AI HAWTAH
City Profile
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Cover photo:
Credit: Old heritage building in Al Hawtah, Yemen.

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Urban Profiling Yemen

This project is part of a Profiling Project that aims to develop city profiles of 7 cities in Yemen. These cities include Aden, Sana’a, Sa’dah, Ta’iz, Al Hodeidah, Al Hawtah and Zinjibar. All profiles and data developed in this profile are accessible on the Yemen Mapping and Data Portal.

https://yemenportal.unhabitat.org/

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# Acronyms

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<td>AQAP</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula</td>
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<td>CCIF</td>
<td>Cleanliness and City Improvement Fund</td>
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<td>CFP</td>
<td>Community Focal Point</td>
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<td>CRPD</td>
<td>Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Central Statistical Organization</td>
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<td>DTM</td>
<td>Displacement Tracking Matrix</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<td>EFSNA</td>
<td>Emergency Food Security and Nutrition Assessment</td>
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<td>ERW</td>
<td>Explosive Remnants of War</td>
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<td>FAQ</td>
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<td>GBV</td>
<td>Gender-Based Violence</td>
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<td>GHG</td>
<td>Greenhouse Gas</td>
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<td>GIS</td>
<td>Geographic Information System</td>
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<td>GIZ</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH</td>
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<td>GoY</td>
<td>Government of Yemen</td>
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<td>GPC</td>
<td>General People’s Congress</td>
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<td>GPS</td>
<td>Global Positioning System</td>
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<td>GSM</td>
<td>Global System for Mobile communication</td>
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<td>Ha</td>
<td>Hectares</td>
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<td>HF</td>
<td>Health Facility</td>
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<td>HH</td>
<td>Household</td>
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<td>HLP</td>
<td>Housing, Land, and Property</td>
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<td>Humanitarian Needs Overview</td>
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<td>IASC</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Standing Committee</td>
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<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and Communications Technology</td>
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<td>ID</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<td>IHL</td>
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<td>IRG</td>
<td>Internationally Recognized Government</td>
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<td>Joint Research Center</td>
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<td>Ki</td>
<td>Key Informant</td>
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<td>LAEO</td>
<td>Literacy and Adult Education Organization</td>
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<td>LAL</td>
<td>Local Authority Law</td>
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<td>LC</td>
<td>Local Council</td>
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<td>LPG</td>
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<td>LWSC</td>
<td>Lajh Water &amp; Sanitation Corporation</td>
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<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
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<td>MHHM</td>
<td>Ministry of Housing and Municipalities</td>
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<td>MoLA</td>
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<td>NAMCHA</td>
<td>National Authority for the Management and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Recovery</td>
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<td>NF</td>
<td>Non-Food Items</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NSSWM</td>
<td>National Strategy for Solid Waste Management</td>
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<td>NWRA</td>
<td>National Water Resources Authority</td>
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<td>NWSSIP</td>
<td>National Water Sector Strategy and Investment Program</td>
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<td>PEC</td>
<td>Public Electricity Corporation</td>
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<td>PiN</td>
<td>People in Need</td>
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<td>REA</td>
<td>Rural Electricity Authority</td>
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<td>SBF</td>
<td>Security Belt Forces</td>
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<td>Social Fund for Development</td>
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<td>Social Protection for Community Resilience Project</td>
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<td>STC</td>
<td>Southern Transitional Council</td>
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<td>SWM</td>
<td>Solid Waste Management</td>
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<td>UAE</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
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<td>UNOSAT</td>
<td>UNITAR’s Operational Satellite Applications Program</td>
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<td>USA</td>
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<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>UXO</td>
<td>Unexploded Ordnance</td>
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<td>WASH</td>
<td>Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Program</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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<td>WSS</td>
<td>Water Supply and Sanitation</td>
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<td>WWTP</td>
<td>Wastewater Treatment Plant</td>
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<td>YER</td>
<td>Yemeni Rial (currency)</td>
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Executive Summary

This urban profile describes and examines living conditions and needs in the city of Al Hawtah across a variety of sectors. It addresses key thematic findings made prominent by the impact of the ongoing conflict, its toll on the city’s population, and the ability of institutions to provide basic services. Each individual section paints a picture of the prevailing situation and the needs of the city’s residents through triangulation of different data types, including secondary data analysis which draws on available publications and media reports; remote sensing, and structured interviews with community leaders and key sector experts. The aim of this profile is to provide partners with the widest possible canvas, assisting them in their operational programming and strategic policy development.

Key findings include:

- **Property damage is apparent throughout Al Hawtah.** Long considered a strategic foothold by warring factions, the city suffered a significant amount of damage since the start of the war in Yemen. Damage incurred from airstrikes, artillery, mortar improvised explosive ordinances and small arms fire has left its mark on various residences, commercial buildings, landmarks, and public spaces. The overall housing situation in Al Hawtah raises several concerns. At the forefront of these issues are the city’s accelerated population growth rate, a growing squatter population that has no secure land tenure and lacks access to basic municipal services and increasing land and housing costs. The lack of housing in the city can mostly be attributed to the (i) sudden rapid influx of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) to Lahj (75.1 percent of prospective tenants are IDPs), (ii) tenants’ inability to maintain the funds necessary to pay rent on a timely manner, and (iii) the deteriorating infrastructure situation that puts buildings and their structural integrity at risk.

- **The main challenges facing the health sector, according to government partners, are a decreased operating budget approved for Health Facilities (HFs), partly caused by the weak Yemeni Rial compared to the dollar. This is particularly relevant as there is also significant damage to the health infrastructure, which is also suffering from frequent electricity outages. This includes a lack of budget to deal with the spread of epidemics. Furthermore, the health sector in Al Hawtah suffers not only from a shortage of medical staff due to retirements and low salaries, but also a shortage of medicines and medical supplies due to the recent increases of the population.**

- **Years of ongoing conflicts coupled with the lack of available finance have deteriorated the education sector in Al Hawtah.** While most schools are open currently, many school buildings are in poor condition, with some reported to be near collapse. Most of the deterioration evidenced in educational facilities occurred due to conflict-related damage, lack of maintenance and repair and poor overall construction.

- **Several water and sanitation infrastructure assets sustained conflict-related damage.** This included the main office building (located in Al Hawtah), warehouses, reservoirs, pumping station and wells. As of 2018, nearly 84 percent of the Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene (WASH) sector infrastructure appears to have no damage, while 12 percent was partially damaged, and 4 percent destroyed. In the interviews, affordability issues related to meeting the water needs were reported. When asked about the main barriers related to meeting the water for drinking purposes needs, all community leaders reported insufficient money, followed by the insufficient number of providers/shops supplying the area (57 percent), insufficient safety of goods and services (54 percent), and insufficient skills and competencies of service providers (46 percent). The collapse of the electricity sector had devastating consequences in Al Hawtah. Electricity is a binding constraint for critical city services and facilities that do not have the means to invest in alternative energy sources. These include HFs, schools, grocery stores and vaccine cold chains. The shortage in electricity affects water supply, sanitation, food supply, banking services, fuel stations and more. Even where diesel generators were adopted for emergency power supply during the conflict, fuel shortages severely constrain service delivery. To that end, Al Hawtah has a dire need for critical material and equipment to rehabilitate the heavily damaged urban electric distribution networks.

- **There is no official dumpsite in Lahj Governorate. The nearest landfill is found in the city of Aden and has been there for more than 15 years. Waste is collected in trucks from Al Hawtah City and then disposed of in the Aden landfill.** Collection occurs infrequently, in the interviews it was suggested that 50 percent of residents live in areas where garbage is frequently visible, and that garbage collection takes place once a month. Consequently, over 50 garbage sites were present in Al Hawtah as of March 2019, some of which have served as makeshift landfills created by residents. Many residents have resorted to throwing garbage in the agricultural canals in the city, posing an environmental threat to the city of Al Hawtah and its residents.

- **As of 2018, over half of the intra-city roads in Al Hawtah reportedly sustained some form of damage.** This impacts mobility of the population and reduces access to various services, such as markets, HFs and schools. In terms of functionality, according to sector experts’ perceptions, the main and secondary roads in Al Hawtah are only partially operable.

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3. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
Introduction

**Figure 1: Geographic Location of Lahj governorate within Yemen.**

Al Hawtah is the capital of Lahj Governorate, which is located 337 km to the southwest of the capital city Sana’a, and only 30 km to the east of Aden and its international seaport and airport. Lahj is known as the doorway between the south and north of Yemen and is also situated near other populous Governorates in the north. This affords Lahj a strategic position to access both domestic and global markets. In addition to being near larger cities, it is also near mineral rich areas of Yemen where proven, substantial and high-quality reserves of metallic and non-metallic minerals were long exploited for industrial production, including in Lahj.

Lahj is known for its semi-tropical climate and highly fertile valleys that has endowed it with a pastoral abundance and that has encouraged the agricultural sector to grow vegetables, fruits, various types of grain and long fiber cotton – helping to expand the local economy and support Yemen’s farming resources. The topography of Lahj varies from sea level, such as Wadi Tuban, to high mountains reaching 2500 m above sea level as part of As-Sarat mountainous range.

Under the former Aden Protectorate, a British-ruled area, it was the capital of the ‘Abdali Sultanate, which was abolished when Yemen (Aden) became independent in 1967. During the reign of the Abdali dynasty Lahj was culturally nourishing as it was home to different kinds of artists, mainly poets and composers, who had created their own music, poems and songs specific to Lahj culture.

Total Population of Lahj is around 1 million while the population of Al Hawtah, according to 2020 projected estimates, is 39,009 inhabitants.

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13 This profile examines Al Hawtah city, which is the same as the district of Al Hawtah.


**Figure 2: Al Hawtah Conflict Timeline**

**Al Hawtah within Yemen Contextual Timeline of Conflict**

- **1915**: The Ottoman forces in Yemen launched a military campaign against the British forces in Lahj and Aden and controlled most of the northern parts of Yemen in addition to few protectorates in the south including Lahj, following failed negotiations with the sultan to allow a safe passage for the Ottoman forces as Al Hawtah is the gateway to Aden.

- **1918**: Lahj was captured from Ottoman Empire suzerainty and restored as a British protectorate.

- **1967**: The Abdali dynasty was officially abolished, with the proclamation of South Yemen.

- **JUNE 28, 1994**: Northern forces entered Al Hawtah city, the capital of Lahj during the war of 1994.

- **JANUARY 28, 2015**: Extremists had demolished the most important Islamic landmark in the city of Al Hawtah, which includes the tomb and mosque of the scholar Sufyan bin Abdullah which was more than 800 years old.

- **MARCH 20, 2015**: Al-Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) fighters captured the city of Al Hawtah, killing about 20, before they were driven out by the army late.

- **MARCH 21, 2015**: About 100 American troops and Special Forces members left the Al Anad air base near Al Hawtah amid growing violence.

- **MARCH 26, 2015**: The Houthi troops took control of Al Hawtah, before heading towards Aden.

- **AUGUST 4, 2015**: The southern resistance retook control of Al Hawtah from Houthi forces.

- **JANUARY 25, 2016**: AQAP took control over Al Hawtah city.

- **APRIL 15, 2016**: Security forces loyal to the Internationally Recognized Government (IRG) have taken control over the city after fierce fighting with AQAP’s fighters.

- **NOVEMBER 16, 2017**: President of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) announced the inauguration of the STC’s local leadership in Lahj and Ad Da’il governorates during a festival in Al Hawtah city.

- **MARCH 25, 2018**: IRG took full control over Lahj governorate.

- **AUGUST 28, 2019**: Recognized Government (IRG) have taken control over the city after fierce fighting with AQAP’s fighters.

- **AUGUST 30, 2019**: Armed clashes erupted between STC forces and IRG forces. The later had secured the Security Belt Forces camp in Al Hawtah city, and regained control of the city.

- **SEPTEMBER 24, 2019**: At least 10 AQAP fighters managed to escape backed forces prison in Al Hawtah.

- **DECEMBER 2, 2019**: IRG took full control over Lahj governorate.

- **NOVEMBER 10, 2019**: Tribal gunmen pushed reinforcements towards the headquarters of the fifth Brigade south of Al Hawtah to confront Security Belt Forces after tribal mediations stumbled to ease tensions in the region.

- **DECEMBER 2, 2019**: Clashes erupted between armed factions in Al Hawtah.

- **JANUARY 13, 2020**: President of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) announced the inauguration of the STC’s local leadership in Lahj and Ad Da’il governorates during a festival in Al Hawtah city.

**LAHJ**

- **JANUARY 25, 2016**: Houthi troops took control of Al Hawtah, before heading towards Aden.

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**LAHJ** was sultanate of the Abdali dynasty. The Sultanate lost its independence to the British, after the Royal Navy Aden Expedition attack in 1839. The Sultan signed several treaties with the British. The 1883 opening of the Suez Canal caused the formation of the Aden Protectorate.

**RAPID CITY PROFILE**

*People and Conflicts in Al Hawtah*
Overview

Following the 2012 offensive, Government of Yemen (GoY) military forces reduced their footprint in the area, and Tribal Popular Committees were not provided sustained funding, which allowed AQAP significant freedom of movement to undertake assassinations and launch limited incursions into surrounding governorates. Specifically, AQAP mounted attacks in June 2013 in Lahj in order to hold key villages and demonstrate its continued capabilities.

One of the lessons AQAP gleaned from its occupation was that selectively enforcing key sharia provisions while addressing the local population’s main problems (e.g., security, justice, land and water disputes, electricity, and sanitation) is more fruitful than strictly applying AQAP’s interpretation of Islamic law at the outset. 17

In March 2015, Houthis captured Al Anad military base and Al Hawtah city while they were advancing to Aden. Heavy fighting also took place in other Lahj districts and Ad Dali’ Governorate, according to military and security sources.

Amid the fight against Houthis, AQAP continued to expand their activities. Throughout 2015, to degrade AQAP operational capabilities, coalition forces conducted dozens of air and drone strikes against AQAP targets in the areas under its control. In August the same year, hundreds of pro-government troops pushed north toward the Al Anad military base, as SLC airstrikes cleared the path for their advance. Houthis lost their control over Al Hawtah and appeared to have lost most of their heavy weapons in a battle to defend Al Anad in Lahj. 18

By the end of January 2016, AQAP had gained full control over Al Hawtah with the peak of their activities in April 2016. In June, Security Belt Forces (SBF) was established in Lahj, which serves both military and police functions, as the main force on the ground.

Underscoring AQAP’s continued lethality and reach, it mounted other attacks in the Governorate in March 2017 against the security force’s headquarters. 19 Later, it has been observed that their activities have gradually declined and halted early in 2018 due to counter-terrorism operations, which pushed AQAP’s to Al Bayda Governorate.

While relief efforts for IDPs from the areas controlled by AQAP did much to improve the image of the Yemeni government in the eyes of southerners, a sustained good governance and development initiative was not undertaken in those areas most affected by AQAP.20

Recent Developments

In August 2019, clashes between pro-Hadi and pro-Southern Transitional Council (STC) forces became a major component of the conflict environment in Al Hawtah. Prior to that, pro-Hadi forces seem to have focused largely on fighting pro-Houthi forces in the western and northern frontlines of the Governorate. This is while SBF secured positions in non-frontline areas, attesting to the influence gained by SBF in the Governorate, and the alignment of both the political elite and a significant segment of the population in Lahj Governorate with the STC. 21

STC enjoys the most popular support in the southern Governorates, with 22 percent of those living in the south viewing STC positively and 37 percent of them stating that STC should hold at least some authority in the south. The strongest support base is in Lahj Governorate. 22

Up to now, a power struggle is evident between the Internationally Recognized Government (IRG) and STC. More specifically, state security hierarchies of the IRG military and the STC-loyal Southern Belt Forces began to overlap. 23 Frequent clashes between IRG militaries and STC forces placed civilian lives at risk and created the impression that state structures were absent. 24

20 Ibid.
24 Mohamed al-Iriani and Mareike Transfeld, (Human)Insecurity in a Fragmented State, Research Debrief, Yemen Polling Center, Oct 2019, 5
Data Compilation

This city profile describes and analyzes the situation in the city across a variety of sectors. Using an area-based approach, each individual section paints a separate picture through the latest available data. These are then synthesized to provide the most up-to-date holistic information backed by contextual information and analysis. The aim of the profile is twofold. First, it provides partners with the widest possible canvas to support future rehabilitation plans and prioritization of investments. Second, it assists them in their operational programming and strategic policy development. Urban profiling rests on different sets of elements and pillars, which jointly provide an integrated analysis that assess the city’s capacities as well as its population’s needs. The main elements of urban profiling – in **bold** – are discussed below.

1. **Secondary Data Review** Secondary data draws on available publications and media to create a context-specific background of information on pre- and post-conflict trends and baselines, against which the full array of primary data is weighed. This provides a better understanding of focal events in the city’s own history, thus allowing the triangulation of analysis with primary data results.

2. **Primary Data Collection** Background contextual evidence and area analysis are insufficient material that do not fully capture individual and community experiences. Therefore, a series of structured interviews were conducted in Al Hawtah between May and June 2019 with different stakeholders from a variety of fields to obtain both intersectoral and people-centered data.

   - Sector Experts/ Key Informants (KIs) 11 current or retired government officials, professionals, business leaders, Non-Governmental Organization (NGOs) staff, economic stakeholders were identified and selected as key informants because of their practical experience and knowledge of the city. Intersectoral interviews were conducted focusing on education, healthcare, access to services, housing, the city’s infrastructure, safety and security, and the like.

   - Community Leaders/ Community Focal Points (CFPs) 37 community leaders and elders were identified and selected for interviews because of their long-standing ties to and knowledge of their community needs. Themselves residents representing a geographically distinct locality – a block, neighborhood, or a district – the CFPs are ideally suited to provide accurate, people centered, answers about their community needs, as well as about the quality, availability, and accessibility to basic services. To ensure the widest possible city-wide coverage, the selected CFPs are those who represent the number of the HHs and enjoy ties to the city’s government.

**Figure 3: Analytical Framework**

**Figure 4: Primary Data Collection tools**

- **Secondary Data Review**
- **Remote Sensing**
- **Key Informant Interviews**
- **Community Focal Point Interviews**
- **Asset Verification**
3. **Remote Sensing** Satellite imagery provides accurate assessment of the degree of physical damage inflicted on infrastructure and services, comparing pre-crisis to current imagery. Definitions of damage categories are defined by the UNOSAT. Geographic Information System (GIS) tools provided a comparative pre- and post-conflict analysis on land use classification and damage assessments per district.

4. **Asset Verification** Observational Data was collected on a variety of municipal public assets, like facilities, roads, schools, hospitals and the like. The primary objective is to gather information and quantify the degree of damage that asset has suffered and assess its operational capacity. Sectors include governance; WASH; solid waste management, energy, health, education, communications, cultural heritage and transportation.

During this exercise, some of the damaged buildings were photographed in order to assess the damage, this included: private, public or government buildings of a services provision nature. The rapid field asset verification did not aim to assess all or most of the damaged buildings owing to the difficulty of implementing such an assessment given the fluid situation in Yemen. Therefore, random sampling of the buildings within the predetermined areas was adopted. This approach was based on the relative distribution of the number of buildings, the level of damage shown in satellite imagery, and their approachability relative to distance from battle lines. Over 150 varying buildings were included in the assessment. These structures were evaluated based on the level of damage, ownership and nature of use while excluding all security or military buildings, as well as those that serve any other specific national security purpose.

Field images of damaged or demolished buildings were compared with satellite images by utilizing geographic coordinates taken in the field using the Global Positioning System (GPS) Explorer application installed on mobile devices. These were later office-based corrected using Google Earth. After that, buildings were assessed more accurately through field images according to below classification:

- **No Visible Damage** (class 1): assigned to the structures that appear to have complete structural integrity, i.e. when the walls remain standing and the roof is virtually undamaged;
- **Moderate damage** (class 2): visible damage level, i.e. buildings with a largely intact roof characterized by presence of partial damage (collapse of chimneys or roof tiles detach) or surrounded by large debris/rubble or sand deposit;
- **Severe Damage** (class 3): assigned to structures with part of the roof collapsed and serious failure of walls;
- **Destroyed** (class 4): assigned to structures that are total or largely collapsed (>50%). This category is also assigned when only a portion of the building has collapsed to the ground floor. In these cases, the original building structure is no longer distinguishable.

The satellite-based methodology described, has been developed based on the experience of European Commission (EC) - JRC with assessing damages in numerous crisis areas (e.g. Georgia, Gaza strip, Lebanon).

In some cases, the interpretation is straightforward, and the risk of error is low (industrial and touristic areas), there are also borderline cases in which the assessment is difficult to discern (informal settlements and congested areas). To avoid individual bias linked to the personal judgment of a single image interpreter, collaborative work is particularly encouraged while interpreting borderline cases.

However, for this methodology to be appropriate and efficient, the quality and timing of the image acquisition are of high importance. Specifically, it should be acknowledged that the time of the year for which assessments are made is a source of important challenges with respect to monitoring damages during prolonged conflict situations - the acquisition angle and the acquisition season, both of which impede the satellite damage assessment.

The build-up pattern of Yemeni cities is also a source of important challenges. Urban density undermines the possibility of detecting damage concealing the presence of debris among other important criteria to detect affected areas.

Ground truth photographs, of the satellite images, and field visits remain very important in high density areas where satellite images have limitations. For instance, building facades affected by artillery shells may never be visible in satellite imagery.

Additionally, enumerators faced difficulties on the ground due to inaccurate positioning and GPS error margins, both of which cause navigational discrepancies.
Demographics and Population Movement

Overview

Lahj Governorate was home to an approximate 1,090,000 residents in 2019, living overwhelmingly in rural areas (>90 percent) with more or less an equal distribution between male and female.

The local Health and Population Directorate estimated the population of Al Hawtah city in 2020 to be 39,009, growing at a yearly rate of about 2.52 percent since 2004; 52 percent of the city’s habitants are between 16-64 years of age, while forty-four percent are between 0-14 years of age and four percent are over 65. The Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) population data stipulates that Al Hawtah has a larger population of males compared to females, as shown in the figure below. However, the fluid nature of the conflict also means that the continuous influx and outflow of IDPs could alter these population estimates at any given time.

Figure 5: Population by Age and Gender Distribution in Al Hawtah city, 2019.

Source: HNO Data, 2019.

According to most CFP respondents (78.4 percent), the total population in Al Hawtah city has increased over the past six months, whereas 18.9 percent state that the total population has approximately remained the same, and 2.7 percent of respondents stated the total population in Al Hawtah city had decreased.


25 HNO Data 2019.
27 A study conducted by professors at Aden and Sana’a Universities as a part of “The State of Yemeni Cities Development Report”.
28 Ibid.
30 A study conducted by professors at Aden and Sana’a Universities as a part of “The State of Yemeni Cities Development Report”.

