</p> <p>Achieved</p>
			<p>Property surveys: 22 Occupancy certificates: 38 Street addressing: 6 Sub projects: 25 Safayi process: 113</p>	<p>Achieved</p>

## 3.2 RELEVANCE

This section seeks to assess the extent to which the objective of KSMNP is consistent with and relevant to beneficiaries' requirements, national and local needs, priorities, UN-Habitat and donor policies. It intends to address the following key questions:

- **To what extent was the programme relevant to the needs and priorities of defined stakeholders of USAID, Govt of Afghanistan and UN-Habitat?**
- **To what extent was the programme aligned with relevant development strategies of Kabul municipality and communities (nahias)?**
- **What was UN-Habitat's comparative advantage in implementation of KSMNP compared with other UN entities and key partners?**

### 3.2.1 Relevance to the Needs and Priorities of Key Stakeholders

The programme activities were broadly aligned with the needs and priorities of key stakeholders, as evidenced by the preliminary needs assessment and reinforced by programme documents and discussions with key stakeholders, including:

#### Beneficiaries



Discussions with beneficiaries indicated that the programme was consistent with their needs and priorities. For example, infrastructure sub-projects were deemed highly relevance as they were selected through a community consultative process where communities themselves identified their highest needs and priorities (SWOT Analysis), and subsequently led and managed by development committees at the district- and community-level.

*'The programme was actually designed based on our real needs. Our streets were unpaved and we did not have house numbering. The programme financed construction of streets and installed house numbering. We as beneficiaries are highly satisfied from the programme results that increased the value of our lives.'*

**- COMMUNITY LEADER**

#### Government of Afghanistan



The programme objectives and approach reflects the stated vision of H.E. the President Ghani and the National Unity Government, as outlined in the Realizing Self Reliance Framework (RSR)<sup>16</sup>, which positions **cities as drivers of economic development; making better use of existing resources; increasing local government revenues for service delivery; stimulating local economic development and investment in cities; and fostering a sense of civic responsibility to strengthen the legitimacy of government and state institutions**<sup>17</sup>.

KSMNP is further aligned with the Constitution of Afghanistan and Municipal Law, NPP4 on Local Governance, Sub-National Governance Policy (2010), Afghan National Development Strategy, and the Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework (ANPDF). As Afghanistan undergoes its 'Transformation Decade' (2015-2024), KSMNP supports the government to achieve some of its highest priorities,

16 GoIRA (2014) Realising Self Reliance: Commitments to reforms and a renewed partnership. London Conference, December 2014.

17 Ghani Ahmadzai, A. (2014) Manifesto of Change and Continuity Team. March 2014. [www.ashrafghani.af](http://www.ashrafghani.af)

as stated by government stakeholders, including property registration and growth of domestic revenue. As such, KSMNP was seen as a direct response to the governments' needs and priorities.

Interviewed Government representatives cited the programme as *'One of the most important programme[s] on behalf of beneficiaries'*.

It was further reported that this programme, in particular the land survey, ownership documents, and capacity building components, were requested directly by the Office of the President; such instances of direct requests to UN Agencies by the president's office are exceedingly rare, and further support the view that this programme was highly relevant to the requirements and needs of the government of Afghanistan

**Kabul Municipalities (nahias)**



Interviews with government representatives supported the overall impression that the programme was relevant. It was aligned to the development strategies of the municipality and communities, promoting improved municipal governance, strategic urban planning, and citizen engagement. It was deemed to have contributed to meeting unmet needs and delivering historical results.

For example, the delineation of 536 gozars and establishment of 457 gozar Assemblies contributes directly to the Citizens Charter National Priority Programme which recommended the harmonisation of gozar sites for equitable representation and investment of public resources, as adopted in the GoIRA Sub-National Governance Policy.

**USAID**



The programme was highly relevant to the needs and priorities of USAID. Interviews with stakeholders from USAID Afghanistan particularly highlighted the importance of KSMNP in contributing to initiatives to support Kabul municipality governance. The programme also directly contributes to a number of USAID's publicly stated strategic objectives in Afghanistan, including:

USAID Priority <sup>18</sup>	KSMNP Contribution
<b>Economic Growth</b>	The land/property survey and registration process supported tenure security and asset creation. This created the foundations for local economic development. At the same time, strategic urban plans helped to guide investment.
<b>Infrastructure</b>	On the basis of the survey, registration, taxation and strategic urban planning processes, KSMNP supported infrastructure development and service provision. Underpinned by a Peoples' Process, KSMNP helps to build domestic capacity to secure further infrastructural developments.
<b>Democracy and Governance</b>	By working directly with domestic partners at the national, municipal, district and community level, KSMNP contributed to a stronger social contract, whilst improving the enabling environment for continued Afghan development.
<b>Gender</b>	By titling women for the first time in Afghan history, KSMNP supports women's empowerment and access to opportunities.

18 <https://www.usaid.gov/afghanistan/about-us>

## UN-Habitat



The programme is a core component of UN-Habitat's programming in Afghanistan. It contributes to UN-Habitat's strategic GoIRAls at the global and national level, as well as building on previous programming, complementing ongoing interventions and strengthening the foundations for future work.

Specifically, KSMNP was designed to contribute to the achievement of the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2015-2019 for Afghanistan, and UN-Habitat Afghanistan Strategic Plan (2015-2019).

## Other Key Partners



KSMNP dovetails with the EU-funded Municipal Governance Support Programme (MGSP). MGSP and KSMNP were implemented as one under the umbrella of the Urban National Priority Programme (U-NPP).

### 3.2.2 UN-Habitat's Comparative Advantage

The implementing agency, UN-Habitat, had a comparative advantage in implementation of KSMNP compared with other UN entities and key partners.

UN-Habitat has extensive prior experience of implementing sector-specific development programmes in Afghanistan, including (but not limited to):

- The Community-Based Municipal Support Programme (CBMSP) 2013-2015
- Kabul Solidarity Programme 2011-2014, Land Titling and Economic Restructuring Activity (LTERA) and Land Reform in Afghanistan (LARA) programmes
- Regional Afghan Municipalities Programme for Urban Populations (RAMP-UP) 2010-2013
- Afghanistan Sub-National Governance Programme (ASGP, 2006-2015)
- Kabul Urban Reconstruction Programme (KURP).

KSMNP also builds on and reinforces the results of the MGSP programme, which acted as a 'phase one' roll-out for this programme.

As a result of this longstanding engagement in Afghanistan, UN-Habitat has a deep understanding of the governance system at MUDA and Kabul Municipality, with the ability to implement the programme in a way that mobilized and strengthened local resources.

UN-Habitat drew on its wealth of in-country experience to inform KSMNP. The lessons learned from previous and ongoing interventions were incorporated into the design of the KSMNP (see Table 7).

**Table 7: Lessons Learned from Previous and Ongoing Interventions**

Lessons	Application
<b>Don't focus purely on freehold land titles. Utilise the "continuum of land rights" and focus on de-facto tenure security.</b>	The programme built on the existing system for land surveying to improve safayi taxation. The safayi notebook gives a form of de-facto tenure security by recognising occupancy. In addition, ARAZI has begun issuing 'occupancy certificates', although this process has been delayed by legislative changes and ongoing uncertainties regarding land valuation and the demarcation between public and private land.

<p><b>Strong land management and administration institutions with clear roles and responsibilities are essential; the process requires clear coordination with municipal authorities who should implement the activities.</b></p>	<p>The programme was embedded with key institutions. The Programme Implementation Unit (PIU) facilitated government engagement and ownership. Kabul Municipality was heavily involved with the implementation of activities, although the government capacity to continue these activities will require further strengthening.</p>
<p><b>Link strategic urban planning with finance to ensure plans are implemented. This builds citizen and stakeholder trust in the process and demonstrates state capacity in service delivery through participatory mechanisms.</b></p>	<p>The programme undertook strategic municipal action planning for each Nahia (20 SNAPs were developed). Block grants were provided to co-finance the implementation of 82 strategic infrastructure projects, as identified through the planning process. A total of US\$ 10.4 million, including a combined contribution of US\$ 1.8 million from Kabul municipality and beneficiary communities was invested, including match funding from domestic sources.</p>
<p><b>The land/property survey is relatively straightforward and can be achieved at scale if the political will exists at national and local levels. ARAZI has not been engaged to date which is problematic.</b></p>	<p>The programme worked closely with ARAZI to scale up the land/property survey, ultimately covering circa 80% of all properties in Kabul municipality. Government stakeholders report that the survey is used for urban decision-making. Performance-based, 'matching grants' were implemented to promote political will for programme achievement, although this could be further strengthened.</p>
<p><b>Municipalities significantly lack technical and human capacity to effectively implement land surveying, safayi tax, citizen engagement, and strategic urban planning.</b></p>	<p>Capacity development was a key component of the programme. There were some delays in the implementation of key activities (e.g. launching of nahia and gozar sub-projects, OC issuance), which may be a reflection of the fact that the programme initially overestimated domestic capacities. During the course of the programme, Nahias began sharing information on revenues.</p>
<p><b>Conventional master planning is not the best approach given the fragile and rapidly urbanising context.</b></p>	<p>The land survey created the baseline for the strategic municipal planning process. Strategic urban action plans were participatorily developed to support action-oriented, cost-effective urban development.</p>
<p><b>Corruption in surveying and safayi tax collection is a serious problem. Surveyors have been known to collude with property owners to incorrectly survey and thus reduce safayi tax liability, and safayi has been a significant source of revenue for local officials when not properly recorded, thus resistance to utilizing improved systems.</b></p>	<p>A number of oversight and transparency mechanisms were implemented to reduce corruption. These include the mandatory payment of safayi at the bank and spot checks of survey quality. However, dispute resolution mechanisms may need to be further strengthened. This is evidenced, for example, by the fact that only 27 out of 2019 conflicts and/or claims over the survey results were resolved, as of January 2019.</p>
<p><b>Poor citizen-municipal relations and limited communication hampers the process, reduces trust in municipal authorities, and limits safayi tax collection rates.</b></p>	<p>Public awareness campaigns were implemented at Nahia level. These included both informal and formal channels. Some members of the community reported to be expecting service delivery in return for safayi, and safayi tax collection rates improved. This indicated that citizen-municipal relations may have improved to some degree.</p>

<p><b>Street addressing can be an important part of the process, lending credibility to local governments and improving urban management. However poor institutional coordination has hampered citywide implementation.</b></p>	<p>The programme led to the development of a bespoke system of street addressing for Kabul municipality, resulting in a map with street codes and property numbers for 20 districts. However, this process was substantially delayed by the lack of domestic expertise and the need to recruit an expert consultant. The street signs have not yet been installed by Kabul municipality.</p>
<p><b>Municipal boundaries do not always reflect the built-up area of each city, and are not known by all stakeholders. This creates problems regarding which properties should be registered.</b></p>	<p>The municipal boundaries were updated, however the delineation of public and private land remains contentious.</p>

Municipal boundaries do not always reflect the built-up area of each city, and are not known by all stakeholders. This creates problems regarding which properties should be registered. The municipal boundaries were updated, however the delineation of public and private land remains contentious.

UN-Habitat's clear implementation rules and principles, including transparency, accountability and partnership development, were highly valued by interviewed government representatives and implementing partners, as well as beneficiaries who participated in FGDs. In addition, the programme was deemed to have been implemented by experienced and highly skilled staff, which clearly helped to create and strengthen trusted relationships. Surveyed community stakeholders deemed UN-Habitat staff to be fair, trustworthy, competent and transparent. They expressed their readiness to contribute in cash and in-kind for new programmes implemented by UN-Habitat.

### 3.3 EFFECTIVENESS

This section sets out to clarify how effective the programme was. As such, it provides a breakdown of the programme by its key Indicators to assess progress towards Results and Objectives. This is followed by an investigation of the Theory of Change based on its assumptions and causal linkages. The following questions from the TOR will be addressed:

- **To what extent did the programme achieve its targeted results and how did UN-Habitat contribute towards these?**
- **What evidence is there that what was achieved contributed to the strategic objective of improved tenure security, land management and administration for inclusive urban economic growth and service in Kabul city?**
- **To what extent was the Kabul municipal capacity strengthened through the programme?**

#### 3.3.1 Measurement and Reporting

The programme measured and reported on its achieved results, using:

- A four-tier programme monitoring system, including direct observation by USAID (through joint field visits and invitations to programme events), quarterly programme progress reporting, regular consultative meetings, seminar and workshops with government counterparts, and a participatory programme implementation modality (Peoples' Process).
- The programme developed some data collection tools, as per the M&E Plan, which allowed data to be gathered for monitoring purposes. Available data has been used to support the Impact Survey and Final Evaluation report, although interactions with UN-Habitat suggested that consistent data collection was challenge. Nonetheless, KSMNP met its donor obligations with regards to M&E and has successfully monitored the program to the point of being able to measure programme performance at the Indicator-level.
- Effective reporting mechanisms, managed by a dedicated focal point for M&E and knowledge






management, who was also responsible for programme communications, public relations and visibility. Throughout the programme, WhatsApp-based internal reporting systems facilitated communication. These were highly appreciated by surveyed government stakeholders and implementing partners.

As a result of the above, the programme appears to have been monitored relatively effectively, particularly at Activity and Output level. Measures of success at Outcome (Result) level were less tangible, due in part to the highly qualitative nature of these objectives. Therefore, the key performance indicators may not fully capture the Results, although they help to measure aspects thereof.

### 3.3.2 Analysis of Assumptions Underpinning the Theory of Change (TOC)






The barriers and challenges outlined above are also reflected in a number of the key assumptions underpinning the TOC that were only partly met, or not at all. Table 8 consolidates primary and secondary evidence to verify and establish whether the critical assumptions underpinning the TOC were indeed appropriate; these assumptions were identified within the Inception Report TOC analysis provided at earlier stages of the consultancy. 13 out of 18 core assumptions appear to have been only partially met, or not at a







**Table 8: Analysis of Assumptions underpinning Original TOC**





-  Met
-  partially met
-  Not met

Assumption		Evidence
R1	Registration would lead to increases in revenue; i.e. that residents would trust that payments result in improvements in service delivery, and pay.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prior to the programme, 57% of the properties in Kabul were not in the municipal records, and therefore did not pay Safayi fees. As a result of the programme, about 80% properties within Kabul municipal boundaries were recorded, thereby substantially expanding the tax base.</li> <li>• The number of Safayi invoices being delivered increased from 43,000 in 2016 to 83,000 in 2019. This reflects the shift from residents collecting invoices to the government distributing them directly to residents. In total, 363,386 Safayi invoices were issued in total at completion</li> <li>• A more user-friendly invoicing and payment mechanism was developed, with the automated calculation of Safayi fees and production of invoices using the Safayi information Management System (SMIS)<sup>19</sup>. The percentage of Safayi invoices paid increased by 88% between 2016 and 2019. This represents a 20% increase in Safayi compliance.</li> <li>• Kabul Municipality Safayi revenue income increased by 27% from 550 million Afs in 2016 to almost 700 million in 2019. In fact, according to the Completion Report, 25% of KM's total revenue is derived from Safayi taxes.</li> <li>• The KSMNP programme impact survey revealed that safayi compliance is higher (up to 54%) in districts where all or most properties have been surveyed and registered, and lower (as low as 3%) in districts where most of the properties have not yet been surveyed and registered.</li> </ul>

19 SMIS has not been formally handed over to Kabul municipality yet.

R1	That residents would broadly support registration initiatives, and not see them as putting them at risk for extortion or solicitation of bribery.		Discussions with beneficiaries revealed that residents supported and 'liked' the registration initiatives, because they knew that the collected information would be used for urban development.
	That improved planning capacity, and improved revenues, would result in improved service delivery. That is to say that there would be sufficient will to implement new services, that the revenues raised would be sufficient to improve services, and that new revenues would go largely to improved service delivery, instead of other municipal priorities.		Infrastructure developments were implemented but discussions with beneficiaries revealed that service delivery at Gozar-level remains poor. Some beneficiaries reported to be expecting services in future, whilst others indicated that they do not believe the municipality has sufficient resources to fulfill their needs. This may point to the fact that the revenues raised are still insufficient to implement new services or improve existing services. It may also indicate a diversion of these revenues to municipal priorities other than improved service delivery.
	Continuity between mayoral administrations would be sufficient to not disrupt key gains in outcome and result.		One of the strengths of the programme was that it worked through and with the government. However, this meant that the political turbulence associated with the turnover in mayoral administrations had a significant impact on the programme. This is because the change in leadership had a cascade effect, whereby the hierarchical nature of the organization within KM led to a widespread change in the staffing of ministries, municipalities and technical units. As a result, there was limited continuity in the civil service. This challenge was exacerbated by the fact that activities to ensure a proper handover, orientation or backstopping for incumbent staff were limited. Overall, this appears to have restricted the change in institutional capacity and the retention of knowledge. In addition, a number of activities were put on hold pending approval by the new mayor and the President's Office, which appears to have slowed the momentum of the programme.
	That surveys would result in a generally-accepted documentation of ownership, and not cause additional tension or conflict emerging from ownership disputes.		The surveys resulted in a generally accepted documentation of ownership. Data were verified using municipal records and public validation. However, 219 conflicts and/or claims were filed, of which just 27 were resolved as of March 2019.
	That land registration, and titles, would be enforceable in a court of law, especially for weaker parties; i.e. would registration allow for equitable redress.		Safayi notebooks and OCs represent a form of de-facto tenure, as described by the land rights continuum. However, it remains uncertain as to what extent OCs improve tenure security, particularly as it will depend on how enforceable they are in court. At present, discussions with beneficiaries reveal that residents do not expect OCs to be helpful in dispute resolution over ownership challenges.