Figure 5: Population by Age and Gender Distribution in Al Hawtah city, 2019.
Religious Groups

99 percent of Yemen’s population is Muslim, of which 35 – 45 percent are Zaydi Shi’as, while the remainder are Sunni Muslims. The Zaydis make up approximately 40 percent of the Yemeni population\(^{31}\) whereas the majority, especially in southern Yemen and the coastal areas, belong to the Shafi’i branch of Sunni Islam. Minority groups within Yemen include around 500,000 Muhamasheen, historically regarded as low-class laborers who mainly live in urban areas, and 2,000 Baha’is who have been religiously persecuted since the outbreak of the conflict. The persecution of Yemen’s Baha’is predates the Houthis political ascendancy in 2014, where Baha’is had frequently tried to maintain cordial relations with local authorities and society at large even before the ongoing war, but these efforts were not usually reciprocated.\(^{32}\)

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Contextual Migration

In 2019, International Organization for Migration (IOM)/Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) estimated that some 140,000 migrants entered Yemen and an approximate 50,000 Yemeni nationals returned from Saudi Arabia. The observed caseload mainly included Ethiopian nationals (92 percent) and Somali nationals (8 percent), with 88 percent of those tracked by IOM heading towards Saudi Arabia and 12 percent intending to head to and remain in Yemen. Migrants tracked by IOM were predominantly male (72 percent), with 18 percent being women and 10 percent children (7 percent boys and 3 percent girls). Out of the 14,210 children who migrated to Yemen in 2019, 8,186 were unaccompanied minors and 173 children were under the age of five years old. IOM reports that, although migrant crossings (mainly from Bosasso, Somalia) continued throughout 2019, the smallest numbers of migration were reported during the third quarter, due to heat waves in Djibouti and turbulent sea waters. More than 98 percent of tracked migrants named economic drivers as their main reason for moving.

The southernmost known arrival point of foreign migrants into Yemen is Ras Al Aarah in Lahj Governorate, where in 2019 the highest numbers of migrant arrivals were reported. Al Musafa area (20 kilometers west of Ras Al Aarah) and Bir Issa (25 kilometers west of Ras Al Aarah) are considered trafficking havens. Over the course of 2019, 52,600 migrants entered Yemen through Ras Al Aarah monitoring point, which is also the only point where migrants arrived who expressed their wish to stay in Yemen. IOM reported to charge between $800 – $1300. However, prices fluctuate pertinent to the security situation and changing migrant routes as a result of the fluidity of the situation.

In 2017, open source information reports that security officials in Lahj Governorate indicate that some smuggling networks offer payment schemes in which migrants make payments in Saudi riyals to a third party in Saudi Arabia, often someone who is known to a relative who already lives in Saudi Arabia. For such arrangements, in which migrants are paying smugglers in Lahj (or Ta‘iz) to be taken all the way to Saudi Arabia, smugglers are reported to charge between $800 – $1300. However, prices fluctuate pertinent to the security situation and changing migrant routes as a result of the fluidity of the situation.

Camp Kharaz in Lahj Governorate

Since the conflict began, there were 318 displacement settlements throughout Yemen. By 2017, there were seven in Lahj Governorate. The largest of these settlements, covering an area of 5.4 km2, is Camp Kharaz. By 2018, the population of the camp had reached nearly 16,000 and most of the inhabitants were Somali and Ethiopian refugees.

Figure 7: Total Amount of Tracked Migrants Arriving in IOM Monitoring Points, 2019.


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**Internal displacement**

Displacement of Yemenis throughout Yemen presents significant protection challenges. At the forefront of these challenges is the collapse of safety nets that women and children rely upon. Additionally, poor living conditions are a staple characteristic of IDP host sites. IDPs usually find themselves having to cope with an unbearably overcrowded environment that lacks privacy and increasingly exacerbates psychosocial stresses – in turn these risks further increase individual and intrafamily conflicts. In the absence of both civil and state authority property disputes, including but not limited to eviction threats escalate quickly only to intensify IDPs protection risks. Nonetheless, when respondents to the CFP Survey were asked to list the three main reasons for coming to their current residence in Al Hawtah, affordability, provision of humanitarian aid and security quickly emerged as the common denominators.\(^{45}\)

Available 2019 HNO data indicates the number of IDPs in Al Hawtah district at 7,356, out of which 4,620 IDPs originate from the district and 1,482 are from outside Al Hawtah district. HNO data also estimates that IDPs make up 21.11 percent of the total estimated population in Al Hawtah district whereas CFP respondents estimate that 25 percent of the city's population is IDP. In late 2017, it was estimated 16 percent of the IDP population in Al Hawtah city concerned boys between 0 – 4 years old, 12 percent of the IDP population were boys between 5 – 17 years old, and 28 percent concerned men between 18 – 60 years old.\(^{46}\) In terms of the female IDP population, 8 percent concerned girls between 0 – 4 years old, 4 percent girls between 5 – 17 years old, and 32 percent of women between 18 – 60 years old, meaning that women between 18 – 60 years old were the largest demographic group in terms of IDPs.\(^{47}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0 – 4 years old)</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5 – 17 years old)</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(18 – 60 years old)</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 8: IDP Population Characteristics in Al Hawtah.*

IDPs face challenges across different clusters, including Shelter/Non-Food Items (NFI), WASH, Health and Education. Issues reported in terms of Shelter/NFI include broken windows and leaking roofs, unhygienic washing facilities, and a lack of space/privacy.\(^{48}\) In terms of type of separation for most family units, curtains or other temporary dividers are used. Most IDPs in Al Hawtah city have problems accessing water. Primarily, IDPs rely on piped water being pumped into their dwellings, and secondarily water trucking. Approximately 25 percent of IDPs in Al Hawtah city have access to bathing and sanitation facilities.\(^{49}\) Doctors and nurses are visiting IDP sites, but there is no general primary healthcare provision. Between 2017 and 2018, in terms of Education, only 151 IDP students had gone back to schools: 128 students were enrolled in primary education and 23 in secondary. Additionally, none of the teachers identified as IDP, which differed from other adjacent districts and cities, e.g. Tuban.\(^{50}\)


\(^{47}\) Ibid.

\(^{48}\) Ibid.

\(^{49}\) Ibid.

Figure 9: IDPs Accommodation Typology, UN-Habitat (2020).

Source: Based on IOM DTM Round 37.
Following CFP perception data, the primary reasons for displacement include, in order of importance: a lack of safety and active conflict. Secondary reasons include reduced access to housing and area of livelihood, reduced access to education services and health services, death of husband/family, a general lack of safety. Tertiary causes of displacement include: a lack of employment, reduced access to education and health services, and finally, a lack of access to housing.51

**Figure 10: Primary, Secondary and Third Main Causes Named for Displacement in Al Hawtah City, 2020.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary Cause</th>
<th>Secondary Cause</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lack of Safety</td>
<td>Lack of Access to Home/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Area of Housing and Area of Housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37.8%</td>
<td>and Area of Livelihood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Conflict</td>
<td>Lack of Access to Education Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>and Health Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Cause</td>
<td>Death of Husband/Family Reasons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of Employment Opportunities</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.8%</td>
<td>Lack of Employment Opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of Access to Education</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>Lack of Access to Home/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services and Health Services</td>
<td>Area of Housing and Area of Livelihood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>Lack of Safety</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


According to CFP perceptions, in terms of IDPs choosing their current location of residence, reasons in order of importance include more affordable accommodation costs, security in the location, livelihood (source of income in location), and provision of humanitarian assistance in the area. Secondary reasons as to choosing current location of residence, in order of importance, include: the provision of humanitarian assistance in location, security in location, and livelihood (source of income in location).52 Most IDP sites in Al Hawtah district have been occupied since January 2015 and primarily include male-headed HHs.53

The majority of IDPs have problems accessing water and are frequently exposed to risks associated with landmines, Unexploded Ordnance (UXOs), and Explosive Remnants of War (ERWs). Within this context, local partners in 2015 reported that AQAP had planted landmines in the Al Hamra area of Al Hawtah district in order to stop Houthi advances.54

52 Ibid.
Figure 11: Primary, Secondary and Third Reasons Named for Coming to Current Location of Residence in Al Hawtah city, 2020.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary Reason</th>
<th>Secondary Reason</th>
<th>Third Reason</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Affordable Accommodation Costs in Location</td>
<td>Provision of Humanitarian Assistance in Location</td>
<td>Security in Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.7%</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security in Location</td>
<td>Affordable Accommodation Costs in Location</td>
<td>Provision of Humanitarian Assistance in Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision of Humanitarian Assistance in Location</td>
<td>Security in Location</td>
<td>Provision of Humanitarian Assistance in Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livelihood (Source of Income in Location)</td>
<td>Provision of Humanitarian Assistance in Location</td>
<td>Livelihood (Source of Income in Location)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In terms of needs, CFP data suggests that IDPs are the second highest population group which faces most challenges in satisfying their needs (after the non-host community). More specifically, IDPs in Al Hawtah city face the greatest challenges in satisfying their needs in terms of obtaining medicine and other healthcare products, accessing hygiene/sanitation facilities and hygiene commodities, and utilizing transportation services.55
4 Protection

Overview

Yemen, including Al Hawtah, is facing the world’s largest protection crisis, with potential widespread violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights Law (IHRL), forced displacement, and weak rule of law.

The latest available HNO data estimates the current population in Lahj Governorate at 1,090,000 out of which 790,000 (72 percent) are in need – wherein 57 percent were identified as being in acute need and 43 percent in moderate need in terms of protection assistance.

By comparison between 2018 and 2019 HNO data indicates that the caseload of people in acute need has significantly increased in the protection cluster area (up by 26 percent).

In Lahj Governorate specifically, those most in need of protection assistance are women (132,091), followed by men (131,957), girls (102,728), and then boys (95,870).

Documentation

CFP data shows that in terms of targeted population groups, documentation is generally well taken care of and available. According to CFP data, 100 percent of the population is currently in possession of a national ID card and 100 percent of the population is in possession of their marriage registration/certificate and/or divorce certificates. Moreover, 100 percent of the population is currently in possession of their birth registration/certificate. However, 50 percent of the population is currently in possession of a passport and 50 percent of the population is in possession of a family booklet. According to CFP respondents, approximately 80 percent of IDPs is in possession of birth registration documentation, while only an approximate 8 percent of IDPs is in possession of their family booklet.

It should be noted that according to KI perception data, civil registry facilities are not operational in Al Hawtah city. This would surely prevent the local population from securing the necessary birth/death certificates and delay matrimonial matters involving registrations of marriage/divorce cases. While the legal system is weak and courts lack the necessary resources and personnel, KIs reported that the courts were nonetheless operational.

Figure 12: Percentage of the Population Currently in Possession of Documentation in Al Hawtah city, 2020.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Documentation</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National ID Card</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriage registration/certificate</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorce registration/certificate</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birth registration/certificate</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death registration/certificate</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Booklet</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passport</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


58 HNO Data 2019.


60 HNO Data 2019.

61 CFP Survey, March 2020

Children
Assessments on child protection have shown that most children in Yemen are living under enormous stresses – up to 80 percent of affected children state they fear playing outside, in the open. In addition, in 18 out of 22 Governorates (including Lahj Governorate), children are at greater risk of being exposed to injuries caused by mines and other unexploded ordnances. In Lahj Governorate, humanitarian actors have focused on providing children with activities related to community mine risk education as Lahj Governorate is considered a high-risk district. Additionally, teachers and social workers have been trained to educate and disseminate mine risk education messages to children. Moreover, humanitarian actors have focused on supporting community volunteers, teachers, and social workers through training in child rights and child protection in emergency, alternatives to corporal punishment, and child protection monitoring.

CFP data stipulates there are approximately 70 boys and 20 girls who are victims of exploitative work. Additionally, there are an approximate 55 HHs where a child is considered or recognized as Head of HH by other members of the HH unit or by him-/herself.

Women and Girls
Open source information on Lahj Governorate indicates that humanitarian actors have aimed to focus on consulting women and girls on their particular needs to ensure privacy and protection, and to ensure that distribution points for water, cash, and NFI kits are in safe and accessible areas. Priority has been given to women and other vulnerable HH members (especially female-headed HHs) considering women’s workloads. According to CFP data, there are an approximate 940 pregnant/lactating women or girls currently in Al Hawtah city. Additionally, there are an approximate 300 HHs where a woman is considered or recognized as Head of HH by other members of the HH unit or by herself if living alone.

People with Disabilities
Yemen has signed the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) and its Optional Protocol in 2007 and ratified it in 2009. The number of disabled people vary. According to the 2013 National Health and Demographic Survey, 3 percent of the Yemeni population are disabled (with 1 percent classified as severe and 2 percent moderate disability). In contrast, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) estimates three million disabled people face considerable challenges in meeting their basic needs.

Several pieces of national legislation were passed to protect people with disability. The Law on the Care and Rehabilitation of Disabled Persons of 1999 assigns protection responsibilities to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor. In addition, it provides for the establishment of various care services, including rehabilitation and vocational training. The National Disability Strategy of 2010 recognizes the social model of disability, thus aiming to ensure equal access to the rights of disabled people and inclusive society. Due to the ongoing conflict, the strategy has yet to achieve full implementation. Governmental funds have been further affected by lack of finances, which limits the provision of direct financial support as well as services, healthcare, and housing for the disabled. For instance, as of 2014, an estimated 20,000 people were not receiving medication through the Disability Welfare and Rehabilitation Fund.

Over 80% of people with disabilities and other vulnerable people experience problems accessing services. Impeding factors include physical access challenges, economic and socio-cultural barriers, discrimination, lack of information and services.

People with disability are often affected by their limited mobility and can be left behind by their families in case of evacuation from conflict-ridden areas. Furthermore, there is a stigma associated with disability which leads to many being isolated by their families. According to CFP data, there are approximately 180 people with disabilities living in Al Hawtah city and an approximate 520 individuals who are in serious medical conditions, either life threatening (requiring immediate treatment) or chronic (requiring long-term treatment). Open source data further specifies that issues faced by IDPs in Al Hawtah city are mainly the number of people with chronic illnesses (and not physical or mental disabilities).

64 Ibid.
65 CFP Survey, March 2020
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
Ethnic Minorities

Marginalized groups have existed in Yemen for centuries but are now increasingly struggling to survive. One of the most vulnerable groups identified is the Muhamasheen community (locally referred to as ‘Akhdam’), Yemen’s most marginalized group, who suffer from caste-based, socio-economic, and political discrimination and fall outside established tribal and societal structures. While there are no official statistics on the size of the community, in 2002, it was estimated there were 200,000 Muhamasheen, and in 2014, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) estimated the Muhamasheen population constituted some 10 percent of the population. Historically, the Muhamasheen have mostly lived in very poor conditions in segregated slums on the periphery of urban areas, including Al Hawtah City. Slums consist of small huts haphazardly built of wood and cloth where few basic services were available. Many Muhamasheen are unemployed and are generally excluded from public sector jobs (except in waste management and as street cleaners); in the private sector, the Muhamasheen are often confined to menial, low-paid jobs such as shoe-shining and car washing.

Survivors of Violence

Reported cases of Gender-Based Violence (GBV) increased by 36 percent between 2016 and 2017 and by an additional 70 percent in 2018, which does not account for cases missed due to chronic underreporting. The escalation of the conflict and economic pressure are increasing risks of GBV and have led to a near collapse of protection mechanisms and an increased vulnerability to violence and abuse. The latest available GBV Information Management System data indicates that women and girls received nearly 85 percent of all services for GBV survivors, including psychological, legal, health and shelter support; approximately 12 percent of these services were provided to displaced women and girls. The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), in December 2018, reported that country-wide, GBV incidents included physical assault (46 percent), psychological abuse (22 percent), denial of resources (17 percent), child marriage (11 percent), sexual abuse (3 percent), rape (1 percent). It should be noted that reporting on sexual violence in Yemen remains particularly difficult because of social conservatism and stigma. In terms of response, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) in January 2019 reports that current gaps and challenges in the provision of GBV services – particularly availability, quality, and appropriateness – are largely the result of the inadequate inclusion of gender perspectives into Yemen’s humanitarian programming cycle across all sectors, including protection.

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81 Ibid.
5 Governance

**Highlights**

- With the increasing humanitarian needs in Yemen, international support efforts focus mostly on the humanitarian response. In this context, efforts to develop mechanisms and models for local governance and social cohesion have remained insufficient, uncoordinated and have so far involved a limited number of players. During the consultation workshop in March, leaders in Al Hawtah sent a very clear message that development needs should be addressed as a priority, to enable them to provide services to the population of the city.

- With the current funds, the Local Council (LC) cannot deliver the anticipated services. Dedicated funds to the local governance should be planned.

- Independence of the LC from the fighting factions on the ground is crucial to enable providing services without interruptions to all people equally.

- Continue the coordination between humanitarian actors and the LC as locals know the area best and could easily coordinate with the people there.

- Rampant rates of poverty and a dire lack of sustainable salaries and income are critical obstacles to building resilience within the community.

**Legal Framework**

During the interim years between 1990 (unification) and 2001, a newly unified Yemen organized three national elections, two parliamentary and one presidential. Following the civil war in 1994, former President Saleh carried out a large-scale restructuring of the southern administration. Firstly, he ended the central administrative role that the former capital, Aden, had played in the five outlying southern provinces: Lahj, Abyan, Shabwah, Hadramawt and Al Maharah, consolidating power and resources in Yemen at the central level.

The state had previously responded to calls for decentralization in 2000 with the Local Authority Law (LAL). After 2002, when LAL specified establishment of the LCs, the latter were intended to simplify this structure. In theory, they represented a mechanism of stability which, on the one hand would allow for a reduction of authority of the national government by transferring some administrative and financial functions over to local administrations (i.e. LCs) and, on the other, it would enable the local population to elect their own representatives.

There has been considerable confusion as to whether “decentralization” referred to the transfer of authority from central to local governing bodies, or simply the delegation of responsibilities and tasks downwards while retaining final authority in the hands of central national bodies. Consequently, there was no clear definition of hierarchical administrative powers and prerogatives.

Additionally, while elected officials were able to discuss public issues in various Governorate and District Council meetings, as well as with district residents, they lacked the authority to fire centrally appointed local officials (e.g., directors of health, education, security). LC members can submit a vote of no confidence to make sure that terms of local officials are not further extended.

Furthermore, as per the LAL amendment in 2002, Governorate and District LCs were no longer in charge of overseeing the police chiefs in their respective communities who historically come from outside southern Yemen.

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85 Ibid.
Figure 13: Local Governance Framework in Yemen According to Laws 4/2000 and 18/2008.

Government Structure

Although the local government structure is based on the general organizational structure of governorates, it also departs from it in several significant ways. Broadly, organizational units (offices and bureaus) are either tied directly to the Office of the Governor or managed by the Office of the Deputy Governor. The Office of the Governor, which ranks as a government minister, exercises executive control over the Governorate, either directly or through his deputies.86

The district LC have a similar structure at the governorates level except that the head of the District LC and all civil servants and public employees in the district is called Director General, who is appointed centrally, and the organization units are tied directly with the ones at the Governorate level.87

The election process divides the districts’ population into sub-districts depending on each one’s density. Residents cast ballots for their representative at the LC as well as the president of the LC who, in turn, represents them at the Governorate council. To serve as councillor, the elected councilor must be a natural-born Yemeni citizen, a Muslim, at least 25-years-old, and be a resident of the district which he or she seek to represent. Upon election, their mandate is limited to four years in office, though they may run for reelection at the end of that term. Until 2008, governors were appointed by presidential decree. Following significant political pressure, an amendment was added that year which granted LCs, at both the Governorate- and district-level, the right to elect governors. Since 2011, and despite the 2008 amendments, governors have been appointed by presidential decree.

According to Article 38, after the electoral college elects the governor, the announced winner is confirmed to the post by a presidential decree. Yet, because governors rank as cabinet ministers, in practice, few have ever been elected in this manner. Former president Ali Abdullah Saleh initially reluctantly upheld the letter of the law for most of Yemen’s Governorates, except for Ad Dali’ and Sa’dah, where he appointed his loyalists. The contradictions stem from the inherent ambiguities within LAL itself. For instance, Article 105 specifies that if the Ministry of Local Administration (MoLA) fails to elect a governor, the President may appoint a person of his choice among the members of the Governorate’s LC. The same law upholds the right of the president to appoint officials at lower district posts as well.

The district and governorates councils were envisioned as ‘elected’ bodies, created through the 2000 Local Governorates Law, and Village Councils (also called community committees). These were created by the Social Fund for Development (SFD) in 2013, and in some Governorates including Lahj, counsellors at all levels are tasked with the proposal and oversight of development projects and services in their areas of jurisdiction. District and governorates counsellors also have fiduciary responsibilities and the ability to generate revenue. In the oversight of development projects, they play a role in verifying the impacts of proposed infrastructure projects and have a responsibility to consult and negotiate with landowners and users to ensure that their concerns are considered. Since the outbreak of the war, their revenues have mostly declined, and warring factions — in both the north and the south - have attempted to impose controls over them.

Since the 2011 revolution and the political crisis that followed 2014, new elections for LCs never took place in 2012 as planned. Thus, the elected council members since 2006 are still in office until today.

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Figure 15: The System of Local Government in Yemen.

Pre-conflict: Despite being the Capital of Lahj Governorate, Al Hawtah LC lagged behind the national average on most of the operational dimensions including human resources, equipment, and fiduciary responsibility. Reportedly, the LC only had a hardcopy database of records and did not have an integrated archive, relying exclusively on originals at the governorates-level. The LC also complained that they had inadequate resources to perform its functions, mentioning specifically the weak capacity of district staff, insufficient operational expenses, shortages of furniture, equipment and work tools and a lack of offices and workspaces. For example, the heritage department in Al Hawtah does not have an office. Despite the capacity gaps, the LC staff was involved in both preparing and implementing the annual plan and budget, and unlike in other LCs, the governorates level did not seem to make adjustments to the district plans and budgets.

Like in most other districts, branches of executive organs within Al Hawtah received direct instructions from their counterparts at the governorates level while the District Director General submits periodic reports to the governor on the performance of district level executive organs. Meanwhile, the LC also contributes to monitoring governorates projects and some national level projects—like the street lighting network and health units/centers.
Budget and Financing

In theory, LAL empowers governorates- and districts- councils to generate their own revenues through a series of tariffs and taxes. It specifies four main sources of revenues for the councils; first, the district’s local revenues (illustrated on the left as per KI survey results in Al Hawtah); second, joint revenues gathered by the district and the governorate; third, joint public resources; and forth, financial support by the central government. The budget of LCs, however, is neither distinct nor separate from the national state budGet. They are, in fact, a subset which vertically integrates and consolidates taxation and finance from district to governorate to the national budget. This setup considerably limits the authority of the municipalities to amend budgets or reallocate resources to address crises as they arise. In addition, the LCs have no discretion to set the amount of taxation and must share whatever is collected with the Governorate authorities; which, in turn, must share it with the central government. Revenues from the last two sources are, in theory, redistributable downward to the LCs based on a set of criteria ranging from priority of need, population density, poverty levels, availability of resources, etc. In practice, the degree to which these funds are enough to address and alleviate local issues is uncertain. 89

Figure 16: District Council Main Sources of Revenue in Al Hawtah District, 2020

Although the LCs are in theory entitled to financial support from the central government for capital investments and recurring operating expenses, in practice, the conflict has considerably reduced that aid. LC income is ordinarily generated from commercial taxes: fees on sports’ events, tourism, building permits, registrations; state-operated utilities, such as water and electricity bills, property transfers, car registrations, entertainment venues, and the like. Yet, income from these resources is meager. The LCs have not enjoyed the authority to set a budget that would cover operations and adapt to deal with challenges as needed. They have been reliant on central government funding to cover operations and projects’ costs, wages, infrastructure maintenance, investments, development programs, and capital transfers. 90

Current Operations

Yemen’s central state is weak and fragmented, and it is expected to be even more fragmented in the near future as the country is divided between different factions which in turn interferes with the work of LCs. The city lacks many basic services and the government plays little or no part in providing security or supporting humanitarian aid initiatives as it lacks both the capacity and infrastructure. Instead, the SBF patrol the streets.