R2	That land and property titles would be recognized by a variety of institutions and stakeholders, and that this recognition would result in improved, objective value of land, and an 'unlocking of capital value', per De Soto.		The programme supported Kabul municipality to develop a new method of property valuation which ensures that the assessed land and building values are derived from real market prices and that safayi fees calculated from property values are equitable across Kabul city. Revised and up-to-date property values have been determined for all 22 districts of Kabul. The Cabinet has approved this methodology; however, KM is currently awaiting formal endorsement from the President before implementing the new property values. This suggests that property values are calculated in an objective manner, but property values remain uncertain pending Presidential endorsement.
	Assembly members will act in the interest of communities, and that citizens would have sufficient interest and trust for assemblies.		457 Gozar Assemblies were established to provide a forum for community mobilisation, empowerment and participation. Discussions with beneficiaries indicated that this facilitated a people-led and people-oriented approach, which helped to reduce vulnerability to corruption, nepotism, abuse, or extortion. Discussions with beneficiaries further imply that there are high levels of satisfaction with the way that GAs implemented projects, the community-driven process and GA leadership in general. It was noted that projects were implemented on time and within budget.
	That municipal authorities will work with assemblies in good faith, and accept the 'social contract'.		Discussions with government stakeholders revealed that KM finds GAs useful and wishes to develop them. Interviewed government representatives felt that the programme, and particularly the GAs, had resulted in a heightened sense of responsibility and accountability of KM staff to their citizens at the district-level. The impact survey reported that KM plans to assign more responsibility to the heads of GAs for Safayi collection and project development, and these roles are to be formalized on budget.  However, it appears that there was some push-back, as government partners were not always comfortable with community groups having responsibilities and controlling resources for public projects. Even at completion, KM had not yet formally accepted responsibility for the maintenance of some infrastructure sub-projects (parks and canals), which is a substantial source of concern for some community stakeholders. Discussions with government stakeholders indicated that KM still intends to accept these projects, once approved by HE President.
	That grants, overseen by assemblies, would, in fact, be dedicated to areas of real need.		According to the KSMNP impact survey, 70% of beneficiaries reported that projects developed by GAs were beneficial. However, community stakeholders involved in FGDs also highlighted that there are some outstanding needs, such as drainages systems and paved footpaths.
	That Gozar representation, and activity, would be transparent, and would not result in increased corruption or a diversion of funds.		Community FGDs indicated that beneficiaries were generally satisfied with GA leadership, particularly of sub-projects. This finding is supported by results of the impact survey.
	Provided resources would be sufficient to achieve adequate, notable change.		Discussions with beneficiaries indicated that residents were satisfied with Gozar projects, but that there are still some outstanding needs that have not been met.

R3	Elections would not cause substantial disruption in the relationship between municipal authorities and Gozar Assemblies.		KM had not yet formally accepted responsibility for the maintenance of some infrastructure projects. According to interviewed government stakeholders, this is because KM are awaiting Presidential approval to so do following the change in KM leadership. Discussions with community stakeholders suggested that this had become a political issue.
	Turnover of municipal employees would not result in a loss of new capacity, skills or knowledge.		Government sources revealed that turnover of municipal employees remains a substantial challenge, which was said to have a negative impact on the effectiveness and efficiency of the good results of the KSMNP.
	The capacity building provided would, in fact, lead to improved skills and abilities within the areas necessary for improved administration and leadership.		Key informant interviews revealed that was deemed a 'great learning curve' for MOUDA: 'The programme staff at PIU has worked closely with government staff to transfer necessary skills and techniques to them in survey designing, municipal revenue management, coordination, reporting, GIS, and database management. The MUDA and Municipality in Districts offices have hired some of the programme staff (TAs) to continue their work as they had in KSMNP. Therefore, the programme had a great achievement in increasing [the] capacity of government staff.' However, the same respondent also indicated that 'The most critical challenge is lack of enough human resource[s] (tashkeel) at MUDA and its district offices to secure the KSMNP results"
	That citizens would consider the increased capacities, as targeted by UN Habitat, to align with their own interests and their own definitions of effective governance.		Discussions with beneficiaries revealed that; prior to the implementation of KSMNP, the government could not provide any of the targeted services to communities, which indicates that increased capacities were seen to align with beneficiary interests. However, other aspects of municipal governance, including service delivery and the issuing of OCs, were not deemed to have improved.

### 3.3.3 Theory of Change Analysis

*'The GoIRAI of the programme was to improve the living conditions of 2.9 million Afghan men, women and children in 426,273 households through improved security of land tenure, improved basic infrastructure, and delivery of services in local communities.'*

The primary theoretical and evidentiary bases underpinning this targeted outcome, and the designed supporting interventions and intermediate objectives, arise from the evidence and theories given by Hernando De Soto in *The Mystery of Capital* (2001). According to De Soto, *'Much of the marginalization of the poor in developing and former communist nations comes from their inability to benefit from the six effects that formal property provides. The challenge these countries face is not whether they should produce or receive more money but whether they can understand the legal institutions and summon the political will necessary to build a property system that is easily accessible to the poor.'*

Notably, 60-70% of Kabul consists of informal settlements. Residents of these areas generally had no formal property rights and were long deemed to be occupying state land, with little to no tenure security. Recognizing this, HE President Ashraf Ghani made urban land regularization and improving tenure security a priority for his National Unity Government:

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*'We commit ourselves to legalizing all properties that have legal flaws... Since the properties do not have a credible legal basis, a vast capital of our people is perpetually under threat. At the same time, one of the results... is that our cities can never take the shape of civic cities and citizens cannot tend to their rights and obligations as citizens.'*

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Similarly, Afghanistan's Self-Reliance Mutual Accountability Framework (2015) stated that,

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*'by the end of December 2015, the government will have launched a national programme to survey informal settlements and provide 100% coverage of land tenure certificates in the cities of Kabul, Herat, Kandahar, Mazar-i-Sharif and Jalalabad.'*

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De Soto provided substantial evidence that improved economic outcomes could be achieved for developing countries through undertaking to strengthen six areas of 'successful' and 'inclusive' legal and economic systems. These are: <sup>20</sup>

#### Fixing the economic potential of assets

**'Capital is born by representing in writing**—in a title, a security, a contract, and other such records—the most economically and socially useful qualities about the asset as opposed to the visually more striking aspects of the asset. This is where potential value is first described and registered.'

#### Integrating dispersed information into one system

**Integrate assets into one formal representational system:** This "pulling together" of property representations ... deposited all the information and rules governing the accumulated wealth of their citizens into one knowledge base', thus **making it accessible.**

#### Making people accountable

**'The integration of all property systems under one formal property law shifted the legitimacy of the rights of owners from the political context of local communities to the impersonal context of law.'** This frees people to explore how to **generate surplus value** from their own assets, whilst simultaneously promoting **accountability and enforceability.**

#### Making assets fungible

*'One of the most important things a formal property system does is transform assets from a less accessible condition to a more accessible condition, so that they can do additional work ... By uncoupling the economic features of an asset from its rigid, physical state, a representation makes the asset "fungible"—able to be fashioned to suit practically any transaction.'*

#### Networking people

*'By making assets fungible, by attaching owners to assets, assets to addresses, and ownership to enforcement, and by making information on the history of assets and owners easily accessible'* **formal property systems convert citizens into 'a network of individually identifiable and accountable business agents.'**

#### Protecting transactions

*'One important reason why the Western formal property system works like a network is that **all the property records** (titles, deeds, securities, and contracts that describe the economically significant aspects of assets) **are continually tracked and protected as they travel through time and space.** Public agencies are the stewards of an advanced nation's representations. They administer the files that contain all the economically useful descriptions of assets ... These files will alert anyone eager to use an asset about things that may restrict or enhance its utilization.'*

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Consequently, the various aspects of this programme, and the myriad activities, interventions, and strategies can be seen as an attempt by UN-Habitat and their partners (international and national) to create the necessary systemic conditions for economic development. In order to evaluate this Theory of Change, the Consultant has attempted to validate the extent to which De Soto's six effects of formal property were achieved through the programme.

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*'We understand that registration is useful to link us with the government and receive municipal services from them. It will increase the value of our properties and lives.'*

**- COMMUNITY LEADER**

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## Component 1: Land Management, Land Rights and Responsibilities

Under the **Land Management, Land Rights and Responsibilities Component (1)**, the programme supported ARAZI and KM to survey and register all properties within Kabul Municipality. Based on the programme logic, the full municipal property survey, registration and taxation would contribute to Settlement regularization.

The programme supported municipal nahias to create and maintain accurate and complete Safayi records through the survey and registration of over 427,000 properties across 20 districts, covering about 80% of the properties within Kabul municipal boundary<sup>21</sup>. The resulting information fed into a GIS system that is reported to be widely used for planning and decision-making across government agencies. This comprehensive registration survey, which served to update a partial survey from 1974, was deemed a 'historical result' by some interviewed government representatives. It appears to have helped to **integrate dispersed information into one system**. However, it should be noted that circa 142,000 properties have not yet been registered, and – according to the impact survey - there is, as yet, no clear evidence of a plan to survey these properties.

Following the development of a new land value zoning tool, properties were assigned up-to-date values, which were reflected by Safayi booklets or Occupancy Certificates. These de-facto ownership documents represent an important step towards **fixing the economic potential of assets**. Moreover, these documents appear to be in high demand; for many residents, these documents represent their first government-issued ownership document. An impact survey conducted in Kabul in February 2020 found that 98% of residents felt that land occupancy certificates are essential to secure property.

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*"People are ready to pay fees to get their OCs. We trust that everyone will get OC and it will be more popular and useful in future to be used as collateral to get loan from banks or guaranteed some trade agreements."*

**- COMMUNITY LEADER**

*"We are ready to get OC as soon as government restart the delivery process to those who already paid fees but did not get their OCs yet."*

**- COMMUNITY LEADER**

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However, the process of settlement regularization appears to have faced some key obstacles and issues (see Table 9). Many of these challenges appear to have been mutually reinforcing.

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<sup>21</sup> Together with 71,197 properties surveyed in Kabul districts 5 and 11 under MGSP, the total number of properties surveyed and registered by the CFA programme in Kabul is 501,274 representing about 80% of all properties in Kabul municipality.

**Table 9: Summary of Challenges to the Settlement Regularisation Process**

Issue area	Summary of key challenges
<p><b>Delayed or incomplete regulatory frameworks</b></p>	<p>A new Land Value Zoning method has been developed to facilitate the valuation of land and property assets. Whilst it has been tried and tested across all 22 districts of Kabul, KM is still waiting for formal endorsement from the President before implementing the new property values.</p>
	<p>The regulatory basis of both Safayi and OCs remains tenuous.</p>
	<p><b>A Safayi Regulation</b> was developed but put on hold while the government developed a new Municipal Law. UN-Habitat provided significant inputs to the Municipal Law which was approved in October 2018. Several of UN-Habitat's recommendations were incorporated into this law. Under the Municipal Law, the government must develop a Municipal Revenue Law which will include provisions relevant to safayi fees. UN-Habitat is working closely with the Deputy Ministry of Municipalities and Kabul Municipality to develop the Municipal Revenue Law and is leading on the development of the chapter concerned with safayi fees. Concurrently, UN-Habitat has introduced several changes to safayi invoicing and collection in Kabul where regulatory reform is not required, through the preparation of the safayi guidelines.</p>
	<p><b>OC regulations</b> have been developed and have been approved by the Cabinet. However, some provisions in this regulation are making the issuing of OC very difficult. The Minister of MUDA has requested the Cabinet to make amendments to the OC regulation. Specifically, the following amendments to the OC regulation introduce uncertainties regarding tenure security and property values.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Land Acquisition Law, which will determine fees for land parcels between 300-500 m<sup>2</sup>, was amended and still needs to be approved;</li> <li>• Fees for land parcels between 500-1000 m<sup>2</sup> will be determined based on the market price (determined using the land value zoning method), which creates the potential for corruption;</li> <li>• Land parcels &gt;1000 m<sup>2</sup> in the informal settlement will be returned to the government.</li> </ul>
	<p>Bottlenecks arising from the Occupancy Certificate Regulation (gazette in 2019) include:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. The imposition of fees for issuing of OCs</li> <li>ii. The differential fee structure depending on whether property is located on state or private land, combined with the fact that the delineation between public and private land is ongoing. At present, it appears that the majority of urban areas are not yet formally delineated: 'The GPS [survey map] does not clarify the nature of private or government ownership of properties in informal settlements in all 20 districts of Kabul city.'</li> <li>iii. Challenging eligibility criteria for OCs, such as proof of 15 years of continuous occupancy. Households that fail to provide sufficient evidence are deemed to occupy state land.</li> </ol>
<p>Moreover, the legal frameworks have yet to be formally approved, generating uncertainty regarding the future issuing of OCs (or even, which may lead to a (further) deterioration of public trust in the governments capacity to deliver.</p>	

	<p>An Informal Settlements Upgrading Policy has been drafted to support settlement regularisation in informal areas. This will lay the foundation for in-situ regularisation and upgrading of viable informal/unplanned areas. The draft policy appears to be with the government for endorsement.</p> <p>A Policy on the Management of Vacant Plots is still under development.</p>
<b>Economic</b>	<p>OCs cost about 13-15 USD. Surveyed beneficiaries indicated that they were willing to pay for these documents. Whilst some interviewed beneficiaries indicated that fees were fair, a survey by MGSP found that 75% of households that had received OC invoices had not paid them, with 69% of these households reporting that they could not afford the charges. Furthermore, some reports indicate that occupants whose properties were not previously registered were obliged to pay their backlog in Safayi fees since 2010, in addition to the fee, to receive an OC: <i>'As per HE President decree, those tenures whose properties were not registered with the government before KSMNP were obliged to pay the municipal fees from 2010.'</i> This creates a substantial financial hurdle to tenure security.</p>
<b>Political</b>	<p>Initial resistance to the OC process at ARAZI. This was largely overcome with the establishment of the OC Directorate under ARAZI.</p>
<b>Administrative</b>	<p>The vast majority of OCs have not yet been distributed. A total of 14,896 OCs were issued, but over 60% of eligible beneficiaries have not yet been issued with OCs. as of May 2020. OC were not issued to properties built on private land in informal settlements due to the absence of ownership documents by occupants.</p>

Given these challenges, the legal basis and economic potential of these assets remains uncertain. As a consequence, it **remains difficult to use these ownership documents to promote accountability and rights to property**. The programme initially set out to provide all occupants with Land Acquisition Certificates (formal ownership documents, or titles, to the properties on which beneficiaries reside). However, given the fact that most occupants are tenants (not owners), and the myriad concerns relating to unauthorized occupancy on state and municipal land, the government determined to delay issuance of formal ownership documents. According to evidence from FGDs with the implementing partners, the GoIRA decided to issue Occupancy Certificates (OCs) instead, considered to be an intermediate step towards the issuance of formal ownership documents, allowing more time to resolve outstanding questions relating to municipal vs. private ownership of properties. Moreover, a fee was charged for OCs, which were only issued if rigorous eligibility criteria were met, contrary to initial plans and proposals for KSMNP which were developed on consultation with the government. Yet, it remains uncertain as to what extent OCs improve tenure security, particularly as it will depend on how enforceable they are in court. At present, beneficiaries do not universally expect them to be helpful in dispute resolution over ownership challenges. This perception may be due to:

- A lack of confidence in the judicial system; the Ministry of Justice estimates that 90% of Afghans continue to rely on customary law and local dispute-resolution mechanisms<sup>22</sup>.
- Concern that OCs will not be recognized beyond the office of issue; beneficiaries requested that MUDA take the lead to make the OC a legally enforceable document in the court.

*"If government does not introduce it [occupancy certificates) as a legal[ly] enforceable document, it cannot be used in court."*

**- COMMUNITY LEADER**



As such, further attention may need to be devoted to ensuring that occupancy documents have sufficient basis in law and recognition in the judiciary to allow equitable redress, combined with associated awareness raising activities to ensure that beneficiaries feel empowered to use occupancy documents in the courts. On the other hand, the President has repeatedly and publicly endorsed OCs, which may already help to imbue them with some degree of de facto power; this increasing de facto legitimacy was supported by discussions with myriad stakeholders, though it may be the case that additional work is needed to further strengthen practices and attitudes regarding the enforceability of the OCs.

The **uncertain economic value of these assets may constrain the bankability of these ownership documents, which further limits their fungibility and usefulness regarding the creation of more useful or liquid capital.** Based on discussions with beneficiaries, some small bank loans (generally classed as 'microloans') have been issued upon review of beneficiary OCs; although, it appears banks do not accept OCs as collateral for larger loans, once again arising from concerns relating to the OC's status as interim, and somewhat unofficial, ownership documents (interviews with the implementing agency suggested that a number of requests for bank loans using OCs as collateral had been rejected by several banks). However, in some cases community leadership reported that where loans were issued, the bank successfully verified the OC with the issuance agency to approve the loan<sup>23</sup>. This indicates that the foundations of a nascent OC-based transaction system are in place but may require strengthening. Moreover, members of the community who took part in FGDs requested that KM formally request that banking institutions and other agencies accept OCs as collateral for loans. This would help to formalize the process of using OCs for economic transactions and create confidence that banks will indeed accept OCs as collateral, thus **networking people and protecting transactions.** Conversely, this would also enhance the confidence of banks in the value of OCs.

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*"Land is a serious issue, and all concerned authorities are carefully reviewing its elements before approval to avoid any serious consequences."*

**- MUDA REPRESENTATIVE**

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The improvement of land management and economic outcomes largely hinges on the successful regularization of informal settlements, and the issuing of ownership documents with a sound legal basis and defined market value. The survey and registration have been an important first step to this end, particularly with regard to integrating dispersed information into one system. However, until the economic potential of land and property assets is fixed by law, improved land management and economic development will prove difficult to achieve. Without a legal basis and defined market value, occupancy documents play a limited role in making people accountable or making assets fungible. Furthermore, the uncertain regulatory, judicial and economic environment appear to undermine the potential for networking people and promoting transactions. As a result, it appears that, at present:

- Private sector investment continues to be constrained by a lack of clear land management and administration systems and procedures.
- The conditions that allow for land grabbing have not yet been fully resolved.
- Afghan households are faced with continued tenure insecurity, which undermines state-society relations and constrains household and neighbourhood investment.

Nonetheless, occupancy certificates and Safayi booklets can be seen as a vital 'stepping stone' on the continuum of land rights, as espoused by UN-Habitat. As such, the introduction of these documents is an important step.

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It appears OCs in these cases have been used more to confirm assets, rather than as collateral.

## Component 2: Strategic Urban Planning

Further to the systems strengthening components described above, substantial additional work was undertaken in providing grants to local communities, giving them opportunities to invest in the ways they see fit. **Under the Strategic Urban Planning Component (2)** the survey and registration process were expected to guide investments and to establish a common vision for an inclusive and prosperous urban future. Together with the Safayi process, this was anticipated to contribute to **strengthened municipal capacities and systems for urban planning, land management and municipal revenue/finance (Result 1)**. At city level, the programme would promote local economic development (LED) and expand service delivery through a community-driven process. The purpose of this set of activities was to circumvent many of the challenged institutions in municipal and national government (including difficult procurement and financial systems), creating more accountable and democratic local governments, while also improving quality of life within many of Kabul's more challenged districts.

Street addressing was expected to be a very valuable Output, however it proved to be a hugely challenging enterprise. The assumption that KM had the requisite capacities and datasets proved to be unfounded, leading to substantial delays in the implementation of this aspect of the programme. Nonetheless, KSMNP contributed to the creation of an up-to-date dataset that can serve as the basis of future programming.

The survey and registration also informed a total of 20 Strategic Nahia Plans (SNAPs), which were developed participatorily. These strategic plans were subsequently used to guide investment. Specifically, the programme provided performance-based block grants for infrastructure to catalyse implementation of the strategic plans, build capacity and strengthen the legitimacy of the National Unity Government. At the same time, citizenship requires citizens to also be accountable to their governments. Consequently, attempts to strengthen property rights were accompanied by initiatives to improve the capacity and rates of tax collection at the municipal level. The grants, which were only provided once certain thresholds of tax collection targets were achieved, were designed to serve as an incentive to motivate the collection of Safayi taxes. It seems likely that the incentive provided by the grants contributed to the observed increase in tax revenues, both at the household level (to incentivise payment of taxes) and at the government level (to motivate effective and accountable tax collection).

82 sub-projects were completed at a total cost of USD 10.4 million, including a combined contribution of USD 1.8 million from government and community sources. Local and national sources contributed 10-20% of resources (funds, in-kind support) for sub-projects. Discussions with beneficiaries indicated that this helped to create a sense of ownership. However, the impact survey suggested that it had proven difficult to determine the size of KM's contribution to sub-projects. In part, this is because KM provided both cash and in-kind contributions. Officially, all revenue is managed by KM, with the expectation that KM will allocate funds for projects and service delivery. However, it is unclear what percentage of Safayi revenue is allocated to (i) infrastructure projects or (ii) service delivery. Interviews with government stakeholders indicated that there are some outstanding contributions from KM to infrastructure projects.

22 Nahia sub-projects were completed in 18 districts and 60 Gozar sub-projects were completed in 16 districts. Infrastructure projects were implemented to a high standard and submitted to quality controls. Beneficiaries expressed high levels of satisfaction with the infrastructure sub-projects. Some beneficiaries noted that these developments (e.g. parks, canals, paved roads) were the first of their kind and that their availability significantly increased their quality of life. As such, living conditions appear to have improved as a result of the project.


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*"Infrastructure projects improved our lives. Before KSMNP constructed our streets, our children were not going to schools when it was raining. Even after the end of the rain, there was mud in the streets and small children could not go to school for many days. Thanks to KSMNP that enabled children to go to school every day."*

**- COMMUNITY LEADER**

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The programme logic further posited that increased Safayi revenue would enhance service delivery, which would iteratively incentivize citizens to continue paying taxes and government to continue delivering services. **Improved municipal service delivery would contribute to a strengthened 'social contract' between citizens and municipal authorities (Result 2).** The KSMNP impact survey revealed that over 95% of respondents think that the Safayi tax is necessary to receive services from the municipality, indicating that beneficiaries understand that their taxes are intended to pay for services. Circa 80% of respondents reported that the Safayi tax was not set too high. Beneficiaries demonstrated their willingness to pay for such services, as reflected by the increase in Safayi revenue payments, which was particularly dramatic between 2016 and 2017, whereafter it appears to have decreased slightly. Interviews with representatives from USAID Afghanistan suggested that this decrease might be due to continued human resource constraints for revenue generation within KM. On the other hand, it is possible that this spike is the legacy of a substantial backlog in tax payments as the result of the removal of bureaucratic impediments to payments, which previously served as a disincentive for people to pay their taxes.



**Figure 1:** Trends in Safayi Revenue between 2016 and 2019

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*"The programme has increased motivation of people to pay Safayi as now they see a real change in their community."*


**- COMMUNITY LEADER**

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However, a careful analysis reveals that over half (52%) of beneficiaries included in the KSMNP impact survey felt that municipal service delivery had not improved, despite the strategic investments in infrastructure development. This may point to the fact that the revenues raised are still insufficient to implement new services or improve existing services. It may also reflect a diversion of these revenues to municipal priorities other than improved service delivery, or to weak capacities for municipal revenue/finance management. Moreover, beneficiary satisfaction varies by the type of service. Over half of beneficiaries felt that services associated with street lighting, electricity supply and roads had improved. By contrast, less than half felt that waste collection, sewage collection, water supply, green areas, and drainage systems had improved. The latter services may therefore require further attention in future programming. Only once citizens see tangible improvements, will they feel like they have a 'stake in the city', as was envisioned by the Programme Document.

It is important to note however, that the districts that exhibited the lowest rates of satisfaction with municipal service delivery appear to correspond to the districts where most properties are not yet surveyed (nahias 19 and 21). This suggests that there is a link between the survey and registration activities and the

delivery of municipal services, although this could also be attributed to higher levels of engagement with beneficiaries resulting in higher levels of general satisfaction, irrespective of the quantity or quality of the services being delivered.



**Figure 2:** Beneficiary Satisfaction with Overall Municipal Service Delivery (N=1600)

### Component 3: Municipal Governance and Citizen Engagement

This set of grant activities was complemented by a variety of transparency and democratic governance initiatives under the Municipal **Governance and Citizen Engagement Component (3)**, providing further mechanisms and opportunities for citizens to hold their local government and related institutions accountable. As part of the Peoples' Process, 457 Gozar Assemblies were established to provide a forum for community mobilisation, empowerment and participation. 70% of beneficiaries reported that projects developed by GAs were beneficial.

By contrast, it appears that government partners were not immediately comfortable with community groups having responsibilities and controlling resources for public projects. However, interviewed government representatives felt that the programme, and particularly the GAs, had resulted in a heightened sense of responsibility and accountability of KM staff at the district level.

Based on evidence from discussion with stakeholders, it appears that the GAs were a positive governance mechanism, but citizens' collective ability to hold their local government accountable remains limited. This appears to have led to a deterioration of public trust. For example, community FGDs revealed that residents who registered their properties and did not get OCs were blaming MUDA and KM for their ineffective management and leadership.

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*"We did not see them [KM] in our communities to come and improve our community situation. When we go to their central office, they say we have so many other urgent issues to address and one must wait to receive required services."*


**- COMMUNITY LEADER**

*"We know that government has no resources to fix all our needs. The only hope is development aids and programmes."*

**- COMMUNITY LEADER**

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From the beneficiary perspective, the delay in OC issuance, combined with the paucity of service delivery, appears to have done little to strengthen public confidence in the government. In fact, some beneficiaries stated during FGDs that they do not expect anything from KM. This may already be reflected in the percentage of occupants who paid their Safayi invoices, which decreased between 2018 (66%) and 2019 (38%), as per the KSMNP Impact survey.



**Figure 3:** Percentage of Safayi Invoices Issued and Paid in 2018 and 2019

All of the activities above were to be supported through the establishment of an improved enabling environment for urban land management and administration, municipal governance, local economic development and service delivery (Result 3). In order to achieve this, a number of key policies, legislation, regulation and guidelines were developed as listed in Table 10.

**Table 10:** Description and Status of Relevant Policies, Legislation, Regulations and Guidelines

Document	Description and Status
<b>Regulation on Land Occupancy Certificates</b>	The 2008 Land Management Law was revised in 2017 to include the role of ARAZI in land administration, add a new chapter on land cadaster and introduce anti-corruption measures and penalties for land grabbing. The revision also included provisions for the issuance of land occupancy certificates. The programme further developed this into a Regulation for the registration of properties in urban informal settlements, including issuance of OCs. The Regulation was gazette in February 2018, but is in the process of being amended.
<b>Guidelines on Land Value Zoning</b>	Tried and tested across all 22 districts to assign up-to-date, fair and equitable property values. However, KM is currently awaiting formal endorsement from the President before implementing the new property values.
<b>Informal Settlements Upgrading Policy</b>	Lays the foundation for in-situ regularisation and upgrading of viable informal/unplanned areas Draft policy is with the government for endorsement.
<b>Policy on the Management of Vacant Plots</b>	Under development
<b>Cities for All Manual</b>	A volume of operational procedures covering all aspects of programme activities. The manuals are already being used to train government counterparts, and to mainstream the new processes and procedures into the routine functions of the relevant government agencies. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The CFA Manual volume includes: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Land and property surveying manual</li> <li>• Occupancy certificates manual</li> <li>• Strategic urban action planning manual</li> <li>• Street addressing manual</li> <li>• Municipal finance manual</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

### Safayi Guidelines and Regulation

The Safayi Guidelines and Regulation were developed, but put on hold while the government developed a new Municipal Law. UN-Habitat provided significant inputs to the Municipal Law which was approved in October 2018. Several of UN-Habitat's recommendations were incorporated into this law. Under the Municipal Law, the government must develop a Municipal Revenue Law which will include provisions relevant to safayi fees. UN-Habitat is working closely with the Deputy Ministry of Municipalities and Kabul Municipality to develop the Municipal Revenue Law and is leading on the development of the chapter concerned with safayi fees. Concurrently, UN-Habitat has introduced several changes to safayi invoicing and collection in Kabul where regulatory reform is not required, through the preparation of the safayi guidelines. The changes introduced to date include:

- Transparent and accountable calculation of safayi fees.
- Annual delivery of safayi invoices to all properties registered in a nahia;
- Follow-up on non-paying properties.
- Community outreach, engagement and education on the purpose and expenditure of safayi fees through wakili gozars;
- Linking prioritisation for municipal services to safayi payment rates; and
- Public notification on non-paying properties.

Arguably one of the key results of the programme is the creation of the foundation and legal framework for urban land management and administration, municipal governance, local economic development and service delivery. However, external legislative changes (including the revision of the Land Management Law and development of the new Municipal Law) have delayed the achievement of these reforms. Furthermore, the fact that changes to the legal framework are not formally passed yet raises concerns regarding the achievement and sustainability of these results.

### National and Local Capacity Building

Further to the creation of an enabling environment, the programme logic also posits that if the appropriate training is delivered for national and local government officials, then they would have the required skills, attitudes and predilection to support the achievement of the three key Results. To this end, the programme sought to strengthen municipal capacities and systems through a learning-by-doing approach. To consolidate learnings, a capacity development and staff right-sizing package was prepared for KM in March 2019. This was adopted by the Kabul mayor and implemented in that financial cycle.

Programme Implementation Units (PIUs) worked closely with the government, implementing partners and other stakeholders, supporting capacity building across all implemented activities. The creation of functional units comprising programme staff and government counterparts was reported to forge collaboration and foster team spirit, as well as facilitating the participatory development and institutionalizing of key tools and processes, such as the information systems (APIS and SMIS). The embedding of project staff, such as revenue mobilisers, in government offices was thought by interviewed government and implementing partner stakeholders to promote mutual learning.

*"Without PIUs, we were not able to plan, implement, and control KSMNP. We did not have such a complicated and comprehensive programme in the history of Afghanistan."*

**- MUDA REPRESENTATIVE**

A number of KSMNP Technical Assistance staff have already been hired by MUDA and KM in district offices, or by similar programmes, including:

- 89 revenue mobilisers from the programme were absorbed and the post added into the KM tashkeel to handle key safayi functions at nahia offices.
- 30 ARAZI staff who were trained on the OC process and funded by the programme have been posted to the OC directorate under the Ministry of Urban Development and Land's (MUDL) Property Registration for Urban Informal Settlements (PRUIS) programme.
- Six local consultants who were recruited by the ARAZI OC directorate and funded by the KSMNP programme have been transferred into the ARAZI tashkeel to work with the World Bank-funded Afghanistan Land Administration System Project (ALASP) project, effective from 1 April 2020.

This may indicate governmental satisfaction with programme staff and a willingness to continue programme activities. This impression is further supported by evidence from discussions with government stakeholders. The participatory process of Strategic Municipal Action Planning, including with Municipal Advisory Boards (MABs), and community-based implementation of infrastructure projects also appears to have supported capacity-building at the gozar level. For example, Gozar Assemblies were sufficiently effective and efficient in their project implementation that a number of projects were handed off from KM to GAs,

As a result of these measures, capacities and systems appear to have been strengthened to some extent. Surveyed government stakeholders felt that the capacity of both MUDA and KM had improved significantly. The latter is particularly important as the capacity development and empowerment of municipal nahia offices had previously been largely ignored in favour of central municipal offices. Interviewed MUDA representatives deemed the project to have been a 'great learning curve' for MUDA: 'The programme staff at PIU has worked closely with government staff to transfer necessary skills and techniques to them in survey designing, municipal revenue management, coordination, reporting, GIS, and database management. ... Therefore, the programme had a great achievement in increasing [the] capacity of government staff.'

Interviewed KM representatives felt that UN-Habitat technical assistants worked as coaches and trainers with staff at all levels of the programme, which enabled KM staff to improve their knowledge and skills relating to programme planning, implementation, coordination and management. Many of the respondents were confident that they possessed the capacity to sustain and extend the programme modules. For example, one interviewee claimed that her department could effectively manage the design and implementation of a new programme in this area.

Specific examples of capacity improvement at *Gozar*, *Nahia* or national level include:

Improved knowledge and systems (SMIS, APIS) relating to information management

Strengthened knowledge and skills relating to community engagement

Enhanced capacity for safayi revenue mobilisation, from invoicing to collection, tracking and reporting

Reinforced capacities for survey design and implementation, and management of resultant information including GPS tags and GIS data, contributing to improved urban planning

Empowered gozar leadership, leading to more decentralised project implementation

Improved understanding of strategic urban planning at nahia level

Improved accountability mechanisms, reducing opportunities for corruption

However, despite these laudable improvements in municipal and national capacity, the mid-term evaluation already cautioned that a second phase of the programme should devote further attention to building the capacity of domestic stakeholders. This conclusion was echoed by the Completion Report, which noted that the capacity of government counterparts should have been better assessed prior to the programme, as institutional capacities were initially over-estimated. As a result, the programme had to spend considerable programme time training government counterparts on the job and/or taking up additional tasks that the government partner had been assumed to be capable of. For example, KM proved unable to successfully

procure the services of an expert contractor for the street addressing system for over two years. Conversely however, one government stakeholder indicated that *'The procurement process at [the] implementing agency needs improvement to expedite the implementation process.'*

Feedback from some beneficiaries indicated that they still have limited expectations of KM, which may suggest that from the community perspective, municipal capacity remains weak. Surveyed government representatives also reported that the most critical challenge remains the lack of sufficient human resources at MUDA and its district offices to secure programme results, not least due to the high turnover of staff at KM due to political instability. This was deemed by some stakeholders to have had a negative impact on the programme effectiveness and efficiency. Government stakeholders requested ongoing and regular capacity building programme in technical areas like GIS, IT and data management during FGDs.

Specifically, the perceived lack of improvement in service delivery, combined with the fact that KM has not yet formally accepted responsibility for some of the infrastructure projects, may indicate that the capacities of municipal staff and systems for inclusive service delivery remains limited. By contrast, the production of SNAPs and associated infrastructure projects, combined with increases in revenue indicate that capacities and systems for urban planning and municipal revenue collection appear to have been successfully strengthened.

Overall, these activities collectively appear to have been a positive first step to improving land tenure, basic infrastructure and service delivery. However, the theory of change appears to have omitted a number of key steps, through the assumption that the given inputs and outputs would be sufficient to achieve the Outcomes (Results) and objectives. Given that many of the Outcomes have only been partly achieved, it appears that these causal linkages need to be more fully elaborated to ensure that the higher-level objectives are indeed achieved.