Since its emergence in 2017, the STC has evolved into a state-like entity with an executive body (the Leadership Council), a legislature (the Southern National Assembly), and armed forces (SBF), although the latter are under the virtual command structure of the Interior Ministry in the IRG. Despite partially taking control of the city, the STC struggled to provide public services or manage the work of local authorities.

Incidentally, less than 24 hours after the first Southern National Association session on December 23, 2017, President Hadi dismissed the governors of Ad Dali’ and Lahj, who had been the last remaining southern governors to also be STC members. 91 Financial support from the central government to LCs was cut in half in 2015, 92 while LCs were instructed to keep only the basic operating costs of their business. Furthermore, Houthis have depleted state revenues to finance their military efforts at the expense of basic services.

AQAP on the other hand continued to expand its reach in several other southern governorates including Lahj. AQAP had seemingly learned from its previous experience controlling parts of Abyan and Shabwa Governorates in 2011–2012, when it alienated large segments of the local populations by harshly imposing its rule. However, according to one study, the three greatest benefits that AQAP provided local communities during that period were security, justice, and stability. 93 In 2015, AQAP better integrated itself among local communities, especially through the provision of social welfare programs. The group employed this tactic to good effect in Mukalla by providing essential food and water to

91 The official website of the President of the Republic of Yemen, “الوزراء الجدد يؤدون اليمن الدستورية أمام فخامة الرئيس”, December 25, 2017, https://presidentthadi-gov-ye.info/arch ives/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%B1%D8%A 7%D8%A1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%AF%D8%AF -%D9%8A%8D%A8%AF%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85% D9%8A-%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8% AA%D8%88%D8%B1% D8%8A%D8%92/ (accessed March 22, 2020).
the local population despite shortages in other areas.\textsuperscript{94} AQAP also provided emergency relief following Cyclone Chapala in November 2015; it was in fact the only actor in Yemen to have prepared for damage before the cyclone hit land.\textsuperscript{95}

The government change after September 2014 did not alter the basic legal structure of governance, however, it has deleteriously impacted the LCs’ ability to provide essential services to their communities, thus undermining the trust of Yemeni citizens in state institutions. Nevertheless, the LCs have played a noteworthy role in alleviating the impact of the war and its effects on the population on some occasions; as they played mediating roles between armed groups, which resulted in local ceasefires; facilitated safe pathways for humanitarian aid on the frontlines; and facilitated prisoner exchanges between different groups. Additionally, they supported distributing aid directly to beneficiaries on the ground in coordination with humanitarian actors. A good example came in April 2016, when 2.1 million people regained access to a reliable source of water after fuel was supplied to the local water companies in eight governorates: Sana’a, Al Hodeidah, Amran, Hajjah, Sa’dah, Abyan, Lahj and Ma’rib.\textsuperscript{96}

\textbf{Figure 17: Status of Local Authorities’ Services Offered per District, 2020.}

\begin{figure}[h!]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Status_of_Local_Authorities_Services.png}
\caption{Status of Local Authorities’ Services Offered per District, 2020.}
\end{figure}


\textsuperscript{95} Adam Baron et. al., The Essential Role of Local Governance in Yemen (Sana’a, Yemen: Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies and Adam Smith International, 2016), https://sanaacentre.org/publications/main-publications/3770 (accessed March 10, 2020).

\textsuperscript{96} Ibid.
Figure 18: Government Grassroots Outreach Programs in the Past Six Months in Al Hawtah city, 2020.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Tuban</th>
<th>Al Hawtah</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organize town hall meetings and/or public consultations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engage in awareness campaigns</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manage a functional complaint office</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Produce annual reports</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engage in job creation programmes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organize community events and voluntary campaigns</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant confrontation, and street vendors often pay bribes to save their space</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


On 30 March 2017, an Aden-based news outlet published an article stating that the Lahij City General Director attended a meeting to set the city’s 2017 agenda, indicating that the local LC was functioning at the time. On 28 March 2017, a local news outlet published an article claiming that an explosion damaged the LC building. Moreover, March 2017 imagery analysis indicates that most building damage in the city is apparent in non-residential areas, suggesting potential damage to the LC facility.

Figure 19: Street Vendors’ Relationship with the Local Authority in Al Hawtah city, 2020.


The relationship between the local authority and street vendors as the informal employment sector is an integral part of urban economies specially for those who have less employment opportunities. KIs indicated that there are different dynamics in each district. For example, KI respondents underscored the transparency of the local LC through active public announcement, efforts to organize town hall meetings, and produce annual reports, suggesting a degree of added transparency compared to the adjacent Tuban district.97

Status of Governance Facilities

KI surveys collected in March 2020 included the extent of damage inflicted upon the Governance sector in Al Hawtah.

In the city, a total of nine utilities offices are currently functioning, three partially functioning and another three were acknowledged as non-functional. The situation appears like Tuban district with the main difference being that no non-functional offices were reported there. This may be due to the localized fighting that took place in the city center.98

Figure 20: Functionality Status of Governance Infrastructure in Al Hawtah City, 2020.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facility</th>
<th>Fully functioning</th>
<th>Partially functioning</th>
<th>Not functioning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Municipal services (building permits)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal Complaints Hotline</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The municipal complex</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police stations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courts (if they are in town)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Registry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate and land administration (if it is located in the city)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire stations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Defense</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortality and burial office</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slaughterhouse</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complaints offices (hotline)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Licenses office</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Another Governance Unit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Grand Total 9 3 3

Social Cohesion

Highlights

- Accountability is distorted; authorities are overwhelmed, and tribal sheiks have emerged to occupy a more prominent role in dispute resolution and conflict mediation.
- The road south of Al Hawtah leads straight to Aden, giving the city's strategic importance, checkpoints are frequently installed along the way. Several cases of abuse against travelers have been documented since the onset of the conflict.
- As of 2014, the number of NGOs in Yemen was about 9,996, but by the end of 2018 the number spiked to 18,650.

Background and Overview

The unrest in Yemen is more than a single conflict, instead it is a mosaic of complex regional, local, and international power struggles that are the legacy of recent and past events. The conflict itself may have started as a clash between specific groups but since then, multiple new fault lines have emerged. One of the most prominent of these is the social cohesion fault line. Yemen's cascading system of patronage networks serves the narrow interests of elites and those who consent to this system of governance. Many Yemenis, especially in rural areas view the state as indifferent in implementing the rule of law in a way that would bring about equal opportunity or justice. There is deep mistrust of government and institutions.99

Most of the noticeable decline in social capital in Al Hawtah can be attributed to one of the following: a persistent inequality in accessing water and land, economic marginalization of certain groups (often based on political affinity or allegiances or lack thereof – youth and women are marginalized routinely), a decline in the traditional livelihood system the city had grown accustomed to, social and economic marginalization of IDPs and an inequity in infrastructure expenditures over the years.

Land and Water Disputes Adversely Impact Social Inclusion

The main state institutions involved in mitigating and/or resolving land and natural resource disputes in Yemen include the local governorate, district, and village councils, the police, and the courts. Social polarization, allegiances and personal leanings tend to further divide Yemenis into micro-groups. Contested throughout history, even more so recently, areas like Al Hawtah have been captured and recaptured by different groups at different points in time. As part of this, each newly arrived group attempted to develop its own beneficiary apparatus, which ultimately meant that different individuals were favored by different groups to serve conflicting political agendas.

Unfortunately, land dispute resolution mechanisms are not functioning well. In the absence of adequate dispute resolution, rule of law remains weak and this in turn undermines property rights and the security of tenures. In tribal areas in Lahj and elsewhere, Tribal Sheiks have emerged to occupy a more prominent role in dispute resolution and conflict mediation. Their roles largely revolve around dispute settlement and within their local communities. While Governmental Executive Units and LCs also operate collectively or in parallel, Sheiks are often able to bridge divides much faster than local authorities and offer an opportunity for cooperation between differing local governance actors as well.100 After all, authoritative bodies are ultimately dependent upon their constituents, and any approach to local governance necessitates consideration and inclusion of all conflicting parties, including women, youth, tribal leaders, religious leaders, and local authorities.

Marginalization of Ethnic Minorities

The escalation of the ongoing conflict since March 2015 has greatly magnified the Muhamasheen community’s poverty, displacement and severely hampered their social standing. With an estimated population of 3.5 million individuals throughout Yemen,101 the Muhamasheen were among the first groups to be displaced early in the conflict, the displacement served only to compound the levels of discrimination they faced. Similarly, they continue to struggle to access IDP camps or proper shelter in public institutions, such as cultural sites or even schools, due to the extent of prejudice they face from other IDPs.102 Commonly referred to in Yemen as the “Akhdam”, the Muhamasheen are removed from the privileges of tribal connections and lack native villages to flee to. Instead, many displaced Muhamasheen who managed to escape the frontlines have been compelled to shelter in farmland, parks and public spaces - where it is extremely difficult to access any services, aid or receive support. They have often been excluded from efforts by host communities and local authorities to support IDPs and have been evicted from land where they have taken refuge.103 Reports suggest that in some cases like Al Hawtah, even “Local Elders” (government appointed neighborhood mediators) have been accused of human rights violations perpetrated against Muhamasheen.104


Status of Women

Despite the gender gap, women have played a significant role in the conflict throughout Yemen. Perceptions of their own contributions to peace have included supporting fighters in providing food, nursing the wounded, smuggling weapons and even, in a small number of cases, taking up arms. Simultaneously, women are also contributing to community cohesion in diverse ways (not least at the family level) through psychosocial support, civil life and humanitarian work. Examining these granular differences in experience is vital for developing a complete picture of the roles and status of women in Al Hawth and beyond.

Decline in the Traditional Social Services System

Yemen’s social services were already low and of poor quality prior to the crisis. The ongoing conflict has exacerbated the situation, leading to a collapse of social services with widespread and acute vulnerabilities as a result. This significantly impacts social cohesion and livelihoods. Vast material damages to key services (including public services such as health, education, water, and electricity) and weakened institutional capacities constitute an impediment to economic growth, improved livelihoods, and the provision of basic services, thus aggravating inequalities.

Expenditures on social services like the Social Welfare Fund which offered minimal but crucial financial assistance to poor families, ended at the beginning of 2016, leaving eight million of Yemen’s most vulnerable people without a financial safety net. The shutting down of businesses have directly increased the average number of dependents to 13:1 and weakened the purchasing power of the population.

Complicating matters further is the ongoing embezzlement and harassment that private business owners have been experiencing in places like Al Hawth. Specifically, unidentified groups of armed men force business owners to contribute towards an anonymous City Improvement Fund without providing proper identification. This has led to a collapse of social services with widespread and acute vulnerabilities as a result. This significantly impacts social cohesion and livelihoods. Vast material damages to key services (including public services such as health, education, water, and electricity) and weakened institutional capacities constitute an impediment to economic growth, improved livelihoods, and the provision of basic services, thus aggravating inequalities.

Spontaneous Checkpoints and Arbitrary Arrests

The road south of Al Hawth leads straight to Aden. Given the city’s strategic importance, checkpoints are frequently installed along the way. Several cases of abuse against travelers have been documented since the onset of the conflict. Many reports have also stated that children are being recruited to man these checkpoints, indicating child rights violations.

Further, people have been detained and tried in court for their religious beliefs, and others have been detained because of their journalism work. All parties to the conflict have detained civilians from areas under the control of the opposing side, including based on their surnames or being from certain families thought to be of a particular political inclination. Detentions for lengthy periods without trial or clear charges are continued. A number of detainees have forcibly disappeared and have been tortured and in some cases killed. While the majority of victims of detention-related abuses were men, women have also been detained, mistreated, and sentenced to death following unfair trials.

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)

Even before the war broke out, corruption was rife in Yemen. Ranging from petty corruption at all levels of the state hierarchy to large-scale nepotism and self-enrichment. Currently, as emphasized by activists and organizations, corruption continues to surge and poses a serious impediment to societal progress. Subsequently, humanitarian aid often fails to reach beneficiaries. Each warring faction in Yemen attempts to regulate aid and NGO access into the areas under its control. Admission is subject to political loyalty of NGOs and aid recipients alike – a formula that further increases social strife and intensifies intercommunal conflict. Relief materials are frequently diverted by recipient factions and sold in the black market and the revenues then benefit a few selected individuals.

As of 2014, the number of NGOs in Yemen was about 9,996, but by the end of 2018 the number jumped to 18,650. Most of these organizations were established by the warring factions (the Hadi forces, the Southern movement and the Houthis). For example, between 2014 and 2018 the Houthis founded about 1,500 NGOs in the various cities it controlled. This was done not only to meet local needs and establish legitimacy, but also in order to get access to foreign aid.

Al Hawth’s Women and Children Department, Local Leadership Program of the STC is the main actor on women empowerment in the city. It often holds workshops in Al Hawth addressing the definition of Women’s Rights and highlighted some of the more challenging issues local women face in what it referred to as...
“male dominant society that detracts their legal rights”, 113 the workshop also provided participants with legal information. Initiatives such as these seem to suggest that local women-led organizations are increasing in Al Hawtah. Some of the more active women’s organizations in the city include: (i) Al Hawtah Women Development Association, 114 (ii) Al Hawtah District Union of Southern Women, 115 (iii) Department of Women and Children. 116

This report has identified and collected details pertaining to NGOs that self-reported are being active in Al Hawtah District. Details of their precise roles in the city could not be independently verified. However, the Electronic Directory of Civil Society Organizations in Yemen 117 suggests that Lahj and Al Hawtah, in addition to other neighboring areas and Governorates in the country, are within the NGOs areas of operation. These NGOs include but are not limited to:

1. Isham Charitable Social Contribution Foundation; Providing humanitarian aid and supporting the specific charitable developmental, educational, cultural and social work of all groups of Yemeni society moving the needy segments from the circle of need to the cycle of sufficiency and production. Primarily focused on less fortunate families. The foundation works to achieve a positive impact in the lives of poor families through material and moral support and specialized training and rehabilitation programs.

2. Al Rawafid Foundation for Research and Development Studies; the foundation targets the agricultural, economic and social sectors. Wherein they hold workshops on women and children affairs, youth participation, governance and transparency, human rights, and conflict resolution dialogue.

3. The Polling Organization; The first pioneering institution in research and opinion polls in Yemen. Providing research services, conducting public opinion polls.

4. Freedom Foundation for Human Rights: identifies as an impartial nonpartisan entity that aims to spread and promote human rights values and principles committed to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and all laws and international human rights treaties and covenants. The foundation raises legal awareness through training courses, workshops and seminars.

5. Al Rufiga’ Charitable Development Foundation; specializing in social solidarity and its actual translation between members of society while spreading the values of compassion, cooperation and solidarity among society, rehabilitating orphans, providing adequate and free health care and food for orphans, widows, the elderly, destitute families, especially in slums, remote and rural areas.

6. Save Youth; Preparing and rehabilitating youth leaders developmentally through several social cohesion programs that primarily focus on technical skills development and anti-narcotic programs. Building youth capacities and sponsoring youth initiatives.

7. Environmental Protection and Development Organization (EPSDO); founded under a different name initially, the Association of Bees for Environmental Protection. It was then renamed after increasing its social development participation in Yemen to obtain recognition from the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD).

8. Wigaya For Health Development; raises health awareness, carries out field studies, collects data on maternal and child health, promotes vaccination culture, especially in remote areas.

9. Youth Without Borders Foundation; Engaging youth to achieve sustainable development capacity, countering marginalization by encouraging the youth to participate in Yemen’s development process and communicating youth voices to decision makers.
Culture and Heritage

Highlights

- Cultural heritage sites in Al Hawtah city have come under repeated attacks by warring factions. According to the KI Survey conducted in March 2020, eight out of nine main cultural sites are either non-functional or partly functional.
- Several barriers are obstructing the rehabilitation of these monuments, but the main obstacle is insufficient funding.
- Respondents to the KI Survey, stressed that while Al Hawtah’s heritage facilities can be accessed, it has “never” received any international aid targeting any cultural sites in the city.
- Damage to these sites has been further compounded by the loss of human resources, financial resources and the disruption of administrative oversight.

Figure 21: Public Buildings, Mosques and Entertainment Facilities in Al Hawtah city, UN-Habitat (2020).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>#</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>#</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Political security building</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>Post Office</td>
<td>K</td>
<td>General electricity department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Public building</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Tax and Finance Office</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>Insurance and Pensions Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Health and Population Office</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>Housing and urban planning Office</td>
<td></td>
<td>Insurance and Pensions Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Local Council</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>Local service building</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>Public Telecommunication Foundation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Based on Wikimapia, OpenStreetMap.
Overview

Located in the delta of Wadi Tabn, Al Hawtah has been famous for its fertile lands and agriculture, both of which represent the local population’s main livelihood.

In the south, following the destruction of Al Ra’ra’ when the Ottoman forces destroyed the Tahiri State in the 16th Century, Al Hawtah City became the capital of Lahj. The former capital was left so devastated that little mention was ever made of it again. The Historian Ahmed bin Fadhil who documented the history of Al Hawtah in his book titled: “A Gift of Time”, noted that: “among the first to make Al Hawtah the capital of Lahj were the servants of the Imams Mutawakil and Al Mutasawir” in the 10th Century. He evidences this by referring to their two homes in Al Hawtah, which remain to this day.

Today, Al Hawtah contains nine heritage sites and over 23 mosques and 30 ancient water wells. The city is also renowned for its shrines, most notably for the Shrine of Al Salih Muzahim Jafar, who is visited during the Islamic Month of Rajab. Traders look forward to this occasion all year, anticipating the arrival of tourists from across the country. In fact, Al Hawtah is also referred to as Al Hawtah Al Jafariah, in relation to the city’s famous custodian, Muzahim Jafar, who was known for his knowledge and righteousness among the local population.

Since 2015, cultural heritage sites have come under repeated attack by warring factions. According to the KI Survey conducted in March 2020, eight out of nine main cultural sites are either partly functional or non-functional. Environmental factors is one contributing factor to this. Numerous sites had originally been built using elaborate bricks made of clay. Being fragile, the sites tend to require regular maintenance, preservation and protection. Even though there are more than 180 locations with relevant cultural/heritage importance throughout Lahj, the Heritage Directorate does not have an office or storage space in the area. Additionally, the Ministry lacks the financial means to provide the Directorate with the necessary operational budget to resume their works.

Figure 22: Total Number of Culture and Heritage Facilities and Their Functionalities in Al Hawtah city, 2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facility</th>
<th>Fully functioning</th>
<th>Partially functioning</th>
<th>Not functioning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Historical location</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libraries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manuscripts and archives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monuments / landmarks</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Museums</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious buildings (Mosques, Churches, etc..)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theaters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Another heritage or historical place</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>7</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


---


Landmarks

The palaces of the Abdali Sultanate stand as a historical testament with unique architectural features in the city of Al Hawtah. Yet, despite the remarkable cultural and historical value attached to these bastions, these sites have been severely damaged and neglected in recent years. The Palace of the Stone, built in 1930, by Sultan Abdul Karim bin Fadl Al Abdali, brought in craftsmen and workers from India to carve this architectural feat into the distinctive image seen today. Like many other structures, it too suffered numerous acts of looting and pillaging. By February 2020, the edifices of the palace had caved in due to negligence and chronic lack of maintenance.

Other impressive palaces were also built in Al Hawtah. Notably, Al Rawda Palace and the New Lahj Palace. The latter functioned as the seat of the last rulers of the Abdali Sultanate in the 1960s. More recently, many of these historical places were turned into makeshift shelters for IDP families escaping the conflict. One of the most notably damaged landmarks is the Al Abdali Palace. Over the years, historical sites of cultural value were systematically occupied and targeted throughout Al Hawtah. For example, at the start of the 2015 offensive, Southern Resistance fighters gained control of the Nasser College for Agricultural Sciences (a prestigious local academic institution) and converted it into a military site, established firing and rocket launcher positions, and stored their weapons on site.

In 1976, Sultan Ali Abdel Karim had donated the building to the University of Aden to be used as a center for national agricultural research and knowledge. In 2019, the Sultan’s granddaughter called on authorities to pay more attention to the deterioration of cultural sites in the city and begin implementing plans to renovate and safeguard these monuments.

121 Ibid.
122 AlJazeera, “قصور لحج اليمنية...تاريخ يعاني الإهمال”, January 31, 2013, https://www.aljazeera.net/news/cultureandart/2013/1/31/%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%B1-%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%AC-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%B6%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%78%81%D8%A8-%D8%A7-%D9%8A%D8%89%D8%A7%D8%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%65%D9%87%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84 (accessed March 10, 2020).
Since 1967, the majority of the historical buildings in Al Hawtah were converted to government and military facilities that served at the discretion of various ministries and medical mission field offices for the good of the citizens throughout the governorate. Some of these palaces were also handed over to citizens.
1. Dar Al Hajar Palace: located in Haret alJami’ (AlJami’), the State Mosque was built by Al Hawtah. Built in 1926, during the reign of Sultan Lahj Abdul Karim bin Fadl Al Abdali II (1918-1947), the structure was heavily influenced by the design of Buckingham Palace in London, where Sultan Lahj Abdul Karim Fadl and his son “Fadl” were hosted in 1925. The palace has two entrances facing the west and south, with a large square in front of it used to receive guests and delegations. Part of Dar Al Hajar had been converted into a museum but owing to a lack of security during the recent conflict, many elements were looted. At the beginning of the war, the upper part of the palace on the northwestern side was shelled. The building was also subjected to numerous light and medium small arms fire. The damages sustained remain visible today.\(^{126}\) In 2019, the governor of Lahj stated that the palace would be renovated as part of the 2020 SFD Project, however no renovations have taken place yet.\(^{127}\) Some rooms of Dar Al Hajar Palace were converted into offices of the Democratic People’s Republic of Yemen News Agency on the ground floor. The second floor was converted to the headquarters of the local people’s radio (Lahj Local Radio), and recently, the Yemeni Writers Union set up their headquarters on the same floor. The presence of the Yemeni Writers Union, a group of local intellectuals who played some part in preserving the overall integrity of the building.\(^{128}\)

2. The Sultan’s Palace, Al Abdali: mentioned earlier, is the most prominent landmark in Al Hawtah. The location has deteriorated due to a continuing lack of restoration and damage sustained by serving as a makeshift shelter for IDP families who occupied the premises as early as 2014, with the approval of the owner’s representative agent. Since the Palace is not equipped with proper housing units, IDP families used the main building and were initially granted access after being asked to maintain the condition of the premises and avoid carrying out any alterations on site.\(^{129}\)

3. Al Andalus Park: once a vibrant community recreational area, the park sustained significant damage during the conflict. It was once the main yard of Sultan Al Abdali Palace. More recently, renovations are nearing completion with the installation of a fountain and columns.\(^{130}\)

4. The Jami’ Mosque: Located in Haret alhami’ (AlJami’ neighborhood) the mosque was built by Omar bin Abdullah Al Musawa in the 5th Century AD (1083 AH). It is considered one of the most important mosques in the city of Al Hawtah. The mosque consists of two floors. The first floor was used for commercial shops, where the proceeds are used to maintain the mosque. The second floor is decorated with traditional Islamic elements and has two entrances, one facing South and the other facing East. The Mosque was last renovated in 1970.\(^{131}\)

5. Al Dawla Mosque: The “State” Mosque was built by Sultan Ahmed Fadl Al Abdali Al Salami and was later refurbished by Muhammad bin Mohsen’s brothers in the 12 Century AD (1292 AH). Many of the Sultanate’s royals were buried on its grounds. The structure is characterized by the blended nature of Indian architecture, where six domes decorate the roof. The well on site is the main source of water for visitors. On the front side of the mosque, which faces Mecca, the tombs of most of the Sultans of Lahj can be found.\(^{132}\)


132 Ibid.
6. **Sufyan Tomb and Mosque**: Some believe Al Hawtah was named for this tomb. It is the final resting place of Sheikh Sufyan bin Abdullah, a revered local man of knowledge who resided in the area during the 13th century AD (8th Century AH). This site was raised to the ground in 2015 by AQAP.