### 3.4 EFFICIENCY

Efficiency is a measure of the relationship between Inputs (the resources that it uses) and Outputs (interventions products or services).

This section will address aspects of the programme's efficiency, through the following questions:

- 1. How efficiently were the inputs (financial and human resources), partnerships, policies and implementations strategies used to achieve the planned outputs?**
- 2. To what extent did the management structure of the programme support efficiency for programme implementation?**
- 3. Were activities and outputs delivered in a cost-efficient and timely manner? Specifically, what was the cost efficiency of UN-Habitat's technical assistance for the development of capacity within the partner departments of GoIRA?**

#### 3.4.1. Financial Resources

Overall, the costs associated with the implementation of KSMNP were aligned with those associated with other programmes of similar scale and scope. The budget was efficiently disbursed (Table 11) to achieve the key Indicators (Table 12). However, there was a substantial reduction in Indicator and Output targets between Inception and Completion, indicating that there were challenges to meeting targets as per the timeline. In addition, the programme was granted a No-Cost Extensions (NCE), suggesting that there were challenges to cost-efficient implementation which resulted in a substantial increase in the Unit Cost of some Activities (notably, street signing, OC issuance). Furthermore, whilst the (revised) Indicator targets have largely been achieved, the Expected Results have only been partially achieved.



**Table 11: Budget Spending Efficiency**

Item	Amount (USD)
Total Funding Received by March 2020 <sup>24</sup>	32,898,187
Total Expenditure as of March 2020	30,178,457
Expenditure Rate of Received funding as of March 2020	92%
Total Remaining Funding to be Spent	2,719,730

**Table 12: Budget expenditure per Output and Activity**

Expected Result	Activity	Budget Allocation (USD)	Percentage of Budget	Evaluators' Assessment of Activity Achievement
<b>R1</b>	<b>A1.1</b> Kabul Municipality to undertake citywide property survey/registration and house numbering	8,724,665	27%	Achieved
	<b>A1.2</b> Strengthen municipal finance and revenue collection systems and capacities especially of Nahia offices	1,701,480	5%	Partially Achieved
	<b>A1.3</b> Support strategic urban planning for LED and inclusive service delivery	1,668,041	5%	Partially Achieved
	<b>A1.4</b> Registered properties are issued with occupancy certificate to increase tenure security and stimulate LED	2,376,610	7%	Partially Achieved
<b>R2</b>	<b>A2.1</b> Kabul Municipality delivers strategic service/infrastructure projects in line with Nahia strategic plans to stimulate local economic development	6,764,480	21%	Partially Achieved
	<b>A2.2</b> Establish representative Gozar Assemblies (GAs) to foster improved municipal-citizen relations to build social contract	2,052,480	6%	Partially Achieved
	<b>A2.3</b> Improve access to Gozar-level infrastructure and services	8,148,480	25%	Partially Achieved

<b>R3</b>	<b>A3.1</b> Strengthen the national enabling environment and institutional capacities (MUDA, ARAZI and KM) for land management, strategic urban planning, and inclusive municipal governance	1,461,951	4%	Partially Achieved
<b>Total</b>		<b>32,898,187</b>	<b>100%</b>	

### 3.4.2. Management Structure and Partnerships

Overall, the management structure and partnerships for the programme supported efficiency of implementation, including through the People's Process, PIUs and embedded project staff, and coherent linkages with similar interventions, like MGSP. The management structure involved multiple levels, including the following:

- A National Coordination Mechanism gave the overall programme direction and monitored progress. It functioned as a coordination mechanism for national-level government engagement. The mechanism was comprised of all government and key civil society partners. It met on a six-monthly basis.
- The National Programme Management Unit (PMU) was the technical secretariat of this programme. It was comprised of all relevant institutions (ARAZI, KM, MUDA, IDLG), represented by technical-level staff. It was responsible for programme steering, implementation and monitoring and officially met on a quarterly basis to review progress, take corrective action where necessary, and develop reports and inputs for decision making in the national coordination mechanism. These staff were located in the Kabul Municipality main office.
- Nahia Managers, heading Nahia Offices, were responsible for day-to-day programme implementation, with technical assistance from programme staff. Nahia managers will report to the PIU using standard weekly and monthly reporting templates. Provincial Authorities and line departments coordinated with the programme through the Nahia-level activities. They were engaged in the urban strategic planning activities, ensuring their assets and priorities are reflected in the Nahia plan.
- Communities, through the Gozar Assemblies, cooperated with Nahia officials through structured engagement mechanisms (e.g. Nahia meetings, workshops, etc), supported by programme staff. Gozars presented sub-project proposals to them for review and approval.

UN-Habitat Afghanistan, supported by ROAP, as the implementing partners, provided dedicated technical assistance at all these levels, including senior international staff supporting the planning and implementation of the national coordination mechanism and PIU meetings, qualified Afghan technical staff embedded in the Nahia office, and experienced community organisers and engineers at Gozar level. Interviews with government, beneficiaries and UN-Habitat indicate that this structure appears to have worked well for these parties.

### 3.4.3. Human Resources

The programme dovetailed with a number of related interventions – most notably its sister project, MGSP – which has helped to improve its overall impact. The implementation modality, which leveraged domestic resources and pursued an Afghan-led approach, is likely to have contributed to efficiency of implementation. This programme sought to work through and with the government, rather than on behalf of or in parallel to the government. In part, this was achieved by embedding technical assistance. Specifically, the two Programme Implementation Units (PIUs), which were embedded with ARAZI and Kabul municipality, have played a key role in improving efficiency. This has been particularly effective in ARAZI, where programme staff are continuing their work following the end of the programme. Discussions with

government stakeholders emphasised the critical importance of PIUs, particularly given the limited capacity and lack of experience of implementing such a complex programme within the relevant government departments.

Embedding programme staff within the *tashkeel* has been a very positive innovation in terms of building capacity and strengthening ownership, as well as promoting sustainability. Moreover, the co-location of all government staff of ARAZI, KM and MUDA have been a very valuable contribution to secure efficiency, as it helped to facilitate coordination and streamline the implementation of key activities. From the perspective of the government, efficiency was improved by reducing bureaucratic impediments. This has involved simplifying administration procedures, such as reducing the number of units involved in the processing of OCs from six to three units.

As a result of the above, Activities and Outputs appear to have been broadly delivered in a timely manner. In most cases, inputs contributed directly to the achievement of planned outputs, implying a degree of internal efficiency. For example:

Property Survey and Registration	▶	Historic property database to inform strategic urban planning
Strengthening Safayi taxation systems	▶	Revenue Enhancement
Strategic Urban Planning & Block Grants	▶	Tangible infrastructure developments
Establishment of Gozar Assemblies	▶	Forum for participatory planning

On the other hand, government-led implementation also posed challenges in terms of efficiency of implementation, including time-lags associated with securing approvals from government leadership. In addition, Kabul municipality proved unable to deliver their agreed contribution to the street addressing component, despite the fact that UN-Habitat successfully executed its responsibilities. This was attributed to their inability to secure a suitable vendor for the street signs, even after three rounds of procurement. These inefficiencies suggested a lack of capacity amongst government counterparts to achieve these activities.

Capacity constraints within government counterparts were a common challenge in terms of efficiency. The programme over-estimated the institutional capacity of some of the government partners before the start of the programme. This meant that either the programme had to spend considerable program time training government counterparts on the job and/or taking up additional tasks that the government partner had been assumed to be capable of.

The responsibility for the implementation of the block grants was shifted from Kabul municipality to Gozar Assemblies. The ProDoc envisioned that nahia projects would be implemented by KM and gozar projects would be implemented through GAs. In the end, both gozar and nahia projects were implemented through Agreements of Cooperation (AOCs) with Gozar Assemblies, as this was expected to be more efficient, particularly following the introduction of a new policy in 2017 mandating that all agreements with government entities would have to be cleared and approved by Cabinet, which had proven to be a lengthy process in the past.

The implementation of block grants by the communities was an efficient implementation modality. Feedback from beneficiaries who participated in FGDs validates the expectation that the community implementation modality would be more efficient; people felt that community-driven projects were cost effective because people contributed their own resources and were therefore incentivised to monitor the results. This was corroborated during interviews with the implementing agency. However, it appears that there has been some resistance to this implementation modality from the government side throughout the programme lifespan, particularly as Kabul municipality has initially anticipated that district offices would implement sub-projects. As a result, there was some reluctance from the government to sign off on the completed sub-projects.

Interviews with the implementing agency and partners suggest that there were also substantial delays

for some other aspects of the programme. Most notably, the issuance of OCs was significantly delayed. In part, this was due to external factors that were beyond the control of the programme. For example, the OC Regulation that was developed in 2017 included a number of Articles that imposed novel criteria for the issuance of OC, including fees. These new conditions were not included in the Programme Document, although this had been developed in close collaboration with the government. As a result of these challenges, and in consultation with the donor, the target for OC issuance was cut from 300,000 to 13,882. Other targets were also revised as a result of the decision by the donor not to grant a no-cost extension.

The implementing agency has faced some challenges in the delivery of the Safayi Municipal Information System (SMIS) and Afghanistan Property Information System (APIS). The rich data collected under the programme was to be packaged into custom-made database applications for ARAZI and Kabul municipality to use. This process was sub-contracted to another development partner, and the delivery of these systems is currently pending.

### 3.5 IMPACT

This section provides an overview of the key impacts of the programme, by attempting to answer the following questions:

1. What positive changes have occurred as a result of the programme?
2. What were unintended effects, if any, of the programme?
3. How did the programme influence the work the Kabul municipality and nahias?

The programme has had a largely positive impact. A number of positive changes have occurred as a result of the programme, including<sup>25</sup>:

#### Observed Impacts

##### Property Registration



Circa 80% of all properties within Kabul municipality were surveyed and registered. This was deemed to be a historical result. It has already supported increased revenue generation, informed strategic urban planning and facilitated the issuance of Safayi booklets, which represent a form of de-facto tenure.

##### Strategic Urban Planning



20 Strategic Nahia Action Plans (SNAPs) and associated Capital Investment Plans (CIPs) were developed, which led directly to infrastructural investments in the form of 82 sub-projects worth US\$ 10.4 million at nahia and gozar level.

##### Community projects improving wellbeing



Infrastructure sub-projects were very well received by surveyed beneficiaries, who reported that their quality of life had improved as a result of projects, such as paved roads, drainage and parks. It was reported that women also benefited directly, including from women's parks. In addition, beneficiaries noted that community-based implementation of these projects helped to build a sense of ownership and civic responsibility. Discussions with community and government stakeholders revealed that infrastructural developments were deemed to be permanent changes, provided KM ensured regular maintenance.

25

Priority has been given in this section to longer term effects (i.e. impacts) of the programme. Please refer to the Effectiveness section for a more detailed analysis of the programme's effectiveness in terms of progress towards the achievement of indicators, Outputs, Outcomes and Objectives.

### OCs awarded to women



Of the 14,894 OCs issued, 12,514 certificates were issued jointly (to male and female beneficiaries), 2,208 OC were issued to male beneficiaries and 172 to female beneficiaries. Whilst this is a small proportion of the total number of certificates issued, it nonetheless represented a historical shift, as it was the first time that females were represented on ownership documents.

### Improved tenure security



Despite the fact that the legal basis of occupancy documents remains to be secured, surveyed beneficiaries felt that their tenure security had improved through the issuance of Safayi and Occupancy Certificates (OCs). Prior to the project, beneficiaries commonly possessed no ownership documents whatsoever. Based on an impact survey conducted in Kabul in February 2020, 98% of residents felt that land occupancy certificates were essential to secure property. This was an important impact of the programme because improved tenure security helps to create an enabling environment for individual security and private investment. However, the legal basis of occupancy documents may need to be clarified to ensure that these documents can be used to pursue equitable redress in ownership disputes through the courts.

### Bankability of loans



Discussions with beneficiaries indicated that OCs had been used to secure small bank loans, though they were not used as collateral, but rather as proof of assets. Provided that the legal anchor of OCs can be strengthened, the ability to use of OCs as collateral is a significant impact of the programme. If successfully scaled up, this could contribute to local economic development.

### Empowered community leadership



475 Gozar Assemblies (GAs) were established. GAs played an important role in linking citizens with KM and government departments and were generally well regarded in their own right by surveyed beneficiaries.

The programme appears to have positively influenced the work of Kabul municipality and Nahias, including by:



Reinforced capacities for survey design and implementation, and management of resultant information including GPS tags and GIS data, contributing to improved urban planning.



Improving knowledge and systems (SMIS, APIS) relating to information management, which has helped to integrate dispersed information into one system. As a result, government officials, with the support of UN-Habitat, have been able to increase revenue collection, develop strategic urban plans, and implement infrastructural development projects. The latter also indicate an improved understanding of strategic urban planning at nahia level.



Strengthening knowledge and skills relating to community engagement<sup>26</sup>. As a result, KM and nahias appear to be more comfortable and proficient in engaging community leadership. This appears to have facilitated more decentralised project implementation, despite initial pushback from government.

26

It should be noted that UN-Habitat works with nahias across several of its projects. As such, any observed changes in terms of strengthened knowledge and skills relating to community engagement are likely to be the aggregate result of multiple interventions.



Enhanced capacity for safayi revenue mobilisation, from invoicing to collection, which has driven a substantial increase in revenue income. However, this may need to be paired with improvements in the delivery of municipal services to incentivise citizens to continue paying taxes and ensure sustained revenue income.



Improved accountability mechanisms, reducing opportunities for corruption. Most of the programme activities were implemented through or with active roles for communities. This direct engagement of communities in local development activities apparently led some government representatives to feel more accountable to their citizens. Moreover, activities including (but not limited to) improved record-keeping, automated calculation of safayi fees and mandatory payment of Safayi at the bank, and the systematic verification of survey quality, have reduced opportunities for corruption.

Given the complex nature of the intervention and its working environment, it is to be expected that a number of intended impacts have not yet fully materialized. At present, the programme is likely to have contributed to the creation of some of the conditions required for the following impacts to be realized in future:

### Potential Future Impacts

#### Increased tenure security: 'occupancy certificates are a stepping stone'

Safayi booklets and Occupancy Certificates represent a substantial improvement in tenure security in a context where people previously had no ownership documents. However, these documents are not land titles and their legal basis remains tenuous. Therefore, the potential of these documents to support dispute resolution over property ownership is limited. Nonetheless, the issuing of these documents represents an incremental shift along the continuum of land rights, thus creating the basis for de-facto tenure security to be further strengthened in the future.

#### Improved Service delivery

At present, beneficiaries reported that they saw little or no improvement in municipal service delivery, although this perception varied by service. Better monitoring of the allocation of Safayi revenues is required to understand whether these funds are used efficiently and effectively, in order to tailor future interventions to promote improved service delivery.

#### Local Economic Development (LED)

By fixing the economic potential of assets and integrating dispersed information into one system, the programme created the foundations for local economic development. However, in order to realise positive economic outcomes, it is necessary to make people accountable (clarify and strengthen the legal basis of ownership documents), make assets fungible (clarify the market value of ownership documents and facilitate their use in market transactions), network people and protect transaction (implement the systems required to facilitate and track the use of ownership documents for legal interactions and market transactions).

#### Strengthened enabling environment

The programme developed a number of key policy and legislative documents to lay the foundations for urban planning, land management and municipal governance. However, the legal basis of key results (e.g. OCs, Safayi fees etc.) will need to be substantially strengthened for the programme objectives to be fully achieved and secured.

#### Further improved government capacity and ownership

The programme devoted substantial effort to improving government capacity, but government capacity and ownership will require further strengthening to secure existing impacts over time and achieve outstanding but expected impacts.

Future programming may wish to devote additional effort towards the achievement of the impacts tabled above.

Based on the collection of evidence underpinning this evaluation, there was no direct evidence of unintended negative effects.

### 3.6 SOCIAL INCLUSION ISSUES

The section seeks to evaluate the extent to which KSMNP integrated the needs of different groups and promoted social inclusion by addressing the following questions (as set out in the TOR):

- 1. To what extent were the social inclusion issues of gender, human rights, climate and youth considerations integrated in programme design, implementation, monitoring and reporting on the programme?**
- 2. Are there any outstanding examples of how these issues were successfully applied in the programme?**

The programme sought to integrate the needs of different groups and promote social inclusion. This appears, in part, to have been successfully facilitated by the Peoples' Process, which promoted broad-based participation. For example, the selection of sub-projects was reported to be community-driven, including through participatory one-day workshops that included women and youth at nahia level. Whilst these workshops are likely to have increased public engagement, such discrete events alone may not have been sufficient to fully engage all beneficiaries, particularly vulnerable groups. Nonetheless, the community stakeholders who participated in FGDs suggested that beneficiaries felt that the programme was implemented in an inclusive manner (although it should be noted that these respondents were male).

*"As a head of community, not only myself but a large number of youths, adults, and aged population took active part in planning and implementation of KSMNP."*

**- COMMUNITY LEADER**

Gender: Gender inequality is a major challenge in cities with urban women and girls facing significant structural barriers to their full social and economic participation. The programme planned to address this through the measures listed in Table 13.