**Figure 27**: Photos of Al Dawla Mosque in Al Hawtah.

**Figure 28**: Photos of Sufyan Tomb and Mosque Destruction in Al Hawtah.

7. The Muhassan Al Abdalia (School of Advancement): commissioned in 1930s, the school brought teachers from Egypt and Sudan before it was converted to the Agricultural Court. The school was first built by Sultan Ali Abdul Karim Al Abdali. It is thought to be among the first formal schools in Southern Arabia. Certificates issued there were accredited in Egypt. When the war started, the building was no longer being used as a school, but had been converted into the Administrative Office of the Education Ministry. The building was in poor condition due to the continuous lack of maintenance and it was subsequently vacated. In April 2015, the school was occupied and used as a military base and two months later the building was ultimately destroyed following an airstrike.

8. Al Jafarya Mosque: located on the eastern side of the old cemetery of the city of Al Hawtah, the mosque was built in 1952 AD by Ammar Hassan Ibrahim using bricks of clay and milk.

9. Balghith Mosque (Al Rahman Mosque): located in Balghith neighborhood, next to the old Jewish Quarter, the mosque was commissioned in the 17th Century AD. The "Balghith" Mosque is attributed to Abd Al Rahman bin Ibrahim, a revered local elder and scholar. The mosque was renovated by Sayyid Ahmad bin Balghith, then by his son Muhammad bin Ahmad Balghith, until it was renovated on a third occasion by a local unnamed philanthropist in 1994.

10. Masawa Mosque: Built in 892 AD, it contains a pulpit that was transported from Al Ra’a, the old capital of Lahj. Masawa Mosque was rebuilt in 2000 by an unnamed philanthropist.

Barriers to Renovation

The Ministry of Culture and Al Hawtah District LC are the main entities responsible for any renovation of historical landmarks. Several challenges are obstructing the rehabilitation of these monuments, but the main obstacle is insufficient funding.

Moreover, respondents to the KI Survey conducted in March 2020, stressed that while Al Hawtah’s heritage sites can be accessed, the city has “never” received any international aid targeting cultural sites. The continuous damage to cultural sites has been further compounded by the loss of human resources, financial resources and the disruption of administrative oversight, three issues underscored in the same survey.

According to KI survey the below visual describes the situation of the Culture and Heritage sector in Al Hawtah compared to the adjacent district Tuban.

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138 Ibid.
### Figure 30: Which of the Following Describes the Culture and Heritage Situation Best

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Tuban</th>
<th>Al Hawtah</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Closure of Culture and Heritage sites</td>
<td>☮️</td>
<td>☮️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited acces of Culture and Heritage sites</td>
<td></td>
<td>☮️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Random demolishing of the cultural and historical sites</td>
<td></td>
<td>☮️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Looting and destruction of cultural heritage sites/ assets</td>
<td></td>
<td>☮️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss of historic documents, archival records or databases</td>
<td></td>
<td>☮️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preservation and Promotion of the Intangible Cultural Heritage</td>
<td>☮️</td>
<td>☮️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited accessibility to cultural spaces/places and materials necessary for the practice of intangible cultural expressions</td>
<td></td>
<td>☮️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disruption of the production of tangible cultural goods</td>
<td></td>
<td>☮️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interruption of the basic infrastructural services (communication, electricity, water, etc.)</td>
<td>☮️</td>
<td>☮️</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: KI Survey, March 2020
Highlights

- One of the main demographic challenges facing Lahj Governorate, including Al Hawtah city, is poverty; Lahj Governorate is considered the second poorest governorate in Yemen.
- The majority of CFP respondents reported that, prior to the outbreak of the conflict, the public sector was the main active economic sector in Al Hawtah city, closely followed by construction, artisanal work, and agriculture.
- CFPs also stated that the main impediments to securing a job in Al Hawtah include: a lack of or inadequate skills, lack of money for inputs, lack of family/clan or political connections, fuel being too expensive, lack of information about the local labor market, lack of accessible land, and nepotism.
- CFP respondents also indicated that the main primary sources of money before the outbreak of the conflict, in order of importance, included income generating activities (informal employment, sales), followed by safety nets (pension, insurance), income generating activities (formal employment), loans from bank, government or microfinance.

Overview

Al Hawtah city runs along the main trading route which links Aden, Ta’iz, Ibb, and Sana’a. It is located in the delta of Wadi Tuban, which is famous for the level of purity of its water and is furthermore known for its gardens of jasmine trees and roses. Since Wadi Tuban is characterized by a semi-tropical climate this fills the gardens of Lahj Governorate with vegetables, fruits, various types of grain and long fiber cotton and flowers. Lahj has two livelihood zones: The Western Coastal Plain millet, considered a sorghum and livestock zone (highlands), and the Western and Central Wadi which is regarded as the sorghum, millet, vegetable, fruit and livestock zone (lowlands). The livelihoods of people therefore vary based on geography and the climate of the district in which they reside. Agriculture is the lead economic activity. It includes crop production (mainly millet and sorghum), animal husbandry, and beekeeping. The total cultivable area in Lahj Governorate measures 31,804 acres out of which 88 percent is used to grow crops. The crops produced in the region constitute 4 percent of the total agricultural production in the Republic of Yemen.

The governorate is also renowned for the abundance of clay minerals used in the manufacture of cement and refractory bricks. In addition to crafting hand-made carpets and ceramic pottery, Lahj Governorate is also well known for honey production.

Figure 31: Eve of Conflict Key National Figures, 2013-2014.

Other Figures

- Informal Sector Employment: 73.2%
- Working Age Population: 13.4M
- Employed population: 4.2M


Near Al Hawtah city, irrigation systems are built around floodplains which carry seasonal rainwater from mountains to the north. Farms in these areas provide better agricultural production than neighboring sites which suffer from bad soil quality and scarce water sources. However, it should be noted that participants from the Joint Analysis and Recovery Planning Workshop mentioned that seasonal rainwater washes away parts of the agricultural lands (particularly in Tuban district and in Tur Al Bahan), meaning that pumps would need to be installed in order to avoid future problems. The main sources of irrigation include rainfall, followed by wells, and floods.
Poverty

One of the main demographic challenges facing Lahj Governorate, including Al Hawtah city, is poverty. The Central Statistics Office (CSO), in 2014, estimated a poverty rate of 69.1 percent. It should be noted that Lahj Governorate is considered the second poorest governorate in Yemen, following Sa’dah Governorate for which a poverty rate of 84.5 percent was reported. The latest available CSO data indicates that, country-wide, over half of the total population is below the age of 20; additionally, it is estimated that over 15.4 percent of the total population belongs to the youth category falling in the age bracket between 0 and 4 years (primarily due to high birth rates). Youth unemployment remains a critical development challenge facing Yemen due to the youth bulge. Publicly available 2016 estimates show that the unemployment rate of people aged 15–24 years who live in urban areas fluctuates at around 30 percent. By the fall of 2015, 45 percent of Yemenis surveyed stated they had lost their main source of income due to the conflict. Furthermore, a May 2019 United Nations Development Program (UNDP) report stated that if fighting continues through 2022, Yemen will rank as the poorest country in the world, with almost 80 percent of the population living under the poverty line, and 65 percent classified as extremely poor.

During 2005-2006, Lahj Governorate had an urban poverty rate of 22.9 percent (compared to a national average of 20.7 percent), and a rural poverty rate of 49.49 percent (compared to a national average of 40.1 percent). In 2009 it was estimated that Lahj Governorate had an unemployment rate of 13.9 percent (approximately half of the unemployment rate in Sa’dah Governorate). CFP respondents report that the impact of the conflict on the livelihoods for the majority of HHs in Al Hawtah city has been either extreme (89.1 percent of respondents) or high (10.9 percent of respondents). Before the conflict, in 2009, the average annual HH income was nearly 659,000 YER or $13,612 (when the national average was 884,000 YR or $18,260). By 2016, the average monthly HH income reported in Lahj Governorate was 25,569 YER (306,828 YER per annum).

Figure 33: Unemployment Rate in Yemen, 2015.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governorate</th>
<th>Unemployment Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sa’dah Governorate</td>
<td>29.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aden Governorate</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ta’iz Governorate</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lahj Governorate</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sana’a City</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abyan Governorate</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Hodeidah Governorate</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


142 Ibid.

143 Ibid.

Economic Activities

In terms of the total area in Lahj Governorate which could be cultivated, only 2 percent is used. This is mainly for the cultivation of cereals (40 percent), alfalfa (23 percent) and qat (20 percent), and to a lesser extent money crops (5 percent), and fruits (5 percent). Additionally, long-fiber cotton is grown in the area. Ownership of farmland in Lahj Governorate in 2009 was estimated at 50.7 percent.

The Lahj Governorate coastline is 250 km long and offers the potential for fisheries, along with arable lands due to water availability. Fish production in Ras Al Araah, which is also the main transit point for foreign migrants in the Governorate, went from zero to 7.3 tons in 2005. More up to date information for fish production is unfortunately unavailable.

Figure 34: Cultivation in Lahj Governorate, 2009.

According to the participants from the Joint Analysis and Recovery Planning Workshop, an approximate 20 percent of Al Hawtah district consists of agricultural land while 70 to 80 percent of the surrounding Tuban district consists of agricultural land. Prior to the outbreak of the conflict, Al Hawtah city hosted the Wadi Khair farm which employed hundreds of workers. Since the onset of the conflict, much of the agricultural lands and farms have been destroyed (including the Wadi Khair farm) and agricultural goods have been stolen or looted.145

The participants further stated that factories in Al Hawtah city, including the tomato and cotton factory (which used to employ more than 10,000 workers) have been destroyed. There is a large industrial zone, Al Rija’a area, located 20 kilometers outside of Al Hawtah city (and 27 kilometers from Aden port) which measures a total area of 2,800 hectares.146 Although some activities have been initiated to encourage the use of the industrial zone, such as the allocation of spaces to licensed industrial projects and road works (excavation, filling, and leveling), investments are needed in the areas of electricity, water, road, sanitation, and telephone (in order of importance) to facilitate economic activities here.147

KI data further stipulates that there are three privately owned slaughterhouses in Al Hawtah city; all three slaughterhouses are partially functioning. Additionally, there is one fully functioning marketing facility for activities related to fisheries, and one storage facility which is not functioning, but which is originally related to activities related to fisheries. Souks in Al Hawtah city are organized every Monday and Thursday.

Most CFP respondents reported that, prior to the outbreak of the conflict, the public sector was the main active economic sector in Al Hawtah city, closely followed by construction, artisanal work, and agriculture. According to CFP respondents, the main primary sources of money before the outbreak of the conflict, in order of importance, included income generating activities (informal employment, sales), followed by safety nets (pension, insurance), income generating activities (formal employment), loans from bank, government or microfinance.149

Interestingly, the main sources of money are currently the same, with CFP respondents stating that the main primary sources of money are income generating activities (informal employment, sales), safety nets (pension, insurance), income generating activities (formal employment), and loans from bank, government or microfinance.150

CPF data also indicates that most residents are employed in casual labor (agriculture, construction, domestic work, etc.), closely followed by salaried employment with the government, working in humanitarian assistance, and salaried employment in private companies (for profit or not for profit). Casual labor (agriculture, construction, domestic work) and salaried employment with the government are reported as the main secondary means of employment, followed by self-employment (business owner, petty trade, agriculture and livestock product sales), followed by working in humanitarian assistance, salaried employment in private company (for profit or not for profit) and self-employment related to fishing and/or selling fish.

The main perceived obstacles to finding employment in order of importance are a lack of technical/vocational training, difficulties in obtaining a business loan under favorable conditions, and difficulties in continuing or completing education.151

According to CFP data, primary and secondary sources of income in the past 30 days (March 2020) in Al Hawtah city mainly consisted of income generating activities (informal employment, sales), followed by safety nets (pension, insurance, income generating activities (formal employment), and loans from bank, government or microfinance. As a secondary source of income, Al Hawtah city’s residents mainly rely on income generating activities (formal employment), safety nets, and income generating activities (informal employment, sales). Interestingly, the main third source of income consists of assistance from family and friends which was not mentioned as a primary or secondary source of income. Additionally, NGO/community support is mentioned as a secondary and third source of income.152

145 According to the participants in the Joint Analysis and Recovery Planning workshop, Key Informant discussions, Government Data, March 2020.
147 Ibid.
150 Ibid.
151 Ibid.
152 Ibid.
In terms of the main obstacles that HHs face in securing a job in Al Hawtah city, approximately half of CFP respondents mentioned limited or irregular work opportunities as the first main obstacle, followed by lack of or inadequate skills, lack of money for inputs, lack of family/clan or political connections, fuel being too expensive, lack of information about the local labor market, lack of accessible land, and nepotism.\(^{153}\)

Interestingly, the lack of family/clan or political connections was mentioned among main obstacles but was not further mentioned as a second or third main obstacle. Reasons related to work opportunities (including having access to information about the local labor market), a lack of skills, or lack of money for inputs are named across the board as obstacles faced by HHs in Al Hawtah city. Land issues, including a lack of accessible land, no or lack of irrigation system, and agricultural loans being too expensive are named among first, second, and third main obstacles in terms of obstacles faced by HHs in securing a job in Al Hawtah city.\(^{154}\)
Figure 36: First, Second and Third Main Obstacles that HHs Face in Securing a Job in Al Hawtah city, 2020.

### First Main Obstacle
- Limited or Irregular Work Opportunities: 48.6%
- Lack of or Inadequate Skills: 18.9%
- Lack of Money for Inputs: 13.5%
- Lack of Family/Clan or Political Connections: 8.1%
- Fuel Too Expensive (Leading to High Transportation Costs): 2.7%
- Lack of Information About the Local Labor Market: 2.7%
- No or Lack of Accessible Land (Due to Landmines or Shelling Affecting Cultivation and/or Grazing): 2.7%
- Other, Nepotism: 5.4%

### Second Main Obstacle
- Lack of or Inadequate Skills: 48.6%
- Limited or Irregular Work Opportunities: 24.3%
- Lack of Information About the Local Labor Market: 18.9%
- Lack of Money for Inputs: 18.9%
- Conflict and Insecurity in the Area: 18.9%
- No or Lack of Irrigation System (Agriculture): 2.7%
- Other, Cannot Continue Studies: 2.7%
- I Do Not Know: 2.7%

### Third Main Obstacle
- Lack of Money for Inputs: 21.6%
- Lack of Information About the Local Labor Market: 16.2%
- Lack of or Inadequate Skills: 16.2%
- I Do Not Know: 16.2%
- Lack of Proper Documentation: 5.4%
- Limited or Irregular Work Opportunities: 5.4%
- Disability/Chronic Illness: 5.4%
- Agricultural Loans Too Expensive (Due to High Interest Rates): 2.7%
- Feed Too Expensive: 2.7%
- Other, Nepotism: 2.7%

For women specifically, it is challenging to secure and maintain a job in Al Hawtah. According to nearly 70 percent of CFP respondents, the first main barrier faced by women in taking on a greater role in the local economy is the raising of children and domestic work. Additionally, CFP respondents, in order of importance, also named the lack of jobs and skills, along with limited access to finance as additional barriers faced by women in terms of taking on a greater role in the local economy.  

**Food (In)security**

According to HNO data (2019), Lahj Governorate was home to a total of 416,500 people were in acute need of food security and agricultural assistance, whereas 344,000 were in moderate need, meaning that 71.8 percent of HHs were generally food insecure. As for nutrition, 168,731 people are in acute need, whereas 92,241 are in moderate need, translating into 260,972 people requiring nutrition assistance in the governorate. In comparison, available 2003 data placed the number of food insecure HHs in Lahj Governorate at 23.1 percent (compared to a national average of 21.7 percent). Approximately 12 percent of HHs were facing moderate hunger, 11.2 percent of HHs faced severe hunger, and 10.4 percent of HHs in the Governorate were vulnerable to food insecurity. By 2016, more than half of the HHs in Lahj governorate prioritized food (59.3 percent) as their main humanitarian need.

![Figure 37: Food Security Situation in Lahj Governorate (and Yemen), 2003.](source)

In terms of walking distance to obtain food items (staple food, fresh vegetables and fruit, meat, etc.), most of Al Hawtah city’s residents spend less than 20 minutes of travel time. An approximate 32 percent of CFP respondents state that the population spends 20 – 40 minutes to obtain food items and an approximate 14 percent of respondents stated that the city’s residents spend more than 40 minutes. Approximately 97 percent of the population purchases food items themselves whereas 3 percent of the population relies on aid distribution. Some 16 percent of CFP respondents stated that food items are not easily available.

![Figure 38: Travel Time to Access Food Items in Al Hawtah city, 2020.](source)

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156 HNO data, 2019.
158 Ibid.
Housing, Land and Property (HLP)

Highlights

- Satellite imagery analysis captures 285 damaged structures in Al Hawtah (97 destroyed, 156 severely damaged, 219 moderately damaged).
- Al Hawtah is extremely vulnerable to heavy rains and floods. Since most structures are built using mud brick, natural disasters take a significant toll on homes and buildings alike.
- Lengthy land dispute process through LC, owing to insufficient staffing, inadequate resources and weak administrative and management structures, many citizens tend to settle their issues outside the legal system.
- Disputes over farmland and property frequently occur in the area.
- Informal settlements, or "Ashwaiyat" (slums) often not exceeding a few meters squared in size, can be found throughout the city. This is particularly the case in Al Khatib neighborhood.

Throughout Lahj Governorate, and in Al Hawtah, mud brick homes are abundant. These buildings tend to have thick walls, often measuring up to a meter and a half and tapering towards the top. There are two main reasons mud bricks are used: First, they tend to lock cool air inside the building, a necessity during the summer heatwaves, which can reach temperatures as high as 40°C. Second, mud is widely abundant and far more cost efficient compared to concrete and wood, as it can be acquired for a fraction of the cost. These mud homes tend to have small windows to avoid direct sunlight and provide ample shade as well as privacy. Taller mud buildings have a shaft structure built into them (usually adjacent to a stairway) to act as a chimney to pull cool breeze through the entire building. The circulating air serves as a makeshift apparatus that effectively cools the building. These buildings are often seen laid out in a detached or semi-detached fashion to provide shade for one another and act like a barrier against sunlight for the streets and alleyways in-between. These fragile structures have come under repeated attacks during the conflict in Yemen.

Damaged Buildings

Figure 39: Examples of Housing Damage in Al Hawtah 2015-2016.

Property damage is obvious throughout Al Hawtah. Long considered a strategic foothold by warring factions, the city suffered a significant amount of damage since the start of the war in Yemen. Damage incurred from airstrikes, artillery, mortar improvised explosive ordinances and small arms fire has left its mark on various residences, commercial buildings, landmarks, and public spaces. Satellite imagery from Remote Damage Analysis (UNOSAT 2019) captured images of several incapacitated structures and damaged buildings. Moreover, according to the World Bank, 60 percent of the Al Hawtah’s buildings exhibit clear signs of structural damage.161 Owing to financial constraints, a chronic lack of maintenance and a lack of authority, the structural integrity of numerous buildings in the city have deteriorated to alarming levels. Many homes have been completely or partially destroyed, where the occupants are faced with the choice to either flee or to stay in their semi-destroyed houses, which are sometimes even in danger of collapse, some resort to occupy government buildings. There are no mechanisms for compensation for those whose homes have been damaged during the war.

Figure 40: Building Remote Damage Analysis, 2019.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Damage Level</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Completely Destroyed</td>
<td>37% (40)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severely Damaged</td>
<td>45% (49)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderately Damaged</td>
<td>18% (20)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Aden Alghed, "2015, لحج بعد الحرب .. دمار ومعانة وغياب الجهات الحكومية.

Source: Aden Alghed, "2016, حوطة لحج .. المدينة المنكوبة.


Al Hawtah
RAPID CITY PROFILE

The overall housing situation in Al Hawtah city raises several concerns. At the forefront of these issues are the city’s accelerated population growth rate, a growing squatter population that has no secure land tenure and lacks access to basic municipal services and increasing land and housing costs.¹⁶²

Informal settlements, or “Ashwaiyat” (slums) often not exceeding a few meters squared in size, can be found throughout the city. This is particularly the case in Al Khatib neighborhood, an area home to numerous IDPs, many of whom have either lost their homes in the city or were displaced from other cities due to the conflict. The poorly constructed makeshift homes found here, and other informal areas of the city tend to suddenly cave in and collapse, so much so that these fallen buildings have become a pastime folklore symbol of Al Hawtah.¹⁶³

Housing Tenures

Housing tenures refer to the financial arrangements under which an individual has the right to reside in a house or apartment. The most frequent forms of tenures are ownership and tenancy. While some housing tenures have remained unchanged in Al Hawtah city (according to 18.9 percent of respondents), over 78 percent of CFPs indicated that housing tenures were generally increasing.¹⁶⁴

Figure 41: Target Population by Current Housing Tenure Types, Al Hawtah city, 2020.

18.90% 2.70% 78.40%
Remained the same Decreasing Increasing


Flooding and Housing Damage

A regular occurrence, Al Hawtah is extremely vulnerable to heavy rains and floods. As a mud brick city, natural disasters and thunderstorms take a significant toll on homes and buildings. Hurricanes traveling inward from the Gulf of Aden (less than 25km away) tend to carry a great deal of precipitation and strong winds, often compromising the structural integrity of both concrete and mud homes.¹⁶⁵ In some cases, this has also led to secondary displacement. During the last rains, 225 families had suffered some degree of damage to their houses. According to the National Authority for the Management and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Recovery (NAMCHA), 80,000 people, including IDPs and host families, have been affected by the flash floods in Yemen. The overwhelming majority of which were victims from the Governorates of Lahj, Aden and Hajjah.¹⁶⁶ The population in the affected areas lost their livelihoods, essential HH assets and personal belongings due to the overwhelming amounts of rain and flooding.

Source: Al Mashhed, 2019.

Access to Property

The lack of housing in the city can mostly be attributed to the (i) sudden rapid influx of IDPs to Lahj Governorate (75.1 percent of prospective tenants are IDPs), (ii) tenants’ inability to maintain the funds necessary to pay rent on a timely manner, and (iii) the deteriorating infrastructure situation that puts buildings and their structural integrity at risk. Together, these factors have significantly reduced the total number of rental units available in Al Hawtah.

Figure 43: Tenants Characteristics in Lahj Governorate, 2018.

Some of the major challenges to accessing housing needs in Al Hawtah city include an insufficient number of housing units, a lack in competencies of landlords and a chronic shortage of money to sustain a tenant’s ability to pay rent. The CFP Survey conducted in March 2020 reaffirmed that these barriers continue to impede access to appropriate shelter in the city.

Land Laws and Ownership in Al Hawtah

Land has been a fundamental component to the ongoing conflict and power struggles throughout Yemen, particularly in the Governorates of Al Hodeidah, Lahj and Sa’dah where farming has long been an essential means of living. With a lack of a transparent land registry, conflicting systems of tenure, tribal claims, land grabbing and corruption, reaching national reconciliation requires an urgent redress of land disputes.

The Authority of State Land, under the Ministry of Finance, is responsible for the all state land in Yemen, which is rented to tenant farmers with similar arrangements to tenancies on other land. The State Land Authority estimates that 90 percent of all land in Yemen is state owned land, but the proportion of arable land is much smaller, and this figure includes much land which is locally considered to be owned communally.

In Al Hawtah city, 71 percent of the farmland is privately owned, while 26 percent is rented. Once renowned for its ample farmland, farms today suffer from a severe lack of water. Many farmers have turned their agricultural lands into residential lands for sale after they failed to find the necessary means of water to plow and irrigate their lands. Evidently, this lack of adequate water supply has given rise to intergroup conflicts among farm owners and further increased the amounts of disputes arising between owners and tenants.

168 Ibid.
170 Ibid.
Transitional Justice Law – Property:

The current transitional justice process underway in Yemen is at a critical juncture in development and implementation. The Transitional Justice Law correlates positively with international human rights obligations, including provisions for compensation and restitution of property (Article 7.C). However, despite these provisions, transitional justice processes generally, including the present process in Yemen, tend to overpromise and underdeliver economic, social and cultural rights and further lack sufficient precedents for operationalizing these rights. The court system is ineffective and overburdened with adjudicating property cases and resolving land conflicts. Even prior to the recent conflict, several notable challenges were facing the judicial system, namely: (i) insufficient educational skills of legal and administrative staff; (ii) inadequate administrative documentation systems; (iii) insufficient number of physical facilities; and (iv) corruption. As a result, ordinary citizens are frequently discouraged from using the legal system and are unsure of whether to use the tribal or state institutions.

Al Hawtah city is surrounded by a significant number of areas of cultivated rural lands. Most of these farms are privately owned and are obtained through inheritance. With the high number and frequent land disputes, laws pertaining to the access and ownership of agricultural land thus become crucial also to secure livelihoods.

Six Categories for Land Administration Purposes

Yemeni law divides State Land down to six categories for land administration purposes, with different rules applicable to them. There is no specific data on the amounts of land falling within these categories.

- Allocated Land: Lands that have been planned and plotted prior to distribution;
- White Land: Lands that are not allocated lands but fall within urban planning areas;
- Agricultural Land: Land cultivated or well suited for cultivation;
- Fallow Land: Agricultural land that has been abandoned or neglected;
- Public Utility Land: Mountains, hills and slopes that receive rainwater, including the major structures through which flood waters are collected from tributaries;
- Desert Land: Lands that are covered by sand or sandy lands.

Most property rights and claims are managed by specialized committees called “Land Committees”. First commissioned in 2013 by way of a Presidential Decree that established the Southern Yemen Land Remedies Commission composed of five judges, these Committees served as governing bodies to settle land disputes and determine any relevant reimbursements. However, given the lengthy due process that can last a minimum of 11.4 years, due to insufficient staffing, inadequate resources, corruption and weak administrative and management structures, many citizens tend to settle their issues outside the legal system. Addressing the land grievances in Southern Yemen in a satisfactory and sustainable manner does not only depend on the speed and quality of the Land Commission’s work but also on a successful and timely enforcement and implementation of its decisions which in turn depends on the political will and operational capacity of a range of other administrative and governance entities in the south as well as at the central level.

Figure 45: Average Duration of Land Disputes in Lahj Governorate, 2009.

![Figure 45](Image)


Figure 46: Land Tenure in Farmer Holdings, 2009.

![Figure 46](Image)


173 Ibid.
IDP Housing

According to Shelter Cluster Data, approximately 75 percent of the tenants in Lahj Governorate are IDPs and landlords in the Governorate are generally willing to rent their properties to IDPs. Shelter Cluster data also suggests that 96.4 percent of landlords in Lahj Governorate indicated they would not object to rent their properties to displaced individuals – while the remaining objected. However, the unwillingness of some landlords to rent to IDPs might be a result of IDPs’ inability to pay rent on a regular basis owing to livelihood restrictions and a lack of income.

Barriers to Accessing HH Items

In most Yemeni cities, including Al Hawtah, insufficient money is the leading obstacle to acquiring personal necessities and HH products alike. Respondents to the CFP Survey also indicated that a constant lack in product variety and an insufficient number of shops that supply HH products was evident in the city. Inaccessibility means most HHs do not have the necessary number of mosquito nets and blankets, among other critical items.

Ethnic Minorities

Prior to the current conflict, social discrimination against the Muhamasheen limited their access to education, healthcare, meaningful work and housing. Surely, no Yemeni State Law explicitly discriminates against the Muhamasheen, yet systemic discrimination prevents Muhamasheen from accessing reparation or mediation from exploitation and abuse; they face systemic prejudice in the justice system and a lack of concern from local governments and tribal authorities. Discrimination is generally worse in rural areas, where Muhamasheen are often prohibited from purchasing land or property. Consequently, Muhamasheen in rural areas are then forced to secure an income by working for local tribal or village leaders. Others cultivate land for agricultural use and pay the landowners from their yield in a sharecropping-type arrangement.

Figure 47: Main Barriers to Meet/Secure Household Items in Al Hawtah city, 2020.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Barriers to Meet/Secure Household Items</th>
<th>2020</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient money to buy goods</td>
<td>91.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient variety of goods</td>
<td>59.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient skills and competencies of service providers</td>
<td>45.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient number of providers and shops supplying the area</td>
<td>40.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient safety or reliability of provided goods</td>
<td>29.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient or unreliable quantity of goods</td>
<td>24.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrain and logistical constraints to access providers</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


175 Ibid.
Health and Emergency

Highlights

- In addition to a shortage in staff, a decreased operating budget approved for HFs is also among the main challenges facing the health sector in Al Hawtah, partly caused by the weak YER compared to the $.
- Between the public and private sector, there are 39 healthcare facilities operating in the city (including pharmacies). As of March 2020, all these facilities are believed to be functional.
- Ibn Khaldoun is the main public hospital in Lahj Governorate. Servicing the population in Al Hawtah, the hospital currently has a bed capacity of 250 and the majority of IDPs from the surrounding areas are frequently transferred to it for treatment.
- The health sector in Al Hawtah city suffers not only from a shortage of medical staff due to retirements and low salaries, but also a shortage of medicines and medical supplies due to the recent increases of the population.

Overview

Across Yemen, an estimated 14.8 million people lack access to adequate healthcare. Of them, 8.8 million are living in underserved areas where less than half of HFs are functioning around the country (45 percent).\(^{176}\) Amongst the functioning HFs, almost 60 percent are supported by humanitarian organizations through incentive payments and covering operational costs. The country has also been hit by several outbreaks, such as cholera, acute watery diarrhea, and dengue fever. As of 2019, five Governorates in Yemen have acute malnutrition rates that exceed the 15 percent World Health Organization (WHO) emergency threshold: Al Hodeidah, Lahj, Ta’iz, Aden and Hadramawt.\(^{177}\)

![Figure 48: Health Workers Density per 10,000 Population in Yemen, 2019.](source: HNO, 2019.)

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In Lahj Governorate, around 75 percent of HFIs are reported as fully functional. These include general hospitals, district hospitals, health centers and health units and the Governorate has around 7.45 beds per 10,000 population. The Governorate has 14 health workers per 10,000 population, which is below the recommended average 22 as per the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) standard. However, organizations such as UNICEF have been supporting several Governorates, including Lahj, in providing qualified health workers.

As per the most recent CSO Statistical Yearbook, there were 131,235 reported cases with diseases in Lahj Governorate in 2017. The most widespread diseases in the Governorate were Diarrhea and Gastroenteritis (51.6 percent of total diseases) as well as Lower Respiratory Infections (33 percent of total diseases). Incidence of other diseases also showed the prevalence of Upper Respiratory Infection, Typhoid and Influenza.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: Main Health Services in the Community, 2020.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1st</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Hawtah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuban</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


182 KI Survey, March 2020
Infrastructure and Operational Capacity

There are four governmental HF in Al Hawtah City, one specialized hospital, one health center, one blood bank and health office. However, the maternity and childhood center has no beds as per 2019 data\(^{183}\) even though this center was just recently fully rehabilitated by UNDP in collaboration with the SFD. As of 2020, it is said to be the largest and primary medical storage facility in the governorate.\(^{184}\)

Between the public and private sector, there are 39 healthcare facilities operating in the city. As of March 2020, all these facilities are functional. While only four are publicly owned, there are 35 privately owned facilities, comprising 16 local clinics and 19 pharmacies.\(^{185}\)

The main challenges facing the health sector, according to government partners, are a decreased operating budget approved for HF's, partly caused by the weak YER compared to the $. This is particularly relevant as there is also significant damage to the health infrastructure, which is also suffering from frequent electricity outages. This includes a lack of budget to deal with the spread of epidemics. Furthermore, the health sector in Al Hawtah suffers not only from a shortage of medical staff due to retirements and low salaries, but also a shortage of medicines and medical supplies due to the recent increases of the population.

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183 HeRAMS Data, 2019.


There has also been an increase in health demand in Al Hawtah, in particular among IDPs arriving from rural areas. Many of these IDPs have not received basic vaccinations in their areas of origin, causing an increase in preventable diseases. Other factors increasing demand for health services is the increase in malnutrition due to the lack of food security as well as a lack of clean drinking water and poor sanitation networks.

### Ibn Khaldoun Hospital

Built in 1990, Ibn Khaldoun is the main public hospital in Lahj Governorate. Servicing the population in Al Hawtah, the hospital currently has a bed capacity of 250. The majority of IDPs from the surrounding areas are frequently transferred from other facilities to Ibn Khaldoun for treatment. Government reports suggest that the hospital requires an air conditioning system, an overhaul of the sanitation system and more international aid. New departments built over what used to be a garden space attached to the hospital have significantly increased pressure on electricity and water services. Since the services provided are generally free of charge, the hospital does not generate revenue. There is a continued lack of specialists, most of whom have fled to other countries. Authorities stress that the hospital is in dire need of specialists in the fields of chest surgery, Anesthesia, orthopedics, vascular medicine, urology, obstetrics and gynecology.\(^\text{186}\)

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\(^{186}\) According to the participants in the Joint Analysis and Recovery Planning workshop, Key informant discussions, Government Data, March 2020.
Population Needs

Figure 51: PiN of Healthcare in Al Hawtah city, 2019.

As of 2019, out of the 34,852 people living in Al Hawtah, 15 percent need healthcare (5,228). Of those, 16 percent are boys, 18 percent are girls, 32 percent are men and 34 percent are women. A major improvement is seen during 2019 as compared to 2018 suggesting a drop in the total number of People in Need (PiN).

Figure 52: KI and CFP Healthcare Perceptions, 2020.

Source: HNO Data, 2019.


Ibid.
Being the capital city of Lahj Governorate, healthcare in Al Hawtah city has seen great support from International and National NGOs and United Nations (UN) Agencies as shown in the below table. Support to already existing facilities as well as opening temporary tents to provide healthcare as gap-filling measures. Moreover, in January 2020, the Department of Public Health and Population Office in Al Hawtah has been carrying out different types of campaigns and awareness sessions to combat several health issues and diseases. In 2015, the maternity facility was severely damaged during armed clashes – decreasing its capacity to about 30 per cent and severely limiting access to health care services primarily for women and children. In response to community needs, both the maternity ward and storage facility were renovated in 2019. The project was managed by UNDP’s Social Protection Project for Community Resilience Project (SPCRP), SFD, funded with $136,548 by the European Union. Respondents to the March 2020 KI Survey reported that emergency services, outpatient clinics, major surgery, lab services, immunizations, minor surgery and maternal health services remain inaccessible to the population in Al Hawtah. They also identified the lack of mental health services among the top four most needs. While the availability of services in health units is variable among Yemen’s Governorates, the highest availability is in Sana’a and the lowest is in Lahj.

Community Challenges to Satisfying Health Needs

According to CFP perceptions, Al Hawtah’s non-host community continues to face the most pressing challenges to satisfying health needs, between 86-90 percent of respondents stated that the non-host community has less access to healthcare services and pharmaceutical products. Respondents also pointed to IDPs, non-host Community and host communities as being among the top three populations facing continuous accessibility challenges.

**Figure 53: Population Group Facing the Biggest Challenges in Satisfying Needs, 2020.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population Group</th>
<th>Healthcare Services</th>
<th>Medicines and Other Healthcare Products</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>35.1%</td>
<td>37.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returnees</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host community</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Host community</td>
<td>89.2%</td>
<td>86.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CFP Survey, March 2020

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193 HeRAMS Data, 2019.

There is a general lack of teachers. In addition, due to displacement, the number of enrolled students has increased, which requires adding more teaching personnel. Number of female students enrolled in schools as well as female teachers remain significantly lower than male students and male teachers.

Absence of safety and security has a significant effect on children on their way to school.

One of the more prominent academic facilities in Al Hawtah, the Nasser College for Agricultural Sciences, has seen destruction and looting, resulting in a discontinuity of practical learning, with the theoretical approach being the only mode of learning currently available at the college.

The number of children who need education assistance is increasing year by year, rising from 2.3 million in 2017 to 4.7 million in 2019. The vulnerability of school-age children has increased significantly due to escalation of conflict, severe deterioration of the economic situation and increased displacement. Lahj Governorate in Southern Yemen has been known for its long history in education, especially since the 1930s in its capital, Al Hawtah.

Until today, the education system is burdened by poor access to drinking water and electricity in schools, the lack of qualified teachers and staff, and teachers who are denied their basic reimbursement rights. In fact, in January 2020, teachers went on a city-wide strike to demand regular salaries and allowances, while also requesting an increase in their monthly salaries.

MoE, in collaboration with the SFD, are trying to enhance the skillset of teachers using different approaches. As part of this effort, teachers were offered instructional courses and training seminars in Computer literacy, English, and Sign Language. Also, activities and initiatives are taking place for electronic learning, and for Arabic calligraphy, painting and chanting in Al Hawtah schools.

Organizational Structure

Key legislation includes the Education Act (1964), which establishes different levels of education, and the Education Act (1965), which sets up scholarships and fellowships. Prior to the conflict, the education system was highly centralized. Currently, there are several ministries that manage the education system at different levels. General education falls under the purview of the MoE. Vocational schools and community colleges are managed by the Ministry of Technical Education and Vocational Training (MoTEVT), first introduced in the 1970s under the MoE, but then established as a separate system in 2001. Finally, the tertiary level is managed by the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (MoHESR), first established in 1990 and, after a brief hiatus, reestablished in 2001. The government of Yemen subsidizes public education at all levels. The Literacy and Adult Education Organization (LAEO), is an autonomous technical agency within the MoE that measures and reports on national literacy rates.


200 The government of Yemen subsidizes public education at all levels. The Literacy and Adult Education Organization (LAEO), is an autonomous technical agency within the MoE that measures and reports on national literacy rates.
The education cycle in Yemen begins at early childhood, or preschool, which, however, is non-obligatory. Next, basic education is compulsory for all children, generally starting at the age of six or seven. Following nine years of basic education, students proceed either through a general secondary path or a vocational path (which consists of either vocational secondary or vocational training education). Secondary school lasts for three years. The first year is general education and consists of literary and scientific subjects. During the second year, students may choose to pursue either humanities or exact sciences. After the general secondary education, students may choose to pursue higher education at a university, a teachers’ institute, a community college, or receive a technical education. To be admitted to postgraduate studies, one must complete a bachelor’s degree amongst other prerequisites. Entering into the labor market is possible following any level after the completion of basic education. Following vocational secondary education, the student may opt for a technical education.


206 Ibid.
207 Ibid.
Admissions and Progression

The regulations governing admissions and progression are complex and can prevent students from obtaining further education. Already prior to the conflict, the number of students repeating a school year in Yemen was high. According to a 2010 World Bank report, it took 15.9 years on average to complete the compulsory nine years of education.208

Students who choose to proceed to vocational education upon the completion of basic education legally lose the opportunity to attend university in the future.209 Moreover, both the TEVT post-basic and TEVT post-secondary institutions have set age limits for admission purposes. Since most students require more time to progress out of basic education, some might not even qualify for a TEVT path solely due to age restrictions. Furthermore, there are no regulations allowing for reentry into the basic education system following a dropout.210 In such instances, the only possible path is Alphabetical Programs, whose mandate is only to teach reading and writing.

To be admitted to a public university, a secondary education diploma is required. However, upon finishing secondary education, graduates cannot directly apply or enroll for a tertiary education. A one-year-long hiatus is legally mandated. Although unclear, the reason is generally attributed to the obligatory performance of the national military service upon reaching the age of 18 years old. After the year has elapsed, secondary education graduates have only up to three years to apply for admittance to the university. If unable, they lose the privilege to attend a tertiary education institution for life.211 The complexity of the system thus prevents not only further education but also the attainment of qualifications necessary to transition into the labor market.

Infrastructure and Operational Capacity

Years of ongoing conflict coupled with the lack of available finance have deteriorated the education sector in Al Hawtah city. While most schools are open currently, many school buildings are in poor condition, with some reported to be near collapse.212 For instance, in September 2017, it was reported that eight schools in Al Hawtah sustained damage, where one was totally damaged and seven were partially damaged.213 Five of the schools were reported to be functional, and three were closed due to building damages leaving more children out of school. The remaining 33 percent sustained no damage.214

Most of the deterioration evidenced in educational facilities occurred due to conflict-related damage, lack of maintenance and repair and poor overall construction.

During 2015, schooling for many children was disrupted, as Lahj Governorate received many IDPs from neighboring governorates.215 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Surveys of IDP children in the Governorate suggested that approximately two-thirds of them were not yet enrolled in schools. While there was an influx of IDPs, at a governorate level, there was also a noticeable drop in the number of kindergartens that could accommodate new placements for the school year 2016-2017 as compared to 2015-2016 as shown in Figure 54.

Figure 54: Number of Schools in Service in Al Hawtah and Tuban Districts, 2017-2018.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Al Hawtah</th>
<th>Tuban</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-school</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary/secondary</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


209 Ibid.
210 Ibid.
211 Ibid.
In terms of the number of basic and secondary education (private and public schools) in Lahj Governorate, there was no change in the number of schools from 2015-2016 to 2016-2017: 710 schools (of which 535 are mixed schools, 82 are females only schools, and 93 are males only schools). As for the number of enrolled students and teachers in basic and secondary education, there was a 0.3 percent increase in the number of enrolled students for the year 2016-2017 (227,273) as compared to 2015-2016 (226,777). Whereas, the number of teachers remain the same (12,200).

### Figure 55: Number of Private and public Kindergartens (Children and Teachers) in Lahj Governorate, 2017.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enrolled Children</th>
<th>Teachers</th>
<th># of Kindergartens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Figure 56: Needs for Education Facilities in Al Hawtah, UN-Habitat (2020).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Interventions</th>
<th>Construction cost</th>
<th>Equipment cost</th>
<th>Total cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Al Farouq Secondary School for Boys</td>
<td>Extension</td>
<td>200K</td>
<td>200K</td>
<td>400K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Al Zahra'a Secondary School for Girls</td>
<td>Extension</td>
<td>200K</td>
<td>200K</td>
<td>400K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Muharaykah School for Boys</td>
<td>Extension</td>
<td>200K</td>
<td>200K</td>
<td>400K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Khidr School for Girls</td>
<td>Rehabilitation + Build Extension</td>
<td>200K</td>
<td>200K</td>
<td>400K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Asmaa School for Girls</td>
<td>Rehabilitation + Build Extension</td>
<td>200K</td>
<td>200K</td>
<td>400K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Al Thawrah School</td>
<td>Demolition</td>
<td>100K</td>
<td>100K</td>
<td>200K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Al Fasad School for Girls</td>
<td>Extension</td>
<td>200K</td>
<td>200K</td>
<td>400K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Ammar Lami School for Girls</td>
<td>Rehabilitation + Build Extension</td>
<td>200K</td>
<td>200K</td>
<td>400K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Al Shroq Kindergarten</td>
<td>Rehabilitation</td>
<td>100K</td>
<td>100K</td>
<td>200K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Education Administration Building</td>
<td>Demolition</td>
<td>100K</td>
<td>100K</td>
<td>200K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Teacher’s Building</td>
<td>Demolition</td>
<td>100K</td>
<td>100K</td>
<td>200K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Old Muharaykah School</td>
<td>Renovation</td>
<td>100K</td>
<td>100K</td>
<td>200K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>People with Special needs - School</td>
<td>Extension</td>
<td>100K</td>
<td>100K</td>
<td>200K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Examination Administration Building</td>
<td>Renovation</td>
<td>100K</td>
<td>100K</td>
<td>200K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Education office - Restaurant</td>
<td>Rehabilitation</td>
<td>100K</td>
<td>100K</td>
<td>200K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Nasser College</td>
<td>Rehabilitation</td>
<td>100K</td>
<td>100K</td>
<td>200K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>111</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,815,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,179,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,994,000</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Based on input from the Directorate of Education, Openstreetmap, and Wikimapia.
Al Hawtah
RAPID CITY PROFILE

According to inputs received from the Directorate of Education in March 2020, Al Hawtah has an immediate need to build 111 new classrooms in 16 different educational facilities in the city. While some schools require building a new periphery extension to accommodate these classrooms, others would need to either be renovated or rehabilitated – some of these facilities must be demolished and rebuilt due to extreme structural instability. The Directorate of Education estimates that such a project would cost $4,994,000.

Enrollment Rates

Enrollment rates in primary education are higher for male students in Al Hawtah, however, the gender gap is much higher in Tuban district. For secondary education, while enrollment rates are higher amongst male students in Tuban, the reverse trend is observed in Al Hawtah district.

The influx of IDPs, along with the deterioration of educational facilities during the conflict have led to overcrowding in schools, especially in primary education facilities.

**Figure 57: Gross and Net Enrollment Rates in Al Hawtah and Tuban Districts, 2017-2018.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tuban</th>
<th>Al Hawtah</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Primary Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross Enrollment</td>
<td>138%</td>
<td>120%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Enrollment</td>
<td>127%</td>
<td>110%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                |       |           |
| **Secondary Education** |       |           |
| Gross Enrollment | 73%   | 62%       |
| Net Enrollment   | 54%   | 43%       |


At a governorate level, enrollment in primary and secondary education for Lahj have seen a minor increase. However, the enrollment for females in primary and secondary education remain significantly lower than for males, as shown in Figure 56.

**Figure 58: Students Enrolled in Basic and Secondary Education (Males and Females) in Lahj Governorate, 2012-2013 and 2016-2017.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2012-2013</th>
<th>2016-2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total number of enrolled students</td>
<td>214.4k</td>
<td>227.2k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of males</td>
<td>121.6k</td>
<td>128.8k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of females</td>
<td>92.5k</td>
<td>98.5k</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In addition, as per the Medium-Term Results Framework by the MoE, Figure 59 shows the existing and target number of students and Net Enrollment Rate by Gender and Governorate between 2008-2009 and 2015-2016.