**Table 13: Gender Measures**

<b>Mixed-gender Gozar Assemblies</b>
Mixed-Gender Gozar Assemblies, with at least three female members and one female Chair or Deputy.
<b>Improved women's land rights</b>
Improved women's land rights through modifications to safayi guidelines and re-formulation of the land certification legislation
<b>Gender-sensitive Guidelines</b>
Sub-project guidelines developed to ensure Gozar-level female participation in project selection, and that sub-projects do not only 'do no harm' to women and girls but also meet their needs and priorities for access to improved infrastructure and services

### **Dedicated budget for female-oriented sub-projects**

At least 25% budget allocation of Nahia-level block grants allocated to female sub-projects, identified in public consultations, with the specific aim to improve urban space, mobility and employment opportunities for women and girls

### **Gender-sensitive recruitment**

At least 35% female programme staff, including in senior positions, and balanced across all target Nahias. Discussions with representatives from USAID Afghanistan indicated that KSMNP, together with similar programmes, had contributed to an increase in the number of female staff working at KM. Some interviewees reported that Survey teams were composed of 50% females.

### **Programme monitoring and reporting using sex-disaggregated data**

Project activities, outputs and outcomes were monitored using sex-disaggregated data. Gender analyses were conducted to ensure social impact and economic benefit reach both men and women equitably.

### **Empowerment of young women**

UN-Habitat hosted 70 female undergraduate students in the Professional Practice Programme, providing an opportunity for young women to apply their academic knowledge and gain work experience from the field.

The programme design was well-intentioned, and it appears to have helped to open the door to a greater role of women in decision making processes by positioning women as an integral part of participatory processes in strategic action planning initiatives at the gozar level. However, male-dominated community workshops and municipal nahia offices resulted in fewer women-focused sub-projects, despite the mandated quotas. There was a general lack of interest in women-focused planning workshops and sub-projects. Interviews with male beneficiaries indicated that male participants were consulting with their female family members and endorsing their preferences at meetings. Nonetheless, To ensure more women focused urban infrastructure and services, both development partners and the municipality should consider women-only planning workshops and strict quotas for selection of women-focused projects in future programming.

One key achievement of the project is fact that females were officially titled for the first time in Afghan history. Women now have the right to possess and occupancy certificate under their name. Out of the 14,894 OCs issued, 12,514 certificates were issued jointly (male and female), 2,208 OC were issued to male beneficiaries and 172 to female beneficiaries. This was a landmark result and a significant first step towards improved land tenure for women.

Youth: Afghanistan has one of the youngest populations in the world, with almost 80% of the population under 30 years of age. As a result, youth were naturally a key target group of the programme<sup>27</sup>. This is reflected by the following:



**Table 14: KSMNP Youth Engagement**

<b>Youth empowered to participate in planning and decision-making</b>
Community leaders noted that the programme allowed for many different stakeholders to be involved in planning, including youth and the elderly. For example, youth were part of shura meetings for the planning of infrastructure projects (road construction, canal construction). Specifically, youth were reportedly involved in Districts 6, Gozar 22 and District 17, Gozar 2, in the planning process for road construction.
<b>Youth-oriented projects</b>
Many infrastructure projects appear to have benefited children and young people. For example, the pavement of roads was reported by community stakeholders to improve children and young people's access to school. This was deemed to be particularly important during the rainy season. Similarly, parks were noted to provide a safe space for children and youth.
<b>Youth work experience</b>
The survey teams were commonly comprised of young people, helping to engage youth.

*"Infrastructure projects improved our lives. Before KSMNP constructed our streets, our children were not going to schools when it was raining. Even after the end of the rain, there was mud in the streets and small children could not go to school for many days. Thanks to KSMNP that enabled children to go to school every day."*

**- COMMUNITY LEADER**

UN-Habitat also promotes **a human rights-based approach (HRBA)** across all its programming, including in Afghanistan. For example, UN-Habitat Afghanistan co-chairs the Housing, Land and Property Rights Taskforce (HLP-TF). Whilst external to this programme, the aim of the task force, which is to increase access to land, tenure security, and housing, is directly aligned with the programme objectives. This programme itself was also explicitly designed to respect and promote all Human Rights, as outlined in the UN Charter on Human Rights.

UN-Habitat recognizes that it is *'only when all dimensions of human rights are respected will urbanization realise itself as the transformative force that it is'*<sup>28</sup>. UN-Habitat committed to mainstreaming Human Rights in November 2014 in order to ensure that human rights to adequate housing and basic services are realized for the urban poor and the most vulnerable urban dwellers. KSMNP directly contributes to the achievement of this Strategic Result and its four associated Expected Accomplishments, as well as human rights more broadly (Table 14 and 15, respectively).

**Table 15: Expected Achievements under UN-Habitat's Human Rights Mainstreaming Approach**

<b>UN-Habitat enabled to empower stakeholders on human rights issues related to adequate housing and basic services</b>
A human rights-based approach involves moving away from assessing the needs of beneficiaries towards empowering and building the capacity claims-holders in asserting their rights. KSMNP was implemented through the People's Process, which included awareness raising and tangible efforts to empower stakeholders' rights on these topics.

28 <https://unhabitat.org/sites/default/files/download-manager-files/Human%20Rights%20Mainstreaming%2827Nov2014%-29Final-PDF.pdf>

### **Claim-holders able to assert rights to adequate housing and basic services**

By promoting de-facto tenure security through the issuing of safayi notebooks and occupancy certificates, KSMNP contributes towards this achievement, although the strength of OCs is yet to be tested in the courts and banks.

### **Duty-bearers held accountable for achievement of rights to adequate housing and basic services.**

Gozar Assemblies have contributed to closing the gap between citizen and state, contributing towards this GoIRAI. Some government representatives also reported that they felt more accountable.

### **Human rights standards for adequate housing and basic services protected, fulfilled and respected by duty-bearers**

KSMNP contributes towards the achievement of this GoIRAI through the city-wide registration, strategic urban planning and infrastructure projects, as well as through systems to promote the delivery of Safayi services.

**Table 16: Global Human Rights addressed through KSMNP**

### **Article 17 and Tenure Security**

By promoting de-facto tenure security through the issuing of safayi notebooks and occupancy certificates, KSMNP directly supports Article 17, which states that (i) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others, and (ii) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.

### **Article 21 and the Peoples's Process**

KSMNP was implemented through the People's Process, which supports Article 21, which states that (i) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his/her country, directly or through freely chosen representatives, (ii) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country, (iii) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.

### **Article 25 and Improved Living Standards**

By working towards improving tenure security, basic infrastructure and service delivery, KSMNP addresses the right to an adequate standard of living (Article 25).

### **Article 2 and Social Inclusivity**

Based on an inclusive approach, the programme upholds the right to non-discrimination in this context.

**Climate considerations** appear to have been considered throughout the Strategic Urban Planning component, including for infrastructure development projects. However, climate change does not appear to have been a core focus of the programme, and it may require further attention in future programming.

### 3.7 SUSTAINABILITY

This section sets out the assess the sustainability of the programme by evaluating the likelihood that benefits from the programme will be continued. It seeks to answer the following questions:

- 1. Were the results achieved sustainable?**
- 2. To what extent was Kabul municipal capacity developed in order to ensure sustainability of the results and benefits achieved?**
- 3. What accountability and oversight systems were established to secure the benefits from the programme?**

The majority of activities in this programme are not new. They have been undertaken by UN-Habitat over the course of the last decade (as detailed under the Relevance section). Nevertheless the programme represents a 'scaling up'.

The programme document acknowledged that it would be unrealistic to expect that the Afghan government would directly be able to independently maintain key programme activities using its own capacity and resources. Therefore, it was expected that a 'Phase 2' would be required to consolidate achievements from the first four years and continue to build local capacities for eventual self-reliance. Therefore, Sustainability indicators are evaluated in this context.

Significant efforts were made to achieve the programme results in a sustainable manner. This included:

Legal and regulatory improvements for property registration, safayi taxation, and land certification to streamline the processes and clarify roles and responsibilities among government agencies

Advocacy for the use of part of the increased revenues for recruitment and training of an expanded tashkeel to undertake updates of property registration and to maintain registration, safayi and land certification systems

Community-based approaches, low-technology/maintenance designs, community and municipality contributions and alignment with municipal plans for the projects and sub-projects to promote local ownership, reduce recurring costs and ensure coordination with city-level infrastructure

Emphasis on strategic action planning (as opposed to master planning) to ensure a faster, participatory process for urban planning that is linked to realistic plans and sub-projects that are financed

Institutionalising the land management, urban planning and municipal finance processes in the municipal structure, including the establishment and registration of Gozars as part of the sub-national governance system and the vision for scaling up.

Gozar Assemblies have contributed to closing the gap between citizen and state, contributing towards this GoIRAI. Some government representatives also reported that they felt more accountable.

Human rights standards for adequate housing and basic services protected, fulfilled and respected by duty-bearers

KSMNP contributes towards the achievement of this GoIRAI through the city-wide registration, strategic urban planning and infrastructure projects, as well as through systems to promote the delivery of Safayi services.

As a result, it is possible that select results will be sustained over time, creating the building blocks for further development and expansion of the programme. For example, discussions with government stakeholders indicated their belief that the development of (GIS and other) databases and systems for information management and revenue collection, and the establishment of shuras at district- and community-level were deemed sustainable.

However, the sustainability of the results varies substantially.

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*"Government has so many other priorities and cannot fulfil our community needs as needed."*

**- COMMUNITY LEADER**

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Specifically, there were concerns about:

### **Breached Social Contract and Potential for Discontinuation of Safayi Revenue Generation**

Safayi revenue and OC fees may not provide sufficient income to support the continuation of programme activities, thus undermining the sustainability of key Outcomes. Already, there has been a substantial decline in safayi revenue between 2018 and 2019, possibly attributable to the limited delivery of municipal services, constituting a perceived breach of the social contract.

Specifically, this may undermine:

- The provision of service delivery, which is already deemed to be limited by beneficiaries.
- The operation and maintenance of infrastructure developed through the programme sub-projects. At present, a number of key infrastructure developments have not yet been formally accepted by KM from the contractors, raising concerns that they will not be maintained. Surveyed beneficiaries were particularly concerned about this.
- The systems underpinning Safayi tax collection and OC issuance. OC issuance has already been put on hold whilst the legal framework for land valuation and delineation is clarified.

### **Inappropriate/Incomplete Regulatory Frameworks**

The regulatory frameworks underpinning the achievement of key results, including OCs and Safayi taxes, remains tenuous. Whilst the programme made positive contributions to secure the legal and legislative basis for tenure security, many of these documents are awaiting formal adoption by the government (e.g. Guidelines on Land Value Zoning, Informal Settlements Upgrading Policy, Safayi Guidelines and Regulation), or require further clarification (Regulation on Land Occupancy Certificates) It is therefore possible (if not likely) that these results will not be sustained in the absence of continued support from UN-Habitat for the time being. In addition, external legislative changes (including the revision of the Land Management Law and development of the new Municipal Law) have delayed the achievement of these reforms.

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### Turnover of mayoral administrations

The challenges associated with the turnover in mayoral administrations had a significant impact on the programme. This is because the change in leadership had a cascade effect, whereby the hierarchical nature of the organization within KM led to a widespread change in the staffing of ministries, municipalities and technical units. As a result, there was limited continuity in the civil service. This challenge was exacerbated by the fact that activities to ensure a proper handover, orientation or backstopping for incumbent staff were limited, or have required multiple such handovers in the course of the programme implementation. Overall, this appears to have restricted the change in institutional capacity and the retention of knowledge. In addition, a number of activities were put on hold pending approval by the new mayor and the President's Office, which slowed the momentum of the programme.

Discussions with beneficiaries and government stakeholders alike indicated that the turnover of leadership at Kabul Municipality delayed the formal acceptance of the handover of some infrastructure sub-projects. Beneficiaries expressed their concerns regarding the upkeep and maintenance of these projects. Government stakeholders indicated that KM would assume these responsibilities pending approval from HE President.

However, it is hoped that the communities have been sufficiently informed and empowered, through their Gozar Assemblies, to be able to demand that commitments made by Kabul municipality are realised, irrespective of leadership. For example, the SNAPs may represent a tangible, mutually agreed document that may be used to lobby the government.

### 3.7.1 Capacity Development and Capacity Gaps in the Context of Sustainability

Kabul municipality capacity was developed significantly, and government stakeholders expressed confidence in the new capacities to sustain and scale the programme approach and results. Specifically, the Programme Implementation Units (PIUs) were seen to be a very valuable capacity-building tool based on discussions with government stakeholders, because they allowed the transfer of necessary skills and techniques, including for survey design, municipal revenue management, coordination, reporting, GIS and database management.

However, key capacity gaps remain. The mid-term evaluation reported that a second phase of the programme should devote further attention to building the capacity of national stakeholders. Similarly, the Completion Report found that the capacity of government counterparts should have been better assessed prior to the programme, as institutional capacities were initially over-estimated. Moreover, community members were concerned about capacity in KM and MUDA. Some of the surveyed government representatives echoed this; explaining that they saw government capacity as a key constraint in securing programme results.

*"Most of KM/MOUDA staff is not trained and qualified."*

**- COMMUNITY LEADER**

Outstanding gaps include:

Sufficient technical skills for ongoing GIS, IT and data management

Skills and systems for inclusive service delivery

Skills for continued community consultation in informal settlements at the nahia level, such as for participatory workshops and on the design of infrastructure investments, such as parks

Skills for revenue/financial management and resource allocation, including transparent monitoring and reporting, especially at nahia level

Skills for improved land management, including for systematic issuing of OCs and to resolve potential ownership disputes

Internal ability to identify capacity gaps and promote relevant capacity development or manage recruitment to overcome gaps

Technical capacity to develop key regulatory instruments and determination to ensure that these instruments are reflected in law

### 3.7.2 Accountability and Oversight Mechanisms

The programme sought to increase accountability and transparency of land management and taxation. As such, the following accountability and oversight systems were established to secure the benefits from the programme:

#### Overarching accountability and oversight mechanisms

An independent oversight mechanism was established at the national level, chaired by HE President. It was mandated to review and monitor progress and take corrective action where necessary. In addition, a Dispute Resolution and Anti-Corruption mechanisms was established, supported by Oversight Consultants.

#### Improved Safayi Systems and Oversight mechanisms

A unit was established to independently monitor the safayi process. It undertook random 'spot-checks', such as checking 30 out of every 1000 properties surveyed. The unit also included an independent citizen dispute resolution mechanism for the safayi process, to ensure that citizens and Gozars have recourse to independent support. This unit was aligned with other national anti-corruption initiatives. In addition, significant modifications were made to the safayi system, including:

- Simplification of the taxable value calculations (reduced number of criteria to be based on easily visible attributes e.g. land area; building type)
- Mandatory payment of Safayi fees at a local Bank; never in cash at Nahia office
- Updating and simplification of the land value zoning map, aligned with Gozar boundaries.
- Use of a digital system and records to support remote monitoring and checking.
- Improved feedback mechanisms on safayi collection/arrears to citizens, through Gozar Assembly meetings, monthly newsletters, and annual reporting
- Clearly defined and agreed Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for safayi taxation along with training for roll-out.

The programme thus sought to improved accountability and transparency of revenue collection and promoted annual financial reporting. This was envisioned as a first step towards 'participatory budgeting', which may include holding citizen forums and meetings with Wakili Gozars and Gozar Assembly leaders

#### Community Oversight

In addition, the programme pursued a community-based approach, through the Gozar Assemblies, which was seen as a key strategy to improve accountability. This was based on experience over the past decade, which revealed that: 'the more eyes that are looking, the less chance of corruption and abuse of power by elites going unnoticed'.

Communities were mobilised and trained on anti-corruption, the rights and responsibilities of duty bearers and rights holders, and informed of the dispute resolution mechanism. Public campaign and communications during programme roll-out in each Nahia to improve clarity on SOPs, roles and responsibilities, and set expectations.

### 3.8 COHERENCE

This section sets out to evaluate the internal and external coherence of the programme by qualifying its consistency with other actors' interventions in the same context, with a focus on added value and avoidance of duplication of effort. It will seek to answer the following questions:

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**1. Was the programme coherent and implemented in synergy with other municipality finance and capacity building programmes?**

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**2. Was the programme coherent or complement other donors' development interventions?**

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The programme builds on previous interventions implemented by UN-Habitat and others. It was coherent with and implemented in synergy with other municipality finance and capacity building programmes, including (but not limited to):

- Afghanistan City for All (CFA) Initiative
- EU-funded MGSP: KSNMP dovetails with this programme under the CSA umbrella
- Afghanistan Urban National Priority Programme (U-NPP)
- World Bank-funded Afghanistan Land Administration System Project (ALASP)

Based on the available evidence, the programme has added substantial value to these interventions, whilst avoiding duplication of effort. Specifically, the programme complements these and other development and government interventions, including by:

- Laying the foundation for municipal elections through undertaking a detailed enumeration of all properties within the municipal boundaries
- Supporting the development of the National Urban Priority Programme (U-NPP) by contributing data and lessons learned
- Guiding larger-scale infrastructure investments through the strategic municipal actions plans, detailed at nahia level
- Supporting the development and implementation of the Urban Solidarity Programme, which focuses on community-based settlement upgrading
- Integrating urban land management under ARAZI, which previously only held records for non-municipal land
- Support the implementation of the IDP Policy and the development of Provincial/Municipal Action Plan in Kabul for local integration of IDPs and returnees

The programme successfully leveraged existing relationships and built new partnerships to ensure coherence, including with the Ministry of Urban Development Affairs (MUDA), Independent Directorate of Local Governance/General Directorate of Municipal Affairs (IDLG/GDMA), Kabul Municipality and its district offices, Afghan Land Authority (ARAZI), Office of the President (OoP) and Ministry of Finance (MoF), relevant Provincial Authorities and line departments, and Gozar Assemblies.

In terms of internal coherence, the programme sought to build on existing coordination mechanisms rather than replicate or create new ones. All programme staff providing technical assistance were embedded within the relevant government institutions, providing on-the-job technical assistance and mentoring of Tashkeel staff. All government staff of ARAZI, KM, and MUDA were physically located in the same Nahia office to ensure effective day-to-day programme implementation and avoid 'silos'. This helped to coordinate and streamline the safayi and land certification activities.

A National Coordination Mechanism gave the overall programme direction and monitored progress. It functioned as a coordination mechanism for national-level government engagement. The mechanism was comprised of all government and key civil society partners. It met on a six-monthly basis.

The National Programme Management Unit (PMU) is the technical secretariat of this programme. It was comprised of all relevant institutions (ARAZI, KM, MUDA, IDLG), represented by technical-level staff. It was responsible for programme steering, implementation and monitoring and officially met on a quarterly basis to review progress, take corrective action where necessary, and develop reports and inputs for decision making in the national coordination mechanism. These staff were located in the Kabul Municipality main office.

Nahia Managers, heading Nahia Offices, were responsible for day-to-day programme implementation, with technical assistance from programme staff. Nahia managers will report to the PIU using standard weekly and monthly reporting templates. Provincial Authorities and line departments coordinated with the programme through the Nahia-level activities. They were engaged in the urban strategic planning activities, ensuring their assets and priorities are reflected in the Nahia plan.

Communities, through the Gozar Assemblies, cooperated with Nahia officials through structured engagement mechanisms (e.g. Nahia meetings, workshops, etc), supported by programme staff. Gozars presented sub-project proposals to them for review and approval.

UN-Habitat, as the implementing partner, provided dedicated technical assistance at all these levels, including senior international staff supporting the planning and implementation of the national coordination mechanism and PIU meetings, qualified Afghan technical staff embedded in the Nahia office, and experienced community organisers and engineers at Gozar level.

### 3.9 CROSS-CUTTING BARRIERS AND CHALLENGES

Despite the good progress on key programme Indicators, there were a number of cross-cutting barriers and challenges to programme implementation which may undermine the sustainable attainment of higher-level objectives. These include:

#### Resistance to Change

##### **Completion Report; KII/FGDs with beneficiaries; government**

- The programme introduced a significant number of new methods, procedures and changes, such as computerised property registration and Safayi systems. Public officials who were unfamiliar with these new methods initially resisted them. A lengthy consultation process with senior management of KM, combined with on-the-job training, was required to sensitise staff and overcome resistance.
- There was also resistance to community involvement in and management of finance for public projects. This is likely to be a legacy of historical 'top-down' governance, which may create barriers to more 'bottom-up', community-based governance. This preference for centralised governance was also observed during the strategic urban planning component, which was hampered by a preference for centralised planning. Afghanistan has a long history of very centralised urban planning that rarely reflected the realities on the ground.
- Male-dominated community workshops and municipal nahia offices resulted in fewer women-focused sub-projects. There appears to have been a general lack of interest in women-focused planning and projects. The conservative mindsets regarding women's land rights and involvement in decision-making and public affairs may have restrained the full and equal involvement in and impact of the programme for women and girls.
- At ARAZI, an initial resistance to the occupancy certificates process dissipated with the establishment of the OC Directorate and embedding of a PIU at ARAZI, as well as the arrival of additional support from the World Bank's Afghanistan Land Administration System Project. Nonetheless, this initial resistance, combined with the lack of progress on regulatory reforms,



appears to have led to substantial delays in the issuing of occupancy certificates.

- The political turbulence associated with the appointment of the new mayor and the associated turnover of the mayoral administration led to a temporary suspension of some activities pending further approvals from the President's Office. The shift in mayoral leadership also led to a shift in priorities. For example, tentative commitments to earmark revenue for further community-based projects may be retracted.

## Legal and Policy Issues

### **Completion Report, KII/FGDs with government; UN-Habitat**

- The approval process for regulations, legislation and new policy is lengthy, and often required numerous consultations and coordination between multiple government departments and partners.
- The Safayi Regulation posed a major challenge for the Safayi process. The current safayi regulation is not adequate for a systematic, efficient, and transparent safayi system. The KSMNP programme has proposed various solutions, including amendments to the existing regulation, but it has been difficult to reach agreement with all partners. First, the government had to focus on completing the new Municipal Law, then, when the Municipal Law was passed, the government embarked on the development of a Municipal Revenue Law, which is to include provisions relevant to safayi fees. Nonetheless, amendments developed in consultation with senior municipal staff at a dedicated forum were approved by the municipal administrative board, which apparently helped to move the new Safayi process forwards, although many changes are not yet reflected by regulatory reform.
- Similarly, securing formal approval for the new land value zoning (LVZ) methodology has been a lengthy process involving extensive consultations that lasted three years. The LVZ valuation method for safayi was developed in 2017 but was only been approved by the cabinet in late 2019 to be used in Kabul as a pilot. Moreover, KM is currently awaiting formal endorsement from the President before implementing the new property values.
- The legal anchor for the SNAP process has remained weak, although SNAPs have been recognised by DMM as a component of the Strategic Municipal Action Plans (SMAPs) under the revised Municipal Law. The KSMNP programme has worked with DMM to institutionalize SMAPs in the forthcoming development guidelines for Strategic Municipal Plans.
- The Informal Settlements Upgrading Policy, which lays the foundation for in-situ regularisation and upgrading of viable informal/unplanned areas, appears to represent a core input to secure the regulatory framework of the settlement regularisation activity. It has been drafted, but the draft policy is still with the government for endorsement.
- Several bottlenecks have been identified during the implementation of the occupancy certificates (OC) process. Most of the bottlenecks emanate from the OC regulation that was gazetted in February 2018. These bottlenecks are substantial and have delayed the issuance of OCs to thousands of beneficiaries. The main bottlenecks were:
  - The requirement for payment of OC charges has necessitated the introduction of additional procedures and the involvement of additional actors in the OC process. A survey conducted by the MGSP programme in Kabul in June 2019 found that %75 of the households that had received OC invoices had not paid the charges and, out of these, %69 reported that they could not afford to pay the charges.
  - The OC charges are applied differently for properties on state land and private land. The delineation of state and private land is tedious and time consuming as ARAZI has only a few cadastral maps for small parts of urban areas, which leaves majority of urban areas uncovered.
  - Eligibility criteria for occupancy certificates include rigorous adjudication procedures to ascertain property claims, including the production of original property ownership documents. Households

that fail to provide sufficient evidence of ownership are deemed to occupy state land. In some cases, such households have resisted the OC programme. Furthermore, some of the eligibility criteria are difficult to implement (e.g. proof of 15 years continuous occupancy) and, therefore, controversial.

- KSMNP has recommended revisions to the OC regulation that are necessary to remedy these bottlenecks and unlock the distribution of OCs. These revisions are under process. The revisions will need to be reviewed by the Ministry of Justice and approved by the Urban High Council and the cabinet.

## Limited Administrative and Technical Capacity

### Completion Report

- The programme had a crosscutting focus on capacity building, but implementation was nonetheless constrained by weak domestic capacities, including for Safayi administration and financial management. For example, the introduction of an automated system of safayi invoicing meant that banks and nahia staff were unable to process the huge numbers of safayi payments. Residents were asked to pay safayi in a government bank (Pashtani Bank) that does not have many branches. This frustrated the residents who had to wait for long hours to pay safayi. Aside from embedding more revenue mobilizers in the nahias with more properties to enable nahias to process invoices and payments quicker, Kabul municipality's revenue department was advised to liaise with private banks and allow payment of safayi fee through private banks which had branches in all Kabul nahias. This led to an agreement between Kabul Municipality and Azizi Bank for payment of safayi as well as other municipal fees and charges. Nonetheless, transaction fees may still serve as an impediment to Safayi compliance.
- The programme over-estimated the institutional capacity of some of the government partners before the start of the programme. This meant that the programme had to spend considerable programme time training government counterparts on the job and/or taking up additional tasks that the government partner had been assumed to be capable of. One example stands out. Kabul municipality was unable to successfully procure the services of a contractor for part of the street addressing work in a period of more than two years.

The street addressing system proved to be especially difficult to implement, particularly in unplanned and irregular settlements; streets do not have uniform widths, houses are not laid out in regular patterns, and some do not have street access. Efforts to apply standards street addressing approaches from the World Bank manual were therefore inappropriate. Furthermore, most Kabul streets did not have government-approved names, and the relevant authorities had limited capacity to establish and translate street names. This required the assignment of additional time and resources by the KSMNP programme. These challenges required the engagement of an expert consultant to develop a tailor-made street coding and property numbering methodology for Kabul. Recruitment of the expert was delayed due to a general lack of expertise in street addressing.

## 4. KEY CONCLUSIONS

KSMNP was an ambitious and impactful programme. It contributed to the creation of the foundations for improved strategic urban planning and enhanced municipal governance. Specifically, the survey and registration activities have created the basis for increased revenue generation, strategic urban development and improved infrastructure, which have already generated a number of highly visible Outputs, including:

- The registration of nearly half a million properties (circa 80% of all properties) in Kabul, creating an up-to-date property registry and documentation of de facto tenure.
- The development of 20 strategic urban development plans to guide infrastructure investment.
- The increase in annual Safayi revenue from 550 million Afs to almost 700 million Afs, creating the economic basis for improved municipal services.
- The establishment of 386 Gozar Assemblies, creating an important forum to link citizens and state.

These Outputs appear to have contributed to **tangible improvements to the lives of Kabul's residents**. For example, an estimated 4.2 million people benefited from the 88 infrastructure projects which were implemented. The unprecedented scale and holistic nature of the programme contributed to this remarkable achievement. Moreover, some of the most valuable achievements of the programme are difficult to quantify. Specifically, the programme appears to have driven a shift in public psychology, social understanding and community expectations. Such invisible impacts may be intangible, but they are likely to prove invaluable in terms of creating the basis for increased trust and a stronger social contract.

The broad-based evidence underpinning this evaluation indicates that the programme leaves behind an overwhelmingly positive legacy and creates strong grounds for further programming to build upon. This is evidenced by the widespread requests from beneficiaries and government stakeholders for a Phase 2 of the programme. However, many of the higher-level Results and Objectives of the programme may still need further consolidation if they are to be secured and sustained in the longer term. This conclusion is perhaps to be expected given the level of ambition exhibited by the programme's three-pronged approach, particularly considering the complex environment that the programme operated within.

A Phase 2 of the programme should seek to consolidate the achievements of KSMNP to date, and might include the following key elements (which are further elaborated in Section 6 on Recommendations):

- Regulatory Reform to establish formal property laws, shifting OCs up the property rights continuum.
- Awareness raising to the judicial and banking systems, as well as beneficiaries, on OCs and other ownership documents
- Strengthened service delivery to improve community trust in the government's capacity to deliver on services in return for Safayi fees.

## 5. LESSONS LEARNED

The following lessons highlight new knowledge and insights that came about as a result of the implementation of programme activities, the interaction between programme stakeholders, the Outputs produced by the programme, and the Outcome and impact of the programme stakeholders and beneficiaries. The lessons are informed by the programme reports as well as novel findings from the primary data collection conducted during the process of this evaluation.

### **An integrated approach can achieve remarkable results**

The program pioneered a complex three-pronged approach that sought to simultaneously address land management, strategic urban planning, and municipal governance and citizen engagement. Whilst this was ambitious, it appears to have contributed to the substantial achievements of the programme and created a solid foundation for future urban development.

### **Community-driven approaches are key to sustainability**

Despite the substantive focus on government, it appears that one of the most sustainable aspects of the programme was the model of community involvement. The empowerment of community leadership and engagement in decision-making are valuable results. Despite the turbulent political environment, which is characterised by high rates of turnover in government, communities should now have more leverage to lobby for the provision of services and infrastructure.

### **Bringing together government, nahias and gozars was a positive approach to strategic urban planning**

Afghanistan has a long history of highly centralised urban planning within ARAZI. Previous plans that were developed in this way did not always reflect the realities on the ground, leading to constraints on their implementation. Conversely, community and municipal groups, supported by UN and other agencies, pursued community-based approaches to planning. However, these two approaches rarely converged. KSMNP targeted a mid-road by disaggregating the centralised government plan to the nahia level and hosting workshops with the community to work through their needs, priorities and challenges. By bridging the gap between central government and communities, linked through the nahias, the programme could ensure that priority projects are reflective of real community needs.

### **The majority of property owners in Kabul support the implementation of community projects by Gozar Assemblies**

70% of property owners in Kabul felt that projects implemented by GAs are useful for residents. Evidence from discussions with beneficiaries supported this finding, indicating that beneficiaries and community members appreciated the way in which GAs implemented projects.

### **Learning by doing proved to be an effective tool for capacity building**

The programme was implemented through Programme Implementation Units (PIUs) comprising both programme staff and their counterparts in partner departments of the government. These functional units effectively fostered team spirit. Government counterparts were trained on-the-job, allowing them to start producing Outputs as soon as they were ready, with the support and supervision of the municipality, ministry and UN-Habitat. Towards the end of the programme, programme staff were absorbed into the government tashkeel to continue their work, which is testament to the value of this embedded approach to capacity building.

### **Develop a detailed and time-bound roadmap to chart the course of action in detail before implementation**

The programme might have benefited from a more elaborate 'roadmap for action', which clarified and detailed the causal linkages and steps required to achieve the desired objective. Specifically, the regulatory frameworks that govern programme activities and outputs need to be clarified and a road map developed to put them in place in good time. While some of the regulatory instruments required by the programme could be passed in relatively good time (e.g. Occupancy Certificates regulation), others were either delayed (e.g. Land Value Zoning regulation) or not passed at all (e.g. recommendations for revision of the Safayi regulation), with clear implications for the sustainability of programme outcomes. Similarly, clear understanding of programme objectives and the roles of all partners is key for achieving programme results.

### **Male dominated community workshops and municipal nahia officers resulted in fewer women-focused sub-projects**

There was a general lack of interest in women- focused planning workshops and sub-projects as most GAs were male-dominated and all nahia managers were male. To ensure more women- focused urban infrastructure and services, both development partners and the municipality should consider women-only planning workshops and strict quotas for selection of women-focused projects in future programming.

### **Clarify the legal basis and economic value of tenure documents to unlock their potential**

The issuance of de facto tenure documents (Safayi notebooks and occupancy certificates) was a key contribution of this programme. Aside from the delays in issuing occupancy certificates, a more fundamental challenge lies in clarifying and legalising their actual value to ensure that they can be used to strengthen tenure security and legally resolve ownership disputes, as well as to facilitate their use as collateral to release capital. Moreover, the uncertainties associated with the legal status of these tenure documents does not inspire confidence amongst market actors (individuals and businesses alike) to invest and thus stimulate local economic development.

### **Interventions that seek to strengthen the social contract need to monitor citizen and state compliance**

The programme aimed to strengthen the social contract between citizens and state by creating a situation wherein citizens paid their taxes in the understanding that the revenues generated would finance services in return. Conversely, this necessitates an understanding amongst government stakeholders that Safayi income is allocated to deliver municipal services. However, surveyed beneficiaries reported that service delivery remained poor. Moreover, FGDs indicated that this may undermine public trust and confidence in the government's capacity to deliver services. It is crucial to monitor not just Safayi income, but also subsequent revenue allocation, to track how these revenues are spent and validate the perceived lack of service delivery. This makes the government more accountable and allows for programming to be adjusted according to the reasons for the perceived poor service delivery.

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## 6. RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are derived from the evidence and analysis detailed above. They are also reflective of insights provided by the donor, implementing partners, community members and government stakeholders.

### Continuity and Tashkeel for Future Programmes

Continuity of staff engaging with, and delivering, projects and activities is very important for the sustainability of any similar interventions. In this case, transitioning supported staff onto the Tashkeel has clearly promoted sustainability of outcomes and capacity gains; future, similar, programmes should undertake to ensure similar measures are taken.

### Ensure Service Continuity after Funds End

As was highlighted throughout the report, gains and improvements of service delivery, and community improvement projects, slowed, declined, or faced challenges after funds and support from UN Habitat began to taper off. Initial gains in community confidence (i.e. faith in the social contract), were subsequently undermined by the challenges that began to arise once resources and supports dried up. This has the possibility to lead to disillusionment among residents, and consequent reticence to engage with future improvement initiatives. Future programmes should ensure there are continuity plans in place, or that the scale of support provided by UN Habitat and partners can be continued after completion of the project; it may be appropriate to consider reducing the provision of grants and service delivery support, in favour of other actions, seeking to minimise this challenge.

### Continuity Planning between Mayoral Administrations

While this may prove to be a substantial challenge, planning for continuity between mayoral administrations, and planning for the risks associated with mayoral turnover, is important to minimise disruptions to project implementation, as well as to promote improved sustainability of outcome. UN Habitat and partners should make more explicit plans, and develop strong strategies, to address this key challenge.

### Frame TOCs, and Project Objectives, in a Longer Term Way – Roadmap for Actions

The Theory of Change (TOC) for this project did, in broad terms, have linkages and pillars which were consistent with the evidence gathered, and outcomes achieved. However, there was a long way between the achieved inputs, and the high-level outcomes and impacts the programme sought to achieve. Such was the gap between them, that it may be appropriate to adopt a longer-term TOC, with more intermediate impacts, results, and activities, rather than the three-level approach taken with the current TOC. Charting more intermediate results, and working to identify the key needs and preconditions required to achieve them, may facilitate ongoing planning, as well as ensure continuity and coherence between different rounds of funding and different projects.