**Figure 59: Number of Students and Net Enrollment Rate by Gender 2008-2009 and 2015-2016.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Students 6-14 Years Old</td>
<td>85,571</td>
<td>95,501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Enrollment Rate by Gender</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted Numbers of Students Within 6-14 Years Old</td>
<td>87,693</td>
<td>82,980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted Net Enrollment Rate by Gender</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>153,264</td>
<td>176,481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MoE, Yemen Education Sector Plan Mid Term Results Framework 2013-2015.

Education is also offered in the Mosques in the city, where for centuries mosques have held lectures provided by scholars, sheikhs and spiritual guides who teach the Quran and the tenants of religion.

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216 According to the participants in the Joint Analysis and Recovery Planning workshop, Key Informant discussions, Government Data, March 2020.

217 According to the participants in the Joint Analysis and Recovery Planning workshop, Key Informant discussions, Government Data, March 2020.

Higher Education

There are only two training and technical institutes in Lahj Governorate. During the academic year 2016 – 2017, there were 792 students enrolled in these institutions, with only 160 female students (20 percent). Variations can be observed in the below chart:

![Figure 60: Number of Students Enrolled in Training and Technical Institutes in Lahj Governorate, 2015-2017.](image)


Nasser College of Agricultural Sciences

Established in Al Hawtah in 1969, the college aimed to facilitate academic cooperation between Egyptian and Yemeni scientists. An Egyptian educational mission from the Faculty of Agricultural Sciences at Zagazig University developed a syllabus adapted from the University Curricula of Egyptian Colleges and modified it to fit local conditions in Yemen. Later, Nasser College became one of three colleges that formed the first nucleus of the University of Aden. It quickly became known as the focal college of agriculture in Yemen and the Arabian Peninsula offering a 4-year bachelor’s degree, majoring in the field of Agricultural Production. A significant step was taken with the opening of graduate programs in 1996. Currently, the college offers seven master’s degrees and two doctoral programs in the specialty of plant protection and agricultural crops.

In 2015, when the conflict reached Lahj Governorate, Nasser College was the subject of looting and destruction. Today, private homes have been built on the outskirts of what was once the college campus. As a result of war, all holdings of the college, including livestock, rare bird species, laboratory equipment and tools, were stolen, thus everything that the university once relied on to teach the practical side of courses is no longer available.

Population Needs

According to recent HNO data (2019), there are 6,796 people in need of education services in Al Hawtah city, representing 19 percent of the total city population. Compared to the previous year, the number has increased by 4 percent.

Reports released by the government, underscore priority issues that include the reconstruction of destroyed and looted facilities, building a new primary and secondary school, rehabilitating and expanding existing schools, supporting student activities, printing textbooks, and improving teachers’ salaries, as well as providing training to educational staff.

Availability of education services and commodities is scarce, as between 80-85 percent of CFPs reported that education commodities and services are not readily available in Al Hawtah. In addition, almost 60 percent reported that most HHs just barely meet the need of education services while a third of CFPs stated that this need is not met at all. Similarly, over 70 percent of CFPs reported that education commodities needs are either barely met or not met at all in most of the HHS.

When asked about the required time to reach a closest education facility, KI and the CFP feedback varied. The KIs indicated that it takes between 20 and 40 minutes for the 3-12 age group, and over 40 minutes for the students aged 13-17. Over half of the CFPs stated that it takes less than 20 minutes on average to reach an education facility, while almost a third reported that it takes between 20 and 40 minutes. In addition, 14 percent of CFPs stated that it usually takes over 40 minutes.

Social discrimination due to ethnicity, religion, poverty, gender, health, and disability are the main schooling dropout triggers in Al Hawtah city, especially among children aged 6-17 years old. These are followed by the lack of money to pay school fees and families having other priorities for children, such as collecting water or working. For children aged 3-5 years old, lack of money to pay school fees was reported as the primary reason, followed by social discrimination, and families having other priorities for children.


222 Ibid.


224 Ibid.

Figure 61: KI Education Perceptions, 2020.

- **Estimated Walking Distance to the Nearest Education Facility**
  - 3-5 years old: 75% less than 20 minutes, 25% 20-40 minutes, 0% over 40 minutes
  - 6-12 years old: 75% less than 20 minutes, 25% 20-40 minutes, 0% over 40 minutes
  - 13-17 years old: 75% less than 20 minutes, 25% 20-40 minutes, 0% over 40 minutes

- **Share of Children Facing Challenges Related to Accessing Education Services**
  - 100% facing challenges
  - 75% facing challenges
  - 50% facing challenges
  - 25% facing challenges

- **Estimated Average Number of Students per Classroom**
  - 7-5 years old (pre-school): 13, 18, 30, 30
  - 6-12 years old: 46, 40, 45, 41
  - 13-17 years old: 40, 43, 46, 41


Between 70-80 percent of CFPs also stated that there is a lack of education facilities and pointed to the insufficient skills and competencies of teachers and administrative staff. The non-host-community is affected the most, according to almost 90 percent of CFPs, percent followed by IDPs, reported by 35 percent of CFPs. In addition, 14 percent of CFPs suggested that the host-community face the biggest challenges in relation to education services and commodities. Other issues include lack of infrastructure, classrooms, school supplies, teachers, and curriculum.  

Figure 62: Barriers to Meet/Secure Education Commodities and Services in Al Hawtah city, 2020.

- Insufficient money to buy goods or services: 100%
- Insufficient or unreliable quantity of goods/services available locally: 10.8%
- Insufficient number of facilities/providers supplying the area: 48.6%
- Insufficient variety of goods/services: 32.4%
- Insufficient skills and competencies of service providers: 75.7%
- Insufficient safety or reliability of provided goods/services: 18.9%
- Other: 13.5%

Source: CFP Survey, March 2020

In Tuban district, insecurity or fear of physical injury was reported as the primary issue, followed by the lack of infrastructure to accommodate all children as a second issue, and lack of teaching materials as a third issue for male and female children aged 3-17 years old, with the exception of female children aged 13-17 years old, where social discrimination was reported as the primary issue.  

Almost all CFPs reported that the population obtains education commodities and services through purchase. Thus, insufficient money was reported as the main barrier related to these needs by all CFPs.  

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226 Ibid.
228 Ibid.
**Table 2:** The Most Serious Education Issues that Require Immediate Intervention in Al Hawtah city, 2020.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>1st</th>
<th>2nd</th>
<th>3rd</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al Hawtah</td>
<td>Lack of learning space (infrastructure, building, maintenance, etc.) at reasonable distance</td>
<td>Lack of safety and security for children in school or on their way to school</td>
<td>Lack of teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuban</td>
<td>One or more school level is not available (pre-primary, primary, secondary, tertiary)</td>
<td>Lack of safety and security for children in school or on their way to school</td>
<td>Lack of teachers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


KI respondents pointed out to three main issues that require immediate attention in Al Hawtah: lack of learning space, lack of safety for children and a lack of teachers. According to reports released by the government, the shortage of staff is primarily due to a significant increase in retirement, and the ailing health of the workforce.

**Figure 63:** Average Number of Teachers and Students per School in Al Hawtah and Tuban Districts, 2017-2018.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tuban</th>
<th>Al Hawtah</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student/Teacher Ratio</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


At the governorate level, the number of female teachers in Lahj Governorate are significantly lower than males. During the academic year 2016-2017, out of 12,200 teachers, only 3,383 (28 percent) were female. The lack of female teachers is especially acute in secondary schools, where less than a quarter of teachers are female. The following charts reflect numbers of enrolled students and teachers, disaggregated by gender and level of education for Lahj Governorate — considering three types of educational facilities, basic schools (primary education), secondary schools and schools offering both basic and secondary education:

**Figure 64:** Number of Teachers in General Basic and Secondary Schooling in Lahj Governorate, 2016-2017.

**Figure 65:** Number of Students enrolled in General Basic and Secondary Schooling in Lahj Governorate, 2016-2017.

Humanitarian and Governmental Interventions

There have been several aid initiatives targeting the educational sector in Al Hawtah. Tunisia has been supporting curriculum design and review, training teachers and providing scholarships through the National Committee for Education, Culture and Science. Germany has been supporting reconstruction projects through its German Construction Bank. As for the SFD, they focused on providing equal opportunities and access to education for both sexes, in addition to training youth to provide educational support in areas lacking enough teachers in Lahj Governorate.

In both districts (Al Hawtah and Tuban), KIs reported that the humanitarian assistance offered does not meet the priority needs.
**Highlights**

- Al Hawtah’s water supply infrastructure sustained extensive conflict-related damage and urgent rehabilitation is required. This includes the main office building (located in Al Hawtah), warehouses, reservoirs, pumping stations and wells.
- While the number of Lahj Water & Sanitation Corporation (LWSC) operating wells in the area has increased since 2015, five wells are still not operational.
- Most of the CFPs (95 percent) stated that water for drinking purposes is not readily available and 86 percent reported that most HHs either barely meet this need or are unable to meet this need at all. Moreover, according to KIs, only about a half of the population in Al Hawtah and Tuban districts have enough water to drink and enough containers to fetch/store water.
- The majority of CFPs also stated that the water supply is available daily for less than 6 hours.
- Both CFPs and KI reported affordability issues related to meeting the water needs.
- Sewage and wastewater management issues are frequently observed. KIs referred to the severity of these issues as extreme in Tuban and high in Al Hawtah.

**Overview**

Prior to the escalation of the conflict, Yemen already faced several issues related to the water supply and sanitation services. Yemen is one of the most water-scarce countries in the region. Groundwater is one of the primarily sources of water in the country, and the depletion rates have been reported to be high. Population growth and rural to urban migration put additional pressure on WASH sector.

Following the escalation of the conflict in 2015, provision of services worsened due to the conflict-related damage, lack of finances and intermittent electricity supply. Deterioration of water supply and sanitation systems also contributes to the spread of water-borne diseases.

**WASH Management**

Management of water resources and uses falls under the oversight of several government entities. First, the National Water Resources Authority (NWRA), established in 1995 is a decentralized government agency with wide-ranging legal powers to implement water laws and regulations, allocate water rights, approve permits for drilling wells, and undertake various other water resource management functions. Second, the Ministry of Water and Environment (MWE), established in 2003, is the cabinet level supervisory body that brings the water sector as a whole, and water management in particular, under the purview of the central government, thus facilitating the allocation of necessary funds. Yet, the responsibility of water uses for irrigation purposes falls under, the third, Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation (MoAI), which shares jurisdiction over surface space water infrastructure with the MWC.

The shared jurisdictions are somewhat problematic and prevent the integration of planning, institutionalizing regulatory responsibility, and broader development goals for water system and sanitation. The Water Law, ratified in 2002, remains the primary piece of legislation which deals with the exploitation and protection of water resources and its distribution among the population.

Following the reorganization of the water sector in 2003, the newly established MWE initiated a multi-stakeholder process, the National Water Sector Strategy and Investment Program (NWSSIP), of preparing a consolidated strategy, an action plan, and an investment program for the sector as a whole; water resources, urban and rural Water Supply and Sanitation (WSS), irrigation, environment and human being. The strategy aimed to ensure coordination among the stakeholders, unify policies regarding water supply in urban and rural areas, ensure equitable allocation of funds, integrate sustainable policies and poverty reduction and ensure effective financing.

Part of NWSSIP’s strategy involves the progressive decentralization of responsibilities for providing services by transforming National Water and Sanitation Authority (NWSA) branches into autonomous local corporations responsible for managing the water and sanitation services. Although the legal framework for the erection of the local corporation was promulgated in 1997, they became operational only after 2000. Each local corporation has a board of representatives and is, in addition, also responsible for water prices.

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234 Ibid.

235 Ibid.
Infrastructure

Lahj Water and Sanitation Corporation (LWSC) is the body responsible for managing the water services in Al Hawtah and Tuban districts and several villages located alongside the water transmission pipelines from the well field to Al Hawtah city.236 The coverage area is divided into the four distribution zones, with the equal coverage. The water is mainly supplied by gravity from either the water reservoirs or directly from wells.237 As of 2017, the LWSC covers 71 percent of the area population, representing a decrease of 11 percent in services coverage as compared to 2014. Also, the LWSC relies on 53 water wells, 48 of which are operational.238 The situation seems to have improved over recent years, as only 38 wells were operating in 2014, and the number decreased to 28 in 2015. According to KIs, there is one governmental well in Al Hawtah District and 12 private ones, out of which 10 are fully functioning and three are inoperable.239 The LWSC water infrastructure also includes 20 water reservoirs and water towers, with a capacity of 28,800 m³, one water sterilization facility and 89 km of the supply network.240 Seven fuel generators are in the possession of the LWSC, all of which are used for the water supply system.241 As of 2018, there also were 7 generators and one water laboratory to support the operation of water supply.242 There are no operation and maintenance vehicles, and as they have been damaged or stolen during the conflict.

Operational Capacity

Several water and sanitation infrastructure assets sustained conflict-related damage. This included the main office building (located in Al Hawtah), warehouses, reservoirs, pumping station and wells.243 As of 2018, 84 percent of the WASH sector infrastructure appears to have no damage, while 12 percent are partially damaged and 4 percent are destroyed.244 It is important to note, however, that these numbers are significantly lower as compared to those reported the previous year, when 40 percent of WASH sector assets were reported to have sustained partial damage, while 6 percent were completely destroyed.245 As of 2017 only a half (49 percent) of the assets were functioning, with 15 percent partially functioning and 37 percent not functioning.246 It should be expected, however, that as damage levels decreased between 2017 and 2018, better functionality of the sector assets resulted. Currently, according to KIs, 88 percent of all Water and Sanitation Infrastructure in Al Hawtah and Tuban districts is fully functioning, while 5 percent is partially functioning, and 7 percent is not functioning.247 The functionality levels are lower in Tuban district, as compared to Al Hawtah district. In fact, all Water and Sanitation Infrastructure assets, except for three wells, were reported as fully functioning in Al Hawtah district.

LWSC operations and services have been significantly reduced, mainly due to diesel shortages, intermittent electricity supply, and lack of spare parts. Looting has also been reported throughout the conflict, which led to the loss of equipment.248 Further, the office building of LWSC has been destroyed, and employees lack office space. Importantly, the number of employees at LWSC has reduced drastically from 323 prior to the conflict to 30 people working as of August 2016.249 According to the KIs, all WASH facilities in Al Hawtah are fully working, except for three wells which are not working. Meanwhile in Tuban district, one well, two water tanks and two pumps are partially functioning and one water treatment plant, one sewage treatment plant, one pump station and one administrative office are not functioning.250 Water production is also affected by the frequent electricity cuts, which limit pumping hours. Other barriers include the poor physical state of pipes, lack of maintenance and failure of residents to pay their water bills. Subsequently, due to the reduced provision of water, many residents rely on water trucking, which can cost around $40 on a monthly basis.251

**Figure 66: Number of Operational Wells in Lahj Governorate, 2018.**


243 Ibid.


246 Ibid.


249 Ibid.

Population Needs

According to HNO data (2019), there are 20,911 people in acute need of water and sanitation services in Al Hawtah district, representing around 60 percent of the districts’ population. The numbers have slightly increased (6 percent), as compared to 2018. Most of the CFPs (95 percent) stated that water for drinking purposes is not readily available and 86 percent reported that most HHs either barely meet this need or are unable to meet this need at all.252 Moreover, according to KIs, only about half of the population in Al Hawtah and Tuban districts have enough water to drink and enough containers to fetch/store water. In addition, less than a third (30 percent) of the population in Al Hawtah and half of the population in Tuban district have enough water for HH purposes. Most of the CFPs reported that it takes less than 20 minutes to acquire potable water. Overall, the KIs reported that in both districts (Al Hawtah and Tuban) the number of sick people have increased as a result of WASH related issues.253 Elderly people were reported to face the most severe WASH issues in Al Hawtah district, while all demographic groups (elderly, adults and children) were reported in Tuban district. The majority of the CFPs (89 percent) reported that non-host community faces the biggest issues meeting the water for drinking purposes needs.


Most of the CFPs (84 percent) reported that the water supply through a pipeline network is the main water source in Al Hawtah city and that all HHs (100 percent) have access to piped water. This is in line with KI feedback, as piped water supply was indicated as the primary source of water for both drinking and other HH purposes in Al Hawtah and Tuban districts, while tanker-truck or cart was reported as the second source in both districts, and protected well-springs and packaged bottled water were reported as the third main source in Al Hawtah and Tuban districts. However, according to an assessment conducted by the WASH Cluster and REACH in Tuban district, the most common water source for drinking purposes was reported as water trucking amongst host communities (49 percent).

Amongst IDPs, only 14 percent primarily rely on the water trucking; most rely on piped water connected to public tap (21 percent) and bottled water (20 percent). For domestic purposes, most of the HHs within the host community also rely on the water trucking (57 percent), while most IDP HHs rely on water pipes that supply the compound (25 percent).

Almost two thirds of the CFPs (amongst those who stated that piped water is the main water source in the city) reported that the water supply is available daily for less than 6 hours, while another third reported that it is available daily between 6 and 12 hours. All CFPs, except for one, stated that the population obtains potable water through purchase, while one CFP reported that it is obtained via aid. Both CFPs and KIs reported affordability issues related to meeting the water needs. When asked about the main barriers related to meeting the water for drinking purposes needs, all CFPs reported insufficient money, followed by the insufficient number of providers/shops supplying the area (57 percent), insufficient safety of goods and services (54 percent), and insufficient skills and competencies of service providers (46 percent). Moreover, in both Al Hawtah and Tuban districts KIs reported that water and storage containers are too expensive. In addition, water treatment chemicals were also reported as too expensive in Tuban district, KIs indicated that in Al Hawtah waterpoints are too far.

Figure 70: Main Source of Water in Al Hawtah city, 2020.

Figure 71: Main Barriers to Meet/Secure Water for Drinking Needs in Al Hawtah city, 2020.


In terms of the water quality, in Al Hawtah, most of the CFPs (65 percent) stated that the water is adequate and all CFPs except for one stated that the population doesn’t treat water to make it safe.\textsuperscript{262} CFPs who stated that the population treats water, reported that they do so by boiling. According to an assessment conducted by the WASH Cluster and REACH for Host community and IDPs, almost half of all respondents in Tuban district (24 percent and 22 percent, respectively) indicated having issues with taste, appearance or smell of the water used, while only a few reported treating water (6 percent and 2 percent, respectively). The most frequently reported issue was bad taste followed by bad appearance.\textsuperscript{263}

The three most common ways to deal with the lack of water were reported in Tuban as reducing drinking water consumption, Spending money usually spent on other things to buy water, and going to fetch water from further supply points.\textsuperscript{264}

### Figure 72: KI and CFP Sanitation Perceptions, 2020.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tuban</th>
<th>Al Hawtah</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* N/A - Not Available


### Table 3: Main Sanitation Problems in the Community, Al Hawtah City, 2020.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1st</th>
<th>2nd</th>
<th>3rd</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al Hawtah</td>
<td>Sanitation facilities are not functioning or full</td>
<td>Garbage is not collected and remains in the street</td>
<td>Sanitation facilities are too far</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuban</td>
<td>Lack of sanitation facilities or facilities too crowded</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Sanitation

According to CFP perceptions, an estimated 76 percent of the HHs in Al Hawtah district are connected to the wastewater network. However, both the majority of CFPs and KIs reported that sewage and wastewater management issues are frequently observed in the city. In addition, KIs reported the severity of these issues as extreme in Tuban and high in Al Hawtah.

According to the WASH Cluster and REACH assessment, while half (51 percent) of the host-community HHs reported that all family members have access to functional latrines, the same was true for only a 7 percent of IDP HHs.\textsuperscript{265} Furthermore, almost 20 percent of IDPs indicated that no members have access to a functioning latrine, while none of host-community reported that. When asked about the main issue related to latrines in Al Hawtah district, KIs reported a lack of latrines as the primary issue, followed by absent or insufficient water supplies, and unclean or unhygienic latrines as the tertiary issue for the female population and the secondary issue for the male population.\textsuperscript{266} In Tuban district, no sewage system was reported as the primary issue. In addition, a lack of water was reported as the second main issue for the female population.\textsuperscript{267}

### Figure 73: Frequency of Sewage and Wastewater Management Issues in Al Hawtah city, 2020.


\textsuperscript{262} CFP Survey, March 2020.


\textsuperscript{264} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{266} KI Survey, March 2020.

\textsuperscript{267} KI Survey, March 2020.
Hygiene

Most CFPs stated that hygiene commodities, such as clothing, washing, soap, toothbrushes, pads, and diapers, as well as hygiene and sanitation facilities, are not readily available. Moreover, nearly 70 percent of the CFPs perceive that most HHs either barely meet this need or are unable to meet this need at all, while the remaining 30 percent stated that this need is either largely or fully met in most of the HHs. As for the hand-washing facilities, KIs reported that an estimated 60 percent of the population in Al Hawtah and 90 percent of the population in Tuban have access to them. However, it was stated that most people prefer to use soap but do not have any, as soap is not available (Al Hawtah) or too expensive (Tuban).

Half of the CFPs reported that it takes less than 20 minutes to acquire hygiene items, while 27 percent stated that it takes between 20 and 40 minutes, and 19 percent reported that it takes more than 40 minutes. Almost all of the CFPs (97 percent) reported that insufficient money to buy goods and services is the main barrier related to securing the hygiene commodities. This was followed by insufficient skills and competencies of service providers (68 percent), and insufficient safety or reliability of provided goods or services (43 percent). In addition, around 30 percent of the CFPs stated that there was insufficient or unreliable quantity of goods or services available locally, and insufficient number of providers or shops supplying the area.

Table 4: Priority Areas for Interventions in WASH Sector, 2020.

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1st</th>
<th>2nd</th>
<th>3rd</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al Hawtah</td>
<td>People who do not have enough water to drink.</td>
<td>People who do not treat their water before drinking it</td>
<td>People who do not have access to functioning sanitation facilities (latrines/toilets).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuban</td>
<td>People who do not have enough water to drink.</td>
<td>People who do not have access to functioning bathing/shower facilities.</td>
<td>People who do not have enough containers to fetch/store water.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Humanitarian Interventions

Between March and November 2019, there were two UN Agencies, two governmental entities and two NNGOs supported the WASH cluster in Al Hawtah. Supported activities include repairment, rehabilitation and augmentation of the sanitation systems, support for solid waste collection and disposal, provision of HH level water treatment options, distribution of hygiene kits and hygiene promotion and community engagement. In both districts, the KIs reported that the humanitarian assistance offered to the population in the WASH sector partially meets the priority needs.

References:
271 Ibid.
273 Ibid.
274 WASH Cluster Yemen, Yemen-WASH Cluster Partners Presence (4W Matrix) Jan-Dec 2019 Dashboard. Available at https://app.powerbi.com/view?r=eyJrIjoiNjY3ZGM2MWUtNzkwYS00M2RjLTIzLjQ5LjUxNzgwYWZmY2UzNjY3ZmYtMzY1LTc2LTIxMi0wMzI0NjkiIiwidCI6ImY2ZjcwZjFiLTJhMmQtNGYzMC04NTJhLTY0YjhjMTkzY2RiMzY2IiwicCI6ImY2ZjcwZjFiLTJhMmQtNGYzMC04NTJhLTY0YjhjMTkzY2RiMzY2IiwicCI6NjY1MzY2IiwicCI6NjY1MzY2fQ#view=a4c4d4a134 (accessed March 22, 2020).
275 Ibid.
Energy and Electricity

Highlights

- In Al Hawtah, severe fuel shortages are evidenced (especially diesel); the public grid is only partially functional and diesel shortages further reduce the amounts of electricity generated at power stations. Personal generators rely heavily on diesel as well.
- Local authorities are facing financial challenges; untimely collection of electricity bills and illegal connections have further strained the finances of local power companies. As there has been no central budget since 2014, financial challenges have limited these companies’ abilities to rehabilitate infrastructure and pay employee salaries in a timely manner.
- The main drivers of electricity shortage are inadequate generation capacity, aging equipment, diesel shortages, and lack of financial resources.
- An increasing number of individuals in Lahj Governorate and many throughout Yemen are resorting to solar energy panels.

The electricity sector in Yemen is managed by the Ministry of Electricity and Energy, which is responsible for the electricity sector’s ability to supply and meet national demands. The Ministry is also in charge of setting electricity policies. It is also the main authority on all maintenance issues, licenses and almost all decisions of consequence except tariffs.

The Public Electricity Corporation (PEC), a State-owned enterprise, oversees most of the electricity generation, transmission and distribution in the country. Prior to 2015, the remaining power needed was produced mainly by a British company that sells electricity at high prices to PEC. The Electricity Sector Regulatory Board was commissioned under the 2009 Electricity Law to set the tariffs for businesses across the electric system and monitor the compliance of the industry with regulations. The Rural Electricity Authority (REA) was also commissioned by way of the 2009 Electricity Law through the coordination of a council headed by the Minister for Electricity. Prior to the conflict, the Yemeni Government drafted plans to expand and modernize the National Grid (the plan proposed doubling the capacity of electricity produced to three times the 2009 average, equivalent to 3 GW) but owing to the dramatic series of events that took place since, most of these plans had been interrupted and many of the projects have been left unrealized. Figure 73 shows the pre-conflict plans including the proposed load capacities.

Figure 74: Yemen National Grid Implemented/Proposed Transmission.

Even before the recent conflict, much of Yemen’s population was deprived of basic electricity services. Yemen had the lowest electricity access rate in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Access to electricity from either on-grid or off-grid sources was estimated at between 40 to 60 percent, averaging 123.303 kWh per capita from December 1971 to 2014. The country’s per capita electricity consumption stood at 217 kWh in 2014, less than one-sixth of the regional average. In 2015, electricity supply was estimated at 1,520 MW, with supply capacity falling 20 percent below peak demand. Most grid-connected consumers suffered from recurrent daily load shedding. By 2017, access to electricity (percent of population) in Yemen was reported at 79.2 percent. Despite significant direct and indirect subsidies, the energy sector was unable to meet demands and incapable of generating the affordable, reliable, and sufficient electricity needed to sustain economic growth and livelihoods, nor was the government capable of sustainably extending coverage of electricity services to rural areas. In fact, the gas fired Ma’rib I power plant was the only electric production project the government managed to complete in the past 20 years.

Due to recent conflict in Lahj Governorate, about 55 percent of the assessed power sector assets, excluding towers, exhibited some degree of damage, and 8 percent were destroyed. All large thermal power plants had some degree of damage and 71 percent were not functioning, while 80 percent of the distributed generation units were damaged, and 90 percent were functioning only partially or not at all. The deterioration of this upstream infrastructure severely constrains overall sector functionality, as some downstream assets are left to sit idle despite exhibiting no or only partial damage. While World Bank estimates in 2018 suggested that 45 MW electricity was being leveraged through the public grid in Lahj Governorate, more recently in 2020, the Electricity Directorate indicated that only 35 MW were being generated.

The collapse of the electricity sector had devastating consequences in Al Hawtah and beyond. Electricity is a binding constraint for critical city services and facilities that do not have the means to invest in alternative energy sources. These include HFs, schools, grocery stores and vaccine cold chains. The shortage in electricity affects water supply, sanitation, food supply, banking services, fuel stations and more. Even where diesel generators were adopted for emergency power supply during the conflict, fuel shortages severely constrain service delivery.

Many of the major electric transmission linkages have sustained serious damage, suggesting that grid-based electricity supply must be restored on a regional level first before moving to the national level. To that end, Al Hawtah has a dire need for critical material and equipment to rehabilitate the heavily damaged urban electric distribution networks. As of June 2019, the city’s electricity supply schedule consisted of two hours on and two hours off, leaving the local population without electricity for 12 hours or more each day. A lack of electricity during the 40-degree summer heat also meant that citizens of Al Hawtah were often without access to proper ventilation and air-conditioning.

Soaring fuel costs are already impacting access to energy and hindering transport. Owing to the frequent interruptions in availability, an informal market for diesel has emerged throughout Yemen.

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285 According to the participants in the Joint Analysis and Recovery Planning workshop, Key Informant discussions, March 2020.

Status of Energy Facilities

According to the KI Survey conducted in March 2020, Al Hawtah currently has 420 adapters, 20 distributor substations and five conveyor stations, coupled with 15 oil tanks to service the local population. KI respondents also noted that 20 out of 420 adapters are currently not functioning.287

Four main electric power sources feed Al Hawtah: (i) Al Ahram Station (20 MW), (ii) Al Alyan Station (10 MW), (iii) The UAE Station (10 MW) and (iv) Aden.

Several challenges impede progress in Al Hawtah’s electricity sector. First, the Electricity stations and generators Al Hawtah relies on have surpassed their operational expiration date and there is a continued lack of supplies needed to maintain and repair them. Second, new investment initiatives that aim to deliver more electricity to rural communities have focused on expansion instead of generation. Third, severe fuel shortages curb powerplant performance.288 As recent as April 2020, both Beir Nasser and Al Abbas Stations were shut down due to a lack of diesel,289 further demonstrating how fuel shortages remain a critical issue.

Nightlights

Even as early as 2011, media reports had indicated that Al Hawtah frequently experienced total blackouts.290 The city remains without reliable access to the public grid and lacks the necessary fuel quantities to operate generators every day. More recently in 2020, media reports continue to highlight grievances in the city pointing to residents frequently complaining of prolonged power cuts.291 While satellite imagery might suggest that Al Hawtah appears to be a relatively ordinary city during the day, it is consumed by darkness at nightfall. The most significant negative change can be observed between 2012 and 2016. During that period, the decline of nighttime light in Lahj, Amran, Al Mahwit, Sana’a City, Dhahar, Ibb, Ad Dali’ has been greater than all other governorates.292

Figure 76: Electricity Supply in Al Hawtah.

| Source: Joint Analysis and Recovery Planning workshop, Key Informant discussions, March 2020. |  |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Al Ahram | 53% | Al Alyan | 28% | UAE Station | 22% | Aden | 16% |


288 According to participants in the Joint Analysis and Recovery Planning workshop, Key Informant discussions, March 2020.


Figure 77: Nightlight Change in Al Hawtah, UN-Habitat (2020).

Source: Earth Observation Group, NOAA National Centers for Environmental Information (2014-2019). Data processed by PNGK.
Lahj Electrical Substation – Al Hawtah

Figure 78: Photo of Damage to Al Abbas Generator.

All power that reaches Al Hawtah through the National Electric Grid is diverted to Lahj Electrical Substation first. Located south of the city, adjacent to the General Electricity Administration building on N1 Highway, the substation is the sole electricity provider in the city. This diesel-powered plant relies on fuel rations sent from Aden. Frequent disruptions in service are common owing to both the lack of diesel and the inflated prices when the fuel is available. Systematic interruptions in electricity have become a routine part of life in Al Hawtah.

In June 2019, local media reports began to emerge suggesting that the Al Hawtah District Government had rehabilitated a 20 MW station called “The Martyr Al Abbas Generator.”

Prior to this, chronic corruption and enduring conflict had all but destroyed Al Hawtah’s hopes to provide adequate electric power through its local transformers. Up to 2018, Al Abbas Station, which was entirely neglected, also doubled as a container depot where out of service generators were dumped. One of the transformers on site has been destroyed and appears to have been entirely engulfed in flames at some stage.

The three main transformers in Al Hawtah are operating at a critical deficit. Even if all structural conditions were improved and the grid was revamped, at least one other transformer (26 MW) would be needed to satisfy local demand.

By February 2020, citizens all over Lahj Governorate began publicly calling for local authorities to put an end to the 20-hour long power cuts and take serious efforts to restore electricity. They further accused local authorities of profiting off the diesel allocations the governorate receives through Aden. However, local authorities have attributed the lack of production to a shortage of diesel, a commodity usually bought from local gas stations or through the black-market.

Source: Joint Analysis and Recovery Planning workshop, Key Informant discussions, March 2020.

Figure 79: Capacity and Load of Al Hawtah’s Transformers, 2020.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transformer</th>
<th>Capacity (MW)</th>
<th>Current Load (MW)</th>
<th>Electricity Deficit (MW)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lahj Abbas</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beer Nasser</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabr</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>40</strong></td>
<td><strong>66</strong></td>
<td><strong>28</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Joint Analysis and Recovery Planning workshop, Key Informant discussions, March 2020.

Figure 80: Capacity and Production of Al Hawtah’s Electric Generators, 2020.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generator</th>
<th>Active Since</th>
<th>Capacity (MW)</th>
<th>Currently Producing (MW)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al Ahram</td>
<td>2019</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Alyan</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE Station</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2019</strong></td>
<td><strong>40</strong></td>
<td><strong>30</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Joint Analysis and Recovery Planning workshop, Key Informant discussions, March 2020.

295 AlYemen Al Arabi, “لحج... بدء تركيب محطة كهرباء بقدرة ميجاوات 20,” June 23, 2019, http://www.elyamnelara-by.com/399135/%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%AC-%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%A1-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%3%D9%8A%D8%A8-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%B7%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A9-%D8%B2-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A9-20-%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA (accessed March 18, 2020).
296 According to participants in the Joint Analysis and Recovery Planning workshop, Key Informant discussions, March 2020.
297 Ibid.
Al Hawtah
ENERGY AND ELECTRICITY

Figure 81: KI Energy Perceptions, 2020.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Energy Issues Requiring Immediate Attention, 2020</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First Reason</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damage to Electricity Infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unreliable or Intermittent Electricity Supply</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Reason</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damage to Electricity Infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unreliable or Intermittent Electricity Supply</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Reason</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inability to Maintain or Repair Electricity Infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Status of Energy Facilities, 2020

- Damaged
- Partially damaged
- Not Damaged

Status of Street Lights, 2020

- Damaged
- Partially damaged
- Not Damaged


Damage and Rehabilitation Costs

The damage incurred by way of conflict, as well as that sustained due to a lack of maintenance, is extensive. In 2017, the World Bank estimated that Lahj would require a low estimate of $4.75 million and a high estimate of $5.81 million.\(^{299}\)

Notably, looting has also contributed to the overall damage caused to power stations, electric grid and local electricity transformers. The International Energy Charter also estimated that $952,350 would cover the immediate costs of spare parts (and other material) needed to recover the operability of the distribution networks in the city.\(^{300}\)

According to KI respondents, notable damage to Al Hawtah’s electric grid and infrastructure can be seen throughout the city. Respondents indicated that unreliable electricity supply, damage to the electricity infrastructure and an inability to repair the grid were among the three most pressing concerns that required immediate attention. Additionally, the abundant damage to streetlights was also highlighted.\(^{301}\)

Source:


\(^{301}\) KI Survey, March 2020.
Summer Electricity Capacity in Al Hawtah

According to data gathered from the UN-Habitat Workshop in Aden in March 2020, the Ministry of Electricity and Energy anticipates that Al Hawtah will continue to experience power shortages in the summer of 2020 – averaging two to four hours of electricity for every two hours users are left without electricity. Since most of the power generation units rely on the availability of already depleted amounts of diesel, generators can run no longer than 18 hours a day at an efficiency of 50-70 percent.

Travel Time to Secure Fuel Needs

When fuels are available in the city, 57 percent of residents tend to spend 20 minutes or less, on average, to travel to the fuel depot and from the fuel depot and their place of residence with the fuel they need, whereas 24 percent take anywhere between 20 to 40 minutes.

Fuel Stations in Al Hawtah

Fuel stations in Al Hawtah receive stipulated fuel rations from the PEC form Al Buraika Refinery near Aden. The names of recipient fuel stations are usually published by authorities prior to delivery. Four main stations located on N1 Highway, just south of the city center, service the citizens of Al Hawtah:

- Teeba Gas Station
- Petrogas Sabr
- Al Hawtah Fuel Services Gas Station
- Ibn Khaldoon Gas Station

In January 2020, media reports stated that LC in Al Hawtah have tried to restore at least one gas station indicating that the District Authority has commissioned a renovation project to reopen another gas-station in the city to deter black-market trading. The latter station has been closed since 1994.

Solar Energy in Al Hawtah

The trade in batteries and solar panels has flourished in Lahj, and the demand for these commodities is increasing with the continued interruption of electricity. News reports suggest that residents prefer relying on solar panels instead of the public grid or generators. Most have grown accustomed to using rechargeable batteries instead of electric generators, especially since the latter comes with high maintenance and fuel cost.

The standard 200-amp battery would allow a user to illuminate some parts of a house and operate essential devices such as TV and an electric fan for nearly ten hours. While solar panels may provide an urgent alternative, the high cost of solar panels remains an obstacle.

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302 According to participants in the Joint Analysis and Recovery Planning workshop, Key Informant discussions, March 2020.
Liquid Petroleum Gas Usage in Al Hawtah

Al Hawtah suffers from a continued lack of domestic gas, with its prices rising sharply in gas stations, many residents have switched to firewood for cooking. Liquid petroleum gas (LPG) drums can be found at privately owned stations owned by local merchants, but public supply is not available on a continuous basis. According to the Emergency Food Security and Nutrition Assessment (EFSNA) conducted jointly by the World Food Program (WFP), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), UNICEF, and the Republic of Yemen: 45 percent of homes in Lahj rely on LPG powered stoves for cooking and 48.3 percent depend on firewood. While 63.3 percent depend on either public electricity/gas, a generator or solar panels for lighting. Whereas 36.4 percent rely exclusively on candlelight during the evening. However, more specific to Al Hawtah, by March 2020, reliance on the public grid had increased to over 90 percent and solar energy usage appears to be gaining favor in the city. Owing to several other conjoined factors, this increased reliance on the public grid services does not necessarily translate to an abundance in the local electricity supply. Indeed, availability had somewhat improved in recent years, but Al Hawtah continues to experience recurrent blackouts. KIs further underscored the deteriorating state of the public grid and indicated that the local population frequently relies on solar energy and energy storage batteries.

Collective Electrical Outages

Another challenge in Al Hawtah is the price of electricity, with monthly electric bills averaging around 2000 YER per month. This directly affects the District Government’s ability to pay salaries to employees operating local electric power stations. The local government has therefore begun enforcing collective-outage-penalties to compel consumers to pay. That often means that entire neighborhoods are reprimanded because some of their inhabitants failed to pay their monthly bills. Local authorities usually announce these penalty outages on social media first, which means that most residents who cannot access the internet or the electric grid to begin with, would not be able to see these announcements.

In December 2019, local media reports suggested that the Electricity Corporation and local security authorities in Al Hawtah began carrying out mass arrests targeting shop owners who had failed to pay their electricity bills. More than 40 shop owners were arrested on the pretext of accumulating their electricity debt. This infuriated the local community who protested what they referred to as “acts of extortion.”

Figure 85: Main Energy Source of Lighting in Lahj Governorate, 2017.


Figure 86: Main Energy Source for Cooking in Lahj Governorate, 2017.


Main Barriers to Meeting Energy Needs

Financial hardships ultimately prevent Al Hawtah’s residents from accessing energy products and services. Most residents in the city rely on the public grid despite the frequent interruptions in electricity. Nonetheless, several other types of barriers have emerged according to the CFP Survey where respondents confirmed that efforts to secure reliable energy sources are often obstructed by insufficient skills of service providers (77.8 percent), insufficient number of providers (59.5 percent) and a lack of service reliability (32.4 percent). 313

In Al Hawtah, the non-host community appears to face the most challenges in meeting their energy needs. The influx of IDPs has further strained the already limited supply of fuels. Further, according to the CFPs’ perceptions, more than 89 percent of respondents identified the non-host community as the most vulnerable to interruptions in energy commodities. 314

Figure 87: Barriers to meeting Energy Needs in Al Hawtah, 2020.

- Insufficient money to buy goods or services: 100%
- Insufficient skills and competencies of service providers: 77.8%
- Insufficient number of facilities and providers supplying the area: 59.5%
- Insufficient safety or reliability of provided goods or services: 32.4%
- Insufficient variety of goods and services: 18.9%
- Insufficient or unreliable quantity of goods and services: 8.11%
- Other: 8.11%


Figure 88: Population Facing the Biggest Challenges in Accessing Energy Commodities for Heating, Lights, Cooking and Heating, 2020.

- IDP: 35%
- Returnees: N/A
- Host community: 13.5%
- Non-Host community: 89.2%
- Refugees: N/A
- Migrants: N/A


314 Ibid.
Renewable Energy Success Stories

The World Bank Yemen Emergency Electricity Access Project supplied solar systems in hard-to-reach areas, in schools and HFs. The World Bank’s International Development Agency, in partnership with the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), is working with local providers with the objective to support hundreds of HFs across Yemen. Al Salam Hospital in Lahj Governorate had to close after the start of the war. It recently received new solar installations and is now able to receive patients again. Before the intervention, the lack of electricity prevented medical staff from providing vital health services, especially at night. The hospital could not admit patients for emergency and critical cases, child delivery, or obstructed labor cases. After receiving modern and efficient solar power systems, Al Salam Hospital now operates 24 hours a day, seven days a week. It has also recently opened a special wing for child delivery and newborn care services.315

In 2018, a project funded by the government of the Netherlands and implemented by the IOM installed a solar powered pumping system to extract water from a well at the Nasser College for Agricultural Sciences in Al Hawtah.316

According to the market assessment study conducted by the Regional Center for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency, commissioned by the World Bank, solar power systems have reached nearly 50 percent of homes in rural areas of Yemen and up to 75 percent in cities by November 2016. A survey conducted by the Percent Institute for Opinion Polls and Transparency in January 2017 reached a similar conclusion, where it was found that half of Yemenis enjoy some form of access to solar energy outside the unified network, where rates in some Governorates reach more than 80 percent.317

A 2019 UNDP assessment of solar energy consumption in Lahj found that 54 percent of schools were very satisfied with the solar solutions provided to them and 46 percent were satisfied, requesting bigger systems and more power to allow several applications to work at the same time.318


Solid Waste Management (SWM)

**Highlights**
- As of March 2019, 53 garbage dumpsites were present in Al Hawtah as of March 2019. Most HHs either leave their garbage in public areas or opt to burning/burying their garbage.
- According to KIs, 50 percent of the local population lives in areas where refuse is frequently visible.
- Despite SFD’s intervention in Al Hawtah City to support solid waste collection and disposal, in addition to all campaigns and efforts on part of the Cleanliness and Improvement Fund, much more support is still needed to establish a sustainable SWM system in Al Hawtah.
- Solid waste in is a leading source of air pollution in the city.

**Overview**
Solid waste services across Yemen have significantly deteriorated since the start of the conflict. Garbage collection services have declined, leading to the accumulation of garbage piles in the streets. The sector has also been affected by the lack of cleaning equipment, decreased numbers of workers and damage to facilities.

An annual report issued by the Administration of the Cleanliness and City Improvement Fund (CCIF) in Lahj Governorate stated that the cleanliness funds were established according to Republican Decree No. 20 of 1999, indicating that the tasks of the fund were limited to cleaning, agricultural, horticultural, urban improvement, and collecting fees determined by laws to cover the activities assigned to the fund. On the financial side, the report indicated that the Cleaning and Improvement Fund in Lahj Governorate received financial support from the Ministry of Finance during the past year (2018) amounting to 108,989,095 YER (equivalent to $435,348) to handle the fixed salaries of the number of the 174 workers. Reportedly, however, collection was very low due to the change in collection managers. The report also indicated that Al Hawtah has a shortage in the number of cleaners. As such, the Fund’s management proposed adding 55 cleaning workers during 2019 to be distributed around the city. However, informal settlements and heavy traffic around the city impeded cleaning mechanisms and efforts for the city to remove accumulated waste in the streets.

Reportedly, residents dispose of construction waste in landfills, which mixes with garbage and leads to difficulty in collecting waste. It has also been reported that there is a clear lack of coordination between residents and shop owners when discarding waste in suitable designated areas.

In January 2020, the President of the Chamber of Commerce and a member of the Board of Directors of the Cleaning and Improvement Fund in Lahj Governorate called for activating the administrative structure of the Cleaning Fund in accordance with the law and assigning the relevant departments with tasks.
Stakeholders and Legal Framework

Following the unification of Yemen in 1990, Solid Waste Management (SWM) fell under the oversight of several governmental entities. Conventionally, the Ministry of Housing and Municipalities (MHM) had been the agency responsible since its inception in the 1970s. After 1990, the MHM was renamed the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development (MoHHUD). In 1997, the administrative functions for SWM shifted to the Ministry of Public Works and Highways (MPWH). Then, in 1999, the CCIF, a public sector entity responsible for managing the financial aspects for SWM and city improvements, was established. The Public Cleansing Law (Law 39/1999) was passed the same year and a bylaw was drafted to provide detailed regulations for the Public Cleansing Law. Following the LAL of 2000, local authorities became responsible for waste collection and management, and in 2006, the responsibility for SWM came under the MoLA and the districts’ LCs.

The National Strategy for Solid Waste Management (NSSWM) tasked MoLA with the authority to reorganize and manage policy making, coordinate at the national level, as well as the supervision of the work of LCs in their own districts. In 2008, the General Directorate for Solid Waste Management was established within MoLA as the supervising agency in charge of implementing the legal framework, issuing national strategy and guidelines, coordinating with CIFs, and distributing government funds. The NSSWM also recognized the need to revise the Public Cleansing Law and bring it in line with the decentralization process to transfer authority to MoLA and LCs. However, the escalation of the conflict in Yemen after 2015 prevented implementation.

The CCIFs are managed by the Governorate council. According to the NSSWM, 83 percent of the capital investment for all CCIFs came from foreign donors, but also included monies allocated by the central government. Cabinet Decree 236 of 2000 specified that at least 60 percent of the fund must be used to finance SWM activities, while the remainder should be used to finance other projects, such as urban rehabilitation and beautification.

Infrastructure and Operational Capacity

According to the Statistical Yearbook 2017, there is no official dumpsite in Lahij Governorate. The nearest official landfill is found in the city of Aden, which has been there for more than 15 years. Waste is collected in trucks from Al Hawtah city, and then transported to Aden, where it is disposed of. The dumpsite belongs to the Aden’s CCIF and it is operated and maintained by the Landfill Department.

According to media reports, 53 garbage sites were present in Al Hawtah as of March 2019, some of which were turned into makeshift landfills by residents. Many residents have resorted to throwing garbage in the agricultural canals in the city, posing an environmental threat to the city of Al Hawtah and its residents. A campaign was launched by the Public Works Office in Lahij Governorate in cooperation with the Administration of the CCIF, to remove obstacles and informal settlements, and open crowded corridors in the city of Al Hawtah. Several cleaning campaigns have taken place throughout the year 2019. The Public Works Office has resorted to the use of force to collect cleaning fees from residents in the district of Tuban earlier in January 2019. Approximately 136,670 tons of solid waste are generated in Lahij Governorate annually (141,222 tons generated in 2017). Over 80 percent of it is produced in rural areas. Even though solid waste generation is higher in rural areas, however, as compared to its population, solid waste generation per capita is almost double in urban areas as compared to rural areas of Lahij Governorate in 2017.