### Plan Concretely for Inclusion of Women, Youth, and Vulnerable Groups

In future programmes, the specific actions and activities seeking to address the needs, and promote inclusion, of women, youth, and other vulnerable groups likely need to be defined in detail during the proposal or initial planning phase. Whether that comprise women and youth advisory councils or groups, female participation targets, etc., should be left to the discretion of UN Habitat; it is clear, however, that highlighting key principles, or the desire to include these groups, short of specific and concrete plans, tend to result in challenges engaging key subgroups at the required level.

### Strengthen and Expand M&E

Current M&E offered substantial improvements on previous programming, providing insights into key things like improved revenues, participation, and outputs. However, there are a number of areas which future programmes may wish to monitor better, seeking to promote improved insights into project performance: once revenues are collected, how they are then spent; what is the economic impact, and how much capital has been created, as a result of key initiatives; and, in general, more qualitative and in depth information on ongoing programme performance, challenges, and successes.

### Complete Surveys and OC Issuance

Given the success of these actions, and the clear demand for OCs, future rounds of implementation should work to achieve broader coverage of OC issuance.

### Address Issues Surrounding Informal Settlements

There remain a number of questions relating to land tenure and occupancy rights within informal settlements in Kabul and its surrounds; stakeholders identified a key need to work with the government to address these issues, and support residents in achieving improved stability and inclusion.

### Build on Street Mapping and Surveying Work

Substantial work, and success, was highlighted in the completion of street mapping databases, tools, and resources. Future programmes should build on this success, and work to achieve the outcomes (namely street naming, and related actions) which were unable to be completed in this round of implementation.

### Finalise Incomplete Policies and Laws

There are a number of policies and laws which remain incomplete, un-endorsed, or still under consideration; these were highlighted as many of the key barriers and bottlenecks to achieving the outcomes and impacts described in the original programme proposal. UN Habitat should work with the government to finalise these.

It is recommended to work with the government to finalise and pass the relevant regulatory frameworks, to secure and sustain key results. The OC Regulation should be given priority given the associated delays to the issuance of OCs. Specifically, it is recommended that UN-Habitat work with the government to rationalise the OC regulation, particularly with regards to payment for OCs, thus making it more affordable, and by removing eligibility criteria that cannot be verified. Other regulatory instruments, such as the Informal Settlements Regularisation Policy and the Policy on the Management of Vacant Plots should also be finalised. These activities are crucial to anchor the good results of the program in law.

### Work to Convert OCs to Ownership Documents

OCs still do not comprise ownership certificates or titles, as the initial programme proposal envisioned. This poses substantial barriers to their being used to generate capital, as well as challenges to land tenure and security. Working with the government, the process of converting OCs to ownership certificates should be a primary focus of future programming.

### Work to Gain Acceptance of OCs, or Whatever Replaces Them, as Enforceable Documents

As OCs become more enforceable ownership documents, working with the private sector, judicial system, and other relevant entities will be important to promote certificate acceptance for use in growing economic activity, and strengthening accountability. The end goal in this regard is the creation of capital or collateral with which Kabul residents can invest in, and grow, economic activity. There are myriad rule of law and government capacity implications which should be considered, and strengthened, in future programme to ensure this recommendation can be effectively implemented.

### **Continue to Strengthen and Empower Gozar Assemblies, Community-based Approaches**

Gozar Assemblies had the trust of residents, with many indicating they felt the assemblies represented their interests effectively; continuing to think of how these can be strengthened, and better utilised to lead and consult on future relevant programmes, has the potential to offer dividends in community trust, as well as sustainable strengthening of the social contract.

### **Increase Focus on Capital- and Economic-focussed Impacts**

The TOC, and much of the programme activity, focussed on the potential impacts on service delivery, governance, and other government-focussed outcomes. However, the substantial economic potential from issuance of ownership documents, as well as strengthening rule of law and judicial practice surrounding them, are enormous. UN habitat may wish to add complementary target outcomes and indicators, as well as key relevant activities, to future programmes, seeking to impact upon, and then document, this important area.

### **Empower Municipal Advisory Boards**

MABs were originally envisioned as a forum for civic engagement and citizen engagement in municipal affairs. At present, MABs appear to have limited capacity to execute this function. Therefore, it is recommended that UN-Habitat work with Kabul municipality and MABs to strengthen their role and capacity, particularly on budgetary issues.

### **Implement the property values assigned through Land Value Zoning**

It is recommended that UN-Habitat work with ARAZI to ensure that the new property values, assigned with the Land Value Zoning method, are endorsed and implemented.

### **Integrate climate considerations as a foundational component of all programming, particularly related to infrastructure**

Climate change (and natural disasters more broadly) need to be considered across all components of development programming. This is particularly important in the context of Kabul, which is prone to flooding, droughts and earthquakes, amongst other climate-related threats. It is therefore recommended that UN-Habitat mandate the implementation of climate risk assessments for all infrastructure developments across Kabul.

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# ANNEXES

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# ANNEX 1: TERMS OF REFERENCE



**United Nations Human Settlements Programme**  
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 Tel: +254-20 7623120, Fax: +254-20 7624266/7  
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## TERMS OF REFERENCE

### END-TERM PROGRAMME EVALUATION OF THE KABUL STRENGTHENING MUNICIPAL NAHIAS PROGRAMME (KSMNP) 2016-2020.

#### 1. Background and programme context

Evaluation is an integral component of programming and project cycle management at UN-Habitat. These Terms of Reference are for final programme evaluation of the Kabul Strengthening Municipal Nahias Programme (KSMNP). Since 1992, UN-Habitat has been working in Afghanistan in partnership with communities and Government. It has provided basic services and worked with the Government of Afghanistan and local authorities on various projects, including policy support and institutional capacity strengthening. The KSMNP was implemented by UN-Habitat Country Office in Afghanistan, in coordination with the UN-Habitat Regional Office of Asia and Pacific (ROAP), during the period of January 2016-March 2020. It was funded by USAID with a total budget of US\$30,178,457.

The programme's overall objective was to improve tenure security, land management and administration for inclusive urban economic growth and service delivery in Kabul Municipality. The programme was designed and was implemented in the context of the City for All (CFA) programme, a flagship action of the Government of Afghanistan's urban programme – the Urban National Priority Programme, 2016-2025. By March 2020, the programme was expected to have improved land tenure security for 2.9 million people living in Kabul; increased urban economic growth and created jobs as result of improved property rights and infrastructure investments; increased municipal revenues through land-based financing; and improved government capacities and institutions for urban land management and strategic urban planning.

The programme was designed with evaluation framework of mid-term and final evaluation. The mid-term evaluation was conducted in the first quarter of 2019. It results positive as the programme has achieved most of its targets of December 2018. However, there were some issues that needed to be addressed and the evaluation provided 14 recommendations for improving the programme implementation for the remaining period. By the July 2020, 9 recommendations had been implemented, 4 in progress. One recommendation was not accepted.

Afghanistan is undergoing a wave of urbanization. Urban population is growing with a growth rate of 4% per year, due to rural-urban migration, influx of IDPs and returnees, and the expansion of the urban built up area to incorporate surrounding towns and villages. Kabul, as national capital city has the highest percentage of urban population in the country and its annual population growth rate is estimated at 10%. Estimation of January 2020, is that about 4.27 million lived in the city of Kabul. However, the city has expanded without strategic and spatial plans and has limited access to formal land and housing. There is inefficient land use (e.g vacant plots), land grabbing, tenure insecurity, limited of well-located plots for housing for middle and low-income households, and undeveloped land-based financing for local urban -based service delivery.

As of 2014, the challenges of urban poverty, unemployment, gender inequality, youth exclusion, socio-economic marginalization were getting worse. Urban poor households, IDPs and female headed households continued to be most affected from macro-economic changes.

In 2014, the new National Unity Government (NUG) of Afghanistan recognized the transformative role of urbanisation and is prioritizing urbanisation in its 'Self-Reliance' reform agenda, noting that cities should be drivers of economic development, and municipalities and urban development can contribute to national state building and peace-building

objectives

## 1.2 Description of the programme

The USAID-funded Programme was implemented in 20 Nahias of Kabul municipality, under the umbrella City for All (CFA) programme. CFA is a flagship action of the Government of Afghanistan's Urban National Priority Programme 2016-2025 (U-NPP), the government's reform agenda for the urban sector.

The overall objective was to improve stability and stimulate local economic development in Kabul city through enhancing municipal governance and strengthening the social contract between citizens and the state. The specific objective of the project was to improve tenure security, land management and administration for inclusive urban economic growth and service delivery in Kabul city. The expected results (Expected Accomplishments -EAs) were the following:

- **R1:** Strengthened municipal capacities and systems for urban planning, land management and municipal revenue/finance;
- **R2:** Improved municipal service delivery and strengthened 'social contract' between citizens and municipal authorities;
- **R3:** Improved enabling environment for urban land management and administration, municipal governance, local economic development and service delivery.

The programme had the following components:

### Component 1: Land management, land rights and responsibilities

Under this component, the programme was to support Kabul municipality to survey and register all properties within Kabul municipality. This would improve land management, increase security and reduce land grabbing and expand municipal tax base. Aligned with land survey, the project was to address street addressing, house numbering and street lighting. With property registration, safayi certificates would be issued by the municipality once the property occupant paid annual safayi taxi. The focus was on land management to improve land tenure security for 2.9 million people and municipal capacities for revenue collection.

### Component 2: Strategic Urban Planning

This component was to guide investments and establish a common vision for inclusive and prosperous urban future. At city level, the programme would promote local economic development (LED) to stimulate investment, and expand inclusive service delivery. The process was to be driven by local stakeholders. The planning was to be followed up with financing of sub-projects. The programme was to provide performance block grants for infrastructure at the Nahia level. Such subprogrammes would act as a catalyst towards implementation of the strategic plans; build the capacity in municipal finance, engineering, planning, design, implementation, monitoring; and as incentive to motivate the collection of safayi. Such grants were to be provided once certain threshold of tax collection targets were achieved.

### Component 3: Municipal Governance and citizen engagement

This component was to address central capacity development and reforms. The programme was to provide technical support to central level government authorities, including the Afghan Land Authority (Arazi), the Ministry of Urban Development Affairs (MUDA) and Kabul Municipality to improve relevant national policies, legislation, regulations and guidelines.

The implementation of the project included the UN-Habitat's peoples process approach, which was supposed to place the people of Kabul at the centre of the development process. It also applied a gender – lens and phased-based approach, involving key stakeholders in the identification of local problems and learning by doing. The programme was supposed to intergrate cross-cutting issues of climate change, gender, human rights and the youth.

Key stakeholders in the project included the UN-Habitat Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific (ROAP), Ministry of Urban Development Affairs (MUDA), Kabul Municipality, Afghan Land Authority (ARAZI), Independent Directorate of Local Government (IDLG), the General Directorate of Municipal Affairs (GDMA), Afghanistan Ministry of Finance (MOF); the municipal staff, the Wakili Gozars, other Government actors, donor community to align their urban investments. The programme was aligned with Afghanistan UNDAF 2015-2019; the UN-Habitat Country Programme

of Afghanistan 2015-2019, and UN-Habitat Strategic plan. It was implemented by UN-Habitat Country Office in Afghanistan, in collaboration with all other stakeholders.

## 2. Purpose, Objectives and scope of the Evaluation

The end-term programme evaluation is mandated by the donor, USAID, and will be undertaken in-line with UN-Habitat Evaluation Policy (2013) and the Revised UN-Habitat Evaluation Framework (2016) which requires that programmes and projects of over USD1 million should be evaluated by external consultant by the end of the intervention. The evaluation will be conducted by an independent international, supported by a national consultant.

The evaluation will be both summative and formative, serving purposes of accountability and enhancing learning. It will support reporting on resources used, results achieved and the way they were achieved by the programme to key KSMP stakeholders and partners, and enhance their learning, reflection for decision-making on future programming and designs of new programmes/projects or replication of the programme. The target audience for the evaluation findings USAID, UN-Habitat, Ministry of Urban Development Affairs (MUDA), Kabul Municipality, Afghan Land Authority (ARAZI), Independent Directorate of Local Government (IDLG), the General Directorate of Municipal Affairs (GDMA) and Afghanistan Ministry of Finance (MOF with an independent appraisal of the KSMNP).

- i. The specific objectives of the evaluation are to:
- ii. Assess the performance of the programme in terms the extent to which it achieved planned results at the expected accomplishment (outcome) and output levels;
- iii. Assess the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability, impact and coherence of the programme;
- iv. Assess the planning and implementation modalities, including working arrangements and how they may have affected the effectiveness of the programme;
- v. Assess how cross-cutting issues of gender equality, youth and human rights and climate change integrated in the programme;
- vi. Identify lessons and propose recommendations for future programming of such pro-programmes;

The evaluation will cover the implementation period of the programme, from April 2016 to March 2020.

## 3. Evaluation Questions

The evaluation will seek to answer the following overarching evaluation questions:

To what extent the programme achieved its planned results at output and outcome level;

To what extent were implementation modalities, collaboration and coordination among key stakeholders appropriate;

What were the critical gaps in respect to delivery of the programme;

What were the lessons learned, good practices, innovation efforts and recommendations for future programming;

The proposed evaluation questions will be supplemented with sub-questions along the criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, impact and coherence.

**Relevance:** The extent to which the objective of KSMNP is consistent with the beneficiaries' requirements, national and local needs, priorities, UN-Habitat and donor policies.

To what extent was the programme relevant to the needs and priorities of defined stakeholders of USAID, Govt of Afghanistan and UN-Habitat?

To what extent was the programme aligned with relevant development strategies of Kabul municipality and communities (nahias)?

What was UN-Habitat's comparative advantage in implementation of KSMNP compared with other UN entities and key partners?

**Effectiveness:** The extent to which the KSMNP objective was achieved:

To what extent did the programme achieve its targeted results and how did UN-Habitat contribute towards these?  
 What evidence is there that what was achieved contributed to the strategic objective of improved tenure security, land management and administration for inclusive urban economic growth and service in Kabul city?  
 To what extent was the Kabul municipal capacity strengthened through the programme?  
 How effectively did the programme measure and report on its achieved results?

**Efficiency:** A measure of how economically resources/ inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted to results.

How efficiently were the inputs (financial and human resources), partnerships, policies and implementations strategies used to achieve the planned outputs?  
 To what extent did the management structure of the programme support efficiency for programme implementation?  
 Were activities and outputs delivered in a cost-efficient and timely manner? Specifically, what was the cost efficiency of UN-Habitat's technical assistance for the development of capacity within the partner departments of GoIRA?

**Sustainability:** The continuation of benefits from KSMNP after programme completed.

Were the results achieved sustainable?  
 To what extent was Kabul municipal capacity developed in order to ensure sustainability of the results and benefits achieved?  
 What accountability and oversight systems were established to secure the benefits from the programme?

**Impact:** Positive and negative long-term effects produced by KSMNP, intended or unintended.

What positive changes have occurred as a result of the programme?  
 What were unintended effects, if any, of the programme?  
 How did the programme influence the work the Kabul municipality and nahias?

**Coherence:** The consistency of the KSMNP with other actors' interventions in the same context and the extent to which the intervention is adding value while avoiding duplication of effort.

Was the programme coherent and implemented in synergy with other municipality finance and capacity building programmes?  
 Was the programme coherent or complement other donors' development interventions?

**Social inclusion issues:** The extent to which the KSMNP integrated needs of different groups and promoted social inclusion.

To what extent were the social inclusion issues of gender, human rights, climate and youth considerations integrated in programme design, implementation, monitoring and reporting on the programme?  
 Are there any outstanding examples of how these issues were successfully applied in the programme?

#### 4. Evaluation Approach and Methodology

The evaluation will be conducted in line with the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) Norms and Standards for evaluation in Nations System. The evaluation team will decide on the concreted approach and methodology, considering the COVID-19 situation. It is anticipated that the evaluation will apply results-based approach (Theory of Change).

The evaluation team will develop the Theory of Change (TOC), mapping different components of the programme to show how the programme was supposed to work to achieve its planned results. The TOC as an evaluation tool, will provide a useful framework around which the evaluation design and evaluation questions will be structured. The TOC will build on the logic framework the programme design. The evaluation will also use participatory and utilization focused approach, to enhance the utilization of evaluation results and engagement of the stakeholders in the evaluation process.

The objectives and evaluation questions will provide the analytical framework for the evaluation. A variety of methods will be used to collect data from a various sources intaking into account of the COVID-19 situation. These methods include:

- i. Desk review of relevant documents, including project document, work plans, progress and monitoring reports, cooperation agreements, activity reports, mid-term evaluation report, training and capacity building reports and materials, publications, outreach and communication materials, website, etc.
- ii. Key informant interviews and consultations, including semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions with key stakeholders, including donor, beneficiaries and UN-Habitat staff;
- iii. Surveys, if deemed feasible to obtain quantitative information on stakeholders' views and perceptions.
- iv. Field visits to assess selected activities, if feasible with in the time schedule and budget of the evalua-tion, should provide insight into both the scope (time), depth and range of activities carried out.

## 5. Stakeholder Involvement

The evaluation will be participatory and involving key stakeholders. Stakeholders will be kept informed of the evaluation processes including design, information, collection and evaluation reporting and results dissemination to create a positive attitude towards the evaluation and enhance its utilization. The donor, USAID, relevant United Nations entities, national government/ local authorities, beneficiaries and other stakeholders may participate through interviews, focus group discussions or survey.