A study conducted by Aden university in 2019 found that solid waste in Al Hawtah was the leading secondary source of air pollution. The city was estimated to have 38,636 inhabitants and daily waste generation was estimated at 0.35 kg per capita. The study concluded that Al Hawtah produced 447 tons of solid waste on a monthly basis. On average, 75 percent of this solid waste is burned in open areas. According to the Ministry of Local Administration, the waste is made up of 65 percent food waste, 10 percent plastics, 7 percent paper, 6 percent textile, 4 percent leather or rubber, 1 percent glass and 6 percent metal. Quantifying for Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions from solid waste management options from a life cycle perspective: 88 tons of CO2-eq/month are emitted in Al Hawtah. 333

**Population Needs**

Respondents to both the KI and CFP surveys underscored the accumulation of solid waste around the city, and further noted that 50 percent of the local population lives in areas where refuse is frequently visible. 334 The surveyed respondents also stressed that, on average, garbage is collected once every month in Al Hawtah. 335

According to a WASH Cluster and REACH assessment conducted in 2018, the overwhelming majority of HHs living in Tuban District (58 percent of Host Community HHs and 47 percent of IDP HHs) dispose of garbage by leaving it in public areas where it is not collected, while 29.5 percent of the host community and 45 percent of IDPs dispose of garbage by burning it. 336

**Humanitarian and Governmental Interventions**

As per the Yemen WASH Cluster Partners Presence Dashboard, the SFD is the one partner that is seen to provide the most support for solid waste collection and disposal in Al Hawtah City. The SFD is funded by United States Agency for International Development (USAID)-UNDP and since May 2019, they have provided support to 1600 beneficiaries. 337

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336 WASH Cluster Yemen and REACH, Yemen WASH Cluster Assessment Dashboard. Available at: https://reach-info.org/yem/

337 WASH Cluster Yemen, Partners Presence Dashboard. Available at: https://app.powerbi.com/view?r=euyJrjio-iNy32Gt2MVU2nZkwYSU0M2RJLTk00WEtHziHy72M-Z2Hz1O2kK4IwldG16mY7Z2jcW2FjLTjht/lmOzFC0NTlJhLTQyYj2TBjMTkNy5iM9OjFC9 (accessed January 16, 2020).
Transportation

Highlights

- As of 2018, over half of all roads in Al Hawtah city sustained notable damage and are in need of rehabilitation.
- As reported by almost all of CFPs, the main barrier to meeting transportation needs is insufficient money to pay for transportation services. This is followed by the insufficient or unreliable quantity of services available locally, and insufficient skills and competencies of service providers.
- Urban HHs reportedly allocate a large part of their income towards covering transportation costs, with some HHs spending as much as 20 percent-30 percent of their income.

Overview

Al Hawtah is located on the Aden–Ta’iz national highway corridor (N1), 30 kilometers from Aden and 337 km to the southwest of Sana’a. Lahj Governorate borders the five Governorates Aden, Ta’iz, Ad Dali’, Al Bayda and Abyan, and holds its strategic importance as a doorway between the south and north of Yemen.

Following the start of the conflict, the city sustained heavy damage to various infrastructure assets, including transport infrastructure. Checkpoints and roadblocks were also reported at various stages, further limiting mobility among the population.

Stakeholders and Legal Framework

The two main governmental authorities responsible for managing the transportation sector are the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and the Ministry of Transport (MoT). The former is responsible for inspecting and licensing vehicles and services while the latter sets policy and manages airport and port facilities. In addition, the MPWH supervises the overall road infrastructure, including development and maintenance. Its role, however, is restricted to the network of rural roads. The Land Transport Law was introduced on 30 March 2003 to provide the regulatory framework for land transportation. Prior to this, land transportation services were provided through two syndicates in the Governorate (passenger and freight transport), for which companies had to register through a lengthy and expensive process. The new law sets guidelines for private companies on passenger and trucking transportation services:

- Trucking companies: the law specifies the possession of a minimum of 10 trucks, not more than two years old and a limited amount of 250 heavy trucks, 400 medium trucks or 300 light trucks per company. The MoT awards only one-year renewable licenses based on the information each company is required to submit, which includes policies, regulations and contracts among others. The law also allows companies to submit bank guarantees in lieu of registration fees. This led to a reduction of freight rates by 40 percent a year.

- Passenger transportation services: companies should own no less than 10 buses and have a number of passenger stations in various city points. All public bus companies in Yemen are private, apart from the state-owned Local Transport Corporation.

The law has never been fully enforced, mostly because of financial and technical issues but also because of absence in human resources capacity. For instance, while in theory the law requires all transportation vehicles to be examined, in practice many vehicles are considered unfit despite being in service. Further regulations were introduced in 2004 that deal with cargo and trucks freight transport, passenger (bus) transport, and car rentals.


341 Ibid.
Infrastructure and Operational Capacity

Following the peripheral expansion of the city towards the east and west, parts of the paved roads have been extended to meet the demand of the local population. However, the expansion to the west can pose a safety concern because it leads to frequent traffic congestion, since residents have to cross the highway corridor (N1) to reach the western neighborhoods.

The road sector has sustained widespread damage, including to major road links and bridges. In 2017, at the governorate level, there were approximately 605.5 km of asphalt roads (3.5 percent). As of 2018, over half of the intra-city roads in Al Hawtah reportedly sustained damage. This impacts mobility of the population and reduces access to various services, such as markets, HFs and schools. In terms of functionality, according to the KIs, the main and secondary roads in Al Hawtah are partially working, while in Tuban they are fully working.

Figure 92: Damage Status of the Intra-Urban Roads in Al Hawtah, 2018

Transport and Mobility

While there is no official city-level data on vehicle ownership, at a governorate level, the number of public (8,582) and private vehicles (9,899) is almost equal, followed by a smaller share of taxis (2,729). In addition, there were 1,483 motorbike plates issued between 2004 and 2017.

Figure 93: Number of Vehicles by Plate Number Issued in Lahj Governorate, 1996-2017.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>9,899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Transport</td>
<td>8,582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxi</td>
<td>2,729</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


However, usage of motorized vehicles within the old town neighborhood is problematic, as most build-up is informal with narrow streets. Consequently, most of the trips are made by walking, at least to cover part of the distance. Therefore, most of the transportation means are used to connect the periphery neighborhoods with the city center. For inter-city journeys, bus and minibus service, as well as shared taxis are available to Aden, Al What, Al Anad, and Al Habilain.

Population Needs

Overall, almost 80 percent of CFPs stated that transportation services are not readily available in the city. In fact, 70 percent of CFPs reported that most HHs either barely meet this need or are unable to meet this need at all. Only 16 percent of CFPs perceive this need to be either largely or fully met in most HHs, while the remaining 14 percent stated that this is not applicable. The main barrier, as reported by almost all CFPs (97 percent) is insufficient money to pay for transportation services. This is followed by the insufficient or unreliable quantity of services available locally, and the insufficient skills and competencies of service providers, which were reported by almost two-thirds of the CFPs.

346 Ibid.
**Figure 94: Main Barriers to Transportation Services, CFP Perceptions, 2020.**

Urban HHs reportedly spend a large part of their income on transportation costs, with some HHs spending as much as 20-30 percent. While many residents commute to their workplaces outside of the city, primarily to the surrounding farmlands and to Aden, the bus service operates on the main highway (N1), providing no coverage in neighborhood roads, which increases dependency on other transport modes, as well as the overall cost of the journey. By the end of 2015, the price of fuel had spiked from 158 YER/liter to 403.75 YER/liter, this volatility continued well into 2018 when the price reached 553.75/liter by October.

The majority of CFPs (86 percent) reported that the non-host community faces more barriers to meeting their transportation needs.

**Figure 95: Population Groups Facing the Biggest Challenges Related to Transportation Services in Al Hawtah city, 2020.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population Group</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Host community</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host community</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


---


**Figure 96: Petrol Prices in Al Hawtah, 2015-2020.**

Source: WFP, Yemen-Food Prices Database. Available at: https://data.humdata.org/dataset/wfp-food-prices-for-yemen.
Communications

Highlights

- Approximately 15 percent of CFPs stated that communication services (providers, towers, network, etc.) are not readily available. KI data specifies that both the internet and mobile network connection are currently not available to the population in Al Hawtah city. There is one mobile tower in Al Hawtah city which is supposed to provide network coverage; the tower is partially functioning.

- KI data stipulates that the most serious accessibility problems faced by the population in terms communication accessibility are that the network coverage is unavailable or bad, high tariffs, and bad customer services.

- Availability of communication commodities (phone, credit, etc.) does not appear to be a major problem in Al Hawtah city; only 3 percent of respondents stated these items are not readily available.

- The non-host community is the population group which faces most challenges in satisfying their needs when it comes to both communication services and commodities, according to approximate 90 percent of CFP respondents. Additionally, an approximate 35 percent of CFP respondents state that IDPs face the same issues.

- In terms of travel time to reach communication service providers, services, and supplies, the majority of CFP respondents stated residents travel less than 20 minutes. However, 25 percent of respondents stated Al Hawtah city’s population has to travel between 20 and 40 minutes whereas an approximate 20 percent of respondents reported the population has to travel more than 40 minutes to reach communication service providers, services, and supplies.

Overview

Across Yemen, the number of subscribers to mobile and internet networks has been steadily increasing over the past 15 years. Prior to 2015, almost 90 percent of the population in Yemen were connected to mobile networks. The number of these subscriptions increased from 3 million in 2006 to a peak of 18.36 million in December 2015.\(^\text{352}\) Thereafter, there was a sharp decline by 4 percent at the end of the year and the numbers remained relatively steady at 16 million subscriptions in 2016.\(^\text{353}\)

The telecom sector underwent considerable reform prior to the escalation of the conflict. This included new legislation, a restructuring of the Ministry of Telecommunications and Information Technology (MTIT), and the establishment of a regulatory body monitoring the network.\(^\text{354}\)

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353 Ibid.

Rapid City Profile

Infrastructure and Operational Capacity

Prior to the conflict, there were 13,000 km of fiber optic across Yemen that connected to the international submarine fiber in Aden, Al Mukalla and Al Hodeidah. Although the level of structural damage is unknown, most of the fiber network in Yemen runs above ground. This increases its vulnerability and likelihood to interruptions. The telecommunications infrastructure is mostly located in Sana’a. According to media reports, the government was exploring ways to launch new telecommunication projects in Aden to enhance its autonomy from Sana’a. The domestic network is comprised of microwave radio relay, cables and tropospheric scatter. According to KI data, there are limited communication facilities in Al Hawtah city. Limited available facilities include an information and communications technology station which is partially functioning, an information and communication technology facility which is partially functioning, and one mobile tower which is supposed to provide network coverage which is partially functioning.

Figure 98: Total Number of Communication Facilities and Their Functionality, Al Hawtah, 2020.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facility Type</th>
<th>Fully functioning</th>
<th>Partially functioning</th>
<th>Not functioning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ICT Station</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT Facility</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT Tower</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


According to CSO data, by 2017 there were 30,997 fixed telephone operating lines in Lahij Governorate. In 2016, this number was 32,944, and in 2015, there were 32,629 operating lines. Furthermore, the governorate has 4 internet cafes (only in urban areas) and 286 call centers; the same numbers were reported for 2015 – 2017. In addition to the limited number of internet cafes, costs are a big factor limiting internet usage. In 2012, it was estimated that two hours of accessing the internet via a phone network cost about 1,200 YER (approximately $4.80). Most of the population cannot afford regular internet access at home.


Service Providers

There are two mobile phone operators in Al Hawtah: Sabafon and MTN Yemen. Sabafon, Yemen’s first Global System for Mobile communication (GSM) cell phone network, was founded by prominent tribal leader and businessman Hamid Alahmar, whose father helped establish Al Islah. Yemen Mobile, a state-owned operator, and Y-Telecom (HiTS Unite) do not provide services in Lahj Governorate, including Al Hawtah city.

Figure 99: Travel Time to Access Communication Services and Supplies in Al Hawtah city, 2020.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Travel Time</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 20 minutes</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-40 minutes</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 40 minutes</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do Not Know</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Figure 100: Network Coverage in Al Hawtah vs Surrounding Areas, 2019.

Source: GSMA, Network Coverage Maps. Available at: https://www.gsma.com/coverage/.

In terms of travel time to reach communication service providers and supplies, the majority of CFP respondents stated Al Hawtah city’s residents travels less than 20 minutes. However, nearly 25 percent of respondents stated the city’s population has to travel between 20 and 40 minutes whereas an approximate 20 percent of respondents reported the population has to travel more than 40 minutes to reach communication service providers, services, and supplies.

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Population Needs

Reliable and secure telecommunications and internet services are vital, but significantly disrupted in Yemen. While a complete picture of damage to the telecommunications infrastructure is not available, mobile towers are often deliberately targeted, maintenance is dangerous to staff (which have often been withdrawn due to the conflict), and a scarcity of telecommunications equipment (including charging stations) as well as limited internet access is reported, especially in more rural areas.361 According to the participants from the Joint Analysis and Recovery Planning workshop, the network is worn out and needs to be rehabilitated. Though a minimum level of maintenance is carried out, it has not had any updates or larger repairs since it entered into service.

KI data specifies that both the internet and mobile network connection are currently not available to the population in Al Hawtah city. KI data further stipulates that the most serious problems faced by the population in terms of access to communication are that the network coverage is unavailable or bad, high tariffs, and bad customer services.362 An approximate 3 percent of CFP respondents stated that communication commodities (phone, credit, etc.) are not readily available. All CFP respondents stated communication services and supplies are purchased by the population; none of the respondents stated they rely on family and friends or the provision of humanitarian aid to obtain their communication items. According to CFP respondents, approximately 75 percent of the adult population in Al Hawtah city has a working mobile phone and an approximate 15 percent of the adult population has an internet connection at home.363 In Al Hawtah city, 13.5 percent of CFP respondents stated that communication services (providers, towers, network, etc.) are not readily available.364

KI respondents to the March 2020 survey stated that while customer services in Al Hawtah is relatively better than the surrounding Tuban area, and tariffs are lower, network coverage in Al Hawtah continues to be unreliable.365

**Figure 101: The Most Serious Issues Related to Accessing Communication Services in Al Hawtah city, 2020.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tuban</th>
<th>Al Hawtah</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Network coverage is</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unavailable or bad</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High tariffs</td>
<td></td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad customer service</td>
<td></td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


According to 89.2 percent of CFP respondents, the non-host community faces challenges in satisfying their needs in Al Hawtah city. Additionally, 35.1 percent of respondents reported that IDPs face the same issues, and 13.5 percent of CFP respondents state the same for the host community. CFP communication data for returnees, refugees, and migrants is not available.

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364 Ibid.
ANNEXES
Al Hawtah Analysis of City Recovery Needs

Strategic priorities

**Housing**
1. Improve urban growth management and integrate recent growth with the existing city.

**Economy**
2. Remove barriers for economic growth to investment in infrastructure.

**Services**
3. Health and education services.

**Environment**
4. Green and healthy Al Hawtah by focusing on water, sewage and waste networks.

**Heritage**
5. Develop a heritage conservation plan with focus on the old city.

**Social Cohesion and Governance**
6. Strengthen efficient and transparent governance processes
1. **Cope with extensive damages to houses and improve urban growth management**

Pre-conflict Al Hawtah was growing at a rate of approximately 2.5 percent per year\(^{366}\), compared to a national average of 4.1 percent.\(^{367}\) Recently, however, internal migration as a result of the conflict has led to an influx of IDPs which resulted in pressure on the host community, both in the surrounding villages and the city itself, where IDPs comprise almost 10 percent of the population, as per HNO 2019. Most of the IDPs are residing in rented accommodations, which has reduced rental unit availability and led to rising rents, pushing some stranded families to squat in public buildings or other facilities such as damaged schools.

The vast majority of settlements in the Governorate are rural, which makes controlling the expansion of informal and unplanned built-up fabric in this context challenging but urgent. Developments usually take the shape of encroachments on agricultural land or on streets in unsafe, ramshackle constructions. Furthermore, a succession of conflicts as well as floods have led to damages to many of the city’s mud-brick houses.

---

**Figure 103:** Damage Assessment in Al Hawtah, UN-Habitat (2020).


**Note:** About 285 damaged structures (97 destroyed, 156 severe, 219 moderate) can be observed with satellite imagery analysis. Since most of the damage on the ground is partial damage, this visual is likely to be a gross underestimation of the actual amount of damaged buildings.

Some actions that can be implemented to improve the housing conditions within Al Hawah could include:

- Focusing on housing rehabilitation to upgrade damaged houses to a minimum acceptable standard.
- Enforcing growth boundaries around environmentally sensitive areas, in particular wadis and agricultural lands.
- Defining serviced extension areas with clear road reserves to cope with potential new arrivals for IDPs.
- Considering a multi-polar growth modal by increasing the level of service provision in these villages and providing incentives for village communities to host IDPs in order to alleviate the pressure on services in the city center and decrease travel times.
- Defining pathways for IDPs to achieve a degree of certainty of tenure across the city.
2. **Investing in road and electricity networks to accelerate economic recovery.**

Economic recovery is the basis for improving self-reliance among the affected population and necessary to reduce unemployment. Even though the current political situation, including fiscal and monetary policies, will continue to be major impediments to economic recovery, there are also several other barriers. Some relate partly to the infrastructure networks:

2.1 **Restore the public electricity network**

Energy provision in Al Hawtah is a challenging issue. The Electricity Directorate states that the damages caused by the conflict and lack of maintenance heavily impacted an already deteriorated infrastructure. Cuts in electricity provision, which can extend to 20-hours at a time, are one of the main challenges for the health sector and for the adequate operation of water pumps. The local energy directorate envisions a tripling of the current capacity, from 35MW to 100MW through a combination of an additional station, a solar station at the Beir Nasser area and a wind farm at the Great Wadi. Even though this goal may seem ambitious in the current circumstances, it is clear that improved energy generation should be a priority to improve quality of life for Al Hawtah’s residents. Other important measures should include reducing dependence on fuel-based electricity generating modalities to guard against oil-price fluctuations and the value of the YER as well as a reduction of transmission losses through rehabilitation of the network and transformers, which is estimated by the Electricity Directorate to cost about 10 million Dollars.

The current lack of electricity is also negatively impacting (existing and potential) local business and industry. Very significant drops in nighttime can be observed in particular in the city center, up to 40 percent, compared to pre-conflict levels. This suggests a chronic deterioration of the public provision of electricity, and by proxy indicates a significant decline in economic activity in these areas.

2.2 **Expand the road and public transport to improve urban-rural linkages.**

The road network in Al Hawtah was already poorly developed before the conflict. Expansions on the eastern and western side of the N1, the national transport backbone that connects Aden to Sana’a and crosses Al Hawtah from north to south, leads to congestion at the crossings of the N1. The conflict has somewhat impacted the road network: 32 impact craters on roads were found through remote sensing, but roads are reported to have sustained damage from other causes too, such as seasonal or extraordinary flooding.

There is potential here in strengthening the infrastructural connections between Al Hawtah city and its surrounding villages to improve urban-rural linkages, to improve access for agricultural workers, farmers, food distributors and retailers. For some families, daily commuting costs can reach up to a third of family incomes. Options here include the expansion of minibus services, which currently operates only on the main highway, connecting Al Hawtah to other cities like Aden and Al What, as well as asphalting of existing road connections.

3. **Health and education sector rehabilitation**

HFs in Lahj Governorate sustained damages during the conflict. Even though 75 percent of the facilities are operative, hospitals, health centers and health units suffer a lack of specialized staff and adequate equipment, making Lahj Governorate and Al Hawtah city dependent on support from the international community. In order to increase the autonomy in the health sector, Al Hawtah should invest in vocational training and capacity building. Some of the more immediate actions that could be taken in Al Hawtah include, but are not limited to:

- Equipping HFs with diagnostic medical devices to meet therapeutic requirements and providing them with qualified personnel.
- Promotion and development of health services in schools.
- Increasing preparedness for possible spread of infectious diseases, such as COVID-19 or other respiratory infections.

*Figure 104: Centralized Test Administration Building in Al Hawtah.*
4. Improve local water supply and management capabilities.

Al Hawtah and the surrounding villages mainly rely on agricultural areas lying on a plain situated between two wadis. Due to the natural topography, even light rain events can trigger floods. Houses in Lahj Governorate are traditionally built using mud bricks which require regular maintenance. These homes are vulnerable to flooding and the elements. A study in upstream flood diversion mechanisms should be considered to prevent future harm to the city.

About a third of IDPs have enough water to cover their needs, and the quality of water supplied through the network is generally poor. This suggests that even though two UN agencies are supporting the local government with WASH related activities, additional rehabilitation of the water supply networks is required. This includes the main water management office building (located in Al Hawtah), warehouses, reservoirs, pumping station and the citywide system of wells.

5. Develop a heritage conservation plan with a focus on the protection of mud-houses and monuments.

Al Hawtah’s heritage is characterized by a wide variety of buildings typology. It is home to 23 mosques and numerous old water wells, all of them representing a unique artifact that blends Yemeni and East Asian architecture. Al Hawtah also hosts important palaces of the Abdali Sultanate and shrines. In total, there are more than 180 locations with a relevant cultural/heritage importance in Lahj Governorate, but the Heritage Directorate does not currently have an office in the area. This is also due to the fact that the Ministry cannot provide the Directorate with the necessary operational budget, which represents yet another obstacle for the employment of young generations of tourism and heritage professionals. Furthermore, local officials have expressed the desire to submit Al Hawtah town to UNESCO, in hope of designating it a world heritage site.

Immediate actions that should be undertaken include:

- The rehabilitation and relocation of offices and warehouses for the Heritage Directorate;
- Heritage surveys assessing weathering and conflict damages to buildings to serve as a baseline for requests for additional allocation of funds for recovery, restoration and storage of heritage sites and antiquities.
The team identified multiple areas to assess within the city of Al Hawtah based on verifying satellite imageries from UNOSAT (2019) and Digital Globe (May 2020) for 141 buildings, in addition to real pictures (March and April 2020). After that, iMMAP GIS unit triangulated data from different sources, compiled GPS coordinates and analyzed it as shown on the map below:

*Figure 105: Assessed Locations to Verify Damages*
Although the past two years were calmer than the binging of the escalation in 2015, yet Lahj governorate witness fierce fighting due to its strategic location and proximity to Aden. Around 300 Armed clashes incidents (out of 1,843 nationwide) were reported in Lahj since the escalation of the conflict\textsuperscript{368}. Evidence of widespread destruction in residential areas, which is heavily populated, and widescale infrastructure damage is visible via Satellite imageries.

Damaged buildings appear to be scattered throughout the city. This can be attributed to the fact that major fighting on the ground follows no clear pattern, in addition to the urban nature of the city where informal settlements are spread, and houses are built of mud bricks.

The asset verification in the city center are unlike evidence captured in satellite images and field images; the situation is much worse on the ground. However, it is not accurately captured in the other areas due to accessibility issues.

In conclusion, satellite imagery can be relied on in rapid asset verification, especially when assessing damage on a large scale as a substitute for field assessments. The latter may be difficult to conduct in battlefield areas such as Al Hodeidah during periods of armed conflict and political tensions.
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