## 6. Management and Conduct of the Evaluation

The evaluation will be conducted by an international evaluation consultant as the lead evaluator supported by a national evaluation consultant.

Impartiality is an important principle of evaluation because it ensures credibility of the evaluation and avoids a conflict of interest. For this purpose, officers responsible for design and implementation of the project should not manage the evaluation process. The Independent Evaluation Unit will manage the evaluation process, ensuring that the evaluation is conducted by a suitable evaluator, providing technical support and advice on methodology, explaining evaluation process and standards, and ensuring they are respected, ensuring contractual requirements are met, approving all deliverables (TOR, Inception Report, Draft and Final Evaluation Report), sharing the evaluation results, supporting use and follow-up of the implementation of the evaluation recommendations.

KSMNP Team will be responsible for supporting the evaluation team by providing information and documentation required as well as providing contacts of stakeholders to be consulted to provide evaluation information.

The Evaluation Reference Group, will be established as a consultative arrangement and will have representatives of USAID and UN-Habitat and Govt of Afghanistan representatives to oversee the evaluation process, to maximize the relevance, credibility, quality, uptake and use of the evaluation. Responsibilities of the ERG will include:

- Acting as source of knowledge for the evaluation;
- Assisting in identifying other stakeholders to be consulted during the evaluation process;
- Participating in meetings of the reference group;
- Providing input and quality assurance on the key evaluation products: TOR, inception and draft evalua-tion report; and
- Participating in validation meeting of the final evaluation report.

## 7. Qualifications of the Lead Evaluator

### Education

- At least a master's degree in international development, public administration, development economics, municipal governance, information technology, project management or related fields.

### Work experience and other requirements

- Extensive evaluation experience. The consultant should have ability to present credible findings de-rived from evidence and putting conclusions and recommendations supported findings.
- A minimum of 7 years of professional practical experience in results-based management working with projects/ programmes.
- International track record of project evaluation work for different organizations, including in fragile and/or post conflict context
- Familiar with United Nations and UN-Habitat's mandate.
- Knowledge of municipal governance and capacity building.

### Language

- Excellent proficiency in spoken and written English is required.

## 8. Work Schedule/ Time Frame

The evaluation will be conducted over the period from August to October 2020. A negotiated lumpsum will be paid to the consultants upon satisfactory delivery of specified deliverables. The evaluation team is expected to prepare inception report that will operationalize the evaluation. The provisional timetable as follows. The consultancy will include work from home office. Due to the Covid-19 related restrictions on travel, interviews and consultations will be conducted remotely and there will be no travel of the lead evaluator to Kabul to meet with project stakeholders.

### Time Frame

#	Task Description	July				August				September				October				
		1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	
2	Development of TOR and Recruitment				X	X	X	X										
3	Inception Phase								X	X								
4	Data collection Phase										X	X	X					
5	Report writing phase													X	X			
6	Use and Follow-up phase.															X	X	

## 9. Deliverables

The three primary deliverables for this evaluation are:

- Inception Report** /evaluation work plan. Once approved, it will become the key management document for guiding the evaluation process. The inception report shall include background and context, evaluation purpose and objectives, evaluation matrix, approach, including the Theory of Change, and methods, limitations to the evaluation, proposed outline of the evaluation report, as well as work schedule and delivery dates of key evaluation deliverables.

- b) **Draft Evaluation Report.** The evaluator will prepare a draft evaluation report (s). The draft(s) should follow UN-Habitat's standard format for evaluation reports (the format will be provided). The format is intended to help guide the structure and main contents of evaluation reports .
- c) **Final Evaluation Report.** A final evaluation report of not more than 50 pages, including Executive Summary, but excluding Annexes, will be prepared in English. The report should be technically easy to comprehend for non-evaluation specialists.

## 10. Resources

The evaluation consultants will be paid an evaluation fee based on the level of expertise and experience. DSA will be paid only when travelling on mission outside official duty station (home) of the consultant. Travel costs will be covered by UN-Habitat.



# ANNEX 2: LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED OR CONSULTED

List of People Interviewed or Consulted for the End Term Evaluation of KSMNP, December 2020 – January 2021

Participant(s)	Position(s)	Venue	No of people	Method
Mr. Fernando Da Cruz	UN-Habitat Deputy Country Manager and Country Representative, UN-Habitat	Online	1	KII
Mr. Antony Lamba	UN-Habitat Chief of Party, City for All Programme, UN-Habitat	Online	1	KII
Ms. Felicity Cain	UN-Habitat Technical Advisor for Urban Planning, UN-Habitat	Online	1	KII
1. Mr Manuchech Sultanov 2. Mr Najibullah Niazi	USAID 1. Program Analyst (Budget) – USAID 2. Project Management Specialist	Online	2	FGD
Mrs. Laya Mushraf	Government Informal Urban Settlement Director	Deputy Directorate of MOUDA	1	KII
3. Ismail Ahmadi 1. Mohamad Azimi, Mirbaz 2. Khan Ahmadzai	Government TAS 1. MIS and Data Base Officer 2. Database Officer 3. GIS officer	Deputy Directorate of MOUDA	3	FGD
Mr. Samiullah Haneed	Government Deputy Director Planning, Policy, Monitoring, Evaluation, and Reporting, Kabul Municipality	Kabul Municipality	1	KII
Eng. Akram Salam	UN-Habitat staff KSMNP Program Implementation Unit Manager	Deputy Directorate of MOUDA	1	KII

1. Mr. Karimullah Ataei	Government TAs	1. Assistant Project Manager	Kabul Municipality	2	FGD
2. Mrs. Humaira Latifi	Government TAs	2. Municipal Finance Officer (KSMNP TAs)	Kabul Municipality	2	FGD
1. Haji Mehrabudin Malang,	Community/Shura	Head of Gozar 22 and Community/Shura members (beneficiaries)	Kabul, District 6, Gozar 22	5	FGD
2. Nesar Ahmad,					
3. Haji Mohamad karim,					
4. Haji Ghulam Mohaiduin					
5. And Naser Ahmad					
1. Haji Ghulam Hussain	Community/Shura	1. Head of Gozar 36	Kabul, District 6, Gozar 36	5	FGD
2. 4 OC Beneficiaries		2. Community beneficiaries			
Mohammad Dawod	Community/Shura	Head of Gozar 2, District 7	Kabul City, Gozar 2, District 7	5	FGD
Eng. Shamsullah Najafi	Government/Nahia	Director of District 6, Kabul Municipality	Kabul City, District 6 Directorate	1	KII
Mr. Bahauddin Sahil		Revenue Collection Manager	Kabul City, District 7 Directorate	1	KII
1. Mr. Saifurahman Haris	Government TAs	1. UN-Habitat Representative at ARAZI Directorate Kabul City	Directorate of Urban Development and Arazi, Kabul City Office	5	FGD
2. Mr. Abdul Muqet Hazim		2. GIS Officer			
3. Mr. Nawroz Salehe		3. Database Officer			
4. Mr. Masihullah Lutfullah Khei		4. Database Officer			
5. Mr. Fazlulhaq Azizi		5. Conflict Resolution Officer			
Mr. Najibullah Qaderi	Government/Nahia	Director of District 2	Kabul City, District 2 Directorate	1	KII

1. Mr. Gul Khan 2. 9 Community beneficiaries	Community/ Shura	1. Head of Gozar 5, District 2 2. Shura members	Kabul City, Gozar 5, District 2	10	FGD
1. Mr. Marof 2. 2 Shura members	Community/ Shura	1. Shura Monitor 2. Shura members	Kabul City, Gozar 10, District 4	3	FGD
1. Mr. Masood Nazari 2. 5 Shura members	Community/ Shura	1. Director of Shura 2. Shura members	Kabul City, Gozar 4 and 7, District 15	6	FGD
1. Mr. Shah Wali 2. Mohammad Shafi 3. Mr. Aimal Khan	Community/ Shura	Directors of Shura	Kabul City, Gozar 27, District 17	3	FGD
1. Haji Ahmadullah 2. Mr. Abdul Manan Rahimi, 3. 3 Shura members	Community/ Shura	1. Deputy Head of Gozar 2. Deputy Head of Gozar 3. Shura members	Kabul City, Gozar 2, District 17	5	FGD
1. Haji Taj Mohammad Faqeri 2. 4 Shura members	Community/ Shura	1. Director of Shura 2. Shura members	Kabul, District 22, Gozar 8	5	FGD
1. Haji Kamawal 2. 4 Shura members	Community/ Shura	1. Director of Shura 2. Shura members	Kabul, District 22, Gozar 9	5	FGD
1. Haji Shahzada 2. 2 Shura members	Community/ Shura	1. Deputy Head of Shura 2. Shura members	Kabul, District 22, Gozar 21, 34, 35	3	FGD
1. Haji Ajmal 2. 6 Shura members	Community/ Shura	1. Deputy Head of Shura 2. Shura members	Kabul, District 22, Gozar 3	7	FGD
1. Haji Ahmadzai 2. 8 Shura members	Community/ Shura	1. Director of Shura 2. Shura members	Kabul, District 7, Gozar 21	9	FGD
1. Haji Mohammad Akram 2. 8 Shura members	Community/ Shura	1. Director of Shura 2. Shura members	Kabul City, District 6, Gozar 17	9	FGD

1. Mr. Asif Daqiq 2. 6 Shura members	Community/ Shura	1. Director of Shura 2. Shura members	Kabul City, District 13, Gozar 36	7	FGD
1. Mr. Ajmal Painda 2. 6 Shura members	Community/ Shura	1. Director of Shura 2. Shura members	Kabul City, District 13, Gozar 29	7	FGD
Mr. Samiullah Haneed	Government	Deputy Director Planning, Policy, Monitoring, Evaluation, and Reporting, Kabul Municipality	Kabul Municipality	1	KII
1. Mr. Habib Rahimi 2. Mr. Sayed Sadullah Wahab	UN-Habitat staff	1. National Program Manager City for All 2. National Program Coordinator City for All	Online	2	FGD

# ANNEX 3: DATA COLLECTION TOOLS

The consultancy team designed and deploy the following tools:

## Client Data Review

### ***Rationale & Sample Approach***

Relevant documents and data held by the client and key partners have been solicited and were analysed for insights into the services provided to the target communities. This was undertaken both before and throughout the data collection. Review of existing data and documents allows for activity which builds on (rather than duplicates) existing resources.

The following documents were shared with the team:

- USAID KSMNP Completion Report April 2016 – March 2020
- USAID KSMNP Annual Report April 2018 – March 2019
- USAID KSMNP Annual Report April 2017 – March 2018
- USAID KSMNP Annual Report April 2016 – April 2017
- USAID KSMNP Programme Monitoring & Evaluation Plan October 2016 KSMNP budget
- K-SMNP Financial report as of 31 Mar 2019
- K-SMNP Financial report as of 31 March 2018
- K-SMNP Financial report as of 31 March 2017
- K-SMNP Fully Executed Agreement
- K-SMNP Logframe – 22 Nov 2015
- Programme Document KSMNP Version 3 – November 2015
- Key Elements of Inception Report
- KSMNP - Pro-Description Revisions Summary – Dec 2019
- KSMNP - Programme Description – Revised Dec 19
- KSMNP Final Grant Financial Report as of 31 March 2020
- KSMNP Impact Survey Final Report – 29 March 2020
- KSMNP Mid Term Evaluation Report – 20 Feb 2019
- KSMNP Countersigned Fifth Amendment
- Raw Survey Data – March 26
- UN-Habitat Evaluation Manual – April 2018

# ANNEX 4: RECONSTRUCTED TOC

**Strategic Objective: Improve the living conditions of 2.9 million Afghan men, women and children in 426,273 households through improved security of land tenure, improved basic infrastructure and delivery of services in local communities.**

The Theory of Change posits that the three results are both appropriate and adequate to achieve the above strategic objective within Kabul. This is a rather large and challenging assumption to make; Key Evaluation Questions focusing on impact and effectiveness will undertake to establish whether the assumptions underpinning the TOC in this regard are appropriate.

<p><b>Result 1.</b> Strengthened municipal capacities and systems for urban planning, land management and municipal revenue/finance.</p>	<p><b>Result 2.</b> Improved municipal service delivery and strengthened “social contract” between citizens and municipal authorities.</p>	<p><b>Result 3.</b> Improved enabling environment for urban land management and administration, municipal governance, local economic development and service delivery.</p>
<p><b>Outputs under Result 1:</b></p>	<p><b>Outputs under Result 2:</b></p>	<p><b>Outputs under Result 3:</b></p>
<p><b>1.1</b> Municipalities undertake citywide property survey/ registration and house numbering;</p> <p><b>1.2</b> Strengthen municipal finance and revenue collection systems and capacities especially of Nahia offices; and</p> <p><b>1.3</b> Support strategic urban planning for LED and inclusive service delivery.</p>	<p><b>2.1</b> Kabul municipality delivered strategic service/ infrastructure projects in line with Nahia strategic plans to stimulate local economic development;</p> <p><b>2.2</b> Establish representative Gozar Assemblies (GAs) to foster improved municipal citizen relations in land management, service delivery to build social contract and sense of civic responsibility, and government legitimacy;</p> <p><b>2.3</b> Improve access to Gozar-level infrastructure and services.</p>	<p><b>3.1</b> Strengthen the national enabling environment and institutional capacities (of MUDL, ARAZI and KM) for land management, strategic urban planning, and inclusive municipal governance.</p>

In order to achieve many of the features of strong economic systems described by de Soto, registration of property must be undertaken in a transparent, systematic, and generally accepted manner. As such, registration initiatives were undertaken.

However, strong citizenship requires citizens to also be accountable to their governments. Consequently, attempts to strengthen property rights were accompanied by initiatives to improve the capacity and rates of tax collection at the municipal level.

Seeking to capitalize on improved, mutual accountability systems and available resources, strategic planning on how best to enfranchise residents, and use new revenue sources for better urban environments and municipal services, comprised a core focus of activity.

As such, the logic chain posits that IF the preceding activities are undertaken (with implementation and coordination between actors being of the required standard), then the essential improvements in municipal capacities and systems for urban planning, land management and municipal revenue/finance can be counted upon.

This result, according to the logic chain, is a necessary precondition of achievement of the overarching Strategic Objective.

Alongside improved municipal and property registration systems, as well as strengthened capacities for revenue generation and strategic planning, programme designers also assumed that an effective, democratic municipal system of governance also had to be created.

These local representative governments were anticipated to strengthen accountability linkages between citizens and their local government, reinforcing the systems and changes to be achieved under Result 1, as well as ensuring improved access to local services for citizens.

These local services would be further supported by direct investments by the government and international donors, who would use the assemblies and improved accountability mechanisms as a means of ensuring the resources were, in fact, allocated to citizens' priorities, rather than individual civil servants, elected officials, and city employees.

As such, the logic chain posits that IF the preceding activities are undertaken (with implementation and coordination between actors being of the required standard), then an improved 'social contract' between city government and local citizens would be achieved, and quality of life for targeted citizens would be substantially improved.

This result, according to the logic chain, is a necessary precondition of achievement of the overarching Strategic Objective.

This final result posits that IF the appropriate training is delivered for national and local government officials, then they would have the required skills, attitudes, and predilection to support the achievement of the preceding two results.

In order for this logic chain to work, the quality and focus of training would have to be appropriate to the needs of both the trainees as well as local systems. It also pre-supposes that the methods of training and capacity building were appropriate to achieve the desired ends.

This result, according to the logic chain, is a necessary precondition of achievement of the overarching Strategic Objective.

**Assumptions**

- Registration would lead to increases in revenue; i.e. that residents would trust that payments result in improvements in service delivery, and pay.
- That residents would broadly support registration initiatives, and not see them as putting them at risk for extortion or solicitation of bribery.
- That improved planning capacity, and improved revenues, would result in improved service delivery. That is to say that there would be sufficient will to implement new services, that the revenues raised would be sufficient to improve services, and that new revenues would go largely to improved service delivery, instead of other municipal priorities.
- Continuity between mayoral administrations would be sufficient to not disrupt key gains in outcome and result.
- That surveys would result in a generally-accepted documentation of ownership, and not cause additional tension or conflict emerging from ownership disputes.
- That surveys would not be used by unscrupulous members of the public to secure titles for land to which they did not actually own.
- That land registration, and titles, would be enforceable in a court of law, especially for weaker parties; i.e. would registration allow for equitable redress.

That land and property titles would be recognized by a variety of institutions and stakeholders, and that this recognition would result in improved, objective value of land, and an 'unlocking of capital value', per De Soto.

**Assumptions**

- Assembly members will act in the interest of communities, and that citizens would have sufficient interest and trust for assemblies.
- That municipal authorities will work with assemblies in good faith, and accept the 'social contract'.
- That grants, overseen by assemblies, would, in fact, be dedicated to areas of real need.
- That Gozar representation, and activity, would be transparent, and would not result in increased corruption or a diversion of funds.
- Provided resources would be sufficient to achieve adequate, notable change.
- Elections would not cause substantial disruption in the relationship between municipal authorities and Goza Assemblies.

**Assumptions**

- Turnover of municipal employees would not result in a loss of new capacity, skills or knowledge.
- The capacity building provided would, in fact, lead to improved skills and abilities within the areas necessary for improved administration and leadership.
- That citizens would consider the increased capacities, as targeted by UN Habitat, to align with their own interests and their own definitions of effective governance.





END-TERM PROGRAMME EVALUATION OF THE KABUL STRENGTHENING  
MUNICIPAL NAHIAS PROGRAMME (KSMNP)  
2016-2020

**Evaluation Report/2021/1**



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